

THE JOURNAL OF MILITARY HISTORY:

Vol.59 (1995) to Vol.86 (2022)

Compiled by Paul V. Walsh

This index is divided into three sections. The first section lists articles by volume and issue (pages 1-130). The second section lists articles by subject (pages 131-672). The final section lists articles alphabetically by author (pages 673-794). Online access to these articles may be found at:

PART I: ARTICLES LISTED BY VOLUME / ISSUE

Vol.59, No.1 (January, 1995)

Janda, Lance, **“Shutting the Gates of Mercy: The American Origins of Total War, 1860-1880.”** Vol.59, No.1 (January, 1995), pp.7-26. Links the evolution of ‘total war’ with the nature of armed conflict during the U.S. Civil War through to the late nineteenth century campaigns against the Native American tribes.

Bittner, Donald F. **“Shattering Images: Officers of the Royal Marines, 1867-1913.”** Vol.59, No.1 (January, 1995), pp.27-52. Demonstrates that Great Britain’s Royal Marines provided members of the middle class with the opportunity to earn a commission.

Corum, James S. **“The Luftwaffe’s Army Support Doctrine, 1918-1941.”** Vol.59, No.1 (January, 1995), pp.53-76. Covers close air support doctrine and training, development and implementation, from the Spanish Civil War to Operation Barbarossa.

Ganz, A. Harding, **“Questionable Objective: The Brittany Ports, 1944.”** Vol.59, No.1 (January, 1995), pp.77-96.

Lofgren, Stephen J. (ed.) **“Diary of First Lieutenant Sugihara Kinrū: Iwo Jima, January-February 1945.”** Vol.59, No.1 (January, 1995), pp.97-134. Served in the 11th Antitank Battalion which was manned by reservists from Hiroshima and Shimane prefectures.

Deutsch, Harold C. **“The Matter of Records.”** Vol.59, No.1 (January, 1995), pp.135-142. Concerning the reliability of official documents, including both sins of commission and omission.

Vol.59, No.2 (April, 1995)

Wirtschafter, Elise Kimerling, **“Social Misfits: Veterans and Soldier’s Families in Servile Russia [1682-1874].”** Vol.59, No.2 (April, 1995), pp.215-235. Endeavors to understand the relationship between military service and social categories in Imperial Russia, beginning with the reign of Peter the Great in 1682 up to the introduction of universal conscription in 1874.

Skaggs, David Curtis, **“Aiming at the Truth: James Fenimore Cooper and the Battle of Lake Erie.”** Vol.59, No.2 (April, 1995), pp.237-255. Disentangles the disputed account of the Battle of Lake Erie, 10 September, 1813, written by Cooper (1789-1851) in his *History of the Navy of the United States* (1839).

Hughes, Daniel J. **“Schlichting, Schlieffen, and the Prussian Theory of War in 1914.”** Vol.59, No.2 (April, 1995), pp.257-277. Reviews the work of the controversial and influential Prussian Army theorist and critic of Alfred von Schlieffen, General Sigismund von Schlichting (1829-1909).

Ponichtera, Robert M. **“The Military Thought of Wladyslaw Sikorski.”** Vol.59, No.2 (April, 1995), pp.279-301. Offers a description of Sikorski’ (1881-1943) pursuit of political goals through the promotion of Polish military strength throughout his career, from within the Austro-Hungarian Empire to the leadership of the Polish state in exile.

Meixsel, Richard B. **“Major General George Grunert, WPO-3, and the Philippine Army, 1940-1941.”** Vol.59, No.2 (April, 1995), pp.303-324. Challenges the conventional account of the initial abandonment of War Plan Orange – 3 by the Commanding General of the Philippine Department, General Grunert (1881-1971), and Philippine Army Field Marshal, Douglas MacArthur (1880-1964).

Vol.59, No.3 (July, 1995)

Wawro, Geoffrey, **“An ‘Army of Pigs’: The technical, Social, and Political Basis of Austrian Shock Tactics, 1859-1866.”** Vol.59, No.3 (July, 1995), pp.407-433. Contends that, like the French after 1871, the Austrian Army responded to their defeat in the Second Italian War of Unification, 1859, by a commitment to aggressive shock tactics.

Pope, Steven W. **“An Army of Athletes: Playing Fields, Battlefields, and the American Military Sporting Experience, 1890-1920.”** Vol.59, No.3 (July, 1995), pp.435-456. Looks at the efforts of a reformist generation of officers, who were committed to their soldiers’ welfare, to utilize athletics and sports as a means of combatting desertion and vice, which contributed to a transformation in the public image of both sports and the Army.

Laurie, Clayton D. **“‘The Chanting of Crusaders’: Captain Heber Blankenhorn and A.E.F. Combat Propaganda in World War I.”** Vol.59, No.3 (July, 1995), pp.457-481.

Vance, Jonathan F. **“Men in Manacles: The Shackling of Prisoners of War, 1942-1943.”** Vol.59, No.3 (July, 1995), pp.483-504. Appraises the wartime relationship of the Dominion nations with Great Britain as reflected in the success of Canadian Prime Minister Mackenzie King’s (1874-1950) government in convincing Churchill (1874-1965) to abandon the retaliatory shackling of German P.O.W.s.

Leary, William M. **“The C.I.A. and the ‘Secret War’ in Laos: The Battle for Skyline Ridge, 1971-1971.”** Vol.59, No.3 (July, 1995), pp.505-517. Narrates an all-but-forgotten victory of a force of Hmong, Lao, and Thai defenders against the North Vietnamese Army.

Vol.59, No.4 (October, 1995)

Ripperger, Robert M. **“The Development of the French Artillery for the Offensive, 1890-1914.”** Vol.59, No.4 (October, 1995), pp.599-618. Advances the proposition that the French Army’s embrace of *offensive à l’outrance* produced strategies and tactics in which there was little room for heavy artillery.

Tetsuro Sumida, Jon, **“Sir John Fisher and the Dreadnought: The Sources of Naval Mythology.”** Vol.59, No.4 (October, 1995), pp.619-637.

Lambert, Nicholas A. **“Admiral Sir John Fisher and the Concept of Flotilla Defence, 1904-1909.”** Vol.59, No.4 (October, 1995), pp.639-660. Asks whether Admiral Fisher’s (1841-1920) embracing of a submarine and flotilla strategy represented an abandonment of the Mahanian approach to winning control of the seas through victory in a decisive clash between battle fleets.

Holizimmer, Kevin C. **“Walter Krueger, Douglas MacArthur, and the Pacific War: The Wakde-Sarmi Campaign as a Case Study.”** Vol.59, No.4 (October, 1995), pp.661-685. Uses the Wakde-Sarmi operation in Northern New Guinea, 17-21 May, 1944, to demonstrate that General Krueger’s (1881-1967) performance as a commander has to be judged within the context of circumstances beyond anyone’s control.

Foregger, Richard, **“Two Sketch Maps of the Auschwitz-Birkenau Extermination Camps.”** Vol.59, No.4 (October, 1995), pp.687-696. Asks whether or not the sketch maps in question would have provided the Allies with adequate information for the bombing of gas chambers.

Sullivan, Brian R. **“Review Essay: Fascist Italy’s Military Involvement in the Spanish Civil War.”** Vol.59, No.4 (October, 1995), pp.697-727. Surveys the existing literature concerning Benito Mussolini’s (1883-1945) commitment some 70,000 soldiers of the *Corpo Truppe Volontarie* and over 700 warplanes of the *Aviazione Legionaria* to the Nationalist cause, including the publications of official histories.

Vol.60, No.1 (January, 1996)

Williams, William J. **“Josephus Daniels and the U.S. Navy’s Shipbuilding Program During World**

War I.” Vol.60, No.1 (January, 1996), pp.7-38. Observes how Daniels (1862-1948), with no naval or maritime background, applied himself conscientiously to shifting the Navy’s building program from capitol ships to destroyers designed to address the U-Boat threat.

Hancock, Eleanor, **“Ernst Rohm and the Experience of World War I.”** Vol.60, No.1 (January, 1996), pp.39-60. Inspects the role of the Great War service in the political rhetoric of the Chief of Staff of the National Socialist Sturmabteilung, including Rohm’s version of his war experiences as recounted in his 1928 autobiography.

Bell, Christopher M. **“ ‘Our Most Exposed Outpost’: Hong Kong and British Far Eastern Strategy, 1921-1941.”** Vol.60, No.1 (January, 1996), pp.61-88. Brings to light the vital, if overlooked role of Hong Kong as a base for offensive operations in British interwar plans for a war with Japan has been.

Kimball, Warren F. **“Stalingrad: A Chance for Choices.”** Vol.60, No.1 (January, 1996), pp.89-114. Delves into the significance of the Battle of Stalingrad for United States foreign policy.

Glantz, David M. **“Soviet Military Strategy during the Second Period of War (November 1942 – December 1943): A Reappraisal.”** Vol.60, No.1 (January, 1996), pp.115-150. Seeks to clarify the broader strategic context of the goals the Soviets sought, but failed, to achieve during the ‘Second Period of the Great Patriotic War.’

Vol.60, No.2 (April, 1996)

Shulimson, Jack, **“Military Professionalism: The Case of the U.S. Marine Officer Corps, 1880-1898.”** Vol.60, No.2 (April, 1996), pp.231-242. Views the transformation of the officer corps of the Marines into a professional body as part of the late nineteenth century, society wide ‘organizational revolution.’

Meilinger, Phillip, **“Trenchard and ‘Morale Bombing’: The Evolution of Royal Air Force Doctrine before World War II.”** Vol.60, No.2 (April, 1996), pp.243-270. Deals with the inexact blend of the intended goals of the R.A.F.’s interwar strategic bombing doctrine: breaking the will of the enemy and / or breaking the enemy’s economy.

Dickson, Paul D. **“The Politics of Army Expansion: General H.D.G. Crerar and the Creation of the First Canadian Army, 1940-41.”** Vol.60, No.2 (April, 1996), pp.271-298. Explains that General Henry Duncan Graham Crerar’s (1888-1965) success in winning approval for raising and deploying a Field Army represented an aberration in the balance of Canadian civil-military relations and illustrates aspects of Canadian military and its impact on the war.

Grandstaff, Mark R. **“Making the Military American: Advertising, Reform, and the Demise of an Antistanding Military Tradition, 1945-1955.”** Vol.60, No.2 (April, 1996), pp.299-323. Establishes that, while concerns over the spread of communism and nuclear war played a role, both reforms within

the military and a national public relations campaign also helped citizens view the armed forces as an acceptable American institution.

Skelton, William B. **“Samuel P. Huntington and the Roots of the American Military Tradition.”** Vol.60, No.2 (April, 1996), pp.325-338.

Van De Mark, Brian, **“Review Essay: Thinking about the Vietnam War.”** Vol.60, No.2 (April, 1996), pp.339-357. Although the majority of the seven books reviewed are from the perspective of the involvement of the United States, including one on the anti-war movement and two works on the Johnson administration, 1963-1969, there is a memoir from a rural woman living in South Vietnam and a comparative work about the reaction of academics to the wars in Algeria and Vietnam.

Vol.60, No.3 (July, 1996)

Santosuosso, Antonio, **“Kadesh Revisited: Reconstructing the Battle between the Egyptians and the Hittites [1274 B.C.E.].”** Vol.60, No.3 (July, 1996), pp.423-444.

Kopperman, Paul E. **“‘The Cheapest Pay’: Alcohol Abuse in the Eighteenth-Century British Army.”** Vol.60, No.3 (July, 1996), pp.445-470. Analyzes the unwillingness of officers to confront what was generally agreed to be a significant problem due to conflicting medical opinion and the utility of control over government supplied alcohol.

Echevarria, Antulio, **“General Staff Historian Hugo Freiherr von Freytag-Loringhoven and the Dialectics of German Military Thought.”** Vol.60, No.3 (July, 1996), pp.471-494. Von Freytag-Loringhoven (1855-1924) was arguably the most prolific of Imperial Germany’s military authors and, notably, a historian of the Great General Staff, whose opposition to change served as an antithesis that forced his critics to justify and further develop their ideas.

Van Courtland Moon, John Ellis, **“United States Chemical Warfare Policy in World War II: A Captive of Coalition Policy?”** Vol.60, No.3 (July, 1996), pp.495-511.

Jablon, Howard, **“General David M. Shoup, U.S.M.C.: Warrior and War Protester.”** Vol.60, No.3 (July, 1996), pp.513-538. Claims that the same hard-headed pragmatism that made General Shoup (1904-1983) a reliable Marine Corps officer led him to conclude that U.S. involvement in Vietnam was ultimately a pointless waste of American lives.

Vol.60, No.4 (October, 1996)

Oyos, Matthew M. **“Theodore Roosevelt and the Implements of War.”** Vol.60, No.4 (October, 1996), pp.631-655. Brings to light an overlooked aspect of Roosevelt’s presidency (1901-1909), his role in

accelerating the pace of military technological modernization, including involvement with battleships, submarines, aircraft, and machine guns.

Overlack, Peter, **“The Force of Circumstances: Graf Spee’s Options for the East Asian Cruiser Squadron in 1914.”** Vol.60, No.4 (October, 1996), pp.657-682. Investigates how the denial of coaling stations by both Japan’s decision to join the Entente Powers and the actions of Australia and New Zealand severely constricted the choices available to Vice-Admiral Maximilian Reichsgraf von Spee (1861-1914).

Fritz, Stephen G. **“ ‘We are Trying...to Change the Face of the World’ – Ideology and Motivation in the Wehrmacht on the Eastern Front: The View from Below.”** Vol.60, No.4 (October, 1996), pp.683-710. Appraises the influence of ‘positive’ National Socialist ideological beliefs on the average *Landser*’s motives to engage in combat.

DiNardo, R.L. **“The Dysfunctional Coalition: The Axis Powers and the Eastern Front in World War II.”** Vol.60, No.4 (October, 1996), pp.711-730. Illustrates that German arrogance, compounded by muddled political and strategic thinking, inadequate resources, widely varying capabilities, and linguistic differences, rendered the Axis Coalition a costly failure.

Xiaoming Zhang, **“The Vietnam War, 1964-1969: A Chinese Perspective.”** Vol.60, No.4 (October, 1996), pp.731-762. Recounts how the People’s Republic of China supported Hanoi’s drive to unify Vietnam, assessing the extent to which there was a potential for direct Chinese military intervention.

Vol.61, No.1 (January, 1997)

Kubik, Timothy R.W. **“Is Machiavelli’s Canon Spiked? Practical Reading in Military History.”** Vol.61, No.1 (January, 1997), pp.7-30. Argues that Niccolò Machiavelli’s (1469-1527) *The Art of War* functioned as a prompt for debate, an exercise of prudent judgement, rather than offering a stock of handy maxims for use in a crisis.

Ferrell, Henry C., Jr. **“Guns for Vermont: Military Land Acquisition in the 1920s.”** Vol.61, No.1 (January, 1997), pp.31-47. Presents the remarkable achievement of Vermont Senator, Frank Lester Greene (1870-1930), of arranging for the purchase of additional land for Fort Ethan Allen at a time of severely constrained defense budgets.

Rossi, Mario, **“United States Military Authorities and Free France, 1942-1944.”** Vol.61, No.1 (January, 1997), pp.49-64. Probes the political and military consequences of the clash between U.S. policy towards liberated French territory and Charles De Gaulle’s (1890-1970) claim to be the legitimate representative of the French people.

Perras, Galen Roger, **“We have Opened the Door to Tokyo: United States Plans to Seize the Kurile**

Islands, 1943-1945.” Vol.61, No.1 (January, 1997), pp.65-91. Proposals to defeat Imperial Japan by attacking the Home Islands through a campaign in the Northern Pacific, including the potential complications for U.S.-Soviet relations.

Fautua, David T. **“The ‘Long Pull’ Army: NSC 68, the Korean War, and the Creation of the Cold War Army.”** Vol.61, No.1 (January, 1997), pp.93-120. Endeavors to distinguish the changes to the U.S. Army in the early 1950s resulting from National Security Council paper 68 from those prompted by the Korean War.

Kohn, Richard H. (ed.) **“The Practice of Military History in the U.S. Government: The Department of Defense.”** Vol.61, No.1 (January, 1997), pp.121-147. Includes contributions from Alfred Goldberg, Elizabeth A. Muenger, and Harold W. Nelson.

Vol.61, No.2 (April, 1997)

Dunn, John, **“Egypt’s Nineteenth-Century Armaments Industry.”** Vol.61, No.2 (April, 1997), pp.231-254. Explains that the efforts of Muhammad Ali Pasha (1769-1849) and Khedive Ismail to establish a modern arms industry in Egypt was doomed in part due to haphazard implementation and inadequate funding, but, in a broader context, failure sprang from an unwillingness and / or inability to impose major political, cultural, and social changes.

Birtle, Andrew J. **“The U.S. Army’s Pacification of Marinduque, Philippine Islands, April 1900 – April 1901.”** Vol.61, No.2 (April, 1997), pp.255-282. Observes that the common image of the U.S. counterinsurgency campaign in the Philippines that emphasizes the political ‘nation building’ approach obscures the equally if not more important harsh military measures indispensable for pacification.

Fanning, William J., Jr. **“The Origin of the Term ‘Blitzkrieg’: Another View.”** Vol.61, No.2 (April, 1997), pp.283-302.

Bacevich, A.J. **“The Paradox of Professionalism: Eisenhower, Ridgway, and the Challenge to Civilian Control, 1953-1955.”** Vol.61, No.2 (April, 1997), pp.303-333. By focusing on the U.S. Army’s efforts to undermine President Eisenhower’s (1953-1961) policy of massive nuclear retaliation, this article attempts to depict the actual terms of the civil-military relationship within the innermost circles of the U.S. government to determine the realities and limits of civilian control of the armed forces.

Weinberg, Gerhard L. **“Historiographical Essay: World War II Scholarship, now and in the Future.”** Vol.61, No.2 (April, 1997), pp.335-345. Includes issues surrounding the use of the memoirs of German military leaders, the revelations of Field Marshal Lord Alanbrooke’s (1883-1963) unabridged diary, and the declassification of materials pertaining to Magic and Ultra.

Vol.61, No.3 (July, 1997)

Kastor, Peter J. **“Toward ‘The Maritime War Only’: The Question of Naval Mobilization, 1811-1812.”**

Vol.61, No.3 (July, 1997), pp.455-480. Applies the broader context of the ‘New Military History’, particularly political circumstances, in an effort to better understand President James Madison’s (1809-1817) naval policy and strategy leading up to the outbreak of the War of 1812.

Lyon, James M.B. **“ ‘A Peasant Mob’: The Serbian Army on the Eve of the Great War.”** Vol.61, No.3

(July, 1997), pp.481-502. In contrast to previous studies, this article seeks to assess the Army’s preparedness on the eve of World War I based on Serbian archival sources, as opposed to Hapsburg sources.

Thompson, David G. **“Norwegian Military Policy, 1905-1940: A Critical Appraisal and Review of the Literature.”** Vol.61, No.3 (July, 1997), pp.503-520.

Questions the reliance exclusively on British and German sources for an understanding of the 1940 Norwegian campaign, insisting that without knowledge of the role of the Norwegian government and armed forces, the picture is incomplete.

Giangreco, D.M. **“Casualty Projections for the U.S. Invasion of Japan, 1945-1946: Planning and Policy Implications.”** Vol.61, No.3 (July, 1997), pp.521-581.

Demonstrates that those historians who have rejected President Harry Truman’s (1945-1953) claim that he expected huge losses from an invasion of the Japanese Home Islands have based their conclusions on a combination of superficial research in the mass of related documents and specifically misinterpreting planning documents.

Millett, Allan R. **“A Reader’s Guide to the Korean War.”** Vol.61, No.3 (July, 1997), pp.583-597.

Vol.61, No.4 (October, 1997)

Palmer, Michael A. **“ ‘The Soul’s Right Hand’: Command and Control in the Age of Fighting Sail, 1652-1827.”** Vol.61, No.4 (October, 1997), pp.679-705.

Suggests that the ‘rationalism’ of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries had a detrimental impact on methods of command and control, emphasizing centralization which, in turn, favored the single line ahead formation that has been blamed for the indecisiveness of naval battles in this period.

Fuquea, David C. **“Task Force One: The Wasted Assets of the United States Pacific Battleship Fleet, 1942.”** Vol.61, No.4 (October, 1997), pp.707-734.

Explores the reasons behind Task Force One’s battleships languishing as a last line of defense during the first year of the war following Pearl Harbor.

Kirkland, Faris R. **“The Attack on Cap Mui Lay, Vietnam, July 1968.”** Vol.61, No.4 (October, 1997), pp.735-760.

Shines light on Operation Thor, a neglected example of joint operation in Vietnam and one that significantly disrupted North Vietnam’s strategic plans.

Coffman, Edward M. **“The Course of Military History in the United States since World War II.”** Vol.61, No.4 (October, 1997), pp.761-775.

Lynn, John A. **“The Embattled Future of Academic Military History.”** Vol.61, No.4 (October, 1997), pp.777-789.

Vol.62, No.1 (January, 1998)

Tone, John Lawrence, **“The Machete and the Liberation of Cuba.”** Vol.62, No.1 (January, 1998), pp.7-28. Disputes the importance attached to the machete, arguing that the significance of its symbolic value has overshadowed the fact that the Cuban Liberation Army relied, first and foremost, on the use of rifles, in which they surpassed their Spanish opponents.

Lambert, Nicholas A. **“ ‘Our Bloody Ships’ or ‘Our Bloody System’? Jutland and the Loss of the Battle Cruisers, 1916.”** Vol.62, No.1 (January, 1998), pp.29-55. Speculates that an emphasis on rapid fire led gunnery personnel to stockpile far more shells in their turrets than the regulated maximum of eight projectiles, resulting in catastrophic explosions when German shells found their mark.

Gershovich, Moshe, **“The Ait Ya’qub Incident and the Crisis of French Military Policy in Morocco.”** Vol.62, No.1 (January, 1998), pp.57-73. Though small in scale, the author suggests that defeat at Ait Ya’qub was the final straw that led the French government to call into question the twin concepts of *Maroc utile* and peaceful penetration.

Lund, Erik, **“The Industrial History of Strategy: Re-evaluating the Wartime Record of the British Aviation Industry in Comparative Perspective, 1919-1945.”** Vol.62, No.1 (January, 1998), pp.75-99. Rejects the conventional notion that the Allies achieved victory by outproducing the Axis, insisting that, instead, more factors than mere volume played a role, as demonstrated by the British air sector that displayed greater flexibility, technological sophistication, and effectiveness than either its German or United States counterparts.

Hofmann, George F. **“The Tactical and Strategic Use of Attaché Intelligence: The Spanish Civil War and the U.S. Army’s Misguided Quest for a Modern Tank Doctrine.”** Vol.62, No.1 (January, 1998), pp.101-134. Asserts that the analysis of the employment of tanks in the war was distorted by the cultural bias of the infantry, cavalry, and artillery branch chiefs, leaving the U.S. Army without an armored doctrine on the eve of World War II.

Shepardson, Donald E. **“The Fall of Berlin and the Rise of a Myth.”** Vol.62, No.1 (January, 1998), pp.135-154. Refutes the notions of United States naiveté and British realism in dealing with both their German enemy and their Soviet ally in the spring of 1945.

Willoughby, John, **“The Sexual Behavior of American G.I.s during the Early Years of the Occupation**

of Germany.” Vol.62, No.1 (January, 1998), pp.155-174. Investigates the U.S. Army’s search for a form of sexual relations between G.I.’s and German girls that would be acceptable to young German men, young U.S. women, and the mothers and fathers of both lands, a topic that illuminates much about the social and political relations between the American and German people in the immediate aftermath of World War II.

Grimsley, Mark, **“Review Essay: In Not so Dubious Battle: The Motivations of American Civil War Soldiers.”** Vol.62, No.1 (January, 1998), pp.175-188.

Vol.62, No.2 (April, 1998)

Weitz, Mark A. **“Drill, Training, and the Combat Performance of the Civil War Soldier: Dispelling the Myth of the Poor Soldier, Great Fight.”** Vol.62, No.2 (April, 1998), pp.263-289. Proposes that, contrary to conventional wisdom, the soldiers who fought in the war functioned effectively because of military skills that flowed directly from drill, training, and discipline rather than any innate fighting ability.

Angevine, Robert G. **“The Rise and Fall of the Office of Naval Intelligence, 1882-1892: A Technological Perspective.”** Vol.62, No.2 (April, 1998), pp.291-312. Advances the argument that the first peacetime military intelligence organization, by successfully gathering, overtly and covertly, information on foreign naval technology, enabled the United States to build a modern fleet as quickly and inexpensively as possible.

Corum, James S. **“The Spanish Civil War: Lessons Learned and not Learned by the Great Powers.”** Vol.62, No.2 (April, 1998), pp.313-334. Considers what the British, French, German, Italian, Soviet, and United States armed forces learned or failed to learn from the study of the air war in Spain within the context of how armed forces undergo reform.

Xiaoming Zhang, **“China and the Air War in Korea, 1950-1953.”** Vol.62, No.2 (April, 1998), pp.335-370. Looks at the development of the People’s Republic of China’s Air Force during the war, the role played by the Soviet Union, and the emergence of an air warfare strategy.

Weinberg, Gerhard L. **“Unexplored Questions about the German Military during World War II.”** Vol.62, No.2 (April, 1998), pp.371-380. Touches upon the 1934 oath to Hitler, reasons why high-ranking German commanders felt the need to justify to their troops their orders to slaughter Jewish civilians, the role of high-ranking German commanders in approving the execution of tens-of-thousands of their own troops, *Luftwaffe* field divisions, the creation of new airborne divisions after the use of paratroopers had been all but abandoned, and the organizing of *Kriegsmarine* and *Luftwaffe* suicide units.

Vol.62, No.3 (July, 1998)

Neill, Donald A. **“Ancestral Voices: The Influence of the Ancients on the Military Thought of the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries.”** Vol.62, No.3 (July, 1998), pp.487-520. Insists that the

military developments of the Enlightenment were the result of the normal course of military innovation, simple evolutionary adaptation, as opposed to a sudden, revolutionary change stemming from the rediscovery of the military methods described by Classical authors.

Grandstaff, Mark R. **“Preserving the ‘Habits and Usages of War’: William Tecumseh Sherman, Professional Reform and the U.S. Army Officer Corps, 1865-1881, Revisited.”** Vol.62, No.3 (July, 1998), pp.521-545.

Bernstein, Barton J. **“Truman and the A-Bomb: Targeting Noncombatants, Using the Bomb, and His Defending the ‘Decision’.”** Vol.62, No.3 (July, 1998), pp.547-570. Focuses on the 1996 publication *Harry S. Truman and the Bomb: A Documentary History*. Edited and with commentary by Robert Ferrell.

Dhada, Mustafah, **“The Liberation War in Guinea-Bissau Reconsidered.”** Vol.62, No.3 (July, 1998), pp.571-593. Disputes the image of a straightforward march to victory for the *Partido Africano de Independência de Guiné e Cabo Verde* (P.A.I.G.C.), demonstrating that, instead, it was a struggle involving moves and countermoves by Portuguese forces and the P.A.I.G.C., each designed to maintain or regain specific initiatives, each designed to check or checkmate the opponent.

Glantz, David M. **“Historiographical Essay: The Red Army at War, 1941-1945: Sources and Interpretations.”** Vol.62, No.3 (July, 1998), pp.595-617.

Vol.62, No.4 (October, 1998)

Dawson, Joseph G. **“With Fidelity and Effectiveness: Archibald Henderson’s Lasting Legacy to the U.S. Marine Corps.”** Vol.62, No.4 (October, 1998), pp.727-753. Affirms Henderson’s importance as Commandant of the Corps (1821-1859), during which he expanded the roles and capabilities of Marines, such as the deployment of a Marine battalion alongside Army units against the Creeks and Seminoles and the addition of an artillery component to strengthen landing forces.

Cook, Tim, **“Creating the Faith: The Canadian Gas Services in the First World War.”** Vol.62, No.4 (October, 1998), pp.755-786. The Canadian forces developed a very efficient organization to instruct their troops in how to protect themselves from Chemical weapons.

Lewis, Adriabn R. **“The Failure of Allied Planning and Doctrine for Operation Overlord: The Case of Minefield and Obstacle Clearance.”** Vol.62, No.4 (October, 1998), pp.787-807.

Drew, Dennis M. **“U.S. Airpower Theory and the Insurgent Challenge: A Short Journey to Confusion.”** Vol.62, No.4 (October, 1998), pp.809-832. Covering the period from 1945 to 1992, the article contends that the U.S. Air Force has failed to account for the realities of guerrilla warfare in its theory of airpower.

Meilinger, Phillip S. **“Historiographical Essay: U.S. Air Force Leaders: A Biographical Tour.”**

Vol.62, No.4 (October, 1998), pp.833-870.

Black, Jeremy, **“Historiographical Essay: Military Organisations and Military Change in Historical Perspective.”** Vol.62, No.4 (October, 1998), pp.871-892. Presents an explanatory model of change based on military organization, including both unit and command structures, and intersection and interaction with wider social patterns and practices.

Vol.63, No.1 (January, 1999)

Schneid, Frederick C. **“The Dynamics of Defeat: French Army Leadership, December 1812 – March 1813.”** Vol.63, No.1 (January, 1999), pp.7-28. Examines how, in the wake of the catastrophe in Russia, the remnants of the *Grande Armée* were preserved despite the departure of Emperor Napoleon Bonaparte (1769-1821).

Gardner, Nikolas, **“Command and Control in the ‘Great Retreat of 1914: The Disintegration of the British Cavalry Division.’”** Vol.63, No.1 (January, 1999), pp.29-54. Suggests that the lack of experience in operating as a division, the division’s unwieldy size, the inefficiency of its commander and staff, and the independent mindset of its brigade commanders prevented it from operating effectively.

Palazzo, Albert P. **“The British Army’s Counter-Battery Staff Office and Control of the Enemy in World War I.”** Vol.63, No.1 (January, 1999), pp.55-74. Sets forth the argument that the critical turning point for the artillery occurred during the winter of 1916-1917, when, drawing upon the lessons of the Battle of the Somme, a corps-level Counter-Battery Staff Office was created.

Alvarez, Jose E. **“Between Gallipoli and D-Day: Alhucemas, 1925.”** Vol.63, No.1 (January, 1999), pp.75-98. Recounts the Spanish amphibious landing at Alhucemas Bay on 8 September, 1925, during the Rif Rebellion in North Africa.

Geller, Jay Howard, **“The Role of Military Administration in German-Occupied Belgium, 1940-1944.”** Vol.63, No.1 (January, 1999), pp.99-125. Attempts to determine how the German Military Administration viewed its role in occupying and governing the Kingdom of Belgium.

Wanke, Paul, **“American Military Psychiatry and its Role among Ground Forces in World War II.”** Vol.63, No.1 (January, 1999), pp.127-146. Explains how the role of U.S. military psychiatrists evolved from one of screening recruits as a preventative measure to one of responding to battlefield psychiatric casualties.

Syrett, David, **“Historiographical Essay: The British Armed Forces in the American Revolutionary War: Publications, 1875-1998.”** Vol.63, No.1 (January, 1999), pp.147-164.

Dawson, Joseph G. **“Review Essay: Civil War Soldiers and Leaders: A Glatthaar Trio.”** Vol.63, No.1

(January, 1999), pp.165-168. Contains a single study on the relationships between high-ranking commanders and two involving the enlisted men's experience, included African American soldiers and their officers and the troops who participated in Sherman's march.

Vol.63, No.2 (April, 1999)

Dwyer, Christopher S. **"Raiding Strategy: As Applied by the Western Confederate Cavalry in the American Civil War."** Vol.63, No.2 (April, 1999), pp.263-281. Offers the explanation that the failure of the Confederate Cavalry in the Western Theater was not due to any lack of success in the raids that were conducted, but to the misuse made of these raids in the overall strategy of Confederate theater commanders.

Greenhalgh, Elizabeth, **"'Parade Ground Soldiers': French Army Assessments of the British on the Somme in 1916."** Vol.63, No.2 (April, 1999), pp.283-312. Assesses the attitudes among the *Poilus* towards their British counterparts in a battle in which roughly equal numbers of French and British troops fought alongside each other.

Danchev, Alex, **"Liddell Hart and the Indirect Approach."** Vol.63, No.2 (April, 1999), pp.313-337.

Boyd, Carl, **"U.S. Navy Radio Intelligence during the Second World War and the Sinking of the Japanese Submarine I-52."** Vol.63, No.2 (April, 1999), pp.339-354. Determines the role of Ultra in the June, 1944, sinking of the blockade runner, I-52, in the Atlantic Ocean by aircraft from the escort carrier U.S.S. *Bogue*.

Rawling, William, **"The Challenge of Modernization: The Royal Canadian Navy and Antisubmarine Weapons, 1944-1945."** Vol.63, No.2 (April, 1999), pp.355-378.

Hanson, Victor Davis, **"Historiographical Essay: The Status of Ancient Military History: Traditional Work, Recent Research, and On-Going Controversies."** Vol.63, No.2 (April, 1999), pp.379-413. A very thorough survey covering works on every conceivable topic concerning the armed forces and conduct of warfare in the age of ancient Greece and Rome.

Bernstein, Barton J. **"Review Essay: The Making of the Atomic Admiral: 'Deak' Parsons and Modernizing the U.S. Navy."** Vol.63, No.2 (April, 1999), pp.415-426. William Sterling Parsons (1901-1953) was an ordnance expert who participated in the Manhattan project and was involved in post-war nuclear tests.

Bland, Larry I.; Marshall, George C. and the Duke of Wellington, **"Document of Note: Wellington Instructs the Yanks."** Vol.63, No.2 (April, 1999), pp.427-428.

Vol.63, No.3 (July, 1999)

DeVries, Kelly, **“The Lack of a Western European Military Response to the Ottoman Invasions of Eastern Europe from Nicopolis (1396) to Mohacs (1526).”** Vol.63, No.3 (July, 1999), pp.539-559.

Inquires into the reasons behind a failure to respond to the Turkish threat, proposing that it was a combination of the intimidating power of the Ottomans and changing attitudes towards the duties expected of a Christian soldier.

Rose, Susan, **“Islam Versus Christendom: The Naval Dimension, 1000-1600.”** Vol.63, No.3 (July, 1999), pp.561-578. Surveys developments from the Crusades to the dominance of the Ottoman Empire within the geographic framework of the Mediterranean Sea.

Nicolle, David, **“Medieval Warfare: The Unfriendly Interface.”** Vol.63, No.3 (July, 1999), pp.579-599. Probes the nature of and reasons for the adoption of military technology and techniques, focusing on the influence of the Islamic world on Christian Europe.

Kleinschmidt, Harald, **“Using the Gun: Manual Drill and the Proliferation of Portable Firearms.”** Vol.63, No.3 (July, 1999), pp.601-630. Delves into the military, political, and social factors that led to an increase in the use of hand-held firearms throughout Europe, from the fifteenth through the eighteenth century.

Raudzens, George, **“Military Revolution or Maritime Evolution? Military Superiorities or Transportation Advantages as Main Causes of European Colonial Conquests to 1788.”** Vol.63, No.3 (July, 1999), pp.631-641.

Boyce, D. George, **“From Assaye to the Assaye: Reflections on British Government, Force, and Moral Authority in India.”** Vol.63, No.3 (July, 1999), pp.643-668. Appraises the role of the threat and use of force in British rule, from the Battle of Assaye (1803) to the naval mutiny of 1946, including how the reliance on force shaped the moral and ethical justifications for the British governing India.

Black, Jeremy, **“War and the World, 1450-2000.”** Vol.63, No.3 (July, 1999), pp.669-681. After a consideration of the circumstances of the study of military in the academy, the author focuses primarily on European states’ military interaction with civilizations throughout the globe in the context of the ‘Military Revolution’ theory.

Rodger, N.A.M. **“Historiographical Essay: Recent Books on the Royal Navy of the Eighteenth Century.”** Vol.63, No.3 (July, 1999), pp.683-703. A very thorough survey of the latest works.

Sorley, Lewis and Pernell, Ralph McT. **“Too Good for the Infantry?”** Vol.63, No.3 (July, 1999), pp.704-705. This is a 1942 letter from New Mexico Congressman Clinton P. Anderson in response to a request for an individual to be reassigned out of a rifle squad.

Vol.63, No.4 (October, 1999)

Weigley, Russell F. **“The George C. Marshall Lecture in Military History: The Soldier, the Statesman, and the Military Historian.”** Vol.63, No.4 (October, 1999), pp.807-822. Reviews the United States tradition of the subordination of the Armed Forces to civilian control at the highest level of civil-military relations, beginning with the Civil War.

Roberts, William H. **“ ‘The Name of Ericsson’: Political Engineering in the Union Ironclad Program, 1861-1863.”** Vol.63, No.4 (October, 1999), pp.823-843.

Ferris, John, **“Fighter Defence before Fighter Command: The Rise of Strategic Air Defence in Great Britain, 1917-1934.”** Vol.63, No.4 (October, 1999), pp.845-884. Attests to the fact that the R.A.F. developed a sophisticated defense system against enemy bombers prior to the development of radar, laying the foundation for victory in the Battle of Britain.

Crane, Conrad C. **“Raiding the Beggar’s Pantry: The Search for Airpower Strategy in the Korean War.”** Vol.63, No.4 (October, 1999), pp.885-920. Contrasts the need to fight a limited war with the newly independent U.S. Air Force’s focus on nuclear warfare.

Dooley, Edwin L. **“Memoirs: Wartime San Juan, Puerto Rico: The Forgotten American Home Front, 1941-1945.”** Vol.63, No.4 (October, 1999), pp.921-938. The author provides an account of his father’s experiences as a young U.S. Army Private from Astoria, New York, who was deployed to Puerto Rico in 1939.

Rohwer, Jurgen, **“Historiographical Essay: Signal Intelligence and World War II: The Unfolding Story,”** Vol.63, No.4 (October, 1999), pp.939-951.

Vol.64, No.1 (January, 2000)

Barker, Thomas M. **“A Debacle of the Peninsular War: The British-led Amphibious Assault against Fort Fuengirola 14-15 October 1810.”** Vol.64, No.1 (January, 2000), pp.9-52. Reassesses the failed amphibious assault by a multi-national force under the command of the Eleventh Lord Blayney, General Andrews Thomas.

Frank, Joseph Allan and Duteau, Barbara, **“Measuring the Political Articulatness of United States Civil War Soldiers: The Wisconsin Militia.”** Vol.64, No.1 (January, 2000), pp.53-77.

Brereton, T.R. **“First Lessons in Modern War: Arthur Wagner, the 1898 Santiago Campaign, and the U.S. Army Lesson-Learning.”** Vol.64, No.1 (January, 2000), pp.79-96. Relates how Lieutenant Colonel Arthur Wagner (1853-1905) pioneered the U.S. Army’s practice of producing ‘lessons-learned’

studies of the Army's recent military operations.

Gunsburg, Jeffrey A. **"The Battle of Gembloux, 14-15 May 1940: The 'Blitzkrieg' Checked."** Vol.64, No.1 (January, 2000), pp.97-140. Uses an examination of the effectiveness of the French forces holding a defensive position at the Belgium town of Gembloux as a test case for French doctrine and performance.

Cole, Bernard D. **"Memoirs: A Noglow in Vietnam, 1968: Air Power at the Battle of Khe Sanh."** Vol.64, No.1 (January, 2000), pp.141-158. Both a memoir and an analysis by a U.S. Marine who experienced first-hand the fighting at Khe Sanh.

Black, Jeremy, **"Historiographical Essay: Britain as a Military Power, 1688-1815."** Vol.64, No.1 (January, 2000), pp.159-177.

Gentile, Gian P.; Becker, Carl; Commager, Henry S.; Gottschalk; Schmitt, Bernadotte and Malone, Dumas, **"Document of Note: General Arnold and the Historians."** Vol.64, No.1 (January, 2000), pp.179-180. Concerning U.S. Army Air Force General 'Hap' Arnold's (1886-1950) commissioning of a group of leading historians to determine whether strategic bombing could force Germany to capitulate by the spring of 1944.

Vol.64, No.2 (April, 2000)

Harari, Yuval Noah, **"Strategy and Supply in Fourteenth-Century Western European Invasion Campaigns."** Vol.64, No.2 (April, 2000), pp.297-333. Seeks to understand both how food for men and animals was ensured by logistical trains versus plunder, and to what extent the chosen or imposed form of supply placed restrictions on strategy.

Epkenhans, Michael, **"Krupp and the Imperial German Navy, 1898-1914: A Reassessment."** Vol.64, No.2 (April, 2000), pp.335-369.

Tan Tai-Yong, **"An Imperial Home-Front: Punjab and the First World War."** Vol.64, No.2 (April, 2000), pp.371-410. Looks at how, during the war, the civil administration of the State of Punjab winded up concentrating on recruiting men for the Indian Army.

Coox, Alvin D. **"Needless Fear: The Compromise of U.S. Plans to Invade Japan in 1945."** Vol.64, No.2 (April, 2000), pp.411-437. The disappearance of top-secret material from Manila caused a great deal of concern, but post-war access to Japanese documents demonstrate that these stolen papers had no impact on defensive plans for Kyushu.

Sarantakes, Nicholas Evan, **"The Quiet War: Combat Operations along the Korean Demilitarized Zone, 1966-1969."** Vol.64, No.2 (April, 2000), pp.439-457. Describes how South Korea and the

United States responded differently to the provocations of North Korea and how this impacted the war in Vietnam.

Eddy, George G. **“Memoirs: The Birth of the Concrete-Piercing Fuze: How the Siegfried Line and Other Formidable Targets were Breached.”** Vol.64, No.2 (April, 2000), pp.459-465. Brigadier General George G. Eddy (1895-1969) relates the development of the concrete piercing fuze when he served as Director of the Ordnance Research Center at Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland, during World War II.

Meilinger, Phillip S. **“Historiographical Essay: The Historiography of Airpower: Theory and Doctrine.”** Vol.64, No.2 (April, 2000), pp.467-501.

Smith, Ralph B. **“Review Essay: Choosing War in Vietnam.”** Vol.64, No.2 (April, 2000), pp.503-513. Critiques Fredrik Logevall’s 1999 book of the same name.

Vol.64, No.3 (July, 2000)

Ostwald, Jamel, **“The ‘Decisive’ Battle of Ramillies, 1706: Prerequisites for Decisiveness in Early Modern Warfare.”** Vol.64, No.3 (July, 2000), pp.649-677. Asks whether eighteenth century military strategy was indecisive by choice rather than by necessity by looking at the 1st Duke of Marlborough, John Churchill’s (1650-1722), Ramillies campaign.

Showalter, Dennis, **“From Deterrence to Doomsday Machine: The German Way of War, 1890-1914.”** Vol.64, No.3 (July, 2000), pp.679-710. Proposes that between 1890 and 1914 the German Army developed a siege mentality, the only solution for which was believed to be the refinement of operational capabilities, pursued at the expense of policy and strategy.

Van Tuyll, Hubert P. **“The Dutch Mobilization of 1914: Reading the ‘Enemy’s’ Intentions.”** Vol.64, No.3 (July, 2000), pp.711-737. Establishes that the Dutch Armed Forces were aware that Von Schlieffen intended to violate Dutch neutrality and their response resulted in a change in Germans plans for war with France.

Nenninger, Timothy K. **“‘Unsystematic as a Mode of Command’: Commanders and the Process of Command in the American Expeditionary Forces, 1917-1918.”** Vol.64, No.3 (July, 2000), pp.739-768. Inquires into how the knowledge, skills, and preparations of A.E.F. commanders and staff officers and their interactions with one another produced a distinctly American process of command.

Hayward, Joel, **“Too Little, Too Late: An Analysis of Hitler’s Failure in August 1942 to Damage Soviet Oil Production.”** Vol.64, No.3 (July, 2000), pp.769-794. Claims that, had Adolf Hitler not been so fixated on Stalingrad, *Luftwaffe* assets could have been used to significantly disrupt the supply of oil to Soviet factories and forces.

Loveland, Anne C. **“Character Education in the U.S. Army, 1947-1977.”** Vol.64, No.3 (July, 2000), pp.795-818. Scrutinizes the promotion of the Christian Faith in the Army Character Guidance program in the context of Cold War paranoia.

Vol.64, No.4 (October, 2000)

Coffman, Edward M. **“The George C. Marshall Lecture of Military History: The Duality of the American Military Tradition: A Commentary.”** Vol.64, No.4 (October, 2000), pp.967-980. Discusses the duality of a standing, professional regular Armed Forces versus the citizen-soldier tradition.

Croxton, Derek, **“‘The Prosperity of Arms is Never Continual’: Military Intelligence, Surprise, and Diplomacy in 1640s Germany.”** Vol.64, No.4 (October, 2000), pp.981-1003.

Bower, Stephen E. **“The Theology of the Battlefield: William Tecumseh Sherman and the U.S. Civil War.”** Vol.64, No.4 (October, 2000), pp.1005-1034. Focuses on the role of Sherman’s (1820-1891) nondenominational religious faith in his experiences in the Civil War.

Winton, Harold R. **“Toward an American Philosophy of Command.”** Vol.64, No.4 (October, 2000), pp.1035-1060. Considers the particular blend of intellectual and psychological qualities articulated within the practice of command in the U.S. Army during the interwar period.

Yelton, David K. **“*Ein Volk Steht Auf*: The German *Volkssturm* and Nazi Strategy, 1944-45.”** Vol.64, No.4 (October, 2000), pp.1061-1083. Explains that the *Volkssturm*, though based on flawed assumptions, was part of a coherent strategy that was intended to simultaneously fanaticize the civilian population and maximize Allied casualties beyond what their governments were willing to bare.

Gentile, Gian P. **“Shaping the Past Battlefield, ‘For the Future’: The United States Strategic Bombing Survey’s Evaluation of the American Air War against Japan.”** Vol.64, No.4 (October, 2000), pp.1085-1112. Contests the image of the Bombing Survey as an impartial primary source, demonstrating that it was shaped by particular circumstances, bias, and political factors, most notably the effort to justify an independent Air Force.

Donnelly, William M. **“Thunderbirds in Korea: The U.S. 45th Infantry Division, 1950-1952.”** Vol.64, No.4 (October, 2000), pp.1113-1139. Investigates the performance of one of two National Guard divisions deployed to Korea, concentrating on the division’s officers.

Vol.65, No.1 (January, 2001)

Monteiro, Armando da Silva Saturnino, **“The Decline and Fall of Portuguese Seapower, 1588-1663.”**

Vol.65, No.1 (January, 2001), pp.9-20.

Herrera, Ricardo A. **“Self-Governance and the American Citizen as Soldier, 1775-1861.”** Vol.65, No.1 (January, 2001), pp.21-52. Attempts to understand the conception of the relationship between military service and the Republic held by enlisted men, including regulars, militiamen, and volunteers, from the Revolution to the first year of the Civil War.

Szabó, Miklós, **“The Development of the Hungarian Aircraft Industry, 1938-1944.”** Vol.65, No.1 (January, 2001), pp.53-76.

Whitby, Michael J. **“Matelots, Martinets, and Mutineers: The Mutiny in H.M.C.S. *Iroquois*, 19 July 1943.”** Vol.65, No.1 (January, 2001), pp.77-103. The author identifies the substantial expansion of the Royal Canadian Navy, bringing together inexperienced officers with inexperienced crews, as the cause of the Destroyer *Iroquois*.

Coles, Michael, **“Ernest King and the British Pacific Fleet: The Conference at Quebec, 1944 (‘Octagon’).”** Vol.65, No.1 (January, 2001), pp.105-129. While not excluding complications from Fleet Admiral King’s (1878-1956) personality, the author insists that there were valid political, economic, and operational factors against the deployment of the British Fleet alongside the U.S. Navy in the Pacific Theater.

Lynn, John A. **“Historiographical Essay: The Treatment of Military Subjects in Diderot’s *Encyclopedie*.”** Vol.65, No.1 (January, 2001), pp.131-165. Concludes that while Denis Diderot’s (1713-1784) coverage of military topics was not the basis for reforms, they provide an excellent picture of the European art of war in the mid-eighteenth century.

Vol.65, No.2 (April, 2001)

Phillips, Gervase, **“To Cry ‘Home! Home!’: Mutiny, Morale, and Indiscipline in Tudor Armies.”** Vol.65, No.2 (April, 2001), pp.313-332. Points to the study of the unrest within Tudor armies as a means of better understanding common notions of equitable treatment, mutual obligations, and obedience within society as a whole.

Sumida, Jon Tetsuro, **“The Relationship of History and Theory in *On War*: The Clausewitzian Ideal and Its Implications.”** Vol.65, No.2 (April, 2001), pp.333-354.

Fitzpatrick, David J. **“Emory Upton and the Citizen Soldier.”** Vol.65, No.2 (April, 2001), pp.355-389. Refutes the accepted notion of Upton’s opposition to citizen-soldiers and democracy. The article includes a review of Upton’s (1839-1881) reflections on the military systems in India and Serbia.

Jacobs, Harry A. **“Operation Strakonice: In Pursuit of the Soviet Order of Battle.”** Vol.65, No.2

(April, 2001), pp.391-400. Chronicles the successful mission of the U.S. military intelligence unit, Order of Battle Team 24, to seize German documents detailing Soviet forces, documents that were located beyond the Line of Demarcation in Czechoslovakia.

Witty, David M. **“A Regular Army in Counterinsurgency Operations: Egypt in North Yemen, 1962-1967.”** Vol.65, No.2 (April, 2001), pp.401-439. The Egyptian campaign in Yemen may have contributed to a compromise peace settlement, but it adversely impacted the Egyptian Army’s capacity to fight conventional wars.

France, John, **“Historiographical Essay: Recent Writing on Medieval Warfare: From the Fall of Rome to c.1300.”** Vol.65, No.2 (April, 2001), pp.441-473. Primarily covering works that have been publishing in the last twenty-five years, the author reviews studies on the successor states to Rome, the Byzantine Empire, the thorny subject of feudalism, fortifications and siege operations, the naval dimension, the manner in which warfare was conducted in Europe during the High Middle Ages, 1000-1300, the employment of mercenaries, and the Crusades.

Vol.65, No.3 (July, 2001)

McConachy, Bruce, **“The Roots of Artillery Doctrine: Napoleonic Artillery Tactics Reconsidered.”** Vol.65, No.3 (July, 2001), pp.617-640. Puts forward the explanation that the changes in Napoleonic artillery practices beginning in 1807 were the results of years of experimentation and innovation, rather than compensation for a general decline in standards throughout the *Grande Armée*.

Westermann, Edward B. **“Fighting for the Heavens from the Ground: German Ground-Based Air Defenses in the Great War, 1914-1918.”** Vol.65, No.3 (July, 2001), pp.641-669.

Roberts, Priscilla, **“Tasker H. Bliss and the Evolution of Allied Unified Command, 1918: A Note on Old Battles Revisited.”** Vol.65, No.3 (July, 2001), pp.671-695.

Wildenberg, Thomas, **“In Support of the Battle Line: Gunnery’s Influence on the Development of Carrier Aviation in the U.S. Navy.”** Vol.65, No.3 (July, 2001), pp.697-711. Debunks the presumed anti-aviation attitude of ‘battleship admirals’ and describes how carrier aviation was a mission driven, rather than a technological driven, affair that proceeded incrementally over the course of several years.

McCreedy, Kenneth O. **“Planning the Peace: Operation Eclipse and the Occupation of Germany.”** Vol.65, No.3 (July, 2001), pp.713-739. Indicates that Operation Eclipse, which was planned simultaneously with Overlord, had the dual goals of thoroughly eliminating Nazism in Germany and establishing the conditions that would free up Allied forces for military operations against Japan.

Hickey, Donald R. **“Historiographical Essay: The War of 1812: Still a Forgotten Conflict?”** Vol.65, No.3 (July, 2001), pp.741-769.

Karpat, Kemal H. **“Review Essay: The Rise of Modern Turkey.”** Vol.65, No.3 (July, 2001), pp.771-775. Covers two recent books that chronicle the transformation of the Turkish state from the late Ottoman Empire to a nation-state under Mustafa Kemal Atatürk (1881-1938).

Vol.65, No.4 (October, 2001)

Millett, Allan R. **“The George C. Marshall Lecture in Military History: Introduction to the Korean War.”** Vol.65, No.4 (October, 2001), pp.921-935.

Roy, Kaushik, **“Coercion through Leniency: British Manipulation of the Courts-Martial System in the Post-Mutiny Indian Army, 1859-1913.”** Vol.65, No.4 (October, 2001), pp.937-964.

Travers, Tim, **“Liman von Sanders, the Capture of Lieutenant Palmer, and Ottoman Anticipation of the Allied Landings at Gallipoli on 25 April 1915.”** Vol.65, No.4 (October, 2001), pp.965-979. Shines a light on the expectations of the Turks for a possible landing on the Gallipoli Peninsula and, in particular, the neglected issue of the impact of information from a captured British intelligence officer shortly before the actual landing.

Erickson, Edward J. **“Strength against Weakness: Ottoman Military Effectiveness at Gallipoli, 1915.”** Vol.65, No.4 (October, 2001), pp.981-1011. In contrast to most studies, the author concentrates on Turkish preparations and performance, showing that the peninsula was heavily fortified and defended by the Empire’s finest divisions.

Peifer, Douglas, **“Commemoration of Mutiny, Rebellion, and Resistance in Postwar Germany: Public memory, History, and the Formation of ‘Memory Beacons’.”** Vol.65, No.4 (October, 2001), pp.1013-1052. Analyzes three ‘memory beacons’ that have been cultivated in German public and social memory: the naval mutinies of 1917-18, the 20th July, 1944, plot, and *Wehrmacht* deserters during World War II.

Nelson, David T. and Cole, Richard G. **“Memoirs: Behind German Lines in 1915: The Letters Home of David T. Nelson.”** Vol.65, No.4 (October, 2001), pp.1053-1060. Nelson, who was from Decorah, Iowa, was a Rhodes Scholar at Oxford when the war broke out. He worked for the Commission for Relief in German occupied Belgium and, later in 1916, as a driver for the American Field Ambulance Corps.

Marble, Sanders, **“Document of Note: General Haig Dismisses Attritional Warfare, January 1916.”** Vol.65, No.4 (October, 2001), pp.1061-1065.

Vandervort, Bruce, **“Review Essay: The Thin Black Line of Heroes.”** Vol.65, No.4 (October, 2001), pp.1067-1073. Recent work on European Colonial and, especially, African troops, 1700-1964.

Vol.66, No.1 (January, 2002)

Grant, Jonathan, **“The Sword of the Sultan: Ottoman Arms Imports, 1854-1914.”** Vol.66, No.1 (January, 2002), pp.9-36. Attempts to ascertain why the Ottoman Empire changed from being self-sufficient in the production of armaments, including warships, to relying entirely on imports by 1914.

Podsoblyayev, Evgenii; King, Francis and Biggart, John, **“The Russian Naval General Staff and the Evolution of Naval Policy, 1905-1914.”** Vol.66, No.1 (January, 2002), pp.37-69. Addresses the neglected perspective of the connections between the formulation of naval strategy for the Baltic Sea, warship construction, and Imperial Russia’s aspirations to become a great naval power.

Reese, Roger R. **“Red Army Professionalism and the Communist Party, 1918-1941.”** Vol.66, No.1 (January, 2002), pp.71-102. Explores the social and institutional dynamics that shaped the Red Army’s officer corps and determined the extent of its ability to face the Nazi invasion.

Searle, Thomas R. **“ ‘It made a Lot of Sense to Kill Skilled Workers’: The Firebombing of Tokyo in March 1945.”** Vol.66, No.1 (January, 2002), pp.103-133. Demonstrates that the fire bombing of Japanese cities was not a radical departure from U.S.A.A.F. tactics used against Germany, that it was not an abandonment of concentrating on targeting industry, and that it was based on long-term planning.

Jordan, Kelly C. **“Right for the Wrong Reasons: S.L.A. Marshall and the Ratio of Fire in Korea.”** Vol.66, No.1 (January, 2002), pp.135-162.

Hoffenaar, Jan, **“*Hannibal ante portas*: The Soviet Military Threat and the Build-up of the Dutch Armed Forces, 1948-1958.”** Vol.66, No.1 (January, 2002), pp.163-191.

Vol.66, No.2 (April, 2002)

Bachrach, Bernard, **“Charlemagne and the Carolingian General Staff.”** Vol.66, No.2 (April, 2002), pp.313-357. Contends that the personnel and procedures relied upon by Emperor Charlemagne (747-814) for intelligence and planning fulfill the qualifications for a modern general staff.

Greenhalgh, Michael, **“French Military Reconnaissance in the Ottoman Empire during the Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries as a Source for Our Knowledge of Ancient Monuments.”** Vol.66, No.2 (April, 2002), pp.359-388. Displays how a combination of the intellectual background of many French officers and the Ottoman reuse of Classical Greek and Roman ruins for military purposes resulted in valuable archaeological information in reports preserved in French military archives.

Travers, Tim and Celik, Birten, **“ ‘Not One of Them Ever came Back’: What Happened to the 1/5**

Norfolk Battalion on 12 August 1915 at Gallipoli?" Vol.66, No.2 (April, 2002), pp.389-406.

Bruce, Robert B. **"America Embraces France: Marshal Joseph Joffre and the French Mission to the United States, April-May 1917."** Vol.66, No.2 (April, 2002), pp.407-441. Proposes that marshal Joffre (1852-1931), more than any other individual, established strong-Franco-American military, political, and social ties, contributing mightily to U.S. public support for a commitment of a large expeditionary force to the Western Front.

Bartsch, William H. **"Operation Dovetail: Bungled Guadalcanal Rehearsal, July 1942."** Vol.66, No.2 (April, 2002), pp.443-476. Reports on the all-but-forgotten rehearsal conducted at Koro Island in the Fijis, held ten days before the landing on Guadalcanal.

Snyder, David R. **"Arming the *Bundesmarine*: The United States and the Build-Up of the German Federal Navy, 1950-1960."** Vol.66, No.2 (April, 2002), pp.477-500.

Linn, Brian M. and Weigley, Russell F. **"*The American Way of War Revisited*."** Vol.66, No.2 (April, 2002), pp.501-533. The author challenges some of the conclusions in Dr. Weigley's (1930-2004) classic study of the manner in which the United States Army has conducted warfare through the length of its history.

Vol.66, No.3 (July, 2002)

Herwig, Holger H. **"Germany and the 'Short War' Illusion: Toward a New Interpretation?"** Vol.66, No.3 (July, 2002), pp.681-693. A reassessment based on newly accessed documents from the *Reichsarchiv* in the former East Germany suggest that Imperial Germany's military leaders recognized that a conflict that they initiated might last up to two or more years.

Hull, Mark M. **"The Irish Interlude: German Intelligence in Ireland, 1939-1943."** Vol.66, No.3 (July, 2002), pp.695-717.

Jackson, Ashley, **"Supplying War: The High Commission Territories' Military-Logistical Contribution in the Second World War."** Vol.66, No.3 (July, 2002), pp.719-760. Assesses the mobilization of manpower from Basutoland, Bechuanaland, and Swaziland for use in logistics in the North African and Italian Campaigns.

Nenninger, Timothy K. **"United States Prisoners of War and the Red Army, 1944-45: Myths and Realities."** Vol.66, No.3 (July, 2002), pp.761-781. When the Soviets overran German P.O.W. camps, they came into the possession of some 28,000 U.S. soldiers, the repatriation of which proved complicated.

Marchio, James D. **"Risking General War in Pursuit of Limited Objectives: U.S. Military**

Contingency Planning for Poland in the Wake of the 1956 Hungarian Uprising.” Vol.66, No.3 (July, 2002), pp.783-812. Reveals that the various problems in exploring options for coming to the defense of Poland in the wake of the suppression of the Hungarian uprising led the Eisenhower administration to develop more response options to compliment the doctrine of massive nuclear retaliation.

Nasson, Bill, **“Historiographical Essay: Waging Total War in South Africa: Some Centenary Writings on the Anglo-Boer War, 1899-1902.”** Vol.66, No.3 (July, 2002), pp.813-828.

Bland, Larry I. **“Document of Note: Marlene Dietrich’s Firepower.”** Vol.66, No.3 (July, 2002), pp.829-831. Chief-of-Staff George C. Marshall (1880-1959) sought a means to stop the flow of firearms being brought back to the U.S. as war trophies.

Vol.66, No.4 (October, 2002)

May, Ernest R. **“The George C. Marshall Lecture in Military History: 1947-48: When Marshall kept the U.S. Out of War in China.”** Vol.66, No.4 (October, 2002), pp.1001-1010.

DiNardo, Richard L. **“Southern by the Grace of God but Prussian by Common Sense: James Longstreet and the Exercise of Command in the U.S. Civil War.”** Vol.66, No.4 (October, 2002), pp.1011-1032. Compares the manner in which General James Longstreet (1821-1904) organized and utilized his staff with the staff practices developed by the Prussian Army under Helmuth von Moltke the Elder (1800-1891).

Kelly, Patrick J. **“Strategy, Tactics, and Turf Wars: Tirpitz and the *Oberkommando der Marine*, 1892-1895.”** Vol.66, No.4 (October, 2002), pp.1033-1060. Relies on previously ignored archival material to reexamine the development of Grand Admiral Alfred von Tirpitz’s (1849-1930) strategic and tactical thought, including some significant contradictions.

Wilson, Timothy, **“Broken Wings: The Curtis Aeroplane Company, K-Boats, and the Russian Navy, 1914-1916.”** Vol.66, No.4 (October, 2002), pp.1061-1083. Indicates that the contention between Curtiss and the Imperial Russian Government over the purchase of fifty-six flying boats impeded Russia’s operations in the Black Sea for the first eighteen months of World War I.

Statiev, Alexander, **“Antonescu’s Eagles against Stalin’s Falcons: The Romanian Air Force, 1920-1941.”** Vol.66, No.4 (October, 2002), pp.1085-1113. Gives an account of how, though it was favored over the Army, the Air Force was assigned missions that exceeded its capacity so that it was brought to the brink of extinction.

Schwab, Stephen I. **“The Role of the Mexican Expeditionary Air Force in World War II: Late, Limited, but Symbolically Significant.”** Vol.66, No.4 (October, 2002), pp.1115-1140. Recounts the

raising and service of the 201st Mexican P-47 Squadron in the Philippines beginning in May, 1945.

Xiaoming Zhang, **“China’s Involvement in Laos during the Vietnam War, 1963-1975.”** Vol.66, No.4 (October, 2002), pp.1141-1166. Shows that the competition between Hanoi and Beijing for control over the Laotian Communists reflected an underlying mistrust between the two governments.

Rogers, Clifford J. **“Clausewitz, Genius, and the Rules.”** Vol.66, No.4 (October, 2002), pp.1167-1176. Contends that ‘genius rises above the rules’, attributed to Carl von Clausewitz (1780-1831), has been misunderstood, that what Clausewitz meant was that geniuses violate only the incorrect or oversimplified rules of bad theory.

Karsten, Peter, **“The ‘Naval Aristocracy’ and the ‘Young Turks’ of the *Fin de Siècle*: A Dotting of the ‘I’s and Crossing of the ‘T’s.”** Vol.66, No.4 (October, 2002), pp.1177-1180. Undertakes to determine whether the social backgrounds of the ‘Young Turk’ generation of officers of the late-nineteenth century ‘New Navy’ played a role in their careers.

Vol.67, No.1 (January, 2003)

Boesche, Roger, **“Kautilya’s *Arthaśāstra* on War and Diplomacy in Ancient India.”** Vol.67, No.1 (January, 2003), pp.9-37. Kautilya is believed to have been an adviser to the founder of the Mauryan Empire, Chandragupta (c.317-293 B.C.E.).

Leggiere, Michael V. **“From Berlin to Leipzig: Napoleon’s Gamble in North Germany, 1813.”** Vol.67, No.1 (January, 2003), pp.39-48. Claims that the Allies’ defense of Berlin defeated Napoleon’s strategy. Significantly contributing to his expulsion from Germany.

Sumida, Jon Tetsuro, **“A Matter of Timing: The Royal Navy and the Tactics of Decisive Battle, 1912-1916.”** Vol.67, No.1 (January, 2003), pp.85-136. Advances the explanation that the Admiralty’s adoption of a secret tactical system in 1912 interfered with the development of equipment and methods suitable for alternate forms of battle fleet action, with consequences for the Battle of Jutland.

Perrun, Jody, **“Best-Laid Plans: Guy Simonds and Operation Totalize, 7-10 August 1944.”** Vol.67, No.1 (January, 2003), pp.137-173. Probes the role of airpower in Operation Totalize, which, the author claims, calls for a reassessment of Lieutenant General Simonds (1903-1974) leadership of the II Canadian Corps.

Pribbenow II, Merle L. **“The -Ology War: Technology and Ideology in the Vietnamese Defense of Hanoi, 1967.”** Vol.67, No.1 (January, 2003), pp.175-200. Considers the multiple factors in the recovery of the air defenses of Hanoi following near disaster in 1967.

Cogan, Charles G. **“Desert One and Its Disorders.”** Vol.67, No.1 (January, 2003), pp.201-216.

Argues that the failure of the attempt to rescue the hostages in Iran, 1980, provoked the principle of joint operations in the U.S. Armed Forces and the consolidation of Special Forces under a Special Operations Command.

Vol.67, No.2 (April, 2003)

Bertosa, Brian, **“The Supply of Hoplite Equipment by the Athenian State down to the Lamian War [323-322 B.C.E.]”** Vol.67, No.2 (April, 2003), pp.361-379. Covers the break with tradition in the *polis* of Athens in 335 B.C.E. when arms and armor were provided to citizens, including, for the first time, the *thetes* (poor), who had not previously been able to serve as hoplites.

Cassidy, Ben, **“Machiavelli and the Ideology of the Offensive: Gunpowder Weapons in *The Art of War*.”** Vol.67, No.2 (April, 2003), pp.381-404. Disputes the interpretation that, in his *Art of War*, Niccolò Machiavelli (1469-1527) completely rejects the use of both cannon and hand-held firearms, explaining that his downplaying of the use of gunpowder weapons was due to Machiavelli's association of cannons and handguns with the defensive, while he endorsed the offensive.

Castel, Albert, **“Liddell Hart's *Sherman*: Propaganda as History.”** Vol.67, No.2 (April, 2003), pp.405-426. Concludes that Liddell Hart's 1929 biography of U.S. Civil War General William Tecumseh Sherman (1820-1891) is seriously flawed, both factually and analytically, because it was written to validate the author's concept of the 'indirect approach' in warfare.

Doughty, Robert A. **“French Strategy in 1914: Joffre's Own.”** Vol.67, No.2 (April, 2003), pp.427-454.

Karau, Mark, **“Twisting the Dragon's Tail: The Zeebrugge and Ostend Raids of 1918.”** Vol.67, No.2 (April, 2003), pp.455-481.

Lock-Pullan, Richard, **“‘An Inward Looking Time’: The United States Army, 1973-1976.”** Vol.67, No.2 (April, 2003), pp.483-511. Rejects the explanation that the immediate post-Vietnam War reforms were primarily shaped by the recent conflict in Southeast Asia, insisting, instead, that of greater importance was the end of the draft and the lessons drawn from the 1973 Arab-Israeli War by General William E. DePuy (1919-1992).

Holmes, Terence M. **“‘One Throw of the Gambler's Dice’: A Comment on Holger Herwig's View of the Schlieffen Plan.”** Vol.67, No.2 (April, 2003), pp.513-516.

Stevenson, Matthew, **“Memoirs: War's End on Okinawa: In Search of Captain Robert Fowler.”** Vol.67, No.2 (April, 2003), pp.517-528. U.S.M.C. Captain Fowler, who was killed on Okinawa on 12 June, 1945, was a close friend of the author's father.

North, Johnathan, **“General Hoche and Counterinsurgency.”** Vol.67, No.2 (April, 2003), pp.529-540.

Louis Lazare Hoche (1768-1797) was a General of Revolutionary France whose service included the successful suppression of the Catholic Royalist Revolt in the Vendée.

Vol.67, No.3 (July, 2003)

Johnson, R.A. “**‘Russians at the Gates of India’?: Planning the Defence of India, 1885-1900.**”

Vol.67, No.3 (July, 2003), pp.697-743.

Holmes, Terence M. “**Classical Blitzkrieg: The Untimely Modernity of Schlieffen’s Cannae Programme.**” Vol.67, No.3 (July, 2003), pp.745-771. Reveals that the Chief of the Prussian General Staff, Count Alfred von Schlieffen (1891-1906), only adopted the Cannae paradigm in 1909, four years *after* he had formulated his plans for war with France, and that this paradigm inadvertently fit subsequent concepts for mechanized warfare.

Percy, William Alexander, “**Jim Crow and Uncle Sam: The Tuskegee Flying Units and the U.S. Army Air Forces in Europe during World War II.**” Vol.67, No.3 (July, 2003), pp.773-810. Links the success of the African American 99th Fighter Squadron and the 332nd Fighter Group with President Harry S. Truman’s decision to end segregation in the Armed Forces.

Loss, Christopher P. “**Reading between Enemy Lines: Armed Services Editions and World War II.**”

Vol.67, No.3 (July, 2003), pp.811-834.

Lasterle, Philippe, “**Could Admiral Gensoul have Averted the Tragedy of Mers el-Kébir?**” Vol.67, No.3 (July, 2003), pp.835-844. Admiral Marcel-Bruno Gensoul (1880-1973) commanded the French fleet at Mers el-Kébir, Algeria, when it was bombarded by a British force commanded by Admiral James Somerville (1882-1949) on 3 July, 1940.

Borch, Fred L. “**Comparing Pearl Harbor and ‘9/11’: Intelligence Failure? American Unpreparedness? Military Responsibility?**” Vol.67, No.3 (July, 2003), pp.845-860.

Wetta, Frank J. and Novelli, Martin A. “**Review Essay: ‘Now a Major Motion Picture’: War Films and Hollywood’s New Patriotism.**” Vol.67, No.3 (July, 2003), pp.861-882. Suggests that the ‘New Patriotism’ displayed in films (1998-2002) celebrates loyalty to one’s comrades in battle and the ability to survive the horrific experience of modern combat rather than any stated or understood national or public rationales for whatever a war is being fought.

Bernstein, Barton J. “**Reconsidering the ‘Atomic General’: Leslie R. Groves.**” Vol.67, No.3 (July, 2003), pp.883-920. A critical review of the influential published works, the substantial archival sources, and an attempt to separate fact from fiction regarding specific controversial issues.

Settle, Frank; Whaley, Tom and Blackmer, Elizabeth, “**Alsos Digital Library for Nuclear Issues.**”

Vol.67, No.3 (July, 2003), pp.921-923.

Vol.67, No.4 (October, 2003)

Davis, Robert S. **“Escape from Andersonville: A Study in Isolation and Imprisonment.”** Vol.67, No.4 (October, 2003), pp.1065-1081. Seeks to understand why only some two dozen Union prisoners escaped from Andersonville within the larger context of the P.O.W. experience in later conflicts.

Todman, Daniel, **“*Sans peur et sans reproche: The Retirement, Death, and Mourning of Sir Douglas Haig, 1918-1928.*”** Vol.67, No.4 (October, 2003), pp.1083-1106.

Hone, Trent, **“The Evolution of Fleet Tactical Doctrine in the U.S. Navy, 1922-1941.”** Vol.67, No.4 (October, 2003), pp.1107-1148. Establishes how the Navy intended to use the battleships stationed at Pearl Harbor in battle, including Admiral Husband E. Kimmel’s (1882-1968) plans for a decisive fleet engagement in the Central Pacific.

Mann, B. David, **“Japanese Defense of Bataan, Luzon, Philippine Islands, 16 December 1944 – 4 September, 1945.”** Vol.67, No.4 (October, 2003), pp.1149-1176.

Tanner, Harold M. **“Guerrilla, Mobile, and Base Warfare in Communist Military Operations in Manchuria, 1945-1947.”** Vol.67, No.4 (October, 2003), pp.1177-1222. Relates how, after initial setbacks while relying on a conventional war strategy, the Communists developed a hybrid strategy that turned the tide of the Civil War, enabling them to make a more successful transition from guerrilla to conventional warfare.

Regnault, Jean-Marc, **“France’s Search for Nuclear Test Sites, 1957-1963.”** Vol.67, No.4 (October, 2003), pp.1223-1248. Reckons with the consequences for French Polynesia and New Caledonia of the mother country’s search for an alternative to the Sahara Desert in Algeria as a nuclear test site.

Birtle, Andrew J. **“The Origins of the Legion of the United States.”** Vol.67, No.4 (October, 2003), pp.1249-1262. Offers the possibility that the reorganization of the U.S. Army in 1792 was based on the writings of Colonel Henry Bouquet (1719-1765), a noted veteran of the Indian Frontier.

Rudd, Gordon W. **“Review Essay: The Israeli Revisionist Historians and the Arab-Israeli Conflict Part One: From the Founding of Zionism to the 1967 War.”** Vol.67, No.4 (October, 2003), pp.1263-1270; **“Part Two: From the 1967 War to the Present.”** Vol.68, No.1 (January, 2004), pp.225-231.

Vol.68, No.1 (January, 2004)

Paul, Michael C. **“The Military Revolution in Russia, 1550-1682.”** Vol.68, No.1 (January, 2004),

pp.9-45. Asserts that the Armed Forces of the tsars underwent truly revolutionary changes between the mid-sixteenth and late-seventeenth centuries that made Imperial Russia a significant power and laid the groundwork for the reforms of Peter the Great.

Fitzharris, Joseph C. **“Field Officer Courts and the U.S. Civil War Military Justice.”** Vol.68, No.1 (January, 2004), pp.47-72. Looks at the neglected topic of field officer courts which, by a Congressional Act of July, 1862, was supposed to replace the more arbitrary regimental courts-martial system.

Jackman, Steven D. **“Shoulder to Shoulder: Close Control and ‘Old Prussian Drill’ in German Offensive Infantry Tactics, 1871-1914.”** Vol.68, No.1 (January, 2004), pp.73-104.

Beaver, Daniel R. **“The U.S. War Department in the Gaslight Era: Stephen Vincent Benét at the Ordnance Department, 1870-91.”** Vol.68, No.1 (January, 2004)pp.105-132.

Nelson, Anna Kasten, **“Anna M. Rosenberg, an ‘Honorary Man’.**” Vol.68, No.1 (January, 2004), pp.133-161. Considers how and why Defense Secretary George C. Marshall (1880-1959) bucked political and gender assumptions when he appointed a pro-New Deal, Jewish immigrant woman, Anna M. Rosenberg (1899-1983), as the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower.

Veith, George J. and Pribbenow, Merle L., II, **“ ‘Fighting is an Art’: The Army of the Republic of Vietnam’s Defense of Xuan Loc, 9 – 21 April, 1975.”** Vol.68, No.1 (January, 2004), pp.163-213. Provides an account of the successful defensive operation of Brigadier General Lê Minh Đảo’s (1933-2020) 18th Division, demonstrating what A.R.V.N. units were capable of accomplishing when led by commanded by inspiring leaders.

Steffen, Dirk, **“The Holtzendorff Memorandum of 22 December, 1916, and Germany’s Declaration of Unrestricted U-Boat Warfare.”** Vol.68, No.1 (January, 2004), pp.215-224. Examines how the Chief of the Imperial German Navy’s Admiralty Staff, Henning von Holtzendorff (1853-1919), successfully argued that Germany could risk provoking the United States entering the war in return for starving Great Britain into submission.

Rudd, Gordon W. **“Review Essay: The Israeli Revisionist Historians and the Arab-Israeli Conflict Part Two: From the Founding of Zionism to the 1967 War.”** Vol.67, No.4 (October, 2003), pp.1263-1270; **“Part Two: From the 1967 War to the Present.”** Vol.68, No.1 (January, 2004), pp.225-231.

Vandervort, Bruce, **“Review Essay: Small Wars in North America.”** Vol.68, No.1 (January, 2004), pp.233-238. Covers works on conflicts with Native American peoples, particularly in the Old West.

Vol.68, No.2 (April, 2004)

Stone, John, **“Technology, Society, and the Infantry Revolution of the Fourteenth Century.”** Vol.68,

No.2 (April, 2004), pp.361-380. Challenges the concept of changes in warfare provoking changes in society, insisting, instead, that the opposite was case, calling for a new approach to understanding late-Medieval military developments based on a greater appreciation of the societies from which armies were raised.

Becker, Ann M. **“Smallpox in Washington’s Army: Strategic Implications of the Disease during the American Revolutionary War.”** Vol.68, No.2 (April, 2004), pp.381-430.

Bryant, G.J. **“Asymmetric Warfare: The British Experience in Eighteenth-Century India.”** Vol.68, No.2 (April, 2004), pp.431-469. Juxtaposes the adaption to new circumstance of Indian versus British military forces, proposing that while the British were able to retain their military superiority, Indian rulers were unable to overcome political obstacles that interfered with the adoption of European methods.

Weddle, Kevin J. **“‘The Magic Touch of Reform’: Samuel Francis Du Pont and the Efficiency Board of 1855.”** Vol.68, No.2 (April, 2004), pp.471-504. Using previously neglected sources, this article considers how political and military leaders, notably Commander Du Pont (1803-1865), broke the logjam produced by a system of promotion based exclusively on seniority.

Stolfi, Russell H.S. **“A Critique of Pure Success: Inchon Revisited, Revised, and Contrasted.”** Vol.68, No.2 (April, 2004), pp.505-525. Critiques the performance of the ground forces that were successfully landed at Inchon, proposing that a comparative example of German operations in the Baltic in 1941 suggests greater boldness would have rewarded U.S. forces.

Atkinson, Rick, **“Speech to the U.S. Commission on Military History: Washington, 1 November, 2003.”** Vol.68, No.2 (April, 2004), pp.527-533.

Arnold, James R. **“A Reappraisal of Column Versus Line in the Peninsular War.”** Vol.68, No.2 (April, 2004), pp.535-552. Disputes the influential English historian of the Napoleonic Wars, Sir Charles Oman’s (1860-1946), explanation for the superiority of the British line over the French column.

Carland, John M. **“Winning the Vietnam War: Westmoreland’s Approach in Two Documents.”** Vol.68, No.2 (April, 2004), pp.553-574.

Vol.68, No.3 (July, 2004)

Lee, Wayne E. **“Fortify, Fight, or Flee: Tuscarora and Cherokee Defensive Warfare and Military Culture Adaptation.”** Vol.68, No.3 (July, 2004), pp.713-770.

Greenhalgh, Elizabeth, **“Myth and memory: Sir Douglas Haig and the Imposition of Allied Unified Command in March, 1918.”** Vol.68, No.3 (July, 2004), pp.771-820. Debunks Field Marshal Haig’s (1861-1928) claim that he deserves credit for Chief of the French General Staff, Ferdinand Foch’s

(1851-1929), appointment as Allied Supreme Commander.

Bechthold, B. Michael, **“A Question of Success: Tactical Air Doctrine and Practice in North Africa, 1942-43.”** Vol.68, No.3 (July, 2004), 821-851. Reveals that the tactical doctrine of the U.S. Army Air Force was found wanting in North Africa in 1942, leading to the adoption of the proven British Eighth Army Western Desert Air Force model of ground-air cooperation.

Dingman, Roger V. **“Language at War: U.S. Marine Corps Japanese Language Officers in the Pacific.”** Vol.68, No.3 (July, 2004), pp.853-883. Analyzes the origins, training, experiences, and recollections of Caucasian Japanese language officers, including the shift from translating to facilitate life-taking to lifesaving.

Tal, David, **“Between Intuition and Professionalism: Israeli Military Leadership during the 1948 Palestine War.”** Vol.68, No.3 (July, 2004), pp.885-909.

Malkasian, Carter, **“Toward a Better Understanding of Attrition: The Korean and Vietnam Wars.”** Vol.68, No.3 (July, 2004), pp.911-942.

Vol.68, No.4 (October, 2004)

Bachrach, David S. **“The Military Administration of England: The Royal Artillery (1216-1272).”** Vol.68, No.4 (October, 2004), pp.1083-1104. By describing an example of the sophisticated military administration during the reign of King Henry III, specifically involving siege engines, the author argues that much of the military innovations that have been attributed to Henry III's successor, King Edward I, already existed before he ascended the throne.

Capponi, Niccolò, **“Le Palle di Marte: Military Strategy and Diplomacy in the Grand Duchy of Tuscany under Ferdinand II de' Medici (1621-1670).”** Vol.68, No.4 (October, 2004), pp.1105-1141.

Burrell, Robert S. **“Breaking the Cycle of Iwo Jima Mythology: A Strategic Study of Operation Detachment.”** Vol.68, No.4 (October, 2004), pp.1143-1186. Questions the justification for the invasion of Iwo Jima, 19 February, 1945, explaining that the decision to invade was a matter of the competing agendas of the Navy, Army, and Army Air Force.

Gat, Moshe, **“On the Use of Air Power and Its Effect on the Outbreak of the Six Day War.”** Vol.68, No.4 (October, 2004), pp.1187-1215. Insists that, whatever advantages Israel's increased reliance on air power following the Suez Campaign, 1956, it inadvertently led to a deterioration of Arab-Israeli relations. See: Elron, Zeev and Gat, Moshe, **“Remarks on Air Power and the Six-Day War [And Response].”** Vol.69, No.3 (July, 2005), pp.811-820.

Black, Jeremy, **“Determinisms and Other Issues.”** Vol.68, No.4 (October, 2004), pp.1217-1232.

Addresses the multiple problems surrounding the ways in which the role of technology in history has been interpreted.

Rogers, Clifford J. **“Review Essay: The Field & the Forge.”** Vol.68, No.4 (October, 2004), pp.1233-1239. Population, production, and power in the pre-industrial West.

Vol.69, No.1 (January, 2005)

Swope, Kenneth M. **“Crouching Tigers, Secret Weapons: Military Technology Employed during the Sino-Japanese War, 1592-1598.”** Vol.69, No.1 (January, 2005), pp.11-41. Reviews the major military technology employed by the belligerents, showing, contesting the conventional explanation that superior numbers and the death of Toyotomi Hideyoshi's (1537-1598) death were the deciding factors in Japan's defeat.

Harari, Yuval Noah, **“Martial Illusions: War and Disillusionment in Twentieth-Century and Renaissance Military memoirs.”** Vol.69, No.1 (January, 2005), pp.43-72. Sets forth the notion that the change in the image of war from one that was positive and romantic to disillusionment owed more to soldiers' self-perceptions and expectations that developments in technology produced.

Bartlett, Merrill L. **“Ben Hebard Fuller and the Genesis of a Modern United States Marine Corps, 1891-1934.”** Vol.69, No.1 (January, 2005), pp.73-91.

Rodgers, Thomas E. **“Billy Yank and G.I. Joe: An Exploratory Essay on the Sociopolitical Dimensions of Soldier Motivation.”** Vol.69, No.1 (January, 2005), pp.93-121. Presents the assertion that the pre-war socialization of Civil War Volunteers that enabled them to perform effectively in combat was missing among the citizen-soldiers of World War II.

Wood, James A. **“Captive Historians, Captivated Audience: The German Military History Program, 1945-1961.”** Vol.69, No.1 (January, 2005), pp.123-147. Delves into the work and motivations of Wehrmacht officers who were employed the United States Government to describe their wartime experiences concerning Germany's war effort.

Jeans, Roger B. **“Victims or Victimizers? Museums, Textbooks, and the War Debate in Contemporary Japan.”** Vol.69, No.1 (January, 2005), pp.149-195. Shows that, rather than possessing a unified view of the war, the 'correct history' of the conflict is contested between conservatives, the right-wing, moderates, and the left-wing.

Sheldon, Rose Mary, **“Review Essay: *The Military History of Ancient Israel* by Richard A. Gabriel.”** Vol.69, No.1 (January, 2005), pp.197-204.

Parker, Geoffrey, **“Review Essay: The ‘Military Revolution’, 1550-2005: From Belfast to Barcelona**

and the Hague.” Vol.69, No.1 (January, 2005), pp.205-209.

Danchev, Alex, **“Review Essay: War Stories.”** Vol.69, No.1 (January, 2005), pp.211-215. Covers works about the occupation of war photographers.

Vol.69, No.2 (April, 2005)

Bruce, Susannah Ural, **“ ‘Remember Your Country and Keep up Its Credit’: Irish Volunteers and the Union Army, 1861-1865.”** Vol.69, No.2 (April, 2005), pp.331-359. Puts forward the explanation that a central theme in the support of Irish immigrants for the Union cause was their dual loyalties to both their new and original homelands, support that was tested by the rising casualties, Emancipation Proclamation, and the introduction of the draft.

Lambert, Nicholas A. **“Strategic Command and Control for Maneuver Warfare: Creation of the Royal Navy’s ‘War Room’ System, 1905-1915.”** Vol.69, No.2 (April, 2005), pp.361-410.

Hughes, Matthew, **“Logistics and the Chaco War: Bolivia versus Paraguay, 1932-1935.”** Vol.69, No.2 (April, 2005), pp.411-437. Employs a broad definition of logistics that includes the acquisition of matériel before the outbreak of war, as well as the establishment of national and international supply lines during the war.

Ford, Douglas, **“British Intelligence on Japanese Army Moral during the Pacific War: Logical Analysis or Racial Stereotyping?”** Vol.69, No.2 (April, 2005), pp.439-474.

Reiss, Matthias, **“Bronzed Bodies behind Barbed Wire: Masculinity and the Treatment of German Prisoners of War in the United States in World War II.”** Vol.69, No.2 (April, 2005), pp.475-504. In contrast to other Allied nations, the War Department chose not to parole German P.O.W.s being held in the United States into the custody of employers because of concerns over the potential for women being attracted to these prisoners.

Geissler, Suzanne, **“Professor Dennis Mahan Speaks out on West Point Chapel Issues, 1850.”** Vol.69, No.2 (April, 2005), pp.505-519. An 1850 letter from West Point professor to the Secretary of War in which Mahan (1802-1871) expressed his opposition to the academy’s Chaplain always having to be Episcopalian and mandatory chapel attendance for staff.

Browning, Reed, **“Review Essay: New Views on the Silesian Wars.”** Vol.69, No.2 (April, 2005), pp.521-534. Concerning the series of conflicts, 1740-42, 1744-45, and 1756-63, fought between Austria and the Kingdom of Prussia, led by Frederick the Great (1712-1786).

Vol.69, No.3 (July, 2005)

Roy, Kaushik, **“Military Synthesis in South Asia: Armies, Warfare, and Indian Society, c.1740-1849.”** Vol.69, No.3 (July, 2005), pp.651-690. Attempts to determine why, with both the British East India Company and the Mughal successor states developing hybrid military forces, it was the E.I.C.’s armies that, more often than not, achieved victory.

Miller, Stephen M. **“In Support of the ‘Imperial Mission’? Volunteering for the South African War, 1899-1902.”** Vol.69, No.3 (July, 2005), pp.691-711. Inquires into the motives of British civilians who responded to the call for recruits by enlisting in the Volunteers, the Militia, or the Imperial Yeomanry.

Lunn, Joe, **“Male Identity and Martial Codes of Honor: A Comparison of the War Memoirs of Robert Graves, Ernst Jünger, and Kande Kamara.”** Vol.69, No.3 (July, 2005), pp.713-735. The memoirs of the British officer and author, Robert Graves (1895-1985), the German soldier and author, Ernst Jünger (1895-1998), and the French Colonial soldier from West Africa, Kande Kamara.

Neufeld, Michael J. **“The End of the Army Space Program: Interservice Rivalry and the Transfer of the von Braun Group to N.A.S.A., 1958-1959.”** Vol.69, No.3 (July, 2005), pp.737-757.

Priest, Andrew, **“‘In Common Cause’: The N.A.T.O. Multilateral Force and the Mixed-Manning Demonstration on the U.S.S. *Claude V. Ricketts*, 1964-1965.”** Vol.69, No.3 (July, 2005), pp.759-789. The crew of the destroyer (DDG-5) U.S.S. *Claude V. Ricketts* included U.S., British, Dutch, Greek, Italian, Turkish, and West German officers and men.

Meixsel, Richard, **“A Uniform Story.”** Vol.69, No.3 (July, 2005), pp.791-799. Debunks the often-repeated story that Douglas MacArthur (1880-1964) designed a field marshal’s uniform for his role as Philippine military advisor in the 1930s.

Hanley, Brian and Burrell, Robert S. **“The Myth of Iwo Jima: A Rebuttal [And Response].”** Vol.69, No.3 (July, 2005), pp.801-809.

Elron, Zeev and Gat, Moshe, **“Remarks on Air Power and the Six-Day War [And Response].”** Vol.69, No.3 (July, 2005), pp.811-820.

Bird, Keith, **“Review Essay: The Tirpitz Legacy: The Political Ideology of German Sea Power.”** Vol.69, No.3 (July, 2005), pp.821-825.

Black, Jeremy, **“Review Essay: War Stories.”** Vol.69, No.3 (July, 2005), pp.827-832. The author critiques a pair of books by John Mosier that purport to address myths about the World Wars.

Vol.69, No.4 (October, 2005)

Worthing, Peter, **"The Road through Whampoa: The Early Career of He Yingqin."** Vol.69, No.4 (October, 2005), pp.953-985. Determines that He Yingqin (1890-1987) owed his repeated promotions to his good working relationship with Jiang Jieshi (Chiang Kai-shek, 1887-1975), a relationship that was based on shared experiences and values.

Jones, Mark C. **"Give Credit where Credit is Due: The Dutch Role in the Development and Deployment of the Submarine Schnorkel."** Vol.69, No.4 (October, 2005), pp.987-1012.

Mulligan, Timothy P. **"Ship-of-the-Line or Atlantic Raider? Battleship *Bismarck* between Design Limitations and Naval Strategy."** Vol.69, No.4 (October, 2005), pp.1013-1044.

Warren, Mame, **"Focal Point of the Fleet: U.S. Navy Photographic Activities in World War II."** Vol.69, No.4 (October, 2005), pp.1045-1079. Concerned with the work of Edward Streichen (1879-1973) and his team of professional photographers.

Krebs, Gerhard, **"Operation Super Sunrise? Japanese-United States Peace Feelers in Switzerland, 1945."** Vol.69, No.4 (October, 2005), pp.1081-1120. Explains why informal discussions between the Japanese Naval Commander from the embassy in Berlin, Fujimura Yoshikazu, and Allen W. Dulles (1893-1969) of the U.S. Office of Strategic Services failed to develop into formal communications.

Spector, Ronald H. **"After Hiroshima: Allied Military Occupations and the Fate of Japan's Empire, 1945-1947."** Vol.69, No.4 (October, 2005), pp.1121-1136. The Allies confronted problems far beyond the disarming of Japanese troops in occupied China, Korea, and Southeast Asia, where internal conflicts rendered the plans of the Allied powers irrelevant.

Coleman, Bradley Lynn, **"The Colombian Army in Korea, 1950-1954."** Vol.69, No.4 (October, 2005), pp.1137-1177. Uses the service history of the Colombian Battalion as an example of the United Nations' multi-national coalition force.

Sumida, Jon Tetsuro, **"Review Essay: Gunnery, Procurement, and Strategy in the *Dreadnought* Era."** Vol.69, No.4 (October, 2005), pp.1179-1187.

Vol.70, No.1 (January, 2006)

Brady, Andrea, **"Dying with Honour: Literary Propaganda and the Second English Civil War."** Vol.70, No.1 (January, 2006), pp.9-30. Deals with the coverage in Parliamentary versus Royalist propaganda of the executions of Sir Charles Lucas and Sir George Lisle in 1648, following General Thomas Fairfax's (1612-1671) siege of Colchester.

Irish, Kerry E. **"Apt Pupil: Dwight Eisenhower and the 1930 Industrial Mobilization Plan."** Vol.70, No.1 (January, 2006), pp.31-61. While the detailed plan for industrial mobilization drawn up by

Eisenhower (1890-1969) as a staff officer was not formally implemented, it nevertheless provided the basis for a more efficient transition to war production than had taken place in World War I.

Moore, Bob, **“Unwanted Guests in Troubled Times: German Prisoners of War in the Union of South Africa, 1942-1943.”** Vol.70, No.1 (January, 2006), pp.63-90. Contrasts the potential threats to domestic security in South Africa during a time of internal dissention of holding German P.O.W.s with the less troublesome experience with Italian prisoners.

Hawkins, John M. **“The Costs of Artillery: Eliminating Harassment and Interdiction Fire During the Vietnam War.”** Vol.70, No.1 (January, 2006), pp.91-122. Determines that the reason that the use of U.S. artillery for harassment and interdiction had been all but eliminated by June, 1970, was due to budgetary pressures and not from concerns over collateral damage.

Dunn, John P. **“Americans in the Nineteenth Century Egyptian Army: A Selected Bibliography.”** Vol.70, No.1 (January, 2006), pp.123-136. Ismail (r.1863-1879), grandson of Muhammad Ali Pasha, employed officers from the United States, including both veterans from both sides in the Civil War and serving officers in the postwar United States Army.

Gordon, David M. **“Historiographical Essay: The China-Japan War, 1931-1945.”** Vol.70, No.1 (January, 2006), pp.137-182.

Carland, John M. **“Review Essay: Abandoning Vietnam.”** Vol.70, No.1 (January, 2006), pp.183-186. Examines James H. Willbanks 2004 book about the withdrawal of direct U.S. involvement in the war, beginning in 1968, to the victorious conclusion of the North Vietnamese invasion in 1975.

Sadkovich, James J. **“Review Essay: Balkan Battlefields.”** Vol.70, No.1 (January, 2006), pp.187-194. Concerns works on the violent breakup of Yugoslavia in the 1990s.

Vol.70, No.2 (April, 2006)

Kagan, Kimberly, **“Redefining Roman Grand Strategy.”** Vol.70, No.2 (April, 2006), pp.333-362. By scrutinizing the patterns of troop movements provided by surviving sources, the author proposes that Roman Emperors directed how to allocate resources empire-wide to meet objectives, which satisfies the definition of a grand strategy.

Liaropoulos, Andrew N. **“Revolutions in Warfare: Theoretical Paradigms and Historical Evidence: The Napoleonic and First World War Revolutions in Military Affairs.”** Vol.70, No.2 (April, 2006), pp.363-384.

Reid, Brian Holden, **“‘A Signpost that was Missing?’ Reconsidering British Lessons from the American Civil War.”** Vol.70, No.2 (April, 2006), pp.385-414. Focuses on the works of the military

authors, notably General J.F.C. Fuller (1878-1966) and Captain Basil Liddell Hart (1895-1970), to consider the ‘lessons’ they perceived from their study of the U.S. Civil War.

Ortiz, Stephen R. **“The ‘New Deal’ for Veterans: The Economy Act [1934], the Veterans of Foreign Wars, and the Origins of New Deal Dissent.”** Vol.70, No.2 (April, 2006), pp.415-438.

Jones, Edgar, **“‘L.M.F.’: The Use of Psychiatric Stigma in the Royal Air Force during the Second World War.”** Vol.70, No.2 (April, 2006), pp.439-458. Explores the consequences of the introduction by the R.A.F. of the term ‘Lack of Moral Fibre’ in April, 1940, which was intended to stigmatize aircrew who, without a medical reason, refused to fly.

Pribbenow, Merle L., II, **“A Tale of Five Generals: Vietnam’s Invasion of Cambodia.”** Vol.70, No.2 (April, 2006), pp.459-486. Concerned the meticulously planned and well executed 1978-79 invasion of neighboring Cambodia by the Communist forces of the newly united Vietnam, which included both an amphibious assault and combined arms mechanized columns.

Vol.70, No.3 (July, 2006)

May, Timothy, **“The Training of an Inner Asian Nomad Army in the Pre-Modern Period.”** Vol.70, No.3 (July, 2006), pp.617-635. Confirms that nomadic ‘horse people’, such as the Mongols, employed more sophisticated training for war than had previously been imagined.

Cook, Tim, **“The Politics of Surrender: Canadian Soldiers and the Killing of Prisoners in the Great War.”** Vol.70, No.3 (July, 2006), pp.637-665.

McRandle, James and Quirk, James, **“The Blood Test Revisited: A New Look at German Casualty Counts in World War I.”** Vol.70, No.3 (July, 2006), pp.667-701. Tests Winston Churchill’s (1874-1965) claim that the Allies generally suffered higher casualties in battle on the Western Front than their German opponents by examining the German Medical Corps’ official history.

Sacca, John Wanda, **“Like Strangers in a Foreign Land: Chinese Officers Prepared at American Military Colleges, 1904-37.”** Vol.70, No.3 (July, 2006), pp.703-742. Relates how those Chinese officers who received military education in the United States during the turbulent period marked by the end of the Qing Dynasty and the establishment of the Republic were tainted by their foreign education and hampered by their lack of membership in any alumni associations.

Schwonek, Matthew R. **“Kazimierz Sosnkowski as Commander in Chief: The Government-in-Exile and Polish Strategy, 1932-1944.”** Vol.70, No.3 (July, 2006), pp.743-780.

Powers, Sandra L. **“Historiographical Essay: Studying the Art of War: Military Books known to American Officers and Their French Counterparts during the Second Half of the**

Eighteenth Century.” Vol.70, No.3 (July, 2006), pp.781-814.

Vol.70, No.4 (October, 2006)

Paoletti, Ciro, **“Prince Eugene of Savoy, the Toulon Expedition of 1707, and the English Historians: A Dissenting View.”** Vol.70, No.4 (October, 2006), pp.939-962. Using the siege of Toulon as an example, the author insists that most of the military histories of the period between 1688 and 1748 written by English speaking authors are flawed due to a failure to consult non-English contemporary sources.

Hunter, Mark C. **“The U.S. Naval Academy and Its Summer Cruises: Professionalization in the Antebellum U.S. Navy, 1845-1861.”** Vol.70, No.4 (October, 2006), pp.963-994.

Faust, Drew Gilpin, **“The 2006 George C. Marshall Lecture in Military History: ‘Numbers on Top of Numbers’: Counting the Civil War Dead.”** Vol.70, No.4 (October, 2006), pp.995-1009. The scale and destructiveness of the United States Civil War generated the assumption that the government had an obligation to accurately name and count the military dead.

Orange, Vincent, **“The German Air Force is Already ‘The Most Powerful in Europe’: Two Royal Air Force Officers Report on a Visit to Germany, 6-15 October, 1936.”** Vol.70, No.4 (October, 2006), pp.1011-1028. Presents the contents of an unpublished report by two R.A.F. officers who toured Germany to investigate the *Luftwaffe*, where they were well received and given access to both the latest aircraft and high-ranking air force personnel.

Peszke, Michael Alfred, **“Historiographical Essay: An Introduction to English-Language Literature on the Polish Armed Forces in World War II.”** Vol.70, No.4 (October, 2006), pp.1029-1064.

Porch, Douglas, **“Historiographical Essay: Writing History in the ‘End of History’ Era: Reflections on Historians and the GWOT.”** Vol.70, No.4 (October, 2006), pp.1065-1079. Addresses the danger of history being twisted by partisans, polemicists, and ideologues into an apologia for contemporary U.S. policy, and ultimately as a weapon of intimidation to silence doubt, dissent, disagreement, and even debate, which serves neither the cause of history, nor of policy and strategy formulation, nor even of democracy in a moment of national peril.

Spiller, Roger, **“Historiographical Essay: Military History and Its Fictions.”** Vol.70, No.4 (October, 2006), pp.1081-1097. Observes that military history’s intellectual authority has declined as other disciplines have taken more adventurous approaches to the study of war and assumed a more prominent role in contemporary military criticism.

Vol.71, No.1 (January, 2007)

Kagay, Donald J. **“The Defense of the Crown of Aragon during the War of the Two Pedros (1356-1366).”** Vol.71, No.1 (January, 2007), pp.11-33. Undertakes to show that the War of the Two Pedros established the administrative and military forces that would ultimately lead toward a unified Spanish kingdom in the fifteenth century.

Phillips, Gervase, **“Scapegoat Arm: Twentieth-Century Cavalry in Anglophone Historiography.”** Vol.71, No.1 (January, 2007), pp.37-74. Too often used as a scapegoat for failures in war and an obstacle to modernization in peacetime, this article reassesses the capabilities of early twentieth-century soldiers, with a consideration of the military history of Eastern Europe, presenting a more positive interpretation of role of cavalry in modern warfare.

Badsey, Stephen, **“The Boer War (1899-1902) and British Cavalry Doctrine: A Re-Evaluation.”** Vol.71, No.1 (January, 2007), pp.75-97. Rejecting the traditional interpretation, the article proposes that a cavalry reform movement incorporating dismounted tactics pre-dated the Second Anglo-Boer War, a mixture of mounted and dismounted tactics were used by both sides in the conflict, and that the problems experienced by cavalry were largely not of their own making

Bou, Jean, **“Cavalry, Firepower, and Swords: The Australian Light Horse and the Tactical Lessons of Cavalry Operations in Palestine, 1916-1918.”** Vol.71, No.1 (January, 2007), pp.99-125. Contrary to the traditions of the Australian mounted service, by the end of the Campaign in Palestine more than half of the Australian Light Horse were armed with both rifles and swords, relying on both fire and modern shock tactics.

Bielakowski, Alexander M. **“General Hawkins’ War: The Future of the Horse in the U.S. Cavalry.”** Vol.71, No.1 (January, 2007), pp.127-138. Provides an account of the career of Brigadier General Hamilton S. Hawkins III (1872-1950), who, despite the increasing significance of mechanized forces, steadfastly advocated for horse cavalry throughout the interwar period and into the Second World War.

Meilinger, Phillip S. **“A History of Effects-Based Air Operations.”** Vol.71, No.1 (January, 2007), pp.139-167. Surveys the problem of measuring the effectiveness of Air Operations due to the ready availability of metrics such as casualty numbers, bomb tonnage, and the number of sorties flown versus the lack of the intelligence apparatus with which to analyze the complex economic system of one’s opponents.

Milne, David, **“‘Our Equivalent of Guerrilla Warfare’: Walt Rostow and the Bombing of North Vietnam, 1961-1968.”** Vol.71, No.1 (January, 2007), pp.169-203. Claims that Walt Rostow’s (1916-2003) background as an economic historian led him to become one of the strongest advocates for the strategic bombing of North Vietnam.

Parker, Geoffrey, **“The Limits to Revolutions in Military Affairs: Maurice of Nassau, the Battle of Nieuwpoort (1600), and the Legacy.”** Vol.71, No.2 (April, 2007), pp.331-372. Probes the evolution of the use of volley fire by matchlock armed infantry, beginning with its use in Japan in the 1560s and by the Dutch in the 1590s, with its first use in combat in Europe at the battle of Nieuwpoort, 2 July, 1600.

White, Lorraine, **“Strategic Geography and the Spanish Habsburg Monarchy’s Failure to Recover Portugal, 1640-1668.”** Vol.71, No.2 (April, 2007), pp.373-409. Contrasting Alba’s (1507-1582) successful campaign in 1580 with the course of this mid-17th century conflict, the article considers the impact of geographic and climactic factors on the strategy, tactics, and logistics of the Spanish forces.

Jeans, Roger B., Jr. **“Alarm in Washington: A Wartime ‘Expose’ of Japan’s Biological Warfare Program.”** Vol.71, No.2 (April, 2007), pp.411-439. Discusses a book published in the summer of 1944 describing both Japan’s biological warfare program and the failure of the U.S. government to meet this threat, and the government and the media’s response to this publication, considering parallels with the 2001 anthrax ‘scares.’

Hadley, Gregory and Oglethorpe, James, **“Mackay’s ‘Betrayal’: Solving the Mystery of the ‘Sado Island Prisoner-of-War Massacre’.”** Vol.71, No.2 (April, 2007), pp.441-464. Conclusively demonstrates that the suppression of a supposed Japanese massacre of Allied prisoners working in a gold mine in Aikawa on Sado island in 1945 as presented in James MacKay’s 1996 book, *Betrayal in High Places*, is an intentional forgery.

Bronfeld, Saul, **“Fighting Outnumbered: The Impact of the Yom Kippur War on the U.S. Army.”** Vol.71, No.2 (April, 2007), pp.465-498. Illustrates the different ways in which the Yom Kippur War impacted the work of Generals William E. DePuy (1919-1992) and Donn A. Starry (1925-2011) in reforming the U.S. Army.

Kahn, David, **“The Prehistory of the General Staff.”** Vol.71, No.2 (April, 2007), pp.499-504. Sets forth the argument that the advent of the modern general staff system was the consequence of secularization, which provided control, bureaucracy, which rationalized endeavor, and management, which overcame specialization.

Vandervort, Bruce, **“Review Essay: From the Halls of Montezuma.”** Vol.71, No.2 (April, 2007), pp.505-511. Native American resistance to European conquest to the 19th century.

Vol.71, No.3 (July, 2007)

Guilmartin, John F., Jr. **“The Earliest Shipboard Gunpowder Ordnance: An Analysis of its Technical Parameters and Tactical Capabilities.”** Vol.71, No.3 (July, 2007), pp.649-669. Various obstacles presented difficulties to the effective use of early cannons onboard ships, but

shortly after 1400 these were swiftly overcome, so that ordnance became an increasingly important weapon on Mediterranean war galleys and Portuguese caravels.

Manning, Roger B. **“Styles of Command in Seventeenth Century English Armies.”** Vol.71, No.3 (July, 2007), pp.671-699. Proposes that aristocratic officers were reluctant to accept the idea that military hierarchies had superseded social hierarchies or that in warfare they should pursue military objectives rather than personal honor, so that, excepting the New Model Army, English military leadership was backwards in comparison with its continental counterparts.

Lee, Wayne E. **“Peace Chiefs and Blood Revenge: Patterns of Restraint in Native American Warfare, 1500-1800.”** Vol.71, No.3 (July, 2007), pp.701-741. Although eastern Native American societies were willing to attempt to destroy an enemy, including indiscriminate killing, patterns of restraint inherent to their social authority, cultural values, and methods of warfare tended to limit escalation and the overall level of violence.

Philpott, William and Alexander, Martin S. **“The French and the British Field Force: Moral Support or Material Contribution?”** Vol.71, No.3 (July, 2007), pp.743-772. Contends that, even though France viewed the military benefit of the British commitment of a field army if war broke out with Germany as unsubstantial, the moral value of such a promise meant that it played an important role in France’s preparations for war.

Hill, Alexander, **“British Lend Lease Aid and the Soviet War Effort, June 1941 – June 1942.”** Vol.71, No.3 (July, 2007), pp.773-808. Measures the significance of the aid provided by Great Britain during the First Moscow Protocol to the end of June, 1942.

Donnelly, William M. **“ ‘The Best Army that can be put in the Field in the Circumstances’: The U.S. Army, July 1951 – July 1953.”** Vol.71, No.3 (July, 2007), pp.809-847. Reckons with the difficulties faced by career soldiers during the Korean War due to limited national mobilization and the cuts to the Army’s budget by President Harry S. Truman (1945-1953).

Rafuse, Ethan S. **“Historiographical Essays: Still a Mystery? General Grant and the Histories, 1981-2006.”** Vol.71, No.3 (July, 2007), pp.849-874. Traces the evolution of the assessment of General Ulysses S. Grant (1822-1885), from William S. McFeely’s 1981 Pulitzer Prize-winning study to the present day.

Kiesling, Eugenia C. **“Historiographical Essays: Illuminating ‘Strange Defeat’ and ‘Pyrrhic Victory’: The Historian Robert A. Doughty.”** Vol.71, No.3 (July, 2007), pp.875-888. Reviews the English language publications on the performance of France in both World Wars and how Brigadier General (Rtd.) Robert A. Doughty (b.1943) has sought to teach the U.S. Army how to harness historical study in the interest of doctrinal development.

Ulbrich, David J. **“The Long Lost ‘Tentative Manual for Defense of Advance Bases’ (1936).”** Vol.71,

No.3 (July, 2007), pp.889-901. In 1998 a copy of the Marine Corps' previously lost 1936 Tentative Manual for Defense of Advance Bases was uncovered, a manual that displays the culmination of decades of doctrinal thinking about the defense of island bases against enemy amphibious, naval, and aerial assaults.

Vol.71, No.4 (October, 2007)

Lloyd, Nick, “**‘With Faith and without Fear’: Sir Douglas Haig’s Command of First Army during 1915.**” Vol.71, No.4 (October, 2007), pp.1051-1076. Shines a light on the neglected performance of Sir Douglas Haig (1861-1928) as commander of the B.E.F.’s First Army during 1915.

Kuhlman, Erika, “**American Doughboys and German Fräuleins: Sexuality, Patriarchy, and the Privilege in the American-Occupied Rhineland, 1918-23.**” Vol.71, No.4 (October, 2007), pp.1077-1106.

Peifer, Douglas C. “**The Past in the Present: Passion, Politics, and the Historical Profession in the German and British Pardon Campaigns.**” Vol.71, No.4 (October, 2007), pp.1107-1132. Long a peripheral matter, by the 1990s military justice during the World Wars had vaulted from the field of grassroots activism to the legislative, executive, and judicial arenas of government in Germany and Great Britain, resulting in official pardons for soldiers who had been court martialed in these conflicts.

Young, Ken, “**No Blank Cheque: Anglo-American (Mis)Understandings and the Use of the English Airbases.**” Vol.71, No.4 (October, 2007), pp.1133-1167. Deals with the diplomatic, political, and military issues surrounding the deployment of U.S. nuclear-capable strategic bombers to bases in Great Britain following the Berlin crisis of 1948.

Carter, Donald Alan, “**Eisenhower versus the Generals.**” Vol.71, No.4 (October, 2007), pp.1169-1199. Traces the rancor that evolved between President Dwight D. Eisenhower (1953-1961), who pursued the ‘New Look’ national security policy that relied on nuclear weapons, the Strategic Air Command, and a robust economy, versus Army officers who believed the drastic reductions in conventional ground forces challenged the very existence of their service.

Carland, John M. “**High Maintenance Generals.**” Vol.71, No.4 (October, 2007), pp.1201-1202. A passage from Anthony Dymoke Powell’s 1968 novel, *The Military Philosophers*, concerning dealing with demanding superiors.

Pennington, Reina, “**Review Essay: Women, War, and the Military.**” Vol.71, No.4 (October, 2007), pp.1203-1210. Reference works covering antiquity to the present.

Vol.72, No.1 (January, 2008)

Wilson, Peter H. **“Defining Military Culture.”** Vol.72, No.1 (January, 2008), pp.11-41. Puts forward the notion that military culture is a specific form of institutional culture and that viewing armies from this perspective offers new insight into both how they functioned and the nature of their interaction with state and society.

Kingsley, Ronald F. and Alexander, Harvey J. **“The Failure of Abercromby’s Attack on Fort Carillon, July 1758, and the Scapegoating of Matthew Clerk.”** Vol.72, No.1 (January, 2008), pp.43-70. A reassessment, based on letters and other documents, that calls into question the degree that the young engineer, Matthew Clerk, contributed to the defeat of the British attack on Fort Carillon (Fort Ticonderoga) during the French and Indian War. See also: McCulloch, Ian Macpherson, “ ‘A Blanket of Inconsistencies’: The Battle of Ticonderoga, 2008.” Vol.72, No.3 (July, 2008), Vol.72, No.1 (January, 2008), pp.889-900.

Van de Logt, Mark, **“ ‘The Powers of the Heavens Shall Eat of my Smoke’: The Significance of Scalping in Pawnee Warfare.”** Vol.72, No.1 (January, 2008), pp.71-104. Explains that there were a range of motives for Pawnee warriors to seek scalps, including improved status and marriage prospects for the warrior, revenge for the killing of tribal members, to end the mourning period of those who had lost a relative or friend, and, when sacrificed in a special ceremony, to improve the spiritual well-being of the Pawnee people.

Xu Guoqi, **“The Great War and China’s Military Expedition Plan.”** Vol.72, No.1 (January, 2008), pp.105-140. The article seeks to understand why China tried so hard to participate in the war, why China’s plans to raise an expeditionary force went unfulfilled, and what role China played in the First World War.

Glantz, Mary, **“An Officer and a Diplomat? The Ambiguous Position of Philip R. Faymonville and United States-Soviet Relations, 1941-1943.”** Vol.72, No.1 (January, 2008), pp.141-177. Appraises the role played by Colonel Philip Faymonville (1888-1962) in U.S.-Soviet relations, an officer who served as the United States’ first military attaché and as expediter of Lend-Lease Aid during the war, but who had a contentious relationship with U.S. diplomatic personnel.

Coleman, Bradley Lynn, **“Recovering the Korean War Dead, 1950-1958: Graves Registration, Forensic Anthropology, and Wartime Memorialization.”** Vol.72, No.1 (January, 2008), pp.179-222. The Graves Registration Service, U.S. Quartermaster Corps, developed an innovative system during the Korean War in which the dead were recovered and repatriated to the United States during major combat operations.

Vol.72, No.2 (April, 2008)

Larson, Robert H. **“Max Jähns and the Writing of Military History in Imperial Germany.”** Vol.72,

No.2 (April, 2008), pp.345-370. A career Prussian officer who taught military history at the elite War Academy for fourteen years and was a prolific author, Max Jähns' (1837-1900) studies focused on the place of military institutions and practices in the context of general history.

Budreau, Lisa M. **"The Politics of Remembrance: The Gold Star Mothers' Pilgrimage and America's Fading Memory of the Great War."** Vol.72, No.2 (April, 2008), pp.371-411. Collectively, the Gold Star Mothers offer a multidimensional model of the ethnic, cultural, economic, and religious diversity prevalent in the United States during the interwar years.

Biddle, Tami Davis, **"Dresden 1945: Reality, History, and Memory."** Vol.72, No.2 (April, 2008), pp.413-449. This essay is an effort to untangle a complicated and much misunderstood episode in the history of modern warfare and to make sense of it in the context in which it occurred.

Werrell, Kenneth P. **"Across the Yalu: Rules of Engagement and the Communist Air Sanctuary during the Korean War."** Vol.72, No.2 (April, 2008), pp.451-475. U.S. warplanes violated Chinese air space during the Korean War more frequently than was generally acknowledged, often encouraged and sometimes led by field grade officers, with few pilots suffering punishment.

Trauschweizer, Ingo Wolfgang, **"Learning with an Ally: The U.S. Army and the Bundeswehr in the Cold War."** Vol.72, No.2 (April, 2008), pp.477-508. Discusses four areas of German-U.S. defense cooperation, including aid for West German rearmament, the reorganization of German and U.S. combat formations in the post-Korean War period, the failed attempt at tank design, and the impact of German tactical and operational concepts on post-Vietnam U.S. Army doctrine.

Joseph, Uri Bar, **"Strategic Surprise or Fundamental Flaws? The Source of Israel's Military Defeat at the Beginning of the 1973 War."** Vol.72, No.2 (April, 2008), pp.509-530. Suggests that the deficient deployment of Israeli forces that met the Egyptian assault was due to a failure of intelligence to provide sufficient warning.

Salaita, George D. **"Embellishing Omaha Beach."** Vol.72, No.2 (April, 2008), pp.531-534. Clarifies the misconceptions surrounding Company 'A', 116th Infantry Regiment, 29th Infantry Division, a lead unit in the landing on Omaha Beach.

Vol.72, No.3 (July, 2008)

Dreyer, Edward L. **"Zhao Chongguo: A Professional Soldier of the Former Han Dynasty."** Vol.72, No.3 (July, 2008), pp.665-725. Claims that the Former Han Dynasty general, Zhao Chongguo (137-52 B.C.E.) best known innovation, *tuntian* (military farms), was intended to deny the enemy land for grazing and growing crops, rather than as a means of providing food for troops involved in distant campaigns.

Stentiford, Barry M. **“The Meaning of a Name: The Rise of the National Guard and the End of a Town Militia.”** Vol.72, No.3 (July, 2008), pp.727-754. Recounts the changing relationship between the community of Wakefield, Massachusetts, and its town militia, the Richardson Light Guard, when the unit became part of the National Guard in 1916.

Wolters, Timothy S. **“Electric Torpedoes in the Confederacy: Reconciling Conflicting Histories.”** Vol.72, No.3 (July, 2008), pp.755-783. The article seeks to clarify the linkages between memory, history, and technology by examining the claims of Hunter Davidson, Beverley Kennon, Stephen Mallory, Matthew, and Gabriel Rains to contributing to the development of electric torpedoes for the Confederacy.

Perras, Galen Roger and Kellner, Katrina E. **“ ‘A Perfectly Logical and Sensible Thing’: Billy Mitchell Advocates a Canadian-American Aerial Alliance Against Japan.”** Vol.72, No.3 (July, 2008), pp.785-823. As a result of his overlooked trip to Canada in 1923, Brigadier General Billy Mitchell (1879-1936) formulated a plan for employing an allied U.S.-Canadian strategic bombing force based in Alaska to wage war on Japan.

Reese, Roger R. **“Lessons of the Winter War: A Study in the Military Effectiveness of the Red Army, 1939-1940.”** Vol.72, No.3 (July, 2008), pp.825-852. Based on newly consulted primary sources, this article confronts the notion of a uniformly dismal performance of the Red Army during the Winter War.

Flint, Fr. James, O.S.B. **“A Chaplain’s Diary: Reverend Victor Laketek, O.S.B., 1942-1946.”** Vol.72, No.3 (July, 2008), pp.853-867. The account of a World War II Army Air Force Chaplain stationed in Maine, Florida, California, and Canton Island in the Pacific.

Deitchman, Seymour J. **“The ‘Electronic Battlefield’ in the Vietnam War.”** Vol.72, No.3 (July, 2008), pp.869-887. Concludes that the proposal of the Jason Group of scientists for a network of sensors and aircraft to detect activity on the Ho Chi-Minh Trail in Laos, though not totally successful, impacted the course of the war and foreshadowed key aspects of the equipment and operation of the U.S. Armed Forces today.

McCulloch, Ian Macpherson, **“ ‘A Blanket of Inconsistencies’: The Battle of Ticonderoga, 2008.”** Vol.72, No.3 (July, 2008), pp.889-900. A response to Ronald F. Kingsley and Harvey J. Alexander article, “The Failure of Abercomby’s Attack on Fort Carillon, July 1758, and the Scapegoating of Matthew Clerk.” Vol.72, No.1 (January, 2008), pp.43-70.

Ferreiro, Larrie D. **“Mahan and the ‘English Club’ of Lima, Peru: The Genesis of *The Influence of Sea Power upon History*.”** Vol.72, No.3 (July, 2008), pp.901-906.

Glantz, David M. **“Review Essay: Stalingrad Revisited.”** Vol.72, No.3 (July, 2008), pp.907-910.

Weintraub, Stanley, **“Review Essay: The Conscript: George Catlett Marshall.”** Vol.72, No.3 (July,

2008), pp.911-919. The fifth volume of The Papers of George Catlett Marshall, covering 1945 to 1947.

Vol.72, No.4 (October, 2008)

Shy, John, **“The 2008 George C. Marshall Lecture in Military History: History and the History of War.”** Vol.72, No.4 (October, 2008), pp.1033-1046. A consideration of the works of military history written by distinguished non-military historians over the past twenty years.

Black, Jeremy, **“Frontiers and Military History.”** Vol.72, No.4 (October, 2008), pp.1047-1059.
As zones of interaction and contested sovereignty, it’s not surprising that frontiers, throughout history, have witnessed armed conflict, just as armed conflicts have both established and changed frontiers.

Bachrach, David S. **“The Military Organization of Ottonian Germany, c.900-1018: The Views of Bishop Thietmar of Merseburg.”** Vol.72, No.4 (October, 2008), pp.1061-1088.

Noe, Kenneth W, **“ ‘Damned North Carolinians’ and ‘Brave Virginians’: The Lane-Mahone Controversy, Honor, and Civil War Memory.”** Vol.72, No.4 (October, 2008), pp.1089-1115.
Charts the feud between the North Carolina commander, James Henry, and William Mahone over the question of who deserved credit for capturing three enemy flags at the Battle of Spotsylvania, 1864, a feud that was influenced by a culture of honor and post-war politics.

Hines, Jason, **“Sins of Omission and Commission: A Reassessment of the Role of Intelligence in the Battle of Jutland.”** Vol.72, No.4 (October, 2008), pp.1117-1153. Sets forth the explanation that it was the higher priority that the Admiralty placed on security, at the expense of operational use, that interfered with British Admirals successfully exploiting the fruits of the Admiralty’s cryptographic organization at the Battle of Jutland.

Parton, Neville, **“The Development of Early R.A.F. Doctrine.”** Vol.72, No.4 (October, 2008), pp.1155-1177. Rather than a monolithic focus on strategic bombing imposed by Hugh Trenchard (1873-1956), the article argues that R.A.F. doctrine between 1918 and 1923 was a more nuanced, balanced approach to developing and applying air power.

Jones, Mark C. **“Experiment at Dundee: The Royal Navy’s 9th Submarine Flotilla and Multinational Naval Cooperation during World War II.”** Vol.72, No.4 (October, 2008), pp.1179-1212. The 9th Flotilla included British, Dutch, Free French, Norwegian, and Polish submariners.

Birtle, Andrew J. **“PROVN, Westmoreland, and the Historians: A Reappraisal.”** Vol.72, No.4 (October, 2008), pp.1213-1247. A reassessment of the U.S. Army report, nicknamed PROVN, that, in the past, had been mined for information with which to criticize General William C. Westmoreland (1914-2004) and praise his successor as commander of U.S. forces in South Vietnam, General

Creighton Abrams (1914-1974).

Capponi, Niccolò, **“Clio, Mars, and Wine: Tracking Down Military Documents in Italy.”** Vol.72, No.4 (October, 2008), pp.1249-1256.

Carland, John M. **“War, Politics, Diplomacy, and the Presidency: Off the Record Comments by Lyndon B. Johnson in Retirement.”** Vol.72, No.4 (October, 2008), pp.1257-1263.

Terrar, Toby, **“First Landing on Guam: The Difficulties of a Naval Aviator during the Invasion.”** Vol.72, No.4 (October, 2008), pp.1265-1270. Gives an account of the rivalry between the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps for landing the first plane on the newly liberated island of Guam, in which the Navy pilot, Ed Terrar, won the honor on 30 July, 1944.

Vol.73, No.1 (January, 2009)

Adelberg, Michael S. **“The Scope and Severity of Civil Warfare in Revolutionary Monmouth County, New Jersey.”** Vol.73, No.1 (January, 2009), pp.9-47. Examines both how many of the residents of Monmouth County chose to participate on the opposing sides and how many lives were adversely affected by the war.

Black, Jeremy, **“A Revolution in Military Cartography?: Europe 1650-1815.”** Vol.73, No.1 (January, 2009), pp.49-68. This article approaches the issue of cartography not only in tactical, operational and strategic terms, but also with reference to the mapping of war for public interest.

Leiner, Frederick C. **“The Squadron Commander’s Share: Decatur and the Prize Money for the Chesapeake’s First War of 1812 Cruise.”** Vol.73, No.1 (January, 2009), pp.69-82. An examination of the prize case of Decatur vs. Chew that displays the tensions between ranking officers over their contrasting views of their appropriate shares.

Morgan, John, **“War Feeding War? The Impact of Logistics on the Napoleonic Occupation of Catalonia.”** Vol.73, No.1 (January, 2009), pp.83-116. The inability of the French occupation forces to live off the land meant that alternate sources and modes of supply had to be relied upon in the midst of guerrilla resistance and the British blockade of Catalan ports, all of which negatively impacted French operations.

Keller, Christian B. **“Flying Dutchmen and Drunken Irishmen: The Myths and Realities of Ethnic Civil War Soldiers.”** Vol.73, No.1 (January, 2009), pp.117-145. Contrasts the myths, misconceptions, and stereotypes developed by Anglo-Americans regarding German- and Irish-American soldiers fighting in the United States Civil War with the historical truth about ethnic participation in the conflict.

Reid, Brian Holden, **“ ‘Young Turks, or Not So Young?’: The Frustrated Quest of Major General**

J.F.C. Fuller and Captain B.H. Liddell Hart.” Vol.73, No.1 (January, 2009), pp.147-175. A study of their motives and aspirations during the inter-war period.

Kohn, Richard H. **“The Danger of Militarization in an Endless ‘War’ on Terrorism.”** Vol.73, No.1 (January, 2009), pp.177-208. The identification of Americans with and use of war images and thinking, and a belief in the primacy of standing military forces for the safety of the country, have become normalized, so that the pursuit of an endless ‘war’ on terrorism only further threatens to militarize the nation.

Esdaile, Charles, **“Review Essay: Recent Writing on Napoleon and His Wars.”** Vol.73, No.1 (January, 2009), pp.209-220. Contains four works that cover the struggle specifically between Britain and France from 1792 to 1815, Napoleon’s (1769-1821) skill as a commander on all levels of warfare, and the guerrilla war in Spain.

Wilkins, Thomas S. **“Review Essay: Anatomy of a Military Disaster: The Fall of ‘Fortress Singapore’ 1942.”** Vol.73, No.1 (January, 2009), pp.221-230.

Schmider, Klaus, **“Review Essay: The Last of the First: Veterans of the *Jagdwaaffe* Tell Their Story.”** Vol.73, No.1 (January, 2009), pp.231-249. Covers five memoirs of *Luftwaaffe* fighter pilots.

Vol.73, No.2 (April, 2009)

Kostick, Conor, **“*Iuvenes* and the First Crusade (1096-99): Knights in Search of Glory?”** Vol.73, No.2 (April, 2009), pp.369-392. *Iuvenes* was a term applied to a category of knights who were not necessarily young in age, but were ‘young’ in their careers, a category of knights who, despite a degree of recklessness and indiscipline, played an important role in the First Crusade.

Levinson, Irving W. **“A New Paradigm for an Old Conflict: The Mexico-United States War.”** Vol.73, No.2 (April, 2009), pp.393-416. The victorious U.S. Army that found itself in possession of Mexico City had to provide assistance to the dominant political and socio-economic groups in order to obtain a peace treaty that would conclude the war.

Prete, Roy A. **“Joffre and the Origins of the Somme: A Study in Allied Military Planning.”** Vol.73, No.2 (April, 2009), pp.417-448.

McCall, Jack H., Jr. **“‘Amazingly Indiscreet’: The Plot to Capture Wilhelm II.”** Vol.73, No.2 (April, 2009), pp.449-469. Relates how former U.S. Senator, Col. Luke Lea (1879-1945), planned to kidnap the deposed Kaiser from his exile in the Netherlands and bring him to the Paris Peace Conference to be tried as a war criminal.

Mann, Christopher, **“Combined Operations, the Commandos, and Norway, 1941-1944.”** Vol.73,

No.2 (April, 2009), pp.471-495. Displays the broader strategic consequences of a series of British raids on the coast of Norway, including valuable experience in joint operations and the commitment of German forces for the defense of Norway.

Roy, Kaushik, **“Military Loyalty in the Colonial Context: A Case Study of the Indian Army during World War II.”** Vol.73, No.2 (April, 2009), pp.497-529. Uncovers the motives for and extent of loyalty to the British colonial regime of the Indian Army troops fighting in Burma in the context of the British elite’s concerns about the loyalty of Indian soldiers.

Goldman, David I. **“The Generals and the Germs: The Army Leadership’s Response to Nixon’s Review of Chemical and Biological Warfare Policies in 1969.”** Vol.73, No.2 (April, 2009), pp.531-569. The response of U.S. Army leadership to President Richard Nixon (1969-1974) unilateral elimination of biological warfare agents, retaining only a defensive research program, as well as placing limitations on the chemical weapons.

Stoker, Donald, **“Forum: Confederate Military Strategy in the U.S. Civil War: There was no Offensive-Defensive Confederate Strategy.”** Vol.73, No.2 (April, 2009), pp.571-590.

Dawson, Joseph G., III, **“Forum: Confederate Military Strategy in the U.S. Civil War: Jefferson Davis and the Confederacy’s ‘Offensive-Defensive’ Strategy in the U.S. Civil War.”** Vol.73, No.2 (April, 2009), pp.591-613.

Vol.73, No.3 (July, 2009)

Naiden, F.S. **“Spartan Naval Performance in the Decelean War, 413-404 B.C.E.”** Vol.73, No.3 (July, 2009), pp.729-744. Identifies improvements in Sparta’s cadre of naval officers as the reason for Spartan naval victories during the final phase of the Peloponnesian War.

Willis, Sam, **“The Battle of Lagos, 1759.”** Vol.73, No.3 (July, 2009), pp.745-765. Though an indecisive engagement, Royal Navy Vice-Admiral Edward Boscawen’s (1711-1761) squadron weakened the French Mediterranean fleet that was sailing to join the French Atlantic fleet, thus serving as an important precursor to the Battle of Quiberon Bay, November, 1759.

Tripodi, Christian, **“ ‘Good for one but not the other’: The ‘Sandeman System’ of Pacification as Applied to Baluchistan and the North-West Frontier, 1877-1947.”** Vol.73, No.3 (July, 2009), pp.767-802. Looks at why the Government of India declared Colonel Sir Robert Groves Sandeman’s (1835-1892) innovative doctrine of tribal administration inapplicable for the troubled North West Frontier, despite its having achieved success in Baluchistan.

Sheffy, Yigal, **“Chemical Warfare and the Palestine Campaign, 1916-1918.”** Vol.73, No.3 (July, 2009), pp.803-844. Brings light to the British use of chemical warfare in the Second (April, 1917)

and Third (October-November, 1917) Battles of Gaza, the Ottoman response, and the reasons why this aspect of the Palestine Campaign have been disregarded in the historiography.

Winkler, Jonathan Reed, **“Information Warfare in World War I.”** Vol.73, No.3 (July, 2009), pp.845-867. Presents both the British success in destroying the pre-war German system and the simultaneous German campaign against Allied communications, all within the broader economic, political, intelligence, and military context of modern conflict.

Reid, Brian Holden, **“Michael Howard and the Evolution of Modern War Studies.”** Vol.73, No.3 (July, 2009), pp.869-904. Chart the efforts of Sir Michael Howard (1922-2019), beginning in 1950, to impart a framework on the study of the relationship between war and society to the extent that it has been shaped by organizational and moral forces.

Kwan, Toh Boon, **“ ‘It was a thrill to see rows of B-29s going through the sky’: The Strategic Bombing of Singapore, 1944-45.”** Vol.73, No.3 (July, 2009), pp.905-924. Reports on an overlooked campaign in the U.S. strategic Air War in Asia from the perspective of U.S. bomber crews, Japanese occupation forces in Singapore, local civilians, and internees, noting that the experiences of the latter have, in particular, been neglected.

Anon. **“The Air War Over Germany: Claims and Counter-claims.”** Vol.73, No.3 (July, 2009), pp.925-932.

Vol.73, No.4 (October, 2009)

Bradley, Carl Meredith, **“The British War Chariot: A Case for Indirect Warfare.”** Vol.73, No.4 (October, 2009), pp.1073-1089. Weighs the capabilities of the Celtic tribes who fielded sturdy and fast two-horse chariots against Julius Caesar’s (100-44 B.C.E.) two landings in Britannia in 55-54 B.C.E. and the means used to sustain their resources and gauge their capabilities.

Maass, John R. **“ ‘Too Grievous for a People to Bear’: Impressment and Conscription in Revolutionary North Carolina.”** Vol.73, No.4 (October, 2009), pp.1091-1115. The government of North Carolina, faced with the challenges of fighting a revolutionary war, chose to impose impressment and conscription, which produced antipathy and resistance to Patriot authorities, undermining support for the new state, and added to the disorders within the state during the war.

Neumann, Brian, **“ ‘A Question of Authority’: Reassessing the March-Pershing ‘Feud’ in the First World War.”** Vol.73, No.4 (October, 2009), pp.1117-1142. Ascertains that the conflict between John J. Pershing (1860-1940) and Peyton C. March (1864-1955) was the result of a lack of a clearly defined command structure within the U.S. Army rather than a matter of opposing personalities.

Hatzivassiliou, Evanthis, **“Cold War Pressures, Regional Strategies, and Relative Decline: British Military and Strategic Planning for Cyprus, 1950-1960.”** Vol.73, No.4 (October, 2009),

pp.1143-1166. Highlights the significance of Cyprus as a secure base in the Middle East for Great Britain during the Cold War, particularly after the loss of the Suez Canal.

Stapleton, Tim, “**‘Bad Boys’: Infiltration and Sedition in the African Military Units of the Central African Federation (Malawi, Zambia and Zimbabwe) 1953-63.**” Vol.73, No.4 (October, 2009), pp.1167-1193. Illustrates that nationalists exploited the rising unpopularity of colonialism, discontent with participation in the war in Malaya, the Mau Mau uprising in Kenya, and the Congo Crisis, which led white officers doubt the dependability of their African troops.

Boylan, Kevin M. “**The Red Queen’s Race: Operation Washington Green and Pacification in Binh Dinh Province, 1969-70.**” Vol.73, No.4 (October, 2009), pp.1195-1230. Examines the operations conducted by the 173rd Airborne Brigade in Binh Dinh Province closely, which matched recommendations made by many of the critics of the way U.S. military forces was conducted the war and, therefore. offers insight into the likely effectiveness of an alternate strategy focused on population control.

Weldemichael, Awet T. “**The Eritrean Long March: The Strategic Withdrawal of the Eritrean People’s Liberation Front (E.P.L.F.), 1978-1979.**” Vol.73, No.4 (October, 2009), pp.1231-1271. Despite the battlefield victories achieved by the Soviet backed Ethiopian offensives, as a guerrilla force, the Eritrean proved to be more adaptable to the changing circumstances, enabling them to go over to the tactical offensive by 1980.

Badsey, Stephen; Stoker, Donald and Dawson, Joseph G., III “**Forum: Confederate Military Strategy in the U.S. Civil War – Revisited.**” Vol.73, No.4 (October, 2009), pp.1273-1287.

Paret, Peter, “**Review Essay: The Annales School and the History of War.**” Vol.73, No.4 (October, 2009), pp.1289-1295.

Vol.74, No.1 (January, 2010)

Parker, Geoffrey, “**States Make War but Wars also Break States.**” Vol.74, No.1 (January, 2010), pp.11-34. The ‘chicken and egg’ debate at the heart of the mid-seventeenth century ‘General Crisis Debate’, arguing that only a synergy between natural and man-made disasters produced state-breakdown.

Kennedy, Paul, “**History from the Middle: The Case of the Second World War.**” Vol.74, No.1 (January, 2010), pp.35-51. Investigates the middle levels of war through examples from the middle of World War II when the chief operational objectives of the Allies were clearly established but had yet to be realized.

Harari, Tuval Noah, “**Armchairs, Coffee, and Authority: Eye-witnesses and Flesh-witnesses Speak about War, 1100-1200.**” Vol.74, No.1 (January, 2010), pp.53-78. The possibility and utility of

understanding the experience of war from first-hand accounts.

Davis, James A. **“Musical Reconnaissance and Deception in the American Civil War.”** Vol.74, No.1 (January, 2010), pp.79-105. Demonstrating both the intrinsic role of music in the lives of nineteenth century Americans and a growing understanding of battlefield psychology, the article looks at how music could provide scouts with clues about enemy locations and how this could be exploited to enhance tactical deception.

Gordon, Andrew, **“Time after Time in the Horn of Africa.”** Vol.74, No.1 (January, 2010), pp.107-144. Provides an examination of the British joint, amphibious assault on the Dervish stronghold of Illig, Somaliland, in 1904.

Westphal, Raymond W., Jr. **“Postwar Planning: Parliamentary Politics and the Royal Navy, 1919-22.”** Vol.74, No.1 (January, 2010), pp.145-171. Delves into the conflict between governments that viewed cuts in the military budget as a means of achieving economic recovery versus the Royal Navy’s goal of achieving parity with their U.S. counterpart while fulfilling its mission of two-ocean imperial defense.

Esdaile, Charles, **“Spain 1808 – Iraq 2003: Some Thoughts on the Use and Abuse of History.”** Vol.74, No.1 (January, 2010), pp.173-188. Disputes comparisons of Napoleon’s intervention in Spain, George Bush’s (r.2001-2009) intervention in Iraq, and the subsequent counterinsurgency campaigns, arguing that they are based on false notions about the war in Spain.

Mikaberidze, Alexander, **“Historiographical Essay: Recent Trends in the Russian Historiography of the Napoleonic Wars.”** Vol.74, No.1 (January, 2010), pp.189-194.

Vandervort, Bruce, **“Review Essay: Remembering the Empire of France in America.”** Vol.74, No.1 (January, 2010), pp.195-199.

Vol.74, No.2 (April, 2010)

Jones, Spencer, **“The Influence of Horse Supply Upon Field Artillery in American Civil War.”** Vol.74, No.2 (April, 2010), pp.357-377. Proposes that the difficulties of both sides in finding and maintaining a sufficient supply of horses for artillery has implications for the wider debate on whether the U.S. Civil War marked the beginnings of ‘modern’ war.

Bell, Andrew McIlwaine, **“ ‘Gallinippers & Glory’: The Links between Mosquito-borne Diseases and U.S. Civil War Operations and Strategy, 1862.”** Vol.74, No.2 (April, 2010), pp.379-405. Covers the physiological and psychological effects of malaria and yellow fever and their impact on military operations and strategy in 1862.

Grimes, Shawn, **“The Baltic and Admiralty War Planning, 1906-1907.”** Vol.74, No.2 (April, 2010), pp.407-437. Reassessment of the Ballard Committee’s 1907 War Plans against Germany in the context of Norway’s gaining independence in 1905.

Irish, Kerry, **“Dwight Eisenhower and Douglas MacArthur in the Philippines: There Must Be a Day of Reckoning [1935-39].”** Vol.74, No.2 (April, 2010), pp.439-473. Demonstrates that Eisenhower’s (1890-1969) dislike of MacArthur (1880-1964) was less about personalities and more about disagreements over the building of an army in an impoverished country and the proper qualities that a U.S. Army officer should exhibit and develop in his subordinates.

Sturma, Michael, **“U.S. Submarine Patrol Reports during World War II: Historical Evidence and Literary Flair.”** Vol.74, No.2 (April, 2010), pp.475-490. Insists that the patrol reports of U.S. submariners should be approached with caution due, among other things, to the ‘fog of war’, intentional fabrication, and deliberate omissions for security reasons or to avoid censure.

Milner, Marc, **“Stopping the Panzers: Reassessing the Role of 3rd Canadian Infantry Division in Normandy, 7-10 June, 1944.”** Vol.74, No.2 (April, 2010), pp.491-522. Reveals that the 3rd Canadian Infantry Division’s beachhead battles of 7-10 June against the 12th Hitler Youth Panzer Division are fundamentally misunderstood as failed breakout attempts when, in fact, they were successful defensive operations.

Courtney, Jocelyn, **“The Civil War that was fought by Children: Understanding the Role of Child Combatants in El Salvador’s Civil War, 1980-1992.”** Vol.74, No.2 (April, 2010), pp.523-556. Explores the legacy of the extensive reliance on child soldiers by both the Salvadoran government and the Farabundo Martí Front for National Liberation in terms of demobilization issues and postwar societal problems.

Vandervort, Bruce, **“Review Essay: The Indian Wars of North America: From East to West.”** Vol.74, No.2 (April, 2010), pp.557-560.

Vol.74, No.3 (July, 2010)

Davey, James, **“The Repatriation of Spanish Troops from Denmark, 1808: The British Government, Logistics, and Maritime Supremacy.”** Vol.74, No.3 (July, 2010), pp.689-707. When Spain rebelled against French occupation, the British government responded by, among other things, preparing and executing the repatriation of the Spanish regiments formerly fighting for Napoleon in northern Europe.

Arndt, Jochen S. **“Treacherous Savages & Merciless Barbarian: Knowledge, Discourse and Violence during the Cape Frontier Wars, 1834 and 1853.”** Vol.74, No.3 (July, 2010), pp.709-735. Concludes that the British stereotypes of the Xhosa people of the eastern frontier of the Cape Colony, South Africa, that evolved during three wars fought between 1834 and 1853 were used to justify policies of

dispossession and subjugation in the name of colonial security.

Kennedy, Greg, **“Anglo-American Strategic Relations and Intelligence Assessments of Japanese Air Power 1934-1941.”** Vol.74, No.3 (July, 2010), pp.737-773. Reassesses the influence of racism on Anglo-American views of Japanese air power, and how this influence evolved in the seven years leading up to Pearl Harbor.

Pennington, Reina, **“Offensive Women: Women in Combat in the Red Army in the Second World War.”** Vol.74, No.3 (July, 2010), pp.775-820. Reports on the nature and variety of women’s combat experiences.

Casey, Steven, **“Wilfred Burchett and the United Nations Command’s Media Relations during the Korean War, 1951-1952.”** Vol.74, No.3 (July, 2010), pp.821-845. Assesses the Australian journalist, Wilfred Burchett’s (1911-1983), observations concerning the U.S. Army’s relations with the media during the Korean armistice negotiations.

Young, James L., Jr. **“The Heights of Ineptitude: The Syrian Army’s Assault on the Golan Heights.”** Vol.74, No.3 (July, 2010), pp.847-870. Argues that, during the 1973 Yom Kippur War, it was primarily the Syrian’s tactical incompetence and failure to adhere to Soviet operational doctrine that ensured Israeli victory on the Golan Heights, notwithstanding the bravery of the Israeli troops.

Birtle, Andrew James, **“Advisory Service in Vietnam: Detrimental to an Officer’s Career?”** Vol.74, No.3 (July, 2010), pp.871-877. By examining the extent to which former Vietnam advisers achieved general officer rank in the U.S. Army, the article seeks to test the common belief among officers that the Army did not assign its best men for service as advisors and that promotion boards discriminated against these advisors.

Tucci, Jim, **“Historiographical Essay: Warfare in the Ancient World.”** Vol.74, No.3 (July, 2010), pp.878-899.

Bachrach, Bernard S. **“Review Essay: The Barbarian Hordes that never were.”** Vol.74, No.3 (July, 2010), pp.901-904. A critical assessment of Peter Heather’s 2009 book *Empires and Barbarians: Migration, Development and the Birth of Europe*, which covers the period from the decline of the Roman Empire to the age of the Viking.

Vol.74, No.4 (October, 2010)

Harrington, Hugh T. and Jordan, Jim, **“The Other Mystery Shot of the American Revolution: Did Timothy Murphy Kill British Brigadier General Simon Fraser at Saratoga?”** Vol.74, No.4 (October, 2010), pp.1037-1045. Attempts to disentangle the various accounts of the Battle of Saratoga, 1777, to determine the origins and validity of the Murphy legend, and its repetition by

subsequent historians, along with the physics of musket fire.

Varnava, Andrekos, “**‘Martial Races’ in the Isle of Aphrodite.**” Vol.74, No.4 (October, 2010), pp.1047-1067. The British attempt in the 1890s to form an indigenous defense force on Cyprus based on the ‘Martial Races’ concept and its enduring consequences.

Smith, David G. “**‘Clear the Valley’: The Shenandoah Valley and the Genesis of the Gettysburg Campaign.**” Vol.74, No.4 (October, 2010), pp.1069-1096. Brings to light an overlooked motivation for General Robert E. Lee’s (1807-1870) Gettysburg Campaign, the need to clear the Shenandoah Valley of occupying U.S. troops due to a combination of home front discontent and logistical issues.

Bell, Christopher M. “**Winston Churchill and the Ten Year Rule.**” Vol.74, No.4 (October, 2010), pp.1097-1128. Insists that criticisms of Churchill’s defense spending cutbacks during his tenure as Chancellor of the Exchequer (1924-29) exaggerate his authority and oversimplify his complex and shifting combination of political, financial, strategic, and bureaucratic goals.

Kuehn, Joh T. “**The U.S. Navy General Board and Naval Arms Limitations: 1922-1937.**” Vol.74, No.4 (October, 2010), pp.1129-1160. Highlights the critical link played by the Navy General Board between the U.S. Navy and 1922 Washington Naval Limitations Treaty.

Buckley, John, “**Tackling the Tiger: The Development of British Armoured Doctrine for Normandy 1944.**” Vol.74, No.4 (October, 2010), pp.1161-1184. Asserts that the British Army’s loose approach to developing and imposing doctrine, despite inherent shortcomings, actually facilitated a flexibility that allowed the armoured forces to quickly and effectively modify their doctrines in the heat of battle.

Wheeler, Everett L. “**Rome’s Dacian Wars: Domitian, Trajan, and Strategy on the Danube.**” Vol.74, No.4 (October, 2010), pp.1185-1227; Vol.75, No.1 (January, 2011), pp.191-219. Seeks to clarify the narrative accounts of the three Dacian Wars of Emperors Domitian (r.81-96) and Trajan (r.98-117), fought between 84 and 106 C.E., within the context of the development of a Geto-Dacian State in Transylvania.

Khan, David, “**How the Allies Suppressed the Second Greatest Secret of World War II.**” Vol.74, No.4 (October, 2010), pp.1229-1241. Concerning the post-war classification of information about the Allies’ success in breaking German codes.

Esdaille, Charles J. “**Review Essay: Recent Works of Note on the Peninsular War (1808-1815).**” Vol.74, No.4 (October, 2010), pp.1243-1252.

Vol.75, No.1 (January, 2011)

Berkovich, Ilya, “**The Battle of Forbie and the Second Frankish Kingdom of Jerusalem.**” Vol.75,

No.1 (January, 2011), pp.9-44. Inquires into the disastrous defeat of the Second Kingdom of Jerusalem' coalition Franko-Syrian army at the Battle of Forbie, 1244, which reduced it to a pawn in the power politics of neighboring Muslim kingdoms.

Cronin, Stephanie, **"Building and Rebuilding Afghanistan's Army: An Historical Perspective."** Vol.75, No.1 (January, 2011), pp.45-91. The repeated failure of the efforts of successive Afghan governments, from the nineteenth-century to the present, to create a modern regular army.

Hughes, Matthew, **"War without Mercy? American Armed Forces and the Deaths of Civilians during the Battle for Saipan, 1944."** Vol.75, No.1 (January, 2011), pp.93-123. Despite this being the first Central Pacific Island on which U.S. forces encountered large numbers of civilians, including Japanese and Korean migrants, and native Chamorro and Carolinian peoples, the military histories of the battle for Saipan generally neglect how noncombatants were treated.

Thomas, Martin, **"Colonial Violence in Algeria and the Distorted Logic of State Retribution: The Sétif Uprising of 1945."** Vol.75, No.1 (January, 2011), pp.125-157. Charts the rapid escalation of French security and vigilante violence in response to the uprising that broke out on VE-Day, 8 May, 1945, arguing that in the long run this was counterproductive.

Cline, Eric H. and Sutter, Anthony, **"Battlefield Archaeology at Armageddon: Cartridge Cases and the 1948 Battle for Megiddo, Israel."** Vol.75, No.1 (January, 2011), pp.159-190. Israeli Archaeologists investigating the ancient history of Megiddo, came across 213 spent Czechoslovakian cartridge cases, with which they attempted to reconstruct the fighting that took place at that location during the 1948 war.

Wheeler, Everett L. **"Rome's Dacian Wars: Domitian, Trajan, and Strategy on the Danube [2 Parts]."** Vol.74, No.4 (October, 2010), pp.1185-1227; Vol.75, No.1 (January, 2011), pp.191-219. Seeks to clarify the narrative accounts of the three Dacian Wars of Emperors Domitian (r.81-96) and Trajan (r.98-117), fought between 84 and 106 AD, within the context of the development of a Geto-Dacian State in Transylvania.

Watson, Samuel, **"Historiographical Essay: Continuity in Civil-Military Relations and Expertise: The U.S. Army during the Decade before the Civil War."** Vol.75, No.1 (January, 2011), pp.221-250.

Vol.75, No.2 (April, 2011)

Strachan, Hew, **"The 2010 George C. Marshall Lecture in Military History: Clausewitz and the First World War."** Vol.75, No.2 (April, 2011), pp.367-391. How the belligerents interpreted the writings of Clausewitz during and in the immediate aftermath of World War I.

Bachrach, David S. **"Early Ottonian Warfare: The Perspective from Corvey."** Vol.75, No.2 (April, 2011), pp.393-409. A critical reassessment of the depiction of warfare in Widukind of Corvey's *Res*

gestae Saxonicae, which concludes that, rather than small bands of heavily armed, mounted warriors, King Henry I (r.919-936) and Emperor Otto (r.936-973) deployed large armies for placing fortresses under siege.

Weddle, Kevin J. **“The Fall of Satan’s Kingdom: Civil-Military Relations and the Union Navy’s Attack on Charleston, April 1863.”** Vol.75, No.2 (April, 2011), pp.411-439. Describes the conflict between Rear Admiral Samuel Francis Du Pont (1803-1865) and the members of Lincoln’s administration, Secretary of the Navy Gideon Welles (1802-1878) and his assistant, Gustavus Fox (1821-1883).

Martin, Christopher, **“The Complexity of Strategy: ‘Jackie’ Fischer and the Trouble with Submarines.”** Vol.75, No.2 (April, 2011), pp.441-470. The problems of re-formulating strategy in the wake of the introduction of submarines for Admiral ‘Jackie’ Fischer (1841-1920), Prime Minister A.J. Balfour (r.1902-1905), and Julian Corbett (1854-1922).

Foley, Robert T. **“Learning War’s Lessons: The German Army and the Battle of the Somme 1916.”** Vol.75, No.2 (April, 2011), pp.471-504. Over the course of the Battle of the Somme, the Germans were forced by superior Anglo-French weaponry and tactics to improvise a new defensive tactical doctrine, the evolution of which is examined through the study of German ‘lessons-learned’ reports which display intellectual flexibility.

Neilson, Keith, **“The Royal Navy, Japan, and British Strategic Foreign Policy, 1932-1934.”** Vol.75, No.2 (April, 2011), pp.505-531. Japan’s challenge to British interests affected British policy generally, and particularly Anglo-American relations, producing conflicting proposals from the Treasury, the Admiralty, and the Foreign Offices.

Reardon, Jeff, **“Breaking the U.S. Navy’s ‘Gun Club’ Mentality in the South Pacific.”** Vol.75, No.2 (April, 2011), pp.533-564. Analyzing the adjustment of pre-war doctrine in the face of defeat in nighttime naval engagements with the Imperial Japanese Navy.

Orbach, Danny, **“Criticism Reconsidered: The German Resistance to Hitler in Critical German Scholarship.”** Vol.75, No.2 (April, 2011), pp.565-590. Establishes that, beginning in the 1960s, some of the so-called ‘critical’ historiography of the 20 July, 1944, conspirators suffer from erroneous reading of the sources, one-sided evaluations, moral condescension, and rhetorical manipulation.

Paret, Peter, **“Clausewitz: ‘Half against my will, I have become a Professor.’”** Vol.75, No.2 (April, 2011), pp.591-601. Carl von Clausewitz’ (1780-1831) lectures on ‘Little War’ during the Prussian reform era.

Jackson, Aaron P. **“Review Essay: Expanding the Scope and Accessibility of Non-Western Military History.”** Vol.75, No.2 (April, 2011), pp.603-613. Covering works on China, India, and Russia.

Vol.75, No.3 (July, 2011)

Weinberg, Gerhard L. **“The George C. Marshall Lecture in Military History: Some Myths of World War II.”** Vol.75, No.3 (July, 2011), pp.701-718. Includes issues surrounding Winston Churchill, Adolf Hitler, Isoroku Yamamoto, Benito Mussolini, Franklin Roosevelt, and Josef Stalin, as well as the Yalta Conference, the Morgenthau Plan for Germany, and the ubiquity of horses in the Second World War.

Robinson, Gavin, **“Equine Battering Rams? A Reassessment of Cavalry Charge in the English Civil War.”** Vol.75, No.3 (July, 2011), pp.719-731. Challenges the traditional notion that shock cavalry tactics imported from Sweden had replaced the caracole during the English Civil War and, in particular, contemplates the mechanics of cavalry shock tactics.

Germani, Ian, **“Terror in the Army: Representatives on Mission and Military Discipline.”** Vol.75, No.3 (July, 2011), pp.733-768. The French National Convention’s Representatives on Mission and the exercise of military justice in the French Revolutionary armies.

Benbow, Tim, **“ ‘Menace’ to ‘Ironclad’: The British Operations against Dakar (1940) and Madagascar (1942).”** Vol.75, No.3 (July, 2011), pp.769-809. Investigates why, regarding two separate British operations against Vichy French colonies in Africa, ‘Menace’ failed, while ‘Ironclad’ succeeded.

Lacey, James, **“World War II’s Real Victory Program.”** Vol.75, No.3 (July, 2011), pp.811-834. Challenges Maj. Albert C. Wedemeyer’s assertion that he was the author of the United States’ Victory Program.

Clymer, Kenton, **“U.S. Homeland Defense in the 1950s: The Origin of the Ground Observer Corps.”** Vol.75, No.3 (July, 2011), pp.835-859. Quasi-auxiliary of the U.S. Air Force from 1950 to 1959.

Brands, Hal, **“Why did Saddam Invade Iran [1980]? New Evidence on Motives, Complexity, and the Israel Factor.”** Vol.75, No.3 (July, 2011), pp.861-885.

Carland, John M. **“Review Essay: Scorecard on CIA C.O.I.N. in Vietnam.”** Vol.75, No.3 (July, 2011), pp.887-891.

Vol.75, No.4 (October, 2011)

Hogan, David W. **“Head and Heart: The Dilemmas of American Attitudes towards War.”** Vol.75, No.4 (October, 2011), pp.1021-1054. Modernist challenges to the old uniform attitudes towards war in a larger, more pluralistic society has made consensus difficult, if not impossible, to reach.

Hagemann, Karen, **“Mobilizing Women for War: The History, Historiography, and Memory of**

German Women's War Service in the Two World Wars." Vol.75, No.4 (October, 2011), pp.1055-1093. An effort to understand why the large-scale mobilization of women in Germany during the course of both world wars is missing from the historiography.

Orr, Andrew, " **'We call you to holy war': Mustafa Kemal, Communism, and Germany in French Intelligence Nightmare, 1919-1923.**" Vol.75, No.4 (October, 2011), pp.1095-1123. Explains how French military intelligence analysts chose to identify Mustafa Kemal (1881-1938) as the central figure in a communist-inspired, German controlled, anti-colonial enterprise that was closely allied to Islamist political movements, rather than the nationalist, secular, westernizing leader that he was.

Cerdá, Néstor, " **Political Ascent and Military Commander: General Franco in the Early Months of the Spanish Civil War, July-October 1936.**" Vol.75, No.4 (October, 2011), pp.1125-1157. Displays how General Francisco Franco (1892-1975) exploited the opportunities presented by the setbacks to the coup plotters in July through August, 1936, to rise from being merely another general supporting the uprising to the position of commander-in-chief of the Nationalist Army and head of the government.

McEvoy, William P. " **'Experiences at Sea': A Navy Doctor of War.**" Vol.75, No.4 (October, 2011), pp.1159-1182. U.S. Navy doctor serving in the Pacific from September 1944 to December 1945.

Donnelly, William M. " **Bilko's Army: A Crisis in Command?**" Vol.75, No.4 (October, 2011), pp.1183-1215. Focusing on U.S. Army officers above company grade level, 1953 to 1965, the author considers whether service schools, the headquarters of the Continental Army Command, and Headquarters, Department of the Army identified a crisis in command.

Schubert, Frank N. " **The 25th Infantry at Brownsville, Texas: Buffalo Soldiers, the 'Brownsville Six', and the Medal of Honor.**" Vol.75, No.4 (October, 2011), pp.1217-1224. Addresses the myth that there were six holders of the Medal of Honor among the Buffalo Soldiers who were dismissed after the August, 1906, shooting in Brownsville, Texas.

Hale, Brian J. " **Review Essay: Recent Literature on the Crusades.**" Vol.75, No.4 (October, 2011), pp.1225-1272. Includes twenty-three recent titles that cover a wide variety of topics, such as the pre-Crusades struggles of Byzantium with the Turks, the Albigensian Crusade, fortifications in the Holy Land, logistics, and the role of women.

Vol.76, No.1 (January, 2012)

Çeçen, Zeynep Kocabiyoikoğlu, " **Two Different Views of Knighthood in the Early Fifteenth Century: Le Livre de Bouciquaut and the Works of Christine de Pizan.**" Vol.76, No.1 (January, 2012), pp.9-35. Comparing the different contemporary views of knighthood, the author considers whether its depiction in the biography of Marshal of France, Jean le Meingre Bouciquaut (1366-1421), is consistent with its image in the works of Christine de Pizan (1363-1430).

- Davies, Huw J. **“Diplomats as Spymasters: A Case Study of the Peninsular War, 1809-1813.”** Vol.76, No.1 (January, 2012), pp.37-68. The work of the Duke of Wellington’s (1769-1852) intelligence network, particularly during 1812, compared with examples from the Crimean War, 1853-1856, and World War I, 1914-1918.
- Hooper, Candice Shy, **“The War that Made Hollywood: How the Spanish-American War Saved the U.S. Film Industry.”** Vol.76, No.1 (January, 2012), pp.69-97. By 1897 the embryonic film industry was in decline, but the industry’s exploitation of the public’s interest in the explosion of the U.S.S. *Maine* and the subsequent war made the business of movies lucrative once more.
- Anselmo, Frank A. **“The Battle for Hill K-9 and the Fall of Rome, 2 June 1944.”** Vol.76, No.1 (January, 2012), pp.99-126. The author seeks to ascertain which version of the capture of Hill K-9 by the U.S. 179th Infantry Regiment is the most accurate.
- Jones, Mark C. **“Not Just along for the Ride: The Role of Royal Navy Liaison Personnel in Multinational Naval Operations during World War II.”** Vol.76, No.1 (January, 2012), pp.127-158. The liaison system as a means of cooperation with European navies in exile from France, Greece, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, and Yugoslavia.
- Lockenour, Jay, **“Black and White Memories of War: Victimization and Violence in West German War Films of the 1950s.”** Vol.76, No.1 (January, 2012), pp.159-191. Contends that war films helped to construct a specifically West German identity as helpless victims or heroic nonconformists rather than historical actors and compliant, or even eager, collaborators by creating myths and memories important to the legitimacy of the new Federal Republic.
- Holwitt, Joel I. **“Review Essay: Reappraising the Interwar U.S. Navy.”** Vol.76, No.1 (January, 2012), pp.193-210. New studies demonstrate that the interwar U.S. was frequently led by innovative leaders, willing to experiment with new technologies and able to use fleet exercises and an internal review process to creatively, but realistically, generate a strategy that worked within the geographical and treaty constraints of an expected war in the Pacific.

Vol.76, No.2 (April, 2012)

- Bacevich, Andrew J. **“The Revisionist Imperative: Rethinking Twentieth Century Wars.”** Vol.76, No.2 (April, 2012), pp.333-342. Insists that historians need to replace the familiar and morally reassuring story of a Short Twentieth Century with a less familiar and morally ambiguous story of a still unfolding Long Twentieth Century.
- Probasco, Nate, **“The Role of Commoners and Print in Elizabethan England’s Acceptance of Firearms.”** Vol.76, No.2 (April, 2012), pp.343-372. Looks at the debate in print between, on the

one hand, common citizens and local officials, who were skeptical of firearms, the expense and safety of which they criticized, and those who promoted the replacement of longbows with firearms, who often employed dubious information.

McMahon, Daniel, **“Geomancy and Walled Fortifications in Late Eighteenth Century China.”**

Vol.76, No.2 (April, 2012), pp.373-393. Takes account of the role of geomancy based on *fengshui* in military planning and activity during the Qing Dynasty, including intelligence gathering, sabotage, and fortifications.

Schneid, Frederick C. **“A Well-Coordinated Affair: Franco-Piedmontese War Planning in 1859.”**

Vol.76, No.2 (April, 2012), pp.395-425. Demonstrates that the Franco-Piedmontese general staffs undertook extensive planning that incorporating the new technologies of railways and steam ships, so that the Second War of Italian Unification (1859-1861) qualifies, alongside the more familiar U.S. Civil War and German Wars of Unification, as one of the first ‘modern’ wars of the industrial age.

Seidule, James Tyrus, **“Treason is Treason: Civil War Memory at West Point, 1861-1902.”** Vol.76,

No.2 (April, 2012), pp.427-452. Asserts that West Point during the Gilded Age neither forgot nor forgave graduates who had chosen to fight against the U.S. Army as officers in the Confederate forces and that memorials were created during the 1890s to highlight the role of its graduates in preserving the Union.

McGinnis, Anthony R. **“When Courage was not Enough: Plains Indians at War with the United**

States Army.” Vol.76, No.2 (April, 2012), pp.454-473. Considers why the Native American tribes of the Great Plains continued to rely on their own specific style of limited warfare in the face of the U.S. Army newcomers when this style of warfare was unable to achieve any permanent success against the ‘Blue Coats’.

Statiev, Alexander, **“Blocking Units in the Red Army.”** Vol.76, No.2 (April, 2012), pp.475-495.

Concerning Joseph Stalin’s (1878-1953) ‘No Step Back!’ Order No.227.

Nenninger, Timothy K. **“‘Casualties’ at Leavenworth: A Research Problem.”** Vol.76, No.2 (April,

2012), pp.497-506. A cautionary tale of doing research in terms of bias and the issue of the factual content of sources.

Trauschweizer, Ingo, **“Historiographical Essay: On Militarism.”** Vol.76, No.2 (April, 2012),

pp.507-543. The definition(s) of European militarism, beginning in the late eighteenth century, and the question of U.S. militarism.

Parker, Geoffrey, **“Review Essay: A Soldier of Fortune in Seventeenth Century Eastern Europe.”**

Vol.76, No.2 (April, 2012), pp.545-548. Examines Diary of General Patrick Gordon of Auchleuchries 1635-1699, the account of a Scottish Catholic who, like many Early-Modern Scots, served in the armies of Sweden, Poland, and Russia.

Vol.76, No.3 (July, 2012)

Arndt, Jochen S. **“The True Napoleon of the West: General Winfield Scott’s Mexico City Campaign [1847] and the Origins of the U.S. Army’s Combined-Arms Combat Division.”** Vol.76, No.3 (July, 2012), pp.649-671. Ventures to prove that General Winfield Scott (1786-1866) organized the Army of the Invasion of Mexico according to the French system of combined arms divisions, enabling him to replicate the Napoleonic era’s aggressive operational tactics.

Stone, David R. **“Misreading Svechin: Attrition, Annihilation, and Historicism.”** Vol.76, No.3 (July, 2012), pp.673-693. Debunks the interpretation that the Soviet military theorist Aleksandr Svechin (1878-1938) favored attrition over annihilation, demonstrating, instead, that he was a historicist, who saw the precise balance between attrition and annihilation, or defense and offense, as constantly shifting as a result of changing material circumstances.

Ungari, Andrea, **“The Official Inquiry into the Italian Defeat at the Battle of Caporetto (October 1917).”** Vol.76, No.3 (July, 2012), pp.695-726. Addresses the question of why the general officer most responsible for the catastrophe not only managed to evade being charged for his failures but instead ended up as the Chief of Staff of the Italian Army.

Ewer, Peter, **“The British Campaign in Greece 1941: Assumptions about the Operational Art and Their Influence on Strategy.”** Vol.76, No.3 (July, 2012), pp.727-745. Inquires into the British decision to dispatch an expeditionary force to Greece and what it tells us about contemporary British Army doctrine.

Stockings, Craig and Hancock, Eleanor, **“Reconsidering the *Luftwaffe* in Greece, 1941.”** Vol.76, No.3 (July, 2012), pp.747-773. Despite its complete dominance of the Greek skies, the terror it inspired, and its almost continual operations against Allied positions, the author challenges the assumption that the *Luftwaffe* had a decisive impact on the campaign.

Dujmović, Nicholas, **“Drastic Actions Short of War: The Origins and Application of C.I.A.’s Covert Paramilitary Function in the Early Cold War.”** Vol.76, No.3 (July, 2012), pp.775-808. In mid-1948, the Central Intelligence Agency was assigned a covert paramilitary function, which may explain why the C.I.A.’s paramilitary activities were never as effective as policy makers and Agency operations officers expected.

Martini, Edwin A. **“Incinerating Agent Orange: Operations Pacer HO, Pacer IVY, and the Rise of Environmentalist Thinking.”** Vol.76, No.3 (July, 2012), pp.809-836.

Paret, Peter, **“Clausewitz and Schlieffen as Interpreters of Frederick the Great: Three Phases in the History of Grand Strategy.”** Vol.76, No.3 (July, 2012), pp.837-845. Compares how Carl von

Clausewitz (1780-1831) and Count Alfred von Schlieffen (1833-1913) interpreted Frederick the Great's generalship, illustrating the function of historical study in the development of Clausewitz's theories.

Vandervort, Bruce, **"When the French Colonial Mind Turns to Thoughts of War."** Vol.76, No.3 (July, 2012), pp.847-851. Looks at two recent works on French imperialism: one a two-volume collection of twenty-eight essays, the overwhelming majority of which are devoted to Africa, the other book is an attempt at a synthesis of French colonialism exclusively in Africa.

Vol.76, No.4 (October, 2012) – Special Issue: Bicentenary of the War of 1812

Hickey, Donald R. **"1812: Remembering a Forgotten War."** Vol.76, No.4 (October, 2012), pp.969-972.

Watson, Samuel, **"Trusting to 'the Chapter of Accidents': Contingency, Necessity, and Self-Constraint in Jeffersonian National Security Policy."** Vol.76, No.4 (October, 2012), pp.973-1000. Ascertains how the U.S. war effort was crippled by the antipathy of the Democratic-Republican Party of Thomas Jefferson (1743-1826) towards taxation, debt, a standing army, federal aid to infrastructure, and a national bank

Stagg, J.C.A. **"United States Army Officers in the War of 1812: A Statistical and Behavioral Portrait."** Vol.76, No.4 (October, 2012), pp.1001-1034. An examination of 334 general court martials demonstrates that officers were judged more harshly for their moral and character defects than for their shortcomings in performing routine duties.

Crawford, Michael J. **"U.S. Navy Petty Officers in the Era of the War of 1812."** Vol.76, No.4 (October, 2012), pp.1035-1051. Scrutinizes the Navy's process of recruiting and training petty officers between the years 1797 and 1812.

Black, Jeremy, **"The North American Theater of the Napoleonic Wars, or, as It is sometimes Called, the War of 1812."** Vol.76, No.4 (October, 2012), pp.1053-1066. The challenge for Great Britain was to balance the demands of different naval commitments.

McCranie, Kevin D. **"The War of 1812 in the ongoing Napoleonic Wars: The Response of Britain's Royal Navy."** Vol.76, No.4 (October, 2012), pp.1067-1094. The challenge for Great Britain to balance the demands of different naval commitments, particularly in 1812 and 1813.

Graves, Donald E. **"Why the White House was Burned: An Investigation into the British Destruction of Public Buildings at Washington in August 1814."** Vol.76, No.4 (October, 2012), pp.1095-1127. Encrusted with mythology by nineteenth century historians motivated by national chauvinism, the article considers whether the actions of the British forces were justified by the contemporary laws of war and / or as retaliation for the U.S. destruction of Canadian towns.

Bowes, John P. **"Transformation and Transition: American Indians and the War of 1812 in the**

Lower Great Lakes.” Vol.76, No.4 (October, 2012), pp.1129-1146. Focusing on the Wyandot communities in the Old Northwest within a broader temporal context beyond the beginning and end dates of the War of 1812.

Leiner, Frederick C. “**‘The Sport of Arbitrary Men’: The Privateer *Nonsuch* and a Search at Sea in the War of 1812.**” Vol.76, No.4 (October, 2012), pp.1147-1164. An incident involving the Baltimore Privateer *Nonsuch*’s seizure of the schooner *Ann Maria*, which resulted in court cases that led all the way to the U.S. Supreme Court.

Jensen, Richard, “**Military History on the Electronic Frontier: Wikipedia Fights the War of 1812.**” Vol.76, No.4 (October, 2012), pp.1165-1182.

Arnold, James R. “**Winfield Scott Makes a Name for Himself.**” Vol.76, No.4 (October, 2012), pp.1183-1185.

Grodzinski, John R. “**Review Essay: Opening Shots from the Bicentenary of the War of 1812: A Canadian Perspective on Recent Titles.**” Vol.76, No.4 (October, 2012), pp.1187-1201.

Vol.77, No.1 (January, 2013)

Krebs, Daniel, “**Useful Enemies: The Treatment of German Prisoners of War during the American War of Independence.**” Vol.77, No.1 (January, 2013), pp.9-39. Narrates how, to boost morale, revolutionaries staged elaborate rituals with P.O.W.s, that local citizens hired captive soldiers as laborers, and that, after the victory at Yorktown, 1781, Congress and the Continental Army allowed P.O.W.s to go free after a cash payments and even sold some into indentured servitude.

Sundaram, Chandar S. “**‘Treated with Scant Attention’: The Imperial Cadet Corps, Indian Nobles, and Anglo-Indian Policy, 1897-1917.**” Vol.77, No.1 (January, 2013), pp.41-70. Foreshadowing the Indianization of the Indian Army’s officer corps and the opening of the Indian Military Academy in 1932, the Imperial Cadet Corps offered officer training to Indian princes and gentlemen between 1901 and 1917.

Hughes, Thomas, “**Learning to Fight: Bill Halsey and the Early American Destroyer Force.**” Vol.77, No.1 (January, 2013), pp.71-90. The outcome of Admiral Halsey’s (1882-1959) service under Admiral William Sims (1858-1936) as a destroyer Captain, 1914-1922.

Krause, Jonathan, “**The French Battle for Vimy Ridge, Spring 1915.**” Vol.77, No.1 (January, 2013), pp.91-113. Analyzes the early French efforts to solve the challenge of the trench stalemate.

Woodfork, Jacqueline, “**It is a Crime to be a *Tirailleur* in the Army.**” Vol.77, No.1 (January, 2013), pp.115-139. Presents the contrast between the rights of indigenous civilians in the French colony of

Senegal and those of the *Tirailleur sénégalais*.

Macri, Franco David, “**‘C’ Force to Hong Kong: The Price of Collective Security in China, 1941.**” Vol.77, No.1 (January, 2013), pp.141-171. Concerning the strategic and political influences on the deployment of two Canadian infantry battalions to Hong Kong in November, 1941.

Gibby, Bryan, “**The Best Little Army.**” Vol.77, No.1 (January, 2013), pp.173-201. Surveys the results of the work of the U.S. Korean Military Advisory Group (K.M.A.G.) prior to the outbreak of the Korean War.

MacKenzie, S.P. “**Progressives and Reactionaries among British Prisoners of War at Pyoktong and Chongson, North Korea, 1951-1953.**” Vol.77, No.1 (January, 2013), pp.203-228. From the Chinese perspective, why were the British P.O.W.s at Chongson (Camp 1) more troublesome than those at Pyoktong (Camp 5).

Daddis, Gregory A. “**Eating Soup with a Spoon: The U.S. Army as a ‘Learning Organization’ in the Vietnam War.**” Vol.77, No.1 (January, 2013), pp.229-254. The U.S. Army’s strategic approach, operational experience, and organizational changes.

McLaughlin, John J. and Lomazow, Steven, “**Counterpoint: Albert Coady Wedemeyer.**” Vol.77, No.1 (January, 2013), pp.255-272.

Lacey, James, “**Historical Truth and Tilting at Windmills.**” Vol.77, No.1 (January, 2013), pp.267-272. Addresses the controversy surrounding U.S. Army General Albert C. Wedemeyer (1896-1989).

Trautsch, Jasper M. “**The Causes of the War of 1812: 200 Years of Debate.**” Vol.77, No.1 (January, 2013), pp.273-293.

Gill, John H. “**Review Essay: Glimpses Inside Pakistan’s Elusive Army.**” Vol.77, No.1 (January, 2013), pp.294-298. Covers five recent works on the Army of Pakistan, a very difficult subject to study due to a lack of access to archival sources.

Lenaburg, Jerry, “**Review Essay: Four Slices of the Iraq War Apple.**” Vol.77, No.1 (January, 2013), pp.299-303. Includes an assessment of four recent titles about the United States war in Iraq, 2003-2011, in one case comparing counterinsurgency efforts in Iraq with those conducted by the U.S. forces in Vietnam.

Vol.77, No.2 (April, 2013)

Robertson, Claire, “**Racism, the Military, and Abolitionism in the Late Eighteenth- and Early Nineteenth-Century Caribbean.**” Vol.77, No.2 (April, 2013), pp.433-461. Examines Governor of

Guadeloupe, Victor Hugues (1762-1826), General Sir John Moore (1761-1809), Captain Thomas Southey, and Sir John Jeremie (1795-1841) and the impact of racism on the differences between the British and French conduct of warfare in the Caribbean.

Fitzpatrick, David J. “**Emory Upton and the Army of Democracy.**” Vol.77, No.2 (April, 2013), pp.463-490. Challenges the depiction of Emory Upton (1839-1881) as an anti-democracy militarist.

Epstein, Katherine C. “**‘No One can Afford to Say ‘Damn the Torpedoes’: Battle Tactics and the U.S. Naval History before World War I.**” Vol.77, No.2 (April, 2013), pp.491-520.

Cook, Tim, “**Grave Beliefs: Stories of the Supernatural and the Uncanny among Canada’s Great War Trench Soldiers.**” Vol.77, No.2 (April, 2013), pp.521-542.

Souchen, Alex, “**The Culture of Morale: Battalion Newspapers in the 3rd Canadian Infantry Division, June-August 1944.**” Vol.77, No.2 (April, 2013), pp.543-567.

Young, Ken, “**Special Weapon, Special Relationship: The Atomic Bomb Comes to Britain.**” Vol.77, No.2 (April, 2013), pp.569-598. Beginning in 1950, the United States Air Force based strategic bombers with atomic bombs in East Anglia, England.

Tuck, Christopher, “**‘Cut the bonds which bind our hands’: Deniable Operations during the Confrontation with Indonesia, 1963-1966.**” Vol.77, No.2 (April, 2013), pp.599-623. Describes the British confrontation with Indonesia and the problems with cross-border operations.

Fino, Steven A. “**Breaking the Trance: The Perils of Technological Exuberance in the U.S. Air Force Entering Vietnam.**” Vol.77, No.2 (April, 2013), pp.625-655. The response of individual units to the need for guns, in addition to missiles, for air-to-air combat.

Catagnus, Earl J. “**Infantry Field Manual 7-5 *Organization and Tactics of Infantry: The Rifle Battalion* (October 1940).**” Vol.77, No.2 (April, 2013), pp.657-666.

Speelman, Patrick J. “**Review Essay: The Logistics of British Naval Supremacy in the Age of Sail.**” Vol.77, No.2 (April, 2013), pp.667-670. Consists of three recent books, two covering systems of supply during the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars, 1793-1815, and a third concerning medical care from 1805 to 1916.

Borch, Fred L. “**Review Essay: Lieber’s Code: A Landmark in the Law of War but not Lincoln’s Code.**” Vol.77, No.2 (April, 2013), pp.671-674. Critiques John Fabian Witt’s *Lincoln’s Code: The Laws of War in American History* (2012), which concludes with the Philippine Insurrection, 1898.

Lonsdale, David J. **“Alexander the Great and the Art of adaptation.”** Vol.77, No.3 (July, 2013), pp.817-835. Uses the examples of Alexander’s (356-323 B.C.E.) operations in the Balkans, against the Persian navy, counterinsurgency in Central Asia, and the Battle of Hydaspes (326 B.C.E.).

Weddle, Kevin J. **“ ‘A Change of both Men and Measures’: British Reassessment of Military Strategy after Saratoga, 1777-1778.”** Vol.77, No.3 (July, 2013), pp.837-865.

Newell, Clayton R. and Shrader, Charles R. **“The U.S. Army’s Transition to Peace, 1865-66.”** Vol.77, No.3 (July, 2013), pp.867-894.

Collins, Bruce, **“Defining Victory in Victorian Warfare, 1860-1882.”** Vol.77, No.3 (July, 2013), pp.895-929. Catalogues the range of pressures on the commanders of expeditions in Africa to declare victory.

Delaney, Douglas E. **“Mentoring the Canadian Corps: Imperial Officers and the Canadian Expeditionary Force, 1914-1918.”** Vol.77, No.3 (July, 2013), pp.931-953.

Hein, David, **“Vulnerable: H.M.S. *Prince of Wales* in 1941.”** Vol.77, No.3 (July, 2013), pp.955-989. The storied career of the H.M.S. *Prince of Wales*, involving fighting the K.M.S. *Bismarck*, the first Churchill-F.D.R. summit, service in the Mediterranean, and its sinking off the coast of Malaya.

Jones, Mark C. **“Friend and Advisor to the Allied Navies: The Royal Navy’s Principal Liaison Officer and Multinational Naval Operations in World War II.”** Vol.77, No.3 (July, 2013), pp.991-1023. The work of Principal Liaison Officer, Allied Navies (P.N.L.O.) with the Belgian, Dutch, French, Greek, Norwegian, Polish, and Yugoslav navies in exile.

Mears, Dwight S. **“The Catch-22 Effect: The lasting Stigma of Wartime Cowardice in the U.S. Army Air Forces.”** Vol.77, No.3 (July, 2013), pp.1025-1054. Accusations of cowardice by the air crews that landed in Switzerland and their consequences.

Lambert, Nicholas A. **“Review Essay: False Prophet?: The Maritime Theory of Julian Corbett and Professional Education.”** Vol.77, No.3 (July, 2013), pp.1055-1078.

Lenaburg, Jerry, **“Review Essay: Iraq & Afghanistan.”** Vol.77, No.3 (July, 2013), pp.1079-1084. Exploration of three recent studies of the wars in both Afghanistan, 2001-2021, and Iraq, 2003-2011.

Vol.77, No.4 (October, 2013)

Leiner, Frederick C. **“Privateers in the War of 1812.”** Vol.77, No.4 (October, 2013), Pp.1225-1250. Seeks to answer the question, ‘Was privateering profitable?’

Bruscino, Thomas, “**Naturally Clausewitzian: U.S. Army Theory and Education from Reconstruction to the Inter-War Years.**” Vol.77, No.4 (October, 2013), pp.1251-1275. Though familiar with Carl von Clausewitz (1780-1831), U.S. Army officers independently embraced concepts that Clausewitz advocated.

Otte, T.G. “**From *Can-Can Diabolique* to *Sitzkrieg*: The International China Expeditionary Force, 1900-1901.**” Vol.77, No.4 (October, 2013), pp.1277-1302. Analyzes a neglected example of coalition warfare.

Vergolina, Joseph R. “**‘Methods of Barbarism’ or Western Tradition? Britain, South Africa, and the Evolution of Escalatory Violence as Policy.**” Vol.77, No.4 (October, 2013), pp.1303-1327. Investigates British counterinsurgency methods in the Second Anglo-Boer War (1899-1902).

Miller, Stephen M. “**The British Way of War: Cultural Assumption and Practices in the South African War, 1899-1902.**” Vol.77, No.4 (October, 2013), pp.1329-1347. Cosmopolitanism, political egalitarianism, and attitudes towards race influenced the British conduct of the war.

Gray, Peter, “**A Culture of Official Squeamishness? Britain’s Air Ministry and the Strategic Air Offensive against Germany?**” Vol.77, No.4 (October, 2013), pp.1349-1377. Endeavors to determine if the reluctance of the Air Ministry to issue a campaign medal for the R.A.F.s strategic bombing campaign was due to a discomfort with the tactics of area bombing, particularly in the wake of the attack on Dresden.

Reist, Katherine K. “**The American Military Advisory Missions to China, 1945-1949.**” Vol.77, No.4 (October, 2013), pp.1379-1398. Provides an account of the difficulties between the Joint U.S. Military Advisory Group and *Guomindang* leaders.

Dorn, Walter, “**The U.N.’s First ‘Air Force’: Peacekeepers in Combat, Congo 1960-64.**” Vol.77, No.4 (October, 2013), pp.1399-1425. Recounts O.N.U.C.’s Operation Grand Slam in December, 1962, during which Swedish jets neutralized Katanga’s air force.

Yarborough, William Michael, “**Undocumented Triumph: Gulf War Operational Records Management.**” Vol.77, No.4 (October, 2013), pp.1427-1438.

Vol.78, No.1 (January, 2014)

Bachrach, David S. “**Restructuring the Eastern Frontier: Henry I of Germany, 924-936.**” Vol.78, No.1 (January, 2014), pp.9-35. Analyzes the establishment of a defense in depth against Magyar raiders, relying on garrisoned fortifications.

Hall, Brian N. “**Technological Adaptation in Global Conflict: The British Army and Communications**

beyond the Western Front, 1914-1918.” Vol.78, No.1 (January, 2014), pp.37-71.

McPherson, Alan, **“Lid Sitters and Prestige Seekers: The U.S. Navy versus the State Department and the End of U.S. Occupations.”** Vol.78, No.1 (January, 2014), pp.73-99. Conflicting outlooks between the State Department and the Marine Corps on the U.S. military occupation of the Dominican Republic, from 1912 to 1924, Haiti, from 1915 to 1934, and Nicaragua, from 1927 to 1932.

Gunsburg, Jeffrey A. **“La Grand Illusion: Belgian and Dutch Strategy Facing Germany, 1919 – May, 1940.”** Vol.78, No.1 (January, 2014), pp.101-158; Vol.78, No.2 (April, 2014), pp.605-671.

Douglas, Sarah K. **“The Search for Hitler: Hugh Trevor-Roper, Humphrey Searle, and the Last Days of Adolf Hitler.”** Vol.78, No.1 (January, 2014), pp.159-210. The means by which British intelligence officer Hugh Trevor-Roper (1914-2003) obtained his information for his book, *The Last Days of Hitler* (1947).

Friedman, Hal M. **“Blue versus Orange: The United States Naval War College, Japan, and the Old Enemy in the Pacific, 1945-1946.”** Vol.78, No.1 (January, 2014), pp.211-231. Reports on the delay in adjusting to post-war circumstances that meant that the War College curriculum remained a mixture of interwar and wartime doctrine during the early Cold War.

Boylan, Kevin M. **“Goodnight Saigon: American Provincial Advisors’ Final Impressions of the Vietnam War.”** Vol.78, No.1 (January, 2014), pp.233-270. Scrutinizes the revisionist proposition that the United States had won the war in the wake of the Tet Offensive, 1968, by examining the assessments of U.S. Province Senior Advisors.

Sumida, Jon, **“A Concordance of Selected Subjects in Carl von Clausewitz’s *On War*.”** Vol.78, No.1 (January, 2014), pp.271-331.

Lee, Wayne E. **“Research Note: Military History in a Global Frame.”** Vol.78, No.1 (January, 2014), pp.333-336. Three works by the prolific military historian, Jeremy Black that explore the conduct and consequences of warfare throughout the globe from the mid-fifteenth century to the conclusion of the eighteenth century.

Vol.78, No.2 (April, 2014)

Kerner, Alex, **“Espionage and Field Intelligence in the Conquest of México, 1519-1521.”** Vol.78, No.2 (April, 2014), pp.469-501. Identifies the types of intelligence sources and information-gathering systems available to both sides during the fateful events of 1519-1521, and their role in the outcome of this milestone in the New World’s history.

Mayer, Holly A. **“Canada, Congress, and the Continental Army: Strategic Accommodations, 1774-**

1776.” Vol.78, No.2 (April, 2014), pp.503-535. Discusses the challenge of reconciling the Continental Congress’ policy of encouraging the enlistment of French Catholics in Canada with anti-Catholic bigotry among the members of the Continental Army.

Stagg, J.C.A. **“Freedom and Subordination: Disciplinary Problems in the U.S. Army of 1812.”** Vol.78, No.2 (April, 2014), pp.537-574. Based on general court martial case files and the question of proper forms of punishment.

Smith, Jason W. **“Twixt the Devil and the Deep Blue Sea: Hydrography, Sea Power, and the Marine Environment, 1898-1901.”** Vol.78, No.2 (April, 2014), pp.575-604. Endeavors to understand the role played by knowledge of the marine environment in the Spanish-American War, 1898.

Gunsburg, Jeffrey A. **“La Grand Illusion: Belgian and Dutch Strategy Facing Germany, 1919 – May, 1940.”** Vol.78, No.1 (January, 2014), pp.101-158; Vol.78, No.2 (April, 2014), pp.605-671.

Stubbs, David, **“A Blind Spot? The Royal Air Force (R.A.F.) and Long-Range Fighters, 1936-1944.”** Vol.78, No.2 (April, 2014), pp.673-702. Explores why Bomber Command maintained its view that it would be neither appropriate nor prudent to protect its bombers with long-range fighter escort.

Arielli, Nir, **“When are Foreign Volunteers Useful? Israel’s Transnational Soldiers in the War of 1948 Re-examined.”** Vol.78, No.2 (April, 2014), pp.703-724. Assesses the military and political utility for Israel of *Machal* (overseas volunteers) by comparing them with alternate examples of this phenomenon in other twentieth century conflicts.

Hickey, Donald R. **“‘War Hawks’: Using Newspapers to Trace a Phrase, 1792-1812.”** Vol.78, No.2 (April, 2014), pp.725-740.

Turner, Blair P. **“Capturing the many Faces of War.”** Vol.78, No.2 (April, 2014), pp.741-746. A look at a 2012 catalogue of the exposition of war photography by the Museum of Fine Arts at Houston, Texas.

Dudley, William S. **“Review Essay: War of 1812 Trilogy.”** Vol.78, No.2 (April, 2014), pp.747-751. Three works by the noted Canadian military historian, Donald E. Graves, on the Battles of the War of 1812 fought during the years 1813 to 1814.

Dingman, Roger, **“Review Essay: American Bases in Japan.”** Vol.78, No.2 (April, 2014), pp.753-755. A collection of essays by Japanese academics and public historians providing a balanced study of the impact of U.S. bases Kanagawa Prefecture, just southwest of Tokyo

Vol.78, No.3 (July, 2014)

Sherer, Idan, **“‘All of Us, in One Voice, Demand what’s Owed Us’: Mutiny in the Spanish Infantry**

during the Italian Wars, 1525-1538.” Vol.78, No.3 (July, 2014), pp.893-926. The author notes the similarities between these all too frequent mutinies and strikes initiated and resolved by modern employees.

De la Garza, Andrew, **“The Mughal Battlefield: Personnel, Technology, and Tactics in the Early Empire, 1500-1605.”** Vol.78, No.3 (July, 2014), pp.927-960. Challenges the assumptions of inferiority in comparison with the ‘European Military Revolution.’

Hall, John W. **“An Irregular Reconsideration of George Washington and the American Military Tradition.”** Vol.78, No.3 (July, 2014), pp.961-993. Attempts to reconcile the contradictory interpretations of George Washington’s (1732-1799) approach to and performance in the conduct of war.

Worthing, Peter, **“Continuity and Change: Chinese Nationalist Army Tactics, 1925-1938.”** Vol.78, No.3 (July, 2014), pp.995-1016.

Goulter, Christine J.M. **“The Greek Civil War: A National Army’s Counter-Insurgency Triumph.”** Vol.78, No.3 (July, 2014), pp.1017-1055. Challenges the assumption that victory resulted from Anglo-American training and equipment, rather than the Greek National Army’s successful development of an effective counter-insurgency strategy.

Rives, Tim, **“Like Footprints in the Sand: Searching for Eisenhower’s Climactic D-Day Words.”** Vol.78, No.3 (July, 2014), pp.1057-1067.

Chet, Guy, **“Teaching in the Shadow of the Military Revolution.”** Vol.78, No.3 (July, 2014), pp.1069-1075.

Paret, Peter, **“Translation, Literal or Accurate.”** Vol.78, No.3 (July, 2014), pp.1077-1080. Disagreements over the proper translation of five words in Carl von Clausewitz’s *On War* as an example of the challenges of translating complex texts.

Wheeler, Everett L. **“The Archaeology of War in Late Antiquity.”** Vol.78, No.3 (July, 2014), pp.1081-1093. A critical examination of a two volume collection of papers originally presented at a 2007 Oxford conference.

Vol.78, No.4 (October, 2014)

McPherson, James M. **“The 2014 George C. Marshall Lecture in Military History: The Rewards of Risk-Taking: Two Civil War Admirals.”** Vol.78, No.4 (October, 2014), pp.1225-1237. Comparison between Rear Admiral David Glasgow Farragut (1801-1870) and Rear Admiral Samuel Francis Du Pont (1803-1865).

Lapp, Derrick E. **“Did They Really ‘Take None but Gentlemen’? Henry Hardman, the Maryland Line, and a Reconsideration of the Socioeconomic Composition of the Continental Officer Corps.”** Vol.78, No.4 (October, 2014), pp.1239-1261.

Beckett, Ian F.W. **“The Road to Kandahar: The Politics of Retention and Withdrawal in Afghanistan, 1880-81.”** Vol.78, No.4 (October, 2014), pp.1263-1294.

Forrester, Charles, **“Field Marshal Montgomery’s Role in the Creation of the British 21st Army Group’s Combined Arms Doctrine for the Final Assault on Germany.”** Vol.78, No.4 (October, 2014), pp.1295-1320.

Hutchinson, Robert W. **“The Weight of History: *Wehrmacht* Officers, the U.S. Army Historical Division, and U.S. Military Doctrine, 1945-1956.”** Vol.78, No.4 (October, 2014), pp.1321-1348. Suggests that, even within the ‘purely operational’ lessons provided by veteran German officers to the U.S. Army, a considerable element of Nazi racist ideology was transmitted.

Boylan, Kevin M. **“No ‘Technical Knockout’: Giap’s Artillery at Dien Bien Phu.”** Vol.78, No.4 (October, 2014), pp.1349-1383. Contests the common explanation for the victory of the Vietnamese People’s Army based on a flood of Vietnamese publications around the 2004 fiftieth anniversary of the siege.

Gioia, Philip, **“When ‘The Institution was Heard from’ in World War II: V.M.I. Alumni on the War Department General Staff, 1939-1945.”** Vol.78, No.4 (October, 2014), pp.1385-1394.

Lender, Mark Edward, **“Review Essay: The Ever Controversial General Charles Lee.”** Vol.78, No.4 (October, 2014), pp.1395-1405. Charles Lee (1732-1782), a veteran of service in the British, Portuguese, and Polish armies, served as a high-ranking commander in George Washington’s Continental Army until his court martial over behavior associated with the Battle of Monmouth, June 28, 1778.

Vol.79, No.1 (January, 2015)

Herrera, Ricardo A. **“ ‘[T]he zealous activity of Capt. Lee’: Light-Horse Harry Lee and *Petite Guerre*.”** Vol.79, No.1 (January, 2015), pp.9-36. Captain ‘Light Horse Harry’ Lee’s (1756-1818) foraging mission in Delaware and Maryland, during February and March, 1778, as an example of command at the company level.

Fedorowich, Kent, **“ ‘Caught in the Crossfire’: Sir Gerald Campbell, Lord Beaverbrook and the Near Demise of the British Commonwealth Air Training Plan, May-October 1940.”** Vol.79, No.1 (January, 2015), pp.37-68. The program was threatened by intemperate remarks by Lord Beaverbrook (1879-1964) which rattled Anglo-Canadian relations.

Chi Man Kwong, **“The Failure of Japanese Land-Sea Cooperation during the Second World War: Hong 1879-1964) Kong and the South China Coast as an Example, 1942-1945.”** Vol.79, No.1 (January, 2015), pp.69-91.

Borch, Fred L. **“ ‘In the Name of the Queen’: Military Trials of Japanese War Criminals in the Netherlands East Indies (1946-1949).”** Vol.79, No.1 (January, 2015), pp.93-125.

Rislakki, Jukka, **“ ‘Without Mercy’ – U.S. Strategic Intelligence and Finland in the Cold War.”** Vol.79, No.1 (January, 2015), pp.127-149. Unbeknownst to Finland’s political leaders, a secret channel for the exchange of information regarding the U.S.S.R. existed between Finnish military intelligence and the United States.

Lipman, Jana K. **“ ‘A Precedent Worth Setting...’ Military Humanitarianism: The U.S. Military and the 1975 Vietnamese Evacuation.”** Vol.79, No.1 (January, 2015), pp.151-179. Proposes that the U.S. Armed Forces’ involvement in the evacuation of over 100,000 Vietnamese to the United States represented a turning point in how these institutions viewed humanitarian operations.

Graves, Donald E. **“Review Essay: U.S. Army Campaigns of the War of 1812.”** Vol.79, No.1 (January, 2015), pp.181-185.

Vol.79, No.2 (April, 2015)

Stoler, Mark A. **“The 2015 George C. Marshall Lecture in Military History: George C. Marshall and the ‘Europe-First Strategy, 1939-1951: A Study in Diplomatic as well as Military History.”** Vol.79, No.2 (April, 2015), pp.293-316. Examines the relationship between diplomatic and military history regarding Marshall’s (1880-1959) support for the strategy of ‘Germany First’ during World War II, for the postwar European Recovery Program, and the relief of Gen. Douglas MacArthur (1880-1964) during the Korean War.

Isaac, Steven, **“The Role of Towns in the Battle of Bouvines (1214).”** Vol.79, No.2 (April, 2015), pp.317-344. Uses the French King, Philip Augustus’ (1165-1223), victory at Bouvines as an example of the military contributions of urban centers in the form of non-noble troops, the production of arms and armor, financial resources, and contributors to policy.

Bellinger, Vanya Eftimova, **“The Other Clausewitz: Findings from the Newly Discovered Correspondence between Marie and Carl von Clausewitz.”** Vol.79, No.2 (April, 2015), pp.345-367.

Muschamp, Amy, **“Living Under Allied Military Government in Southern Italy during the Second World War: A Case Study of the Region of Molise.”** Vol.79, No.2 (April, 2015), pp.369-386. Based on a combination of archival research at the regional capital of Campobasso and oral history.

Boghardt, Thomas, **“Dirty Work? The Use of Nazi Informants by U.S. Army Intelligence in Postwar Europe.”** Vol.79, No.2 (April, 2015), pp.387-422. Probes ethical issues and utility of the Allied enlistment of war criminals and suspected war criminals for collecting information on Soviet and Communist Party activities in Europe.

Hughes, Geraint, **“Demythologising Dhofar: British Policy, Military Strategy, and Counter-Insurgency in Oman, 1963-1976.”** Vol.79, No.2 (April, 2015), pp.423-456. Demonstrates that the UK backed C.O.I.N. operations of the Sultanate of Oman placed a heavier reliance on military force than civil engagement and that specific historical circumstances make the ‘lessons learned’ less applicable for other conflicts.

Donnelly, William M. **“This ‘Horrible Example’: An Extraordinary Case of Absent Without Leave during the Vietnam War.”** Vol.79, No.2 (April, 2015), pp.457-466. Thomas J. Cuchal of Cleveland, Ohio.

Vol.79, No.3 (July, 2015)

Swope, Kenneth M. **“Manifesting Awe: Grand Strategy and Imperial Leadership in the Ming Dynasty.”** Vol.79, No.3 (July, 2015), pp.597-634. Affirms the development and use of an overarching grand strategy by the Ming Dynasty (1368-1644) and considers its relationship with the actual policy decisions and military operations of the dynasty’s Emperors.

Richenbacher, Wayne E. **“The Demise of Stonewall Jackson: A Civil War Medical Case Study.”** Vol.79, No.3 (July, 2015), pp.635-655. Chronicles the eight days between General Stonewall Jackson’s (1824-1863) wounding at the Battle of Chancellorsville, 2 May, 1863, and his death, considering the care provided his surgeon,

Canfield, Daniel T. **“Opportunity Lost: Combined Operations and the Development of Union Military Strategy, April 1861 – April 1862.”** Vol.79, No.3 (July, 2015), pp.657-690.

Bell, Christopher M. **“Air Power and the Battle of the Atlantic: Very Long Range Aircraft and the Delay in Closing the Atlantic ‘Air Gap’.”** Vol.79, No.3 (July, 2015), pp.691-719. Places the blame involving this failure to address this problem on the Royal Air Force’s Coastal Command rather than a prioritization of strategic bombing over the protection of maritime convoys.

Seipp, Adam R. **“Buchenwald Stories: Testimony, Military History, and the American Encounter with the Holocaust.”** Vol.79, No.3 (July, 2015), pp.721-744. Demonstrates how the testimonies of American servicemen have evolved in tandem with changes in public perceptions of the war and the Holocaust.

Phimister, Ian, **“Developing and Defending Britain and Her Empire: Montgomery’s 1947 Tour of**

Africa.” Vol.79, No.3 (July, 2015), pp.745-766. An overlooked event of the immediate postwar era that provides a window into both Field Marshal Bernard Montgomery’s (1887-1976) post-1945 career and the attitudes of the new Labour government towards defense.

Stamp, Jeffrey, **“Aero-Static Warfare: A Brief Survey of Ballooning in Mid-nineteenth-century Siege Warfare.”** Vol.79, No.3 (July, 2015), Pp.767-782. Includes usage in the U.S. Civil War, War of the Triple Alliance / Paraguayan War, and the Franco-Prussian War.

Grimsley, Mark, **“Review Essay: The American Military History Master Narrative: Three Textbooks on the American Military Experience.”** Vol.79, No.3 (July, 2015), pp.783-802.

Vol.79, No.4 (October, 2015)

“Forward: In Commemoration of the First World War.” Vol.79, No.4 (October, 2015), pp.925-928.

Little, Branden, **“Evacuating Wartime Europe: U.S. Policy, Strategy, and Relief Operations for Overseas American Travelers, 1914-15.”** Vol.79, No.4 (October, 2015), pp.929-958. The evacuation by the U.S. Relief Commission of 125,000 U.S. citizens stranded in Europe and its far-ranging impact on war preparedness and subsequent humanitarian operations.

Doughty, Robert A. **“Papa’ Joffre and the Great War.”** Vol.79, No.4 (October, 2015), pp.959-979. Asks whether General Joseph Joffre’s (1852-1931) achievements are outweighed by his failures.

DiNardo, Richard L. **“The Limits of Technology: The Invasion of Serbia, 1915.”** Vol.79, No.4 (October, 2015), pp.981-995. By focusing on the different forms of technology employed by the invading forces of the Central Powers, the author explains how they benefitted the invaders, but also had their limitations.

Greenhalgh, Elizabeth. **“General Ferdinand Foch and Unified Allied Command in 1918.”** Vol.79, No.4 (October, 2015), pp.997-1023. Examines the actions and decisions of General Foch (1851-1929), including four during the German Spring Offensives, two during the Allied counteroffensive, and one during the armistice negotiations.

Peifer, Douglas, **“The Sinking of the *Lusitania*, Wilson’s Response, and Paths Not Taken: Historical Revisionism, the Nye Committee, and the Ghost of William Jennings Bryan.”** Vol.79, No.4 (October, 2015), pp.1025-1045. Assesses the way that the impact of the revisionist literature of the interwar period on the Neutrality Acts of the mid-1930s demonstrates how ‘history’s lessons’ without context can mislead rather than inform.

Moore, Andrew, **“Monuments Men and Martyred Towns: *The Arras Belfry* by Fernand Sabatté.”** Vol.79, No.4 (October, 2015), pp.1047-1057. Sabatté (1874-1940) served as a French officer in charge

of evacuating artworks from Medieval churches and town halls that were under the threat of destruction as well as painting an example of the ‘martyred towns’ genre.

Burns, Robert G.H. **“British Folk Songs of the Great War – Then and Now.”** Vol.79, No.4 (October, 2015), pp.1059-1071.

Kemmerly, Phillip R. **“Environment and the Course of Battle: Flooding at Shiloh (6-7 April, 1862).”** Vol.79, No.4 (October, 2015), pp.1079-1108.

Kaplan, Mike, **“Review Essay: Grant’s Drinking... The Beast that will not Die.”** Vol.79, No.4 (October, 2015), pp.1109-1119.

Vandervort, Bruce, **“Review Essay: Italian Imperialism and the Onset of the Great War.”** Vol.79, No.4 (October, 2015), pp.1121-1126. Three books about the Italo-Turkish War, 1911-1912, and a third covering the wars that immediately preceding the outbreak of World War I which, of course, include both Italy’s war and the Balkan Wars.

Parker, Geoffrey, **“Review Essay: Patrick Gordon Rides Again.”** Vol.79, No.4 (October, 2015), pp.1127-1129. Examines The remaining volumes of the diary of General Patrick Gordon of Auchleuchries 1635-1699, the account of a Scottish Catholic who, like many Early-Modern Scots, served in the armies of Sweden, Poland, and Russia.

Vol.80, No.1 (January, 2016)

Dodman, Thomas, **“1814 and the Melancholy of War.”** Vol.80, No.1 (January, 2016), pp.31-55. Through contemporary accounts, this article explores the emotional reaction of state officials, soldiers, military doctors, etc. to the collapse of Napoleon’s Empire.

Hantraye, Jacques, **“The Silence of the Woods: The 1815 Murder of a Prussian Soldier in Western France.”** Vol.80, No.1 (January, 2016), pp.57-76. Focuses on the murder of a Prussian soldier on 22 July, 1815, outside of the village of Unverre, located roughly ninety miles southwest of Paris, as a means of exploring the interactions between the forces of occupation and the civilian population of postwar France.

Calvet, Stéphane, **“The Painful Demobilization of the Napoleonic Grande Armée’s Officers.”** Vol.80, No.1 (January, 2016), pp.77-92. By examining the Western French Department of Charente, the author illustrates the diverse loyalties, motivations, and subsequent careers of the officers of Napoleon’s Grande Armée.

Tozzi, Christopher, **“Soldiers without a Country: Foreign Veterans in the Transition from Empire to Restoration.”** Vol.80, No.1 (January, 2016), pp.93-120. The article identifies and explores three

trends: the exclusion of foreign veterans from the program of social healing that the Restoration Bourbons undertook, the limits of the modern French state's care for veterans, and the ambiguity of national identity after the revolutionary era.

Heuer, Jennifer, **"Soldiers as Victims or Villains? Demobilization, Masculinity, and Family in French Royalist Pamphlets, 1814-1815."** Vol.80, No.1 (January, 2016), pp.121-144.

Ottosen, Morten Nordhagen, **"Ending War and Making Peace in Scandinavia, 1814-1848: 'Peace Crisis', Demobilization, and Reconciliation."** Vol.80, No.1 (January, 2016), pp.145-172.

Wulff, Petter, **"Artillery, Light and Heavy: Sardinia-Piedmont and Sweden in the Nineteenth Century."** Vol.80, No.1 (January, 2016), pp.173-185. Despite contrary requirements for polar opposite strategic circumstances, the cooperation of these two states produced path-breaking artillery technology.

Dudley, William S. **"A Soldier, His Family, and the Impact of the Pacific War, 1942-1945."** Vol.80, No.1 (January, 2016), pp.187-192. A three-volume biography of Wilber Bradt of Washington State who served as a Field Artillery officer in the 43rd Infantry Division as it fought its way through the Solomons, New Guinea, and the Philippines. Based on a trove of preserved correspondence and interviews, this account is as much about his family on the home front as it is about Bradt on the frontlines.

Vol.80, No.2 (April, 2016)

Atkinson, Rick, **"The 2016 George C. Marshall Lecture in Military History: Projecting American Power in the Second World War."** Vol.80, No.2 (April, 2016), pp.345-354. In spite of devoting a smaller proportion of the country's gross domestic product to the war than any other major belligerent, the United States demonstrated logistical brilliance, firepower, mobility, mechanical aptitude, and an economic preponderance that outproduced the Axis powers.

Smith, Mark A. **"The Politics of Military Professionalism: The Engineer Company and the Political Activities of the Antebellum U.S. Army Corps of Engineers."** Vol.80, No.2 (April, 2016), pp.355-387. Addresses the tensions presented by both internal politicking in the Corps and the lobbying of officers in promoting the nation's defensive needs.

Dunley, Richard, **"Technology and Tradition: Mine Warfare and the Royal Navy's Strategy of Coastal Assault, 1870-1890."** Vol.80, No.2 (April, 2016), pp.398-409.

Jeffrey, Thomas E. **"Commodore' Edison Joins the Navy: Thomas Alva Edison and the Naval Consulting Board."** Vol.80, No.2 (April, 2016), pp.411-445. Claims that the impetus for the formation of the Naval Consulting Board headed by Edison (1847-1931), which was intended to provide advice

on naval warfare technology, was Edison's chief engineer, who conceived it as the centerpiece of a marketing campaign to sell Edison designed batteries to the Navy for their submarines.

Hammond, Richard, **"Fighting under a Different Flag: Multinational Naval Cooperation and Submarine Warfare in the Mediterranean, 1940-1944."** Vol.80, No.2 (April, 2016), pp.447-476.

In contrast to their experience in the British home theatre, the submarines in the Mediterranean operated by the exiled governments of the Free French, Greece, the Netherlands, Poland, and Yugoslavia, along with those of Italy beginning in 1943, found it difficult to cooperate with the Royal Navy, as well as each other.

Paret, Peter, **"On War then and now."** Vol.80, No.2 (April, 2016), pp.477-485. Analyzes the development of some of Clausewitz' (1780-1831) concepts from the 1790s to the early 1830s and their relevance today.

Matsui, John H. **"Historiographical Essay: Seven Score and Ten: American Civil War Historiography at the Close of the Sesquicentennial."** Vol.80, No.2 (April, 2016), pp.487-509.

Vol.80, No.3 (July, 2016)

Rommelse, Gijs and Downing, Roger, **"Victims of an Ideological Rift? Dutch Prisoners of War during the First Anglo-Dutch War (1652-1654)."** Vol.80, No.3 (July, 2016), pp.649-669. Rather than ideology, the author shows that it was a combination of logistical problems and a lack of funds that produced the dire conditions experienced by Dutch P.O.W.s.

Tzoref-Ashkenazi, Chen, **"German Military Participation in Early Modern European Colonialism."** Vol.80, No.3 (July, 2016), pp.671-695. Brings to light the employment of German mercenaries in the colonial ventures of different European kingdoms.

Baker, Anni, **"The Abolition of the U.S. Army Canteen, 1898-1914."** Vol.80, No.3 (July, 2016), pp.697-724. The impact of Progressive era activists on conditions in the Army and the debate over the role of the Army in U.S. society.

Matthews, James, **"Battling Bolshevik Bogeymen: Spain's Cordon Sanitaire against Revolution from a European Perspective, 1917-1923."** Vol.80, No.3 (July, 2016), pp.725-755. The violent social unrest experienced by Spain after 1917 represented the broader impact of the Russian Revolution that effected countries, whether they were belligerents in the Great War or neutrals like Spain.

Finch, Michael P.M. **"Edward Mead Earle and the Unfinished *Makers of Modern Strategy*."** Vol.80, No.3 (July, 2016), pp.781-814.

Toprani, Anand, **"The First War for Oil: The Caucasus, German Strategy, and the Turning Point**

of the War on the Eastern Front, 1942.” Vol.80, No.3 (July, 2016), pp.815-854.

Ferreiro, Larrie D. **“Horatio Nelson never Wrote ‘A Ship’s a Fool to Fight a Fort’: It was Jackie Fisher Who Invented the Attribution.”** Vol.80, No.3 (July, 2016), pp.855-856.

Hitchens, Ralph M. **“Review Essay: Casting Light on a Dark Territory.”** Vol.80, No.3 (July, 2016), pp.857-862. Works concerning cyber warfare.

Vol.80, No.4 (October, 2016)

Schubert, Frank N. **“Commemorative Essay: Sesquicentennial Reflection on the Black Regulars.”** Vol.80, No.4 (October, 2016), pp.1011-1016. To honor the sesquicentennial of the inclusion of African Americans in the regular U.S. Army, this brief essay considers how this precedent that came about in the wake of the service Black Volunteers in the Civil War pushed forward, albeit all too slowly, social change in American society.

Sears, Matthew A. and Willekes, Carolyn, **“Alexander’s Cavalry Charge at Chaeronea, 338 B.C.E.”** Vol.80, No.4 (October, 2016), pp.1017-1035. Confronts the controversy surrounding whether or not the eighteen year old Alexander the Great (356-322 B.C.E.) actually led a cavalry charge that contributed to the defeat of the forces of the Greek coalition.

Watt, Robert N. **“ ‘An Exodus to Nowhere’?: Victorio’s Tres Castillos Campaign, September-October 1880.”** Vol.80, No.4 (October, 2016), pp.1037-1072. Undertakes to show that, rather than being the conclusion to aimless wandering in the deserts of northern Mexico, the campaign was based on the traditional Apache conduct of guerrilla warfare.

Van Tuyll, Hubert, **“Memory, Myth and Forgetting: The Netherlands and the World Wars.”** Vol.80, No.4 (October, 2016), pp.1073-1081. Advances the explanation that the inaccurate myths that evolved around Netherlands neutrality during World War I had an unfortunate impact on the country’s defensive preparations leading up to World War II.

Goldstein, Cora Sol, **“A Comparative Analysis of Cultural Control: The German Military Occupation of France (1940-1942) and the American Military Occupation of Germany (1945-1949).”** Vol.80, No.4 (October, 2016), pp.1083-1116. Although their respective agendas were inspired by opposite ideologies, the author proposes that the mechanisms of control over information by both occupiers shared significant similarities.

Uyar, Mesut and Güvenç, Serhat, **“One Battle and Two Accounts: The Turkish Brigade at Kunu-ri in November 1950.”** Vol.80, No.4 (October, 2016), pp.1117-1147. Assesses the impact of U.S. military assistance provided to the Turkish Army and why the official U.S. and Turkish accounts of the Battle of Kunu-ri / Chongchon differ significantly.

Marolda, Edward J. **“Orphan of the Mekong Delta: The Army-Navy Mobile Riverine Force.”** Vol.80, No.4 (October, 2016), pp.1149-1181. Despite its success during the Tet Offensive of 1968, the failure of Army and Navy leaders to fully embrace the creation of the Army-Navy Mobile Riverine Force resulting in its disbanding by Gen. Creighton Abrams (1914-1974).

Vol.81, No.1 (January, 2017)

Laband, John, **“The Slave Soldiers of Africa.”** Vol.81, No.1 (January, 2017), pp.9-38. Presents a broad overview of the long history of African military slavery, which the author notes was not limited to Muslim states, was adapted by European colonial powers, and has re-emerged in the phenomenon of child soldiers.

Downs, Troy, **“The Raj in Peril: The City of Benares [Varanasi] during the Indian Uprising of 1857.”** Vol.81, No.1 (January, 2017), pp.39-73.

Hackemer, Kurt, **“Wartime Trauma and the Lure of the Frontier: Civil War Veterans in Dakota Territory.”** Vol.81, No.1 (January, 2017), pp.75-103. Surveys a sample of 6,000 veterans based on the 1885 Dakota Territory census.

Crawford, Michael J. **“The Abolition of Prize Money in the United States Navy Reconsidered.”** Vol.81, No.1 (January, 2017), pp.105-132. Sizes up the efforts to eliminate prize money for the capture of enemy warships and merchant ships, which began shortly after the War of 1812, but only came about in 1899 due to a confluence of motives.

Kranjc, Gregor, **“Fight or Flight: Desertion, Defection, and Draft-Dodging in Occupied Slovenia, 1941-1945.”** Vol.81, No.1 (January, 2017), pp.133-162. Questions the motives for Slovenes to avoid or escape from military service for three occupying powers, Germany, Hungary, and Italy, and these powers efforts to combat draft-dodging, desertion, and defection.

Eames, Anthony, **“The Trident Sales Agreement and Cold War Diplomacy.”** Vol.81, No.1 (January, 2017), pp.163-186. The ‘Special Relationship’ was bolstered by the sale of U.S. Trident submarine-launched ballistic missile technology to Great Britain in 1982.

Paoletti, Ciro, **“The Battle of Culloden: A Pivotal Moment in World History.”** Vol.81, No.1 (January, 2017), pp.187-198. Highlights the international context of the Battle of Culloden, 16 April, 1746, and speculates on the wider consequences of a Hanoverian defeat.

Cashin, Joan, **“Bibliographic Essay: American Women and the American Civil War.”** Vol.81, No.1 (January, 2017), pp.199-204.

Vandervort, Bruce, **“Review Essay: African Military History Comes of Age.”** Vol.81, No.1 (January, 2017), pp.205-208. A look at two significant works on the military history of the continent, one an encyclopedia of colonial conflicts, the other a three-volume narrative account of conflict, edited and written by Timothy J. Stapleton, respectively.

Vol.81, No.2 (April, 2017)

Bachrach, David S. and Bachrach, Bernard S. **“Bruno of Mersburg *Saxon War: A Study in Eleventh-Century German Military History.*”** Vol.81, No.2 (April, 2017), pp.341-367. Bruno of Mersburg’s account of the civil wars fought by King Henry IV (1056-1106) provides valuable information on the nature and conduct of warfare in north-central Europe during this period.

Soucier, Daniel S. **“ ‘Where there was no Signs of any Human Being’: Navigating the Eastern Country Wilderness on Arnold’s March to Quebec, 1775.”** Vol.81, No.2 (April, 2017), pp.369-393. Looks at soldiers’ attitudes towards and interaction with the natural environment.

McGovern, Rory M. **“The School of Experience: George W. Goethals and the U.S. Army, 1867-1907.”** Vol.81, No.2 (April, 2017), pp.395-424. Observes George W. Goethals (1858-1928) pre-Panama Canal / World War I career as an example of the career path of officers within the Gilded Age Army.

Nordlund, Alexander, **“ ‘Done My Bit’: British Soldiers, the 1918 Armistice, and Understanding the First World War.”** Vol.81, No.2 (April, 2017), pp.425-446. Contrasts British soldiers’ reactions to the Armistice and their war experience with their later reflections.

Borzęcki, Jerzy, **“Battle of Warsaw, 1920: Was Radio Intelligence the Key to Polish Victory over the Red Army?”** Vol.81, No.2 (April, 2017), pp.447-468. A look at what recent Polish literature has to say about the role of radio-intelligence in the Russo-Polish War, 1919-1920.

Wylie, Neville, **“Allied Special Forces and Prisoner of War Recovery Operations in Europe, 1944-1945.”** Vol.81, No.2 (April, 2017), pp.469-489. Contrary to contemporary and historical judgements, Allied plans to secure the safety of P.O.W.s in German hands were reasonable, realistic, and provided a template for similar operations in the Pacific Theater and beyond.

Jeans, Roger B., Jr. **“Ghost Guerrillas: The C.I.A. and ‘Tiger General’ Li Zongren’s Third Force during the Early Cold War.”** Vol.81, No.2 (April, 2017), pp.491-512. The attempt by the C.I.A. to develop an anti-Communist faction as an alternative to Chiang Kai-Shek’s (1887-1975) Nationalists and the broader impact of this approach on the C.I.A.

Lines, Lisa, **“Francisco Franco as Warrior: Is It Time for a Reassessment of His Military Leadership?”** Vol.81, No.2 (April, 2017), pp.513-534. Critiques Franco’s (1892-1975) performance as a military commander within the context of his cultural and political environment.

Hoffman, F.G. **“To Drone or not to Drone.”** Vol.81, No.2 (April, 2017), pp.535-538.

Vol.81, No.3 (July, 2017)

Symonds, Craig, **“The 2017 George C. Marshall Lecture in Military History: For Want of a Nail: The Impact of Shipping on Grand Strategy in World War II.”** Vol.81, No.3 (July, 2017), pp.657-666. The remarkable success of U.S. ship building and its impact on Allied strategy.

Muehlbauer, Matthew S. **“Holy War and Just War in Early New England, 1630-1655.”** Vol.81, No.3 (July, 2017), pp.667-692. Questions the uneven application of these concepts by the New England colonies in relation to both wars and efforts to avoid war with both Native American tribes and the neighboring colony of New Netherlands.

Boutin, Cameron, **“Adversary and Ally: The Role of Weather in the Life and Career of George Washington.”** Vol.81, No.3 (July, 2017), pp.693-718.

Jones, T. Cole, **“‘The Rage of Tory-Hunting’: Loyalist Prisoners, Civil War, and the Violence of American Independence.”** Vol.81, No.3 (July, 2017), pp.719-746.

Johnson, Mark W. **“Emory Upton’s Twenty-Six: Desertion and Divided Loyalty of the U.S. Army Soldiers, 1860-1861.”** Vol.81, No.3 (July, 2017), pp.747-774. Contrary to common assumptions, the enlisted men of the regular peace-time Army were as conflicted in their loyalties as their officers, resulting in over 500 deserting during the secession crisis to serve in what became the Army of the Confederate States of America.

Rafuse, Ethan S. **“‘Little Phil’, a ‘Bad Old Man’, and the ‘Gray Ghost’: Hybrid Warfare and the Fight for the Shenandoah Valley, August-November 1864.”** Vol.81, No.3 (July, 2017), pp.775-801. Uses Major General Philip Sheridan’s (1831-1888) successful campaign against the combination of Confederate regular and irregular forces as a case study of addressing the challenges of hybrid warfare.

Charles, Patrick J. **“Dissecting the Origins of Air-Centric Special Operations Theory.”** Vol.81, No.3 (July, 2017), pp.803-828. Seeks to find the answers to the controversy surrounding whether British or U.S. officers deserve the most credit for developing the concepts that led to Operation THURSDAY, the airlanding of a specialized force behind Japanese lines in Burma in March, 1944, to disrupt enemy infrastructure and communications.

Paret, Peter, **“Review Essay: Clausewitz’s Life and Work as a Subject of Historical Interpretation.”** Vol.81, No.3 (July, 2017), pp.829-837.

Vol.81, No.4 (October, 2017) – Jeffrey Grey Memorial Issue

Connor, John, “**Climate, Environment, and Australian Frontier Wars: New South Wales, 1788-1841.**” Vol.81, No.4 (October, 2017), pp.985-1006. Attests that there was a strong correlation between the onset of drought in the inland region of south-eastern Australia and the eruption of armed conflict from 1824 to 1841, advocating a consideration of the impact of weather on the outbreak of war throughout history.

Westerman, William, “**The Real Controller of the Battle: The Importance of Studying Tactical Battalion Command – A Case Study.**” Vol.81, No.4 (October, 2017), pp.1007-1038. Offers the experience of the 22nd Australian Infantry Battalion during the 1918 Hundred Days Campaign as an example of decentralized command and control.

Sturma, Michael, “**Coco Solo Submarines: Protecting the Panama Canal, 1941-1942.**” Vol.81, No.4 (October, 2017), pp.1039-1057. While these submarine patrols may have contributed little to repelling any threat to the Canal Zone, they did provide useful training and experience for a significant number of U.S. submariners.

McGibbon, Ian, “**Australian-New Zealand Relations and Commitments to Asian Conflicts 1950-1972.**” Vol.81, No.4 (October, 2017), pp.1059-1074. Despite the replacement of the British security framework by alliance with the United States, New Zealand resisted pressure to commit troops to the Vietnam War in direct contrast to its larger neighbor.

Parkin, Russell, “**Colonel E.G. Keogh and the Making of the *Australian Army Journal*.**” Vol.81, No.4 (October, 2017), pp.1075-1096. Shines a light on the overlooked contribution to professional education and military history in Australia by Eustace Graham Keogh (1899-1981).

Grey, Jeffrey, “**The Formation of the Commonwealth Division, 1950-1951.**” Vol.81, No.4 (October, 2017), pp.1097-1107. The saga of the military and political challenges of forming a division composed of units from the Australian, British, Canadian, Indian, and New Zealand armies.

Dennis, Peter, “**Historiographical Note: The Books that Influenced Jeff Grey.**” Vol.81, No.4 (October, 2017), pp.1109-1112. Professor Jeffrey Grey (1959-2016), Australia’s most prominent military historian and the first President of the Society for Military History from outside of the United States.

Vol.82, No.1 (January, 2018)

Grummitt, David, “**Flodden 1513: Re-Examining British Warfare at the End of the Middle Ages.**” Vol.82, No.1 (January, 2018), pp.9-28. Asserts that the English Army that fought the forces lead by King James IV (1473-1513) on 9 September, 1513, was more modern than its Scottish counterpart, just as its commander, Thomas Howard, the Earl of Surrey (1443-1524), was more of a ‘Renaissance

General' than James IV.

Beckett, Ian F. **"How Wars End: Victorian Colonial Conflicts."** Vol.82, No.1 (January, 2018), pp.29-44.

The author challenges the conclusions of Bruce Collins' in his article "Defining Victory in Victorian Warfare, 1860-1882." *The Journal of Military History*, Vol.77, No.3 (July, 2013), pp.895-929.

Siotto, Andrea, **"Mapping the First World War: The Empowering Development of Mapmaking during the First World War in the British Army."** Vol.82, No.1 (January, 2018), pp.45-66.

Phillips, Gervase, "Technology, 'Machine Age' Warfare, and the Military Use of Dogs, 1880-1918."

Vol.82, No.1 (January, 2018), pp.67-94. The establishment of permanent, regular military dog units in 1880 reflects the overlooked fact that, during modern 'machine age' warfare, there remained a widespread reliance on animals.

Trifković, Gaj, **"The Yugoslav Partisans' Lost Victories: Operations in Montenegro and Bosnia-Herzegovina, 1944-1945."** Vol.82, No.1 (January, 2018), pp.95-124. Seeks to understand why the Germans were able to extricate their XXI Mountain Corps from two consecutive attempts at encirclement during October 1944 through April 1945.

Scianna, Bastian Matteo, **"Rommel Almighty? Italian Assessment of the 'Desert Fox' during and after the Second World War."** Vol.82, No.1 (January, 2018), pp.125-145. The Italian view based on new primary material, including the eavesdropping by British intelligence on Italian officers held as P.O.W.s in both Egypt and Britain.

Donnelly, William M. **"A Damn Hard Job: James A. Van Fleet and the Combat Effectiveness of U.S. Army Infantry, July 1951 – February 1953."** Vol.82, No.1 (January, 2018), pp.147-179. The difficulties faced by the Eighth Army commander, Gen. Van Fleet (1892-1992), to maintain 'the will to win' during the Korean War.

Daddis, Gregory A. **"Historiographical Essay: Mansplaining Vietnam: Male Veterans and America's Popular Image of the Vietnam War."** Vol.82, No.1 (January, 2018), pp.181-207. Explores how various media, such as memoirs, have excluded the story of the roughly 7,500 U.S. women who served in the Vietnam War.

Rodman, David, **"Review Essay: A Tale of Two Fronts: Israeli Military Performance during the Early Days of the 1973 Yom Kippur War."** Vol.82, No.1 (January, 2018), pp.208-218.

Vol.82, No.2 (April, 2018)

Halperin, Charles J. **"Ivan IV's State Cossacks."** Vol.82, No.2 (April, 2018), pp.357-371. During the reign of Ivan IV (1533-1584) Muscovite 'State Cossacks' lived in urban enclaves, fought under

the command of a government-appointed colonels, most were infantry, and a large percentage were armed with firearms.

Watson, Samuel, **“Military Learning and Adaptation Shaped by Social Context: The U.S. Army and its ‘Indian Wars’, 1790-1890.”** Vol.82, No.2 (April, 2018), pp.373-412.

Petty, Adam H. **“Reconsidering the Wilderness’s Role in Battle, 4-6 May 1864.”** Vol.82, No.2 (April, 2018), pp.413-438. Questions the existing consensus regarding the influence of the forest known as the Wilderness on the battle of the same name.

Sarty, Roger, **“The American Origins of Academic Military History in Canada: Princeton University, the Carnegie Endowment, and C.P. Stacey’s *Canada and the British Army*.”** Vol.82, No.2 (April, 2018), pp.439-460.

Ezov, Amiram, **“The Crossing Challenge: The Suez Canal Crossing by the Israeli Defense Forces during the Yom Kippur War of 1973.”** Vol.82, No.2 (April, 2018), pp.461-490. Compares the setting of objectives, planning, and execution of the Egyptian Army’s crossing with that of the Israeli Defense Forces.

Drohan, Brian, **“Unintended Consequences: Baton Rounds, Riots, and Counterinsurgency in Northern Ireland, 1970-1981.”** Vol.82, No.2 (April, 2018), pp.491-514. Designed to be a non-lethal means of employing force, the misuse of baton rounds by British soldiers resulting in serious injuries and even deaths, produced exactly the opposite public relations impact that was intended.

Lerner, Mitchell, **“‘Is It for This We Fought and Bled?’: The Korean War and the Struggle for Civil Rights.”** Vol.82, No.2 (April, 2018), pp.515-545. Explains the role of the Korean War in the African American struggle for Civil Rights.

Cyr, Arthur I. **“Review Essay: Custer before the Little Bighorn: A Boy General Heads West.”** Vol.82, No.2 (April, 2018), pp.547-550.

Borch, Fred L. **“Review Essay: My Lai at Fifty: A History of Literature on the ‘My Lai Incident’ Fifty Years Later.”** Vol.82, No.2 (April, 2018), pp.551-564. Concerning the killing of unarmed civilians by U.S. Army troops during the Vietnam War at the village of My Lai in the Son Tinh district on 16 March, 1968.

Hosler, John D. **“Status Report: Pre-Modern Military History in American Doctoral Programs: Figures and Implications.”** Vol.82, No.2 (April, 2018), pp.565-582.

Vol.82, No.3 (July, 2018)

Rogers, Clifford J. **“Medieval Strategy and the Economics of Conquest.”** Vol.82, No.3 (July, 2018), pp.709-738. Approaching the question in a quantitative fashion, the author seeks to show how Medieval kings could make war pay for war, especially in urbanized areas and in times and places where it was permitted to enslave enemy populations.

Shellum, Brian G. **“African American Officers in Liberia, 1910-1942.”** Vol.82, No.3 (July, 2018), pp.739-757. Seventeen African American officers from the U.S. Army reorganized, trained, and commanded the Liberian Frontier Force that enabled it to defend the nation’s borders and defeat a number of indigenous uprisings.

Armes, Keith, **“French Intelligence on the Russian Army on the Eve of the First World War.”** Vol.82, No.3 (July, 2018), pp.759-782.

Biddiscombe, Perry, **“The Mufti’s Men: Haj Amin-al-Husayni and S.S. Parachute Expeditions to Palestine and Iraq, 1944-1945.”** Vol.82, No.3 (July, 2018), pp.783-815.

Hone, Trent, **“Learning to Win: The Evolution of U.S. Navy Tactical Doctrine During the Guadalcanal Campaign.”** Vol.82, No.3 (July, 2018), pp.817-841. Challenges the notion that the U.S. Navy suffered complete failure in surface night combat, contending, instead, that it was particularly skilled in integrating combat lessons and, accordingly, modifying its tactical doctrine.

Holwitt, Joel I. **“The Loss of U.S.S. *Thresher*: Technological and Cultural Change and the Cold War U.S. Navy.”** Vol.82, No.3 (July, 2018), pp.843-872. Advances the proposition that the response to the 10 April, 1963, loss of the U.S.S. *Thresher* with all hands led to a cultural shift within the U.S. naval officer development from a ‘generalist’ to a ‘technical specialist’ model.

Tuck, Christopher, **“Measuring Victory: Assessing the outcomes of *Konfrontasi*, 1963-66.”** Vol.82, No.3 (July, 2018), pp.873-898. Suggests that the outcome of the British low intensity conflict with Indonesia, known as the ‘Confrontation’, is far more complex than either the triumphal or revisionist interpretations suggest.

Kolberg, Are Skarstein, **“Did Vikings Really go Berserk? An Interdisciplinary Critical Analysis of Berserks.”** Vol.82, No.3 (July, 2018), pp.899-908.

Lak, Martijn, **“Review Essay: The Death Ride of the Panzers? Recent Historiography on the Battle of Kursk.”** Vol.82, No.3 (July, 2018), pp.909-919.

Vol.82, No.4 (October, 2018)

Paret, Peter, **“The Function of History in Clausewitz’s Understanding of War.”** Vol.82, No.4 (October, 2018), pp.1049-1066.

McCranie, Kevin D. **“Perception and Naval Dominance.: The British Experience during the War of 1812.”** Vol.82, No.4 (October, 2018), pp.1067-1091. The defeat of three British frigates by U.S. counterparts had no actual effect on British sea power, but provoked a disproportionate reaction within society and the Royal Navy, inadvertently leading to beneficial changes.

Jamison, Thomas M. **“The War of the Pacific, Technology and U.S. Naval Development: An International History of a Regional War.”** Vol.82, No.4 (October, 2018), pp.1093-1122. The observations by foreign nations of the war between Chile and a coalition of Bolivia and Peru, 1879-1884, influenced naval developments around the globe, including contributing to the U.S. building of the ‘New Navy’ in the 1890s.

Delis, Panagiotis, **“The Treatment of Prisoners of War Captured by the Greek Army during the Balkans Wars of 1912-13.”** Vol.82, No.4 (October, 2018), pp.1123-1147. Due to a combination of the inability of the Greeks to pay for the care of Bulgarian and Ottoman P.O.W.s and negative stereotypes held about the same, the laws concerning the treatment of prisoners established by international conventions in 1899 and 1907 were not honored by the Greek Army.

De Meneses, Filipe Rineiro, **“ ‘Not only Useless, but Dangerous?’ The Portuguese Expeditionary Corps in France in the Aftermath of the Battle of La Lys, 9 April 1918.”** Vol.82, No.4 (October, 2018), pp.1149-1174. Conflict between the wishes of the new President of Portugal, Sidónio Pais (1872-1918), the British High Command, and the soldiers and officers of the Portuguese Expeditionary Corps over the question of whether it should return to frontline duty.

D’Amours, Caroline, **“Canadian Military Culture and Tactical Training, 1940-1944: The Making of Infantry Junior N.C.O.s.”** Vol.82, No.4 (October, 2018), pp.1175-1198.

Walsh, Brian, **“Sexual Violence during the Occupation of Japan.”** Vol.82, No.4 (October, 2018), pp.1199-1230. Insists that the accusations of recent publications of the widespread rape of Japanese women by Allied troops during the occupation (1945-1952) are grossly exaggerated.

Finch, Michael P.M. **“Theodore Ropp’s *Makers of Modern Strategy* Revisited and the Course of Military History, 1945-1981.”** Vol.82, No.4 (October, 2018), pp.1231-1257. Though it was never completed, Theodore Ropp’s (1911-2000) project to update his 1943 edition reflected some of the ways in which military history had developed since the conclusion of World War II.

Vol.83, No.1 (January, 2019)

Kolberg, Are Skarstein, **“There is Power in a Cohort: Development of Warfare in Iron Age to Early Medieval Scandinavia.”** Vol.83, No.1 (January, 2019), pp.9-30. Questions the degree to which Scandinavian society was organized for warfare and the extent to which tactics in Iron Age to Early

Medieval Scandinavia were influenced by external examples.

Ehrlich, Michael, **“The Battle of Ain al-Mallāha, 19 June 1157.”** Vol.83, No.1 (January, 2019), pp.31-42. An examination of this battle that relates written sources to a careful examination of the terrain of the actual battlefield.

Osman, Julia, **“Guibert vs. Guibert: Competing Notions in the *Essai general de Tactique and the Défense du système de guerre modern.*”** Vol.83, No.1 (January, 2019), pp.43-65. Examines the apparently contradictory ideas about the conduct of war in two books written by the Enlightenment-era author, Jacques Antoine Hippolyte, the Comte de Guibert (1743-1790), who has been credited as the prophet of French Revolutionary and Napoleonic warfare.

Lender, Mark Edward and Martin, James Kirby, **“Target New London: Benedict Arnold’s Raid, Just War, and ‘Homegrown Terror’ Reconsidered.”** Vol.83, No.1 (January, 2019), pp.67-95. Challenges the traditional Patriot depiction of Benedict Arnold’s (1741-1801) attack on the privateer base of New London, Connecticut, 6 September, 1781, arguing that it was conducted according to the contemporary rules of ‘civilized warfare.’

Carney, James T. **“The Great Silence of Robert E. Lee.”** Vol.83, No.1 (January, 2019), pp.97-126. Concludes that the primary reason Gen. Robert E. Lee (1807-1870) failed to advocate for an end to the war when, by November, 1864, it was clear that the Confederacy had lost, was his loyalty to his friend, President Jefferson Davis (1808-1889).

Crawford, Michael J. **“Avast Swabbing! The Medical Campaign to reform Swabbing the Decks in the U.S. Navy.”** Vol.83, No.1 (January, 2019), pp.127-156. Delves into the conflict between Navy officers, who prioritized the clean appearance of their ships, and Navy doctors, who believed that the humid air produced by swabbing the decks facilitated the spread of diseases that afflicted sailors.

Biddle, Tami Davis, **“On the Crest of Fear: V-Weapons, the Battle of the Bulge, and the Last Stages of World War II in Europe.”** Vol.83, No.1 (January, 2019), pp.157-194. Puts forward a causal relationship between Germany’s introduction of the use of the ‘V’ weapons, the impact of Germany’s Ardennes offensive on the Allied High Command, the Allied manpower crisis, and the acceleration of the Strategic Bombing Campaign during the last months of the war.

Ferraro, William M. **“Old and New Views of Ulysses S. Grant: The Soldier and the Man.”** Vol.83, No.1 (January, 2019), pp.195-212.

Vol.83, No.2 (April, 2019)

Linn, Jason, **“Attila’s Appetite: The Logistics of Attila the Hun’s Invasion of Italy in 452.”** Vol.83, No.2 (April, 2019), pp.325-246. Offers the explanation that Attila the Hun’s (406-453) decision

to withdraw from Italy was not due to either Pope Leo the Great (400-461) or hunger and disease, but the approach of winter.

Ansani, Fabrizio, “**‘This French Artillery is very good and very effective’: Hypotheses on the Diffusion of a New Military Technology in Renaissance Italy.**” Vol.83, No.2 (April, 2019), pp.347-378. Scrutinizes the development of the production of heavy cannons in Italy before and after the French Neapolitan Campaign of 1494.

Rodriguez, Manuel Santirso, “**Under the Uniform: Tyrants and Praetorians in the Aftermath of the Revolution (1829-1854).**” Vol.83, No.2 (April, 2019), pp.379-407. Weighs the parallels and differences in the lives and careers of Nicholas Jean-de-Dieu Soult of France (1769-1851), Arthur Wellesley, the Duke of Wellington of Great Britain (1769-1852), Baldomero Espartero of Spain (1793-1879), and Andrew Jackson of the United States (1767-1845).

Krueger, David, “**The Red Cross, the Daughters of the American Revolution, and the Origins of the Army Nurse Corps in the Spanish-American War.**” Vol.83, No.2 (April, 2019), pp.409-434. Determines that the work of contract nurses, promoted by the Daughters of the American Revolution Hospital Corps and the Red Cross, demonstrated the capability and necessity of female nurses in the military, the Army chose to establish a professional nurse corps rather than rely on volunteers.

Stice, Elizabeth, “**Men on the Margins: Representations of Colonial Troops in British and French Trench Newspapers of the Great War.**” Vol.83, No.2 (April, 2019), pp.435-454. Ascertains how, through the contents of trench newspapers, the war provided a new context for evaluating empires and their peoples and questioning existing imperial culture.

Yelton, David K. “**Older German Officers and National Socialist Activism: Evidence from the German *Volksturm*.**” Vol.83, No.2 (April, 2019), pp.455-485. Addresses the question of to what degree older, lower-level German officers serving in the *Volksturm* embraced National Socialist ideology.

Hughes, Matthew, “**Women, Violence, and the Arab Revolt in Palestine, 1936-39.**” Vol.83, No.2 (April, 2019), pp.487-507. Seeks to understand what part Palestinian women played in the Arab Revolt, how British colonial pacification affected the latter, and how British soldiers treated Palestinian women.

Werrell, Kenneth P. “**Friction in Action: Revisiting the U.S. Army Air Forces’ August 1943 Raid on Ploesti.**” Vol.83, No.2 (April, 2019), pp.509-540. Looks at the Ploesti Raid from the perspective of planning and outcomes, pointing to failure of flexible leadership in the face of minor unforeseen factors that had a major impact on the effectiveness of the mission.

Carland, John M. “**Daniel Ellsberg and the Tet Offensive.**” Vol.83, No.2 (April, 2019), pp.541-552. An analyst for the RAND Corporation and employee of both the Defense and State Departments,

Daniel Ellsberg's (1931-2023) critical assessment of the impact of the Tet Offensive, January, 1968, reflected a stage in his growing disillusionment with the war in Vietnam.

Vol.83, No.3 (July, 2019)

Pearson, Elizabeth, **“Decimation and Unit Cohesion: Why were Roman Legionaries willing to Perform Decimation?”** Vol.83, No.3 (July, 2019), pp.665-688. Analyzes the practice in light of ‘primary group’ theory, arguing that it reintegrated offending units through collective acceptance of both guilt and the necessity for punishment.

Fulton, Michael S. **“The Siege of Montfort and Mamluk Artillery Technology in 1271: Integrating the Archaeology and Topography with the Narrative Sources.”** Vol.83, No.3 (July, 2019), pp.689-717. An investigation into the development of mechanical artillery, specifically the trebuchet, through the study of archaeologically unearthed projectiles and the suitability of the surrounding terrain for the deployment of trebuchets.

Stoyanov, Aleksandar, **“The Size of Bulgaria’s Medieval Field Armies: A Case Study of Military Mobilization Capacity in the Middle Ages.”** Vol.83, No.3 (July, 2019), pp.719-746. Broadens the scope of time and sources to ascertain estimates of the actual size of Bulgarian field Armies from the First Bulgarian Empire (681-1018) to the Second Bulgarian Empire (1185-1422).

Czarnecki, Jacek, **“The Rebirth and Progress of the Polish Military during the Interwar Years.”** Vol.83, No.3 (July, 2019), pp.747-768. Challenges the notion that the Polish Army’s cavalry reflected a failure of modernization, enshrined in the myth of Polish lancers charging Panzers in 1939.

Harrison, Richard W. **“Soviet Planning for War, 1936-1941: The ‘Preventative Attack’ Thesis in Historical Context.”** Vol.83, No.3 (July, 2019), pp.769-794.

Petrina, Stephen, **“Scientific Ammunition to Fire at Congress: Intelligence, Reparations, and the U.S. Army Air Forces, 1944-1947.”** Vol.83, No.3 (July, 2019), pp.795-829. Appraises the place of intelligence and reparations in U.S. Army Air Force and U.S. Air Force postwar research and development.

Trauschweizer, Ingo, **“Cautious Hawk: Maxwell Taylor and the Path to War in Vietnam.”** Vol.83, No.3 (July, 2019), pp.831-859. Relates the U.S. ambassador to Saigon’s, 1964-1965, opinions regarding the efficacy of bombing Hanoi and deploying ground forces to South Vietnam and their possible influence on the decisions of President Lyndon Johnson.

Fuller, Howard J. **“Review Essay: Much in Little: John Ericsson and His Monitor Save the Republic.”** Vol.83, No.3 (July, 2019), pp.861-864.

Vol.83, No.4 (October, 2019)

Staiano-Daniels, Lucian E. **“Determining Early Modern Army Strength: The Case of Electoral Saxony.”** Vol.83, No.4 (October, 2019), pp.1001-1020. Questions the issues of the ‘Military Revolution’ thesis that larger armies both reflected a revolution in warfare and forced states to adopt more efficient means of raising revenue by examining the experience of Saxony during the Thirty Years War (1618-1648).

Gyucha, Attila; Lee, Wayne E. and Rózsa, Zoltán, **“The Mongol Campaign in Hungary, 1241-1242: The Archaeology and History of Nomadic Conquest and Massacre.”** Vol.83, No.4 (October, 2019), pp.1021-1066. This article integrates conquest process theory, literary evidence, and data from substantial new archaeological work to explore the motivation and nature of Mongol invasions and the consequences for rural settlements on the Great Hungarian Plain.

Brands, Benjamin D. **“‘Unsatisfactory and Futile’: The Officers’ Lyceum Program and U.S. Army Reform.”** Vol.83, No.4 (October, 2019), pp.1067-1094. Inquires into the impact of the Officers’ Lyceum Program on the late-nineteenth century Army’s effort to provide its officer corps with professional education.

Morgan-Owen, David, **“War as it Might Have Been: British Sea Power and the First World War.”** Vol.83, No.4 (October, 2019), pp.1095-1131. Argues that because of shortcomings in Britain’s strategic decision-making apparatus, the alternatives to the attrition on the Western Front offered by British Sea Power never received due consideration.

Wright, Donald P. **“‘Clouds Gathering on the Horizon’: The Russian Army and the Preparation of the Imperial Population for War, 1906-1914.”** Vol.83, No.4 (October, 2019), pp.1133-1160.

Jacobs, W.A. **“Royal Air Force Bomber Command, the ‘Overlord Air Diversion’, and ‘Precision’ Bombing at Night.”** Vol.83, No.4 (October, 2019), pp.1161-1188. Takes account of the significant changes in procedure developed and adopted by Bomber Command and seeks to answer why further progress was limited through 1944 to 1945.

Wildermuth, David W. **“‘I am fully aware of my guilt...’: Insights from a Soviet Military Tribunal’s Investigation of the German Army’s 35th Division, 1946-47.”** Vol.83, No.4 (October, 2019), pp.1189-1212. Weighing the credibility of both perpetrator and eyewitness statements from Soviet tribunals for information on the actions of officers and soldiers of the German 35th Division during anti-partisan operations in April, 1944.

Tian Ser Seah, Joshua-John, **“Singapore, Hong Kong, and the Royal Navy’s War in Korea, c.1950-1953: Part 1.”** Vol.83, No.4 (October, 2018), pp.1213-1234; **“Part 2.”** Vol.84, No.1 (January, 2020), pp.237-260.

Seipp, Adam R. “**‘Visionary Battle Scenes’: Reading Sir John Hackett’s *The Third World War*, 1977-85.**” Vol.83, No.4 (October, 2019), pp.1235-1257. Suggests that the success of Sir John Hackett’s (1910-1997) 1978 best-selling novel reflected rising Cold War tensions, as well as inspiring the modern literary genre of the techno-thriller.

Vol.84, No.1 (January, 2020)

Larnach, Matthew, “**The Battle of the Gates of Trajan, 986: A Reassessment.**” Vol.84, No.1 (January, 2020), pp.9-34. An investigation of the destruction of Emperor Basil II’s (r.976-1025) Byzantine army by the Bulgarians that incorporates the issue of logistics and an examination of terrain to ascertain the reasons for victory and defeat.

Paret, Peter, “**The Impact of Clausewitz’s Early Life on His Theories and Politics.**” Vol.84, No.1 (January, 2020), pp.35-50. Proposes that the angry quarrels with his father led Clausewitz (1780-1831) to develop a combative relationship with authority throughout his life that impacted the development of his theories.

Hunter, Antwain K. “**‘Patriots, Cowards, and Men Disloyal at Heart’: Labor and Politics at the Springfield Armory, 1861-1865.**” Vol.84, No.1 (January, 2020), pp.51-81. Demonstrates that while the Springfield Armory was vocal in its support for the cause of the Union during the Civil War, it nevertheless contained employees who expressed criticism of the Lincoln administration and support for the Confederacy.

Donaldson, Peter, “**‘A New and Deadly Game’: British Sporting Culture in the First World War.**” Vol.84, No.1 (January, 2020), pp.83-114. Popular journalism, memoirs, novels, and poetry provided the British public with a diet of war stories and reportage in which athletic endeavor and organized games featured prominently, demonstrating that the association between games and combat survived the horrors of industrial killing between 1914 and 1918.

Hobbins, Peter, “**Engineering the Fighter Pilot: Aviators, Anti-G suits, and Allied Air Power, 1940-53.**” Vol.84, No.1 (January, 2020), pp.115-149. Probes the failure of the Cotton Aerodynamic Anti-G suit championed by the Australian Air Force to be adopted by the British and United States Air Forces during the period marked by World War II and the Korean War.

Fagan, Brennen; Horwood, Ian; MacKay, Niall; Price, Christopher; Richards, Ed, and Wood, A. Jamie, “**Bootstrapping the Battle of Britain.**” Vol.84, No.1 (January, 2020), pp.151-186. Using the statistical technique of weighted bootstrapping to provide a quantified assessment of the likelihood of German achievement of air superiority.

López, Miguel A. “**The Survival of *Auftragstaktik* during the Soviet Counterattack in the Battle for**

Moscow, December 1941 to January 1942.” Vol.84, No.1 (January, 2020), pp.187-212. Claims that Adolf Hitler’s 16 December, 1941, *Haltbefehl* (Halt Order) did not mark the end of the Prussian-German principle of *Auftragstaktik*, that in the face of the Soviet counterattacks German field commanders did retain their command independence and conducted withdrawals regardless of the *Haltbefehl*.

Fuquea, David C. **“Advantage Japan: The Imperial Japanese Navy’s Superior High Seas Refueling Capability.”** Vol.84, No.1 (January, 2020), pp.213-235. Addresses an understudied factor that made the Japanese victories at Pearl Harbor and beyond possible, one that at least initially, was not available to the U.S. Navy.

Tian Ser Seah, Joshua-John, **“Singapore, Hong Kong, and the Royal Navy’s War in Korea, c.1950-1953: Part 1.”** Vol.83, No.4 (October, 2018), pp.1213-1234; “Part 2.” Vol.84, No.1 (January, 2020), pp.237-260.

Vol.84, No.2 (April, 2020)

Sheppard, Thomas, **“There will still remain Heroes and Patriots: The Politics of Resignation in the Early American Navy, 1794-1815.”** Vol.84, No.2 (April, 2020), pp.369-394. Establishes that early secretaries of the navy worked to end the practice of officers resigning their commissions, or using the threat to do so, as a bargaining tactic with the Navy Department, something that they had largely accomplished by the end of the War of 1812.

Goldman, David I. **“‘Charlie’ Chaplains in the Great War: Chaplains’ Experiences in the U.S. Army, 1917-1919.”** Vol.84, No.2 (April, 2020), pp.395-426. Due to budget cuts, the section of the U.S. Army’s official history of participation in world War I concerning the service of Chaplains was never completed. Nevertheless, the material for such a section in the form of letters, photos, and documents has survived and provides a largely overlooked source for the United States involvement in the Great War.

Wagner, Erich, **“Ingenuity, Excess, Incompetence, and Luck: Air-Resupply Anecdotes in Military History.”** Vol.84, No.2 (April, 2020), pp.427-457. Reviews six case studies from taken the Second Italo-Ethiopian War (1935-1936), the Spanish Civil War (1936-1939), the Battle of Stalingrad (1942), Operation Market Garden (1944), the Battle of the Chosin Reservoir (1950), and the Battle of Dien Bien Phu (1954).

Stubbs, David, **“Reappraising the Royal Air Force Contribution to the Defense of Crete, 1941.”** Vol.84, No.2 (April, 2020), pp.459-486. Points out that the failure of the British and Commonwealth ground troops to retain control over the airfields was not the primary reason for defeat, given that the fighter squadrons necessary for the defense of the island were not scheduled to arrive in the Mediterranean Sea in time to participate in the battle, a fact known to decision makers in London.

Venable, Heather, **“Rescuing a General: General Haywood ‘Possum’ Hansell and the Burden of Command.”** Vol.84, No.2 (April, 2020), pp.487-509. Reappraises the negative assessment of General Haywood Hansell’s (1903-1988) command of the U.S. 8th Air Force.

Murteira, André, **“Historiographical Essay: The Military Revolution and European Wars Outside of Europe: The Dutch-Portuguese War in Asia in the First Quarter of the Seventeenth Century.”** Vol.84, No.2 (April, 2020), pp.511-535. Challenges the notion of Early Modern Western Military exceptionalism that, in Portuguese historiography, has blamed their defeat on Portuguese naval forces that were inferior to their Dutch opponents supposedly because of Asian military influence that was absent among the Dutch.

Marble, Sanders, **“Medical Problems in the Sicilian Campaign.”** Vol.84, No.2 (April, 2020), pp.537-540. Excerpt from the Monthly Progress Report, U.S. Army Service Forces, 31 October 1943.

Lawlor, Ruth, **“Bibliographic Essay: Contested Crimes: Race, Gender, and Nation in Histories of GI Sexual Violence, World War II.”** Vol.84, No.2 (April, 2020), pp.541-569.

Vol.84, No.3 (July, 2020)

McMaster, H.R. **“The 2020 George C. Marshall Lecture in Military History: Developing Strategic Empathy: History as a Foundation of Foreign Policy and National Security Strategy.”** Vol.84, No.3 (July, 2020), pp.689-697.

Vigus, Robert T. **“The Military Revolution and the Ancient Origins of the *Trace Italienne*.”** Vol.84, No.3 (July, 2020), pp.698-712. Points out that the *trace italienne*, in the form of angled bastions, that have been identified as a key and novel feature of the Early-Modern ‘Military Revolution’, had its roots in Ancient Greek and Roman treatises and the actual works constructed by Roman and Byzantine engineers, surviving examples of which could be seen in important trading and pilgrimage routes.

Kemmerly, Phillip R. **“Rivers, Rails, and Rebels: Logistics and Struggle to Supply U.S. Army Depot at Nashville, 1862-1865.”** Vol.84, No.3 (July, 2020), pp.713-746. Highlights the indispensable support provided by the U.S. Army depot at Nashville, Tennessee, for Union operations in the Western Theater, which, in turn, depended upon the Louisville-Nashville railway line and the Cumberland River kept open by the U.S. Navy.

Dykstra, Bodie D. **“‘To Dig and Burrow like Rabbits’: British Field Fortifications at the Battle of the Aisne, September and October 1914.”** Vol.84, No.3 (July, 2020), pp.747-773.

Lukasik, Sebastian H. **“Doughboys, the Y.M.C.A., and the Moral Economy of Sacrifice in the First**

World War.” Vol.84, No.3 (July, 2020), pp.774-797. Contends that U.S. soldiers’ complaints about the Y.M.C.A. in France reflected larger concerns about the Home Front, perceptions of which shaped soldiers’ notions about the value of their sacrifices.

De Ninno, Fabio, **“A Technological Fiasco: Scientific Research, Institutional Culture, and Fascism in the Italian Navy (1919-1940).”** Vol.84, No.3 (July, 2020), pp.798-824. Explains that the failure of the Italian Navy to develop and adopt new technologies, such as radar and sonar, was rooted in an opposition to technological change within the culture of the officer corps, compounded by inter-service rivalry and the chaos of the Fascist regime.

Capps-Tunwell; Passmore, David, and Harrison, Stephan, **“An Evaluation of Allied Intelligence in the Tactical Bombing of German Supply Depots during the Normandy Campaign, 1944.”** Vol.84, No.3 (July, 2020), pp.825-842. Sets forth the proposition that had Allied intelligence regarding German supply activities been more accurate, a decisive crippling of German logistics could have enabled Allied troops to achieve victory sooner than was the case.

FitzSimonds, James R. **“Aircraft Carrier versus Battleships in War and Myth: Demythologizing Carrier Air Dominance at Sea.”** Vol.84, No.3 (July, 2020), pp.843-865. Claims that a closer examination of the evidence from World War II demonstrates that the battleship was far from powerless in the face of air strikes and that it was the battleship, and not the Aircraft Carrier, that determined control of the sea.

Paret, Peter, **“From the Discovery of a Clausewitz Manuscript to Its Interpretation.”** Vol.84, No.3 (July, 2020), pp.867-871. A translation of an unpublished manuscript written by Carl von Clausewitz from the first years of his military career, specifically August, 1802.

Vol.84, No.4 (October, 2020)

Serebriakova, Polina and Orbach, Danny, **“Irregular Warfare in Late Medieval Japan: Towards a Historical Understanding of the Ninja.”** Vol.84, No.4 (October, 2020), pp.997-1020. Separating the contemporary myth from what we can actually determine based on surviving primary sources.

Dee, Darryl, **“The Survival of France: Logistics and Strategy in the 1709 Flanders Campaign.”** Vol.84, No.4 (October, 2020), pp.1021-1050. Shines a light on the significant role of logistics in the debate concerning whether the French field army in Flanders should pursue an aggressive or cautious strategy during the first year of the War of the Spanish Succession, 1701-1715, arguing that this established a pattern for the remainder of the conflict.

Eichhorn, Niels, **“A ‘Century of Peace’ that was not: War in the Nineteenth Century.”** Vol.84, No.4 (October, 2020), pp.1051-1077. Challenges the notion of a century of peace between 1815 and 1914, pointing to a series of devastating wars that were fought, not only in Europe, but throughout the globe.

Bullock, Mike; Lyons, Laurence, and Judkins, Philip, **“A Resolution of the Debate about British Wireless in World War I.”** Vol.84, No.4 (October, 2020), pp.1079-1096. Visits the debate over whether, as Dr. Brian Hall contends, the British Army utilized continuous wave radio as best as this technology allowed with how it was used by their French and U.S. counterparts.

Wadle, Ryan, **“Failing to Speak the same Language: The Roots of ‘Jointness’ in the United States, 1919-1941.”** Vol.84, No.4 (October, 2020), pp.1097-1126. Sizes up the problems that interfered with attempts to create an interservice culture, promoted in efforts to integrate strategic planning, in professional military education, and large-scale joint exercises.

Lim, Preston Jordan, **“Churchill’s Butchers: Mission 204’s Operations in China, 1942-1945.”** Vol.84, No.4 (October, 2020), pp.1127-1156. Whereas previous studies have focused on the mission’s record in 1942, the author examines the entire length of service of this combined British-Australian commando unit tasked with training Nationalist guerrillas, suggesting that it was more successful than previously thought.

Gilbin, Daniel F. **“Seeds of Victory: Satisfying the needs of the Red Army and the Soviet State during the Formation of the Kursk Salient, February – May 1943.”** Vol.84, No.4 (October, 2020), pp.1157-1188. Reviews an example of the Soviet Army’s practice of incorporating the civilian population in the rear areas near the frontlines in various forms of support, including the role of re-installed civilian government in recently liberated territory.

Vol.85, No.1 (January, 2021)

McArthur, Tony, **“Should Roman Soldiers be Called ‘Professional’ Prior to Augustus?”** Vol.85, No.1 (January, 2021), pp.9-26. Raises the question of to what extent, if any, could soldiers in Roman armies during the period between 200 B.C.E. and the Battle of Actium in 31 B.C.E. qualify as professionals.

Arfaoli, Maurizio, **“Bastion of Empire: The Italian *terzo Vecchio* of the Army of Flanders (1597-1682).”** Vol.85, No.1 (January, 2021), pp.27-50. An examination of the service of the longest-lived infantry unit, the *terzo Vecchio*, in an effort to better understand Italian involvement in the long conflict within the Spanish Low Countries.

Mears, Dwight S. **“‘Neither an Officer nor an Enlisted Man;: Contract Surgeons’ Eligibility for the Medal of Honor.”** Vol.85, No.1 (January, 2021), pp.51-75. Presents four instances in the Nineteenth century U.S. Army of contract surgeons who claimed entitlement to the Medal of Honor.

Henriot, Christian, **“The Battle of Shanghai (January-March 1932): A Study in the Space-Time of War.”** Vol.85, No.1 (January, 2021), pp.76-94. Focuses on the impact of urban and rural environments

on the manner in which the Imperial Japanese and Nationalist Chinese forces fought one another.

Wolters, Timothy S. **“Harvey A. De Weerd and the Dawn of Academic Military History in the United States.”** Vol.85, No.1 (January, 2021), pp.95-133. Chronicles the career of Harvey A. De Weerd (1902-1979), a significant member of early academic military historians who was an editor of the Infantry Journal during World War II, early editor of the Journal of Military History, taught some of the first dedicated military history courses in the United States, and was the second military historian hired by the R.A.N.D. corporation.

Zaloga, Steven J. **“Debunking an Omaha Beach Legend: The Use of the ‘Armored Funnies’ on D-Day.”** Vol.85, No.1 (January, 2021), pp.134-162. Confronts the notion that one of the reasons the landing force on Omaha Beach suffered heavy casualties was the U.S. Army’s resistance to the use of specialized tanks developed by the British for the D-Day invasion.

Fitzgerald, David, **“Warriors Who don’t Fight: The Post-Cold War United States Army and debates over Peacekeeping Operations.”** Vol.85, No.1 (January, 2021), pp.163-190.

Vol.85, No.2 (April, 2021)

Sproule, Joseph, **“Raiding, Pillaging, and Violent Social Change in Late Sixteenth-Century Livonia.”** Vol.85, No.2 (April, 2021), pp.317-341. Establishes how the pervasiveness of raiding dictated tactical and strategic considerations, influenced military policy, shaped civil-military relations, and played a role in breaking down longstanding social mores, transforming societies, normalizing violence.

Spears, Timothy B. **“Stone Truths: American Memorial Landscapes of World War I.”** Vol.85, No.2 (April, 2021), pp.342-368. Assesses the accuracy of summaries and maps displaying the operations of the American Expeditionary Force etched in stone by the American Battle Monuments Commission.

Wilson, Evan and Schapira, Ruth, **“German Perspectives on the U-Boat War, 1939-1941.”** Vol.85, No.2 (April, 2021), pp.369-398. Probes the conflict between what the Germans’ needed to secure a quick, decisive result, and the fact that the U-Boat was designed for a war of attrition, resulting in a pessimistic outlook on the part of Germany’s Naval leaders.

Jones, Mark C. **“In Need of a Home Away from Home: The Royal Netherlands Navy in Australia, 1942-1947.”** Vol.85, No.2 (April, 2021), pp.399-425. With the fall of the Netherlands’ East Indies, units of the Royal Netherlands Navy relocated to Australia, from where they continued their operations against the Japanese enemy.

Williamson, Corbin, **“Mediterranean Marines: The Challenges of Forward Deployment, 1948-1958.”** Vol.85, No.2 (April, 2021), pp.426-452. Considers the challenges to U.S. Marine Corps units deployed

in the Mediterranean as part of President Truman's commitment to containment of the Soviet Union.

Haun, Phil, "**Foundation Bias: The Impact of the Air Corps Tactical School on United States Air Force Doctrine.**" Vol.85, No.2 (April, 2021), pp.453-474. Contrasts the steadfast belief in the role of strategic bombing at the Air Corps Tactical School with the effectiveness of joint operations demonstrated in the Korean, Vietnam, Iraq, and Afghanistan wars.

Hickey, Donald R. "**Research Note: The Quasi-War.**" Vol.85, No.2 (April, 2021), pp.475-484. Traces the origins and use of the term 'Quasi-War' to identify the naval conflict fought between the United States and Revolutionary France, 1798-1801.

Vol.85, No.3 (July, 2021)

Marvin, Laurence W. "**The Battle of Fariskur (29 August 1219) and the Fifth Crusade: Causes, Course, and Consequences.**" Vol.85, No.3 (July, 2021), pp.597-618. Seeks to understand the neglected Battle of Fariskur, fought between a force of Crusaders and the army of the Sultan of Egypt, Al-Kamil (circa 1177-1238).

Stapleton, Timothy J. "**Sexual Health in Britain's West African Colonial Army (1898-1960).**" Vol.85, No.3 (July, 2021), pp.619-645. Following an initial neglect due to greater concern over tropical diseases, British officers became obsessed with the threat of venereal diseases, reflecting colonial stereotypes surrounding race and gender.

Blazich, Frank A. "**Notre Cher Ami: The Enduring Myth and Memory of a Humble Pigeon.**" Vol.85, No.3 (July, 2021), pp.646-677. The homing pigeon Cher Ami survived severe wounds transporting messages, but the question of whether or not it was the pigeon that helped save the 'Lost Battalion' of the American Expeditionary Force is explored in this article.

Walsh, Brian, "**'This Degrading Slavery': MacArthur's General Headquarters and Prostitution Policy during the Occupation of Japan.**" Vol.85, No.3 (July, 2021), pp.678-712. The Allied occupation government (1945-1952) outlawed the old Imperial system of licensed prostitution because it relied on human trafficking, but did not outlaw prostitution in general based on respect for individual autonomy and an appreciation for the situation in Japan.

Moulton, Aaron Coy, "**The Dominican Dictator's Funds and Guns in Costa Rica's Wars of 1948.**" Vol.85, No.3 (July, 2021), pp.713-733. Whereas past studies of the conflicts in Costa Rica have focused on the involvement of Anastasio Somoza García of Nicaragua (1896-1956) and Juan José Arévalo of Guatemala (1904-1990), the author demonstrates that Costa Ricans sought to obtain arms from the Dominican Dictator Rafael Trujillo (1891-1961).

Harris, J.P. "**The Early Military History of the Second Indochina War and the Mayor Thesis.**"

Vol.85, No.3 (July, 2021), pp.734-763. Contests the interpretation of Mark Moyar that by mid-1962 the South Vietnamese government was conducting a successful counter-insurgency campaign that was cut short by the overthrow of Ngo Dinh Diem (1901-1963).

Kuronen, Jarmo O.; Heikkinen, Jarmo K., and Lewis, Aidan Mark, **“A Research Note on Military Medicine in Finland, 1555-1945.”** Vol.85, No.3 (July, 2021), pp.765-770.

Vol.85, No.4 (October, 2021)

Campos, Jorge Planas and De Blas, Antonio Grjal, **“French and Allied Officer Casualties in the Peninsular War (1808-1814): A New Examination.”** Vol.85, No.4 (October, 2021), pp.889-905.

Lovelace, Alexander G. **“Meade and the Media: Civil War Journalism and the New History of War Reporting.”** Vol.85, No.4 (October, 2021), pp.907-929. Employs a new approach in which War Correspondents are seen as powerful actors who could influence the decision-making process of commanders.

Xiaogang Lai, Sherman, **“ ‘The Devil is in the Details’: Mao Zedong before and after the Luochuan Conference, August 1937.”** Vol.85, No.4 (October, 2021), pp.930-953. Relates how Mao Zedong (1893-1976) succeeded in convincing both the Chinese Communist Party and Joseph Stalin (1878-1953) to adopt his strategy of guerrilla warfare.

Rutherford, Jeff, **“Germany’s Total War: Combat and Occupation around the Kursk Salient, 1943.”** Vol.85, No.4 (October, 2021), pp.954-979. Examines the changing approach of three German divisions to extract resources from the population living near the frontlines.

Campbell, Isabel, **“A Tale of Submarine Sightings and a Golden Goose: American-British-Canadian Intelligence Sharing in the Early Cold War.”** Vol.85, No.4 (October, 2021), pp.980-1003. The consequences of efforts to establish trilateral intelligence of the sighting of Soviet submarines in the Davis Strait in 1946.

Ruth, Richard A. **“Ham and Mothers: C-Ration Revelry and Revulsion in the Vietnam War.”** Vol.85, No.4 (October, 2021), pp.1004-1028. observes that the comradery of troops was facilitated by the love-hate relations with their rations.

Coleman, Bradley Lynn and Schultz, Timothy A. **“The Cornerstone of Joint Force Transformation: The Standing Joint Force Headquarters at U.S. Southern Command, 2001-2011.”** Vol.85, No.4 (October, 2021), pp.1029-1060. The difficulties of Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld (1932-2021) to establish Standing Joint Force Headquarters for each of the geographic combatant commands is examined by using the U.S. Southern Command as an example.

Vol.86, No.1 (January, 2022)

Nath, Pratyay, “**Looking beyond the Military Revolution: Variations in Early Modern Warfare and the Mughal Case.**” Vol.86, No.1 (January, 2022), pp.9-31. Argues that the heterogeneous nature of Mughal strategy, tactics, and the deployment of technology over time and across space was due to a wide range of factors, including environmental conditions, military pragmatism, financial considerations, and distance from the imperial heartland, challenging the simplistic early modern ‘Military Revolution’ thesis.

Hagstrom, Jacob, “**‘My Soldiers Above All’: Justifying Violence against Noncombatants in French Algeria, 1830-1847.**” Vol.86, No.1 (January, 2022), pp.32-53. Shows that French officers participating in the conquest of Algeria defended the actions of their soldiers against civilians, which were motivated by fear, anger, and greed, on the basis of the necessity of preserving their lives and the lives of indigenous allies.

Krome, Frederic, “**‘Will the Germans Bombard New York?’: Hugo Gernsback and the Future War Tale.**” Vol.86, No.1 (January, 2022), pp.54-76. Appraises the role of ‘Future War’ fiction, particularly works produced by Hugo Gernsback (1884-1967), in engaging the American public’s interest in military affairs in the early 20th century.

Lahey, R.J. “**Hitler’s ‘Intuition’, *Luftwaffe* Photoreconnaissance, and the Reinforcement of Normandy.**” Vol.86, No.1 (January, 2022), pp.77-109. Contends that it was *Luftwaffe* photoreconnaissance, rather than mere intuition, that led Hitler to significantly reinforce the forces tasked with defending the Normandy beaches.

Kürkçü, Burak, “**The Question of U.S. Involvement in Turkish Military Coups during the Cold War: An Analysis via available C.I.A. Archives.**” Vol.86, No.1 (January, 2022), pp.110-131. Recently declassified C.I.A. documents reveal no evidence for direct U.S. involvement in Turkish military coups during the Cold War.

Xiaoming Zhang, “**High-Altitude Duel: The C.I.A.’s U-2 Spy Plane Overflights and China’s Air Defense Force, 1961-1968.**” Vol.86, No.1 (January, 2022), pp.132-159. Charts the overflights of the People’s Republic of China during the 1960s by Chinese Nationalist pilots operating out of Taiwan with the goal of monitoring the P.R.C.’s nuclear weapons program.

Vol.86, No.2 (April, 2022)

Turner, Brian, “**Celebrating ‘Bloodless Victories’ in the Roman World.**” Vol.86, No.2 (April, 2022), pp.277-298. Critiques the references of ancient authors to Roman victories that were bloodless or

were achieved without the loss of a single Roman soldier.

Hurl-Eamon, Jennine, **“Husbands, Sons, Brothers, and Neighbors: Eighteenth-Century Soldiers’ Efforts to Maintain Civilian Ties.”** Vol.86, No.2 (April, 2022), pp.299-320. Endeavors to understand the conflict between army regulations restricting British servicemen’s ability to visit and provide for their kin with the efforts of soldiers to maintain the connections to the communities they left.

Compeau, Timothy, **“The Royal Navy’s *Psyche* on Lake Ontario: A British Experiment with Prefabricated Warships in the War of 1812.”** Vol.86, No.2 (April, 2022), pp.321-343. Narrates the British effort to transport four pre-fabricated vessels to Lake Ontario, of which only one, the 56-gun frigate H.M.S. *Psyche*, reached its destination.

Wiens, Gavin, **“Guardians and Go-betweens: Germany’s Military Plenipotentiaries during the First World War.”** Vol.86, No.2 (April, 2022), pp.344-371. Imperial German federalism was present in the German General Headquarters in the form of military plenipotentiaries from Bavaria, Saxony, and Württemberg who had some degree of responsibility over the units from these former kingdoms.

Beckstrand, Alex, **“Woodrow Wilson and the Struggle of Civil-Military Relations during the Punitive Expedition of 1916-1917.”** Vol.86, No.2 (April, 2022), pp.372-398. Argues that President Woodrow Wilson’s (r.1913-1921) decision to defer to his military commanders, Major General Frederick Funston (1865-1917) and Brigadier General John J. Pershing (1860-1948), was the cause of the failure to achieve the goals of the Punitive Expedition.

Donnelly, William M. **“From Sergeant Snorkels to Drill Sergeants: Basic Training of Male Soldiers in the U.S. Army, 1953-1964.”** Vol.86, No.2 (April, 2022), pp.399-426. Assesses the much-criticized quality of officers and non-commissioned officers assigned to shepherd recruits through basic training, an issue that wasn’t addressed until the Secretaries of the Army Cyrus R. Vance Sr. (1917-2002) and Stephen Ailes (1912-2001).

Vol.86, No.3 (July, 2022)

Haggard, Dixie Ray, **“The First Invasion of Georgia and the myth of Westo Power, 1656-1684.”** Vol.86, No.3 (July, 2022), pp.533-556. Narrates the two decades long assault on Native American towns of central Georgia by a mysterious people known as the ‘Westos’, seeking to better understand the reasons for their success.

Davies, Brian, **“The Russian Baltic Fleet in the Seven Years’ War.”** Vol.86, No.3 (July, 2022), pp.557-572. Charts the rise and fall and rise again of the Russian Baltic Fleet, from the reign of Peter ‘the Great’ (r.1682-1725) to that of Catherine ‘the Great’ (r.1762-1796).

Kemmerly, Phillip R. **“Logistics of U.S. Grant’s 1863 Mississippi Campaign: From the Amphibious**

Landing at Bruinsburg to the Siege of Vicksburg.” Vol.86, No.3 (July, 2022), pp.573-611.

Approaches the much-studied Vicksburg Campaign of General Ulysses S. Grant (r.1869-1877) from the neglected perspective of logistics, assessing how the interactions of the environment and logistical requirements impacted battle plans, command decisions, and tactics.

Dunley, Richard, **“Operation Q: Churchill and Fisher’s Invasion of Germany, 1915?”** Vol.86, No.3 (July, 2022), pp.612-641. Reveals the pursuit of a naval strategy by First Lord of the Admiralty, Winston Churchill (1874-1965), and Admiral of the Fleet, John Arbuthnot Fisher (1841-1920) that came withing hours of execution in May, 1915, but was never acted upon.

Prentice, David L. **“ ‘Waltzing Matilda’ Out of Vietnam: Grand Strategy, Politics, and the Decision to Remove Australian Military Forces from Vietnam.”** Vol.86, No.3 (July, 2022), pp.642-669. When the United States chose to pursue the policy of ‘Vietnamization’, withdrawing increasing numbers of U.S. troops, Australian Prime Minister John Gorton (r.1968-1971) sought to encourage U.S. resolve by retaining Australian troops in South Vietnam until 1970, when Gorton’s government collapsed.

Plotnikov, Dmitry, **“Still Misreading Svechin: Annihilation, Attrition, and the Strategic and Operational Implications.”** Vol.86, No.3 (July, 2022), pp.670-687. Addresses misunderstanding relating to the concepts of annihilation and attrition in the writings of the Imperial Russian and Soviet military theorist Aleksandr Svechin (1878-1938).

Vol.86, No.4 (October, 2022)

Paine, Sarah C.M. **“The 2022 George C. Marshall Lecture in Military History: Centuries of Security: Chinese, Russian and U.S. Continental versus Maritime Approaches.”** Vol.86, No.4 (October, 2022), pp.813-836.

Yun, Dukhee, **“The ‘Push of the Pike’ in Seventeenth-Century English Infantry Combat.”** Vol.86, No.4 (October, 2022), pp.837-857. Relying on a close reading of contemporary sources, the author seeks to develop a better understanding of how opposing pike formations actually fought one another.

Swenson, Benjamin J. **“ ‘Measures of Conciliation’: Winfield Scott, Henry Halleck, and the Origins of U.S. Army Counterinsurgency Doctrine.”** Vol.86, No.4 (October, 2022), pp.859-881. Explores the collaboration between Major General Winfield Scott (1786-1866), who implemented policies intended to forestall insurgency, and General Henry Halleck (1815-1872), who made a study of Napoleon’s failed occupation of Spain, in developing U.S. Army counterinsurgency doctrine, which impacted the formation of international laws of war.

Hauser, Mark T. **“ ‘A Violent Desire for Amusements’: Boxing, Libraries, and the Distribution and Management of Welfare During the First World War.”** Vol.86, No.4 (October, 2022),

pp.883-913. Illustrates the impact of U.S. wartime recreation programs during World War I on the development of mass culture.

Reardon, Jeff T. **“Reevaluating Ghormley and Halsey at Guadalcanal.”** Vol.86, No.4 (October, 2022), pp.915-948. Presents a reassessment of Vice Admiral Robert L. Ghormley (1883-1958) service as commander in chief of the South Pacific Area during 1942.

Bankoff, Greg, **“From the Art of Practical Sailing to the Electronic Science of Navigation: Typhoons, Seamanship, and U.S. Naval Operations in the Northwest Pacific, 1944-1945.”** Vol.86, No.4 (October, 2022), pp.949-972. Concerned with the challenges faced by ship’s commanders of choosing between entrusting the safety of his vessel to his own judgement based on years of practical experience at sea or relying on the new technology at a time when some of the largest armadas of warships were ever assembled in wartime conditions.

PART II: ARTICLES LISTED BY SUBJECT

A

ABERCROMBY, JAMES (1706-81)

Kingsley, Ronald F. and Alexander, Harvey J. **“The Failure of Abercromby’s Attack on Fort Carillon, July 1758, and the Scapegoating of Matthew Clerk.”** Vol.72, No.1 (January, 2008), pp.43-70. A reassessment, based on letters and other documents, that calls into question the degree that the young engineer, Matthew Clerk, contributed to the defeat of the British attack on Fort Carillon (Fort Ticonderoga) during the French and Indian War.

McCulloch, Ian Macpherson, “**‘A Blanket of Inconsistencies’: The Battle of Ticonderoga, 2008.**” Vol.72, No.3 (July, 2008), pp.889-900. A response to Ronald F. Kingsley and Harvey J. Alexander’s article, “The Failure of Abercomby’s Attack on Fort Carillon, July 1758, and the Scapegoating of Matthew Clerk.” Vol.72, No.1 (January, 2008), pp.43-70.

ABRAMS, CREIGHTON (1914-74)

Birtle, Andrew J. **“PROVN, Westmoreland, and the Historians: A Reappraisal.”** Vol.72, No.4 (October, 2008), pp.1213-1247. A reassessment of the U.S. Army report, nicknamed PROVN, that, in the past, had been mined for information with which to criticize General William C. Westmoreland (1914-2004) and praise his successor as commander of U.S. forces in South Vietnam, General Creighton Abrams (1914-1974).

Marolda, Edward J. **“Orphan of the Mekong Delta: The Army-Navy Mobile Riverine Force.”** Vol.80, No.4 (October, 2016), pp.1149-1181. Despite its success during the Tet Offensive of 1968, the failure of Army and Navy leaders to fully embrace the creation of the Army-Navy Mobile Riverine Force resulting in its disbanding by Gen. Creighton Abrams (1914-1974).

ACADEMIC RESEARCH AND STUDY

See Also: HISTORIOGRAPHY

Deutsch, Harold C. **“The Matter of Records.”** Vol.59, No.1 (January, 1995), pp.135-142.
Concerning the reliability of official documents, including both sins of commission and omission.

Van De Mark, Brian, **“Review Essay: Thinking about the Vietnam War.”** Vol.60, No.2 (April,

1996), pp.339-357. Although the majority of the seven books reviewed are from the perspective of the involvement of the United States, including one on the anti-war movement and two on the Johnson administration, 1963-1969, there is a memoir from a rural woman living in South Vietnam and a comparative work about the reaction of academics to the wars in Algeria and Vietnam.

Lynn, John A. **“The Embattled Future of Academic Military History.”** Vol.61, No.4 (October, 1997), pp.777-789.

Settle, Frank; Whaley, Tom and Blackmer, Elizabeth, **“Alsos Digital Library for Nuclear Issues.”** Vol.67, No.3 (July, 2003), pp.921-923.

Spiller, Roger, **“Historiographical Essay: Military History and Its Fictions.”** Vol.70, No.4 (October, 2006), pp.1081-1097. Observes that military history’s intellectual authority has declined as other disciplines have taken more adventurous approaches to the study of war and assumed a more prominent role in contemporary military criticism.

Peifer, Douglas C. **“The Past in the Present: Passion, Politics, and the Historical Profession in the German and British Pardon Campaigns.”** Vol.71, No.4 (October, 2007), pp.1107-1132. Long a peripheral matter, by the 1990s military justice during the World Wars had vaulted from the field of grassroots activism to the legislative, executive, and judicial arenas of government in Germany and Great Britain, resulting in official pardons for soldiers who had been court martialed in these conflicts.

Shy, John, **“The 2008 George C. Marshall Lecture in Military History: History and the History of War.”** Vol.72, No.4 (October, 2008), pp.1033-1046. A consideration of the works of military history written by distinguished non-military historians over the past twenty years.

Reid, Brian Holden, **“Michael Howard and the Evolution of Modern War Studies.”** Vol.73, No.3 (July, 2009), pp.869-904. Chart the efforts of Sir Michael Howard (1922-2019), beginning in 1950, to impart a framework on the study of the relationship between war and society to the extent that it has been shaped by organizational and moral forces.

Paret, Peter, **“Review Essay: The Annales School and the History of War.”** Vol.73, No.4 (October, 2009), pp.1289-1295.

Harari, Yuval Noah, **“Armchairs, Coffee, and Authority: Eye-witnesses and Flesh-witnesses Speak about War, 1100-1200.”** Vol.74, No.1 (January, 2010), pp.53-78. The possibility and utility of understanding the experience of war from first-hand accounts.

Khan, David, **“How the Allies Suppressed the Second Greatest Secret of World War II.”** Vol.74, No.4 (October, 2010), pp.1229-1241. Concerning the post-war classification of information about the Allies’ success in breaking German codes.

Jackson, Aaron P. **“Review Essay: Expanding the Scope and Accessibility of Non-Western Military History.”** Vol.75, No.2 (April, 2011), pp.603-613. Covering works on China, India, and Russia.

Jensen, Richard, **“Military History on the Electronic Frontier: Wikipedia Fights the War of 1812.”** Vol.76, No.4 (October, 2012), pp.1165-1182.

Lee, Wayne E. **“Research Note: Military History in a Global Frame.”** Vol.78, No.1 (January, 2014), pp.333-336. Three works by the prolific military historian, Jeremy Black that explore the conduct and consequences of warfare throughout the globe from the mid-fifteenth century to the conclusion of the eighteenth century.

ACADEMIC RESEARCH AND STUDY arranged alphabetically by country –

AUSTRALIA

Parkin, Russell, **“Colonel E.G. Keogh and the Making of the *Australian Army Journal*.”** Vol.81, No.4 (October, 2017), pp.1075-1096. Shines a light on the overlooked contribution to professional education and military history in Australia by Eustace Graham Keogh (1899-1981).

ACADEMIC RESEARCH AND STUDY arranged alphabetically by country –

CANADA

Sarty, Roger, **“The American Origins of Academic Military History in Canada: Princeton University, the Carnegie Endowment, and C.P. Stacey’s *Canada and the British Army*.”** Vol.82, No.2 (April, 2018), pp.439-460.

ACADEMIC RESEARCH AND STUDY arranged alphabetically by country –

ITALY

Capponi, Niccolò, **“Clio, Mars, and Wine: Tracking Down Military Documents in Italy.”** Vol.72, No.4 (October, 2008), pp.1249-1256.

ACADEMIC RESEARCH AND STUDY arranged alphabetically by country –

JAPAN

Jeans, Roger B. **“Victims or Victimizers? Museums, Textbooks, and the War Debate in Contemporary Japan.”** Vol.69, No.1 (January, 2005), pp.149-195. Shows that, rather than possessing a unified view of the war, the ‘correct history’ of the conflict is contested between conservatives, the right-wing, moderates, and the left-wing.

ACADEMIC RESEARCH AND STUDY arranged alphabetically by country –

RUSSIA / SOVIET UNION

Glantz, David M. **“Historiographical Essay: The Red Army at War, 1941-1945: Sources and Interpretations.”** Vol.62, No.3 (July, 1998), pp.595-617.

ACADEMIC RESEARCH AND STUDY arranged alphabetically by country – U.S.A.

Skelton, William B. **“Samuel P. Huntington and the Roots of the American Military Tradition.”** Vol.60, No.2 (April, 1996), pp.325-338.

Kohn, Richard H. (ed.) **“The Practice of Military History in the U.S. Government: The Department of Defense.”** Vol.61, No.1 (January, 1997), pp.121-147. Includes contributions from Alfred Goldberg, Elizabeth A. Muenger, and Harold W. Nelson.

Coffman, Edward M. **“The Course of Military History in the United States since World War II.”** Vol.61, No.4 (October, 1997), pp.761-775.

Atkinson, Rick, **“Speech to the U.S. Commission on Military History: Washington, 1 November, 2003.”** Vol.68, No.2 (April, 2004), pp.527-533.

Hutchinson, Robert W. **“The Weight of History: *Wehrmacht* Officers, the U.S. Army Historical Division, and U.S. Military Doctrine, 1945-1956.”** Vol.78, No.4 (October, 2014), pp.1321-1348. Suggests that, even within the ‘purely operational’ lessons provided by veteran German officers to the U.S. Army, a considerable element of Nazi racist ideology was transmitted.

Hosler, John D. **“Status Report: Pre-Modern Military History in American Doctoral Programs: Figures and Implications.”** Vol.82, No.2 (April, 2018), pp.565-582.

Goldman, David I. **“‘Charlie’ Chaplains in the Great War: Chaplains’ Experiences in the U.S. Army, 1917-1919.”** Vol.84, No.2 (April, 2020), pp.395-426. Due to budget cuts, the section of the U.S. Army’s official history of participation in world War I concerning the service of Chaplains was never completed. Nevertheless, the material for such a section in the form of letters, photos, and documents has survived and provides a largely overlooked source for the United States involvement in the Great War.

Wolters, Timothy S. **“Harvey A. De Weerd and the Dawn of Academic Military History in the United States.”** Vol.85, No.1 (January, 2021), pp.95-133. Chronicles the career of Harvey A. De Weerd (1902-1979), a significant member of early academic military historians who was an editor of the Infantry Journal during World War II, early editor of the Journal of Military History, taught some of the first dedicated military history courses in the United States, and

was the second military historian hired by the R.A.N.D. corporation.

ACADEMIC RESEARCH AND STUDY arranged alphabetically by topic –
INTERPRETATION OF PRIMARY SOURCES

Paoletti, Ciro, **“Prince Eugene of Savoy, the Toulon Expedition of 1707, and the English Historians: A Dissenting View.”** Vol.70, No.4 (October, 2006), pp.939-962. Using the siege of Toulon as an example, the author insists that most of the military histories of the period between 1688 and 1748 written by English speaking authors are flawed due to a failure to consult non-English contemporary sources.

Harari, Yuval Noah, **“Armchairs, Coffee, and Authority: Eye-witnesses and Flesh-witnesses Speak about War, 1100-1200.”** Vol.74, No.1 (January, 2010), pp.53-78. The possibility and utility of understanding the experience of war from first-hand accounts.

Sturma, Michael, **“U.S. Submarine Patrol Reports during World War II: Historical Evidence and Literary Flair.”** Vol.74, No.2 (April, 2010), pp.475-490. Insists that the patrol reports of U.S. submariners should be approached with caution due, among other things, to the ‘fog of war’, intentional fabrication, and deliberate omissions for security reasons or to avoid censure.

Jackson, Aaron P. **“Review Essay: Expanding the Scope and Accessibility of Non-Western Military History.”** Vol.75, No.2 (April, 2011), pp.603-613. Covering works on China, India, and Russia.

Nenninger, Timothy K. **“‘Casualties’ at Leavenworth: A Research Problem.”** Vol.76, No.2 (April, 2012), pp.497-506. A cautionary tale of doing research in terms of bias and the issue of the factual content of sources.

Paret, Peter, **“Translation, Literal or Accurate.”** Vol.78, No.3 (July, 2014), pp.1077-1080. Disagreements over the proper translation of five words in Carl von Clausewitz’s *On War* as an example of the challenges of translating complex texts.

Paret, Peter, **“Review Essay: Clausewitz’s Life and Work as a Subject of Historical Interpretation.”** Vol.81, No.3 (July, 2017), pp.829-837.

Paret, Peter, **“The Function of History in Clausewitz’s Understanding of War.”** Vol.82, No.4 (October, 2018), pp.1049-1066.

Paret, Peter, **“From the Discovery of a Clausewitz Manuscript to Its Interpretation.”** Vol.84, No.3 (July, 2020), pp.867-871. A translation of an unpublished manuscript written by Carl von Clausewitz from the first years of his military career, specifically August, 1802.

ACADEMIC RESEARCH AND STUDY arranged alphabetically by topic –
THE MILITARY REVOLUTION DEBATE

See Also: MILITARY REVOLUTION DEBATE

Parker, Geoffrey, **“Review Essay: The ‘Military Revolution’, 1955-2005: From Belfast to Barcelona and the Hague.”** Vol.69, No.1 (January, 2005), pp.205-209.

Liaropoulos, Andrew N. **“Revolutions in Warfare: Theoretical Paradigms and Historical Evidence: The Napoleonic and First World War Revolutions in Military Affairs.”** Vol.70, No.2 (April, 2006), pp.363-384.

AFGHANISTAN

Cronin, Stephanie, **“Building and Rebuilding Afghanistan’s Army: An Historical Perspective.”** Vol.75, No.1 (January, 2011), pp.45-91. The repeated failure of the efforts of successive Afghan governments, from the nineteenth-century to the present, to create a modern regular army.

Collins, Bruce, **“Defining Victory in Victorian Warfare, 1860-1882.”** Vol.77, No.3 (July, 2013), pp.895-929. Catalogues the range of pressures on the commanders of expeditions in Africa to declare victory. See also: Beckett, Ian F. **“How Wars End: Victorian Colonial Conflicts.”** Vol.82, No.1 (January, 2018), pp.29-44.

Lenaburg, Jerry, **“Review Essay: Iraq & Afghanistan.”** Vol.77, No.3 (July, 2013), pp.1079-1084. Exploration of three recent studies of the wars in both Afghanistan, 2001-2021, and Iraq, 2003-2011.

Beckett, Ian F.W. **“The Road to Kandahar: The Politics of Retention and Withdrawal in Afghanistan, 1880-81.”** Vol.78, No.4 (October, 2014), pp.1263-1294.

Beckett, Ian F. **“How Wars End: Victorian Colonial Conflicts.”** Vol.82, No.1 (January, 2018), pp.29-44. The author challenges the conclusions of Bruce Collins’ in his article **“Defining Victory in Victorian Warfare, 1860-1882.”** Vol.77, No.3 (July, 2013), pp.895-929.

Haun, Phil, **“Foundation Bias: The Impact of the Air Corps Tactical School on United States Air Force Doctrine.”** Vol.85, No.2 (April, 2021), pp.453-474. Contrasts the steadfast belief in the role of strategic bombing at the Air Corps Tactical School with the effectiveness of joint operations demonstrated in the Korean, Vietnam, Iraq, and Afghanistan wars.

AFRICA

**See Also: ALGERIA; CONGO; EGYPT; ERITREA; ETHIOPIA; THE GAMBIA;
GHANA; GUINEA-BISSAU; KENYA; LIBERIA; LIBYA; MADAGASCAR;
MALAWI; MOROCCO; NIGERIA; SENEGAL; SIERRE LEONE;
SOMALILAND; SOUTH AFRICA; ZAMBIA; ZAMBABWE / RHODESIA**

Vandervort, Bruce, **“Review Essay: The Thin Black Line of Heroes.”** Vol.65, No.4 (October, 2001), pp.1067-1073. Recent work on European Colonial and, especially, African troops, 1700-1964.

Jackson, Ashley, **“Supplying War: The High Commission Territories’ Military-Logistical Contribution in the Second World War.”** Vol.66, No.3 (July, 2002), pp.719-760. Assesses the mobilization of manpower from Basutoland, Bechuanaland, and Swaziland for use in logistics in the North African and Italian Campaigns.

Stapleton, Tim, **“ ‘Bad Boys’: Infiltration and Sedition in the African Military Units of the Central African Federation (Malawi, Zambia and Zimbabwe) 1953-63.”** Vol.73, No.4 (October, 2009), pp.1167-1193. Illustrates that nationalists exploited the rising unpopularity of colonialism, discontent with participation in the war in Malaya, the Mau Mau uprising in Kenya, and the Congo Crisis, which led white officers doubt the dependability of their African troops.

Benbow, Tim, **“ ‘Menace’ to ‘Ironclad’: The British Operations against Dakar (1940) and Madagascar (1942).”** Vol.75, No.3 (July, 2011), pp.769-809. Investigates why, regarding two separate British operations against Vichy French colonies in Africa, ‘Menace’ failed, while ‘Ironclad’ succeeded.

Vandervort, Bruce, **“When the French Colonial Mind Turns to Thoughts of War.”** Vol.76, No.3 (July, 2012), pp.847-851. Looks at two recent works on French imperialism: one a two-volume collection of twenty-eight essays, the overwhelming majority of which are devoted to Africa, the other book is an attempt at a synthesis of French colonialism exclusively in Africa.

Phimister, Ian, **“Developing and Defending Britain and Her Empire: Montgomery’s 1947 Tour of Africa.”** Vol.79, No.3 (July, 2015), pp.745-766. An overlooked event of the immediate postwar era that provides a window into both Field Marshal Bernard Montgomery’s (1887-1976) post-1945 career and the attitudes of the new Labour government towards defense.

Laband, John, **“The Slave Soldiers of Africa.”** Vol.81, No.1 (January, 2017), pp.9-38. Presents a broad overview of the long history of African military slavery, which the author notes was not limited to Muslim states, was adapted by European colonial powers, and has re-emerged in the phenomenon of child soldiers.

Vandervort, Bruce, “**Review Essay: African Military History Comes of Age.**” Vol.81, No.1 (January, 2017), pp.205-208. A look at two significant works on the military history of the continent, one an encyclopedia of colonial conflicts, the other a three-volume narrative account of conflict, edited and written by Timothy J. Stapleton, respectively.

Stapleton, Timothy J. “**Sexual Health in Britain’s West African Colonial Army (1898-1960).**” Vol.85, No.3 (July, 2021), pp.619-645. Following an initial neglect due to greater concern over tropical diseases, British officers became obsessed with the threat of venereal diseases, reflecting colonial stereotypes surrounding race and gender.

AGRICULTURE

Rogers, Clifford J. “**Review Essay: The Field & the Forge.**” Vol.68, No.4 (October, 2004), pp.1233-1239. Population, production, and power in the pre-industrial West.

Dreyer, Edward L. “**Zhao Chongguo: A Professional Soldier of the Former Han Dynasty.**” Vol.72, No.3 (July, 2008), pp.665-725. Claims that the Former Han Dynasty general, Zhao Chongguo (137-52 B.C.E.) best known innovation, *tuntian* (military farms), was intended to deny the enemy land for grazing and growing crops, rather than as a means of providing food for troops involved in distant campaigns.

Gyucha, Attila; Lee, Wayne E. and Rózsa, Zoltán, “**The Mongol Campaign in Hungary, 1241-1242: The Archaeology and History of Nomadic Conquest and Massacre.**” Vol.83, No.4 (October, 2019), pp.1021-1066. This article integrates conquest process theory, literary evidence, and data from substantial new archaeological work to explore the motivation and nature of Mongol invasions and the consequences for rural settlements on the Great Hungarian Plain.

AILES, STEPHEN (1912-2001)

Donnelly, William M. “**From Sergeant Snorkels to Drill Sergeants: Basic Training of Male Soldiers in the U.S. Army, 1953-1964.**” Vol.86, No.2 (April, 2022), pp.399-426. Assesses the much-criticized quality of officers and non-commissioned officers assigned to shepherd recruits through basic training, an issue that wasn’t addressed until the Secretaries of the Army Cyrus R. Vance Sr. (1917-2002) and Stephen Ailes (1912-2001).

AIR WARFARE

Oyos, Matthew M. **“Theodore Roosevelt and the Implements of War.”** Vol.60, No.4 (October, 1996), pp.631-655. Brings to light an overlooked aspect of Roosevelt’s presidency (1901-1909), his role in accelerating the pace of military technological modernization, including involvement with battleships, submarines, aircraft, and machine guns.

Meilinger, Phillip S. **“Historiographical Essay: The Historiography of Airpower: Theory and Doctrine.”** Vol.64, No.2 (April, 2000), pp.467-501.

Meilinger, Phillip S. **“Historiographical Essay: U.S. Air Force Leaders: A Biographical Tour.”** Vol.62, No.4 (October, 1998), pp.833-870.

Meilinger, Phillip S. **“A History of Effects-Based Air Operations.”** Vol.71, No.1 (January, 2007), pp.139-167. Surveys the problem of measuring the effectiveness of Air Operations due to the ready availability of metrics such as casualty numbers, bomb tonnage, and the number of sorties flown versus the lack of the intelligence apparatus with which to analyze the complex economic system of one’s opponents.

Stamp, Jeffrey, **“Aero-Static Warfare: A Brief Survey of Ballooning in Mid-nineteenth-century Siege Warfare.”** Vol.79, No.3 (July, 2015), Pp.767-782. Includes usage in the U.S. Civil War, Paraguayan War / War of the Triple Alliance, and the Franco-Prussian War.

Vandervort, Bruce, **“Review Essay: Italian Imperialism and the Onset of the Great War.”** Vol.79, No.4 (October, 2015), pp.1121-1126. Three books about the Italo-Turkish War, 1911-1912, and a third covering the wars that immediately preceding the outbreak of World War I which, of course, include both Italy’s war and the Balkan Wars.

Hobbins, Peter, **“Engineering the Fighter Pilot: Aviators, Anti-G suits, and Allied Air Power, 1940-53.”** Vol.84, No.1 (January, 2020), pp.115-149. Probes the failure of the Cotton Aerodynamic Anti-G suit championed by the Australian Air Force to be adopted by the British and United States Air Forces during the period marked by World War II and the Korean War.

**AIR WARFARE arranged chronologically by historical period, conflict,
or theater of operations - WORLD WAR I (1914-18)**

Westermann, Edward B. **“Fighting for the Heavens from the Ground: German Ground-Based Air Defenses in the Great War, 1914-1918.”** Vol.65, No.3 (July, 2001), pp.641-669.

Wilson, Timothy, **“Broken Wings: The Curtis Aeroplane Company, K-Boats, and the Russian Navy, 1914-1916.”** Vol.66, No.4 (October, 2002), pp.1061-1083. Indicates that the contention between Curtiss and the Imperial Russian Government over the purchase of fifty-six flying boats impeded Russia’s operations in the Black Sea for the first eighteen months of World War I.

**AIR WARFARE arranged chronologically by historical period, conflict,
or theater of operations - INTERWAR PERIOD (1919-39)**

Corum, James S. **“The *Luftwaffe*’s Army Support Doctrine, 1918-1941.”** Vol.59, No.1 (January, 1995), pp.53-76. Covers close air support doctrine and training, development and implementation, from the Spanish Civil War to Operation Barbarossa.

Sullivan, Brian R. **“Review Essay: Fascist Italy’s Military Involvement in the Spanish Civil War.”** Vol.59, No.4 (October, 1995), pp.697-727. Surveys the existing literature concerning Benito Mussolini’s (1883-1945) commitment some 70,000 soldiers of the *Corpo Truppe Volontarie* and over 700 warplanes of the *Aviazione Legionaria* to the Nationalist cause, including the publications of official histories.

Meilinger, Phillip, **“Trenchard and ‘Morale Bombing’: The Evolution of Royal Air Force Doctrine before World War II.”** Vol.60, No.2 (April, 1996), pp.243-270. Deals with the inexact blend of the intended goals of the R.A.F.’s interwar strategic bombing doctrine: breaking the will of the enemy and / or breaking the enemy’s economy.

Corum, James S. **“The Spanish Civil War: Lessons Learned and not Learned by the Great Powers.”** Vol.62, No.2 (April, 1998), pp.313-334. Considers what the British, French, German, Italian, Soviet, and United States armed forces learned or failed to learn from the study of the air war in Spain within the context of how armed forces undergo reform.

Ferris, John, **“Fighter Defence before Fighter Command: The Rise of Strategic Air Defence in Great Britain, 1917-1934.”** Vol.63, No.4 (October, 1999), pp.845-884. Attests to the fact that the R.A.F. developed a sophisticated defense system against enemy bombers prior to the development of radar, laying the foundation for victory in the Battle of Britain.

Wildenberg, Thomas, **“In Support of the Battle Line: Gunnery’s Influence on the Development of Carrier Aviation in the U.S. Navy.”** Vol.65, No.3 (July, 2001), pp.697-711. Debunks the presumed anti-aviation attitude of ‘battleship admirals’ and describes how carrier aviation was a mission driven, rather than a technological driven, affair that proceeded incrementally over the course of several years.

Statiev, Alexander, **“Antonescu’s Eagles against Stalin’s Falcons: The Romanian Air Force, 1920-1941.”** Vol.66, No.4 (October, 2002), pp.1085-1113. Gives an account of how, though it was favored over the Army, the Air Force was assigned missions that exceeded its capacity so that it was brought to the brink of extinction.

Orange, Vincent, **“The German Air Force is Already ‘The Most Powerful in Europe’: Two**

Royal Air Force Officers Report on a Visit to Germany, 6-15 October, 1936.” Vol.70, No.4 (October, 2006), pp.1011-1028. Presents the contents of an unpublished report by two R.A.F. officers who toured Germany to investigate the *Luftwaffe*, where they were well received and given access to both the latest aircraft and high-ranking air force personnel.

Kellner, Katrina E. and Perras, Galen Roger, “**‘A Perfectly Logical and Sensible Thing’: Billy Mitchell Advocates a Canadian-American Aerial Alliance Against Japan.**” Vol.72, No.3 (July, 2008), pp.785-823. As a result of his overlooked trip to Canada in 1923, Brigadier General Billy Mitchell (1879-1936) formulated a plan for employing an allied U.S.-Canadian strategic bombing force based in Alaska to wage war on Japan.

Parton, Neville, “**The Development of Early R.A.F. Doctrine.**” Vol.72, No.4 (October, 2008), pp.1155-1177. Rather than a monolithic focus on strategic bombing imposed by Hugh Trenchard (1873-1956), the article argues that R.A.F. doctrine between 1918 and 1923 was a more nuanced, balanced approach to developing and applying air power.

Kennedy, Greg, “**Anglo-American Strategic Relations and Intelligence Assessments of Japanese Air Power 1934-1941.**” Vol.74, No.3 (July, 2010), pp.737-773. Reassesses the influence of racism on Anglo-American views of Japanese air power, and how this influence evolved in the seven years leading up to Pearl Harbor.

**AIR WARFARE arranged chronologically by historical period, conflict,
or theater of operations - WORLD WAR II (1939-45)**

Corum, James S. “**The *Luftwaffe*’s Army Support Doctrine, 1918-1941.**” Vol.59, No.1 (January, 1995), pp.53-76. Covers close air support doctrine and training, development and implementation, from the Spanish Civil War to Operation Barbarossa.

Lund, Erik, “**The Industrial History of Strategy: Re-evaluating the Wartime Record of the British Aviation Industry in Comparative Perspective, 1919-1945.**” Vol.62, No.1 (January, 1998), pp.75-99. Rejects the conventional notion that the Allies achieved victory by outproducing the Axis, insisting that, instead, more factors than mere volume played a role, as demonstrated by the British air sector that displayed greater flexibility, technological sophistication, and effectiveness than either its German or United States counterparts.

Weinberg, Gerhard L. “**Unexplored Questions about the German Military during World War II.**” Vol.62, No.2 (April, 1998), pp.371-380. Touches upon the 1934 oath to Hitler, reasons why high-ranking German commanders felt the need to justify to their troops their orders to slaughter Jewish civilians, the role of high-ranking German commanders in approving the execution of tens-of-thousands of their own troops, *Luftwaffe* field divisions,

the creation of new airborne divisions after the use of paratroopers had been all but abandoned, and the organizing of *Kriegsmarine* and *Luftwaffe* suicide units.

Szabó, Miklós, **“The Development of the Hungarian Aircraft Industry, 1938-1944.”** Vol.65, No.1 (January, 2001), pp.53-76.

Jones, Edgar, **“ ‘L.M.F.’: The Use of Psychiatric Stigma in the Royal Air Force during the Second World War.”** Vol.70, No.2 (April, 2006), pp.439-458. Explores the consequences of the introduction by the R.A.F. of the term ‘Lack of Moral Fibre’ in April, 1940, which was intended to stigmatize aircrew who, without a medical reason, refused to fly.

Peszke, Michael Alfred, **“Historiographical Essay: An Introduction to English-Language Literature on the Polish Armed Forces in World War II.”** Vol.70, No.4 (October, 2006), pp.1029-1064.

Schmider, Klaus, **“Review Essay: The Last of the First: Veterans of the *Jagdwaiffe* Tell Their Story.”** Vol.73, No.1 (January, 2009), pp.231-249. Covers five memoirs of *Luftwaffe* fighter pilots.

Stubbs, David, **“A Blind Spot? The Royal Air Force (R.A.F.) and Long-Range Fighters, 1936-1944.”** Vol.78, No.2 (April, 2014), pp.673-702. Explores why Bomber Command maintained its view that it would be neither appropriate nor prudent to protect its bombers with long-range fighter escort.

Fedorowich, Kent, **“ ‘Caught in the Crossfire’: Sir Gerald Campbell, Lord Beaverbrook and the Near Demise of the British Commonwealth Air Training Plan, May-October 1940.”** Vol.79, No.1 (January, 2015), pp.37-68. The program was threatened by intemperate remarks by Lord Beaverbrook (1879-1964) which rattled Anglo-Canadian relations.

FitzSimonds, James R. **“Aircraft Carrier versus Battleships in War and Myth: Demythologizing Carrier Air Dominance at Sea.”** Vol.84, No.3 (July, 2020), pp.843-865. Claims that a closer examination of the evidence from World War II demonstrates that the battleship was far from powerless in the face of air strikes and that it was the battleship, and not the Aircraft Carrier, that determined control of the sea.

AIR WARFARE arranged chronologically by historical period, conflict,

or theater of operations - WORLD WAR II (1939-45): BATTLE OF THE ATLANTIC

Bell, Christopher M. **“Air Power and the Battle of the Atlantic: Very Long Range Aircraft and the Delay in Closing the Atlantic ‘Air Gap’.”** Vol.79, No.3 (July, 2015), pp.691-719. Places the blame involving this failure to address this problem on the Royal Air Force’s Coastal Command rather than a prioritization of strategic bombing over the protection of maritime convoys.

**AIR WARFARE arranged chronologically by historical period, conflict,
or theater of operations - WORLD WAR II (1939-45): BATTLE OF BRITAIN**

Fagan, Brennen; Horwood, Ian; MacKay, Niall; Price, Christopher; Richards, Ed, and Wood, A. Jamie, **“Bootstrapping the Battle of Britain.”** Vol.84, No.1 (January, 2020), pp.151-186. Using the statistical technique of weighted bootstrapping to provide a quantified assessment of the likelihood of German achievement of air superiority.

**AIR WARFARE arranged chronologically by historical period, conflict,
or theater of operations - WORLD WAR II (1939-45):
ALLIED STRATEGIC BOMBING OFFENSIVE, EUROPE**

Foregger, Richard, **“Two Sketch Maps of the Auschwitz-Birkenau Extermination Camps.”** Vol.59, No.4 (October, 1995), pp.687-696. Asks whether or not the sketch maps in question would have provided the Allies with adequate information for the bombing of gas chambers.

Gentile, Gian P.; Becker, Carl; Commager, Henry S.; Gottschalk; Schmitt, Bernadotte and Malone, Dumas, **“Document of Note: General Arnold and the Historians.”** Vol.64, No.1 (January, 2000), pp.179-180. Concerning U.S. Army Air Force General ‘Hap’ Arnold’s (1886-1950) commissioning of a group of leading historians to determine whether strategic bombing could force Germany to capitulate by the spring of 1944.

Anon. **“The Air War Over Germany: Claims and Counter-claims.”** Vol.73, No.3 (July, 2009), pp.925-932.

Mears, Dwight S. **“The Catch-22 Effect: The lasting Stigma of Wartime Cowardice in the U.S. Army Air Forces.”** Vol.77, No.3 (July, 2013), pp.1025-1054. Accusations of cowardice by the air crews that landed in Switzerland and their consequences.

Gray, Peter, **“A Culture of Official Squeamishness? Britain’s Air Ministry and the Strategic Air Offensive against Germany?”** Vol.77, No.4 (October, 2013), pp.1349-1377. Endeavors to determine if the reluctance of the Air Ministry to issue a campaign medal for the R.A.F.s strategic bombing campaign was due to a discomfort with the tactics of area bombing, particularly in the wake of the attack on Dresden.

Biddle, Tami Davis, **“On the Crest of Fear: V-Weapons, the Battle of the Bulge, and the Last Stages of World War II in Europe.”** Vol.83, No.1 (January, 2019), pp.157-194. Puts forward a causal relationship between Germany’s introduction of the use of the ‘V’ weapons, the impact of Germany’s Ardennes offensive on the Allied High Command, the Allied manpower crisis, and the acceleration of the Strategic Bombing Campaign during the last months of the war.

Werrell, Kenneth P. **“Friction in Action: Revisiting the U.S. Army Air Forces’ August 1943 Raid on Ploesti.”** Vol.83, No.2 (April, 2019), pp.509-540. Looks at the Ploesti Raid from the perspective of planning and outcomes, pointing to failure of flexible leadership in the face of minor unforeseen factors that had a major impact on the effectiveness of the mission.

Jacobs, W.A. **“Royal Air Force Bomber Command, the ‘Overlord Air Diversion’, and ‘Precision’ Bombing at Night.”** Vol.83, No.4 (October, 2019), pp.1161-1188. Takes account of the significant changes in procedure developed and adopted by Bomber Command and seeks to answer why further progress was limited through 1944 to 1945.

Venable, Heather, **“Rescuing a General: General Haywood ‘Possum’ Hansell and the Burden of Command.”** Vol.84, No.2 (April, 2020), pp.487-509. Reappraises the negative assessment of General Haywood Hansell’s (1903-1988) command of the U.S. 8th Air Force.

**AIR WARFARE arranged chronologically by historical period, conflict,
or theater of operations - WORLD WAR II (1939-45): NORTH AFRICA**

Bechthold, B. Michael, **“A Question of Success: Tactical Air Doctrine and Practice in North Africa, 1942-43.”** Vol.68, No.3 (July, 2004), 821-851. Reveals that the tactical doctrine of the U.S. Army Air Force was found wanting in North Africa in 1942, leading to the adoption of the proven British Eighth Army Western Desert Air Force model of ground-air cooperation.

Percy, William Alexander, **“Jim Crow and Uncle Sam: The Tuskegee Flying Units and the U.S. Army Air Forces in Europe during World War II.”** Vol.67, No.3 (July, 2003), pp.773-810. Links the success of the African American 99th Fighter Squadron and the 332nd Fighter Group with President Harry S. Truman’s decision to end segregation in the Armed Forces.

**AIR WARFARE arranged chronologically by historical period, conflict,
or theater of operations - WORLD WAR II (1939-45): BALKANS THEATER**

Stockings, Craig and Hancock, Eleanor, **“Reconsidering the *Luftwaffe* in Greece, 1941.”** Vol.76, No.3 (July, 2012), pp.747-773. Despite its complete dominance of the Greek skies, the terror it inspired, and its almost continual operations against Allied positions, the author challenges the assumption that the *Luftwaffe* had a decisive impact on the campaign.

Stubbs, David, **“Reappraising the Royal Air Force Contribution to the Defense of Crete, 1941.”** Vol.84, No.2 (April, 2020), pp.459-486. Points out that the failure of the British and Commonwealth ground troops to retain control over the airfields was not the primary reason for defeat, given that the fighter squadrons necessary for the defense of the island were not scheduled to arrive in the Mediterranean Sea in time to participate in the battle, a fact known

to decision makers in London.

**AIR WARFARE arranged chronologically by historical period, conflict,
or theater of operations - WORLD WAR II (1939-45): EASTERN FRONT**

Hayward, Joel, **“Too Little, Too Late: An Analysis of Hitler’s Failure in August 1942 to Damage Soviet Oil Production.”** Vol.64, No.3 (July, 2000), pp.769-794. Claims that, had Adolf Hitler not been so fixated on Stalingrad, *Luftwaffe* assets could have been used to significantly disrupt the supply of oil to Soviet factories and forces.

Pennington, Reina, **“Offensive Women: Women in Combat in the Red Army in the Second World War.”** Vol.74, No.3 (July, 2010), pp.775-820. Reports on the nature and variety of women’s combat experiences.

**AIR WARFARE arranged chronologically by historical period, conflict,
or theater of operations - WORLD WAR II (1939-45):
NORTHWESTERN EUROPE THEATER (1944-45)**

Perrun, Jody, **“Best-Laid Plans: Guy Simonds and Operation Totalize, 7-10 August 1944.”** Vol.67, No.1 (January, 2003), pp.137-173. Probes the role of airpower in Operation Totalize, which, the author claims, calls for a reassessment of Lieutenant General Simonds (1903-1974) leadership of the II Canadian Corps.

Tunwell, David Passmore and Harrison, Stephan, **“An Evaluation of Allied Intelligence in the Tactical Bombing of German Supply Depots during the Normandy Campaign, 1944.”** Vol.84, No.3 (July, 2020), pp.825-842. Sets forth the proposition that had Allied intelligence regarding German supply activities been more accurate, a decisive crippling of German logistics could have enabled Allied troops to achieve victory sooner than was the case.

Lahey, R.J. **“Hitler’s ‘Intuition’, *Luftwaffe* Photoreconnaissance, and the Reinforcement of Normandy.”** Vol.86, No.1 (January, 2022), pp.77-109. Contends that it was *Luftwaffe* photoreconnaissance, rather than mere intuition, that led Hitler to significantly reinforce the forces tasked with defending the Normandy beaches.

**AIR WARFARE arranged chronologically by historical period, conflict,
or theater of operations - WORLD WAR II (1939-45): PACIFIC THEATER**

Schwab, Stephen I. **“The Role of the Mexican Expeditionary Air Force in World War II: Late, Limited, but Symbolically Significant.”** Vol.66, No.4 (October, 2002), pp.1115-1140. Recounts the raising and service of the 201st Mexican P-47 Squadron in the Philippines

beginning in May, 1945.

Terrar, Toby, **“First Landing on Guam: The Difficulties of a Naval Aviator during the Invasion.”** Vol.72, No.4 (October, 2008), pp.1265-1270. Gives an account of the rivalry between the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps for landing the first plane on the newly liberated island of Guam, in which the Navy pilot, Ed Terrar, won the honor on 30 July, 1944.

AIR WARFARE arranged chronologically by historical period, conflict,
or theater of operations - WORLD WAR II (1939-45):
U.S. STRATEGIC BOMBING CAMPAIGN, ASIA

Gentile, Gian P. **“Shaping the Past Battlefield, ‘For the Future’: The United States Strategic Bombing Survey’s Evaluation of the American Air War against Japan.”** Vol.64, No.4 (October, 2000), pp.1085-1112. Contests the image of the Bombing Survey as an impartial primary source, demonstrating that it was shaped by particular circumstances, bias, and political factors, most notably the effort to justify an independent Air Force.

Searle, Thomas R. **“ ‘It made a Lot of Sense to Kill Skilled Workers’: The Firebombing of Tokyo in March 1945.”** Vol.66, No.1 (January, 2002), pp.103-133. Demonstrates that the firebombing of Japanese cities was not a radical departure from U.S.A.A.F. tactics used against Germany, that it was not an abandonment of concentrating on targeting industry, and that it was based on long-term planning.

Kwan, Toh Boon, **“ ‘It was a thrill to see rows of B-29s going through the sky’: The Strategic Bombing of Singapore, 1944-45.”** Vol.73, No.3 (July, 2009), pp.905-924. Reports on an overlooked campaign in the U.S. strategic Air War in Asia from the perspective of U.S. bomber crews, Japanese occupation forces in Singapore, local civilians, and internees, noting that the experiences of the latter have, in particular, been neglected.

AIR WARFARE arranged chronologically by historical period, conflict,
or theater of operations - THE COLD WAR (1945-91)

Drew, Dennis M. **“U.S. Airpower Theory and the Insurgent Challenge: A Short Journey to Confusion.”** Vol.62, No.4 (October, 1998), pp.809-832. Covering the period from 1945 to 1992, the article contends that the U.S. Air Force has failed to account for the realities of guerrilla warfare in its theory of airpower.

Young, Ken, **“No Blank Cheque: Anglo-American (Mis)Understandings and the Use of the English Airbases.”** Vol.71, No.4 (October, 2007), pp.1133-1167. Deals with the diplomatic, political, and military issues surrounding the deployment of U.S. nuclear-capable strategic bombers to bases in Great Britain following the Berlin crisis of 1948.

Carter, Donald Alan, **“Eisenhower versus the Generals.”** Vol.71, No.4 (October, 2007), pp.1169-1199. Traces the rancor that evolved between President Dwight D. Eisenhower (1953-1961), who pursued the ‘New Look’ national security policy that relied on nuclear weapons, the Strategic Air Command, and a robust economy, versus Army officers who believed the drastic reductions in conventional ground forces challenged the very existence of their service.

Clymer, Kenton, **“U.S. Homeland Defense in the 1950s: The Origin of the Ground Observer Corps.”** Vol.75, No.3 (July, 2011), pp.835-859. Quasi-auxiliary of the U.S. Air Force from 1950 to 1959.

Young, Ken, **“Special Weapon, Special Relationship: The Atomic Bomb Comes to Britain.”** Vol.77, No.2 (April, 2013), pp.569-598. Beginning in 1950, the United States Air Force based strategic bombers with atomic bombs in East Anglia, England.

Dorn, Walter, **“The U.N.’s First ‘Air Force’: Peacekeepers in Combat, Congo 1960-64.”** Vol.77, No.4 (October, 2013), pp.1399-1425. Recounts O.N.U.C.’s Operation Grand Slam in December, 1962, during which Swedish jets neutralized Katanga’s air force.

Petrina, Stephen, **“Scientific Ammunition to Fire at Congress: Intelligence, Reparations, and the U.S. Army Air Forces, 1944-1947.”** Vol.83, No.3 (July, 2019), pp.795-829. Appraises the place of intelligence and reparations in U.S. Army Air Force and U.S. Air Force postwar research and development.

Haun, Phil, **“Foundation Bias: The Impact of the Air Corps Tactical School on United States Air Force Doctrine.”** Vol.85, No.2 (April, 2021), pp.453-474. Contrasts the steadfast belief in the role of strategic bombing at the Air Corps Tactical School with the effectiveness of joint operations demonstrated in the Korean, Vietnam, Iraq, and Afghanistan wars.

Xiaoming Zhang, **“High-Altitude Duel: The C.I.A.’s U-2 Spy Plane Overflights and China’s Air Defense Force, 1961-1968.”** Vol.86, No.1 (January, 2022), pp.132-159. Charts the overflights of the People’s Republic of China during the 1960s by Chinese Nationalist pilots operating out of Taiwan with the goal of monitoring the P.R.C.’s nuclear weapons program.

**AIR WARFARE arranged chronologically by historical period, conflict,
or theater of operations - ARAB-ISRAELI WARS**

Gat, Moshe, **“On the Use of Air Power and Its Effect on the Outbreak of the Six Day War.”** Vol.68, No.4 (October, 2004), pp.1187-1215. Insists that, whatever advantages Israel’s increased reliance on air power following the Suez Campaign, 1956, it inadvertently led to a deterioration

of Arab-Israeli relations. See also: Elron, Zeev and Gat, Moshe, "Remarks on Air Power and the Six-Day War [And Response]." Vol.69, No.3 (July, 2005), pp.811-820.

Elron, Zeev and Gat, Moshe, "**Remarks on Air Power and the Six-Day War [And Response].**" Vol.69, No.3 (July, 2005), pp.811-820.

**AIR WARFARE arranged chronologically by historical period, conflict,
or theater of operations - KOREAN WAR (1950-53)**

Millett, Allan R. "**A Reader's Guide to the Korean War.**" Vol.61, No.3 (July, 1997), pp.583-597.

Xiaoming Zhang, "**China and the Air War in Korea, 1950-1953.**" Vol.62, No.2 (April, 1998), pp.335-370. Looks at the development of the People's Republic of China's Air Force during the war, the role played by the Soviet Union, and the emergence of an air warfare strategy.

Crane, Conrad C. "**Raiding the Beggar's Pantry: The Search for Airpower Strategy in the Korean War.**" Vol.63, No.4 (October, 1999), pp.885-920. Contrasts the need to fight a limited war with the newly independent U.S. Air Force's focus on nuclear warfare.

Werrell, Kenneth P. "**Across the Yalu: Rules of Engagement and the Communist Air Sanctuary during the Korean War.**" Vol.72, No.2 (April, 2008), pp.451-475. U.S. warplanes violated Chinese air space during the Korean War more frequently than was generally acknowledged, often encouraged and sometimes led by field grade officers, with few pilots suffering punishment.

**AIR WARFARE arranged chronologically by historical period, conflict,
or theater of operations - VIETNAM WAR (1955-75)**

Cole, Bernard D. "**Memoirs: A Noglow in Vietnam, 1968: Air Power at the Battle of Khe Sanh.**" Vol.64, No.1 (January, 2000), pp.141-158. Both a memoir and an analysis by a U.S. Marine who experienced first-hand the fighting at Khe Sanh.

Pribbenow II, Merle L. "**The -Ology War: Technology and Ideology in the Vietnamese Defense of Hanoi, 1967.**" Vol.67, No.1 (January, 2003), pp.175-200. Considers the multiple factors in the recovery of the air defenses of Hanoi following near disaster in 1967.

Milne, David, "**'Our Equivalent of Guerrilla Warfare': Walt Rostow and the Bombing of North Vietnam, 1961-1968.**" Vol.71, No.1 (January, 2007), pp.169-203. Claims that Walt Rostow's (1916-2003) background as an economic historian led him to become one of the strongest advocates for the strategic bombing of North Vietnam.

Deitchman, Seymour J. "**The 'Electronic Battlefield' in the Vietnam War.**" Vol.72, No.3 (July,

2008), pp.869-887. Concludes that the proposal of the Jason Group of scientists for a network of sensors and aircraft to detect activity on the Ho Chi-Minh Trail in Laos, though not totally successful, impacted the course of the war and foreshadowed key aspects of the equipment and operation of the U.S. Armed Forces today.

Fino, Steven A. **“Breaking the Trance: The Perils of Technological Exuberance in the U.S. Air Force Entering Vietnam.”** Vol.77, No.2 (April, 2013), pp.625-655. The response of individual units to the need for guns, in addition to missiles, for air-to-air combat.

Trauschweizer, Ingo, **“Cautious Hawk: Maxwell Taylor and the Path to War in Vietnam.”** Vol.83, No.3 (July, 2019), pp.831-859. Relates the U.S. ambassador to Saigon’s, 1964-1965, opinions regarding the efficacy of bombing Hanoi and deploying ground forces to South Vietnam and their possible influence on the decisions of President Lyndon Johnson (1963-69).

**AIR WARFARE arranged chronologically by historical period, conflict,
or theater of operations - POST COLD WAR PERIOD**

Hoffman, F.G. **“To Drone or not to Drone.”** Vol.81, No.2 (April, 2017), pp.535-538.

AIRBORNE WARFARE

Weinberg, Gerhard L. **“Unexplored Questions about the German Military during World War II.”** Vol.62, No.2 (April, 1998), pp.371-380. Touches upon the 1934 oath to Hitler, reasons why high-ranking German commanders felt the need to justify to their troops their orders to slaughter Jewish civilians, the role of high-ranking German commanders in approving the execution of tens-of-thousands of their own troops, *Luftwaffe* field divisions, the creation of new airborne divisions after the use of paratroopers had been all but abandoned, and the organizing of *Kreigsmarine* and *Luftwaffe* suicide units.

Charles, Patrick J. **“Dissecting the Origins of Air-Centric Special Operations Theory.”** Vol.81, No.3 (July, 2017), pp.803-828. Seeks to find the answers to the controversy surrounding whether British or U.S. officers deserve the most credit for developing the concepts that led to Operation THURSDAY, the airlanding of a specialized force behind Japanese lines in Burma in March, 1944, to disrupt enemy infrastructure and communications.

Biddiscombe, Perry, **“The Mufti’s Men: Haj Amin-al-Husayni and S.S. Parachute Expeditions to Palestine and Iraq, 1944-1945.”** Vol.82, No.3 (July, 2018), pp.783-815.

Wagner, Erich, **“Ingenuity, Excess, Incompetence, and Luck: Air-Resupply Anecdotes in Military History.”** Vol.84, No.2 (April, 2020), pp.427-457. Reviews six case studies from

taken the Second Italo-Ethiopian War (1935-1936), the Spanish Civil War (1936-1939), the Battle of Stalingrad (1942), Operation Market Garden (1944), the Battle of the Chosin Reservoir (1950), and the Battle of Dien Bien Phu (1954).

AITKEN, WILLIAM MAXWELL (1879-1964)

Fedorowich, Kent, “**‘Caught in the Crossfire’: Sir Gerald Campbell, Lord Beaverbrook and the Near Demise of the British Commonwealth Air Training Plan, May-October 1940.**”

Vol.79, No.1 (January, 2015), pp.37-68. The program was threatened by intemperate remarks by Lord Beaverbrook (1879-1964) which rattled Anglo-Canadian relations.

ALEXANDER THE GREAT (356-323 B.C.E.)

Lonsdale, David J. “**Alexander the Great and the Art of adaptation.**” Vol.77, No.3 (July, 2013), pp.817-835. Uses the examples of Alexander’s (356-323 B.C.E.) operations in the Balkans, against the Persian navy, counterinsurgency in Central Asia, and the Battle of Hydaspes (326 B.C.E.).

Sears, Matthew A. and Willekes, Carolyn, “**Alexander’s Cavalry Charge at Chaeronea, 338 B.C.E.**” Vol.80, No.4 (October, 2016), pp.1017-1035. Confronts the controversy surrounding whether or not the eighteen year old Alexander the Great (356-322 B.C.E.) actually led a cavalry charge that contributed to the defeat of the forces of the Greek coalition.

ALGERIA

Van De Mark, Brian, “**Review Essay: Thinking about the Vietnam War.**” Vol.60, No.2 (April, 1996), pp.339-357. Although the majority of the seven books reviewed are from the perspective of the involvement of the United States, including one on the anti-war movement and two on the Johnson administration, 1963-1969, there is a memoir from a rural woman living in South Vietnam and a comparative work about the reaction of academics to the wars in Algeria and Vietnam.

Regnault, Jean-Marc, “**France’s Search for Nuclear Test Sites, 1957-1963.**” Vol.67, No.4 (October, 2003), pp.1223-1248. Reckons with the consequences for French Polynesia and New Caledonia of the mother country’s search for an alternative to the Sahara Desert in Algeria as a nuclear test site.

Thomas, Martin, “**Colonial Violence in Algeria and the Distorted Logic of State Retribution: The Sétif Uprising of 1945.**” Vol.75, No.1 (January, 2011), pp.125-157. Charts the rapid escalation of French security and vigilante violence in response to the uprising that broke

out on VE-Day, 8 May, 1945, arguing that in the long run this was counterproductive.

Hagstrom, Jacob, “**‘My Soldiers Above All’: Justifying Violence against Noncombatants in French Algeria, 1830-1847.**” Vol.86, No.1 (January, 2022), pp.32-53. Shows that French officers participating in the conquest of Algeria defended the actions of their soldiers against civilians, which were motivated by fear, anger, and greed, on the basis of the necessity of preserving their lives and the lives of indigenous allies.

AL-QAEDA – See: TERRORISM

**AMERICAN REVOLUTIONARY WAR – See: UNITED STATES OF AMERICA:
REVOLUTIONARY WAR (1775-83)**

**AMERICAS – See: BOLIVIA; BRAZIL; CANADA; CHILE; COLOMBIA; COSTA RICO;
CUBA; DOMINICAN REPUBLIC; GUATEMALA; HAITI; MEXICO;
NICARAGUA; PANAMA; PERU; PUERTO RICO; EL SALVADOR;
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA**

AMPHIBIOUS WARFARE arranged chronologically by period or conflict –
PRE-WORLD WAR I

Dawson, Joseph G. “**With Fidelity and Effectiveness: Archibald Henderson’s Lasting Legacy to the U.S. Marine Corps.**” Vol.62, No.4 (October, 1998), pp.727-753. Affirms Henderson’s importance as Commandant of the Corps (1821-1859), during which he expanded the roles and capabilities of Marines, such as the deployment of a Marine battalion alongside Army units against the Creeks and Seminoles and the addition of an artillery component to strengthen landing forces.

Barker, Thomas M. “**A Debacle of the Peninsular War: The British-led Amphibious Assault against Fort Fuengirola 14-15 October 1810.**” Vol.64, No.1 (January, 2000), pp.9-52. Reassesses the failed amphibious assault by a multi-national force under the command of the Eleventh Lord Blayney, General Andrews Thomas.

Gordon, Andrew, “**Time after Time in the Horn of Africa.**” Vol.74, No.1 (January, 2010), pp.107-144. Provides an examination of the British joint, amphibious assault on the Dervish

stronghold of Illig, Somaliland, in 1904.

Canfield, Daniel T. **“Opportunity Lost: Combined Operations and the Development of Union Military Strategy, April 1861 – April 1862.”** Vol.79, No.3 (July, 2015), pp.657-690.

AMPHIBIOUS WARFARE arranged chronologically by period or conflict –
WORLD WAR I (1914-18)

See Also: WORLD WAR I: THE GALLIPOLI CAMPAIGN

Travers, Tim, **“Liman von Sanders, the Capture of Lieutenant Palmer, and Ottoman Anticipation of the Allied Landings at Gallipoli on 25 April 1915.”** Vol.65, No.4 (October, 2001), pp.965-979. Shines a light on the expectations of the Turks for a possible landing on the Gallipoli Peninsula and, in particular, the neglected issue of the impact of information from a captured British intelligence officer shortly before the actual landing.

Dunley, Richard, **“Operation Q: Churchill and Fisher’s Invasion of Germany, 1915?”** Vol.86, No.3 (July, 2022), pp.612-641. Reveals the pursuit of a naval strategy by First Lord of the Admiralty, Winston Churchill (1874-1965), and Admiral of the Fleet, John Arbuthnot Fisher (1841-1920) that came withing hours of execution in May, 1915, but was never acted upon.

AMPHIBIOUS WARFARE arranged chronologically by period or conflict –
INTERWAR PERIOD (1919-39)

Alvarez, Jose E. **“Between Gallipoli and D-Day: Alhucemas, 1925.”** Vol.63, No.1 (January, 1999), pp.75-98. Recounts the Spanish amphibious landing at Alhucemas Bay on 8 September, 1925, during the Rif Rebellion in North Africa.

Ulbrich, David J. **“The Long Lost ‘Tentative Manual for Defense of Advance Bases’ (1936).”** Vol.71, No.3 (July, 2007), pp.889-901. In 1998 a copy of the Marine Corps’ previously lost 1936 Tentative Manual for Defense of Advance Bases was uncovered, a manual that displays the culmination of decades of doctrinal thinking about the defense of island bases against enemy amphibious, naval, and aerial assaults.

AMPHIBIOUS WARFARE arranged chronologically by period or conflict –
WORLD WAR II (1939-45)

Bartsch, William H. **“Operation Dovetail: Bungled Guadalcanal Rehearsal, July 1942.”** Vol.66, No.2 (April, 2002), pp.443-476. Reports on the all-but-forgotten rehearsal conducted at Koro Island in the Fijis, held ten days before the landing on Guadalcanal.

Salaita, George D. **“Embellishing Omaha Beach.”** Vol.72, No.2 (April, 2008), pp.531-534. Clarifies the misconceptions surrounding Company ‘A’, 116th Infantry Regiment, 29th Infantry Division, a lead unit in the landing on Omaha Beach.

Mann, Christopher, **“Combined Operations, the Commandos, and Norway, 1941-1944.”** Vol.73, No.2 (April, 2009), pp.471-495. Displays the broader strategic consequences of a series of British raids on the coast of Norway, including valuable experience in joint operations and the commitment of German forces for the defense of Norway.

Zaloga, Steven J. **“Debunking an Omaha Beach Legend: The Use of the ‘Armored Funnies’ on D-Day.”** Vol.85, No.1 (January, 2021), pp.134-162. Confronts the notion that one of the reasons the landing force on Omaha Beach suffered heavy casualties was the U.S. Army’s resistance to the use of specialized tanks developed by the British for the D-Day invasion.

AMPHIBIOUS WARFARE arranged chronologically by period or conflict –
THE COLD WAR (1945-91)

Stolfi, Russell H.S. **“A Critique of Pure Success: Inchon Revisited, Revised, and Contrasted.”** Vol.68, No.2 (April, 2004), pp.505-525. Critiques the performance of the ground forces that were successfully landed at Inchon, proposing that a comparative example of German operations in the Baltic in 1941 suggests greater boldness would have rewarded U.S. forces.

Pribbenow, Merle L., II, **“A Tale of Five Generals: Vietnam’s Invasion of Cambodia.”** Vol.70, No.2 (April, 2006), pp.459-486. Concerned the meticulously planned and well executed 1978-79 invasion of neighboring Cambodia by the Communist forces of the newly united Vietnam, which included both an amphibious assault and combined arms mechanized columns.

ANCIENT PERIOD (to 476)

Santosuosso, Antonio, **“Kadesh Revisited: Reconstructing the Battle between the Egyptians and the Hittites [1274 B.C.E.]”** Vol.60, No.3 (July, 1996), pp.423-444.

Hanson, Victor Davis, **“Historiographical Essay: The Status of Ancient Military History: Traditional Work, Recent Research, and On-Going Controversies.”** Vol.63, No.2 (April, 1999), pp.379-413. A very thorough survey covering works on every conceivable topic concerning the armed forces and conduct of warfare in the age of ancient Greece and Rome.

Greenhalgh, Michael, **“French Military Reconnaissance in the Ottoman Empire during the**

Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries as a Source for Our Knowledge of Ancient Monuments.” Vol.66, No.2 (April, 2002), pp.359-388. Displays how a combination of the intellectual background of many French officers and the Ottoman reuse of Classical Greek and Roman ruins for military purposes resulted in valuable archaeological information in reports preserved in French military archives.

Rogers, Clifford J. **“Review Essay: The Field & the Forge.”** Vol.68, No.4 (October, 2004), pp.1233-1239. Population, production, and power in the pre-industrial West.

Sheldon, Rose Mary, **“Review Essay: *The Military History of Ancient Israel* by Richard A. Gabriel.”** Vol.69, No.1 (January, 2005), pp.197-204.

May, Timothy, **“The Training of an Inner Asian Nomad Army in the Pre-Modern Period.”** Vol.70, No.3 (July, 2006), pp.617-635. Confirms that nomadic ‘horse people’, such as the Mongols, employed more sophisticated training for war than had previously been imagined.

Hosler, John D. **“Status Report: Pre-Modern Military History in American Doctoral Programs: Figures and Implications.”** Vol.82, No.2 (April, 2018), pp.565-582.

ANCIENT PERIOD (To 476 A.D.): GREEK CIVILIZATION

Bertosa, Brian, **“The Supply of Hoplite Equipment by the Athenian State down to the Lamian War [323-322 B.C.E.]”** Vol.67, No.2 (April, 2003), pp.361-379. Covers the break with tradition in the *polis* of Athens in 335 B.C.E. when arms and armor were provided to citizens, including, for the first time, the *thetes* (poor), who had not previously been able to serve as hoplites.

Naiden, F.S. **“Spartan Naval Performance in the Decellean War, 413-404 B.C.E.”** Vol.73, No.3 (July, 2009), pp.729-744. Identifies improvements in Sparta’s cadre of naval officers as the reason for Spartan naval victories during the final phase of the Peloponnesian War.

ANCIENT PERIOD: THE HELLENISTIC AGE (334-31 B.C.E.)

Lonsdale, David J. **“Alexander the Great and the Art of adaptation.”** Vol.77, No.3 (July, 2013), pp.817-835. Uses the examples of Alexander’s (356-323 B.C.E.) operations in the Balkans, against the Persian navy, counterinsurgency in Central Asia, and the Battle of Hydaspes (326 B.C.E.).

Sears, Matthew A. and Willekes, Carolyn, **“Alexander’s Cavalry Charge at Chaeronea, 338 B.C.E.”** Vol.80, No.4 (October, 2016), pp.1017-1035. Confronts the controversy surrounding whether or not the eighteen year old Alexander the Great (356-322 B.C.E.) actually led a cavalry charge that contributed to the defeat of the forces of the Greek coalition.

ANCIENT PERIOD: INDIA

Boesche, Roger, “**Kautilya’s *Arthaśāstra* on War and Diplomacy in Ancient India.**” Vol.67, No.1 (January, 2003), pp.9-37. Kautilya is believed to have been an adviser to the founder of the Mauryan Empire, Chandragupta (c.317-293 B.C.E.).

Lonsdale, David J. “**Alexander the Great and the Art of adaptation.**” Vol.77, No.3 (July, 2013), pp.817-835. Uses the examples of Alexander’s (356-323 B.C.E.) operations in the Balkans, against the Persian navy, counterinsurgency in Central Asia, and the Battle of Hydaspes (326 B.C.E.).

ANCIENT PERIOD: CHINA

Dreyer, Edward L. “**Zhao Chongguo: A Professional Soldier of the Former Han Dynasty.**” Vol.72, No.3 (July, 2008), pp.665-725. Claims that the Former Han Dynasty general, Zhao Chongguo (137-52 B.C.E.) best known innovation, *tuntian* (military farms), was intended to deny the enemy land for grazing and growing crops, rather than as a means of providing food for troops involved in distant campaigns.

ANCIENT PERIOD: ROMAN CIVILIZATION

Holmes, Terence M. “**Classical Blitzkrieg: The Untimely Modernity of Schlieffen’s Cannae Programme.**” Vol.67, No.3 (July, 2003), pp.745-771. Reveals that the Chief of the Prussian General Staff, Count Alfred von Schlieffen (1891-1906), only adopted the Cannae paradigm in 1909, four years *after* he had formulated his plans for war with France, and that this paradigm inadvertently fit subsequent concepts for mechanized warfare.

Kagan, Kimberly, “**Redefining Roman Grand Strategy.**” Vol.70, No.2 (April, 2006), pp.333-362. By scrutinizing the patterns of troop movements provided by surviving sources, the author proposes that Roman Emperors directed how to allocate resources empire-wide to meet objectives, which satisfies the definition of a grand strategy.

Bradley, Carl Meredith, “**The British War Chariot: A Case for Indirect Warfare.**” Vol.73, No.4 (October, 2009), pp.1073-1089. Weighs the capabilities of the Celtic tribes who fielded sturdy and fast two-horse chariots against Julius Caesar’s (100-44 B.C.E.) two landings in Britannia in 55-54 B.C.E. and the means used to sustain their resources and gauge their capabilities.

Wheeler, Everett L. “**Rome’s Dacian Wars: Domitian, Trajan, and Strategy on the Danube.**” Vol.74, No.4 (October, 2010), pp.1185-1227; Vol.75, No.1 (January, 2011), pp.191-219. Seeks to clarify the narrative accounts of the three Dacian Wars of Emperors Domitian (r.81-96) and Trajan (r.98-117), fought between 84 and 106 C.E., within the context of the development of a Geto-Dacian State in Transylvania.

Pearson, Elizabeth, **“Decimation and Unit Cohesion: Why were Roman Legionaries willing to Perform Decimation?”** Vol.83, No.3 (July, 2019), pp.665-688. Analyzes the practice in light of ‘primary group’ theory, arguing that it reintegrated offending units through collective acceptance of both guilt and the necessity for punishment.

McArthur, Tony, **“Should Roman Soldiers be Called ‘Professional’ Prior to Augustus?”** Vol.85, No.1 (January, 2021), pp.9-26. Raises the question of to what extent, if any, could soldiers in Roman armies during the period between 200 B.C.E. and the Battle of Actium in 31 B.C.E. qualify as professionals.

Turner, Brian, **“Celebrating ‘Bloodless Victories’ in the Roman World.”** Vol.86, No.2 (April, 2022), pp.277-298. Critiques the references of ancient authors to Roman victories that were bloodless or were achieved without the loss of a single Roman soldier.

ANCIENT PERIOD: LATE ANTIQUITY (235-750)

See also: MEDIEVAL PERIOD

Bachrach, Bernard S. **“Review Essay: The Barbarian Hordes that never were.”** Vol.74, No.3 (July, 2010), pp.901-904. A critical assessment of Peter Heather’s 2009 book *Empires and Barbarians: Migration, Development and the Birth of Europe*, which covers the period from the decline of the Roman Empire to the age of the Viking.

Wheeler, Everett L. **“The Archaeology of War in Late Antiquity.”** Vol.78, No.3 (July, 2014), pp.1081-1093. A critical examination of a two-volume collection of papers originally presented at a 2007 Oxford conference.

Kolberg, Are Skarstein, **“There is Power in a Cohort: Development of Warfare in Iron Age to Early Medieval Scandinavia.”** Vol.83, No.1 (January, 2019), pp.9-30. Questions the degree to which Scandinavian society was organized for warfare and the extent to which tactics in Iron Age to Early Medieval Scandinavia were influenced by external examples.

Linn, Jason, **“Attila’s Appetite: The Logistics of Attila the Hun’s Invasion of Italy in 452.”** Vol.83, No.2 (April, 2019), pp.325-246. Offers the explanation that Attila the Hun’s (406-453) decision to withdraw from Italy was not due to either Pope Leo the Great (400-461) or hunger and disease, but the approach of winter.

ANCIENT PERIOD: LEGACY

Neill, Donald A. **“Ancestral Voices: The Influence of the Ancients on the Military Thought of the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries.”** Vol.62, No.3 (July, 1998), pp.487-520.

Insists that the military developments of the Enlightenment were the result of the normal course of military innovation, simple evolutionary adaptation, as opposed to a sudden, revolutionary change stemming from the rediscovery of the military methods described by Classical authors.

Vigus, Robert T. **“The Military Revolution and the Ancient Origins of the *Trace Italienne*.”** Vol.84, No.3 (July, 2020), pp.698-712. Points out that the *trace italienne*, in the form of angled bastions, that have been identified as a key and novel feature of the Early-Modern ‘Military Revolution’, had its roots in Ancient Greek and Roman treatises and the actual works constructed by Roman and Byzantine engineers, surviving examples of which could be seen in important trading and pilgrimage routes.

ANDERSON, ORVIL A. (1895-1965)

Meilinger, Phillip S. **“Historiographical Essay: U.S. Air Force Leaders: A Biographical Tour.”** Vol.62, No.4 (October, 1998), pp.833-870.

2nd ANGLO-BOER WAR (1899-1902)

Nasson, Bill, **“Historiographical Essay: Waging Total War in South Africa: Some Centenary Writings on the Anglo-Boer War, 1899-1902.”** Vol.66, No.3 (July, 2002), pp.813-828.

Miller, Stephen M. **“In Support of the ‘Imperial Mission’? Volunteering for the South African War, 1899-1902.”** Vol.69, No.3 (July, 2005), pp.691-711. Inquires into the motives of British civilians who responded to the call for recruits by enlisting in the Volunteers, the Militia, or the Imperial Yeomanry.

Badsey, Stephen, **“The Boer War (1899-1902) and British Cavalry Doctrine: A Re-Evaluation.”** Vol.71, No.1 (January, 2007), pp.75-97. Rejecting the traditional interpretation, the article proposes that a cavalry reform movement incorporating dismounted tactics pre-dated the Second Anglo-Boer War, a mixture of mounted and dismounted tactics were used by both sides in the conflict, and that the problems experienced by cavalry were largely not of their own making

Vergolina, Joseph R. **“‘Methods of Barbarism’ or Western Tradition? Britain, South Africa, and the Evolution of Escalatory Violence as Policy.”** Vol.77, No.4 (October, 2013), pp.1303-1327. Investigates British counterinsurgency methods in the 2nd Anglo-Boer War.

Miller, Stephen M. **“The British Way of War: Cultural Assumption and Practices in the South African War, 1899-1902.”** Vol.77, No.4 (October, 2013), pp.1329-1347. Cosmopolitanism, political egalitarianism, and attitudes towards race influenced

the British conduct of the war.

1st ANGLO-DUTCH WAR (1652-54)

Rommelse, Gijs and Downing, Roger, **“Victims of an Ideological Rift? Dutch Prisoners of War during the First Anglo-Dutch War (1652-1654).”** Vol.80, No.3 (July, 2016), pp.649-669. Rather than ideology, the author shows that it was a combination of logistical problems and a lack of funds that produced the dire conditions experienced by Dutch P.O.W.s.

ANIMALS, USE OF IN WAR

See Also: CAVALRY

Harari, Yuval Noah, **“Strategy and Supply in Fourteenth-Century Western European Invasion Campaigns.”** Vol.64, No.2 (April, 2000), pp.297-333. Seeks to understand both how food for men and animals was ensured by logistical trains versus plunder, and to what extent the chosen or imposed form of supply placed restrictions on strategy.

Bradley, Carl Meredith, **“The British War Chariot: A Case for Indirect Warfare.”** Vol.73, No.4 (October, 2009), pp.1073-1089. Weighs the capabilities of the Celtic tribes who fielded sturdy and fast two-horse chariots against Julius Caesar’s (100-44 B.C.E.) two landings in Britannia in 55-54 B.C.E. and the means used to sustain their resources and gauge their capabilities.

Jones, Spencer, **“The Influence of Horse Supply Upon Field Artillery in American Civil War.”** Vol.74, No.2 (April, 2010), pp.357-377. Proposes that the difficulties of both sides in finding and maintaining a sufficient supply of horses for artillery has implications for the wider debate on whether the U.S. Civil War marked the beginnings of ‘modern’ war.

Weinberg, Gerhard L. **“The George C. Marshall Lecture in Military History: Some Myths of World War II.”** Vol.75, No.3 (July, 2011), pp.701-718. Includes issues surrounding Winston Churchill, Adolf Hitler, Yamamoto Isoroku, Benito Mussolini, Franklin Roosevelt, and Josef Stalin, as well as the Yalta Conference, the Morgenthau Plan for Germany, and the ubiquity of horses in the Second World War.

Phillips, Gervase, **“Technology, ‘Machine Age’ Warfare, and the Military Use of Dogs, 1880-1918.”** Vol.82, No.1 (January, 2018), pp.67-94. The establishment of permanent, regular military dog units in 1880 reflects the overlooked fact that, during modern ‘machine age’ warfare, there remained a widespread reliance on animals.

Blazich, Frank A. **“Notre Cher Ami: The Enduring Myth and Memory of a Humble Pigeon.”**

Vol.85, No.3 (July, 2021), pp.646-677. The homing pigeon Cher Ami survived severe wounds transporting messages, but the question of whether or not it was the pigeon that helped save the 'Lost Battalion' of the American Expeditionary Force is explored in this article.

ANTI-AIRCRAFT ARTILLERY – See: AIR WARFARE

APACHES – See: NATIVE AMERICAN CONFLICTS

ARAB-ISRAELI WARS

Rudd, Gordon W. **“Review Essay: The Israeli Revisionist Historians and the Arab-Israeli Conflict Part One: From the Founding of Zionism to the 1967 War.”** Vol.67, No.4 (October, 2003), pp.1263-1270; **“Part Two: From the 1967 War to the Present.”** Vol.68, No.1 (January, 2004), pp.225-231.

ARAB-ISRAELI WAR (1948)

Tal, David, **“Between Intuition and Professionalism: Israeli Military Leadership during the 1948 Palestine War.”** Vol.68, No.3 (July, 2004), pp.885-909.

Arielli, Nir, **“When are Foreign Volunteers Useful? Israel’s Transnational Soldiers in the War of 1948 Re-examined.”** Vol.78, No.2 (April, 2014), pp.703-724. Assesses the military and political utility for Israel of *Machal* (overseas volunteers) by comparing them with alternate examples of this phenomenon in other twentieth century conflicts.

ARAB-ISRAELI WAR (1967)

Gat, Moshe, **“On the Use of Air Power and Its Effect on the Outbreak of the Six Day War.”** Vol.68, No.4 (October, 2004), pp.1187-1215. Insists that, whatever advantages Israel’s increased reliance on air power following the Suez Campaign, 1956, it inadvertently led to a deterioration of Arab-Israeli relations.

Elron, Zeev and Gat, Moshe, **“Remarks on Air Power and the Six-Day War [And Response].”** Vol.69, No.3 (July, 2005), pp.811-820.

ARAB-ISRAELI WAR (1973)

Lock-Pullan, Richard, **“ ‘An Inward Looking Time’: The United States Army, 1973-1976.”** Vol.67, No.2 (April, 2003), pp.483-511. Rejects the explanation that the immediate post-Vietnam War reforms were primarily shaped by the recent conflict in Southeast Asia, insisting,

instead, that of greater importance was the end of the draft and the lessons drawn from the 1973 Arab-Israeli War by General William E. DePuy (1919-1992).

Bronfeld, Saul, **“Fighting Outnumbered: The Impact of the Yom Kippur War on the U.S. Army.”** Vol.71, No.2 (April, 2007), pp.465-498. Illustrates the different ways in which the Yom Kippur War impacted the work of Generals William E. DePuy (1919-1992) and Donn A. Starry (1925-2011) in reforming the U.S. Army.

Joseph, Uri Bar, **“Strategic Surprise or Fundamental Flaws? The Source of Israel’s Military Defeat at the Beginning of the 1973 War.”** Vol.72, No.2 (April, 2008), pp.509-530. Suggests that that the deficient deployment of Israeli forces that met the Egyptian assault was due to a failure of intelligence to provide sufficient warning.

Young, James L., Jr. **“The Heights of Ineptitude: The Syrian Army’s Assault on the Golan Heights.”** Vol.74, No.3 (July, 2010), pp.847-870. Argues that, during the 1973 Yom Kippur War, it was primarily the Syrian’s tactical incompetence and failure to adhere to Soviet operational doctrine that ensured Israeli victory on the Golan Heights, notwithstanding the bravery of the Israeli troops.

Rodman, David, **“Review Essay: A Tale of Two Fronts: Israeli Military Performance during the Early Days of the 1973 Yom Kippur War.”** Vol.82, No.1 (January, 2018), pp.208-218.

Ezov, Amiram, **“The Crossing Challenge: The Suez Canal Crossing by the Israeli Defense Forces during the Yom Kippur War of 1973.”** Vol.82, No.2 (April, 2018), pp.461-490. Compares the setting of objectives, planning, and execution of the Egyptian Army’s crossing with that of the Israeli Defense Forces.

ARCHAEOLOGY – See: SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH: ARCHAEOLOGY

ARÉVALO, JUAN JOSÉ (1904-90)

Moulton, Aaron Coy, **“The Dominican Dictator’s Funds and Guns in Costa Rica’s Wars of 1948.”** Vol.85, No.3 (July, 2021), pp.713-733. Whereas past studies of the conflicts in Costa Rica have focused on the involvement of Anastasio Somoza García of Nicaragua (1896-1956) and Juan José Arévalo of Guatemala (1904-1990), the author demonstrates that Costa Ricans sought to obtain arms from the Dominican Dictator Rafael Trujillo (1891-1961).

ARMORED WARFARE: see MECHANISED WARFARE

ARMS CONTROL

Kuehn, John T. **“The U.S. Navy General Board and Naval Arms Limitations: 1922-1937.”** Vol.74, No.4 (October, 2010), pp.1129-1160. Highlights the critical link played by the Navy General Board between the U.S. Navy and 1922 Washington Naval Limitations Treaty.

ARMS MANUFACTURING – See: MUNITIONS MANUFACTURING

ARMS AND ARMOR – See: TECHNOLOGY

ARMS TRADE

Grant, Jonathan, **“The Sword of the Sultan: Ottoman Arms Imports, 1854-1914.”** Vol.66, No.1 (January, 2002), pp.9-36. Attempts to ascertain why the Ottoman Empire changed from being self-sufficient in the production of armaments, including warships, to relying entirely on imports by 1914.

Wilson, Timothy, **“Broken Wings: The Curtis Aeroplane Company, K-Boats, and the Russian Navy, 1914-1916.”** Vol.66, No.4 (October, 2002), pp.1061-1083. Indicates that the contention between Curtiss and the Imperial Russian Government over the purchase of fifty-six flying boats impeded Russia’s operations in the Black Sea for the first eighteen months of World War I.

Hughes, Matthew, **“Logistics and the Chaco War: Bolivia versus Paraguay, 1932-1935.”** Vol.69, No.2 (April, 2005), pp.411-437. Employs a broad definition of logistics that includes the acquisition of matériel before the outbreak of war, as well as the establishment of national and international supply lines during the war.

Moulton, Aaron Coy, **“The Dominican Dictator’s Funds and Guns in Costa Rica’s Wars of 1948.”** Vol.85, No.3 (July, 2021), pp.713-733. Whereas past studies of the conflicts in Costa Rica have focused on the involvement of Anastasio Somoza García of Nicaragua (1896-1956) and Juan José Arévalo of Guatemala (1904-1990), the author demonstrates that Costa Ricans sought to obtain arms from the Dominican Dictator Rafael Trujillo (1891-1961).

ARNOLD, BENEDICT (1741-1801)

Soucier, Daniel S. **“ ‘Where there was no Signs of any Human Being’: Navigating the Eastern Country Wilderness on Arnold’s March to Quebec, 1775.”** Vol.81, No.2 (April, 2017),

pp.369-393. Looks at soldiers' attitudes towards and interaction with the natural environment.

Lender, Mark Edward and Martin, James Kirby, **"Target New London: Benedict Arnold's Raid, Just War, and 'Homegrown Terror' Reconsidered."** Vol.83, No.1 (January, 2019), pp.67-95. Challenges the traditional Patriot depiction of Benedict Arnold's (1741-1801) attack on the privateer base of New London, Connecticut, 6 September, 1781, arguing that it was conducted according to the contemporary rules of 'civilized warfare.'

ARNOLD, HENRY 'HAP' H. (1886-1950)

Meilinger, Phillip S. **"Historiographical Essay: U.S. Air Force Leaders: A Biographical Tour."** Vol.62, No.4 (October, 1998), pp.833-870.

Gentile, Gian P.; Becker, Carl; Commager, Henry S.; Gottschalk; Schmitt, Bernadotte and Malone, Dumas, **"Document of Note: General Arnold and the Historians."** Vol.64, No.1 (January, 2000), pp.179-180. Concerning U.S. Army Air Force General 'Hap' Arnold's (1886-1950) commissioning of a group of leading historians to determine whether strategic bombing could force Germany to capitulate by the spring of 1944.

ARTILLERY: PRE-GUNPOWDER

Bachrach, David S. **"The Military Administration of England: The Royal Artillery (1216-1272)."** Vol.68, No.4 (October, 2004), pp.1083-1104. By describing an example of the sophisticated military administration during the reign of King Henry III, specifically involving siege engines, the author argues that much of the military innovations that have been attributed to Henry III's successor, King Edward I, already existed before he ascended the throne.

Fulton, Michael S. **"The Siege of Montfort and Mamluk Artillery Technology in 1271: Integrating the Archaeology and Topography with the Narrative Sources."** Vol.83, No.3 (July, 2019), pp.689-717. An investigation into the development of mechanical artillery, specifically the trebuchet, through the study of archaeologically unearthed projectiles and the suitability of the surrounding terrain for the deployment of trebuchets.

ARTILLERY: EARLY MODERN PERIOD (1480-1789)

Cassidy, Ben, **"Machiavelli and the Ideology of the Offensive: Gunpowder Weapons in *The Art of War*."** Vol.67, No.2 (April, 2003), pp.381-404. Disputes the interpretation that, in his *Art of War*, Niccolò Machiavelli (1469-1527) completely rejects the use of both cannon and hand-held firearms, explaining that his downplaying of the use of gunpowder weapons was due to Machiavelli's association of cannons and handguns with the defensive, while he endorsed the offensive.

Swope, Kenneth M. **“Crouching Tigers, Secret Weapons: Military Technology Employed during the Sino-Japanese War, 1592-1598.”** Vol.69, No.1 (January, 2005), pp.11-41.

Reviews the major military technology employed by the belligerents, showing, contesting the conventional explanation that superior numbers and the death of Toyotomi Hideyoshi's (1537-1598) death were the deciding factors in Japan's defeat.

Ansani, Fabrizio, **“‘This French Artillery is very good and very effective’: Hypotheses on the Diffusion of a New Military Technology in Renaissance Italy.”** Vol.83, No.2 (April, 2019), pp.347-378. Scrutinizes the development of the production of heavy cannons in Italy before and after the French Neapolitan Campaign of 1494.

ARTILLERY: FRENCH REVOLUTIONARY AND NAPOLEONIC WARS (1792-1815)

McConachy, Bruce, **“The Roots of Artillery Doctrine: Napoleonic Artillery Tactics Reconsidered.”** Vol.65, No.3 (July, 2001), pp.617-640. Puts forward the explanation that the changes in Napoleonic artillery practices beginning in 1807 were the results of years of experimentation and innovation, rather than compensation for a general decline in standards throughout the *Grande Armée*.

ARTILLERY: 19th CENTURY

Ripperger, Robert M. **“The Development of the French Artillery for the Offensive, 1890-1914.”** Vol.59, No.4 (October, 1995), pp.599-618. Advances the proposition that the French Army's embrace of *offensive à l'outrance* produced strategies and tactics in which there was little room for heavy artillery.

Dawson, Joseph G. **“With Fidelity and Effectiveness: Archibald Henderson's Lasting Legacy to the U.S. Marine Corps.”** Vol.62, No.4 (October, 1998), pp.727-753. Affirms Henderson's importance as Commandant of the Corps (1821-1859), during which he expanded the roles and capabilities of Marines, such as the deployment of a Marine battalion alongside Army units against the Creeks and Seminoles and the addition of an artillery component to strengthen landing forces.

Jones, Spencer, **“The Influence of Horse Supply Upon Field Artillery in American Civil War.”** Vol.74, No.2 (April, 2010), pp.357-377. Proposes that the difficulties of both sides in finding and maintaining a sufficient supply of horses for artillery has implications for the wider debate on whether the U.S. Civil War marked the beginnings of 'modern' war.

Wulff, Petter, **“Artillery, Light and Heavy: Sardinia-Piedmont and Sweden in the Nineteenth Century.”** Vol.80, No.1 (January, 2016), pp.173-185. Despite contrary requirements for polar opposite strategic circumstances, the cooperation of these two states produced path-breaking artillery technology.

ARTILLERY: WORLD WAR I (1914-18)

Ripperger, Robert M. **“The Development of the French Artillery for the Offensive, 1890-1914.”** Vol.59, No.4 (October, 1995), pp.599-618. Advances the proposition that the French Army’s embrace of *offensive à l’outrance* produced strategies and tactics in which there was little room for heavy artillery.

Palazzo, Albert P. **“The British Army’s Counter-Battery Staff Office and Control of the Enemy in World War I.”** Vol.63, No.1 (January, 1999), pp.55-74. Sets forth the argument that the critical turning point for the artillery occurred during the winter of 1916-1917, when, drawing upon the lessons of the Battle of the Somme, a corps-level Counter-Battery Staff Office was created.

ARTILLERY: WORLD WAR II (1939-45)

Eddy, George G. **“Memoirs: The Birth of the Concrete-Piercing Fuze: How the Siegfried Line and Other Formidable Targets were Breached.”** Vol.64, No.2 (April, 2000), pp.459-465. Brigadier General George G. Eddy (1895-1969) relates the development of the concrete piercing fuze when he served as Director of the Ordnance Research Center at Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland, during World War II.

Dudley, William S. **“A Soldier, His Family, and the Impact of the Pacific War, 1942-1945.”** Vol.80, No.1 (January, 2016), pp.187-192. A three-volume biography of Wilber Bradt of Washington State who served as a Field Artillery officer in the 43rd Infantry Division as it fought its way through the Solomons, New Guinea, and the Philippines. Based on a trove of preserved correspondence and interviews, this account is as much about his family on the home front as it is about Bradt on the frontlines.

ARTILLERY: COLD WAR (1945-91)

Hawkins, John M. **“The Costs of Artillery: Eliminating Harassment and Interdiction Fire During the Vietnam War.”** Vol.70, No.1 (January, 2006), pp.91-122. Determines that the reason that the use of U.S. artillery for harassment and interdiction had been all but eliminated by June, 1970, was due to budgetary pressures and not from concerns over collateral damage.

Boylan, Kevin M. **“No ‘Technical Knockout’: Giap’s Artillery at Dien Bien Phu.”** Vol.78, No.4 (October, 2014), pp.1349-1383. Contests the common explanation for the victory of the Vietnamese People’s Army based on a flood of Vietnamese publications around the 2004 fiftieth anniversary of the siege, 13 March – 7 May, 1954.

ASIA

See Also: CAMBODIA; CHINA; HONG KONG; INDIA; JAPAN; KOREA; LAOS; MALAYA; PAKISTAN; SINGAPORE; THAILAND

May, Timothy, **“The Training of an Inner Asian Nomad Army in the Pre-Modern Period.”** Vol.70, No.3 (July, 2006), pp.617-635. Confirms that nomadic ‘horse people’, such as the Mongols, employed more sophisticated training for war than had previously been imagined.

Jackson, Aaron P. **“Review Essay: Expanding the Scope and Accessibility of Non-Western Military History.”** Vol.75, No.2 (April, 2011), pp.603-613. Covering works on China, India, and Russia.

Murteira, André, **“Historiographical Essay: The Military Revolution and European Wars Outside of Europe: The Dutch-Portuguese War in Asia in the First Quarter of the Seventeenth Century.”** Vol.84, No.2 (April, 2020), pp.511-535. Challenges the notion of Early Modern Western Military exceptionalism that, in Portuguese historiography, has blamed their defeat on Portuguese naval forces that were inferior to their Dutch opponents supposedly because of Asian military influence that was absent among the Dutch.

ATHENS - See: ANCIENT PERIOD: GREEK CIVILIZATION

ATATÜRK, MUSTAFA KEMAL (1881-1938)

Karpat, Kemal H. **“Review Essay: The Rise of Modern Turkey.”** Vol.65, No.3 (July, 2001), pp.771-775. Covers two recent books that chronicle the transformation of the Turkish state from the late Ottoman Empire to a nation-state under Mustafa Kemal Atatürk (1881-1938).

Orr, Andrew, **“ ‘We call you to holy war’: Mustafa Kemal, Communism, and Germany in French Intelligence Nightmare, 1919-1923.”** Vol.75, No.4 (October, 2011), pp.1095-1123. Explains how French military intelligence analysts chose to identify Mustafa Kemal (1881-1938) as the central figure in a communist-inspired, German controlled, anti-colonial enterprise that was closely allied to Islamist political movements, rather than the nationalist, secular, westernizing leader that he was.

ATTILA THE HUN (406-453)

Linn, Jason, **“Attila’s Appetite: The Logistics of Attila the Hun’s Invasion of Italy in 452.”**

Vol.83, No.2 (April, 2019), pp.325-246. Offers the explanation that Attila the Hun's (406-453) decision to withdraw from Italy was not due to either Pope Leo the Great (400-461) or hunger and disease, but the approach of winter.

AUGUSTUS, PHILIP (1165-1223)

Isaac, Steven, **"The Role of Towns in the Battle of Bouvines (1214)."** Vol.79, No.2 (April, 2015), pp.317-344. Uses the French King, Philip Augustus' (1165-1223), victory at Bouvines as an example of the military contributions of urban centers in the form of non-noble troops, the production of arms and armor, financial resources, and contributors to policy.

AUSTRALASIA – See: AUSTRALIA; INDONESIA; MALAYA; NEW ZEALAND; PHILIPPINES

AUSTRALIA

Parkin, Russell, **"Colonel E.G. Keogh and the Making of the *Australian Army Journal*."** Vol.81, No.4 (October, 2017), pp.1075-1096. Shines a light on the overlooked contribution to professional education and military history in Australia by Eustace Graham Keogh (1899-1981).

AUSTRALIA: CONFLICTS WITH ABORIGINAL PEOPLES

Connor, John, **"Climate, Environment, and Australian Frontier Wars: New South Wales, 1788-1841."** Vol.81, No.4 (October, 2017), pp.985-1006. Attests that there was a strong correlation between the onset of drought in the inland region of south-eastern Australia and the eruption of armed conflict from 1824 to 1841, advocating a consideration of the impact of weather on the outbreak of war throughout history.

AUSTRALIA: WORLD WAR I (1914-18)

Overlack, Peter, **"The Force of Circumstances: Graf Spee's Options for the East Asian Cruiser Squadron in 1914."** Vol.60, No.4 (October, 1996), pp.657-682. Investigates how the denial of coaling stations by both Japan's decision to join the Entente Powers and the actions of Australia and New Zealand severely constricted the choices available to Vice-Admiral Maximilian Reichsgraf von Spee (1861-1914).

Bou, Jean, **"Cavalry, Firepower, and Swords: The Australian Light Horse and the Tactical Lessons of Cavalry Operations in Palestine, 1916-1918."** Vol.71, No.1 (January, 2007), pp.99-125. Contrary to the traditions of the Australian mounted service, by the end of the Campaign in Palestine more than half of the Australian Light Horse were armed with both

rifles and swords, relying on both fire and modern shock tactics.

Westerman, William, **“The Real Controller of the Battle: The Importance of Studying Tactical Battalion Command – A Case Study.”** Vol.81, No.4 (October, 2017), pp.1007-1038. Offers the experience of the 22nd Australian Infantry Battalion during the 1918 Hundred Days Campaign as an example of decentralized command and control.

AUSTRALIA: WORLD WAR II (1939-45)

Hobbins, Peter, **“Engineering the Fighter Pilot: Aviators, Anti-G suits, and Allied Air Power, 1940-53.”** Vol.84, No.1 (January, 2020), pp.115-149. Probes the failure of the Cotton Aerodynamic Anti-G suit championed by the Australian Air Force to be adopted by the British and United States Air Forces during the period marked by World War II and the Korean War.

Stubbs, David, **“Reappraising the Royal Air Force Contribution to the Defense of Crete, 1941.”** Vol.84, No.2 (April, 2020), pp.459-486. Points out that the failure of the British and Commonwealth ground troops to retain control over the airfields was not the primary reason for defeat, given that the fighter squadrons necessary for the defense of the island were not scheduled to arrive in the Mediterranean Sea in time to participate in the battle, a fact known to decision makers in London.

Lim, Preston Jordan, **“Churchill’s Butchers: Mission 204’s Operations in China, 1942-1945.”** Vol.84, No.4 (October, 2020), pp.1127-1156. Whereas previous studies have focused on the mission’s record in 1942, the author examines the entire length of service of this combined British-Australian commando unit tasked with training Nationalist guerrillas, suggesting that it was more successful than previously thought.

Jones, Mark C. **“In Need of a Home Away from Home: The Royal Netherlands Navy in Australia, 1942-1947.”** Vol.85, No.2 (April, 2021), pp.399-425. With the fall of the Netherlands’ East Indies, units of the Royal Netherlands Navy relocated to Australia, from where they continued their operations against the Japanese enemy.

AUSTRALIA: THE COLD WAR (1945-91)

Tuck, Christopher, **“‘Cut the bonds which bind our hands’: Deniable Operations during the Confrontation with Indonesia, 1963-1966.”** Vol.77, No.2 (April, 2013), pp.599-623. Describes the British confrontation with Indonesia and the problems with cross-border operations.

Tuck, Christopher, **“Measuring Victory: Assessing the outcomes of *Konfrontasi*, 1963-66.”** Vol.82, No.3 (July, 2018), pp.873-898. Suggests that the outcome of the British low intensity conflict with Indonesia, known as the ‘Confrontation’, is far more complex than either the

triumphal or revisionist interpretations suggest.

AUSTRALIA: KOREAN WAR (1950-53)

Casey, Steven, **“Wilfred Burchett and the United Nations Command’s Media Relations during the Korean War, 1951-1952.”** Vol.74, No.3 (July, 2010), pp.821-845. Assesses the Australian journalist, Wilfred Burchett’s (1911-1983), observations concerning the U.S. Army’s relations with the media during the Korean armistice negotiations.

Grey, Jeffrey, **“The Formation of the Commonwealth Division, 1950-1951.”** Vol.81, No.4 (October, 2017), pp.1097-1107. The saga of the military and political challenges of forming a division composed of units from the Australian, British, Canadian, Indian, and New Zealand armies.

Hobbins, Peter, **“Engineering the Fighter Pilot: Aviators, Anti-G suits, and Allied Air Power, 1940-53.”** Vol.84, No.1 (January, 2020), pp.115-149. Probes the failure of the Cotton Aerodynamic Anti-G suit championed by the Australian Air Force to be adopted by the British and United States Air Forces during the period marked by World War II and the Korean War.

AUSTRALIA: VIETNAM WAR (1955-75)

McGibbon, Ian, **“Australian-New Zealand Relations and Commitments to Asian Conflicts 1950-1972.”** Vol.81, No.4 (October, 2017), pp.1059-1074. Despite the replacement of the British security framework by alliance with the United States, New Zealand resisted pressure to commit troops to the Vietnam War in direct contrast to its larger neighbor.

Prentice, David L. **“‘Waltzing Matilda’ Out of Vietnam: Grand Strategy, Politics, and the Decision to Remove Australian Military Forces from Vietnam.”** Vol.86, No.3 (July, 2022), pp.642-669. When the United States chose to pursue the policy of ‘Vietnamization’, withdrawing increasing numbers of U.S. troops, Australian Prime Minister John Gorton (r.1968-1971) sought to encourage U.S. resolve by retaining Australian troops in South Vietnam until 1970, when Gorton’s government collapsed.

AUSTRIA / AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN EMPIRE

Ponichtera, Robert M. **“The Military Thought of Wladyslaw Sikorski.”** Vol.59, No.2 (April, 1995), pp.279-301. Offers a description of Sikorski’ (1881-1943) pursuit of political goals through the promotion of Polish military strength throughout his career, from within the Austro-Hungarian Empire to the leadership of the Polish state in exile.

Wawro, Geoffrey, **“An ‘Army of Pigs’: The technical, Social, and Political Basis of Austrian**

Shock Tactics, 1859-1866.” Vol.59, No.3 (July, 1995), pp.407-433. Contends that, like the French after 1871, the Austrian Army responded to their defeat in the Second Italian War of Unification, 1859, by a commitment to aggressive shock tactics.

Browning, Reed, **“Review Essay: New Views on the Silesian Wars.”** Vol.69, No.2 (April, 2005), pp.521-534. Concerning the series of conflicts, 1740-42, 1744-45, and 1756-63, fought between Austria and the Kingdom of Prussia, led by Frederick the Great (1712-1786).

Otte, T.G. **“From *Can-Can Diabolique* to *Sitzkrieg*: The International China Expeditionary Force, 1900-1901.”** Vol.77, No.4 (October, 2013), pp.1277-1302. Analyzes a neglected example of coalition warfare.

DiNardo, Richard L. **“The Limits of Technology: The Invasion of Serbia, 1915.”** Vol.79, No.4 (October, 2015), pp.981-995. By focusing on the different forms of technology employed by the invading forces of the Central Powers, the author explains how they benefitted the invaders, but also had their limitations.

B

BALFOUR, ARTHUR J. (1848-1930)

Martin, Christopher, **“The Complexity of Strategy: ‘Jackie’ Fischer and the Trouble with Submarines.”** Vol.75, No.2 (April, 2011), pp.441-470. The problems of re-formulating strategy in the wake of the introduction of submarines for Admiral ‘Jackie’ Fischer (1841-1920), Prime Minister A.J. Balfour (r.1902-1905), and Julian Corbett (1854-1922).

BALKANS REGION

**See Also: BULGARIA; GREECE; SERBIA; TURKEY / OTTOMAN EMPIRE;
YUGOSLAVIA**

DeVries, Kelly, **“The Lack of a Western European Military Response to the Ottoman Invasions of Eastern Europe from Nicopolis (1396) to Mohacs (1526).”** Vol.63, No.3 (July, 1999), pp.539-559. Inquires into the reasons behind a failure to respond to the Turkish threat, proposing that it was a combination of the intimidating power of the Ottomans and changing attitudes towards the duties expected of a Christian soldier.

Vandervort, Bruce, **“Review Essay: Italian Imperialism and the Onset of the Great War.”** Vol.79, No.4 (October, 2015), pp.1121-1126. Three books about the Italo-Turkish War, 1911-1912, and a

third covering the wars that immediately preceding the outbreak of World War I which, of course, include both Italy's war and the Balkan Wars.

Delis, Panagiotis, **"The Treatment of Prisoners of War Captured by the Greek Army during the Balkans Wars of 1912-13."** Vol.82, No.4 (October, 2018), pp.1123-1147. Due to a combination of the inability of the Greeks to pay for the care of Bulgarian and Ottoman P.O.W.s and negative stereotypes held about the same, the laws concerning the treatment of prisoners established by international conventions in 1899 and 1907 were not honored by the Greek Army.

BALUCHISTAN – See: INDIA

BALLONING – See: AIR WARFARE

BAVARIA – See: GERMANY

BELGIUM: EARLY MODERN PERIOD (1480-1789)

Arfaioi, Maurizio, **"Bastion of Empire: The Italian *terzo Vecchio* of the Army of Flanders (1597-1682)."** Vol.85, No.1 (January, 2021), pp.27-50. An examination of the service of the longest-lived infantry unit, the *terzo Vecchio*, in an effort to better understand Italian involvement in the long conflict within the Spanish Low Countries.

BELGIUM: WORLD WAR I (1914-18)

Nelson, David T. and Cole, Richard G. **"Memoirs: Behind German Lines in 1915: The Letters Home of David T. Nelson."** Vol.65, No.4 (October, 2001), pp.1053-1060. Nelson, who was from Decorah, Iowa, was a Rhodes Scholar at Oxford when the war broke out. He worked for the Commission for Relief in German occupied Belgium and, later in 1916, as a driver for the American Field Ambulance Corps.

BELGIUM: INTERWAR PERIOD (1919-39)

Gunsburg, Jeffrey A. **"La Grand Illusion: Belgian and Dutch Strategy Facing Germany, 1919 – May, 1940."** Vol.78, No.1 (January, 2014), pp.101-158; Vol.78, No.2 (April, 2014), pp.605-671.

BELGIUM: WORLD WAR II (1939-45)

Geller, Jay Howard, **“The Role of Military Administration in German-Occupied Belgium, 1940-1944.”** Vol.63, No.1 (January, 1999), pp.99-125. Attempts to determine how the German Military Administration viewed its role in occupying and governing the Kingdom of Belgium.

Gunsburg, Jeffrey A. **“The Battle of Gembloux, 14-15 May 1940: The ‘Blitzkrieg’ Checked.”** Vol.64, No.1 (January, 2000), pp.97-140. Uses an examination of the effectiveness of the French forces holding a defensive position at the Belgium town of Gembloux as a test case for French doctrine and performance.

Jones, Mark C. **“Friend and Advisor to the Allied Navies: The Royal Navy’s Principal Liaison Officer and Multinational Naval Operations in World War II.”** Vol.77, No.3 (July, 2013), pp.991-1023. The work of Principal Liaison Officer, Allied Navies (P.N.L.O.) with the Belgian, Dutch, French, Greek, Norwegian, Polish, and Yugoslav navies in exile.

BENÉT, STEPHEN VINCENT (1827-95)

Beaver, Daniel R. **“The U.S. War Department in the Gaslight Era: Stephen Vincent Benét at the Ordnance Department, 1870-91.”** Vol.68, No.1 (January, 2004), pp.105-132.

BIOLOGICAL AND MEDICAL ISSUES

Stapleton, Timothy J. **“Sexual Health in Britain’s West African Colonial Army (1898-1960).”** Vol.85, No.3 (July, 2021), pp.619-645. Following an initial neglect due to greater concern over tropical diseases, British officers became obsessed with the threat of venereal diseases, reflecting colonial stereotypes surrounding race and gender.

Kuronen, Jarmo O.; Heikkinen, Jarmo K., and Lewis, Aidan Mark, **“A Research Note on Military Medicine in Finland, 1555-1945.”** Vol.85, No.3 (July, 2021), pp.765-770.

BIOLOGICAL AND MEDICAL ISSUES: EARLY MODERN PERIOD (1480-1789)

Kopperman, Paul E. **“‘The Cheapest Pay’: Alcohol Abuse in the Eighteenth-Century British Army.”** Vol.60, No.3 (July, 1996), pp.445-470. Analyzes the unwillingness of officers to confront what was generally agreed to be a significant problem due to conflicting medical opinion and the utility of control over government supplied alcohol.

Becker, Ann M. **“Smallpox in Washington’s Army: Strategic Implications of the Disease during the American Revolutionary War.”** Vol.68, No.2 (April, 2004), pp.381-430.

BIOLOGICAL AND MEDICAL ISSUES: 19th CENTURY

Bell, Andrew McIlwaine, “**‘Gallinippers & Glory’: The Links between Mosquito-borne Diseases and U.S. Civil War Operations and Strategy, 1862.**” Vol.74, No.2 (April, 2010), pp.379-405. Covers the physiological and psychological effects of malaria and yellow fever and their impact on military operations and strategy in 1862.

Speelman, Patrick J. “**Review Essay: The Logistics of British Naval Supremacy in the Age of Sail.**” Vol.77, No.2 (April, 2013), pp.667-670. Consists of three recent books, two covering systems of supply during the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars, 1793-1815, and a third concerning medical care from 1805 to 1916.

Richenbacher, Wayne E. “**The Demise of Stonewall Jackson: A Civil War Medical Case Study.**” Vol.79, No.3 (July, 2015), pp.635-655. Chronicles the eight days between General Stonewall Jackson’s (1824-1863) wounding at the Battle of Chancellorsville, 2 May, 1863, and his death, considering the care provided his surgeon,

Crawford, Michael J. “**Avast Swabbing! The Medical Campaign to reform Swabbing the Decks in the U.S. Navy.**” Vol.83, No.1 (January, 2019), pp.127-156. Delves into the conflict between Navy officers, who prioritized the clean appearance of their ships, and Navy doctors, who believed that the humid air produced by swabbing the decks facilitated the spread of diseases that afflicted sailors.

Krueger, David, “**The Red Cross, the Daughters of the American Revolution, and the Origins of the Army Nurse Corps in the Spanish-American War.**” Vol.83, No.2 (April, 2019), pp.409-434. Determines that the work of contract nurses, promoted by the Daughters of the American Revolution Hospital Corps and the Red Cross, demonstrated the capability and necessity of female nurses in the military, the Army chose to establish a professional nurse corps rather than rely on volunteers.

Mears, Dwight S. “**‘Neither an Officer nor an Enlisted Man;: Contract Surgeons’ Eligibility for the Medal of Honor.**” Vol.85, No.1 (January, 2021), pp.51-75. Presents four instances in the Nineteenth century U.S. Army of contract surgeons who claimed entitlement to the Medal of Honor.

BIOLOGICAL AND MEDICAL ISSUES: WORLD WAR I (1914-18)

Nelson, David T. and Cole, Richard G. “**Memoirs: Behind German Lines in 1915: The Letters Home of David T. Nelson.**” Vol.65, No.4 (October, 2001), pp.1053-1060. Nelson, who was from Decorah, Iowa, was a Rhodes Scholar at Oxford when the war broke out. He worked for the Commission for Relief in German occupied Belgium and, later in 1916, as a driver

for the American Field Ambulance Corps.

BIOLOGICAL AND MEDICAL ISSUES: WORLD WAR II (1939-45)

Wanke, Paul, “**American Military Psychiatry and its Role among Ground Forces in World War II.**” Vol.63, No.1 (January, 1999), pp.127-146. Explains how the role of U.S. military psychiatrists evolved from one of screening recruits as a preventative measure to one of responding to battlefield psychiatric casualties.

McEvoy, William P. “**‘Experiences at Sea’: A Navy Doctor of War.**” Vol.75, No.4 (October, 2011), pp.1159-1182. U.S. Navy doctor serving in the Pacific from September 1944 to December 1945.

Pennington, Reina, “**Offensive Women: Women in Combat in the Red Army in the Second World War.**” Vol.74, No.3 (July, 2010), pp.775-820. Reports on the nature and variety of women’s combat experiences.

Hobbins, Peter, “**Engineering the Fighter Pilot: Aviators, Anti-G suits, and Allied Air Power, 1940-53.**” Vol.84, No.1 (January, 2020), pp.115-149. Probes the failure of the Cotton Aerodynamic Anti-G suit championed by the Australian Air Force to be adopted by the British and United States Air Forces during the period marked by World War II and the Korean War.

Marble, Sanders, “**Medical Problems in the Sicilian Campaign.**” Vol.84, No.2 (April, 2020), pp.537-540. Excerpt from the Monthly Progress Report, U.S. Army Service Forces, 31 October 1943.

BIOLOGICAL AND MEDICAL ISSUES: COLD WAR (1945-91)

Goldman, David I. “**The Generals and the Germs: The Army Leadership’s Response to Nixon’s Review of Chemical and Biological Warfare Policies in 1969.**” Vol.73, No.2 (April, 2009), pp.531-569. The response of U.S. Army leadership to President Richard Nixon (1969-1974) unilateral elimination of biological warfare agents, retaining only a defensive research program, as well as placing limitations on the chemical weapons.

Martini, Edwin A. “**Incinerating Agent Orange: Operations Pacer HO, Pacer IVY, and the Rise of Environmentalist Thinking.**” Vol.76, No.3 (July, 2012), pp.809-836.

BLISS, TASKER H. (1853-1930)

Roberts, Priscilla, “**Tasker H. Bliss and the Evolution of Allied Unified Command, 1918: A Note on Old Battles Revisited.**” Vol.65, No.3 (July, 2001), pp.671-695.

BOLIVIA

Hughes, Matthew, “**Logistics and the Chaco War: Bolivia versus Paraguay, 1932-1935.**”

Vol.69, No.2 (April, 2005), pp.411-437. Employs a broad definition of logistics that includes the acquisition of matériel before the outbreak of war, as well as the establishment of national and international supply lines during the war.

Jamison, Thomas M. “**The War of the Pacific, Technology and U.S. Naval Development: An International History of a Regional War.**” Vol.82, No.4 (October, 2018), pp.1093-1122.

The observations by foreign nations of the war between Chile and a coalition of Bolivia and Peru, 1879-1884, influenced naval developments around the globe, including contributing to the U.S. building of the ‘New Navy’ in the 1890s.

BONAPARTE, NAPOLEON (1769-1821)

**See Also: FRANCE: FRENCH REVOLUTIONARY
AND NAPOLEONIC WARS (1792-1815)**

Esdaile, Charles, “**Review Essay: Recent Writing on Napoleon and His Wars.**” Vol.73, No.1

(January, 2009), pp.209-220. Contains four works that cover the struggle specifically between Britain and France from 1792 to 1815, Napoleon’s (1769-1821) skill as a commander on all levels of warfare, and the guerrilla war in Spain.

BOSCAWEN, EDWARD (1711-61)

Willis, Sam, “**The Battle of Lagos, 1759.**” Vol.73, No.3 (July, 2009), pp.745-765. Though an indecisive engagement, Royal Navy Vice-Admiral Edward Boscawen’s (1711-1761) squadron weakened the French Mediterranean fleet that was sailing to join the French Atlantic fleet, thus serving as an important precursor to the Battle of Quiberon Bay, November, 1759.

BOUCIQUAUT, JEAN LE MEINGRE (1366-1421)

Çeçen, Zeynep Kocabiyoikoğlu, “**Two Different Views of Knighthood in the Early Fifteenth**

Century: *Le Livre de Bouciquaut* and the Works of Christine de Pizan.” Vol.76, No.1

(January, 2012), pp.9-35. Comparing the different contemporary views of knighthood, the author considers whether its depiction in the biography of Marshal of France, Jean le Meingre Bouciquaut (1366-1421), is consistent with its image in the works of Christine de Pizan (1363-1430).

BOXER REBELLION (1899-1901) – See: CHINA

BRAZIL

Stamp, Jeffrey, “**Aero-Static Warfare: A Brief Survey of Ballooning in Mid-nineteenth-century Siege Warfare.**” Vol.79, No.3 (July, 2015), Pp.767-782. Includes usage in the U.S. Civil War, War of the Triple Alliance / Paraguayan War, and the Franco-Prussian War.

BROOKE, ALAN FRANCIS (1883-1963)

Weinberg, Gerhard L. “**Historiographical Essay: World War II Scholarship, now and in the Future.**” Vol.61, No.2 (April, 1997), pp.335-345. Includes issues surrounding the use of the memoirs of German military leaders, the revelations of Field Marshal Lord Alanbrooke’s (1883-1963) unabridged diary, and the declassification of materials pertaining to Magic and Ultra.

BROWN, GEORGE S. (1918-78)

Meilinger, Phillip S. “**Historiographical Essay: U.S. Air Force Leaders: A Biographical Tour.**” Vol.62, No.4 (October, 1998), pp.833-870.

BRYAN, WILLIAM JENNINGS (1860-1925)

Peifer, Douglas, “**The Sinking of the *Lusitania*, Wilson’s Response, and Paths Not Taken: Historical Revisionism, the Nye Committee, and the Ghost of William Jennings Bryan.**” Vol.79, No.4 (October, 2015), pp.1025-1045. Assesses the way that the impact of the revisionist literature of the interwar period on the Neutrality Acts of the mid-1930s demonstrates how ‘history’s lessons’ without context can mislead rather than inform.

BUDGETS, DEFENSE

Cronin, Stephanie, “**Building and Rebuilding Afghanistan’s Army: An Historical Perspective.**” Vol.75, No.1 (January, 2011), pp.45-91. The repeated failure of the efforts of successive Afghan governments, from the nineteenth-century to the present, to create a modern regular army.

BUDGETS, DEFENSE: EARLY MODERN PERIOD (1480-1789)

Rommelse, Gijs and Downing, Roger, **“Victims of an Ideological Rift? Dutch Prisoners of War during the First Anglo-Dutch War (1652-1654).”** Vol.80, No.3 (July, 2016), pp.649-669. Rather than ideology, the author shows that it was a combination of logistical problems and a lack of funds that produced the dire conditions experienced by Dutch P.O.W.s.

Staiano-Daniels, Lucian E. **“Determining Early Modern Army Strength: The Case of Electoral Saxony.”** Vol.83, No.4 (October, 2019), pp.1001-1020. Questions the issues of the ‘Military Revolution’ thesis that larger armies both reflected a revolution in warfare and forced states to adopt more efficient means of raising revenue by examining the experience of Saxony during the Thirty Years War (1618-1648).

Nath, Pratyay, **“Looking beyond the Military Revolution: Variations in Early Modern Warfare and the Mughal Case.”** Vol.86, No.1 (January, 2022), pp.9-31. Argues that the heterogeneous nature of Mughal strategy, tactics, and the deployment of technology over time and across space was due to a wide range of factors, including environmental conditions, military pragmatism, financial considerations, and distance from the imperial heartland, challenging the simplistic early modern ‘Military Revolution’ thesis.

BUDGETS, DEFENSE: 19th CENTURY

Dunn, John, **“Egypt’s Nineteenth-Century Armaments Industry.”** Vol.61, No.2 (April, 1997), pp.231-254. Explains that the efforts of Muhammad Ali Pasha (1769-1849) and Khedive Ismail to establish a modern arms industry in Egypt was doomed in part due to haphazard implementation and inadequate funding, but, in a broader context, failure sprang from an unwillingness and / or inability to impose major political, cultural, and social changes.

Epkenhans, Michael, **“Krupp and the Imperial German Navy, 1898-1914: A Reassessment.”** Vol.64, No.2 (April, 2000), pp.335-369.

Sumida, Jon Tetsuro, **“Review Essay: Gunnery, Procurement, and Strategy in the *Dreadnought* Era.”** Vol.69, No.4 (October, 2005), pp.1179-1187.

Watson, Samuel, **“Trusting to ‘the Chapter of Accidents’: Contingency, Necessity, and Self-Constraint in Jeffersonian National Security Policy.”** Vol.76, No.4 (October, 2012), pp.973-1000. Ascertains how the U.S. war effort was crippled by the antipathy of the Democratic-Republican Party of Thomas Jefferson (1743-1826) towards taxation, debt, a standing army, federal aid to infrastructure, and a national bank

BUDGETS, DEFENSE arranged alphabetically by country - ENGLAND / GREAT BRITAIN

Westphal, Raymond W., Jr. **“Postwar Planning: Parliamentary Politics and the Royal Navy,**

1919-22.” Vol.74, No.1 (January, 2010), pp.145-171. Delves into the conflict between governments that viewed cuts in the military budget as a means of achieving economic recovery versus the Royal Navy’s goal of achieving parity with their U.S. counterpart while fulfilling its mission of two-ocean imperial defense.

Bell, Christopher M. **“Winston Churchill and the Ten Year Rule.”** Vol.74, No.4 (October, 2010), pp.1097-1128. Insists that criticisms of Churchill’s defense spending cutbacks during his tenure as Chancellor of the Exchequer (1924-29) exaggerate his authority and oversimplify his complex and shifting combination of political, financial, strategic, and bureaucratic goals.

Neilson, Keith, **“The Royal Navy, Japan, and British Strategic Foreign Policy, 1932-1934.”** Vol.75, No.2 (April, 2011), pp.505-531. Japan’s challenge to British interests affected British policy generally, and particularly Anglo-American relations, producing conflicting proposals from the Treasury, the Admiralty, and the Foreign Offices.

BUDGETS, DEFENSE arranged alphabetically by country – HUNGARY

Szabó, Miklós, **“The Development of the Hungarian Aircraft Industry, 1938-1944.”** Vol.65, No.1 (January, 2001), pp.53-76.

BUDGET, DEFENSE arranged alphabetically by country – U.S.A.

Ferrell, Henry C., Jr. **“Guns for Vermont: Military Land Acquisition in the 1920s.”** Vol.61, No.1 (January, 1997), pp.31-47. Presents the remarkable achievement of Vermont Senator, Frank Lester Greene (1870-1930), of arranging for the purchase of additional land for Fort Ethan Allen at a time of severely constrained defense budgets.

Hawkins, John M. **“The Costs of Artillery: Eliminating Harassment and Interdiction Fire During the Vietnam War.”** Vol.70, No.1 (January, 2006), pp.91-122. Determines that the reason that the use of U.S. artillery for harassment and interdiction had been all but eliminated by June, 1970, was due to budgetary pressures and not from concerns over collateral damage.

Donnelly, William M. **“ ‘The Best Army that can be put in the Field in the Circumstances’: The U.S. Army, July 1951 – July 1953.”** Vol.71, No.3 (July, 2007), pp.809-847. Reckons with the difficulties faced by career soldiers during the Korean War due to limited national mobilization and the cuts to the Army’s budget by President Harry S. Truman (1945-1953).

Atkinson, Rick, **“The 2016 George C. Marshall Lecture in Military History: Projecting American Power in the Second World War.”** Vol.80, No.2 (April, 2016), pp.345-354. In spite of devoting a smaller proportion of the country’s gross domestic product to the war than any other major belligerent, the United States demonstrated logistical brilliance, firepower, mobility, mechanical aptitude, and an economic preponderance that outproduced the Axis powers.

BUFFALO SOLDIERS – See: ETHNIC AND RACIAL ISSUES

BULGARIA

Delis, Panagiotis, **“The Treatment of Prisoners of War Captured by the Greek Army during the Balkans Wars of 1912-13.”** Vol.82, No.4 (October, 2018), pp.1123-1147. Due to a combination of the inability of the Greeks to pay for the care of Bulgarian and Ottoman P.O.W.s and negative stereotypes held about the same, the laws concerning the treatment of prisoners established by international conventions in 1899 and 1907 were not honored by the Greek Army.

Stoyanov, Aleksandar, **“The Size of Bulgaria’s Medieval Field Armies: A Case Study of Military Mobilization Capacity in the Middle Ages.”** Vol.83, No.3 (July, 2019), pp.719-746. Broadens the scope of time and sources to ascertain estimates of the actual size of Bulgarian field Armies from the First Bulgarian Empire (681-1018) to the Second Bulgarian Empire (1185-1422).

Larnach, Matthew, **“The Battle of the Gates of Trajan, 986: A Reassessment.”** Vol.84, No.1 (January, 2020), pp.9-34. An investigation of the destruction of Emperor Basil II’s (r.976-1025) Byzantine army by the Bulgarians that incorporates the issue of logistics and an examination of terrain to ascertain the reasons for victory and defeat.

BURCHETT, WILFRED (1911-83)

Casey, Steven, **“Wilfred Burchett and the United Nations Command’s Media Relations during the Korean War, 1951-1952.”** Vol.74, No.3 (July, 2010), pp.821-845. Assesses the Australian journalist, Wilfred Burchett’s (1911-1983), observations concerning the U.S. Army’s relations with the media during the Korean armistice negotiations.

BUSH, GEORGE W. (b.1946)

Esdaile, Charles, **“Spain 1808 – Iraq 2003: Some Thoughts on the Use and Abuse of History.”** Vol.74, No.1 (January, 2010), pp.173-188. Disputes comparisons of Napoleon’s intervention in Spain, George Bush’s (r.2001-2009) intervention in Iraq, and the subsequent counterinsurgency campaigns, arguing that they are based on false notions about the war in Spain.

BYZANTINE EMPIRE – See: ANCIENT PERIOD: LATE ANTIQUITY; MEDIEVAL PERIOD

C

CAESAR, JULIUS (100-44 B.C.E.)

Bradley, Carl Meredith, “**The British War Chariot: A Case for Indirect Warfare.**” Vol.73, No.4 (October, 2009), pp.1073-1089. Weighs the capabilities of the Celtic tribes who fielded sturdy and fast two-horse chariots against Julius Caesar’s (100-44 B.C.E.) two landings in Britannia in 55-54 B.C.E. and the means used to sustain their resources and gauge their capabilities.

CAMBODIA

Spector, Ronald H. “**After Hiroshima: Allied Military Occupations and the Fate of Japan’s Empire, 1945-1947.**” Vol.69, No.4 (October, 2005), pp.1121-1136. The Allies confronted problems far beyond the disarming of Japanese troops in occupied China, Korea, and Southeast Asia, where internal conflicts rendered the plans of the Allied powers irrelevant.

Pribbenow, Merle L., II, “**A Tale of Five Generals: Vietnam’s Invasion of Cambodia.**” Vol.70, No.2 (April, 2006), pp.459-486. Concerned the meticulously planned and well executed 1978-79 invasion of neighboring Cambodia by the Communist forces of the newly united Vietnam, which included both an amphibious assault and combined arms mechanized columns.

CAMPBELL, GERALD (1879-1964)

Fedorowich, Kent, “**‘Caught in the Crossfire’: Sir Gerald Campbell, Lord Beaverbrook and the Near Demise of the British Commonwealth Air Training Plan, May-October 1940.**” Vol.79, No.1 (January, 2015), pp.37-68. The program was threatened by intemperate remarks by Lord Beaverbrook (1879-1964) which rattled Anglo-Canadian relations.

CANADA

Vandervort, Bruce, “**Review Essay: Remembering the Empire of France in America.**” Vol.74, No.1 (January, 2010), pp.195-199.

Sarty, Roger, “**The American Origins of Academic Military History in Canada: Princeton University, the Carnegie Endowment, and C.P. Stacey’s *Canada and the British Army.***”

Vol.82, No.2 (April, 2018), pp.439-460.

CANADA: U.S. REVOLUTIONARY WAR (1775-83)

Mayer, Holly A. **“Canada, Congress, and the Continental Army: Strategic Accommodations, 1774-1776.”** Vol.78, No.2 (April, 2014), pp.503-535. Discusses the challenge of reconciling the Continental Congress’ policy of encouraging the enlistment of French Catholics in Canada with anti-Catholic bigotry among the members of the Continental Army.

Soucier, Daniel S. **“ ‘Where there was no Signs of any Human Being’: Navigating the Eastern Country Wilderness on Arnold’s March to Quebec, 1775.”** Vol.81, No.2 (April, 2017), pp.369-393. Looks at soldiers’ attitudes towards and interaction with the natural environment.

CANADA: WAR OF 1812 (1812-15)

Black, Jeremy, **“The North American Theater of the Napoleonic Wars, or, as it is sometimes Called, the War of 1812.”** Vol.76, No.4 (October, 2012), pp.1053-1066. The challenge for Great Britain was to balance the demands of different naval commitments.

Graves, Donald E. **“Why the White House was Burned: An Investigation into the British Destruction of Public Buildings at Washington in August 1814.”** Vol.76, No.4 (October, 2012), pp.1095-1127. Encrusted with mythology by nineteenth century historians motivated by national chauvinism, the article considers whether the actions of the British forces were justified by the contemporary laws of war and / or as retaliation for the U.S. destruction of Canadian towns.

Jensen, Richard, **“Military History on the Electronic Frontier: Wikipedia Fights the War of 1812.”** Vol.76, No.4 (October, 2012), pp.1165-1182.

Grodzinski, John R. **“Review Essay: Opening Shots from the Bicentenary of the War of 1812: A Canadian Perspective on Recent Titles.”** Vol.76, No.4 (October, 2012), pp.1187-1201.

Dudley, William S. **“Review Essay: War of 1812 Trilogy.”** Vol.78, No.2 (April, 2014), pp.747-751. Three works by the noted Canadian military historian, Donald E. Graves, on the Battles of the War of 1812 fought during the years 1813 to 1814.

Compeau, Timothy, **“The Royal Navy’s *Psyche* on Lake Ontario: A British Experiment with Prefabricated Warships in the War of 1812.”** Vol.86, No.2 (April, 2022), pp.321-343. Narrates the British effort to transport four pre-fabricated vessels to Lake Ontario, of which only one, the 56-gun frigate H.M.S. *Psyche*, reached its destination.

CANADA: WORLD WAR I (1914-18)

Cook, Tim, **“Creating the Faith: The Canadian Gas Services in the First World War.”** Vol.62, No.4 (October, 1998), pp.755-786. The Canadian forces developed a very efficient organization to instruct their troops in how to protect themselves from Chemical weapons.

Cook, Tim, **“The Politics of Surrender: Canadian Soldiers and the Killing of Prisoners in the Great War.”** Vol.70, No.3 (July, 2006), pp.637-665.

Cook, Tim, **“Grave Beliefs: Stories of the Supernatural and the Uncanny among Canada’s Great War Trench Soldiers.”** Vol.77, No.2 (April, 2013), pp.521-542.

Delaney, Douglas E. **“Mentoring the Canadian Corps: Imperial Officers and the Canadian Expeditionary Force, 1914-1918.”** Vol.77, No.3 (July, 2013), pp.931-953.

CANADA: INTERWAR PERIOD (1919-39)

Kellner, Katrina E. and Perras, Galen Roger, **“ ‘A Perfectly Logical and Sensible Thing’: Billy Mitchell Advocates a Canadian-American Aerial Alliance Against Japan.”** Vol.72, No.3 (July, 2008), pp.785-823. As a result of his overlooked trip to Canada in 1923, Brigadier General Billy Mitchell (1879-1936) formulated a plan for employing an allied U.S.-Canadian strategic bombing force based in Alaska to wage war on Japan.

CANADA: WORLD WAR II (1939-45)

Vance, Jonathan F. **“Men in Manacles: The Shackling of Prisoners of War, 1942-1943.”** Vol.59, No.3 (July, 1995), pp.483-504. Appraises the wartime relationship of the Dominion nations with Great Britain as reflected in the success of Canadian Prime Minister Mackenzie King’s (1874-1950) government in convincing Churchill (1874-1965) to abandon the retaliatory shackling of German P.O.W.s.

Dickson, Paul D. **“The Politics of Army Expansion: General H.D.G. Crerar and the Creation of the First Canadian Army, 1940-41.”** Vol.60, No.2 (April, 1996), pp.271-298. Explains that General Henry Duncan Graham Crerar’s (1888-1965) success in winning approval for raising and deploying a Field Army represented an aberration in the balance of Canadian civil-military relations and illustrates aspects of Canadian military and its impact on the war.

Rawling, William, **“The Challenge of Modernization: The Royal Canadian Navy and Antisubmarine Weapons, 1944-1945.”** Vol.63, No.2 (April, 1999), pp.355-378.

Whitby, Michael J. **“Matelots, Martinets, and Mutineers: The Mutiny in H.M.C.S. *Iroquois*, 19 July 1943.”** Vol.65, No.1 (January, 2001), pp.77-103. The author identifies the substantial expansion of the Royal Canadian Navy, bringing together inexperienced officers with

inexperienced crews, as the cause of the Destroyer *Iroquois*.

Perrun, Jody, **“Best-Laid Plans: Guy Simonds and Operation Totalize, 7-10 August 1944.”**

Vol.67, No.1 (January, 2003), pp.137-173. Probes the role of airpower in Operation Totalize, which, the author claims, calls for a reassessment of Lieutenant General Simonds (1903-1974) leadership of the II Canadian Corps.

Milner, Marc, **“Stopping the Panzers: Reassessing the Role of 3rd Canadian Infantry Division in Normandy, 7-10 June, 1944.”** Vol.74, No.2 (April, 2010), pp.491-522. Reveals that the 3rd

Canadian Infantry Division’s beachhead battles of 7-10 June against the 12th Hitler Youth Panzer Division are fundamentally misunderstood as failed breakout attempts when, in fact, they were successful defensive operations.

Macri, Franco David, **“‘C’ Force to Hong Kong: The Price of Collective Security in China, 1941.”** Vol.77, No.1 (January, 2013), pp.141-171. Concerning the strategic and political

influences on the deployment of two Canadian infantry battalions to Hong Kong in November, 1941.

Souchen, Alex, **“The Culture of Morale: Battalion Newspapers in the 3rd Canadian Infantry Division, June-August 1944.”** Vol.77, No.2 (April, 2013), pp.543-567.

D’Amours, Caroline, **“Canadian Military Culture and Tactical Training, 1940-1944: The Making of Infantry Junior N.C.O.s.”** Vol.82, No.4 (October, 2018), pp.1175-1198.

CANADA: THE COLD WAR (1945-91)

Campbell, Isabel, **“A Tale of Submarine Sightings and a Golden Goose: American-British-**

Canadian Intelligence Sharing in the Early Cold War.” Vol.85, No.4 (October, 2021), pp.980-1003. The consequences of efforts to establish trilateral intelligence of the sighting of Soviet submarines in the Davis Strait in 1946.

CANADA: KOREAN WAR (1950-53)

Grey, Jeffrey, **“The Formation of the Commonwealth Division, 1950-1951.”** Vol.81, No.4

(October, 2017), pp.1097-1107. The saga of the military and political challenges of forming a division composed of units from the Australian, British, Canadian, Indian, and New Zealand armies.

CANTEENS – See: DISCIPLINE AND MORALE

CARIBBEAN

See Also: CUBA; DOMINICAN REPUBLIC; HAITI; PUERTO RICO

Robertson, Claire, “**Racism, the Military, and Abolitionism in the Late Eighteenth- and Early Nineteenth-Century Caribbean.**” Vol.77, No.2 (April, 2013), pp.433-461. Examines Governor of Guadeloupe, Victor Hugues (1762-1826), General Sir John Moore (1761-1809), Captain Thomas Southey, and Sir John Jeremie (1795-1841) and the impact of racism on the differences between the British and French conduct of warfare in the Caribbean.

CARTOGRAPHY, MILITARY – See: ENGINEERING

CASUALTIES: FRENCH REVOLUTIONARY AND NAPOLEONIC WARS (1792-1815)

Campos, Jorge Planas and De Blas, Antonio Grjal, “**French and Allied Officer Casualties in the Peninsular War (1808-1814): A New Examination.**” Vol.85, No.4 (October, 2021), pp.889-905.

CASUALTIES: U.S. CIVIL WAR (1861-65)

Faust, Drew Gilpin, “**The 2006 George C. Marshall Lecture in Military History: ‘Numbers on Top of Numbers’: Counting the Civil War Dead.**” Vol.70, No.4 (October, 2006), pp.995-1009. The scale and destructiveness of the United States Civil War generated the assumption that the government had an obligation to accurately name and count the military dead.

CASUALTIES: WORLD WAR I (1914-18)

Celik, Birten and Travers, Tim, “**‘Not One of Them Ever came Back’: What Happened to the 1/5 Norfolk Battalion on 12 August 1915 at Gallipoli?**” Vol.66, No.2 (April, 2002), pp.389-406.

McRandle, James and Quirk, James, “**The Blood Test Revisited: A New Look at German Casualty Counts in World War I.**” Vol.70, No.3 (July, 2006), pp.667-701. Tests Winston Churchill’s (1874-1965) claim that the Allies generally suffered higher casualties in battle on the Western Front than their German opponents by examining the German Medical Corps’ official history.

CASUALTIES: AIR WARFARE: STRATEGIC BOMBING

Meilinger, Phillip S. “**A History of Effects-Based Air Operations.**” Vol.71, No.1 (January, 2007), pp.139-167. Surveys the problem of measuring the effectiveness of Air Operations due to the ready availability of metrics such as casualty numbers, bomb tonnage, and the number of sorties

flown versus the lack of the intelligence apparatus with which to analyze the complex economic system of one's opponents.

CASUALTIES: WORLD WAR II (1939-45)

Giangreco, D.M. **"Casualty Projections for the U.S. Invasion of Japan, 1945-1946: Planning and Policy Implications."** Vol.61, No.3 (July, 1997), pp.521-581. Demonstrates that those historians who have rejected President Harry Truman's (1945-1953) claim that he expected huge losses from an invasion of the Japanese Home Islands have based their conclusions on a combination of superficial research in the mass of related documents and specifically misinterpreting planning documents.

CASUALTIES: KOREAN WAR (1950-53): U.S.A.

Coleman, Bradley Lynn, **"Recovering the Korean War Dead, 1950-1958: Graves Registration, Forensic Anthropology, and Wartime Memorialization."** Vol.72, No.1 (January, 2008), pp.179-222. The Graves Registration Service, U.S. Quartermaster Corps, developed an innovative system during the Korean War in which the dead were recovered and repatriated to the United States during major combat operations.

CATHERINE THE GREAT (1729-96)

Davies, Brian, **"The Russian Baltic Fleet in the Seven Years' War."** Vol.86, No.3 (July, 2022), pp.557-572. Charts the rise and fall and rise again of the Russian Baltic Fleet, from the reign of Peter 'the Great' (r.1682-1725) to that of Catherine 'the Great' (r.1762-1796).

CAVALRY: ANCIENT PERIOD (to 476)

Hanson, Victor Davis, **"Historiographical Essay: The Status of Ancient Military History: Traditional Work, Recent Research, and On-Going Controversies."** Vol.63, No.2 (April, 1999), pp.379-413. A very thorough survey covering works on every conceivable topic concerning the armed forces and conduct of warfare in the age of ancient Greece and Rome.

May, Timothy, **"The Training of an Inner Asian Nomad Army in the Pre-Modern Period."** Vol.70, No.3 (July, 2006), pp.617-635. Confirms that nomadic 'horse people', such as the Mongols, employed more sophisticated training for war than had previously been imagined.

Sears, Matthew A. and Willekes, Carolyn, **"Alexander's Cavalry Charge at Chaeronea, 338 B.C.E."** Vol.80, No.4 (October, 2016), pp.1017-1035. Confronts the controversy surrounding whether or not the eighteen year old Alexander the Great (356-322 B.C.E.)

actually led a cavalry charge that contributed to the defeat of the forces of the Greek coalition.

CAVALRY: MEDIEVAL PERIOD (476-1480)

May, Timothy, **“The Training of an Inner Asian Nomad Army in the Pre-Modern Period.”** Vol.70, No.3 (July, 2006), pp.617-635. Confirms that nomadic ‘horse people’, such as the Mongols, employed more sophisticated training for war than had previously been imagined.

CAVALRY: EARLY MODERN PERIOD (1480-1789)

Robinson, Gavin, **“Equine Battering Rams? A Reassessment of Cavalry Charge in the English Civil War.”** Vol.75, No.3 (July, 2011), pp.719-731. Challenges the traditional notion that shock cavalry tactics imported from Sweden had replaced the caracole during the English Civil War and, in particular, contemplates the mechanics of cavalry shock tactics.

Herrera, Ricardo A. **“ ‘[T]he zealous activity of Capt. Lee’: Light-Horse Harry Lee and *Petite Guerre*.”** Vol.79, No.1 (January, 2015), pp.9-36. Captain ‘Light Horse Harry’ Lee’s (1756-1818) foraging mission in Delaware and Maryland, during February and March, 1778, as an example of command at the company level.

CAVALRY: 19th CENTURY

Dwyer, Christopher S. **“Raiding Strategy: As Applied by the Western Confederate Cavalry in the American Civil War.”** Vol.63, No.2 (April, 1999), pp.263-281. Offers the explanation that the failure of the Confederate Cavalry in the Western Theater was not due to any lack of success in the raids that were conducted, but to the misuse made of these raids in the overall strategy of Confederate theater commanders.

Badsey, Stephen, **“The Boer War (1899-1902) and British Cavalry Doctrine: A Re-Evaluation.”** Vol.71, No.1 (January, 2007), pp.75-97. Rejecting the traditional interpretation, the article proposes that a cavalry reform movement incorporating dismounted tactics pre-dated the Second Anglo-Boer War, a mixture of mounted and dismounted tactics were used by both sides in the conflict, and that the problems experienced by cavalry were largely not of their own making

McGinnis, Anthony R. **“When Courage was not Enough: Plains Indians at War with the United States Army.”** Vol.76, No.2 (April, 2012), pp.454-473. Considers why the Native American tribes of the Great Plains continued to rely on their own specific style of limited warfare in the face of the U.S. Army newcomers when this style of warfare was unable to achieve any permanent success against the ‘Blue Coats’.

Rafuse, Ethan S. **“ ‘Little Phil’, a ‘Bad Old Man’, and the ‘Gray Ghost’: Hybrid Warfare and the Fight for the Shenandoah Valley, August-November 1864.”** Vol.81, No.3 (July,

2017), pp.775-801. Uses Major General Philip Sheridan's (1831-1888) successful campaign against the combination of Confederate regular and irregular forces as a case study of addressing the challenges of hybrid warfare.

CAVALRY: 20th CENTURY

Phillips, Gervase, **"Scapegoat Arm: Twentieth-Century Cavalry in Anglophone**

Historiography." Vol.71, No.1 (January, 2007), pp.37-74. Too often used as a scapegoat for failures in war and an obstacle to modernization in peacetime, this article reassesses the capabilities of early twentieth-century soldiers, with a consideration of the military history of Eastern Europe, presenting a more positive interpretation of role of cavalry in modern warfare.

Bielakowski, Alexander M. **"General Hawkins' War: The Future of the Horse in the U.S.**

Cavalry." Vol.71, No.1 (January, 2007), pp.127-138. Provides an account of the career of Brigadier General Hamilton S. Hawkins III (1872-1950), who, despite the increasing significance of mechanized forces, steadfastly advocated for horse cavalry throughout the interwar period and into the Second World War.

CAVALRY: WORLD WAR I (1914-18)

Gardner, Nikolas, **"Command and Control in the 'Great Retreat of 1914: The Disintegration**

of the British Cavalry Division." Vol.63, No.1 (January, 1999), pp.29-54. Suggests that the lack of experience in operating as a division, the division's unwieldy size, the inefficiency of its commander and staff, and the independent mindset of its brigade commanders prevented it from operating effectively.

Bou, Jean, **"Cavalry, Firepower, and Swords: The Australian Light Horse and the Tactical**

Lessons of Cavalry Operations in Palestine, 1916-1918." Vol.71, No.1 (January, 2007), pp.99-125. Contrary to the traditions of the Australian mounted service, by the end of the Campaign in Palestine more than half of the Australian Light Horse were armed with both rifles and swords, relying on both fire and modern shock tactics.

CAVALRY: INTERWAR PERIOD (1919-39)

Czarnecki, Jacek, **"The Rebirth and Progress of the Polish Military during the Interwar**

Years." Vol.83, No.3 (July, 2019), pp.747-768. Challenges the notion that the Polish Army's cavalry reflected a failure of modernization, enshrined in the myth of Polish lancers charging Panzers in 1939.

CELTIC CIVILIZATION – See: ANCIENT PERIOD: ROMAN CIVILIZATION

**CENTRAL AMERICA – See: COSTA RICO; GUATEMALA; NICARAGUA; PANAMA;
EL SALVADOR**

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (C.I.A.) – See: DECEPTION AND INTELLIGENCE

THE CHACO WAR (1932-35)

Hughes, Matthew, “**Logistics and the Chaco War: Bolivia versus Paraguay, 1932-1935.**”

Vol.69, No.2 (April, 2005), pp.411-437. Employs a broad definition of logistics that includes the acquisition of matériel before the outbreak of war, as well as the establishment of national and international supply lines during the war.

CHANDRAGUPTA MAURYA (c.317-293 B.C.E.)

Boesche, Roger, “**Kautilya’s *Arthaśāstra* on War and Diplomacy in Ancient India.**” Vol.67, No.1

(January, 2003), pp.9-37. Kautilya is believed to have been an adviser to the founder of the Mauryan Empire, Chandragupta (c.317-293 B.C.E.).

CHAPLAINS – See: RELIGION

CHARIOTS – See: ANCIENT PERIOD

CHARLEMAGNE (747-814)

Bachrach, Bernard, “**Charlemagne and the Carolingian General Staff.**” Vol.66, No.2 (April, 2002),

pp.313-357. Contends that the personnel and procedures relied upon by Emperor Charlemagne (747-814) for intelligence and planning fulfill the qualifications for a modern general staff.

CHEMICAL WEAPONS – See: WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION

CHENNAULT, CLAIRE (1890-1958)

Meilinger, Phillip S. **“Historiographical Essay: U.S. Air Force Leaders: A Biographical Tour.”**
Vol.62, No.4 (October, 1998), pp.833-870.

CHEROKEES – See: NATIVE AMERICAN CONFLICTS

CHIANG KAI-SHEK / JIANG JIESHI (1887-1975)

Worthing, Peter, **“The Road through Whampoa: The Early Career of He Yingqin.”** Vol.69, No.4 (October, 2005), pp.953-985. Determines that He Yingqin (1890-1987) owed his repeated promotions to his good working relationship with Jiang Jieshi (Chiang Kai-shek, 1887-1975), a relationship that was based on shared experiences and values.

CHILE

Jamison, Thomas M. **“The War of the Pacific, Technology and U.S. Naval Development: An International History of a Regional War.”** Vol.82, No.4 (October, 2018), pp.1093-1122. The observations by foreign nations of the war between Chile and a coalition of Bolivia and Peru, 1879-1884, influenced naval developments around the globe, including contributing to the U.S. building of the ‘New Navy’ in the 1890s.

CHINA

See Also: HONG KONG; MONGOLS

Jackson, Aaron P. **“Review Essay: Expanding the Scope and Accessibility of Non-Western Military History.”** Vol.75, No.2 (April, 2011), pp.603-613. Covering works on China, India, and Russia.

Paine, Sarah C.M. **“The 2022 George C. Marshall Lecture in Military History: Centuries of Security: Chinese, Russian and U.S. Continental versus Maritime Approaches.”** Vol.86, No.4 (October, 2022), pp.813-836.

CHINA: HAN DYNASTY (202 B.C.E. – 220 C.E.)

Dreyer, Edward L. **“Zhao Chongguo: A Professional Soldier of the Former Han Dynasty.”** Vol.72, No.3 (July, 2008), pp.665-725. Claims that the Former Han Dynasty general, Zhao Chongguo (137-52 B.C.E.) best known innovation, *tuntian* (military farms), was intended to deny the enemy land for grazing and growing crops, rather than as a means of providing food for troops involved

in distant campaigns.

CHINA: MING DYNASTY (1368-1644)

Swope, Kenneth M. “**Manifesting Awe: Grand Strategy and Imperial Leadership in the Ming Dynasty.**” Vol.79, No.3 (July, 2015), pp.597-634. Affirms the development and use of an overarching grand strategy by the Ming Dynasty (1368-1644) and considers its relationship with the actual policy decisions and military operations of the dynasty’s Emperors.

CHINA: QING DYNASTY (1636-1912)

McMahon, Daniel, “**Geomancy and Walled Fortifications in Late Eighteenth Century China.**” Vol.76, No.2 (April, 2012), pp.373-393. Takes account of the role of geomancy based on *fengshui* in military planning and activity during the Qing Dynasty, including intelligence gathering, sabotage, and fortifications.

Otte, T.G. “**From *Can-Can Diabolique* to *Sitzkrieg*: The International China Expeditionary Force, 1900-1901.**” Vol.77, No.4 (October, 2013), pp.1277-1302. Analyzes a neglected example of coalition warfare.

CHINA: 20th CENTURY

Worthing, Peter, “**The Road through Whampoa: The Early Career of He Yingqin.**” Vol.69, No.4 (October, 2005), pp.953-985. Determines that He Yingqin (1890-1987) owed his repeated promotions to his good working relationship with Jiang Jieshi (Chiang Kai-shek, 1887-1975), a relationship that was based on shared experiences and values.

Sacca, John Wanda, “**Like Strangers in a Foreign Land: Chinese Officers Prepared at American Military Colleges, 1904-37.**” Vol.70, No.3 (July, 2006), pp.703-742. Relates how those Chinese officers who received military education in the United States during the turbulent period marked by the end of the Qing Dynasty and the establishment of the Republic were tainted by their foreign education and hampered by their lack of membership in any alumni associations.

CHINA: WORLD WAR I (1914-18)

Xu Guoqi, “**The Great War and China’s Military Expedition Plan.**” Vol.72, No.1 (January, 2008), pp.105-140. The article seeks to understand why China tried so hard to participate in the war, why China’s plans to raise an expeditionary force went unfulfilled, and what role China played in the First World War.

CHINA: INTERWAR PERIOD (1919-39)

Bell, Christopher M. “**‘Our Most Exposed Outpost’: Hong Kong and British Far Eastern Strategy, 1921-1941.**” Vol.60, No.1 (January, 1996), pp.61-88. Brings to light the vital, if overlooked role of Hong Kong as a base for offensive operations in British interwar plans for a war with Japan has been.

Worthing, Peter, “**Continuity and Change: Chinese Nationalist Army Tactics, 1925-1938.**” Vol.78, No.3 (July, 2014), pp.995-1016.

Henriot, Christian, “**The Battle of Shanghai (January-March 1932): A Study in the Space-Time of War.**” Vol.85, No.1 (January, 2021), pp.76-94. Focuses on the impact of urban and rural environments on the manner in which the Imperial Japanese and Nationalist Chinese forces fought one another.

Xiaogang Lai, Sherman, “**‘The Devil is in the Details’: Mao Zedong before and after the Luochuan Conference, August 1937.**” Vol.85, No.4 (October, 2021), pp.930-953. Relates how Mao Zedong (1893-1976) succeeded in convincing both the Chinese Communist Party and Joseph Stalin (1878-1953) to adopt his strategy of guerrilla warfare.

CHINA: 2nd SINO-JAPANESE WAR (1937-45)

Gordon, David M. “**Historiographical Essay: The China-Japan War, 1931-1945.**” Vol.70, No.1 (January, 2006), pp.137-182.

Lim, Preston Jordan, “**Churchill’s Butchers: Mission 204’s Operations in China, 1942-1945.**” Vol.84, No.4 (October, 2020), pp.1127-1156. Whereas previous studies have focused on the mission’s record in 1942, the author examines the entire length of service of this combined British-Australian commando unit tasked with training Nationalist guerrillas, suggesting that it was more successful than previously thought.

CHINA: THE COLD WAR (1945-91)

Spector, Ronald H. “**After Hiroshima: Allied Military Occupations and the Fate of Japan’s Empire, 1945-1947.**” Vol.69, No.4 (October, 2005), pp.1121-1136. The Allies confronted problems far beyond the disarming of Japanese troops in occupied China, Korea, and Southeast Asia, where internal conflicts rendered the plans of the Allied powers irrelevant.

Jeans, Roger B., Jr. “**Ghost Guerrillas: The C.I.A. and ‘Tiger General’ Li Zongren’s Third Force during the Early Cold War.**” Vol.81, No.2 (April, 2017), pp.491-512. The attempt by the C.I.A. to develop an anti-Communist faction as an alternative to Chiang Kai-Shek’s (1887-1975) Nationalists and the broader impact of this approach on the C.I.A.

Xiaoming Zhang, **“High-Altitude Duel: The C.I.A.’s U-2 Spy Plane Overflights and China’s Air Defense Force, 1961-1968.”** Vol.86, No.1 (January, 2022), pp.132-159. Charts the overflights of the People’s Republic of China during the 1960s by Chinese Nationalist pilots operating out of Taiwan with the goal of monitoring the P.R.C.’s nuclear weapons program.

CHINA: CIVIL WAR (1946-49)

May, Ernest R. **“The George C. Marshall Lecture in Military History: 1947-48: When Marshall kept the U.S. Out of War in China.”** Vol.66, No.4 (October, 2002), pp.1001-1010.

Tanner, Harold M. **“Guerrilla, Mobile, and Base Warfare in Communist Military Operations in Manchuria, 1945-1947.”** Vol.67, No.4 (October, 2003), pp.1177-1222. Relates how, after initial setbacks while relying on a conventional war strategy, the Communists developed a hybrid strategy that turned the tide of the Civil War, enabling them to make a more successful transition from guerrilla to conventional warfare.

Reist, Katherine K. **“The American Military Advisory Missions to China, 1945-1949.”** Vol.77, No.4 (October, 2013), pp.1379-1398. Provides an account of the difficulties between the Joint U.S. Military Advisory Group and *Guomindang* leaders.

CHINA: KOREAN WAR (1950-53)

Millett, Allan R. **“A Reader’s Guide to the Korean War.”** Vol.61, No.3 (July, 1997), pp.583-597.

Xiaoming Zhang, **“China and the Air War in Korea, 1950-1953.”** Vol.62, No.2 (April, 1998), pp.335-370. Looks at the development of the People’s Republic of China’s Air Force during the war, the role played by the Soviet Union, and the emergence of an air warfare strategy.

MacKenzie, S.P. **“Progressives and Reactionaries among British Prisoners of War at Pyoktong and Chongson, North Korea, 1951-1953.”** Vol.77, No.1 (January, 2013), pp.203-228. From the Chinese perspective, why were the British P.O.W.s at Chongson (Camp 1) more troublesome than those at Pyoktong (Camp 5).

CHINA: VIETNAM WAR (2nd Indochina War) (1955-75)

Xiaoming Zhang, **“The Vietnam War, 1964-1969: A Chinese Perspective.”** Vol.60, No.4 (October, 1996), pp.731-762. Recounts how the People’s Republic of China supported Hanoi’s drive to unify Vietnam, assessing the extent to which there was a potential for direct Chinese military intervention.

Xiaoming Zhang, **“China’s Involvement in Laos during the Vietnam War, 1963-1975.”** Vol.66, No.4 (October, 2002), pp.1141-1166. Shows that the competition between Hanoi and Beijing

for control over the Laotian Communists reflected an underlying mistrust between the two governments.

CHURCHILL, JOHN (1650-1722)

Ostwald, Jamel, **“The ‘Decisive’ Battle of Ramillies, 1706: Prerequisites for Decisiveness in Early Modern Warfare.”** Vol.64, No.3 (July, 2000), pp.649-677. Asks whether eighteenth century military strategy was indecisive by choice rather than by necessity by looking at the 1st Duke of Marlborough, John Churchill’s (1650-1722), Ramillies campaign.

CHURCHILL, WINSTON (1874-1965)

Vance, Jonathan F. **“Men in Manacles: The Shackling of Prisoners of War, 1942-1943.”** Vol.59, No.3 (July, 1995), pp.483-504. Appraises the wartime relationship of the Dominion nations with Great Britain as reflected in the success of Canadian Prime Minister Mackenzie King’s (1874-1950) government in convincing Churchill (1874-1965) to abandon the retaliatory shackling of German P.O.W.s.

McRandle, James and Quirk, James, **“The Blood Test Revisited: A New Look at German Casualty Counts in World War I.”** Vol.70, No.3 (July, 2006), pp.667-701. Tests Winston Churchill’s (1874-1965) claim that the Allies generally suffered higher casualties in battle on the Western Front than their German opponents by examining the German Medical Corps’ official history.

Bell, Christopher M. **“Winston Churchill and the Ten Year Rule.”** Vol.74, No.4 (October, 2010), pp.1097-1128. Insists that criticisms of Churchill’s defense spending cutbacks during his tenure as Chancellor of the Exchequer (1924-29) exaggerate his authority and oversimplify his complex and shifting combination of political, financial, strategic, and bureaucratic goals.

Weinberg, Gerhard L. **“The George C. Marshall Lecture in Military History: Some Myths of World War II.”** Vol.75, No.3 (July, 2011), pp.701-718. Includes issues surrounding Winston Churchill, Adolf Hitler, Yamamoto Isoroku, Benito Mussolini, Franklin Roosevelt, and Josef Stalin, as well as the Yalta Conference, the Morgenthau Plan for Germany, and the ubiquity of horses in the Second World War.

Dunley, Richard, **“Operation Q: Churchill and Fisher’s Invasion of Germany, 1915?”** Vol.86, No.3 (July, 2022), pp.612-641. Reveals the pursuit of a naval strategy by First Lord of the Admiralty, Winston Churchill (1874-1965), and Admiral of the Fleet, John Arbuthnot Fisher (1841-1920) that came withing hours of execution in May, 1915, but was never acted upon.

CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS

See Also: POLITICS, INTEREST AND INVOLVEMENT IN

Black, Jeremy, **“Historiographical Essay: Military Organisations and Military Change in Historical Perspective.”** Vol.62, No.4 (October, 1998), pp.871-892. Presents an explanatory model of change based on military organization, including both unit and command structures, and intersection and interaction with wider social patterns and practices.

Kleinschmidt, Harald, **“Using the Gun: Manual Drill and the Proliferation of Portable Firearms.”** Vol.63, No.3 (July, 1999), pp.601-630. Delves into the military, political, and social factors that led to an increase in the use of hand-held firearms throughout Europe, from the fifteenth through the eighteenth century.

Stone, John, **“Technology, Society, and the Infantry Revolution of the Fourteenth Century.”** Vol.68, No.2 (April, 2004), pp.361-380. Challenges the concept of changes in warfare provoking changes in society, insisting, instead, that the opposite was case, calling for a new approach to understanding late-Medieval military developments based on a greater appreciation of the societies from which armies were raised.

Wilson, Peter H. **“Defining Military Culture.”** Vol.72, No.1 (January, 2008), pp.11-41. Puts forward the notion that military culture is a specific form of institutional culture and that viewing armies from this perspective offers new insight into both how they functioned and the nature of their interaction with state and society.

Reid, Brian Holden, **“Michael Howard and the Evolution of Modern War Studies.”** Vol.73, No.3 (July, 2009), pp.869-904. Chart the efforts of Sir Michael Howard (1922-2019), beginning in 1950, to impart a framework on the study of the relationship between war and society to the extent that it has been shaped by organizational and moral forces.

Parker, Geoffrey, **“States Make War but Wars also Break States.”** Vol.74, No.1 (January, 2010), pp.11-34. The ‘chicken and egg’ debate at the heart of the mid-seventeenth century ‘General Crisis Debate’, arguing that only a synergy between natural and man-made disasters produced state-breakdown.

Trauschweizer, Ingo, **“Historiographical Essay: On Militarism.”** Vol.76, No.2 (April, 2012), pp.507-543. The definition(s) of European militarism, beginning in the late eighteenth century, and the question of U.S. militarism.

CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS arranged alphabetically by country - AFGHANISTAN

Cronin, Stephanie, **“Building and Rebuilding Afghanistan’s Army: An Historical Perspective.”**

Vol.75, No.1 (January, 2011), pp.45-91. The repeated failure of the efforts of successive Afghan governments, from the nineteenth-century to the present, to create a modern regular army.

CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS arranged alphabetically by country - AUSTRALIA

Prentice, David L. “**‘Waltzing Matilda’ Out of Vietnam: Grand Strategy, Politics, and the Decision to Remove Australian Military Forces from Vietnam.**” Vol.86, No.3 (July, 2022), pp.642-669. When the United States chose to pursue the policy of ‘Vietnamization’, withdrawing increasing numbers of U.S. troops, Australian Prime Minister John Gorton (r.1968-1971) sought to encourage U.S. resolve by retaining Australian troops in South Vietnam until 1970, when Gorton’s government collapsed.

CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS arranged alphabetically by country –
AUSTRIA / AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN EMPIRE

Wawro, Geoffrey, “**An ‘Army of Pigs’: The technical, Social, and Political Basis of Austrian Shock Tactics, 1859-1866.**” Vol.59, No.3 (July, 1995), pp.407-433. Contends that, like the French after 1871, the Austrian Army responded to their defeat in the Second Italian War of Unification, 1859, by a commitment to aggressive shock tactics.

CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS arranged alphabetically by country – CANADA

Dickson, Paul D. “**The Politics of Army Expansion: General H.D.G. Crerar and the Creation of the First Canadian Army, 1940-41.**” Vol.60, No.2 (April, 1996), pp.271-298. Explains that General Henry Duncan Graham Crerar’s (1888-1965) success in winning approval for raising and deploying a Field Army represented an aberration in the balance of Canadian civil-military relations and illustrates aspects of Canadian military and its impact on the war.

CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS arranged alphabetically by country – CHINA

Swope, Kenneth M. “**Manifesting Awe: Grand Strategy and Imperial Leadership in the Ming Dynasty.**” Vol.79, No.3 (July, 2015), pp.597-634. Affirms the development and use of an overarching grand strategy by the Ming Dynasty (1368-1644) and considers its relationship with the actual policy decisions and military operations of the dynasty’s Emperors.

CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS arranged alphabetically by country –
ENGLAND / GREAT BRITAIN

Todman, Daniel, “***Sans peur et sans reproche: The Retirement, Death, and Mourning of Sir Douglas Haig, 1918-1928.***” Vol.67, No.4 (October, 2003), pp.1083-1106.

Westphal, Raymond W., Jr. **“Postwar Planning: Parliamentary Politics and the Royal Navy, 1919-22.”** Vol.74, No.1 (January, 2010), pp.145-171. Delves into the conflict between governments that viewed cuts in the military budget as a means of achieving economic recovery versus the Royal Navy’s goal of achieving parity with their U.S. counterpart while fulfilling its mission of two-ocean imperial defense.

Collins, Bruce, **“Defining Victory in Victorian Warfare, 1860-1882.”** Vol.77, No.3 (July, 2013), pp.895-929. Catalogues the range of pressures on the commanders of expeditions in Africa to declare victory.

Gray, Peter, **“A Culture of Official Squeamishness? Britain’s Air Ministry and the Strategic Air Offensive against Germany?”** Vol.77, No.4 (October, 2013), pp.1349-1377. Endeavors to determine if the reluctance of the Air Ministry to issue a campaign medal for the R.A.F.s strategic bombing campaign was due to a discomfort with the tactics of area bombing, particularly in the wake of the attack on Dresden.

Phimister, Ian, **“Developing and Defending Britain and Her Empire: Montgomery’s 1947 Tour of Africa.”** Vol.79, No.3 (July, 2015), pp.745-766. An overlooked event of the immediate postwar era that provides a window into both Field Marshal Bernard Montgomery’s (1887-1976) post-1945 career and the attitudes of the new Labour government towards defense.

Beckett, Ian F. **“How Wars End: Victorian Colonial Conflicts.”** Vol.82, No.1 (January, 2018), pp.29-44. The author challenges the conclusions of Bruce Collins’ in his article “Defining Victory in Victorian Warfare, 1860-1882.” *The Journal of Military History*, Vol.77, No.3 (July, 2013), pp.895-929.

CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS arranged alphabetically by country – FRANCE

Germani, Ian, **“Terror in the Army: Representatives on Mission and Military Discipline.”** Vol.75, No.3 (July, 2011), pp.733-768. The French National Convention’s Representatives on Mission and the exercise of military justice in the French Revolutionary armies.

CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS arranged alphabetically by country – GERMANY

Epkenhans, Michael, **“Krupp and the Imperial German Navy, 1898-1914: A Reassessment.”** Vol.64, No.2 (April, 2000), pp.335-369.

Bird, Keith, **“Review Essay: The Tirpitz Legacy: The Political Ideology of German Sea Power.”** Vol.69, No.3 (July, 2005), pp.821-825.

Orbach, Danny, **“Criticism Reconsidered: The German Resistance to Hitler in Critical German Scholarship.”** Vol.75, No.2 (April, 2011), pp.565-590. Establishes that, beginning in the 1960s,

some of the so-called ‘critical’ historiography of the 20 July, 1944, conspirators suffer from erroneous reading of the sources, one-sided evaluations, moral condescension, and rhetorical manipulation.

Wiens, Gavin, **“Guardians and Go-betweens: Germany’s Military Plenipotentiaries during the First World War.”** Vol.86, No.2 (April, 2022), pp.344-371. Imperial German federalism was present in the German General Headquarters in the form of military plenipotentiaries from Bavaria, Saxony, and Württemberg who had some degree of responsibility over the units from these former kingdoms.

CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS arranged alphabetically by country – INDIA

Boyce, D. George, **“From Assaye to the Assaye: Reflections on British Government, Force, and Moral Authority in India.”** Vol.63, No.3 (July, 1999), pp.643-668. Appraises the role of the threat and use of force in British rule, from the Battle of Assaye (1803) to the naval mutiny of 1946, including how the reliance on force shaped the moral and ethical justifications for the British governing India.

Tan Tai-Yong, **“An Imperial Home-Front: Punjab and the First World War.”** Vol.64, No.2 (April, 2000), pp.371-410. Looks at how, during the war, the civil administration of the State of Punjab ended up concentrating on recruiting men for the Indian Army.

Tripodi, Christian, **“ ‘Good for one but not the other’: The ‘Sandeman System’ of Pacification as Applied to Baluchistan and the North-West Frontier, 1877-1947.”** Vol.73, No.3 (July, 2009), pp.767-802. Looks at why the Government of India declared Colonel Sir Robert Groves Sandeman’s (1835-1892) innovative doctrine of tribal administration inapplicable for the troubled North West Frontier, despite its having achieved success in Baluchistan.

CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS arranged alphabetically by country – NORWAY

Thompson, David G. **“Norwegian Military Policy, 1905-1940: A Critical Appraisal and Review of the Literature.”** Vol.61, No.3 (July, 1997), pp.503-520. Questions the reliance exclusively on British and German sources for an understanding of the 1940 Norwegian campaign, insisting that without knowledge of the role of the Norwegian government and armed forces, the picture is incomplete.

CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS arranged alphabetically by country - PAKISTAN

Gill, John H. **“Review Essay: Glimpses Inside Pakistan’s Elusive Army.”** Vol.77, No.1 (January, 2013), pp.294-298. Covers five recent works on the Army of Pakistan, a very difficult subject to study due to a lack of access to archival sources.

CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS arranged alphabetically by country – POLAND

Ponichtera, Robert M. **“The Military Thought of Wladyslaw Sikorski.”** Vol.59, No.2 (April, 1995), pp.279-301. Offers a description of Sikorski’ (1881-1943) pursuit of political goals through the promotion of Polish military strength throughout his career, from within the Austro-Hungarian Empire to the leadership of the Polish state in exile.

Sproule, Joseph, **“Raiding, Pillaging, and Violent Social Change in Late Sixteenth-Century Livonia.”** Vol.85, No.2 (April, 2021), pp.317-341. Establishes how the pervasiveness of raiding dictated tactical and strategic considerations, influenced military policy, shaped civil-military relations, and played a role in breaking down longstanding social mores, transforming societies, normalizing violence.

CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS arranged alphabetically by country –

RUSSIA / SOVIET UNION

Wright, Donald P. **“ ‘Clouds Gathering on the Horizon’: The Russian Army and the Preparation of the Imperial Population for War, 1906-1914.”** Vol.83, No.4 (October, 2019), pp.1133-1160.

Gilbin, Daniel F. **“Seeds of Victory: Satisfying the needs of the Red Army and the Soviet State during the Formation of the Kursk Salient, February – May 1943.”** Vol.84, No.4 (October, 2020), pp.1157-1188. Reviews an example of the Soviet Army’s practice of incorporating the civilian population in the rear areas near the frontlines in various forms of support, including the role of re-installed civilian government in recently liberated territory.

CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS arranged alphabetically by country – SPAIN

Cerdá, Néstor, **“Political Ascent and Military Commander: General Franco in the Early Months of the Spanish Civil War, July-October 1936.”** Vol.75, No.4 (October, 2011), pp.1125-1157. Displays how General Francisco Franco (1892-1975) exploited the opportunities presented by the setbacks to the coup plotters in July through August, 1936, to rise from being merely another general supporting the uprising to the position of commander-in-chief of the Nationalist Army and head of the government.

Lines, Lisa, **“Francisco Franco as Warrior: Is It Time for a Reassessment of His Military Leadership?”** Vol.81, No.2 (April, 2017), pp.513-534. Critiques Franco’s (1892-1975) performance as a military commander within the context of his cultural and political environment.

CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS arranged alphabetically by country –

TURKEY / OTTOMAN EMPIRE

Kürkçü, Burak, **“The Question of U.S. Involvement in Turkish Military Coups during the Cold War: An Analysis via available C.I.A. Archives.”** Vol.86, No.1 (January, 2022), pp.110-131. Recently de-classified C.I.A. documents reveal no evidence for direct U.S. involvement in Turkish military coups during the Cold War.

CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS arranged alphabetically by country – U.S.A.

Weigley, Russell F. **“The George C. Marshall Lecture in Military History: The Soldier, the Statesman, and the Military Historian.”** Vol.63, No.4 (October, 1999), pp.807-822. Reviews the United States tradition of the subordination of the Armed Forces to civilian control at the highest level of civil-military relations, beginning with the Civil War.

Coffman, Edward M. **“The George C. Marshall Lecture of Military History: The Duality of the American Military Tradition: A Commentary.”** Vol.64, No.4 (October, 2000), pp.967-980. Discusses the duality of a standing, professional regular Armed Forces versus the citizen-soldier tradition.

Borch, Fred L. **“Review Essay: Lieber’s Code: A Landmark in the Law of War but not Lincoln’s Code.”** Vol.77, No.2 (April, 2013), pp.671-674. Critiques John Fabian Witt’s *Lincoln’s Code: The Laws of War in American History* (2012), which concludes with the Philippine Insurrection, 1898.

**CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS arranged alphabetically by country – U.S.A. -
FROM THE EARLY REPUBLIC TO THE CIVIL WAR (1783-1861)**

Kastor, Peter J. **“Toward ‘The Maritime War Only’: The Question of Naval Mobilization, 1811-1812.”** Vol.61, No.3 (July, 1997), pp.455-480. Applies the broader context of the ‘New Military History’, particularly political circumstances, in an effort to better understand President James Madison’s (1809-1817) naval policy and strategy leading up to the outbreak of the War of 1812.

Weddle, Kevin J. **“‘The Magic Touch of Reform’: Samuel Francis Du Pont and the Efficiency Board of 1855.”** Vol.68, No.2 (April, 2004), pp.471-504. Using previously neglected sources, this article considers how political and military leaders, notably Commander Du Pont (1803-1865), broke the logjam produced by a system of promotion based exclusively on seniority.

Geissler, Suzanne, **“Professor Dennis Mahan Speaks out on West Point Chapel Issues, 1850.”** Vol.69, No.2 (April, 2005), pp.505-519. An 1850 letter from West Point professor to the Secretary of War in which Mahan (1802-1871) expressed his opposition to the academy’s Chaplain always having to be Episcopalian and mandatory chapel attendance for staff.

Levinson, Irving W. **“A New Paradigm for an Old Conflict: The Mexico-United States War.”** Vol.73, No.2 (April, 2009), pp.393-416. The victorious U.S. Army that found itself in possession of Mexico City had to provide assistance to the dominant political and socio-economic groups in order to obtain a peace treaty that would conclude the war.

Watson, Samuel, **“Historiographical Essay: Continuity in Civil-Military Relations and Expertise: The U.S. Army during the Decade before the Civil War.”** Vol.75, No.1 (January, 2011), pp.221-250.

Krebs, Daniel, **“Useful Enemies: The Treatment of German Prisoners of War during the American War of Independence.”** Vol.77, No.1 (January, 2013), pp.9-39. Narrates how, to boost morale, revolutionaries staged elaborate rituals with P.O.W.s, that local citizens hired captive soldiers as laborers, and that, after the victory at Yorktown, 1781, Congress and the Continental Army allowed P.O.W.s to go free after a cash payments and even sold some into indentured servitude.

Mayer, Holly A. **“Canada, Congress, and the Continental Army: Strategic Accommodations, 1774-1776.”** Vol.78, No.2 (April, 2014), pp.503-535. Discusses the challenge of reconciling the Continental Congress’ policy of encouraging the enlistment of French Catholics in Canada with anti-Catholic bigotry among the members of the Continental Army.

Smith, Mark A. **“The Politics of Military Professionalism: The Engineer Company and the Political Activities of the Antebellum U.S. Army Corps of Engineers.”** Vol.80, No.2 (April, 2016), pp.355-387. Addresses the tensions presented by both internal politicking in the Corps and the lobbying of officers in promoting the nation’s defensive needs.

Sheppard, Thomas, **“There will still remain Heroes and Patriots: The Politics of Resignation in the Early American Navy, 1794-1815.”** Vol.84, No.2 (April, 2020), pp.369-394. Establishes that early secretaries of the navy worked to end the practice of officers resigning their commissions, or using the threat to do so, as a bargaining tactic with the Navy Department, something that they had largely accomplished by the end of the War of 1812.

CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS arranged alphabetically by country – U.S.A. -
FROM THE CIVIL WAR TO ENTRY INTO WORLD WAR I (1861-1917)

Shulimson, Jack, **“Military Professionalism: The Case of the U.S. Marine Officer Corps, 1880-1898.”** Vol.60, No.2 (April, 1996), pp.231-242. Views the transformation of the officer corps of the Marines into a professional body as part of the late nineteenth century, society wide ‘organizational revolution.’

Fitzpatrick, David J. **“Emory Upton and the Citizen Soldier.”** Vol.65, No.2 (April, 2001),

pp.355-389. Refutes the accepted notion of Upton's opposition to citizen-soldiers and democracy. The article includes a review of Upton's (1839-1881) reflections on the military systems in India and Serbia.

Faust, Drew Gilpin, **"The 2006 George C. Marshall Lecture in Military History: 'Numbers on Top of Numbers': Counting the Civil War Dead."** Vol.70, No.4 (October, 2006), pp.995-1009. The scale and destructiveness of the United States Civil War generated the assumption that the government had an obligation to accurately name and count the military dead.

Stentiford, Barry M. **"The Meaning of a Name: The Rise of the National Guard and the End of a Town Militia."** Vol.72, No.3 (July, 2008), pp.727-754. Recounts the changing relationship between the community of Wakefield, Massachusetts, and its town militia, the Richardson Light Guard, when the unit became part of the National Guard in 1916.

Weddle, Kevin J. **"The Fall of Satan's Kingdom: Civil-Military Relations and the Union Navy's Attack on Charleston, April 1863."** Vol.75, No.2 (April, 2011), pp.411-439. Describes the conflict between Rear Admiral Samuel Francis Du Pont (1803-1865) and the members of Lincoln's administration, Secretary of the Navy Gideon Welles (1802-1878) and his assistant, Gustavus Fox (1821-1883).

Fitzpatrick, David J. **"Emory Upton and the Army of Democracy."** Vol.77, No.2 (April, 2013), pp.463-490. Challenges the depiction of Emory Upton (1839-1881) as an anti-democracy militarist.

Baker, Anni, **"The Abolition of the U.S. Army Canteen, 1898-1914."** Vol.80, No.3 (July, 2016), pp.697-724. The impact of Progressive era activists on conditions in the Army and the debate over the role of the Army in U.S. society.

Schubert, Frank N. **"Commemorative Essay: Sesquicentennial Reflection on the Black Regulars."** Vol.80, No.4 (October, 2016), pp.1011-1016. To honor the sesquicentennial of the inclusion of African Americans in the regular U.S. Army, this brief essay considers how this precedent that came about in the wake of the service Black Volunteers in the Civil War pushed forward, albeit all too slowly, social change in American society.

Beckstrand, Alex, **"Woodrow Wilson and the Struggle of Civil-Military Relations during the Punitive Expedition of 1916-1917."** Vol.86, No.2 (April, 2022), pp.372-398. Argues that President Woodrow Wilson's (1913-1921) decision to defer to his military commanders, Major General Frederick Funston (1865-1917) and Brigadier General John J. Pershing (1860-1948), was the cause of the failure to achieve the goals of the Punitive Expedition.

CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS arranged alphabetically by country – U.S.A. -
FROM ENTRY INTO WORLD WAR I TO ENTRY INTO WORLD WAR II (1917-41)

Williams, William J. **“Josephus Daniels and the U.S. Navy’s Shipbuilding Program During World War I.”** Vol.60, No.1 (January, 1996), pp.7-38. Observes how Daniels (1862-1948), with no naval or maritime background, applied himself conscientiously to shifting the Navy’s building program from capitol ships to destroyers designed to address the U-Boat threat.

Ferrell, Henry C., Jr. **“Guns for Vermont: Military Land Acquisition in the 1920s.”** Vol.61, No.1 (January, 1997), pp.31-47. Presents the remarkable achievement of Vermont Senator, Frank Lester Greene (1870-1930), of arranging for the purchase of additional land for Fort Ethan Allen at a time of severely constrained defense budgets.

Irish, Kerry E. **“Apt Pupil: Dwight Eisenhower and the 1930 Industrial Mobilization Plan.”** Vol.70, No.1 (January, 2006), pp.31-61. While the detailed plan for industrial mobilization drawn up by Eisenhower (1890-1969) as a staff officer was not formally implemented, it nevertheless provided the basis for a more efficient transition to war production than had taken place in World War I.

Ortiz, Stephen R. **“The ‘New Deal’ for Veterans: The Economy Act [1934], the Veterans of Foreign Wars, and the Origins of New Deal Dissent.”** Vol.70, No.2 (April, 2006), pp.415-438.

McPherson, Alan, **“Lid Sitters and Prestige Seekers: The U.S. Navy versus the State Department and the End of U.S. Occupations.”** Vol.78, No.1 (January, 2014), pp.73-99. Conflicting outlooks on the U.S. military occupation of the Dominican Republic, Haiti, and Nicaragua between the State Department and the Marine Corps.

CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS arranged alphabetically by country – U.S.A. -
WORLD WAR II (1941-45)

Rossi, Mario, **“United States Military Authorities and Free France, 1942-1944.”** Vol.61, No.1 (January, 1997), pp.49-64. Probes the political and military consequences of the clash between U.S. policy towards liberated French territory and Charles De Gaulle’s (1890-1970) claim to be the legitimate representative of the French people.

Jeans, Roger B., Jr. **“Alarm in Washington: A Wartime ‘Expose’ of Japan’s Biological Warfare Program.”** Vol.71, No.2 (April, 2007), pp.411-439. Discusses a book published in the summer of 1944 describing both Japan’s biological warfare program and the failure of the U.S. government to meet this threat, and the government and the media’s response to this publication, considering parallels with the 2001 anthrax ‘scares.’

Glantz, Mary, **“An Officer and a Diplomat? The Ambiguous Position of Philip R. Faymonville and United States-Soviet Relations, 1941-1943.”** Vol.72, No.1 (January, 2008), pp.141-177.

Appraises the role played by Colonel Philip Faymonville (1888-1962) in U.S.-Soviet relations, an officer who served as the United States' first military attaché and as expediter of Lend-Lease Aid during the war, but who had a contentious relationship with U.S. diplomatic personnel.

Stoler, Mark A. **"The 2015 George C. Marshall Lecture in Military History: George C. Marshall and the 'Europe-First Strategy, 1939-1951: A Study in Diplomatic as well as Military History."** Vol.79, No.2 (April, 2015), pp.293-316. Examines the relationship between diplomatic and military history regarding Marshall's (1880-1959) support for the strategy of 'Germany First' during World War II, for the postwar European Recovery Program, and the relief of Gen. Douglas MacArthur (1880-1964) during the Korean War.

CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS arranged alphabetically by country – U.S.A. -
THE COLD WAR (1945-91)

Grandstaff, Mark R. **"Making the Military American: Advertising, Reform, and the Demise of an Antistanding Military Tradition, 1945-1955."** Vol.60, No.2 (April, 1996), pp.299-323. Establishes that, while concerns over the spread of communism and nuclear war played a role, both reforms within the military and a national public relations campaign also helped citizens view the armed forces as an acceptable American institution.

Fautua, David T. **"The 'Long Pull' Army: NSC 68, the Korean War, and the Creation of the Cold War Army."** Vol.61, No.1 (January, 1997), pp.93-120. Endeavors to distinguish the changes to the U.S. Army in the early 1950s resulting from National Security Council paper 68 from those prompted by the Korean War (1950-1953).

Bacevich, A.J. **"The Paradox of Professionalism: Eisenhower, Ridgway, and the Challenge to Civilian Control, 1953-1955."** Vol.61, No.2 (April, 1997), pp.303-333. By focusing on the U.S. Army's efforts to undermine President Eisenhower's (1953-1961) policy of massive nuclear retaliation, this article attempts to depict the actual terms of the civil-military relationship within the innermost circles of the U.S. government to determine the realities and limits of civilian control of the armed forces.

Millett, Allan R. **"A Reader's Guide to the Korean War."** Vol.61, No.3 (July, 1997), pp.583-597.

Gentile, Gian P. **"Shaping the Past Battlefield, 'For the Future': The United States Strategic Bombing Survey's Evaluation of the American Air War against Japan."** Vol.64, No.4 (October, 2000), pp.1085-1112. Contests the image of the Bombing Survey as an impartial primary source, demonstrating that it was shaped by particular circumstances, bias, and political factors, most notably the effort to justify an independent Air Force.

Neufeld, Michael J. **"The End of the Army Space Program: Interservice Rivalry and the**

Transfer of the von Braun Group to N.A.S.A., 1958-1959.” Vol.69, No.3 (July, 2005), pp.737-757.

Carter, Donald Alan, **“Eisenhower versus the Generals.”** Vol.71, No.4 (October, 2007), pp.1169-1199. Traces the rancor that evolved between President Dwight D. Eisenhower (1953-1961), who pursued the ‘New Look’ national security policy that relied on nuclear weapons, the Strategic Air Command, and a robust economy, versus Army officers who believed the drastic reductions in conventional ground forces challenged the very existence of their service.

Carland, John M. **“War, Politics, Diplomacy, and the Presidency: Off the Record Comments by Lyndon B. Johnson in Retirement.”** Vol.72, No.4 (October, 2008), pp.1257-1263.

Goldman, David I. **“The Generals and the Germs: The Army Leadership’s Response to Nixon’s Review of Chemical and Biological Warfare Policies in 1969.”** Vol.73, No.2 (April, 2009), pp.531-569. The response of U.S. Army leadership to President Richard Nixon (1969-1974) unilateral elimination of biological warfare agents, retaining only a defensive research program, as well as placing limitations on the chemical weapons.

Martini, Edwin A. **“Incinerating Agent Orange: Operations Pacer HO, Pacer IVY, and the Rise of Environmentalist Thinking.”** Vol.76, No.3 (July, 2012), pp.809-836.

Stoler, Mark A. **“The 2015 George C. Marshall Lecture in Military History: George C. Marshall and the ‘Europe-First Strategy, 1939-1951: A Study in Diplomatic as well as Military History.”** Vol.79, No.2 (April, 2015), pp.293-316. Examines the relationship between diplomatic and military history regarding Marshall’s (1880-1959) support for the strategy of ‘Germany First’ during World War II, for the postwar European Recovery Program, and the relief of Gen. Douglas MacArthur (1880-1964) during the Korean War.

CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS arranged alphabetically by country – U.S.A. - **THE POST-COLD WAR PERIOD**

Kohn, Richard H. (ed.) **“The Practice of Military History in the U.S. Government: The Department of Defense.”** Vol.61, No.1 (January, 1997), pp.121-147. Includes contributions from Alfred Goldberg, Elizabeth A. Muenger, and Harold W. Nelson.

Kohn, Richard H. **“The Danger of Militarization in an Endless ‘War’ on Terrorism.”** Vol.73, No.1 (January, 2009), pp.177-208. The identification of Americans with and use of war images and thinking, and a belief in the primacy of standing military forces for the safety of the country, have become normalized, so that the pursuit of an endless ‘war’ on terrorism only further threatens to militarize the nation.

Hogan, David W. **“Head and Heart: The Dilemmas of American Attitudes towards War.”** Vol.75, No.4 (October, 2011), pp.1021-1054. Modernist challenges to the old uniform attitudes towards war in a larger, more pluralistic society has made consensus difficult, if not impossible, to reach.

Coleman, Bradley Lynn and Schultz, Timothy A. **“The Cornerstone of Joint Force Transformation: The Standing Joint Force Headquarters at U.S. Southern Command, 2001-2011.”** Vol.85, No.4 (October, 2021), pp.1029-1060. The difficulties of Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld (1932-2021) to establish Standing Joint Force Headquarters for each of the geographic combatant commands is examined by using the U.S. Southern Command as an example.

CIVIL WAR, UNITED STATES – See: UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: CIVIL WAR

CIVILIANS, IMPACT ON

See Also: LAWS OF WAR AND WAR CRIMES

Black, Jeremy, **“Historiographical Essay: Military Organisations and Military Change in Historical Perspective.”** Vol.62, No.4 (October, 1998), pp.871-892. Presents an explanatory model of change based on military organization, including both unit and command structures, and intersection and interaction with wider social patterns and practices.

CIVILIANS, IMPACT ON: MEDIEVAL PERIOD (476-1480)

Isaac, Steven, **“The Role of Towns in the Battle of Bouvines (1214).”** Vol.79, No.2 (April, 2015), pp.317-344. Uses the French King, Philip Augustus’ (1165-1223), victory at Bouvines as an example of the military contributions of urban centers in the form of non-noble troops, the production of arms and armor, financial resources, and contributors to policy.

Rogers, Clifford J. **“Medieval Strategy and the Economics of Conquest.”** Vol.82, No.3 (July, 2018), pp.709-738. Approaching the question in a quantitative fashion, the author seeks to show how Medieval kings could make war pay for war, especially in urbanized areas and in times and places where it was permitted to enslave enemy populations.

Gyucha, Attila; Lee, Wayne E. and Rózsa, Zoltán, **“The Mongol Campaign in Hungary, 1241-1242: The Archaeology and History of Nomadic Conquest and Massacre.”** Vol.83, No.4 (October, 2019), pp.1021-1066. This article integrates conquest process theory, literary evidence, and data from substantial new archaeological work to explore the motivation

and nature of Mongol invasions and the consequences for rural settlements on the Great Hungarian Plain.

CIVILIANS, IMPACT ON: EARLY MODERN PERIOD (1480-1789)

Sproule, Joseph, **“Raiding, Pillaging, and Violent Social Change in Late Sixteenth-Century Livonia.”** Vol.85, No.2 (April, 2021), pp.317-341. Establishes how the pervasiveness of raiding dictated tactical and strategic considerations, influenced military policy, shaped civil-military relations, and played a role in breaking down longstanding social mores, transforming societies, normalizing violence.

Hurl-Eamon, Jennine, **“Husbands, Sons, Brothers, and Neighbors: Eighteenth-Century Soldiers’ Efforts to Maintain Civilian Ties.”** Vol.86, No.2 (April, 2022), pp.299-320. Endeavors to understand the conflict between army regulations restricting British servicemen’s ability to visit and provide for their kin with the efforts of soldiers to maintain the connections to the communities they left.

CIVILIANS, IMPACT ON: U.S. REVOLUTIONARY WAR (1775-83)

Syrett, David, **“Historiographical Essay: The British Armed Forces in the American Revolutionary War: Publications, 1875-1998.”** Vol.63, No.1 (January, 1999), pp.147-164.

Adelberg, Michael S. **“The Scope and Severity of Civil Warfare in Revolutionary Monmouth County, New Jersey.”** Vol.73, No.1 (January, 2009), pp.9-47. Examines both how many of the residents of Monmouth County chose to participate on the opposing sides and how many lives were adversely affected by the war.

CIVILIANS, IMPACT ON: FRENCH REVOLUTIONARY AND NAPOLEONIC WARS (1792-1815)

Hantraye, Jacques, **“The Silence of the Woods: The 1815 Murder of a Prussian Soldier in Western France.”** Vol.80, No.1 (January, 2016), pp.57-76. Focuses on the murder of a Prussian soldier on 22 July, 1815, outside of the village of Unverre, located roughly ninety miles southwest of Paris, as a means of exploring the interactions between the forces of occupation and the civilian population of postwar France.

Heuer, Jennifer, **“Soldiers as Victims or Villains? Demobilization, Masculinity, and Family in French Royalist Pamphlets, 1814-1815.”** Vol.80, No.1 (January, 2016), pp.121-144.

CIVILIANS, IMPACT ON: 19th CENTURY

Janda, Lance, **“Shutting the Gates of Mercy: The American Origins of Total War, 1860-1880.”** Vol.59, No.1 (January, 1995), pp.7-26. Links the evolution of ‘total war’ with the nature of armed conflict during the U.S. Civil War through to the late nineteenth century campaigns against the Native American tribes.

Hagstrom, Jacob, **“ ‘My Soldiers Above All’: Justifying Violence against Noncombatants in French Algeria, 1830-1847.”** Vol.86, No.1 (January, 2022), pp.32-53. Shows that French officers participating in the conquest of Algeria defended the actions of their soldiers against civilians, which were motivated by fear, anger, and greed, on the basis of the necessity of preserving their lives and the lives of indigenous allies.

CIVILIANS, IMPACT ON: U.S. CIVIL WAR (1861-65)

Faust, Drew Gilpin, **“The 2006 George C. Marshall Lecture in Military History: ‘Numbers on Top of Numbers’: Counting the Civil War Dead.”** Vol.70, No.4 (October, 2006), pp.995-1009. The scale and destructiveness of the United States Civil War generated the assumption that the government had an obligation to accurately name and count the military dead.

Cashin, Joan, **“Bibliographic Essay: American Women and the American Civil War.”** Vol.81, No.1 (January, 2017), pp.199-204.

CIVILIANS, IMPACT ON: 2nd ANGLO-BOER WAR (1899-1902)

Nasson, Bill, **“Historiographical Essay: Waging Total War in South Africa: Some Centenary Writings on the Anglo-Boer War, 1899-1902.”** Vol.66, No.3 (July, 2002), pp.813-828.

Vergolina, Joseph R. **“ ‘Methods of Barbarism’ or Western Tradition? Britain, South Africa, and the Evolution of Escalatory Violence as Policy.”** Vol.77, No.4 (October, 2013), pp.1303-1327. Investigates British counterinsurgency methods in the Second Anglo-Boer War (1899-1902).

CIVILIANS, IMPACT ON: PHILIPPINE-U.S. WAR (1899-1902)

Birtle, Andrew J. **“The U.S. Army’s Pacification of Marinduque, Philippine Islands, April 1900 – April 1901.”** Vol.61, No.2 (April, 1997), pp.255-282. Observes that the common image of the U.S. counterinsurgency campaign in the Philippines that emphasizes the political ‘Nation Building’ approach obscures the equally if not more important harsh military measures indispensable for pacification.

CIVILIANS, IMPACT ON: WORLD WAR I (1914-18)

Little, Branden, **“Evacuating Wartime Europe: U.S. Policy, Strategy, and Relief Operations**

for Overseas American Travelers, 1914-15.” Vol.79, No.4 (October, 2015), pp.929-958. The evacuation by the U.S. Relief Commission of 125,000 U.S. citizens stranded in Europe and its far-ranging impact on war preparedness and subsequent humanitarian operations.

Hauser, Mark T. “**‘A Violent Desire for Amusements’: Boxing, Libraries, and the Distribution and Management of Welfare During the First World War.’**” Vol.86, No.4 (October, 2022), pp.883-913. Illustrates the impact of U.S. wartime recreation programs during World War I on the development of mass culture.

CIVILIANS, IMPACT ON: INTERWAR PERIOD (1919-39)

Meilinger, Phillip, “**Trenchard and ‘Morale Bombing’: The Evolution of Royal Air Force Doctrine before World War II.**” Vol.60, No.2 (April, 1996), pp.243-270. Deals with the inexact blend of the intended goals of the R.A.F.’s interwar strategic bombing doctrine: breaking the will of the enemy and / or breaking the enemy’s economy.

Hughes, Matthew, “**Women, Violence, and the Arab Revolt in Palestine, 1936-39.**” Vol.83, No.2 (April, 2019), pp.487-507. Seeks to understand what part Palestinian women played in the Arab Revolt, how British colonial pacification affected the latter, and how British soldiers treated Palestinian women.

CIVILIANS, IMPACT ON: WORLD WAR II (1939-45)

Bernstein, Barton J. “**Truman and the A-Bomb: Targeting Noncombatants, Using the Bomb, and His Defending the ‘Decision’.**” Vol.62, No.3 (July, 1998), pp.547-570. Focuses on the 1996 publication *Harry S. Truman and the Bomb: A Documentary History*. Edited and with commentary by Robert Ferrell.

Geller, Jay Howard, “**The Role of Military Administration in German-Occupied Belgium, 1940-1944.**” Vol.63, No.1 (January, 1999), pp.99-125. Attempts to determine how the German Military Administration viewed its role in occupying and governing the Kingdom of Belgium.

Yelton, David K. “**Ein Volk Steht Auf: The German Volkssturm and Nazi Strategy, 1944-45.**” Vol.64, No.4 (October, 2000), pp.1061-1083. Explains that the *Volkssturm*, though based on flawed assumptions, was part of a coherent strategy that was intended to simultaneously fanaticize the civilian population and maximize Allied casualties beyond what their governments were willing to bare.

Searle, Thomas R. “**‘It made a Lot of Sense to Kill Skilled Workers’: The Firebombing of Tokyo in March 1945.**” Vol.66, No.1 (January, 2002), pp.103-133. Demonstrates that the firebombing of Japanese cities was not a radical departure from U.S.A.A.F. tactics used against Germany, that

it was not an abandonment of concentrating on targeting industry, and that it was based on long-term planning.

Jeans, Roger B. **“Victims or Victimizers? Museums, Textbooks, and the War Debate in Contemporary Japan.”** Vol.69, No.1 (January, 2005), pp.149-195. Shows that, rather than possessing a unified view of the war, the ‘correct history’ of the conflict is contested between conservatives, the right-wing, moderates, and the left-wing.

Biddle, Tami Davis, **“Dresden 1945: Reality, History, and Memory.”** Vol.72, No.2 (April, 2008), pp.413-449. This essay is an effort to untangle a complicated and much misunderstood episode in the history of modern warfare and to make sense of it in the context in which it occurred.

Kwan, Toh Boon, **“ ‘It was a thrill to see rows of B-29s going through the sky’: The Strategic Bombing of Singapore, 1944-45.”** Vol.73, No.3 (July, 2009), pp.905-924. Reports on an overlooked campaign in the U.S. strategic Air War in Asia from the perspective of U.S. bomber crews, Japanese occupation forces in Singapore, local civilians, and internees, noting that the experiences of the latter have, in particular, been neglected.

Hughes, Matthew, **“War without Mercy? American Armed Forces and the Deaths of Civilians during the Battle for Saipan, 1944.”** Vol.75, No.1 (January, 2011), pp.93-123. Despite this being the first Central Pacific Island on which U.S. forces encountered large numbers of civilians, including Japanese and Korean migrants, and native Chamorro and Carolinian peoples, the military histories of the battle for Saipan generally neglect how noncombatants were treated.

Muschamp, Amy, **“Living Under Allied Military Government in Southern Italy during the Second World War: A Case Study of the Region of Molise.”** Vol.79, No.2 (April, 2015), pp.369-386. Based on a combination of archival research at the regional capital of Campobasso and oral history.

Gilbin, Daniel F. **“Seeds of Victory: Satisfying the needs of the Red Army and the Soviet State during the Formation of the Kursk Salient, February – May 1943.”** Vol.84, No.4 (October, 2020), pp.1157-1188. Reviews an example of the Soviet Army’s practice of incorporating the civilian population in the rear areas near the frontlines in various forms of support, including the role of re-installed civilian government in recently liberated territory.

Rutherford, Jeff, **“Germany’s Total War: Combat and Occupation around the Kursk Salient, 1943.”** Vol.85, No.4 (October, 2021), pp.954-979. Examines the changing approach of three German divisions to extract resources from the population living near the frontlines.

CIVILIANS, IMPACT ON: COLD WAR (1945-91)

Grandstaff, Mark R. **“Making the Military American: Advertising, Reform, and the Demise of an Antistanding Military Tradition, 1945-1955.”** Vol.60, No.2 (April, 1996), pp.299-323. Establishes that, while concerns over the spread of communism and nuclear war played a role, both reforms within the military and a national public relations campaign also helped citizens view the armed forces as an acceptable American institution.

Lockenour, Jay, **“Black and White Memories of War: Victimization and Violence in West German War Films of the 1950s.”** Vol.76, No.1 (January, 2012), pp.159-191. Contends that war films helped to construct a specifically West German identity as helpless victims or heroic nonconformists rather than historical actors and compliant, or even eager, collaborators by creating myths and memories important to the legitimacy of the new Federal Republic.

Dingman, Roger, **“Review Essay: American Bases in Japan.”** Vol.78, No.2 (April, 2014), pp.753-755. A collection of essays by Japanese academics and public historians providing a balanced study of the impact of U.S. bases Kanagawa Prefecture, just southwest of Tokyo.

CIVILIANS, IMPACT ON: VIETNAM WAR (2nd Indochina War) (1955-75)

Van De Mark, Brian, **“Review Essay: Thinking about the Vietnam War.”** Vol.60, No.2 (April, 1996), pp.339-357. Although the majority of the seven books reviewed are from the perspective of the involvement of the United States, including one on the anti-war movement and two on the Johnson administration, 1963-1969, there is a memoir from a rural woman living in South Vietnam and a comparative work about the reaction of academics to the wars in Algeria and Vietnam.

Hawkins, John M. **“The Costs of Artillery: Eliminating Harassment and Interdiction Fire During the Vietnam War.”** Vol.70, No.1 (January, 2006), pp.91-122. Determines that the reason that the use of U.S. artillery for harassment and interdiction had been all but eliminated by June, 1970, was due to budgetary pressures and not from concerns over collateral damage.

Boylan, Kevin M. **“The Red Queen’s Race: Operation Washington Green and Pacification in Binh Dinh Province, 1969-70.”** Vol.73, No.4 (October, 2009), pp.1195-1230. Examines the operations conducted by the 173rd Airborne Brigade in Binh Dinh Province closely, which matched recommendations made by many of the critics of the way U.S. military forces was conducted the war and, therefore, offers insight into the likely effectiveness of an alternate strategy focused on population control.

Lipman, Jana K. **“‘A Precedent Worth Setting...’ Military Humanitarianism: The U.S. Military and the 1975 Vietnamese Evacuation.”** Vol.79, No.1 (January, 2015), pp.151-179. Proposes that the U.S. Armed Forces’ involvement in the evacuation of over 100,000 Vietnamese to the United States represented a turning point in how these institutions

viewed humanitarian operations.

Borch, Fred L. **“Review Essay: My Lai at Fifty: A History of Literature on the ‘My Lai Incident’ Fifty Years Later.”** Vol.82, No.2 (April, 2018), pp.551-564. Concerning the killing of unarmed civilians by U.S. Army troops during the Vietnam War at the village of My Lai in the Son Tinh district on 16 March, 1968.

CIVILIANS, IMPACT ON: THE ‘TROUBLES’ IN NORTHERN IRELAND (1969-98)

Drohan, Brian, **“Unintended Consequences: Baton Rounds, Riots, and Counterinsurgency in Northern Ireland, 1970-1981.”** Vol.82, No.2 (April, 2018), pp.491-514. Designed to be a non-lethal means of employing force, the misuse of baton rounds by British soldiers resulting in serious injuries and even deaths, produced exactly the opposite public relations impact that was intended.

CIVILIANS, IMPACT ON: POST COLD WAR PERIOD

Courtney, Jocelyn, **“The Civil War that was fought by Children: Understanding the Role of Child Combatants in El Salvador’s Civil War, 1980-1992.”** Vol.74, No.2 (April, 2010), pp.523-556. Explores the legacy of the extensive reliance on child soldiers by both the Salvadoran government and the Farabundo Martí Front for National Liberation in terms of demobilization issues and postwar societal problems.

CLASS ISSUES: THE ANCIENT PERIOD (to 476)

Bertosa, Brian, **“The Supply of Hoplite Equipment by the Athenian State down to the Lamian War [323-322 B.C.E.].”** Vol.67, No.2 (April, 2003), pp.361-379. Covers the break with tradition in the *polis* of Athens in 335 B.C.E. when arms and armor were provided to citizens, including, for the first time, the *thetes* (poor), who had not previously been able to serve as hoplites.

CLASS ISSUES: THE MEDIEVAL PERIOD (476-1480)

Çeçen, Zeynep Kocabiyoikoğlu, **“Two Different Views of Knighthood in the Early Fifteenth Century: *Le Livre de Bouciquaut* and the Works of Christine de Pizan.”** Vol.76, No.1 (January, 2012), pp.9-35. Comparing the different contemporary views of knighthood, the author considers whether its depiction in the biography of Marshal of France, Jean le Meingre Bouciquaut (1366-1421), is consistent with its image in the works of Christine de Pizan (1363-1430).

CLASS ISSUES: EARLY MODERN PERIOD (1480-1789)

Probasco, Nate, **“The Role of Commoners and Print in Elizabethan England’s Acceptance**

of Firearms.” Vol.76, No.2 (April, 2012), pp.343-372. Looks at the debate in print between, on the one hand, common citizens and local officials, who were skeptical of firearms, the expense and safety of which they criticized, and those who promoted the replacement of longbows with firearms, who often employed dubious information.

CLASS ISSUES: THE ENGLISH CIVIL WARS (1642-51)

Manning, Roger B. **“Styles of Command in Seventeenth Century English Armies.”** Vol.71, No.3 (July, 2007), pp.671-699. Proposes that aristocratic officers were reluctant to accept the idea that military hierarchies had superseded social hierarchies or that in warfare they should pursue military objectives rather than personal honor, so that, excepting the New Model Army, English military leadership was backwards in comparison with its continental counterparts.

CLASS ISSUES: U.S. REVOLUTIONARY WAR (1775-83)

Lapp, Derrick E. **“Did They Really ‘Take None but Gentlemen’? Henry Hardman, the Maryland Line, and a Reconsideration of the Socioeconomic Composition of the Continental Officer Corps.”** Vol.78, No.4 (October, 2014), pp.1239-1261.

CLASS ISSUES: U.S.-MEXICAN WAR (1846-48)

Levinson, Irving W. **“A New Paradigm for an Old Conflict: The Mexico-United States War.”** Vol.73, No.2 (April, 2009), pp.393-416. The victorious U.S. Army that found itself in possession of Mexico City had to provide assistance to the dominant political and socio-economic groups in order to obtain a peace treaty that would conclude the war.

CLASS ISSUES: WORLD WAR I (1914-18)

Budreau, Lisa M. **“The Politics of Remembrance: The Gold Star Mothers’ Pilgrimage and America’s Fading Memory of the Great War.”** Vol.72, No.2 (April, 2008), pp.371-411. Collectively, the Gold Star Mothers offer a multidimensional model of the ethnic, cultural, economic, and religious diversity prevalent in the United States during the interwar years.

CLASS ISSUES arranged alphabetically by country - ENGLAND / GREAT BRITAIN

Bittner, Donald F. **“Shattering Images: Officers of the Royal Marines, 1867-1913.”** Vol.59, No.1 (January, 1995), pp.27-52. Demonstrates that Great Britain’s Royal Marines provided members of the middle class with the opportunity to earn a commission.

CLASS ISSUES arranged alphabetically by country - INDIA

Sundaram, Chandar S. “**‘Treated with Scant Attention’: The Imperial Cadet Corps, Indian Nobles, and Anglo-Indian Policy, 1897-1917.**” Vol.77, No.1 (January, 2013), pp.41-70.

Foreshadowing the Indianization of the Indian Army’s officer corps and the opening of the Indian Military Academy in 1932, the Imperial Cadet Corps offered officer training to Indian princes and gentlemen between 1901 and 1917.

CLASS ISSUES arranged alphabetically by country - RUSSIA / SOVIET UNION

Wirtschafter, Elise Kimerling, “**Social Misfits: Veterans and Soldier’s Families in Servile Russia [1682-1874].**” Vol.59, No.2 (April, 1995), pp.215-235. Endeavors to understand the relationship between military service and social categories in Imperial Russia, beginning with the reign of Peter the Great in 1682 up to the introduction of universal conscription in 1874.

CLIMATE AND ENVIRONMENT

Parker, Geoffrey, “**States Make War but Wars also Break States.**” Vol.74, No.1 (January, 2010), pp.11-34. The ‘chicken and egg’ debate at the heart of the mid-seventeenth century ‘General Crisis Debate’, arguing that only a synergy between natural and man-made disasters produced state-breakdown.

CLIMATE AND ENVIRONMENT:

THE MEDIEVAL AND EARLY MODERN PERIODS (476-1789)

White, Lorraine, “**Strategic Geography and the Spanish Habsburg Monarchy’s Failure to Recover Portugal, 1640-1668.**” Vol.71, No.2 (April, 2007), pp.373-409. Contrasting Alba’s (1507-1582) successful campaign in 1580 with the course of this mid-17th century conflict, the article considers the impact of geographic and climactic factors on the strategy, tactics, and logistics of the Spanish forces.

Soucier, Daniel S. “**‘Where there was no Signs of any Human Being’: Navigating the Eastern Country Wilderness on Arnold’s March to Quebec, 1775.**” Vol.81, No.2 (April, 2017), pp.369-393. Looks at soldiers’ attitudes towards and interaction with the natural environment.

Boutin, Cameron, “**Adversary and Ally: The Role of Weather in the Life and Career of George Washington.**” Vol.81, No.3 (July, 2017), pp.693-718.

Larnach, Matthew, “**The Battle of the Gates of Trajan, 986: A Reassessment.**” Vol.84, No.1 (January, 2020), pp.9-34. An investigation of the destruction of Emperor Basil II’s (r.976-1025) Byzantine army by the Bulgarians that incorporates the issue of logistics and an examination of terrain to ascertain the reasons for victory and defeat.

Nath, Pratyay, **“Looking beyond the Military Revolution: Variations in Early Modern Warfare and the Mughal Case.”** Vol.86, No.1 (January, 2022), pp.9-31. Argues that the heterogeneous nature of Mughal strategy, tactics, and the deployment of technology over time and across space was due to a wide range of factors, including environmental conditions, military pragmatism, financial considerations, and distance from the imperial heartland, challenging the simplistic early modern ‘Military Revolution’ thesis.

CLIMATE AND ENVIRONMENT: 19th CENTURY

Smith, Jason W. **“Twixt the Devil and the Deep Blue Sea: Hydrography, Sea Power, and the Marine Environment, 1898-1901.”** Vol.78, No.2 (April, 2014), pp.575-604. Endeavors to understand the role played by knowledge of the marine environment in the Spanish-American War, 1898.

Connor, John, **“Climate, Environment, and Australian Frontier Wars: New South Wales, 1788-1841.”** Vol.81, No.4 (October, 2017), pp.985-1006. Attests that there was a strong correlation between the onset of drought in the inland region of south-eastern Australia and the eruption of armed conflict from 1824 to 1841, advocating a consideration of the impact of weather on the outbreak of war throughout history.

CLIMATE AND ENVIRONMENT: U.S. CIVIL WAR (1861-65)

Kemmerly, Phillip R. **“Environment and the Course of Battle: Flooding at Shiloh (6-7 April, 1862).”** Vol.79, No.4 (October, 2015), pp.1079-1108.

Petty, Adam H. **“Reconsidering the Wilderness’s Role in Battle, 4-6 May 1864.”** Vol.82, No.2 (April, 2018), pp.413-438. Questions the existing consensus regarding the influence of the forest known as the Wilderness on the battle of the same name.

Kemmerly, Phillip R. **“Logistics of U.S. Grant’s 1863 Mississippi Campaign: From the Amphibious Landing at Bruinsburg to the Siege of Vicksburg.”** Vol.86, No.3 (July, 2022), pp.573-611. Approaches the much-studied Vicksburg Campaign of General Ulysses S. Grant (1869-1877) from the neglected perspective of logistics, assessing how the interactions of the environment and logistical requirements impacted battle plans, command decisions, and tactics.

CLIMATE AND ENVIRONMENT: WORLD WAR II (1939-45)

Holizimmer, Kevin C. **“Walter Krueger, Douglas MacArthur, and the Pacific War: The Wakde-Sarmi Campaign as a Case Study.”** Vol.59, No.4 (October, 1995), pp.661-685. Uses the Wakde-Sarmi operation in Northern New Guinea, 17-21 May, 1944, to demonstrate that General Krueger’s (1881-1967) performance as a commander

has to be judged within the context of circumstances beyond anyone's control.

Bankoff, Greg, **"From the Art of Practical Sailing to the Electronic Science of Navigation: Typhoons, Seamanship, and U.S. Naval Operations in the Northwest Pacific, 1944-1945."** Vol.86, No.4 (October, 2022), pp.949-972. Concerned with the challenges faced by ship's commanders of choosing between entrusting the safety of his vessel to his own judgement based on years of practical experience at sea or relying on the new technology at a time when some of the largest armadas of warships were ever assembled in wartime conditions.

CLIMATE AND ENVIRONMENT: THE COLD WAR (1945-91)

Martini, Edwin A. **"Incinerating Agent Orange: Operations Pacer HO, Pacer IVY, and the Rise of Environmentalist Thinking."** Vol.76, No.3 (July, 2012), pp.809-836.

COALITION WARFARE: WAR OF THE SPANISH SUCCESSION (1701-15)

Ostwald, Jamel, **"The 'Decisive' Battle of Ramillies, 1706: Prerequisites for Decisiveness in Early Modern Warfare."** Vol.64, No.3 (July, 2000), pp.649-677. Asks whether eighteenth century military strategy was indecisive by choice rather than by necessity by looking at the 1st Duke of Marlborough, John Churchill's (1650-1722), Ramillies campaign.

COALITION WARFARE:

FRENCH REVOLUTIONARY AND NAPOLEONIC WARS (1792-1815)

Barker, Thomas M. **"A Debacle of the Peninsular War: The British-led Amphibious Assault against Fort Fuengirola 14-15 October 1810."** Vol.64, No.1 (January, 2000), pp.9-52. Reassesses the failed amphibious assault by a multi-national force under the command of the Eleventh Lord Blayney, General Andrews Thomas.

COALITION WARFARE: THE BOXER REBELLION (1899-1901)

Otte, T.G. **"From *Can-Can Diabolique* to *Sitzkrieg*: The International China Expeditionary Force, 1900-1901."** Vol.77, No.4 (October, 2013), pp.1277-1302. Analyzes a neglected example of coalition warfare.

COALITION WARFARE: WORLD WAR I (1914-18)

Greenhalgh, Elizabeth, **"'Parade Ground Soldiers': French Army Assessments of the British on the Somme in 1916."** Vol.63, No.2 (April, 1999), pp.283-312. Assesses the attitudes among the *Poilus* towards their British counterparts in a battle in which roughly equal numbers of French

and British troops fought alongside each other.

Roberts, Priscilla, **“Tasker H. Bliss and the Evolution of Allied Unified Command, 1918: A Note on Old Battles Revisited.”** Vol.65, No.3 (July, 2001), pp.671-695.

Travers, Tim, **“Liman von Sanders, the Capture of Lieutenant Palmer, and Ottoman Anticipation of the Allied Landings at Gallipoli on 25 April 1915.”** Vol.65, No.4 (October, 2001), pp.965-979. Shines a light on the expectations of the Turks for a possible landing on the Gallipoli Peninsula and, in particular, the neglected issue of the impact of information from a captured British intelligence officer shortly before the actual landing.

Bruce, Robert B. **“America Embraces France: Marshal Joseph Joffre and the French Mission to the United States, April-May 1917.”** Vol.66, No.2 (April, 2002), pp.407-441. Proposes that Marshal Joffre (1852-1931), more than any other individual, established strong-Franco-American military, political, and social ties, contributing mightily to U.S. public support for a commitment of a large expeditionary force to the Western Front.

Greenhalgh, Elizabeth, **“Myth and memory: Sir Douglas Haig and the Imposition of Allied Unified Command in March, 1918.”** Vol.68, No.3 (July, 2004), pp.771-820. Debunks Field Marshal Haig’s (1861-1928) claim that he deserves credit for Chief of the French General Staff, Ferdinand Foch’s (1851-1929), appointment as Allied Supreme Commander.

Xu Guoqi, **“The Great War and China’s Military Expedition Plan.”** Vol.72, No.1 (January, 2008), pp.105-140. The article seeks to understand why China tried so hard to participate in the war, why China’s plans to raise an expeditionary force went unfulfilled, and what role China played in the First World War.

Prete, Roy A. **“Joffre and the Origins of the Somme: A Study in Allied Military Planning.”** Vol.73, No.2 (April, 2009), pp.417-448.

Delaney, Douglas E. **“Mentoring the Canadian Corps: Imperial Officers and the Canadian Expeditionary Force, 1914-1918.”** Vol.77, No.3 (July, 2013), pp.931-953.

Greenhalgh, Elizabeth. **“General Ferdinand Foch and Unified Allied Command in 1918.”** Vol.79, No.4 (October, 2015), pp.997-1023. Examines the actions and decisions of General Foch (1851-1929), including four during the German Spring Offensives, two during the Allied counteroffensive, and one during the armistice negotiations.

Armes, Keith, **“French Intelligence on the Russian Army on the Eve of the First World War.”** Vol.82, No.3 (July, 2018), pp.759-782.

COALITION WARFARE: SPANISH CIVIL WAR (1936-39)

Sullivan, Brian R. **“Review Essay: Fascist Italy’s Military Involvement in the Spanish Civil War.”** Vol.59, No.4 (October, 1995), pp.697-727. Surveys the existing literature concerning Benito Mussolini’s (1883-1945) commitment some 70,000 soldiers of the *Corpo Truppe Volontarie* and over 700 warplanes of the *Aviazione Legionaria* to the Nationalist cause, including the publications of official histories.

COALITION WARFARE: WORLD WAR II (1939-45): THE AXIS

DiNardo, R.L. **“The Dysfunctional Coalition: The Axis Powers and the Eastern Front in World War II.”** Vol.60, No.4 (October, 1996), pp.711-730. Illustrates that German arrogance, compounded by muddled political and strategic thinking, inadequate resources, widely varying capabilities, and linguistic differences, rendered the Axis Coalition a costly failure.

Statiev, Alexander, **“Antonescu’s Eagles against Stalin’s Falcons: The Romanian Air Force, 1920-1941.”** Vol.66, No.4 (October, 2002), pp.1085-1113. Gives an account of how, though it was favored over the Army, the Air Force was assigned missions that exceeded its capacity so that it was brought to the brink of extinction.

Scianna, Bastian Matteo, **“Rommel Almighty? Italian Assessment of the ‘Desert Fox’ during and after the Second World War.”** Vol.82, No.1 (January, 2018), pp.125-145. The Italian view based on new primary material, including the eavesdropping by British intelligence on Italian officers held as P.O.W.s in both Egypt and Britain.

COALITION WARFARE: WORLD WAR II (1939-45): THE ALLIES

Vance, Jonathan F. **“Men in Manacles: The Shackling of Prisoners of War, 1942-1943.”** Vol.59, No.3 (July, 1995), pp.483-504. Appraises the wartime relationship of the Dominion nations with Great Britain as reflected in the success of Canadian Prime Minister Mackenzie King’s (1874-1950) government in convincing Churchill (1874-1965) to abandon the retaliatory shackling of German P.O.W.s.

Van Courtland Moon, John Ellis, **“United States Chemical Warfare Policy in World War II: A Captive of Coalition Policy?”** Vol.60, No.3 (July, 1996), pp.495-511.

Rossi, Mario, **“United States Military Authorities and Free France, 1942-1944.”** Vol.61, No.1 (January, 1997), pp.49-64. Probes the political and military consequences of the clash between U.S. policy towards liberated French territory and Charles De Gaulle’s (1890-1970) claim to be the legitimate representative of the French people.

Shepardson, Donald E. **“The Fall of Berlin and the Rise of a Myth.”** Vol.62, No.1 (January, 1998), pp.135-154. Refutes the notions of United States naiveté and British realism in dealing

with both their German enemy and their Soviet ally in the spring of 1945.

Lewis, Adriabn R. **“The Failure of Allied Planning and Doctrine for Operation Overlord: The Case of Minefield and Obstacle Clearance.”** Vol.62, No.4 (October, 1998), pp.787-807.

Coles, Michael, **“Ernest King and the British Pacific Fleet: The Conference at Quebec, 1944 (‘Octagon’).”** Vol.65, No.1 (January, 2001), pp.105-129. While not excluding complications from Fleet Admiral King’s (1878-1956) personality, the author insists that there were valid political, economic, and operational factors against the deployment of the British Fleet alongside the U.S. Navy in the Pacific Theater.

Nenninger, Timothy K. **“United States Prisoners of War and the Red Army, 1944-45: Myths and Realities.”** Vol.66, No.3 (July, 2002), pp.761-781. When the Soviets overran German P.O.W. camps, they came into the possession of some 28,000 U.S. soldiers, the repatriation of which proved complicated.

Schwab, Stephen I. **“The Role of the Mexican Expeditionary Air Force in World War II: Late, Limited, but Symbolically Significant.”** Vol.66, No.4 (October, 2002), pp.1115-1140. Recounts the raising and service of the 201st Mexican P-47 Squadron in the Philippines beginning in May, 1945.

Bechthold, B. Michael, **“A Question of Success: Tactical Air Doctrine and Practice in North Africa, 1942-43.”** Vol.68, No.3 (July, 2004), 821-851. Reveals that the tactical doctrine of the U.S. Army Air Force was found wanting in North Africa in 1942, leading to the adoption of the proven British Eighth Army Western Desert Air Force model of ground-air cooperation.

Schwonek, Matthew R. **“Kazimierz Sosnkowski as Commander in Chief: The Government-in-Exile and Polish Strategy, 1932-1944.”** Vol.70, No.3 (July, 2006), pp.743-780.

Philpott, William and Alexander, Martin S. **“The French and the British Field Force: Moral Support or Material Contribution?”** Vol.71, No.3 (July, 2007), pp.743-772. Contends that, even though France viewed the military benefit of the British commitment of a field army if war broke out with Germany as unsubstantial, the moral value of such a promise meant that it played an important role in France’s preparations for war.

Hill, Alexander, **“British Lend Lease Aid and the Soviet War Effort, June 1941 – June 1942.”** Vol.71, No.3 (July, 2007), pp.773-808. Measures the significance of the aid provided by Great Britain during the First Moscow Protocol to the end of June, 1942.

Glantz, Mary, **“An Officer and a Diplomat? The Ambiguous Position of Philip R. Faymonville and United States-Soviet Relations, 1941-1943.”** Vol.72, No.1 (January, 2008), pp.141-177. Appraises the role played by Colonel Philip Faymonville (1888-1962) in U.S.-Soviet relations,

an officer who served as the United States' first military attaché and as expediter of Lend-Lease Aid during the war, but who had a contentious relationship with U.S. diplomatic personnel.

Jones, Mark C. **“Experiment at Dundee: The Royal Navy’s 9th Submarine Flotilla and Multinational Naval Cooperation during World War II.”** Vol.72, No.4 (October, 2008), pp.1179-1212. The 9th Flotilla included British, Dutch, Free French, Norwegian, and Polish submariners.

Kennedy, Paul, **“History from the Middle: The Case of the Second World War.”** Vol.74, No.1 (January, 2010), pp.35-51. Investigates the middle levels of war through examples from the middle of World War II when the chief operational objectives of the Allies were clearly established but had yet to be realized.

Khan, David, **“How the Allies Suppressed the Second Greatest Secret of World War II.”** Vol.74, No.4 (October, 2010), pp.1229-1241. Concerning the post-war classification of information about the Allies' success in breaking German codes.

Jones, Mark C. **“Not Just along for the Ride: The Role of Royal Navy Liaison Personnel in Multinational Naval Operations during World War II.”** Vol.76, No.1 (January, 2012), pp.127-158. The liaison system as a means of cooperation with European navies in exile from France, Greece, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, and Yugoslavia.

Macri, Franco David, **“‘C’ Force to Hong Kong: The Price of Collective Security in China, 1941.”** Vol.77, No.1 (January, 2013), pp.141-171. Concerning the strategic and political influences on the deployment of two Canadian infantry battalions to Hong Kong in November, 1941.

Hein, David, **“Vulnerable: H.M.S. *Prince of Wales* in 1941.”** Vol.77, No.3 (July, 2013), pp.955-989. The storied career of the H.M.S. *Prince of Wales*, involving fighting the K.M.S. *Bismarck*, the first Churchill-F.D.R. summit, service in the Mediterranean, and its sinking off the coast of Malaya.

Jones, Mark C. **“Friend and Advisor to the Allied Navies: The Royal Navy’s Principal Liaison Officer and Multinational Naval Operations in World War II.”** Vol.77, No.3 (July, 2013), pp.991-1023. The work of Principal Liaison Officer, Allied Navies (P.N.L.O.) with the Belgian, Dutch, French, Greek, Norwegian, Polish, and Yugoslav navies in exile.

Fedorowich, Kent, **“‘Caught in the Crossfire’: Sir Gerald Campbell, Lord Beaverbrook and the Near Demise of the British Commonwealth Air Training Plan, May-October 1940.”** Vol.79, No.1 (January, 2015), pp.37-68. The program was threatened by intemperate remarks by Lord Beaverbrook (1879-1964) which rattled Anglo-Canadian relations.

Hammond, Richard, **“Fighting under a Different Flag: Multinational Naval Cooperation and**

Submarine Warfare in the Mediterranean, 1940-1944.” Vol.80, No.2 (April, 2016), pp.447-476. In contrast to their experience in the British home theatre, the submarines in the Mediterranean operated by the exiled governments of the Free French, Greece, the Netherlands, Poland, and Yugoslavia, along with those of Italy beginning in 1943, found it difficult to cooperate with the Royal Navy, as well as each other.

Charles, Patrick J. **“Dissecting the Origins of Air-Centric Special Operations Theory.”** Vol.81, No.3 (July, 2017), pp.803-828. Seeks to find the answers to the controversy surrounding whether British or U.S. officers deserve the most credit for developing the concepts that led to Operation THURSDAY, the airlanding of a specialized force behind Japanese lines in Burma in March, 1944, to disrupt enemy infrastructure and communications.

Biddle, Tami Davis, **“On the Crest of Fear: V-Weapons, the Battle of the Bulge, and the Last Stages of World War II in Europe.”** Vol.83, No.1 (January, 2019), pp.157-194. Puts forward a causal relationship between Germany’s introduction of the use of the ‘V’ weapons, the impact of Germany’s Ardennes offensive on the Allied High Command, the Allied manpower crisis, and the acceleration of the Strategic Bombing Campaign during the last months of the war.

Tunwell, David Passmore and Harrison, Stephan, **“An Evaluation of Allied Intelligence in the Tactical Bombing of German Supply Depots during the Normandy Campaign, 1944.”** Vol.84, No.3 (July, 2020), pp.825-842. Sets forth the proposition that had Allied intelligence regarding German supply activities been more accurate, a decisive crippling of German logistics could have enabled Allied troops to achieve victory sooner than was the case.

Lim, Preston Jordan, **“Churchill’s Butchers: Mission 204’s Operations in China, 1942-1945.”** Vol.84, No.4 (October, 2020), pp.1127-1156. Whereas previous studies have focused on the mission’s record in 1942, the author examines the entire length of service of this combined British-Australian commando unit tasked with training Nationalist guerrillas, suggesting that it was more successful than previously thought.

COALITION WARFARE: COLD WAR (1945-91)

Sarantakes, Nicholas Evan, **“The Quiet War: Combat Operations along the Korean Demilitarized Zone, 1966-1969.”** Vol.64, No.2 (April, 2000), pp.439-457. Describes how South Korea and the United States responded differently to the provocations of North Korea and how this impacted the war in Vietnam.

Priest, Andrew, **“ ‘In Common Cause’: The N.A.T.O. Multilateral Force and the Mixed-Manning Demonstration on the U.S.S. *Claude V. Ricketts*, 1964-1965.”** Vol.69, No.3 (July, 2005), pp.759-789. The crew of the destroyer (DDG-5) U.S.S. *Claude V. Ricketts* included U.S., British, Dutch, Greek, Italian, Turkish, and West German officers and men.

Young, Ken, **“No Blank Cheque: Anglo-American (Mis)Understandings and the Use of the English Airbases.”** Vol.71, No.4 (October, 2007), pp.1133-1167. Deals with the diplomatic, political, and military issues surrounding the deployment of U.S. nuclear-capable strategic bombers to bases in Great Britain following the Berlin crisis of 1948.

Trauschweizer, Ingo Wolfgang, **“Learning with an Ally: The U.S. Army and the Bundeswehr in the Cold War.”** Vol.72, No.2 (April, 2008), pp.477-508. Discusses four areas of German-U.S. defense cooperation, including aid for West German rearmament, the reorganization of German and U.S. combat formations in the post-Korean War period, the failure of a shared attempt at tank design, and the impact of German tactical and operational concepts on post-Vietnam U.S. Army doctrine.

Young, Ken, **“Special Weapon, Special Relationship: The Atomic Bomb Comes to Britain.”** Vol.77, No.2 (April, 2013), pp.569-598. Beginning in 1950, the United States Air Force based strategic bombers with atomic bombs in East Anglia, England.

Eames, Anthony, **“The Trident Sales Agreement and Cold War Diplomacy.”** Vol.81, No.1 (January, 2017), pp.163-186. The ‘Special Relationship’ was bolstered by the sale of U.S. Trident submarine-launched ballistic missile technology to Great Britain in 1982.

Hobbins, Peter, **“Engineering the Fighter Pilot: Aviators, Anti-G suits, and Allied Air Power, 1940-53.”** Vol.84, No.1 (January, 2020), pp.115-149. Probes the failure of the Cotton Aerodynamic Anti-G suit championed by the Australian Air Force to be adopted by the British and United States Air Forces during the period marked by World War II and the Korean War.

McGibbon, Ian, **“Australian-New Zealand Relations and Commitments to Asian Conflicts 1950-1972.”** Vol.81, No.4 (October, 2017), pp.1059-1074. Despite the replacement of the British security framework by alliance with the United States, New Zealand resisted pressure to commit troops to the Vietnam War in direct contrast to its larger neighbor.

Campbell, Isabel, **“A Tale of Submarine Sightings and a Golden Goose: American-British-Canadian Intelligence Sharing in the Early Cold War.”** Vol.85, No.4 (October, 2021), pp.980-1003. The consequences of efforts to establish trilateral intelligence of the sighting of Soviet submarines in the Davis Strait in 1946.

COALITION WARFARE: KOREAN WAR (1950-53)

Millett, Allan R. **“A Reader’s Guide to the Korean War.”** Vol.61, No.3 (July, 1997), pp.583-597.

Coleman, Bradley Lynn, **“The Colombian Army in Korea, 1950-1954.”** Vol.69, No.4 (October, 2005), pp.1137-1177. Uses the service history of the Colombian Battalion as an example of the United Nations’ multi-national coalition force.

Gibby, Bryan, **“The Best Little Army.”** Vol.77, No.1 (January, 2013), pp.173-201. Surveys the results of the work of the U.S. Korean Military Advisory Group (K.M.A.G.) prior to the outbreak of the Korean War.

Uyar, Mesut and Güvenç, Serhat, **“One Battle and Two Accounts: The Turkish Brigade at Kunu-ri in November 1950.”** Vol.80, No.4 (October, 2016), pp.1117-1147. Assesses the impact of U.S. military assistance provided to the Turkish Army and why the official U.S. and Turkish accounts of the Battle of Kunu-ri / Chongchon differ significantly.

Grey, Jeffrey, **“The Formation of the Commonwealth Division, 1950-1951.”** Vol.81, No.4 (October, 2017), pp.1097-1107. The saga of the military and political challenges of forming a division composed of units from the Australian, British, Canadian, Indian, and New Zealand armies.

Hobbins, Peter, **“Engineering the Fighter Pilot: Aviators, Anti-G suits, and Allied Air Power, 1940-53.”** Vol.84, No.1 (January, 2020), pp.115-149. Probes the failure of the Cotton Aerodynamic Anti-G suit championed by the Australian Air Force to be adopted by the British and United States Air Forces during the period marked by World War II and the Korean War.

COALITION WARFARE: VIETNAM WAR (2nd Indochina War) (1955-1975)

Xiaoming Zhang, **“China’s Involvement in Laos during the Vietnam War, 1963-1975.”** Vol.66, No.4 (October, 2002), pp.1141-1166. Shows that the competition between Hanoi and Beijing for control over the Laotian Communists reflected an underlying mistrust between the two governments.

Birtle, Andrew James, **“Advisory Service in Vietnam: Detrimental to an Officer’s Career?”** Vol.74, No.3 (July, 2010), pp.871-877. By examining the extent to which former Vietnam advisers achieved general officer rank in the U.S. Army, the article seeks to test the common belief among officers that the Army did not assign its best men for service as advisors and that promotion boards discriminated against these advisors.

Boylan, Kevin M. **“Goodnight Saigon: American Provincial Advisors’ Final Impressions of the Vietnam War.”** Vol.78, No.1 (January, 2014), pp.233-270. Scrutinizes the revisionist proposition that the United States had won the war in the wake of the Tet Offensive, 1968, by examining the assessments of U.S. Province Senior Advisors.

COLD WAR (1945-91) arranged alphabetically by region - AFRICA

Vandervort, Bruce, **“Review Essay: African Military History Comes of Age.”** Vol.81, No.1 (January,

2017), pp.205-208. A look at two significant works on the military history of the continent, one an encyclopedia of colonial conflicts, the other a three-volume narrative account of conflict, edited and written by Timothy J. Stapleton, respectively.

COLD WAR (1945-91) arranged alphabetically by region - ASIA

See Also: KOREAN WAR; 1st INDOCHINA WAR; VIETNAM WAR

Sarantakes, Nicholas Evan, **“The Quiet War: Combat Operations along the Korean Demilitarized Zone, 1966-1969.”** Vol.64, No.2 (April, 2000), pp.439-457. Describes how South Korea and the United States responded differently to the provocations of North Korea and how this impacted the war in Vietnam.

Spector, Ronald H. **“After Hiroshima: Allied Military Occupations and the Fate of Japan’s Empire, 1945-1947.”** Vol.69, No.4 (October, 2005), pp.1121-1136. The Allies confronted problems far beyond the disarming of Japanese troops in occupied China, Korea, and Southeast Asia, where internal conflicts rendered the plans of the Allied powers irrelevant.

McGibbon, Ian, **“Australian-New Zealand Relations and Commitments to Asian Conflicts 1950-1972.”** Vol.81, No.4 (October, 2017), pp.1059-1074. Despite the replacement of the British security framework by alliance with the United States, New Zealand resisted pressure to commit troops to the Vietnam War in direct contrast to its larger neighbor.

COLD WAR (1945-1991) arranged alphabetically by region - EUROPE

Snyder, David R. **“Arming the *Bundesmarine*: The United States and the Build-Up of the German Federal Navy, 1950-1960.”** Vol.66, No.2 (April, 2002), pp.477-500.

Young, Ken, **“No Blank Cheque: Anglo-American (Mis)Understandings and the Use of the English Airbases.”** Vol.71, No.4 (October, 2007), pp.1133-1167. Deals with the diplomatic, political, and military issues surrounding the deployment of U.S. nuclear-capable strategic bombers to bases in Great Britain following the Berlin crisis of 1948.

Trauschweizer, Ingo Wolfgang, **“Learning with an Ally: The U.S. Army and the Bundeswehr in the Cold War.”** Vol.72, No.2 (April, 2008), pp.477-508. Discusses four areas of German-U.S. defense cooperation, including aid for West German rearmament, the reorganization of German and U.S. combat formations in the post-Korean War period, the failure of a shared attempt at tank design, and the impact of German tactical and operational concepts on post-Vietnam U.S. Army doctrine.

Young, Ken, **“Special Weapon, Special Relationship: The Atomic Bomb Comes to Britain.”** Vol.77, No.2 (April, 2013), pp.569-598. Beginning in 1950, the United States Air Force based

strategic bombers with atomic bombs in East Anglia, England.

Boghardt, Thomas, **“Dirty Work? The Use of Nazi Informants by U.S. Army Intelligence in Postwar Europe.”** Vol.79, No.2 (April, 2015), pp.387-422. Probes ethical issues and utility of the Allied enlistment of war criminals and suspected war criminals for collecting information on Soviet and Communist Party activities in Europe.

Eames, Anthony, **“The Trident Sales Agreement and Cold War Diplomacy.”** Vol.81, No.1 (January, 2017), pp.163-186. The ‘Special Relationship’ was bolstered by the sale of U.S. Trident submarine-launched ballistic missile technology to Great Britain in 1982.

COLD WAR (1945-91) arranged alphabetically by region - MIDDLE EAST

See Also: ARAB-ISRAELI WARS; YEMEN

Hughes, Geraint, **“Demythologising Dhofar: British Policy, Military Strategy, and Counter-Insurgency in Oman, 1963-1976.”** Vol.79, No.2 (April, 2015), pp.423-456. Demonstrates that the UK backed C.O.I.N. operations of the Sultanate of Oman placed a heavier reliance on military force than civil engagement and that specific historical circumstances make the ‘lessons learned’ less applicable for other conflicts.

COLD WAR (1945-91) arranged alphabetically by country - CHINA

See Also: KOREAN WAR; 1st INDOCHINA WAR; VIETNAM WAR

May, Ernest R. **“The George C. Marshall Lecture in Military History: 1947-48: When Marshall kept the U.S. Out of War in China.”** Vol.66, No.4 (October, 2002), pp.1001-1010.

Reist, Katherine K. **“The American Military Advisory Missions to China, 1945-1949.”** Vol.77, No.4 (October, 2013), pp.1379-1398. Provides an account of the difficulties between the Joint U.S. Military Advisory Group and *Guomindang* leaders.

Jeans, Roger B., Jr. **“Ghost Guerrillas: The C.I.A. and ‘Tiger General’ Li Zongren’s Third Force during the Early Cold War.”** Vol.81, No.2 (April, 2017), pp.491-512. The attempt by the C.I.A. to develop an anti-Communist faction as an alternative to Chiang Kai-Shek’s (1887-1975) Nationalists and the broader impact of this approach on the C.I.A.

**COLD WAR (1945-1991) arranged alphabetically by country –
ENGLAND / GREAT BRITAIN**

See Also: KOREAN WAR; INDONESIA-MALAYSIA CONFRONTATION

Hatzivassiliou, Evanthis, **“Cold War Pressures, Regional Strategies, and Relative Decline: British Military and Strategic Planning for Cyprus, 1950-1960.”** Vol.73, No.4 (October, 2009), pp.1143-1166. Highlights the significance of Cyprus as a secure base in the Middle East for Great Britain during the Cold War, particularly after the loss of the Suez Canal.

COLD WAR (1945-91) arranged alphabetically by country - THE NETHERLANDS

Hoffenaar, Jan, **“*Hannibal ante portas*: The Soviet Military Threat and the Build-up of the Dutch Armed Forces, 1948-1958.”** Vol.66, No.1 (January, 2002), pp.163-191.

COLD WAR (1945-91) arranged alphabetically by country - PAKISTAN

Gill, John H. **“Review Essay: Glimpses Inside Pakistan’s Elusive Army.”** Vol.77, No.1 (January, 2013), pp.294-298. Covers five recent works on the Army of Pakistan, a very difficult subject to study due to a lack of access to archival sources.

COLD WAR (1945-1991) arranged alphabetically by country - U.S.A.

See Also: KOREAN WAR; VIETNAM WAR

Grandstaff, Mark R. **“Making the Military American: Advertising, Reform, and the Demise of an Antistanding Military Tradition, 1945-1955.”** Vol.60, No.2 (April, 1996), pp.299-323. Establishes that, while concerns over the spread of communism and nuclear war played a role, both reforms within the military and a national public relations campaign also helped citizens view the armed forces as an acceptable American institution.

Fautua, David T. **“The ‘Long Pull’ Army: NSC 68, the Korean War, and the Creation of the Cold War Army.”** Vol.61, No.1 (January, 1997), pp.93-120. Endeavors to distinguish the changes to the U.S. Army in the early 1950s resulting from National Security Council paper 68 from those prompted by the Korean War (1950-1953).

Bacevich, A.J. **“The Paradox of Professionalism: Eisenhower, Ridgway, and the Challenge to Civilian Control, 1953-1955.”** Vol.61, No.2 (April, 1997), pp.303-333. By focusing on the U.S. Army’s efforts to undermine President Eisenhower’s (1953-1961) policy of massive nuclear retaliation, this article attempts to depict the actual terms of the civil-military relationship within the innermost circles of the U.S. government to determine the realities and limits of civilian control of the armed forces.

Bernstein, Barton J. **“Review Essay: The Making of the Atomic Admiral: ‘Deak’ Parsons and Modernizing the U.S. Navy.”** Vol.63, No.2 (April, 1999), pp.415-426. William Sterling Parsons (1901-1953) was an ordnance expert who participated in the Manhattan project and

was involved in post-war nuclear tests.

Jacobs, Harry A. **“Operation Strakonice: In Pursuit of the Soviet Order of Battle.”** Vol.65, No.2 (April, 2001), pp.391-400. Chronicles the successful mission of the U.S. military intelligence unit, Order of Battle Team 24, to seize German documents detailing Soviet forces, documents that were located beyond the Line of Demarcation in Czechoslovakia.

Marchio, James D. **“Risking General War in Pursuit of Limited Objectives: U.S. Military Contingency Planning for Poland in the Wake of the 1956 Hungarian Uprising.”** Vol.66, No.3 (July, 2002), pp.783-812. Reveals that the various problems in exploring options for coming to the defense of Poland in the wake of the suppression of the Hungarian uprising led the Eisenhower administration to develop more response options to compliment the doctrine of massive nuclear retaliation.

May, Ernest R. **“The George C. Marshall Lecture in Military History: 1947-48: When Marshall kept the U.S. Out of War in China.”** Vol.66, No.4 (October, 2002), pp.1001-1010.

Nelson, Anna Kasten, **“Anna M. Rosenberg, an ‘Honorary Man’.**” Vol.68, No.1 (January, 2004), pp.133-161. Considers how and why Defense Secretary George C. Marshall (1880-1959) bucked political and gender assumptions when he appointed a pro-New Deal, Jewish immigrant woman, Anna M. Rosenberg (1899-1983), as the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower.

Malkasian, Carter, **“Toward a Better Understanding of Attrition: The Korean and Vietnam Wars.”** Vol.68, No.3 (July, 2004), pp.911-942.

Neufeld, Michael J. **“The End of the Army Space Program: Interservice Rivalry and the Transfer of the von Braun Group to N.A.S.A., 1958-1959.”** Vol.69, No.3 (July, 2005), pp.737-757.

Bronfeld, Saul, **“Fighting Outnumbered: The Impact of the Yom Kippur War on the U.S. Army.”** Vol.71, No.2 (April, 2007), pp.465-498. Illustrates the different ways in which the Yom Kippur War impacted the work of Generals William E. DePuy (1919-1992) and Donn A. Starry (1925-2011) in reforming the U.S. Army.

Carter, Donald Alan, **“Eisenhower versus the Generals.”** Vol.71, No.4 (October, 2007), pp.1169-1199. Traces the rancor that evolved between President Dwight D. Eisenhower (1953-1961), who pursued the ‘New Look’ national security policy that relied on nuclear weapons, the Strategic Air Command, and a robust economy, versus Army officers who believed the drastic reductions in conventional ground forces challenged the very existence of their service.

Carland, John M. **“War, Politics, Diplomacy, and the Presidency: Off the Record Comments**

by Lyndon B. Johnson in Retirement.” Vol.72, No.4 (October, 2008), pp.1257-1263.

Goldman, David I. **“The Generals and the Germs: The Army Leadership’s Response to Nixon’s Review of Chemical and Biological Warfare Policies in 1969.”** Vol.73, No.2 (April, 2009), pp.531-569. The response of U.S. Army leadership to President Richard Nixon (1969-1974) unilateral elimination of biological warfare agents, retaining only a defensive research program, as well as placing limitations on the chemical weapons.

Dujmović, Nicholas, **“Drastic Actions Short of War: The Origins and Application of C.I.A.’s Covert Paramilitary Function in the Early Cold War.”** Vol.76, No.3 (July, 2012), pp.775-808. In mid-1948, the Central Intelligence Agency was assigned a covert paramilitary function, which may explain why the C.I.A.’s paramilitary activities were never as effective as policy makers and Agency operations officers expected.

Martini, Edwin A. **“Incinerating Agent Orange: Operations Pacer HO, Pacer IVY, and the Rise of Environmentalist Thinking.”** Vol.76, No.3 (July, 2012), pp.809-836.

Friedman, Hal M. **“Blue versus Orange: The United States Naval War College, Japan, and the Old Enemy in the Pacific, 1945-1946.”** Vol.78, No.1 (January, 2014), pp.211-231.

Reports on the delay in adjusting to post-war circumstances that meant that the War College curriculum remained a mixture of interwar and wartime doctrine during the early Cold War.

Hutchinson, Robert W. **“The Weight of History: *Wehrmacht* Officers, the U.S. Army Historical Division, and U.S. Military Doctrine, 1945-1956.”** Vol.78, No.4 (October, 2014), pp.1321-1348.

Suggests that, even within the ‘purely operational’ lessons provided by veteran German officers to the U.S. Army, a considerable element of Nazi racist ideology was transmitted.

Rislakki, Jukka, **“‘Without Mercy’ – U.S. Strategic Intelligence and Finland in the Cold War.”**

Vol.79, No.1 (January, 2015), pp.127-149. Unbeknownst to Finland’s political leaders, a secret channel for the exchange of information regarding the U.S.S.R. existed between Finnish military intelligence and the United States.

Stoler, Mark A. **“The 2015 George C. Marshall Lecture in Military History: George C.**

Marshall and the ‘Europe-First Strategy, 1939-1951: A Study in Diplomatic as well as Military History.’ Vol.79, No.2 (April, 2015), pp.293-316. Examines the relationship between diplomatic and military history regarding Marshall’s (1880-1959) support for the strategy of ‘Germany First’ during World War II, for the postwar European Recovery Program, and the relief of Gen. Douglas MacArthur (1880-1964) during the Korean War.

Seipp, Adam R. **“‘Visionary Battle Scenes’: Reading Sir John Hackett’s *The Third World War*,**

1977-85.” Vol.83, No.4 (October, 2019), pp.1235-1257. Suggests that the success of Sir John Hackett’s (1910-1997) 1978 best-selling novel reflected rising Cold War tensions, as well as

inspiring the modern literary genre of the techno-thriller.

Williamson, Corbin, **“Mediterranean Marines: The Challenges of Forward Deployment, 1948-1958.”** Vol.85, No.2 (April, 2021), pp.426-452. Considers the challenges to U.S. Marine Corps units deployed in the Mediterranean as part of President Truman’s commitment to containment of the Soviet Union.

COLD WAR (1945-91): HISTORIOGRAPHY

Bacevich, Andrew J. **“The Revisionist Imperative: Rethinking Twentieth Century Wars.”** Vol.76, No.2 (April, 2012), pp.333-342. Insists that historians need to replace the familiar and morally reassuring story of a Short Twentieth Century with a less familiar and morally ambiguous story of a still unfolding Long Twentieth Century.

COLOMBIA

Coleman, Bradley Lynn, **“The Colombian Army in Korea, 1950-1954.”** Vol.69, No.4 (October, 2005), pp.1137-1177. Uses the service history of the Colombian Battalion as an example of the United Nations’ multi-national coalition force.

COMMAND AND CONTROL

Palmer, Michael A. **“ ‘The Soul’s Right Hand’: Command and Control in the Age of Fighting Sail, 1652-1827.”** Vol.61, No.4 (October, 1997), pp.679-705. Suggests that the ‘rationalism’ of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries had a detrimental impact on methods of command and control, emphasizing centralization which, in turn, favored the single line ahead formation that has been blamed for the indecisiveness of naval battles in this period.

Black, Jeremy, **“Historiographical Essay: Military Organisations and Military Change in Historical Perspective.”** Vol.62, No.4 (October, 1998), pp.871-892. Presents an explanatory model of change based on military organization, including both unit and command structures, and intersection and interaction with wider social patterns and practices.

Kahn, David, **“The Prehistory of the General Staff.”** Vol.71, No.2 (April, 2007), pp.499-504. Sets forth the argument that the advent of the modern general staff system was the consequence of secularization, which provided control, bureaucracy, which rationalized endeavor, and management, which overcame specialization.

Wilson, Peter H. **“Defining Military Culture.”** Vol.72, No.1 (January, 2008), pp.11-41. Puts forward the notion that military culture is a specific form of institutional culture and that

viewing armies from this perspective offers new insight into both how they functioned and the nature of their interaction with state and society.

Rodriguez, Manuel Santirso, **“Under the Uniform: Tyrants and Praetorians in the Aftermath of the Revolution (1829-1854).”** Vol.83, No.2 (April, 2019), pp.379-407. Weighs the parallels and differences in the lives and careers of Nicholas Jean-de-Dieu Soult of France (1769-1851), Arthur Wellesley, the Duke of Wellington of Great Britain (1769-1852), Baldomero Espartero of Spain (1793-1879), and Andrew Jackson of the United States (1767-1845).

COMMUNICATIONS

Winkler, Jonathan Reed, **“Information Warfare in World War I.”** Vol.73, No.3 (July, 2009), pp.845-867. Presents both the British success in destroying the pre-war German system and the simultaneous German campaign against Allied communications, all within the broader economic, political, intelligence, and military context of modern conflict.

Pennington, Reina, **“Offensive Women: Women in Combat in the Red Army in the Second World War.”** Vol.74, No.3 (July, 2010), pp.775-820. Reports on the nature and variety of women’s combat experiences.

Hall, Brian N. **“Technological Adaptation in Global Conflict: The British Army and Communications beyond the Western Front, 1914-1918.”** Vol.78, No.1 (January, 2014), pp.37-71.

Bullock, Mike; Lyons, Laurence, and Judkins, Philip, **“A Resolution of the Debate about British Wireless in World War I.”** Vol.84, No.4 (October, 2020), pp.1079-1096. Visits the debate over whether, as Dr. Brian Hall contends, the British Army utilized continuous wave radio as best as this technology allowed with how it was used by their French and U.S. counterparts.

Blazich, Frank A. **“Notre Cher Ami: The Enduring Myth and Memory of a Humble Pigeon.”** Vol.85, No.3 (July, 2021), pp.646-677. The homing pigeon Cher Ami survived severe wounds transporting messages, but the question of whether or not it was the pigeon that helped save the ‘Lost Battalion’ of the American Expeditionary Force is explored in this article.

CONGO, DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF

Dorn, Walter, **“The U.N.’s First ‘Air Force’: Peacekeepers in Combat, Congo 1960-64.”** Vol.77, No.4 (October, 2013), pp.1399-1425. Recounts O.N.U.C.’s Operation Grand Slam in December, 1962, during which Swedish jets neutralized Katanga’s air force.

CONNECTICUT, U.S.A.

Lender, Mark Edward and Martin, James Kirby, **“Target New London: Benedict Arnold’s Raid, Just War, and ‘Homegrown Terror’ Reconsidered.”** Vol.83, No.1 (January, 2019), pp.67-95. Challenges the traditional Patriot depiction of Benedict Arnold’s (1741-1801) attack on the privateer base of New London, Connecticut, 6 September, 1781, arguing that it was conducted according to the contemporary rules of ‘civilized warfare.’

COOPER, JAMES FENIMORE (1789-1851)

Skaggs, David Curtis, **“Aiming at the Truth: James Fenimore Cooper and the Battle of Lake Erie.”** Vol.59, No.2 (April, 1995), pp.237-255. Disentangles the disputed account of the Battle of Lake Erie, 10 September, 1813, written by Cooper (1789-1851) in his *History of the Navy of the United States* (1839).

COSSACKS – See: RUSSIA / SOVIET UNION: EARLY MODERN PERIOD

COSTA RICA

Moulton, Aaron Coy, **“The Dominican Dictator’s Funds and Guns in Costa Rica’s Wars of 1948.”** Vol.85, No.3 (July, 2021), pp.713-733. Whereas past studies of the conflicts in Costa Rica have focused on the involvement of Anastasio Somoza García of Nicaragua (1896-1956) and Juan José Arévalo of Guatemala (1904-1990), the author demonstrates that Costa Ricans sought to obtain arms from the Dominican Dictator Rafael Trujillo (1891-1961).

CORBETT, JULIAN (1854-1922)

Martin, Christopher, **“The Complexity of Strategy: ‘Jackie’ Fischer and the Trouble with Submarines.”** Vol.75, No.2 (April, 2011), pp.441-470. The problems of re-formulating strategy in the wake of the introduction of submarines for Admiral ‘Jackie’ Fischer (1841-1920), Prime Minister A.J. Balfour (r.1902-1905), and Julian Corbett (1854-1922).

Lambert, Nicholas A. **“Review Essay: False Prophet?: The Maritime Theory of Julian Corbett and Professional Education.”** Vol.77, No.3 (July, 2013), pp.1055-1078.

COVERT OPERATIONS: PRE-MODERN PERIOD

See Also: DECEPTION AND INTELLIGENCE

McMahon, Daniel, “**Geomancy and Walled Fortifications in Late Eighteenth Century China.**” Vol.76, No.2 (April, 2012), pp.373-393. Takes account of the role of geomancy based on *fengshui* in military planning and activity during the Qing Dynasty, including intelligence gathering, sabotage, and fortifications.

Serebriakova, Polina and Orbach, Danny, “**Irregular Warfare in Late Medieval Japan: Towards a Historical Understanding of the Ninja.**” Vol.84, No.4 (October, 2020), pp.997-1020. Separating the contemporary myth from what we can actually determine based on surviving primary sources.

COVERT OPERATIONS: WORLD WAR I (1914-18)

Karau, Mark, “**Twisting the Dragon’s Tail: The Zeebrugge and Ostend Raids of 1918.**” Vol.67, No.2 (April, 2003), pp.455-481.

COVERT OPERATIONS: WORLD WAR II (1939-45)

Mann, Christopher, “**Combined Operations, the Commandos, and Norway, 1941-1944.**” Vol.73, No.2 (April, 2009), pp.471-495. Displays the broader strategic consequences of a series of British raids on the coast of Norway, including valuable experience in joint operations and the commitment of German forces for the defense of Norway.

Wylie, Neville, “**Allied Special Forces and Prisoner of War Recovery Operations in Europe, 1944-1945.**” Vol.81, No.2 (April, 2017), pp.469-489. Contrary to contemporary and historical judgements, Allied plans to secure the safety of P.O.W.s in German hands were reasonable, realistic, and provided a template for similar operations in the Pacific Theater and beyond.

Biddiscombe, Perry, “**The Mufti’s Men: Haj Amin-al-Husayni and S.S. Parachute Expeditions to Palestine and Iraq, 1944-1945.**” Vol.82, No.3 (July, 2018), pp.783-815.

Lim, Preston Jordan, “**Churchill’s Butchers: Mission 204’s Operations in China, 1942-1945.**” Vol.84, No.4 (October, 2020), pp.1127-1156. Whereas previous studies have focused on the mission’s record in 1942, the author examines the entire length of service of this combined British-Australian commando unit tasked with training Nationalist guerrillas, suggesting that it was more successful than previously thought.

COVERT OPERATIONS: COLD WAR (1945-91)

Dujmović, Nicholas, “**Drastic Actions Short of War: The Origins and Application of C.I.A.’s**

Covert Paramilitary Function in the Early Cold War.” Vol.76, No.3 (July, 2012), pp.775-808. In mid-1948, the Central Intelligence Agency was assigned a covert paramilitary function, which may explain why the C.I.A.’s paramilitary activities were never as effective as policy makers and Agency operations officers expected.

Tuck, Christopher, “**‘Cut the bonds which bind our hands’: Deniable Operations during the Confrontation with Indonesia, 1963-1966.**” Vol.77, No.2 (April, 2013), pp.599-623. Describes the British confrontation with Indonesia and the problems with cross-border operations.

Jeans, Roger B., Jr. “**Ghost Guerrillas: The C.I.A. and ‘Tiger General’ Li Zongren’s Third Force during the Early Cold War.**” Vol.81, No.2 (April, 2017), pp.491-512. The attempt by the C.I.A. to develop an anti-Communist faction as an alternative to Chiang Kai-Shek’s (1887-1975) Nationalists and the broader impact of this approach on the C.I.A.

Tuck, Christopher, “**Measuring Victory: Assessing the outcomes of *Konfrontasi*, 1963-66.**” Vol.82, No.3 (July, 2018), pp.873-898. Suggests that the outcome of the British low intensity conflict with Indonesia, known as the ‘Confrontation’, is far more complex than either the triumphal or revisionist interpretations suggest.

Xiaoming Zhang, “**High-Altitude Duel: The C.I.A.’s U-2 Spy Plane Overflights and China’s Air Defense Force, 1961-1968.**” Vol.86, No.1 (January, 2022), pp.132-159. Charts the overflights of the People’s Republic of China during the 1960s by Chinese Nationalist pilots operating out of Taiwan with the goal of monitoring the P.R.C.’s nuclear weapons program.

CRERAR, HENRY DUNCAN GRAHAM (1888-1965)

Dickson, Paul D. “**The Politics of Army Expansion: General H.D.G. Crerar and the Creation of the First Canadian Army, 1940-41.**” Vol.60, No.2 (April, 1996), pp.271-298. Explains that General Henry Duncan Graham Crerar’s (1888-1965) success in winning approval for raising and deploying a Field Army represented an aberration in the balance of Canadian civil-military relations and illustrates aspects of Canadian military and its impact on the war.

CRETE – See: GREECE

CRIME AND CIVIL UNREST: LIVONIAN WAR (1558-83)

Sproule, Joseph, “**Raiding, Pillaging, and Violent Social Change in Late Sixteenth-Century Livonia.**” Vol.85, No.2 (April, 2021), pp.317-341. Establishes how the pervasiveness of

raiding dictated tactical and strategic considerations, influenced military policy, shaped civil-military relations, and played a role in breaking down longstanding social mores, transforming societies, normalizing violence.

CRIME AND CIVIL UNREST: U.S. REVOLUTIONARY WAR (1775-83)

Maass, John R. “**‘Too Grievous for a People to Bear’: Impressment and Conscription in Revolutionary North Carolina.**” Vol.73, No.4 (October, 2009), pp.1091-1115.

The government of North Carolina, faced with the challenges of fighting a revolutionary war, chose to impose impressment and conscription, which produced antipathy and resistance to Patriot authorities, undermining support for the new state, and added to the disorders within the state during the war.

CRIME AND CIVIL UNREST: FRENCH REVOLUTIONARY AND NAPOLEONIC WARS (1792-1815)

Hantraye, Jacques, “**The Silence of the Woods: The 1815 Murder of a Prussian Soldier in Western France.**” Vol.80, No.1 (January, 2016), pp.57-76. Focuses on the murder of a Prussian soldier on 22 July, 1815, outside of the village of Unverre, located roughly ninety miles southwest of Paris, as a means of exploring the interactions between the forces of occupation and the civilian population of postwar France.

CRIME AND CIVIL UNREST: EARLY 20th CENTURY

Schubert, Frank N. “**The 25th Infantry at Brownsville, Texas: Buffalo Soldiers, the ‘Brownsville Six’, and the Medal of Honor.**” Vol.75, No.4 (October, 2011), pp.1217-1224. Addresses the myth that there were six holders of the Medal of Honor among the Buffalo Soldiers who were dismissed after the August, 1906, shooting in Brownsville, Texas.

Matthews, James, “**Battling Bolshevik Bogeymen: Spain’s Cordon Sanitaire against Revolution from a European Perspective, 1917-1923.**” Vol.80, No.3 (July, 2016), pp.725-755. The violent social unrest experienced by Spain after 1917 represented the broader impact of the Russian Revolution that effected countries, whether they were belligerents in the Great War or neutrals like Spain.

CRIME AND CIVIL UNREST: WORLD WAR II (1939-45)

Bland, Larry I. “**Document of Note: Marlene Dietrich’s Firepower.**” Vol.66, No.3 (July, 2002), pp.829-831. Chief-of-Staff George C. Marshall (1880-1959) sought a means to stop the flow of firearms being brought back to the U.S. as war trophies.

Moore, Bob, “**Unwanted Guests in Troubled Times: German Prisoners of War in the Union**

of South Africa, 1942-1943.” Vol.70, No.1 (January, 2006), pp.63-90. Contrasts the potential threats to domestic security in South Africa during a time of internal dissension of holding German P.O.W.s with the less troublesome experience with Italian prisoners.

Thomas, Martin, **“Colonial Violence in Algeria and the Distorted Logic of State Retribution: The Sétif Uprising of 1945.”** Vol.75, No.1 (January, 2011), pp.125-157. Charts the rapid escalation of French security and vigilante violence in response to the uprising that broke out on VE-Day, 8 May, 1945, arguing that in the long run this was counterproductive.

Lawlor, Ruth, **“Bibliographic Essay: Contested Crimes: Race, Gender, and Nation in Histories of GI Sexual Violence, World War II.”** Vol.84, No.2 (April, 2020), pp.541-569.

CRIME AND CIVIL UNREST: THE ‘TROUBLES’ IN NORTHERN IRELAND (1969-98)

Drohan, Brian, **“Unintended Consequences: Baton Rounds, Riots, and Counterinsurgency in Northern Ireland, 1970-1981.”** Vol.82, No.2 (April, 2018), pp.491-514. Designed to be a non-lethal means of employing force, the misuse of baton rounds by British soldiers resulting in serious injuries and even deaths, produced exactly the opposite public relations impact that was intended.

CRIME AND CIVIL UNREST: POST COLD WAR PERIOD

Courtney, Jocelyn, **“The Civil War that was fought by Children: Understanding the Role of Child Combatants in El Salvador’s Civil War, 1980-1992.”** Vol.74, No.2 (April, 2010), pp.523-556. Explores the legacy of the extensive reliance on child soldiers by both the Salvadoran government and the Farabundo Martí Front for National Liberation in terms of demobilization issues and postwar societal problems.

THE CRIMEAN WAR (1853-56)

Davies, Huw J. **“Diplomats as Spymasters: A Case Study of the Peninsular War, 1809-1813.”** Vol.76, No.1 (January, 2012), pp.37-68. The work of the Duke of Wellington’s (1769-1852) intelligence network, particularly during 1812, compared with examples from the Crimean War, 1853-56, and World War I, 1914-18.

CRUSADES – See: MEDIEVAL PERIOD

CUBA

See Also: CARIBBEAN

Tone, John Lawrence, **“The Machete and the Liberation of Cuba.”** Vol.62, No.1 (January, 1998), pp.7-28. Disputes the importance attached to the machete, arguing that the significance of its symbolic value has overshadowed the fact that the Cuban Liberation Army relied, first and foremost, on the use of rifles, in which they surpassed their Spanish opponents.

Brereton, T.R. **“First Lessons in Modern War: Arthur Wagner, the 1898 Santiago Campaign, and the U.S. Army Lesson-Learning.”** Vol.64, No.1 (January, 2000), pp.79-96. Relates how Lieutenant Colonel Arthur Wagner (1853-1905) pioneered the U.S. Army’s practice of producing ‘lessons-learned’ studies of the Army’s recent military operations.

CULTURE

DeVries, Kelly, **“The Lack of a Western European Military Response to the Ottoman Invasions of Eastern Europe from Nicopolis (1396) to Mohacs (1526).”** Vol.63, No.3 (July, 1999), pp.539-559. Inquires into the reasons behind a failure to respond to the Turkish threat, proposing that it was a combination of the intimidating power of the Ottomans and changing attitudes towards the duties expected of a Christian soldier.

Harari, Yuval Noah, **“Martial Illusions: War and Disillusionment in Twentieth-Century and Renaissance Military memoirs.”** Vol.69, No.1 (January, 2005), pp.43-72. Sets forth the notion that the change in the image of war from one that was positive and romantic to disillusionment owed more to soldiers’ self-perceptions and expectations than developments in technology produced.

Van de Logt, Mark, **“ ‘The Powers of the Heavens Shall Eat of my Smoke’: The Significance of Scalping in Pawnee Warfare.”** Vol.72, No.1 (January, 2008), pp.71-104. Explains that there were a range of motives for Pawnee warriors to seek scalps, including improved status and marriage prospects for the warrior, revenge for the killing of tribal members, to end the mourning period of those who had lost a relative or friend, and, when sacrificed in a special ceremony, to improve the spiritual well-being of the Pawnee people.

Noe, Kenneth W, **“ ‘Damned North Carolinians’ and ‘Brave Virginians’: The Lane-Mahone Controversy, Honor, and Civil War Memory.”** Vol.72, No.4 (October, 2008), pp.1089-1115. Charts the feud between the North Carolina commander, James Henry, and William Mahone over the question of who deserved credit for capturing three enemy flags at the Battle of Spotsylvania, 1864, a feud that was influenced by a culture of honor and post-war politics.

Moore, Andrew, **“Monuments Men and Martyred Towns: *The Arras Belfry* by Fernand Sabatté.”** Vol.79, No.4 (October, 2015), pp.1047-1057. Sabatté (1874-1940) served as a French officer in

charge of evacuating artworks from Medieval churches and town halls that were under the threat of destruction as well as painting an example of the ‘martyred towns’ genre.

CULTURE: MUSIC

Davis, James A. “**Musical Reconnaissance and Deception in the American Civil War.**” Vol.74, No.1 (January, 2010), pp.79-105. Demonstrating both the intrinsic role of music in the lives of nineteenth century Americans and a growing understanding of battlefield psychology, the article looks at how music could provide scouts with clues about enemy locations and how this could be exploited to enhance tactical deception.

Burns, Robert G.H. “**British Folk Songs of the Great War – Then and Now.**” Vol.79, No.4 (October, 2015), pp.1059-1071.

CULTURE: SPORTS

Pope, Steven W. “**An Army of Athletes: Playing Fields, Battlefields, and the American Military Sporting Experience, 1890-1920.**” Vol.59, No.3 (July, 1995), pp.435-456. Looks at the efforts of a reformist generation of officers, who were committed to their soldiers’ welfare, to utilize athletics and sports as a means of combatting desertion and vice, which contributed to a transformation in the public image of both sports and the Army.

Donaldson, Peter, “**‘A New and Deadly Game’: British Sporting Culture in the First World War.**” Vol.84, No.1 (January, 2020), pp.83-114. Popular journalism, memoirs, novels, and poetry provided the British public with a diet of war stories and reportage in which athletic endeavor and organized games featured prominently, demonstrating that the association between games and combat survived the horrors of industrial killing between 1914 and 1918.

Hauser, Mark T. “**‘A Violent Desire for Amusements’: Boxing, Libraries, and the Distribution and Management of Welfare During the First World War.**” Vol.86, No.4 (October, 2022), pp.883-913. Illustrates the impact of U.S. wartime recreation programs during World War I on the development of mass culture.

CUSTER, GEORGE ARMSTRONG (1839-76)

Cyr, Arthur I. “**Review Essay: Custer before the Little Bighorn: A Boy General Heads West.**” Vol.82, No.2 (April, 2018), pp.547-550.

CYBER WARFARE – See: TECHNOLOGY

CYPRUS

Hatzivassiliou, Evanthis, **“Cold War Pressures, Regional Strategies, and Relative Decline: British Military and Strategic Planning for Cyprus, 1950-1960.”** Vol.73, No.4 (October, 2009), pp.1143-1166. Highlights the significance of Cyprus as a secure base in the Middle East for Great Britain during the Cold War, particularly after the loss of the Suez Canal.

Varnava, Andrekos, **“ ‘Martial Races’ in the Isle of Aphrodite.”** Vol.74, No.4 (October, 2010), pp.1047-1067. The British attempt in the 1890s to form an indigenous defense force on Cyprus based on the ‘Martial Races’ concept and its enduring consequences.

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

Cline, Eric H. and Sutter, Anthony, **“Battlefield Archaeology at Armageddon: Cartridge Cases and the 1948 Battle for Megiddo, Israel.”** Vol.75, No.1 (January, 2011), pp.159-190. Israeli Archaeologists investigating the ancient history of Megiddo, came across 213 spent Czechoslovakian cartridge cases, with which they attempted to reconstruct the fighting that took place at that location during the 1948 war.

D

D-DAY – See: WORLD WAR II (1939-45): NORTHWESTERN EUROPE CAMPAIGN (1944-45)

DACIANS – See: ANCIENT PERIOD

DANIELS, JOSEPHUS (1862-1948)

Williams, William J. **“Josephus Daniels and the U.S. Navy’s Shipbuilding Program During World War I.”** Vol.60, No.1 (January, 1996), pp.7-38. Observes how Daniels (1862-1948), with no naval or maritime background, applied himself conscientiously to shifting the Navy’s building program from capitol ships to destroyers designed to address the U-Boat threat.

DAVIS, JEFFERSON (1808-1889)

Dawson, Joseph G., III, **“Forum: Confederate Military Strategy in the U.S. Civil War:**

Jefferson Davis and the Confederacy's 'Offensive-Defensive' Strategy in the U.S. Civil War." Vol.73, No.2 (April, 2009), pp.591-613.

Carney, James T. **"The Great Silence of Robert E. Lee."** Vol.83, No.1 (January, 2019), pp.97-126. Concludes that the primary reason Gen. Robert E. Lee (1807-1870) failed to advocate for an end to the war when, by November, 1864, it was clear that the Confederacy had lost, was his loyalty to his friend, President Jefferson Davis (1808-1889).

DECATUR, STEPHEN (1779-1820)

Leiner, Frederick C. **"The Squadron Commander's Share: Decatur and the Prize Money for the *Chesapeake's* First War of 1812 Cruise."** Vol.73, No.1 (January, 2009), pp.69-82. An examination of the prize case of Decatur vs. Chew that displays the tensions between ranking officers over their contrasting views of their appropriate shares.

DECEPTION AND INTELLIGENCE: ANCIENT PERIOD (to 476)

See Also: COVERT OPERATIONS

Hanson, Victor Davis, **"Historiographical Essay: The Status of Ancient Military History: Traditional Work, Recent Research, and On-Going Controversies."** Vol.63, No.2 (April, 1999), pp.379-413. A very thorough survey covering works on every conceivable topic concerning the armed forces and conduct of warfare in the age of ancient Greece and Rome.

DECEPTION AND INTELLIGENCE: MEDIEVAL PERIOD (476-1480)

Bachrach, Bernard, **"Charlemagne and the Carolingian General Staff."** Vol.66, No.2 (April, 2002), pp.313-357. Contends that the personnel and procedures relied upon by Emperor Charlemagne (747-814) for intelligence and planning fulfill the qualifications for a modern general staff.

Serebriakova, Polina and Orbach, Danny, **"Irregular Warfare in Late Medieval Japan: Towards a Historical Understanding of the Ninja."** Vol.84, No.4 (October, 2020), pp.997-1020.

Separating the contemporary myth from what we can actually determine based on surviving primary sources.

DECEPTION AND INTELLIGENCE: EARLY MODERN PERIOD (1480-1789)

Croxton, Derek, **"'The Prosperity of Arms is Never Continual': Military Intelligence, Surprise, and Diplomacy in 1640s Germany."** Vol.64, No.4 (October, 2000), pp.981-1003.

McMahon, Daniel, **“Geomancy and Walled Fortifications in Late Eighteenth Century China.”** Vol.76, No.2 (April, 2012), pp.373-393. Takes account of the role of geomancy based on *fengshui* in military planning and activity during the Qing Dynasty, including intelligence gathering, sabotage, and fortifications.

Kerner, Alex, **“Espionage and Field Intelligence in the Conquest of México, 1519-1521.”** Vol.78, No.2 (April, 2014), pp.469-501. Identifies the types of intelligence sources and information-gathering systems available to both sides during the fateful events of 1519-1521, and their role in the outcome of this milestone in the New World’s history.

DECEPTION AND INTELLIGENCE: FRENCH REVOLUTIONARY AND NAPOLEONIC WARS (1792-1815)

Davies, Huw J. **“Diplomats as Spymasters: A Case Study of the Peninsular War, 1809-1813.”** Vol.76, No.1 (January, 2012), pp.37-68. The work of the Duke of Wellington’s (1769-1852) intelligence network, particularly during 1812, compared with examples from the Crimean War, 1853-56, and World War I, 1914-18.

DECEPTION AND INTELLIGENCE: 19th CENTURY

Angevine, Robert G. **“The Rise and Fall of the Office of Naval Intelligence, 1882-1892: A Technological Perspective.”** Vol.62, No.2 (April, 1998), pp.291-312. Advances the argument that the first peacetime military intelligence organization, by successfully gathering, overtly and covertly, information on foreign naval technology, enabled the United States to build a modern fleet as quickly and inexpensively as possible.

Davis, James A. **“Musical Reconnaissance and Deception in the American Civil War.”** Vol.74, No.1 (January, 2010), pp.79-105. Demonstrating both the intrinsic role of music in the lives of nineteenth century Americans and a growing understanding of battlefield psychology, the article looks at how music could provide scouts with clues about enemy locations and how this could be exploited to enhance tactical deception.

DECEPTION AND INTELLIGENCE: WORLD WAR I (1914-18)

Van Tuyll, Hubert P. **“The Dutch Mobilization of 1914: Reading the ‘Enemy’s’ Intentions.”** Vol.64, No.3 (July, 2000), pp.711-737. Establishes that the Dutch Armed Forces were aware that Von Schlieffen intended to violate Dutch neutrality and their response resulted in a change in Germans plans for war with France.

Travers, Tim, **“Liman von Sanders, the Capture of Lieutenant Palmer, and Ottoman Anticipation of the Allied Landings at Gallipoli on 25 April 1915.”** Vol.65, No.4 (October, 2001), pp.965-979.

Shines a light on the expectations of the Turks for a possible landing on the Gallipoli Peninsula and, in particular, the neglected issue of the impact of information from a captured British intelligence officer shortly before the actual landing.

Hines, Jason, **“Sins of Omission and Commission: A Reassessment of the Role of Intelligence in the Battle of Jutland.”** Vol.72, No.4 (October, 2008), pp.1117-1153. Sets forth the explanation that it was the higher priority that the Admiralty placed on security, at the expense of operational use, that interfered with British Admirals successfully exploiting the fruits of the Admiralty’s cryptographic organization at the Battle of Jutland.

Winkler, Jonathan Reed, **“Information Warfare in World War I.”** Vol.73, No.3 (July, 2009), pp.845-867. Presents both the British success in destroying the pre-war German system and the simultaneous German campaign against Allied communications, all within the broader economic, political, intelligence, and military context of modern conflict.

Armes, Keith, **“French Intelligence on the Russian Army on the Eve of the First World War.”** Vol.82, No.3 (July, 2018), pp.759-782.

DECEPTION AND INTELLIGENCE: INTERWAR PERIOD (1919-39)

Orange, Vincent, **“The German Air Force is Already ‘The Most Powerful in Europe’: Two Royal Air Force Officers Report on a Visit to Germany, 6-15 October, 1936.”** Vol.70, No.4 (October, 2006), pp.1011-1028. Presents the contents of an unpublished report by two R.A.F. officers who toured Germany to investigate the *Luftwaffe*, where they were well received and given access to both the latest aircraft and high-ranking air force personnel.

Orr, Andrew, **“‘We call you to holy war’: Mustafa Kemal, Communism, and Germany in French Intelligence Nightmare, 1919-1923.”** Vol.75, No.4 (October, 2011), pp.1095-1123. Explains how French military intelligence analysts chose to identify Mustafa Kemal (1881-1938) as the central figure in a communist-inspired, German controlled, anti-colonial enterprise that was closely allied to Islamist political movements, rather than the nationalist, secular, westernizing leader that he was.

Borzęcki, **“Battle of Warsaw, 1920: Was Radio Intelligence the Key to Polish Victory over the Red Army?”** Vol.81, No.2 (April, 2017), pp.447-468. A look at what recent Polish literature has to say about the role of radio-intelligence in the Russo-Polish War, 1919-1920.

Hofmann, George F. **“The Tactical and Strategic Use of Attaché Intelligence: The Spanish Civil War and the U.S. Army’s Misguided Quest for a Modern Tank Doctrine.”** Vol.62, No.1 (January, 1998), pp.101-134. Asserts that the analysis of the employment of tanks in the war was distorted by the cultural bias of the infantry, cavalry, and artillery branch chiefs, leaving the U.S. Army without an armored doctrine on the eve of World War II.

Kennedy, Greg, **“Anglo-American Strategic Relations and Intelligence Assessments of Japanese Air Power 1934-1941.”** Vol.74, No.3 (July, 2010), pp.737-773. Reassesses the influence of racism on Anglo-American views of Japanese air power, and how this influence evolved in the seven years leading up to Pearl Harbor.

DECEPTION AND INTELLIGENCE: WORLD WAR II (1939-45)

Foregger, Richard, **“Two Sketch Maps of the Auschwitz-Birkenau Extermination Camps.”** Vol.59, No.4 (October, 1995), pp.687-696. Asks whether or not the sketch maps in question would have provided the Allies with adequate information for the bombing of gas chambers.

Weinberg, Gerhard L. **“Historiographical Essay: World War II Scholarship, now and in the Future.”** Vol.61, No.2 (April, 1997), pp.335-345. Includes issues surrounding the use of the memoirs of German military leaders, the revelations of Field Marshal Lord Alanbrooke’s (1883-1963) unabridged diary, and the declassification of materials pertaining to Magic and Ultra.

Boyd, Carl, **“U.S. Navy Radio Intelligence during the Second World War and the Sinking of the Japanese Submarine I-52.”** Vol.63, No.2 (April, 1999), pp.339-354. Determines the role of Ultra in the June, 1944, sinking of the blockade runner, I-52, in the Atlantic Ocean by aircraft from the escort carrier U.S.S. *Bogue*.

Rohwer, Jurgen, **“Historiographical Essay: Signal Intelligence and World War II: The Unfolding Story,”** Vol.63, No.4 (October, 1999), pp.939-951.

Coox, Alvin D. **“Needless Fear: The Compromise of U.S. Plans to Invade Japan in 1945.”** Vol.64, No.2 (April, 2000), pp.411-437. The disappearance of top-secret material from Manila caused a great deal of concern, but post-war access to Japanese documents demonstrates that these stolen papers had no impact on defensive plans for Kyushu.

Jacobs, Harry A. **“Operation Strakonice: In Pursuit of the Soviet Order of Battle.”** Vol.65, No.2 (April, 2001), pp.391-400. Chronicles the successful mission of the U.S. military intelligence unit, Order of Battle Team 24, to seize German documents detailing Soviet forces, documents that were located beyond the Line of Demarcation in Czechoslovakia.

Hull, Mark M. **“The Irish Interlude: German Intelligence in Ireland, 1939-1943.”** Vol.66, No.3 (July, 2002), pp.695-717.

Borch, Fred L. **“Comparing Pearl Harbor and ‘9/11’: Intelligence Failure? American Unpreparedness? Military Responsibility?”** Vol.67, No.3 (July, 2003), pp.845-860.

Ford, Douglas, **“British Intelligence on Japanese Army Moral during the Pacific War: Logical**

Analysis or Racial Stereotyping?" Vol.69, No.2 (April, 2005), pp.439-474.

Khan, David, **"How the Allies Suppressed the Second Greatest Secret of World War II."** Vol.74, No.4 (October, 2010), pp.1229-1241. Concerning the post-war classification of information about the Allies' success in breaking German codes.

Tunwell, David Passmore and Harrison, Stephan, **"An Evaluation of Allied Intelligence in the Tactical Bombing of German Supply Depots during the Normandy Campaign, 1944."** Vol.84, No.3 (July, 2020), pp.825-842. Sets forth the proposition that had Allied intelligence regarding German supply activities been more accurate, a decisive crippling of German logistics could have enabled Allied troops to achieve victory sooner than was the case.

Lahey, R.J. **"Hitler's 'Intuition', *Luftwaffe* Photoreconnaissance, and the Reinforcement of Normandy."** Vol.86, No.1 (January, 2022), pp.77-109. Contends that it was *Luftwaffe* photoreconnaissance, rather than mere intuition, that led Hitler to significantly reinforce the forces tasked with defending the Normandy beaches.

DECEPTION AND INTELLIGENCE: COLD WAR (1945-1991)

Dujmović, Nicholas, **"Drastic Actions Short of War: The Origins and Application of C.I.A.'s Covert Paramilitary Function in the Early Cold War."** Vol.76, No.3 (July, 2012), pp.775-808. In mid-1948, the Central Intelligence Agency was assigned a covert paramilitary function, which may explain why the C.I.A.'s paramilitary activities were never as effective as policy makers and Agency operations officers expected.

Rislakki, Jukka, **"'Without Mercy' – U.S. Strategic Intelligence and Finland in the Cold War."** Vol.79, No.1 (January, 2015), pp.127-149. Unbeknownst to Finland's political leaders, a secret channel for the exchange of information regarding the U.S.S.R. existed between Finnish military intelligence and the United States.

Boghardt, Thomas, **"Dirty Work? The Use of Nazi Informants by U.S. Army Intelligence in Postwar Europe."** Vol.79, No.2 (April, 2015), pp.387-422. Probes ethical issues and utility of the Allied enlistment of war criminals and suspected war criminals for collecting information on Soviet and Communist Party activities in Europe.

Petrina, Stephen, **"Scientific Ammunition to Fire at Congress: Intelligence, Reparations, and the U.S. Army Air Forces, 1944-1947."** Vol.83, No.3 (July, 2019), pp.795-829. Appraises the place of intelligence and reparations in U.S. Army Air Force and U.S. Air Force postwar research and development.

Campbell, Isabel, **"A Tale of Submarine Sightings and a Golden Goose: American-British-Canadian Intelligence Sharing in the Early Cold War."** Vol.85, No.4 (October, 2021),

pp.980-1003. The consequences of efforts to establish trilateral intelligence of the sighting of Soviet submarines in the Davis Strait in 1946.

Kürkçü, Burak, **“The Question of U.S. Involvement in Turkish Military Coups during the Cold War: An Analysis via available C.I.A. Archives.”** Vol.86, No.1 (January, 2022), pp.110-131. Recently de-classified C.I.A. documents reveal no evidence for direct U.S. involvement in Turkish military coups during the Cold War.

DECEPTION AND INTELLIGENCE: VIETNAM WAR (2nd Indochina War) (1955-75)

Carland, John M. **“Review Essay: Scorecard on CIA C.O.I.N. in Vietnam.”** Vol.75, No.3 (July, 2011), pp.887-891.

DECEPTION AND INTELLIGENCE: ARAB-ISRAELI WAR (1973)

Joseph, Uri Bar, **“Strategic Surprise or Fundamental Flaws? The Source of Israel’s Military Defeat at the Beginning of the 1973 War.”** Vol.72, No.2 (April, 2008), pp.509-530. Suggests that that the deficient deployment of Israeli forces that met the Egyptian assault was due to a failure of intelligence to provide sufficient warning.

DECEPTION AND INTELLIGENCE: POST COLD WAR PERIOD

Borch, Fred L. **“Comparing Pearl Harbor and ‘9/11’: Intelligence Failure? American Unpreparedness? Military Responsibility?”** Vol.67, No.3 (July, 2003), pp.845-860.

DE GAULLE, CHARLES (1890-1970)

Rossi, Mario, **“United States Military Authorities and Free France, 1942-1944.”** Vol.61, No.1 (January, 1997), pp.49-64. Probes the political and military consequences of the clash between U.S. policy towards liberated French territory and Charles De Gaulle’s (1890-1970) claim to be the legitimate representative of the French people.

DEMOGRAPHICS

Rogers, Clifford J. **“Review Essay: The Field & the Forge.”** Vol.68, No.4 (October, 2004), pp.1233-1239. Population, production, and power in the pre-industrial West.

Stoyanov, Aleksandar, **“The Size of Bulgaria’s Medieval Field Armies: A Case Study of Military Mobilization Capacity in the Middle Ages.”** Vol.83, No.3 (July, 2019), pp.719-746. Broadens the scope of time and sources to ascertain estimates of the actual size of Bulgarian field Armies

from the First Bulgarian Empire (681-1018) to the Second Bulgarian Empire (1185-1422).

Staiano-Daniels, Lucian E. **“Determining Early Modern Army Strength: The Case of Electoral Saxony.”** Vol.83, No.4 (October, 2019), pp.1001-1020. Questions the issues of the ‘Military Revolution’ thesis that larger armies both reflected a revolution in warfare and forced states to adopt more efficient means of raising revenue by examining the experience of Saxony during the Thirty Years War (1618-1648).

DENMARK

Ostwald, Jamel, **“The ‘Decisive’ Battle of Ramillies, 1706: Prerequisites for Decisiveness in Early Modern Warfare.”** Vol.64, No.3 (July, 2000), pp.649-677. Asks whether eighteenth century military strategy was indecisive by choice rather than by necessity by looking at the 1st Duke of Marlborough, John Churchill’s (1650-1722), Ramillies campaign.

Davey, James, **“The Repatriation of Spanish Troops from Denmark, 1808: The British Government, Logistics, and Maritime Supremacy.”** Vol.74, No.3 (July, 2010), pp.689-707. When Spain rebelled against French occupation, the British government responded by, among other things, preparing and executing the repatriation of the Spanish regiments formerly fighting for Napoleon in northern Europe.

Ottosen, Morten Nordhagen, **“Ending War and Making Peace in Scandinavia, 1814-1848: ‘Peace Crisis’, Demobilization, and Reconciliation.”** Vol.80, No.1 (January, 2016), pp.145-172.

DE PIZAN, CHRISTINE (1363-1430)

Çeçen, Zeynep Kocabiyoikoğlu, **“Two Different Views of Knighthood in the Early Fifteenth Century: *Le Livre de Bouciquaut* and the Works of Christine de Pizan.”** Vol.76, No.1 (January, 2012), pp.9-35. Comparing the different contemporary views of knighthood, the author considers whether its depiction in the biography of Marshal of France, Jean le Meingre Bouciquaut (1366-1421), is consistent with its image in the works of Christine de Pizan (1363-1430).

DePUY, WILLIAM E. (1919-92)

Lock-Pullan, Richard, **“‘An Inward Looking Time’: The United States Army, 1973-1976.”** Vol.67, No.2 (April, 2003), pp.483-511. Rejects the explanation that the immediate post-Vietnam War reforms were primarily shaped by the recent conflict in Southeast Asia, insisting, instead, that of greater importance was the end of the draft and the lessons drawn from the 1973 Arab-Israeli War by General William E. DePuy (1919-1992).

Bronfeld, Saul, **“Fighting Outnumbered: The Impact of the Yom Kippur War on the U.S. Army.”** Vol.71, No.2 (April, 2007), pp.465-498. Illustrates the different ways in which the Yom Kippur War impacted the work of Generals William E. DePuy (1919-1992) and Donn A. Starry (1925-2011) in reforming the U.S. Army.

DE WEERD, HARVEY A. (1902-79)

Wolters, Timothy S. **“Harvey A. De Weerd and the Dawn of Academic Military History in the United States.”** Vol.85, No.1 (January, 2021), pp.95-133. Chronicles the career of Harvey A. De Weerd (1902-1979), a significant member of early academic military historians who was an editor of the *Infantry Journal* during World War II, early editor of the *Journal of Military History*, taught some of the first dedicated military history courses in the United States, and was the second military historian hired by the R.A.N.D. corporation.

DIDEROT, DENIS (1713-84)

Lynn, John A. **“Historiographical Essay: The Treatment of Military Subjects in Diderot’s *Encyclopedie*.”** Vol.65, No.1 (January, 2001), pp.131-165. Concludes that while Denis Diderot’s (1713-1784) coverage of military topics was not the basis for reforms, they provide an excellent picture of the European art of war in the mid-eighteenth century.

DIETRICH, MARLENE (1901-1992)

Bland, Larry I. **“Document of Note: Marlene Dietrich’s Firepower.”** Vol.66, No.3 (July, 2002), pp.829-831. Chief-of-Staff George C. Marshall (1880-1959) sought a means to stop the flow of firearms being brought back to the U.S. as war trophies.

DISCIPLINE AND MORALE

Boyce, D. George, **“From Assaye to the Assaye: Reflections on British Government, Force, and Moral Authority in India.”** Vol.63, No.3 (July, 1999), pp.643-668. Appraises the role of the threat and use of force in British rule, from the Battle of Assaye (1803) to the naval mutiny of 1946, including how the reliance on force shaped the moral and ethical justifications for the British governing India.

Roy, Kaushik, **“Coercion through Leniency: British Manipulation of the Courts-Martial System in the Post-Mutiny Indian Army, 1859-1913.”** Vol.65, No.4 (October, 2001),

pp.937-964.

Wilson, Peter H. **“Defining Military Culture.”** Vol.72, No.1 (January, 2008), pp.11-41. Puts forward the notion that military culture is a specific form of institutional culture and that viewing armies from this perspective offers new insight into both how they functioned and the nature of their interaction with state and society.

DISCIPLINE AND MORALE: ANCIENT PERIOD (to 476)

Pearson, Elizabeth, **“Decimation and Unit Cohesion: Why were Roman Legionaries willing to Perform Decimation?”** Vol.83, No.3 (July, 2019), pp.665-688. Analyzes the practice in light of ‘primary group’ theory, arguing that it reintegrated offending units through collective acceptance of both guilt and the necessity for punishment.

DISCIPLINE AND MORALE: EARLY MODERN PERIOD (1480-1789)

Kopperman, Paul E. **“ ‘The Cheapest Pay’: Alcohol Abuse in the Eighteenth-Century British Army.”** Vol.60, No.3 (July, 1996), pp.445-470. Analyzes the unwillingness of officers to confront what was generally agreed to be a significant problem due to conflicting medical opinion and the utility of control over government supplied alcohol.

Phillips, Gervase, **“To Cry ‘Home! Home!’: Mutiny, Morale, and Indiscipline in Tudor Armies.”** Vol.65, No.2 (April, 2001), pp.313-332. Points to the study of the unrest within Tudor armies as a means of better understanding common notions of equitable treatment, mutual obligations, and obedience within society as a whole.

Sherer, Idan, **“ ‘All of Us, in One Voice, Demand what’s Owed Us’: Mutiny in the Spanish Infantry during the Italian Wars, 1525-1538.”** Vol.78, No.3 (July, 2014), pp.893-926. The author notes the similarities between these all too frequent mutinies and strikes initiated and resolved by modern employees.

Hurl-Eamon, Jennine, **“Husbands, Sons, Brothers, and Neighbors: Eighteenth-Century Soldiers’ Efforts to Maintain Civilian Ties.”** Vol.86, No.2 (April, 2022), pp.299-320. Endeavors to understand the conflict between army regulations restricting British servicemen’s ability to visit and provide for their kin with the efforts of soldiers to maintain the connections to the communities they left.

DISCIPLINE AND MORALE: NATIVE AMERICAN CONFLICTS

Lee, Wayne E. **“Peace Chiefs and Blood Revenge: Patterns of Restraint in Native American Warfare, 1500-1800.”** Vol.71, No.3 (July, 2007), pp.701-741. Although eastern Native American societies were willing to attempt to destroy an enemy, including indiscriminate

killing, patterns of restraint inherent to their social authority, cultural values, and methods of warfare tended to limit escalation and the overall level of violence.

DISCIPLINE AND MORALE: U.S. REVOLUTIONARY WAR (1775-83)

Herrera, Ricardo A. **“Self-Governance and the American Citizen as Soldier, 1775-1861.”** Vol.65, No.1 (January, 2001), pp.21-52. Attempts to understand the conception of the relationship between military service and the Republic held by enlisted men, including regulars, militiamen, and volunteers, from the Revolution to the first year of the Civil War.

Krebs, Daniel, **“Useful Enemies: The Treatment of German Prisoners of War during the American War of Independence.”** Vol.77, No.1 (January, 2013), pp.9-39. Narrates how, to boost morale, revolutionaries staged elaborate rituals with P.O.W.s, that local citizens hired captive soldiers as laborers, and that, after the victory at Yorktown, 1781, Congress and the Continental Army allowed P.O.W.s to go free after a cash payments and even sold some into indentured servitude.

Lender, Mark Edward, **“Review Essay: The Ever Controversial General Charles Lee.”** Vol.78, No.4 (October, 2014), pp.1395-1405. Charles Lee (1732-1782), a veteran of service in the British, Portuguese, and Polish armies, served as a high-ranking commander in George Washington’s Continental Army until his court martial over behavior associated with the Battle of Monmouth, June 28, 1778.

DISCIPLINE AND MORALE: FRENCH REVOLUTIONARY AND NAPOLEONIC WARS (1792-1815)

Schneid, Frederick C. **“The Dynamics of Defeat: French Army Leadership, December 1812 – March 1813.”** Vol.63, No.1 (January, 1999), pp.7-28. Examines how, in the wake of the catastrophe in Russia, the remnants of the *Grande Armée* were preserved despite the departure of Emperor Napoleon Bonaparte (1769-1821).

Germani, Ian, **“Terror in the Army: Representatives on Mission and Military Discipline.”** Vol.75, No.3 (July, 2011), pp.733-768. The French National Convention’s Representatives on Mission and the exercise of military justice in the French Revolutionary armies.

Dodman, Thomas, **“1814 and the Melancholy of War.”** Vol.80, No.1 (January, 2016), pp.31-55. Through contemporary accounts, this article explores the emotional reaction of state officials, soldiers, military doctors, etc. to the collapse of Napoleon’s Empire.

Sheppard, Thomas, **“There will still remain Heroes and Patriots: The Politics of Resignation in the Early American Navy, 1794-1815.”** Vol.84, No.2 (April, 2020), pp.369-394. Establishes that early secretaries of the navy worked to end the practice of officers resigning their commissions,

or using the threat to do so, as a bargaining tactic with the Navy Department, something that they had largely accomplished by the end of the War of 1812.

DISCIPLINE AND MORALE: WAR OF 1812 (1812-15)

Herrera, Ricardo A. **“Self-Governance and the American Citizen as Soldier, 1775-1861.”**

Vol.65, No.1 (January, 2001), pp.21-52. Attempts to understand the conception of the relationship between military service and the Republic held by enlisted men, including regulars, militiamen, and volunteers, from the Revolution to the first year of the Civil War.

Stagg, J.C.A. **“United States Army Officers in the War of 1812: A Statistical and Behavioral Portrait.”** Vol.76, No.4 (October, 2012), pp.1001-1034. An examination of 334 general court

martial demonstrates that officers were judged more harshly for their moral and character defects than for their shortcomings in performing routine duties.

Stagg, J.C.A. **“Freedom and Subordination: Disciplinary Problems in the U.S. Army of 1812.”**

Vol.78, No.2 (April, 2014), pp.537-574. Based on general court martial case files and the question of proper forms of punishment.

Sheppard, Thomas, **“There will still remain Heroes and Patriots: The Politics of Resignation in the Early American Navy, 1794-1815.”** Vol.84, No.2 (April, 2020), pp.369-394. Establishes

that early secretaries of the navy worked to end the practice of officers resigning their commissions, or using the threat to do so, as a bargaining tactic with the Navy Department, something that they had largely accomplished by the end of the War of 1812.

DISCIPLINE AND MORALE: U.S. CIVIL WAR (1861-65)

Grimsley, Mark, **“Review Essay: In Not so Dubious Battle: The Motivations of American Civil War Soldiers.”** Vol.62, No.1 (January, 1998), pp.175-188.

Weitz, Mark A. **“Drill, Training, and the Combat Performance of the Civil War Soldier:**

Dispelling the Myth of the Poor Soldier, Great Fight.” Vol.62, No.2 (April, 1998), pp.263-289. Proposes that, contrary to conventional wisdom, the soldiers who fought in the war functioned effectively because of military skills that flowed directly from drill, training, and discipline rather than any innate fighting ability.

Dawson, Joseph G. **“Review Essay: Civil War Soldiers and Leaders: A Glatthaar Trio.”** Vol.63,

No.1 (January, 1999), pp.165-168. Contains a single study on the relationships between high-ranking commanders and two involving the enlisted men’s experience, included African American soldiers and their officers and the troops who participated in Sherman’s march.

Davis, Robert S. **“Escape from Andersonville: A Study in Isolation and Imprisonment.”** Vol.67,

No.4 (October, 2003), pp.1065-1081. Seeks to understand why only some two dozen Union prisoners escaped from Andersonville within the larger context of the P.O.W. experience in later conflicts.

Fitzharris, Joseph C. **“Field Officer Courts and the U.S. Civil War Military Justice.”** Vol.68, No.1 (January, 2004), pp.47-72. Looks at the neglected topic of field officer courts which, by a Congressional Act of July, 1862, was supposed to replace the more arbitrary regimental courts-martial system.

Herrera, Ricardo A. **“Self-Governance and the American Citizen as Soldier, 1775-1861.”** Vol.65, No.1 (January, 2001), pp.21-52. Attempts to understand the conception of the relationship between military service and the Republic held by enlisted men, including regulars, militiamen, and volunteers, from the Revolution to the first year of the Civil War.

Rodgers, Thomas E. **“Billy Yank and G.I. Joe: An Exploratory Essay on the Sociopolitical Dimensions of Soldier Motivation.”** Vol.69, No.1 (January, 2005), pp.93-121. Presents the assertion that the pre-war socialization of Civil War Volunteers that enabled them to perform effectively in combat was missing among the citizen-soldiers of World War II.

Davis, James A. **“Musical Reconnaissance and Deception in the American Civil War.”** Vol.74, No.1 (January, 2010), pp.79-105. Demonstrating both the intrinsic role of music in the lives of nineteenth century Americans and a growing understanding of battlefield psychology, the article looks at how music could provide scouts with clues about enemy locations and how this could be exploited to enhance tactical deception.

Johnson, Mark W. **“Emory Upton’s Twenty-Six: Desertion and Divided Loyalty of the U.S. Army Soldiers, 1860-1861.”** Vol.81, No.3 (July, 2017), pp.747-774. Contrary to common assumptions, the enlisted men of the regular peace-time Army were as conflicted in their loyalties as their officers, resulting in over 500 deserting during the secession crisis to serve in what became the Army of the Confederate States of America.

DISCIPLINE AND MORALE: LATE 19th TO EARLY 20th CENTURY

Pope, Steven W. **“An Army of Athletes: Playing Fields, Battlefields, and the American Military Sporting Experience, 1890-1920.”** Vol.59, No.3 (July, 1995), pp.435-456. Looks at the efforts of a reformist generation of officers, who were committed to their soldiers’ welfare, to utilize athletics and sports as a means of combatting desertion and vice, which contributed to a transformation in the public image of both sports and the Army.

Baker, Anni, **“The Abolition of the U.S. Army Canteen, 1898-1914.”** Vol.80, No.3 (July, 2016), pp.697-724. The impact of Progressive era activists on conditions in the Army and the debate over the role of the Army in U.S. society.

DISCIPLINE AND MORALE: WORLD WAR I (1914-18)

Laurie, Clayton D. “**‘The Chanting of Crusaders’: Captain Heber Blankenhorn and A.E.F. Combat Propaganda in World War I.**” Vol.59, No.3 (July, 1995), pp.457-481.

Cook, Tim, “**Grave Beliefs: Stories of the Supernatural and the Uncanny among Canada’s Great War Trench Soldiers.**” Vol.77, No.2 (April, 2013), pp.521-542.

De Meneses, Filipe Rineiro, “**‘Not only Useless, but Dangerous?’ The Portuguese Expeditionary Corps in France in the Aftermath of the Battle of La Lys, 9 April 1918.**” Vol.82, No.4 (October, 2018), pp.1149-1174. Conflict between the wishes of the new President of Portugal, Sidónio Pais (1872-1918), the British High Command, and the soldiers and officers of the Portuguese Expeditionary Corps over the question of whether it should return to frontline duty.

Lukasik, Sebastian H. “**Doughboys, the Y.M.C.A., and the Moral Economy of Sacrifice in the First World War.**” Vol.84, No.3 (July, 2020), pp.774-797. Contends that U.S. soldiers’ complaints about the Y.M.C.A. in France reflected larger concerns about the Home Front, perceptions of which shaped soldiers’ notions about the value of their sacrifices.

Hauser, Mark T. “**‘A Violent Desire for Amusements’: Boxing, Libraries, and the Distribution and Management of Welfare During the First World War.**” Vol.86, No.4 (October, 2022), pp.883-913. Illustrates the impact of U.S. wartime recreation programs during World War I on the development of mass culture.

DISCIPLINE AND MORALE: INTERWAR PERIOD (1919-39)

Kuhlman, Erika, “**American Doughboys and German Fräuleins: Sexuality, Patriarchy, and the Privilege in the American-Occupied Rhineland, 1918-23.**” Vol.71, No.4 (October, 2007), pp.1077-1106.

DISCIPLINE AND MORALE: WORLD WAR II (1939-45)

Lofgren, Stephen J. (ed.) “**Diary of First Lieutenant Sugihara Kinrū: Iwo Jima, January-February 1945.**” Vol.59, No.1 (January, 1995), pp.97-134. Served in the 11th Antitank Battalion which was manned by reservists from Hiroshima and Shimane prefectures.

Fritz, Stephen G. “**‘We are Trying...to Change the Face of the World’ – Ideology and Motivation in the Wehrmacht on the Eastern Front: The View from Below.**” Vol.60, No.4 (October, 1996), pp.683-710. Appraises the influence of ‘positive’ National Socialist ideological beliefs on the average *Landser*’s motives to engage in combat.

Weinberg, Gerhard L. **“Unexplored Questions about the German Military during World War II.”** Vol.62, No.2 (April, 1998), pp.371-380. Touches upon the 1934 oath to Hitler, reasons why high-ranking German commanders felt the need to justify to their troops their orders to slaughter Jewish civilians, the role of high-ranking German commanders in approving the execution of tens-of-thousands of their own troops, *Luftwaffe* field divisions, the creation of new airborne divisions after the use of paratroopers had been all but abandoned, and the organizing of *Kriegsmarine* and *Luftwaffe* suicide units.

Whitby, Michael J. **“Matelots, Martinets, and Mutineers: The Mutiny in H.M.C.S. *Iroquois*, 19 July 1943.”** Vol.65, No.1 (January, 2001), pp.77-103. The author identifies the substantial expansion of the Royal Canadian Navy, bringing together inexperienced officers with inexperienced crews, as the cause of the Destroyer *Iroquois*.

Rodgers, Thomas E. **“Billy Yank and G.I. Joe: An Exploratory Essay on the Sociopolitical Dimensions of Soldier Motivation.”** Vol.69, No.1 (January, 2005), pp.93-121. Presents the assertion that the pre-war socialization of Civil War Volunteers that enabled them to perform effectively in combat was missing among the citizen-soldiers of World War II.

Ford, Douglas, **“British Intelligence on Japanese Army Moral during the Pacific War: Logical Analysis or Racial Stereotyping?”** Vol.69, No.2 (April, 2005), pp.439-474.

Jones, Edgar, **“‘L.M.F.’: The Use of Psychiatric Stigma in the Royal Air Force during the Second World War.”** Vol.70, No.2 (April, 2006), pp.439-458. Explores the consequences of the introduction by the R.A.F. of the term ‘Lack of Moral Fibre’ in April, 1940, which was intended to stigmatize aircrew who, without a medical reason, refused to fly.

Peifer, Douglas C. **“The Past in the Present: Passion, Politics, and the Historical Profession in the German and British Pardon Campaigns.”** Vol.71, No.4 (October, 2007), pp.1107-1132. Long a peripheral matter, by the 1990s military justice during the World Wars had vaulted from the field of grassroots activism to the legislative, executive, and judicial arenas of government in Germany and Great Britain, resulting in official pardons for soldiers who had been court martialed in these conflicts.

Carland, John M. **“High Maintenance Generals.”** Vol.71, No.4 (October, 2007), pp.1201-1202. A passage from Anthony Dymoke Powell’s 1968 novel, *The Military Philosophers*, concerning dealing with demanding superiors.

Roy, Kaushik, **“Military Loyalty in the Colonial Context: A Case Study of the Indian Army during World War II.”** Vol.73, No.2 (April, 2009), pp.497-529. Uncovers the motives for and extent of loyalty to the British colonial regime of the Indian Army troops fighting in Burma in the context of the British elite’s concerns about the loyalty of Indian soldiers.

Statiev, Alexander, **“Blocking Units in the Red Army.”** Vol.76, No.2 (April, 2012), pp.475-495. Concerning Joseph Stalin’s (1878-1953) ‘No Step Back!’ Order No.227.

Souchen, Alex, **“The Culture of Morale: Battalion Newspapers in the 3rd Canadian Infantry Division, June-August 1944.”** Vol.77, No.2 (April, 2013), pp.543-567.

Kranjc, Gregor, **“Fight or Flight: Desertion, Defection, and Draft-Dodging in Occupied Slovenia, 1941-1945.”** Vol.81, No.1 (January, 2017), pp.133-162. Questions the motives for Slovenes to avoid or escape from military service for three occupying powers, Germany, Hungary, and Italy, and these powers efforts to combat draft-dodging, desertion, and defection.

Lawlor, Ruth, **“Bibliographic Essay: Contested Crimes: Race, Gender, and Nation in Histories of GI Sexual Violence, World War II.”** Vol.84, No.2 (April, 2020), pp.541-569.

DISCIPLINE AND MORALE: THE COLD WAR (1945-91)

Grandstaff, Mark R. **“Making the Military American: Advertising, Reform, and the Demise of an Antistanding Military Tradition, 1945-1955.”** Vol.60, No.2 (April, 1996), pp.299-323. Establishes that, while concerns over the spread of communism and nuclear war played a role, both reforms within the military and a national public relations campaign also helped citizens view the armed forces as an acceptable American institution.

Willoughby, John, **“The Sexual Behavior of American G.I.s during the Early Years of the Occupation of Germany.”** Vol.62, No.1 (January, 1998), pp.155-174. Investigates the U.S. Army’s search for a form of sexual relations between G.I.’s and German girls that would be acceptable to young German men, young U.S. women, and the mothers and fathers of both lands, a topic that illuminates much about the social and political relations between the American and German people in the immediate aftermath of World War II.

Stapleton, Tim, **“ ‘Bad Boys’: Infiltration and Sedition in the African Military Units of the Central African Federation (Malawi, Zambia and Zimbabwe) 1953-63.”** Vol.73, No.4 (October, 2009), pp.1167-1193. Illustrates that nationalists exploited the rising unpopularity of colonialism, discontent with participation in the war in Malaya, the Mau Mau uprising in Kenya, and the Congo Crisis, which led white officers doubt the dependability of their African troops.

Walsh, Brian, **“Sexual Violence during the Occupation of Japan.”** Vol.82, No.4 (October, 2018), pp.1199-1230. Insists that the accusations of recent publications of the widespread rape of Japanese women by Allied troops during the occupation (1945-1952) are grossly exaggerated.

Walsh, Brian, **“ ‘This Degrading Slavery’: MacArthur’s General Headquarters and**

Prostitution Policy during the Occupation of Japan.” Vol.85, No.3 (July, 2021), pp.678-712. The Allied occupation government (1945-1952) outlawed the old Imperial system of licensed prostitution because it relied on human trafficking, but did not outlaw prostitution in general based on respect for individual autonomy and an appreciation for the situation in Japan.

Donnelly, William M. **“From Sergeant Snorkels to Drill Sergeants: Basic Training of Male Soldiers in the U.S. Army, 1953-1964.”** Vol.86, No.2 (April, 2022), pp.399-426. Assesses the much-criticized quality of officers and non-commissioned officers assigned to shepherd recruits through basic training, an issue that wasn’t addressed until the Secretaries of the Army Cyrus R. Vance Sr. (1917-2002) and Stephen Ailes (1912-2001).

DISCIPLINE AND MORALE: KOREAN WAR (1950-53)

Werrell, Kenneth P. **“Across the Yalu: Rules of Engagement and the Communist Air Sanctuary during the Korean War.”** Vol.72, No.2 (April, 2008), pp.451-475. U.S. warplanes violated Chinese air space during the Korean War more frequently than was generally acknowledged, often encouraged and sometimes led by field grade officers, with few pilots suffering punishment.

Donnelly, William M. **“A Damn Hard Job: James A. Van Fleet and the Combat Effectiveness of U.S. Army Infantry, July 1951 – February 1953.”** Vol.82, No.1 (January, 2018), pp.147-179. The difficulties faced by the Eighth Army commander, Gen. Van Fleet (1892-1992), to maintain ‘the will to win’ during the Korean War.

DISCIPLINE AND MORALE: VIETNAM WAR (2nd Indochina War) (1955-75)

Donnelly, William M. **“This ‘Horrible Example’: An Extraordinary Case of Absent Without Leave during the Vietnam War.”** Vol.79, No.2 (April, 2015), pp.457-466. Thomas J. Cuchal of Cleveland, Ohio.

Ruth, Richard A. **“Ham and Mothers: C-Ration Revelry and Revulsion in the Vietnam War.”** Vol.85, No.4 (October, 2021), pp.1004-1028. observes that the comradery of troops was facilitated by the love-hate relations with their rations.

DOMINICAN REPUBLIC

McPherson, Alan, **“Lid Sitters and Prestige Seekers: The U.S. Navy versus the State Department and the End of U.S. Occupations.”** Vol.78, No.1 (January, 2014), pp.73-99. Conflicting outlooks between the State Department and the Marine Corps on the U.S. military occupation of the Dominican Republic, from 1912 to 1924, Haiti, from 1915 to 1934, and Nicaragua, from 1927 to 1932.

Moulton, Aaron Coy, **“The Dominican Dictator’s Funds and Guns in Costa Rica’s Wars of 1948.”** Vol.85, No.3 (July, 2021), pp.713-733. Whereas past studies of the conflicts in Costa Rica have focused on the involvement of Anastasio Somoza García of Nicaragua (1896-1956) and Juan José Arévalo of Guatemala (1904-1990), the author demonstrates that Costa Ricans sought to obtain arms from the Dominican Dictator Rafael Trujillo (1891-1961).

DOOLITTLE, JAMES H. (1896-1993)

Meilinger, Phillip S. **“Historiographical Essay: U.S. Air Force Leaders: A Biographical Tour.”** Vol.62, No.4 (October, 1998), pp.833-870.

DOUGHTY, ROBERT A. (b.1943)

Kiesling, Eugenia C. **“Historiographical Essays: Illuminating ‘Strange Defeat’ and ‘Pyrrhic Victory’: The Historian Robert A. Doughty.”** Vol.71, No.3 (July, 2007), pp.875-888.
Reviews the English language publications on the performance of France in both World Wars and how Brigadier General (Rtd.) Robert A. Doughty (b.1943) has sought to teach the U.S. Army how to harness historical study in the interest of doctrinal development.

DULLES, ALLEN W. (1893-1969)

Krebs, Gerhard, **“Operation Super Sunrise? Japanese-United States Peace Feelers in Switzerland, 1945.”** Vol.69, No.4 (October, 2005), pp.1081-1120. Explains why informal discussions between the Japanese Naval Commander from the embassy in Berlin, Fujimura Yoshikazu, and Allen W. Dulles (1893-1969) of the U.S. Office of Strategic Services failed to develop into formal communications.

DU PONT, SAMUEL FRANCIS (1803-65)

Weddle, Kevin J. **“‘The Magic Touch of Reform’: Samuel Francis Du Pont and the Efficiency Board of 1855.”** Vol.68, No.2 (April, 2004), pp.471-504. Using previously neglected sources, this article considers how political and military leaders, notably Commander Du Pont (1803-1865), broke the logjam produced by a system of promotion based exclusively on seniority.

Weddle, Kevin J. **“The Fall of Satan’s Kingdom: Civil-Military Relations and the Union Navy’s Attack on Charleston, April 1863.”** Vol.75, No.2 (April, 2011), pp.411-439. Describes the conflict between Rear Admiral Samuel Francis Du Pont (1803-1865) and the members of Lincoln’s administration, Secretary of the Navy Gideon Welles (1802-1878) and his assistant,

Gustavus Fox (1821-1883).

McPherson, James M. **“The 2014 George C. Marshall Lecture in Military History: The Rewards of Risk-Taking: Two Civil War Admirals.”** Vol.78, No.4 (October, 2014), pp.1225-1237. Comparison between Rear Admiral David Glasgow Farragut (1801-1870) and Rear Admiral Samuel Francis Du Pont (1803-1865).

E

EAKER, IRA (1896-1987)

Meilinger, Phillip S. **“Historiographical Essay: U.S. Air Force Leaders: A Biographical Tour.”** Vol.62, No.4 (October, 1998), pp.833-870.

EARLE, EDWARD MEAD (1894-1954)

Finch, Michael P.M. **“Edward Mead Earle and the Unfinished *Makers of Modern Strategy*.”** Vol.80, No.3 (July, 2016), pp.781-814.

EARLY MODERN PERIOD (1480-1789)

Kubik, Timothy R.W. **“Is Machiavelli’s Canon Spiked? Practical Reading in Military History.”** Vol.61, No.1 (January, 1997), pp.7-30. Argues that Niccolò Machiavelli’s (1469-1527) *The Art of War* functioned as a prompt for debate, an exercise of prudent judgement, rather than offering a stock of handy maxims for use in a crisis.

Palmer, Michael A. **“‘The Soul’s Right Hand’: Command and Control in the Age of Fighting Sail, 1652-1827.”** Vol.61, No.4 (October, 1997), pp.679-705. Suggests that the ‘rationalism’ of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries had a detrimental impact on methods of command and control, emphasizing centralization which, in turn, favored the single line ahead formation that has been blamed for the indecisiveness of naval battles in this period.

Neill, Donald A. **“Ancestral Voices: The Influence of the Ancients on the Military Thought of the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries.”** Vol.62, No.3 (July, 1998), pp.487-520. Insists that the military developments of the Enlightenment were the result of the normal course of military innovation, simple evolutionary adaptation, as opposed to a sudden, revolutionary change stemming from the rediscovery of the military methods described by

Classical authors.

DeVries, Kelly, **“The Lack of a Western European Military Response to the Ottoman Invasions of Eastern Europe from Nicopolis (1396) to Mohacs (1526).”** Vol.63, No.3 (July, 1999), pp.539-559. Inquires into the reasons behind a failure to respond to the Turkish threat, proposing that it was a combination of the intimidating power of the Ottomans and changing attitudes towards the duties expected of a Christian soldier.

Rose, Susan, **“Islam Versus Christendom: The Naval Dimension, 1000-1600.”** Vol.63, No.3 (July, 1999), pp.561-578. Surveys developments from the Crusades to the dominance of the Ottoman Empire within the geographic framework of the Mediterranean Sea.

Kleinschmidt, Harald, **“Using the Gun: Manual Drill and the Proliferation of Portable Firearms.”** Vol.63, No.3 (July, 1999), pp.601-630. Delves into the military, political, and social factors that led to an increase in the use of hand-held firearms throughout Europe, from the fifteenth through the eighteenth century.

Raudzens, George, **“Military Revolution or Maritime Evolution? Military Superiorities or Transportation Advantages as Main Causes of European Colonial Conquests to 1788.”** Vol.63, No.3 (July, 1999), pp.631-641.

Lynn, John A. **“Historiographical Essay: The Treatment of Military Subjects in Diderot’s *Encyclopedie*.”** Vol.65, No.1 (January, 2001), pp.131-165. Concludes that while Denis Diderot’s (1713-1784) coverage of military topics was not the basis for reforms, they provide an excellent picture of the European art of war in the mid-eighteenth century.

Cassidy, Ben, **“Machiavelli and the Ideology of the Offensive: Gunpowder Weapons in *The Art of War*.”** Vol.67, No.2 (April, 2003), pp.381-404. Disputes the interpretation that, in his *Art of War*, Niccolò Machiavelli (1469-1527) completely rejects the use of both cannon and hand-held firearms, explaining that his downplaying of the use of gunpowder weapons was due to Machiavelli’s association of cannons and handguns with the defensive, while he endorsed the offensive.

Capponi, Niccolò, **“*Le Palle di Marte*: Military Strategy and Diplomacy in the Grand Duchy of Tuscany under Ferdinand II de’Medici (1621-1670).”** Vol.68, No.4 (October, 2004), pp.1105-1141.

Rogers, Clifford J. **“Review Essay: The Field & the Forge.”** Vol.68, No.4 (October, 2004), pp.1233-1239. Population, production, and power in the pre-industrial West.

Harari, Yuval Noah, **“Martial Illusions: War and Disillusionment in Twentieth-Century and Renaissance Military memoirs.”** Vol.69, No.1 (January, 2005), pp.43-72. Sets forth the

notion that the change in the image of war from one that was positive and romantic to disillusionment owed more to soldiers' self-perceptions and expectations than developments in technology produced.

Powers, Sandra L. **"Historiographical Essay: Studying the Art of War: Military Books known to American Officers and Their French Counterparts during the Second Half of the Eighteenth Century."** Vol.70, No.3 (July, 2006), pp.781-814.

Kahn, David, **"The Prehistory of the General Staff."** Vol.71, No.2 (April, 2007), pp.499-504.
Sets forth the argument that the advent of the modern general staff system was the consequence of secularization, which provided control, bureaucracy, which rationalized endeavor, and management, which overcame specialization.

Guilmartin, John F., Jr. **"The Earliest Shipboard Gunpowder Ordnance: An Analysis of its Technical Parameters and Tactical Capabilities."** Vol.71, No.3 (July, 2007), pp.649-669.
Various obstacles presented difficulties to the effective use of early cannons onboard ships, but shortly after 1400 these were swiftly overcome, so that ordnance became an increasingly important weapon on Mediterranean war galleys and Portuguese caravels.

Black, Jeremy, **"A Revolution in Military Cartography?: Europe 1650-1815."** Vol.73, No.1 (January, 2009), pp.49-68. This article approaches the issue of cartography not only in tactical, operational and strategic terms, but also with reference to the mapping of war for public interest.

Parker, Geoffrey, **"States Make War but Wars also Break States."** Vol.74, No.1 (January, 2010), pp.11-34. The 'chicken and egg' debate at the heart of the mid-seventeenth century 'General Crisis Debate', arguing that only a synergy between natural and man-made disasters produced state-breakdown.

Parker, Geoffrey, **"Review Essay: A Soldier of Fortune in Seventeenth Century Eastern Europe."** Vol.76, No.2 (April, 2012), pp.545-548. Examines Diary of General Patrick Gordon of Auchleuchries 1635-1699, the account of a Scottish Catholic who, like many Early-Modern Scots, served in the armies of Sweden, Poland, and Russia. See also: Parker, Geoffrey, "Review Essay: Patrick Gordon Rides Again." Vol.79, No.4 (October, 2015), pp.1127-1129.

Lee, Wayne E. **"Research Note: Military History in a Global Frame."** Vol.78, No.1 (January, 2014), pp.333-336. Three works by the prolific military historian, Jeremy Black that explore the conduct and consequences of warfare throughout the globe from the mid-fifteenth century to the conclusion of the eighteenth century.

Chet, Guy, **"Teaching in the Shadow of the Military Revolution."** Vol.78, No.3 (July, 2014), pp.1069-1075.

Parker, Geoffrey, **“Review Essay: Patrick Gordon Rides Again.”** Vol.79, No.4 (October, 2015), pp.1127-1129. Examines The remaining volumes of the diary of General Patrick Gordon of Auchleuchries 1635-1699, the account of a Scottish Catholic who, like many Early-Modern Scots, served in the armies of Sweden, Poland, and Russia. See also: Parker, Geoffrey, **“Review Essay: A Soldier of Fortune in Seventeenth Century Eastern Europe.”** Vol.76, No.2 (April, 2012), pp.545-548.

Muehlbauer, Matthew S. **“Holy War and Just War in Early New England, 1630-1655.”** Vol.81, No.3 (July, 2017), pp.667-692. Questions the uneven application of these concepts by the New England colonies in relation to both wars and efforts to avoid war with both Native American tribes and the neighboring colony of New Netherlands.

Boutin, Cameron, **“Adversary and Ally: The Role of Weather in the Life and Career of George Washington.”** Vol.81, No.3 (July, 2017), pp.693-718.

Hosler, John D. **“Status Report: Pre-Modern Military History in American Doctoral Programs: Figures and Implications.”** Vol.82, No.2 (April, 2018), pp.565-582.

EARLY MODERN PERIOD (1480-1789) arranged chronologically by conflict –
ITALIAN WARS (1494-1559)

Sherer, Idan, **“ ‘All of Us, in One Voice, Demand what’s Owed Us’: Mutiny in the Spanish Infantry during the Italian Wars, 1525-1538.”** Vol.78, No.3 (July, 2014), pp.893-926.
The author notes the similarities between these all too frequent mutinies and strikes initiated and resolved by modern employees.

Ansani, Fabrizio, **“ ‘This French Artillery is very good and very effective’: Hypotheses on the Diffusion of a New Military Technology in Renaissance Italy.”** Vol.83, No.2 (April, 2019), pp.347-378. Scrutinizes the development of the production of heavy cannons in Italy before and after the French Neapolitan Campaign of 1494.

EARLY MODERN PERIOD (1480-1789) arranged chronologically by conflict –
THE SPANISH CONQUEST OF THE AZTEC EMPIRE (1519-21)

Kerner, Alex, **“Espionage and Field Intelligence in the Conquest of México, 1519-1521.”** Vol.78, No.2 (April, 2014), pp.469-501. Identifies the types of intelligence sources and information-gathering systems available to both sides during the fateful events of 1519-1521, and their role in the outcome of this milestone in the New World’s history.

EARLY MODERN PERIOD (1480-1789) arranged chronologically by conflict –

EIGHTY YEARS WAR (1566-1648)

Parker, Geoffrey, “**The Limits to Revolutions in Military Affairs: Maurice of Nassau, the Battle of Nieuwpoort (1600), and the Legacy.**” Vol.71, No.2 (April, 2007), pp.331-372. Probes the evolution of the use of volley fire by matchlock armed infantry, beginning with its use in Japan in the 1560s and by the Dutch in the 1590s, with its first use in combat in Europe at the battle of Nieuwpoort, 2 July, 1600.

Arfaioi, Maurizio, “**Bastion of Empire: The Italian *terzo Vecchio* of the Army of Flanders (1597-1682).**” Vol.85, No.1 (January, 2021), pp.27-50. An examination of the service of the longest-lived infantry unit, the *terzo Vecchio*, in an effort to better understand Italian involvement in the long conflict within the Spanish Low Countries.

**EARLY MODERN PERIOD (1480-1789) arranged chronologically by conflict –
THIRTY YEARS WAR (1618-48)**

Croxton, Derek, “**‘The Prosperity of Arms is Never Continual’: Military Intelligence, Surprise, and Diplomacy in 1640s Germany.**” Vol.64, No.4 (October, 2000), pp.981-1003.

**EARLY MODERN PERIOD (1480-1789) arranged chronologically by conflict –
ENGLISH CIVIL WARS (1642-51)**

Brady, Andrea, “**Dying with Honour: Literary Propaganda and the Second English Civil War.**” Vol.70, No.1 (January, 2006), pp.9-30. Deals with the coverage in Parliamentary versus Royalist propaganda of the executions of Sir Charles Lucas and Sir George Lisle in 1648, following General Thomas Fairfax’s (1612-1671) siege of Colchester.

Manning, Roger B. “**Styles of Command in Seventeenth Century English Armies.**” Vol.71, No.3 (July, 2007), pp.671-699. Proposes that aristocratic officers were reluctant to accept the idea that military hierarchies had superseded social hierarchies or that in warfare they should pursue military objectives rather than personal honor, so that, excepting the New Model Army, English military leadership was backwards in comparison with its continental counterparts.

Robinson, Gavin, “**Equine Battering Rams? A Reassessment of Cavalry Charge in the English Civil War.**” Vol.75, No.3 (July, 2011), pp.719-731. Challenges the traditional notion that shock cavalry tactics imported from Sweden had replaced the caracole during the English Civil War and, in particular, contemplates the mechanics of cavalry shock tactics.

Yun, Dukhee, “**The ‘Push of the Pike’ in Seventeenth-Century English Infantry Combat.**”

Vol.86, No.4 (October, 2022), pp.837-857. Relying on a close reading of contemporary sources, the author seeks to develop a better understanding of how opposing pike formations actually fought one another.

EARLY MODERN PERIOD (1480-1789) arranged chronologically by conflict –

1st ANGLO-DUTCH WAR (1652-54)

Rommelse, Gijs and Downing, Roger, **“Victims of an Ideological Rift? Dutch Prisoners of War during the First Anglo-Dutch War (1652-1654).”** Vol.80, No.3 (July, 2016), pp.649-669. Rather than ideology, the author shows that it was a combination of logistical problems and a lack of funds that produced the dire conditions experienced by Dutch P.O.W.s.

EARLY MODERN PERIOD (1480-1789) arranged chronologically by conflict –

WAR OF THE SPANISH SUCCESSION (1701-15)

Ostwald, Jamel, **“The ‘Decisive’ Battle of Ramillies, 1706: Prerequisites for Decisiveness in Early Modern Warfare.”** Vol.64, No.3 (July, 2000), pp.649-677. Asks whether eighteenth century military strategy was indecisive by choice rather than by necessity by looking at the 1st Duke of Marlborough, John Churchill’s (1650-1722), Ramillies campaign.

Paoletti, Ciro, **“Prince Eugene of Savoy, the Toulon Expedition of 1707, and the English Historians: A Dissenting View.”** Vol.70, No.4 (October, 2006), pp.939-962. Using the siege of Toulon as an example, the author insists that most of the military histories of the period between 1688 and 1748 written by English speaking authors are flawed due to a failure to consult non-English contemporary sources.

Dee, Darryl, **“The Survival of France: Logistics and Strategy in the 1709 Flanders Campaign.”** Vol.84, No.4 (October, 2020), pp.1021-1050. Shines a light on the significant role of logistics in the debate concerning whether the French field army in Flanders should pursue an aggressive or cautious strategy during the first year of the War of the Spanish Succession, 1701-1715, arguing that this established a pattern for the remainder of the conflict.

EARLY MODERN PERIOD (1480-1789) arranged chronologically by conflict –

WAR OF THE AUSTRIAN SUCCESSION (1740-48)

Browning, Reed, **“Review Essay: New Views on the Silesian Wars.”** Vol.69, No.2 (April, 2005), pp.521-534. Concerning the series of conflicts, 1740-42, 1744-45, and 1756-63, fought between Austria and the Kingdom of Prussia, led by Frederick the Great (1712-1786).

EARLY MODERN PERIOD (1480-1789) arranged chronologically by conflict –
THE SEVEN YEARS WAR (1756-63)

Kingsley, Ronald F. and Alexander, Harvey J. **“The Failure of Abercromby’s Attack on Fort Carillon, July 1758, and the Scapegoating of Matthew Clerk.”** Vol.72, No.1 (January, 2008), pp.43-70. A reassessment, based on letters and other documents, that calls into question the degree that the young engineer, Matthew Clerk, contributed to the defeat of the British attack on Fort Carillon (Fort Ticonderoga) during the French and Indian War. See also: McCulloch, Ian Macpherson, **“ ‘A Blanket of Inconsistencies’: The Battle of Ticonderoga, 2008.”** Vol.72, No.3 (July, 2008), Vol.72, No.1 (January, 2008), pp.889-900.

McCulloch, Ian Macpherson, **“ ‘A Blanket of Inconsistencies’: The Battle of Ticonderoga, 2008.”** Vol.72, No.3 (July, 2008), pp.889-900. A response to Ronald F. Kingsley and Harvey J. Alexander’s article, **“The Failure of Abercomby’s Attack on Fort Carillon, July 1758, and the Scapegoating of Matthew Clerk.”** Vol.72, No.1 (January, 2008), pp.43-70.

EARLY MODERN PERIOD (1481-1788) arranged alphabetically by country –
ENGLAND / GREAT BRITAIN

Rodger, N.A.M. **“Historiographical Essay: Recent Books on the Royal Navy of the Eighteenth Century.”** Vol.63, No.3 (July, 1999), pp.683-703. A very thorough survey of the latest works.

Black, Jeremy, **“Historiographical Essay: Britain as a Military Power, 1688-1815.”** Vol.64, No.1 (January, 2000), pp.159-177.

Phillips, Gervase, **“To Cry ‘Home! Home!’: Mutiny, Morale, and Indiscipline in Tudor Armies.”** Vol.65, No.2 (April, 2001), pp.313-332. Points to the study of the unrest within Tudor armies as a means of better understanding common notions of equitable treatment, mutual obligations, and obedience within society as a whole.

Probasco, Nate, **“The Role of Commoners and Print in Elizabethan England’s Acceptance of Firearms.”** Vol.76, No.2 (April, 2012), pp.343-372. Looks at the debate in print between, on the one hand, common citizens and local officials, who were skeptical of firearms, the expense and safety of which they criticized, and those who promoted the replacement of longbows with firearms, who often employed dubious information.

Grummitt, David, **“Flodden 1513: Re-Examining British Warfare at the End of the Middle Ages.”** Vol.82, No.1 (January, 2018), pp.9-28. Asserts that the English Army that fought the forces lead by King James IV (1473-1513) on 9 September, 1513, was more modern than its Scottish counterpart, just as its commander, Thomas Howard, the Earl of Surrey (1443-1524),

was more of a ‘Renaissance General’ than James IV.

Hurl-Eamon, Jennine, **“Husbands, Sons, Brothers, and Neighbors: Eighteenth-Century Soldiers’ Efforts to Maintain Civilian Ties.”** Vol.86, No.2 (April, 2022), pp.299-320.

Endeavors to understand the conflict between army regulations restricting British servicemen’s ability to visit and provide for their kin with the efforts of soldiers to maintain the connections to the communities they left.

EARLY MODERN PERIOD (1481-1788) arranged alphabetically by country – INDIA

Bryant, G.J. **“Asymmetric Warfare: The British Experience in Eighteenth-Century India.”**

Vol.68, No.2 (April, 2004), pp.431-469. Juxtaposes the adaption to new circumstance of Indian versus British military forces, proposing that while the British were able to retain their military superiority, Indian rulers were unable to overcome political obstacles that interfered with the adoption of European methods.

De la Garza, Andrew, **“The Mughal Battlefield: Personnel, Technology, and Tactics in the Early Empire, 1500-1605.”** Vol.78, No.3 (July, 2014), pp.927-960. Challenges the assumptions of inferiority in comparison with the ‘European Military Revolution.’

Nath, Pratyay, **“Looking beyond the Military Revolution: Variations in Early Modern Warfare and the Mughal Case.”** Vol.86, No.1 (January, 2022), pp.9-31. Argues that the heterogeneous nature of Mughal strategy, tactics, and the deployment of technology over time and across space was due to a wide range of factors, including environmental conditions, military pragmatism, financial considerations, and distance from the imperial heartland, challenging the simplistic early modern ‘Military Revolution’ thesis.

EARLY MODERN PERIOD (1481-1788) arranged alphabetically by country – THE NETHERLANDS

Murteira, André, **“Historiographical Essay: The Military Revolution and European Wars Outside of Europe: The Dutch-Portuguese War in Asia in the First Quarter of the Seventeenth Century.”** Vol.84, No.2 (April, 2020), pp.511-535. Challenges the notion of Early Modern Western Military exceptionalism that, in Portuguese historiography, has blamed their defeat on Portuguese naval forces that were inferior to their Dutch opponents supposedly because of Asian military influence that was absent among the Dutch.

EARLY MODERN PERIOD (1481-1788) arranged alphabetically by country – PORTUGAL

Monteiro, Armando da Silva Saturnino, **“The Decline and Fall of Portuguese Seapower,**

1588-1663.” Vol.65, No.1 (January, 2001), pp.9-20.

Murteira, André, **“Historiographical Essay: The Military Revolution and European Wars Outside of Europe: The Dutch-Portuguese War in Asia in the First Quarter of the Seventeenth Century.”** Vol.84, No.2 (April, 2020), pp.511-535. Challenges the notion of Early Modern Western Military exceptionalism that, in Portuguese historiography, has blamed their defeat on Portuguese naval forces that were inferior to their Dutch opponents supposedly because of Asian military influence that was absent among the Dutch.

EARLY MODERN PERIOD (1480-1789) arranged alphabetically by country –

RUSSIA / SOVIET UNION

Paul, Michael C. **“The Military Revolution in Russia, 1550-1682.”** Vol.68, No.1 (January, 2004), pp.9-45. Asserts that the Armed Forces of the tsars underwent truly revolutionary changes between the mid-sixteenth and late-seventeenth centuries that made Imperial Russia a significant power and laid the groundwork for the reforms of Peter the Great.

EAST INDIA COMPANY, BRITISH – See: INDIA

ECONOMIC ISSUES

Rogers, Clifford J. **“Review Essay: The Field & the Forge.”** Vol.68, No.4 (October, 2004), pp.1233-1239. Population, production, and power in the pre-industrial West.

Paine, Sarah C.M. **“The 2022 George C. Marshall Lecture in Military History: Centuries of Security: Chinese, Russian and U.S. Continental versus Maritime Approaches.”** Vol.86, No.4 (October, 2022), pp.813-836.

ECONOMIC ISSUES: MEDIEVAL PERIOD (476-1480)

Isaac, Steven, **“The Role of Towns in the Battle of Bouvines (1214).”** Vol.79, No.2 (April, 2015), pp.317-344. Uses the French King, Philip Augustus’ (1165-1223), victory at Bouvines as an example of the military contributions of urban centers in the form of non-noble troops, the production of arms and armor, financial resources, and contributors to policy.

Rogers, Clifford J. **“Medieval Strategy and the Economics of Conquest.”** Vol.82, No.3 (July, 2018), pp.709-738. Approaching the question in a quantitative fashion, the author seeks to show how Medieval kings could make war pay for war, especially in urbanized areas and in times and places where it was permitted to enslave enemy populations.

ECONOMIC ISSUES: U.S. REVOLUTIONARY WAR (1775-83)

Adelberg, Michael S. “**The Scope and Severity of Civil Warfare in Revolutionary Monmouth County, New Jersey.**” Vol.73, No.1 (January, 2009), pp.9-47. Examines both how many of the residents of Monmouth County chose to participate on the opposing sides and how many lives were adversely affected by the war.

ECONOMIC ISSUES: 19th CENTURY

Leiner, Frederick C. “**The Squadron Commander’s Share: Decatur and the Prize Money for the *Chesapeake*’s First War of 1812 Cruise.**” Vol.73, No.1 (January, 2009), pp.69-82. An examination of the prize case of Decatur vs. Chew that displays the tensions between ranking officers over their contrasting views of their appropriate shares.

Leiner, Frederick C. “**‘The Sport of Arbitrary Men’: The Privateer *Nonsuch* and a Search at Sea in the War of 1812.**” Vol.76, No.4 (October, 2012), pp.1147-1164. An incident involving the Baltimore Privateer *Nonsuch*’s seizure of the schooner *Ann Maria*, which resulted in court cases that led all the way to the U.S. Supreme Court.

Leiner, Frederick C. “**Privateers in the War of 1812.**” Vol.77, No.4 (October, 2013), Pp.1225-1250. Seeks to answer the question, ‘Was privateering profitable?’

Crawford, Michael J. “**The Abolition of Prize Money in the United States Navy Reconsidered.**” Vol.81, No.1 (January, 2017), pp.105-132. Sizes up the efforts to eliminate prize money for the capture of enemy warships and merchant ships, which began shortly after the War of 1812, but only came about in 1899 due to a confluence of motives.

ECONOMIC ISSUES: WORLD WAR I (1914-18)

Winkler, Jonathan Reed, “**Information Warfare in World War I.**” Vol.73, No.3 (July, 2009), pp.845-867. Presents both the British success in destroying the pre-war German system and the simultaneous German campaign against Allied communications, all within the broader economic, political, intelligence, and military context of modern conflict.

ECONOMIC ISSUES: INTERWAR PERIOD (1919-39)

Irish, Kerry E. “**Apt Pupil: Dwight Eisenhower and the 1930 Industrial Mobilization Plan.**” Vol.70, No.1 (January, 2006), pp.31-61. While the detailed plan for industrial mobilization drawn up by Eisenhower (1890-1969) as a staff officer was not formally implemented, it nevertheless provided the basis for a more efficient transition to war production than had taken place in World War I.

ECONOMIC ISSUES: WORLD WAR II (1939-45)

Searle, Thomas R. “**‘It made a Lot of Sense to Kill Skilled Workers’: The Firebombing of Tokyo in March 1945.**” Vol.66, No.1 (January, 2002), pp.103-133. Demonstrates that the firebombing of Japanese cities was not a radical departure from U.S.A.A.F. tactics used against Germany, that it was not an abandonment of concentrating on targeting industry, and that it was based on long-term planning.

Meilinger, Phillip S. “**A History of Effects-Based Air Operations.**” Vol.71, No.1 (January, 2007), pp.139-167. Surveys the problem of measuring the effectiveness of Air Operations due to the ready availability of metrics such as casualty numbers, bomb tonnage, and the number of sorties flown versus the lack of the intelligence apparatus with which to analyze the complex economic system of one’s opponents.

Lacey, James, “**World War II’s Real Victory Program.**” Vol.75, No.3 (July, 2011), pp.811-834. Challenges Maj. Albert C. Wedemeyer’s assertion that he was the author of the United States’ Victory Program.

McLaughlin, John J. and Lomazow, Steven, “**Counterpoint: Albert Coady Wedemeyer.**” Vol.77, No.1 (January, 2013), pp.255-272.

Lacey, James, “**Historical Truth and Tilting at Windmills.**” Vol.77, No.1 (January, 2013), pp.267-272. Addresses the controversy surrounding U.S. Army General Albert C. Wedemeyer (1896-1989).

Atkinson, Rick, “**The 2016 George C. Marshall Lecture in Military History: Projecting American Power in the Second World War.**” Vol.80, No.2 (April, 2016), pp.345-354. In spite of devoting a smaller proportion of the country’s gross domestic product to the war than any other major belligerent, the United States demonstrated logistical brilliance, firepower, mobility, mechanical aptitude, and an economic preponderance that outproduced the Axis powers.

ECONOMIC ISSUES: COLD WAR (1945-91)

Dingman, Roger, “**Review Essay: American Bases in Japan.**” Vol.78, No.2 (April, 2014), pp.753-755. A collection of essays by Japanese academics and public historians providing a balanced study of the impact of U.S. bases Kanagawa Prefecture, just southwest of Tokyo.

ECONOMIC ISSUES: VIETNAM WAR (1955-75)

Milne, David, “**‘Our Equivalent of Guerrilla Warfare’: Walt Rostow and the Bombing of North Vietnam, 1961-1968.**” Vol.71, No.1 (January, 2007), pp.169-203. Claims that Walt Rostow’s (1916-2003) background as an economic historian led him to become one of the

strongest advocates for the strategic bombing of North Vietnam.

EDDY, GEORGE G. (1895-1969)

Eddy, George G. **“Memoirs: The Birth of the Concrete-Piercing Fuze: How the Siegfried Line and Other Formidable Targets were Breached.”** Vol.64, No.2 (April, 2000), pp.459-465.
Brigadier General George G. Eddy (1895-1969) relates the development of the concrete piercing fuze when he served as Director of the Ordnance Research Center at Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland, during World War II.

EDISON, THOMAS (1847-1931)

Jeffrey, Thomas E. **“Commodore’ Edison Joins the Navy: Thomas Alva Edison and the Naval Consulting Board.”** Vol.80, No.2 (April, 2016), pp.411-445. Claims that the impetus for the formation of the Naval Consulting Board headed by Edison (1847-1931), which was intended to provide advice on naval warfare technology, was Edison’s chief engineer, who conceived it as the centerpiece of a marketing campaign to sell Edison designed batteries to the Navy for their submarines.

EDUCATION AND TRAINING arranged chronologically by historical period –
ANCIENT PERIOD (to 476)

May, Timothy, **“The Training of an Inner Asian Nomad Army in the Pre-Modern Period.”** Vol.70, No.3 (July, 2006), pp.617-635. Confirms that nomadic ‘horse people’, such as the Mongols, employed more sophisticated training for war than had previously been imagined.

Naiden, F.S. **“Spartan Naval Performance in the Deceleian War, 413-404 B.C.E.”** Vol.73, No.3 (July, 2009), pp.729-744. Identifies improvements in Sparta’s cadre of naval officers as the reason for Spartan naval victories during the final phase of the Peloponnesian War.

McArthur, Tony, **“Should Roman Soldiers be Called ‘Professional’ Prior to Augustus?”** Vol.85, No.1 (January, 2021), pp.9-26. Raises the question of to what extent, if any, could soldiers in Roman armies during the period between 200 B.C.E. and the Battle of Actium in 31 B.C.E. qualify as professionals.

EDUCATION AND TRAINING arranged chronologically by historical period –
MEDIEVAL PERIOD (476-1480)

May, Timothy, **“The Training of an Inner Asian Nomad Army in the Pre-Modern Period.”** Vol.70, No.3 (July, 2006), pp.617-635. Confirms that nomadic ‘horse people’, such as the Mongols, employed more sophisticated training for war than had previously been imagined.

Kostick, Conor, **“*Iuvenes* and the First Crusade (1096-99): Knights in Search of Glory?”** Vol.73, No.2 (April, 2009), pp.369-392. *Iuvenes* was a term applied to a category of knights who were not necessarily young in age, but were ‘young’ in their careers, a category of knights who, despite a degree of recklessness and indiscipline, played an important role in the First Crusade.

EDUCATION AND TRAINING arranged chronologically by historical period – **EARLY MODERN PERIOD (1480-1789)**

Neill, Donald A. **“Ancestral Voices: The Influence of the Ancients on the Military Thought of the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries.”** Vol.62, No.3 (July, 1998), pp.487-520. Insists that the military developments of the Enlightenment were the result of the normal course of military innovation, simple evolutionary adaptation, as opposed to a sudden, revolutionary change stemming from the rediscovery of the military methods described by Classical authors.

Kleinschmidt, Harald, **“Using the Gun: Manual Drill and the Proliferation of Portable Firearms.”** Vol.63, No.3 (July, 1999), pp.601-630. Delves into the military, political, and social factors that led to an increase in the use of hand-held firearms throughout Europe, from the fifteenth through the eighteenth century.

Powers, Sandra L. **“Historiographical Essay: Studying the Art of War: Military Books known to American Officers and Their French Counterparts during the Second Half of the Eighteenth Century.”** Vol.70, No.3 (July, 2006), pp.781-814.

EDUCATION AND TRAINING arranged alphabetically by country - CANADA

Cook, Tim, **“Creating the Faith: The Canadian Gas Services in the First World War.”** Vol.62, No.4 (October, 1998), pp.755-786. The Canadian forces developed a very efficient organization to instruct their troops in how to protect themselves from Chemical weapons.

Rawling, William, **“The Challenge of Modernization: The Royal Canadian Navy and Antisubmarine Weapons, 1944-1945.”** Vol.63, No.2 (April, 1999), pp.355-378.

Delaney, Douglas E. **“Mentoring the Canadian Corps: Imperial Officers and the Canadian Expeditionary Force, 1914-1918.”** Vol.77, No.3 (July, 2013), pp.931-953.

Fedorowich, Kent, **“ ‘Caught in the Crossfire’: Sir Gerald Campbell, Lord Beaverbrook and**

the Near Demise of the British Commonwealth Air Training Plan, May-October 1940.”

Vol.79, No.1 (January, 2015), pp.37-68. The program was threatened by intemperate remarks by Lord Beaverbrook (1879-1964) which rattled Anglo-Canadian relations.

D’Amours, Caroline, **“Canadian Military Culture and Tactical Training, 1940-1944: The Making of Infantry Junior N.C.O.s.”** Vol.82, No.4 (October, 2018), pp.1175-1198.

EDUCATION AND TRAINING arranged alphabetically by country - CHINA

Sacca, John Wanda, **“Like Strangers in a Foreign Land: Chinese Officers Prepared at American Military Colleges, 1904-37.”** Vol.70, No.3 (July, 2006), pp.703-742. Relates how those Chinese officers who received military education in the United States during the turbulent period marked by the end of the Qing Dynasty and the establishment of the Republic were tainted by their foreign education and hampered by their lack of membership in any alumni associations.

Worthing, Peter, **“Continuity and Change: Chinese Nationalist Army Tactics, 1925-1938.”** Vol.78, No.3 (July, 2014), pp.995-1016.

EDUCATION AND TRAINING arranged alphabetically by country –
ENGLAND / GREAT BRITAIN

Sumida, Jon Tetsuro, **“Review Essay: Gunnery, Procurement, and Strategy in the *Dreadnought* Era.”** Vol.69, No.4 (October, 2005), pp.1179-1187.

Buckley, John, **“Tackling the Tiger: The Development of British Armoured Doctrine for Normandy 1944.”** Vol.74, No.4 (October, 2010), pp.1161-1184. Asserts that the British Army’s loose approach to developing and imposing doctrine, despite inherent shortcomings, actually facilitated a flexibility that allowed the armoured forces to quickly and effectively modify their doctrines in the heat of battle.

Lambert, Nicholas A. **“Review Essay: False Prophet?: The Maritime Theory of Julian Corbett and Professional Education.”** Vol.77, No.3 (July, 2013), pp.1055-1078.

EDUCATION AND TRAINING arranged alphabetically by country - FRANCE

McConachy, Bruce, **“The Roots of Artillery Doctrine: Napoleonic Artillery Tactics Reconsidered.”** Vol.65, No.3 (July, 2001), pp.617-640. Puts forward the explanation that the changes in Napoleonic artillery practices beginning in 1807 were the results of years of experimentation and innovation, rather than compensation for a general decline in standards throughout the *Grande Armée*.

EDUCATION AND TRAINING arranged alphabetically by country - GERMANY

Corum, James S. **“The *Luftwaffe*’s Army Support Doctrine, 1918-1941.”** Vol.59, No.1 (January, 1995), pp.53-76. Covers close air support doctrine and training, development and implementation, from the Spanish Civil War to Operation Barbarossa.

Showalter, Dennis, **“From Deterrence to Doomsday Machine: The German Way of War, 1890-1914.”** Vol.64, No.3 (July, 2000), pp.679-710. Proposes that between 1890 and 1914 the German Army developed a siege mentality, the only solution for which was believed to be the refinement of operational capabilities, pursued at the expense of policy and strategy.

Jackman, Steven D. **“Shoulder to Shoulder: Close Control and ‘Old Prussian Drill’ in German Offensive Infantry Tactics, 1871-1914.”** Vol.68, No.1 (January, 2004), pp.73-104.

Larson, Robert H. **“Max Jähns and the Writing of Military History in Imperial Germany.”** Vol.72, No.2 (April, 2008), pp.345-370. A career Prussian officer who taught military history at the elite War Academy for fourteen years and was a prolific author, Max Jähns’ (1837-1900) studies focused on the place of military institutions and practices in the context of general history.

Foley, Robert T. **“Learning War’s Lessons: The German Army and the Battle of the Somme 1916.”** Vol.75, No.2 (April, 2011), pp.471-504. Over the course of the Battle of the Somme, the Germans were forced by superior Anglo-French weaponry and tactics to improvise a new defensive tactical doctrine, the evolution of which is examined through the study of German ‘lessons-learned’ reports which display intellectual flexibility.

EDUCATION AND TRAINING arranged alphabetically by country - INDIA

Sundaram, Chandar S. **“‘Treated with Scant Attention’: The Imperial Cadet Corps, Indian Nobles, and Anglo-Indian Policy, 1897-1917.”** Vol.77, No.1 (January, 2013), pp.41-70. Foreshadowing the Indianization of the Indian Army’s officer corps and the opening of the Indian Military Academy in 1932, the Imperial Cadet Corps offered officer training to Indian princes and gentlemen between 1901 and 1917.

EDUCATION AND TRAINING arranged alphabetically by country –

ISRAEL / PALESTINE

Tal, David, **“Between Intuition and Professionalism: Israeli Military Leadership during the 1948 Palestine War.”** Vol.68, No.3 (July, 2004), pp.885-909.

Ezov, Amiram, **“The Crossing Challenge: The Suez Canal Crossing by the Israeli Defense Forces during the Yom Kippur War of 1973.”** Vol.82, No.2 (April, 2018), pp.461-490.

Compares the setting of objectives, planning, and execution of the Egyptian Army's crossing with that of the Israeli Defense Forces.

EDUCATION AND TRAINING arranged alphabetically by country - KOREA

Gibby, Bryan, **"The Best Little Army."** Vol.77, No.1 (January, 2013), pp.173-201. Surveys the results of the work of the U.S. Korean Military Advisory Group (K.M.A.G.) prior to the outbreak of the Korean War.

EDUCATION AND TRAINING arranged alphabetically by country - LIBERIA

Shellum, Brian G. **"African American Officers in Liberia, 1910-1942."** Vol.82, No.3 (July, 2018), pp.739-757. Seventeen African American officers from the U.S. Army reorganized, trained, and commanded the Liberian Frontier Force that enabled it to defend the nation's borders and defeat a number of indigenous uprisings.

**EDUCATION AND TRAINING arranged alphabetically by country –
RUSSIA / SOVIET UNION**

Reese, Roger R. **"Red Army Professionalism and the Communist Party, 1918-1941."** Vol.66, No.1 (January, 2002), pp.71-102. Explores the social and institutional dynamics that shaped the Red Army's officer corps and determined the extent of its ability to face the Nazi invasion.

EDUCATION AND TRAINING arranged alphabetically by country – SERBIA

Lyon, James M.B. **"'A Peasant Mob': The Serbian Army on the Eve of the Great War."** Vol.61, No.3 (July, 1997), pp.481-502. In contrast to previous studies, this article seeks to assess the Army's preparedness on the eve of World War I based on Serbian archival sources, as opposed to Hapsburg sources.

EDUCATION AND TRAINING arranged alphabetically by country – U.S.A.

Kiesling, Eugenia C. **"Historiographical Essays: Illuminating 'Strange Defeat' and 'Pyrrhic Victory': The Historian Robert A. Doughty."** Vol.71, No.3 (July, 2007), pp.875-888. Reviews the English language publications on the performance of France in both World Wars and how Brigadier General (Rtd.) Robert A. Doughty (b.1943) has sought to teach the U.S. Army how to harness historical study in the interest of doctrinal development.

Arnold, James R. **"Winfield Scott Makes a Name for Himself."** Vol.76, No.4 (October, 2012), pp.1183-1185. General Winfield Scott (1786-1866) first came to public notice during the War of 1812, during which he demonstrated a talent for training troops, but did the Duke of

Wellington (1769-1852) ever actually say “Scott is lost” when commenting on Scott’s Mexico City Campaign (1847).

Friedman, Hal M. **“Blue versus Orange: The United States Naval War College, Japan, and the Old Enemy in the Pacific, 1945-1946.”** Vol.78, No.1 (January, 2014), pp.211-231.

Reports on the delay in adjusting to post-war circumstances that meant that the War College curriculum remained a mixture of interwar and wartime doctrine during the early Cold War.

Grimsley, Mark, **“Review Essay: The American Military History Master Narrative: Three Textbooks on the American Military Experience.”** Vol.79, No.3 (July, 2015), pp.783-802.

Watson, Samuel, **“Military Learning and Adaptation Shaped by Social Context: The U.S. Army and its ‘Indian Wars’, 1790-1890.”** Vol.82, No.2 (April, 2018), pp.373-412.

EDUCATION AND TRAINING: U.S.A. – FROM EARLY REPUBLIC TO CIVIL WAR (1787-1861)

Hunter, Mark C. **“The U.S. Naval Academy and Its Summer Cruises: Professionalization in the Antebellum U.S. Navy, 1845-1861.”** Vol.70, No.4 (October, 2006), pp.963-994.

Watson, Samuel, **“Historiographical Essay: Continuity in Civil-Military Relations and Expertise: The U.S. Army during the Decade before the Civil War.”** Vol.75, No.1 (January, 2011), pp.221-250.

Crawford, Michael J. **“U.S. Navy Petty Officers in the Era of the War of 1812.”** Vol.76, No.4 (October, 2012), pp.1035-1051. Scrutinizes the Navy’s process of recruiting and training petty officers between the years 1797 and 1812.

EDUCATION AND TRAINING: U.S.A. – CIVIL WAR (1861-65)

Weitz, Mark A. **“Drill, Training, and the Combat Performance of the Civil War Soldier: Dispelling the Myth of the Poor Soldier, Great Fight.”** Vol.62, No.2 (April, 1998), pp.263-289. Proposes that, contrary to conventional wisdom, the soldiers who fought in the war functioned effectively because of military skills that flowed directly from drill, training, and discipline rather than any innate fighting ability.

EDUCATION AND TRAINING: U.S.A. – FROM THE END OF THE CIVIL WAR TO ENTRY INTO WORLD WAR I (1865-1917)

Shulimson, Jack, **“Military Professionalism: The Case of the U.S. Marine Officer Corps, 1880-1898.”** Vol.60, No.2 (April, 1996), pp.231-242. Views the transformation of the officer corps

of the Marines into a professional body as part of the late nineteenth century, society wide ‘organizational revolution.’

Grandstaff, Mark R. **“Preserving the ‘Habits and Usages of War’: William Tecumseh Sherman, Professional Reform and the U.S. Army Officer Corps, 1865-1881, Revisited.”** Vol.62, No.3 (July, 1998), pp.521-545.

Brereton, T.R. **“First Lessons in Modern War: Arthur Wagner, the 1898 Santiago Campaign, and the U.S. Army Lesson-Learning.”** Vol.64, No.1 (January, 2000), pp.79-96. Relates how Lieutenant Colonel Arthur Wagner (1853-1905) pioneered the U.S. Army’s practice of producing ‘lessons-learned’ studies of the Army’s recent military operations.

Seidule, James Tyrus, **“Treason is Treason: Civil War Memory at West Point, 1861-1902.”** Vol.76, No.2 (April, 2012), pp.427-452. Asserts that West Point during the Gilded Age neither forgot nor forgave graduates who had chosen to fight against the U.S. Army as officers in the Confederate forces and that memorials were created during the 1890s to highlight the role of its graduates in preserving the Union.

Brands, Benjamin D. **“ ‘Unsatisfactory and Futile’: The Officers’ Lyceum Program and U.S. Army Reform.”** Vol.83, No.4 (October, 2019), pp.1067-1094. Inquires into the impact of the Officers’ Lyceum Program on the late-nineteenth century Army’s effort to provide its officer corps with professional education.

Epstein, Katherine C. **“ ‘No One can Afford to Say ‘Damn the Torpedoes’: Battle Tactics and the U.S. Naval History before World War I.”** Vol.77, No.2 (April, 2013), pp.491-520.

McGovern, Rory M. **“The School of Experience: George W. Goethals and the U.S. Army, 1867-1907.”** Vol.81, No.2 (April, 2017), pp.395-424. Observes George W. Goethals (1858-1928) pre-Panama Canal / World War I career as an example of the career path of officers within the Gilded Age Army.

EDUCATION AND TRAINING: U.S.A. – WORLD WAR I (1917-18)

Nenninger, Timothy K. **“ ‘Unsystematic as a Mode of Command’: Commanders and the Process of Command in the American Expeditionary Forces, 1917-1918.”** Vol.64, No.3 (July, 2000), pp.739-768. Inquires into how the knowledge, skills, and preparations of A.E.F. commanders and staff officers and their interactions with one another produced a distinctly American process of command.

EDUCATION AND TRAINING: U.S.A. – INTERWAR PERIOD (1919-39)

Winton, Harold R. **“Toward an American Philosophy of Command.”** Vol.64, No.4 (October,

2000), pp.1035-1060. Considers the particular blend of intellectual and psychological qualities articulated within the practice of command in the U.S. Army during the interwar period.

Catagnus, Earl J. **“Infantry Field Manual 7-5 *Organization and Tactics of Infantry: The Rifle Battalion* (October 1940).”** Vol.77, No.2 (April, 2013), pp.657-666.

Bruscino, Thomas, **“Naturally Clausewitzian: U.S. Army Theory and Education from Reconstruction to the Inter-War Years.”** Vol.77, No.4 (October, 2013), pp.1251-1275.
Though familiar with Carl von Clausewitz (1780-1831), U.S. Army officers independently embraced concepts that Clausewitz advocated.

Wadle, Ryan, **“Failing to Speak the same Language: The Roots of ‘Jointness’ in the United States, 1919-1941.”** Vol.84, No.4 (October, 2020), pp.1097-1126. Sizes up the problems that interfered with attempts to create an interservice culture, promoted in efforts to integrate strategic planning, in professional military education, and large-scale joint exercises.

EDUCATION AND TRAINING: U.S.A. – WORLD WAR II (1941-45)

Dingman, Roger V. **“Language at War: U.S. Marine Corps Japanese Language Officers in the Pacific.”** Vol.68, No.3 (July, 2004), pp.853-883. Analyzes the origins, training, experiences, and recollections of Caucasian Japanese language officers, including the shift from translating to facilitate life-taking to lifesaving.

Gioia, Philip, **“When ‘The Institution was Heard from’ in World War II: V.M.I. Alumni on the War Department General Staff, 1939-1945.”** Vol.78, No.4 (October, 2014), pp.1385-1394.

Sturma, Michael, **“Coco Solo Submarines: Protecting the Panama Canal, 1941-1942.”** Vol.81, No.4 (October, 2017), pp.1039-1057. While these submarine patrols may have contributed little to repelling any threat to the Canal Zone, they did provide useful training and experience for a significant number of U.S. submariners.

EDUCATION AND TRAINING: U.S.A. – THE COLD WAR (1945-91)

Coffman, Edward M. **“The Course of Military History in the United States since World War II.”** Vol.61, No.4 (October, 1997), pp.761-775.

Loveland, Anne C. **“Character Education in the U.S. Army, 1947-1977.”** Vol.64, No.3 (July, 2000), pp.795-818. Scrutinizes the promotion of the Christian Faith in the Army Character Guidance program in the context of Cold War paranoia.

Lock-Pullan, Richard, **“‘An Inward Looking Time’: The United States Army, 1973-1976.”** Vol.67, No.2 (April, 2003), pp.483-511. Rejects the explanation that the immediate post-

Vietnam War reforms were primarily shaped by the recent conflict in Southeast Asia, insisting, instead, that of greater importance was the end of the draft and the lessons drawn from the 1973 Arab-Israeli War by General William E. DePuy (1919-1992).

Donnelly, William M. **“Bilko’s Army: A Crisis in Command?”** Vol.75, No.4 (October, 2011), pp.1183-1215. Focusing on U.S. Army officers above company grade level, 1953 to 1965, the author considers whether service schools, the headquarters of the Continental Army Command, and Headquarters, Department of the Army identified a crisis in command.

Daddis, Gregory A. **“Eating Soup with a Spoon: The U.S. Army as a ‘Learning Organization’ in the Vietnam War.”** Vol.77, No.1 (January, 2013), pp.229-254. The U.S. Army’s strategic approach, operational experience, and organizational changes.

Holwitt, Joel I. **“The Loss of U.S.S. *Thresher*: Technological and Cultural Change and the Cold War U.S. Navy.”** Vol.82, No.3 (July, 2018), pp.843-872. Advances the proposition that the response to the 10 April, 1963, loss of the U.S.S. *Thresher* with all hands led to a cultural shift within the U.S. naval officer development from a ‘generalist’ to a ‘technical specialist’ model.

Donnelly, William M. **“From Sergeant Snorkels to Drill Sergeants: Basic Training of Male Soldiers in the U.S. Army, 1953-1964.”** Vol.86, No.2 (April, 2022), pp.399-426. Assesses the much-criticized quality of officers and non-commissioned officers assigned to shepherd recruits through basic training, an issue that wasn’t addressed until the Secretaries of the Army Cyrus R. Vance Sr. (1917-2002) and Stephen Ailes (1912-2001).

EGYPT: ANCIENT PERIOD

Santosuosso, Antonio, **“Kadesh Revisited: Reconstructing the Battle between the Egyptians and the Hittites [1274 B.C.E.]”** Vol.60, No.3 (July, 1996), pp.423-444.

EGYPT: CRUSADES IN THE MIDDLE EAST (1090-1291)

Fulton, Michael S. **“The Siege of Montfort and Mamluk Artillery Technology in 1271: Integrating the Archaeology and Topography with the Narrative Sources.”** Vol.83, No.3 (July, 2019), pp.689-717. An investigation into the development of mechanical artillery, specifically the trebuchet, through the study of archaeologically unearthed projectiles and the suitability of the surrounding terrain for the deployment of trebuchets.

Marvin, Laurence W. **“The Battle of Fariskur (29 August 1219) and the Fifth Crusade: Causes, Course, and Consequences.”** Vol.85, No.3 (July, 2021), pp.597-618. Seeks to understand the neglected Battle of Fariskur, fought between a force of Crusaders and the army of the Sultan of Egypt, Al-Kamil (circa 1177-1238).

EGYPT: 19th CENTURY

Dunn, John, **“Egypt’s Nineteenth-Century Armaments Industry.”** Vol.61, No.2 (April, 1997), pp.231-254. Explains that the efforts of Muhammad Ali Pasha (1769-1849) and Khedive Ismail to establish a modern arms industry in Egypt was doomed in part due to haphazard implementation and inadequate funding, but, in a broader context, failure sprang from an unwillingness and / or inability to impose major political, cultural, and social changes.

Rose, Susan, **“Islam Versus Christendom: The Naval Dimension, 1000-1600.”** Vol.63, No.3 (July, 1999), pp.561-578. Surveys developments from the Crusades to the dominance of the Ottoman Empire within the geographic framework of the Mediterranean Sea.

Dunn, John P. **“Americans in the Nineteenth Century Egyptian Army: A Selected Bibliography.”** Vol.70, No.1 (January, 2006), pp.123-136. Ismail (r.1863-1879), grandson of Muhammad Ali Pasha, employed officers from the United States, including both veterans from both sides in the Civil War and serving officers in the postwar United States Army.

EGYPT: ARAB-ISRAELI WARS

Rudd, Gordon W. **“Review Essay: The Israeli Revisionist Historians and the Arab-Israeli Conflict Part One: From the Founding of Zionism to the 1967 War.”** Vol.67, No.4 (October, 2003), pp.1263-1270; **“Part Two: From the 1967 War to the Present.”** Vol.68, No.1 (January, 2004), pp.225-231.

Bronfeld, Saul, **“Fighting Outnumbered: The Impact of the Yom Kippur War on the U.S. Army.”** Vol.71, No.2 (April, 2007), pp.465-498. Illustrates the different ways in which the Yom Kippur War impacted the work of Generals William E. DePuy (1919-1992) and Donn A. Starry (1925-2011) in reforming the U.S. Army.

Joseph, Uri Bar, **“Strategic Surprise or Fundamental Flaws? The Source of Israel’s Military Defeat at the Beginning of the 1973 War.”** Vol.72, No.2 (April, 2008), pp.509-530. Suggests that that the deficient deployment of Israeli forces that met the Egyptian assault was due to a failure of intelligence to provide sufficient warning.

Ezov, Amiram, **“The Crossing Challenge: The Suez Canal Crossing by the Israeli Defense Forces during the Yom Kippur War of 1973.”** Vol.82, No.2 (April, 2018), pp.461-490. Compares the setting of objectives, planning, and execution of the Egyptian Army’s crossing with that of the Israeli Defense Forces.

EGYPT: NORTHERN YEMEN CIVIL WAR (1962-70)

Witty, David M. **“A Regular Army in Counterinsurgency Operations: Egypt in North Yemen, 1962-1967.”** Vol.65, No.2 (April, 2001), pp.401-439. The Egyptian campaign in Yemen may have contributed to a compromise peace settlement, but it adversely impacted the Egyptian Army’s capacity to fight conventional wars.

EIGHTY YEARS WAR (1566-1648)

Parker, Geoffrey, **“The Limits to Revolutions in Military Affairs: Maurice of Nassau, the Battle of Nieuwpoort (1600), and the Legacy.”** Vol.71, No.2 (April, 2007), pp.331-372. Probes the evolution of the use of volley fire by matchlock armed infantry, beginning with its use in Japan in the 1560s and by the Dutch in the 1590s, with its first use in combat in Europe at the battle of Nieuwpoort, 2 July, 1600.

Arfaoli, Maurizio, **“Bastion of Empire: The Italian *terzo Vecchio* of the Army of Flanders (1597-1682).”** Vol.85, No.1 (January, 2021), pp.27-50. An examination of the service of the longest-lived infantry unit, the *terzo Vecchio*, in an effort to better understand Italian involvement in the long conflict within the Spanish Low Countries.

EISENHOWER, DWIGHT D. (1890-1969)

Bacevich, A.J. **“The Paradox of Professionalism: Eisenhower, Ridgway, and the Challenge to Civilian Control, 1953-1955.”** Vol.61, No.2 (April, 1997), pp.303-333. By focusing on the U.S. Army’s efforts to undermine President Eisenhower’s (1953-1961) policy of massive nuclear retaliation, this article attempts to depict the actual terms of the civil-military relationship within the innermost circles of the U.S. government to determine the realities and limits of civilian control of the armed forces.

Irish, Kerry E. **“Apt Pupil: Dwight Eisenhower and the 1930 Industrial Mobilization Plan.”** Vol.70, No.1 (January, 2006), pp.31-61. While the detailed plan for industrial mobilization drawn up by Eisenhower (1890-1969) as a staff officer was not formally implemented, it nevertheless provided the basis for a more efficient transition to war production than had taken place in World War I.

Carter, Donald Alan, **“Eisenhower versus the Generals.”** Vol.71, No.4 (October, 2007), pp.1169-1199. Traces the rancor that evolved between President Dwight D. Eisenhower (1953-1961), who pursued the ‘New Look’ national security policy that relied on nuclear weapons, the Strategic Air Command, and a robust economy, versus Army officers who believed the drastic reductions in conventional ground forces challenged the very existence of their service.

Irish, Kerry, **“Dwight Eisenhower and Douglas MacArthur in the Philippines: There Must Be a Day of Reckoning [1935-39].”** Vol.74, No.2 (April, 2010), pp.439-473. Demonstrates that Eisenhower’s (1890-1969) dislike of MacArthur (1880-1964) was less about personalities and more about disagreements over the building of an army in an impoverished country and the proper qualities that a U.S. Army officer should exhibit and develop in his subordinates.

Rives, Tim, **“Like Footprints in the Sand: Searching for Eisenhower’s Climactic D-Day Words.”** Vol.78, No.3 (July, 2014), pp.1057-1067.

ELLSBERG, DANIEL (1931-2023)

Carland, John M. **“Daniel Ellsberg and the Tet Offensive.”** Vol.83, No.2 (April, 2019), pp.541-552. An analyst for the RAND Corporation and employee of both the Defense and State Departments, Daniel Ellsberg’s (1931-2023) critical assessment of the impact of the Tet Offensive, January, 1968, reflected a stage in his growing disillusionment with the war in Vietnam.

ENGINEERING

Black, Jeremy, **“A Revolution in Military Cartography?: Europe 1650-1815.”** Vol.73, No.1 (January, 2009), pp.49-68. This article approaches the issue of cartography not only in tactical, operational and strategic terms, but also with reference to the mapping of war for public interest.

Smith, Mark A. **“The Politics of Military Professionalism: The Engineer Company and the Political Activities of the Antebellum U.S. Army Corps of Engineers.”** Vol.80, No.2 (April, 2016), pp.355-387. Addresses the tensions presented by both internal politicking in the Corps and the lobbying of officers in promoting the nation’s defensive needs.

Siotto, Andrea, **“Mapping the First World War: The Empowering Development of Mapmaking during the First World War in the British Army.”** Vol.82, No.1 (January, 2018), pp.45-66.

McGovern, Rory M. **“The School of Experience: George W. Goethals and the U.S. Army, 1867-1907.”** Vol.81, No.2 (April, 2017), pp.395-424. Observes George W. Goethals (1858-1928) pre-Panama Canal / World War I career as an example of the career path of officers within the Gilded Age Army.

Dykstra, Bodie D. **“‘To Dig and Burrow like Rabbits’: British Field Fortifications at the Battle of the Aisne, September and October 1914.”** Vol.84, No.3 (July, 2020), pp.747-773.

Zaloga, Steven J. **“Debunking an Omaha Beach Legend: The Use of the ‘Armored Funnies’**

on D-Day.” Vol.85, No.1 (January, 2021), pp.134-162. Confronts the notion that one of the reasons the landing force on Omaha Beach suffered heavy casualties was the U.S. Army’s resistance to the use of specialized tanks developed by the British for the D-Day invasion.

Compeau, Timothy, **“The Royal Navy’s *Psyche* on Lake Ontario: A British Experiment with Prefabricated Warships in the War of 1812.”** Vol.86, No.2 (April, 2022), pp.321-343. Narrates the British effort to transport four pre-fabricated vessels to Lake Ontario, of which only one, the 56-gun frigate H.M.S. *Psyche*, reached its destination.

ENGLAND / GREAT BRITAIN: ANCIENT PERIOD (to 476)

Bradley, Carl Meredith, **“The British War Chariot: A Case for Indirect Warfare.”** Vol.73, No.4 (October, 2009), pp.1073-1089. Weighs the capabilities of the Celtic tribes who fielded sturdy and fast two-horse chariots against Julius Caesar’s (100-44 B.C.E.) two landings in Britannia in 55-54 B.C.E. and the means used to sustain their resources and gauge their capabilities.

ENGLAND / GREAT BRITAIN: MEDIEVAL PERIOD (476-1480)

Bachrach, David S. **“The Military Administration of England: The Royal Artillery (1216-1272).”** Vol.68, No.4 (October, 2004), pp.1083-1104. By describing an example of the sophisticated military administration during the reign of King Henry III, specifically involving siege engines, the author argues that much of the military innovations that have been attributed to Henry III’s successor, King Edward I, already existed before he ascended the throne.

ENGLAND / GREAT BRITAIN: EARLY MODERN PERIOD (1480-1789)

Kopperman, Paul E. **“‘The Cheapest Pay’: Alcohol Abuse in the Eighteenth-Century British Army.”** Vol.60, No.3 (July, 1996), pp.445-470. Analyzes the unwillingness of officers to confront what was generally agreed to be a significant problem due to conflicting medical opinion and the utility of control over government supplied alcohol.

Rodger, N.A.M. **“Historiographical Essay: Recent Books on the Royal Navy of the Eighteenth Century.”** Vol.63, No.3 (July, 1999), pp.683-703. A very thorough survey of the latest works.

Black, Jeremy, **“Historiographical Essay: Britain as a Military Power, 1688-1815.”** Vol.64, No.1 (January, 2000), pp.159-177.

Phillips, Gervase, **“To Cry ‘Home! Home!’: Mutiny, Morale, and Indiscipline in Tudor Armies.”** Vol.65, No.2 (April, 2001), pp.313-332. Points to the study of the unrest within Tudor armies as a means of better understanding common notions of equitable treatment, mutual obligations, and obedience within society as a whole.

Probasco, Nate, **“The Role of Commoners and Print in Elizabethan England’s Acceptance of Firearms.”** Vol.76, No.2 (April, 2012), pp.343-372. Looks at the debate in print between, on the one hand, common citizens and local officials, who were skeptical of firearms, the expense and safety of which they criticized, and those who promoted the replacement of longbows with firearms, who often employed dubious information.

Lender, Mark Edward, **“Review Essay: The Ever Controversial General Charles Lee.”** Vol.78, No.4 (October, 2014), pp.1395-1405. Charles Lee (1732-1782), a veteran of service in the British, Portuguese, and Polish armies, served as a high-ranking commander in George Washington’s Continental Army until his court martial over behavior associated with the Battle of Monmouth, June 28, 1778.

Grummitt, David, **“Flodden 1513: Re-Examining British Warfare at the End of the Middle Ages.”** Vol.82, No.1 (January, 2018), pp.9-28. Asserts that the English Army that fought the forces lead by King James IV (1473-1513) on 9 September, 1513, was more modern than its Scottish counterpart, just as its commander, Thomas Howard, the Earl of Surrey (1443-1524), was more of a ‘Renaissance General’ than James IV.

Hurl-Eamon, Jennine, **“Husbands, Sons, Brothers, and Neighbors: Eighteenth-Century Soldiers’ Efforts to Maintain Civilian Ties.”** Vol.86, No.2 (April, 2022), pp.299-320. Endeavors to understand the conflict between army regulations restricting British servicemen’s ability to visit and provide for their kin with the efforts of soldiers to maintain the connections to the communities they left.

Yun, Dukhee, **“The ‘Push of the Pike’ in Seventeenth-Century English Infantry Combat.”** Vol.86, No.4 (October, 2022), pp.837-857. Relying on a close reading of contemporary sources, the author seeks to develop a better understanding of how opposing pike formations actually fought one another.

ENGLAND / GREAT BRITAIN: INDIA

Roy, Kaushik, **“Military Synthesis in South Asia: Armies, Warfare, and Indian Society, c.1740-1849.”** Vol.69, No.3 (July, 2005), pp.651-690. Attempts to determine why, with both the British East India Company and the Mughal successor states developing hybrid military forces, it was the E.I.C.’s armies that, more often than not, achieved victory.

ENGLAND / GREAT BRITAIN: CIVIL WARS (1642-51)

Brady, Andrea, **“Dying with Honour: Literary Propaganda and the Second English Civil War.”** Vol.70, No.1 (January, 2006), pp.9-30. Deals with the coverage in Parliamentary versus Royalist propaganda of the executions of Sir Charles Lucas and Sir George Lisle in 1648, following

General Thomas Fairfax's (1612-1671) siege of Colchester.

Manning, Roger B. **"Styles of Command in Seventeenth Century English Armies."** Vol.71, No.3 (July, 2007), pp.671-699. Proposes that aristocratic officers were reluctant to accept the idea that military hierarchies had superseded social hierarchies or that in warfare they should pursue military objectives rather than personal honor, so that, excepting the New Model Army, English military leadership was backwards in comparison with its continental counterparts.

Robinson, Gavin, **"Equine Battering Rams? A Reassessment of Cavalry Charge in the English Civil War."** Vol.75, No.3 (July, 2011), pp.719-731. Challenges the traditional notion that shock cavalry tactics imported from Sweden had replaced the caracole during the English Civil War and, in particular, contemplates the mechanics of cavalry shock tactics.

Yun, Dukhee, **"The 'Push of the Pike' in Seventeenth-Century English Infantry Combat."** Vol.86, No.4 (October, 2022), pp.837-857. Relying on a close reading of contemporary sources, the author seeks to develop a better understanding of how opposing pike formations actually fought one another.

ENGLAND / GREAT BRITAIN: 1st ANGLO-DUTCH WAR (1652-54)

Rommelse, Gijs and Downing, Roger, **"Victims of an Ideological Rift? Dutch Prisoners of War during the First Anglo-Dutch War (1652-1654)."** Vol.80, No.3 (July, 2016), pp.649-669. Rather than ideology, the author shows that it was a combination of logistical problems and a lack of funds that produced the dire conditions experienced by Dutch P.O.W.s.

ENGLAND / GREAT BRITAIN: WAR OF THE SPANISH SUCCESSION (1701-15)

Ostwald, Jamel, **"The 'Decisive' Battle of Ramillies, 1706: Prerequisites for Decisiveness in Early Modern Warfare."** Vol.64, No.3 (July, 2000), pp.649-677. Asks whether eighteenth century military strategy was indecisive by choice rather than by necessity by looking at the 1st Duke of Marlborough, John Churchill's (1650-1722), Ramillies campaign.

ENGLAND / GREAT BRITAIN: JACOBITE RISING OF 1745 (1745-46)

Paoletti, Ciro, **"The Battle of Culloden: A Pivotal Moment in World History."** Vol.81, No.1 (January, 2017), pp.187-198. Highlights the international context of the Battle of Culloden, 16 April, 1746, and speculates on the wider consequences of a Hanoverian defeat.

ENGLAND / GREAT BRITAIN: THE SEVEN YEARS WAR (1765-63)

Kingsley, Ronald F. and Alexander, Harvey J. **"The Failure of Abercromby's Attack on Fort**

Carillon, July 1758, and the Scapegoating of Matthew Clerk.” Vol.72, No.1 (January, 2008), pp.43-70. A reassessment, based on letters and other documents, that calls into question the degree that the young engineer, Matthew Clerk, contributed to the defeat of the British attack on Fort Carillon (Fort Ticonderoga) during the French and Indian War. See also: McCulloch, Ian Macpherson, “ ‘A Blanket of Inconsistencies’: The Battle of Ticonderoga, 2008.” Vol.72, No.3 (July, 2008), Vol.72, No.1 (January, 2008), pp.889-900.

McCulloch, Ian Macpherson, “ ‘**A Blanket of Inconsistencies’: The Battle of Ticonderoga, 2008.**” Vol.72, No.3 (July, 2008), pp.889-900. A response to Ronald F. Kingsley and Harvey J. Alexander’s article, “The Failure of Abercomby’s Attack on Fort Carillon, July 1758, and the Scapegoating of Matthew Clerk.” Vol.72, No.1 (January, 2008), pp.43-70.

Willis, Sam, “**The Battle of Lagos, 1759.**” Vol.73, No.3 (July, 2009), pp.745-765. Though an indecisive engagement, Royal Navy Vice-Admiral Edward Boscawen’s (1711-1761) squadron weakened the French Mediterranean fleet that was sailing to join the French Atlantic fleet, thus serving as an important precursor to the Battle of Quiberon Bay, November, 1759.

ENGLAND / GREAT BRITAIN: U.S. REVOLUTIONARY WAR (1775-83)

Syrett, David, “**Historiographical Essay: The British Armed Forces in the American Revolutionary War: Publications, 1875-1998.**” Vol.63, No.1 (January, 1999), pp.147-164.

Barker, Thomas M. “**A Debacle of the Peninsular War: The British-led Amphibious Assault against Fort Fuengirola 14-15 October 1810.**” Vol.64, No.1 (January, 2000), pp.9-52.

Reassesses the failed amphibious assault by a multi-national force under the command of the Eleventh Lord Blayney, General Andrews Thomas.

Adelberg, Michael S. “**The Scope and Severity of Civil Warfare in Revolutionary Monmouth County, New Jersey.**” Vol.73, No.1 (January, 2009), pp.9-47. Examines both how many of the residents of Monmouth County chose to participate on the opposing sides and how many lives were adversely affected by the war.

Weddle, Kevin J. “ ‘**A Change of both Men and Measures’: British Reassessment of Military Strategy after Saratoga, 1777-1778.**” Vol.77, No.3 (July, 2013), pp.837-865.

ENGLAND / GREAT BRITAIN:

FRENCH REVOLUTIONARY AND NAPOLEONIC WARS (1792-1815)

Black, Jeremy, “**Historiographical Essay: Britain as a Military Power, 1688-1815.**” Vol.64, No.1 (January, 2000), pp.159-177.

Arnold, James R. **“A Reappraisal of Column Versus Line in the Peninsular War.”** Vol.68, No.2 (April, 2004), pp.535-552. Disputes the influential English historian of the Napoleonic Wars, Sir Charles Oman’s (1860-1946), explanation for the superiority of the British line over the French column.

Esdaile, Charles, **“Review Essay: Recent Writing on Napoleon and His Wars.”** Vol.73, No.1 (January, 2009), pp.209-220. Contains four works that cover the struggle specifically between Britain and France from 1792 to 1815, Napoleon’s (1769-1821) skill as a commander on all levels of warfare, and the guerrilla war in Spain.

Davey, James, **“The Repatriation of Spanish Troops from Denmark, 1808: The British Government, Logistics, and Maritime Supremacy.”** Vol.74, No.3 (July, 2010), pp.689-707. When Spain rebelled against French occupation, the British government responded by, among other things, preparing and executing the repatriation of the Spanish regiments formerly fighting for Napoleon in northern Europe.

Esdaile, Charles J. **“Review Essay: Recent Works of Note on the Peninsular War (1808-1815).”** Vol.74, No.4 (October, 2010), pp.1243-1252.

Davies, Huw J. **“Diplomats as Spymasters: A Case Study of the Peninsular War, 1809-1813.”** Vol.76, No.1 (January, 2012), pp.37-68. The work of the Duke of Wellington’s (1769-1852) intelligence network, particularly during 1812, compared with examples from the Crimean War, 1853-56, and World War I, 1914-18.

McCranie, Kevin D. **“The War of 1812 in the ongoing Napoleonic Wars: The Response of Britain’s Royal Navy.”** Vol.76, No.4 (October, 2012), pp.1067-1094. The challenge for Great Britain to balance the demands of different naval commitments, particularly in 1812 and 1813.

Robertson, Claire, **“Racism, the Military, and Abolitionism in the Late Eighteenth- and Early Nineteenth-Century Caribbean.”** Vol.77, No.2 (April, 2013), pp.433-461. Examines Governor of Guadeloupe, Victor Hugues (1762-1826), General Sir John Moore (1761-1809), Captain Thomas Southey, and Sir John Jeremie (1795-1841) and the impact of racism on the differences between the British and French conduct of warfare in the Caribbean.

Speelman, Patrick J. **“Review Essay: The Logistics of British Naval Supremacy in the Age of Sail.”** Vol.77, No.2 (April, 2013), pp.667-670. Consists of three recent books, two covering systems of supply during the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars, 1793-1815, and a third concerning medical care from 1805 to 1916.

Campos, Jorge Planas and De Blas, Antonio Grjal, **“French and Allied Officer Casualties in the Peninsular War (1808-1814): A New Examination.”** Vol.85, No.4 (October, 2021), pp.889-905.

ENGLAND / GREAT BRITAIN: WAR OF 1812 (1812-15)

Black, Jeremy, **“The North American Theater of the Napoleonic Wars, or, as it is sometimes Called, the War of 1812.”** Vol.76, No.4 (October, 2012), pp.1053-1066. The challenge for Great Britain was to balance the demands of different naval commitments.

McCranie, Kevin D. **“The War of 1812 in the ongoing Napoleonic Wars: The Response of Britain’s Royal Navy.”** Vol.76, No.4 (October, 2012), pp.1067-1094. The challenge for Great Britain to balance the demands of different naval commitments, particularly in 1812 and 1813.

Jensen, Richard, **“Military History on the Electronic Frontier: Wikipedia Fights the War of 1812.”** Vol.76, No.4 (October, 2012), pp.1165-1182.

Graves, Donald E. **“Why the White House was Burned: An Investigation into the British Destruction of Public Buildings at Washington in August 1814.”** Vol.76, No.4 (October, 2012), pp.1095-1127. Encrusted with mythology by nineteenth century historians motivated by national chauvinism, the article considers whether the actions of the British forces were justified by the contemporary laws of war and / or as retaliation for the U.S. destruction of Canadian towns.

Trautsch, Jasper M. **“The Causes of the War of 1812: 200 Years of Debate.”** Vol.77, No.1 (January, 2013), pp.273-293.

Dudley, William S. **“Review Essay: War of 1812 Trilogy.”** Vol.78, No.2 (April, 2014), pp.747-751. Three works by the noted Canadian military historian, Donald E. Graves, on the Battles of the War of 1812 fought during the years 1813 to 1814.

McCranie, Kevin D. **“Perception and Naval Dominance.: The British Experience during the War of 1812.”** Vol.82, No.4 (October, 2018), pp.1067-1091. The defeat of three British frigates by U.S. counterparts had no actual effect on British sea power, but provoked a disproportionate reaction within society and the Royal Navy, inadvertently leading to beneficial changes.

ENGLAND / GREAT BRITAIN: 19th CENTURY

Reid, Brian Holden, **“ ‘A Signpost that was Missing?’ Reconsidering British Lessons from the American Civil War.”** Vol.70, No.2 (April, 2006), pp.385-414. Focuses on the works of the military authors, notably General J.F.C. Fuller (1878-1966) and Captain Basil Liddell Hart (1895-1970), to consider the ‘lessons’ they perceived from their study of the U.S. Civil War.

Arndt, Jochen S. **“Treacherous Savages & Merciless Barbarian: Knowledge, Discourse and**

Violence during the Cape Frontier Wars, 1834 and 1853.” Vol.74, No.3 (July, 2010), pp.709-735. Concludes that the British stereotypes of the Xhosa people of the eastern frontier of the Cape Colony, South Africa, that evolved during three wars fought between 1834 and 1853 were used to justify policies of dispossession and subjugation in the name of colonial security.

Varnava, Andrekos, “**‘Martial Races’ in the Isle of Aphrodite.**” Vol.74, No.4 (October, 2010), pp.1047-1067. The British attempt in the 1890s to form an indigenous defense force on Cyprus based on the ‘Martial Races’ concept and its enduring consequences.

Collins, Bruce, “**Defining Victory in Victorian Warfare, 1860-1882.**” Vol.77, No.3 (July, 2013), pp.895-929. Catalogues the range of pressures on the commanders of expeditions in Africa to declare victory. See Also: Beckett, Ian F. “How Wars End: Victorian Colonial Conflicts.” Vol.82, No.1 (January, 2018), pp.29-44.

Beckett, Ian F.W. “**The Road to Kandahar: The Politics of Retention and Withdrawal in Afghanistan, 1880-81.**” Vol.78, No.4 (October, 2014), pp.1263-1294.

Dunley, Richard, “**Technology and Tradition: Mine Warfare and the Royal Navy’s Strategy of Coastal Assault, 1870-1890.**” Vol.80, No.2 (April, 2016), pp.398-409.

Downs, Troy, “**The Raj in Peril: The City of Benares [Varanasi] during the Indian Uprising of 1857.**” Vol.81, No.1 (January, 2017), pp.39-73.

Beckett, Ian F. “**How Wars End: Victorian Colonial Conflicts.**” Vol.82, No.1 (January, 2018), pp.29-44. The author challenges the conclusions of Bruce Collins’ in his article “Defining Victory in Victorian Warfare, 1860-1882.” *The Journal of Military History*, Vol.77, No.3 (July, 2013), pp.895-929.

Rodriguez, Manuel Santirso, “**Under the Uniform: Tyrants and Praetorians in the Aftermath of the Revolution (1829-1854).**” Vol.83, No.2 (April, 2019), pp.379-407. Weighs the parallels and differences in the lives and careers of Nicholas Jean-de-Dieu Soult of France (1769-1851), Arthur Wellesley, the Duke of Wellington of Great Britain (1769-1852), Baldomero Espartero of Spain (1793-1879), and Andrew Jackson of the United States (1767-1845).

ENGLAND / GREAT BRITAIN: 2nd ANGLO-BOER WAR (1899-1901)

Nasson, Bill, “**Historiographical Essay: Waging Total War in South Africa: Some Centenary Writings on the Anglo-Boer War, 1899-1902.**” Vol.66, No.3 (July, 2002), pp.813-828.

Miller, Stephen M. “**In Support of the ‘Imperial Mission’? Volunteering for the South African War, 1899-1902.**” Vol.69, No.3 (July, 2005), pp.691-711. Inquires into the motives of British civilians who responded to the call for recruits by enlisting in the Volunteers, the

Militia, or the Imperial Yeomanry.

Badsey, Stephen, **“The Boer War (1899-1902) and British Cavalry Doctrine: A Re-Evaluation.”** Vol.71, No.1 (January, 2007), pp.75-97. Rejecting the traditional interpretation, the article proposes that a cavalry reform movement incorporating dismounted tactics pre-dated the Second Anglo-Boer War, a mixture of mounted and dismounted tactics were used by both sides in the conflict, and that the problems experienced by cavalry were largely not of their own making

Vergolina, Joseph R. **“ ‘Methods of Barbarism’ or Western Tradition? Britain, South Africa, and the Evolution of Escalatory Violence as Policy.”** Vol.77, No.4 (October, 2013), pp.1303-1327. Investigates British counterinsurgency methods in the Second Anglo-Boer War (1899-1902).

Miller, Stephen M. **“The British Way of War: Cultural Assumption and Practices in the South African War, 1899-1902.”** Vol.77, No.4 (October, 2013), pp.1329-1347. Cosmopolitanism, political egalitarianism, and attitudes towards race influenced the British conduct of the war.

ENGLAND / GREAT BRITAIN: EARLY 20th CENTURY

Sumida, Jon Tetsuro, **“Sir John Fisher and the Dreadnought: The Sources of Naval Mythology.”** Vol.59, No.4 (October, 1995), pp.619-637.

Lambert, Nicholas A. **“Admiral Sir John Fisher and the Concept of Flotilla Defence, 1904-1909.”** Vol.59, No.4 (October, 1995), pp.639-660. Asks whether Admiral Fisher’s (1841-1920) embracing of a submarine and flotilla strategy represented an abandonment of the Mahanian approach to winning control of the seas through victory in a decisive clash between battle fleets.

Sumida, Jon Tetsuro, **“Review Essay: Gunnery, Procurement, and Strategy in the *Dreadnought* Era.”** Vol.69, No.4 (October, 2005), pp.1179-1187.

Gordon, Andrew, **“Time after Time in the Horn of Africa.”** Vol.74, No.1 (January, 2010), pp.107-144. Provides an examination of the British joint, amphibious assault on the Dervish stronghold of Illig, Somaliland, in 1904.

Grimes, Shawn, **“The Baltic and Admiralty War Planning, 1906-1907.”** Vol.74, No.2 (April, 2010), pp.407-437. Reassessment of the Ballard Committee’s 1907 War Plans against Germany in the context of Norway’s gaining independence in 1905.

Martin, Christopher, **“The Complexity of Strategy: ‘Jackie’ Fischer and the Trouble with Submarines.”** Vol.75, No.2 (April, 2011), pp.441-470. The problems of re-formulating strategy in the wake of the introduction of submarines for Admiral ‘Jackie’ Fischer (1841-

1920), Prime Minister A.J. Balfour (r.1902-1905), and Julian Corbett (1854-1922).

Otte, T.G. **“From *Can-Can Diabolique* to *Sitzkrieg*: The International China Expeditionary Force, 1900-1901.”** Vol.77, No.4 (October, 2013), pp.1277-1302. Analyzes a neglected example of coalition warfare.

ENGLAND / GREAT BRITAIN: WORLD WAR I (1914-18)

Sheffy, Yigal, **“Chemical Warfare and the Palestine Campaign, 1916-1918.”** Vol.73, No.3 (July, 2009), pp.803-844. Brings light to the British use of chemical warfare in the Second (April, 1917) and Third (October-November, 1917) Battles of Gaza, the Ottoman response, and the reasons why this aspect of the Palestine Campaign have been disregarded in the historiography.

Winkler, Jonathan Reed, **“Information Warfare in World War I.”** Vol.73, No.3 (July, 2009), pp.845-867. Presents both the British success in destroying the pre-war German system and the simultaneous German campaign against Allied communications, all within the broader economic, political, intelligence, and military context of modern conflict.

Burns, Robert G.H. **“British Folk Songs of the Great War – Then and Now.”** Vol.79, No.4 (October, 2015), pp.1059-1071.

Nordlund, Alexander, **“‘Done My Bit’: British Soldiers, the 1918 Armistice, and Understanding the First World War.”** Vol.81, No.2 (April, 2017), pp.425-446. Contrasts British soldiers’ reactions to the Armistice and their war experience with their later reflections.

Siotto, Andrea, **“Mapping the First World War: The Empowering Development of Mapmaking during the First World War in the British Army.”** Vol.82, No.1 (January, 2018), pp.45-66.

Bullock, Mike; Lyons, Laurence, and Judkins, Philip, **“A Resolution of the Debate about British Wireless in World War I.”** Vol.84, No.4 (October, 2020), pp.1079-1096. Visits the debate over whether, as Dr. Brian Hall contends, the British Army utilized continuous wave radio as best as this technology allowed with how it was used by their French and U.S. counterparts.

ENGLAND / GREAT BRITAIN: WORLD WAR I (1914-18) – THE WESTERN FRONT

Gardner, Nikolas, **“Command and Control in the ‘Great Retreat of 1914: The Disintegration of the British Cavalry Division.’”** Vol.63, No.1 (January, 1999), pp.29-54. Suggests that the lack of experience in operating as a division, the division’s unwieldy size, the inefficiency of its commander and staff, and the independent mindset of its brigade commanders prevented it from operating effectively.

Palazzo, Albert P. **“The British Army’s Counter-Battery Staff Office and Control of the**

Enemy in World War I.” Vol.63, No.1 (January, 1999), pp.55-74. Sets forth the argument that the critical turning point for the artillery occurred during the winter of 1916-1917, when, drawing upon the lessons of the Battle of the Somme, a corps-level Counter-Battery Staff Office was created.

Greenhalgh, Elizabeth, “**‘Parade Ground Soldiers’: French Army Assessments of the British on the Somme in 1916.**” Vol.63, No.2 (April, 1999), pp.283-312. Assesses the attitudes among the *Poilus* towards their British counterparts in a battle in which roughly equal numbers of French and British troops fought alongside each other.

Marble, Sanders, “**Document of Note: General Haig Dismisses Attritional Warfare, January 1916.**” Vol.65, No.4 (October, 2001), pp.1061-1065.

Greenhalgh, Elizabeth, “**Myth and memory: Sir Douglas Haig and the Imposition of Allied Unified Command in March, 1918.**” Vol.68, No.3 (July, 2004), pp.771-820. Debunks Field Marshal Haig’s (1861-1928) claim that he deserves credit for Chief of the French General Staff, Ferdinand Foch’s (1851-1929), appointment as Allied Supreme Commander.

Lunn, Joe, “**Male Identity and Martial Codes of Honor: A Comparison of the War Memoirs of Robert Graves, Ernst Jünger, and Kande Kamara.**” Vol.69, No.3 (July, 2005), pp.713-735. The memoirs of the British officer and author, Robert Graves (1895-1985), the German soldier and author, Ernst Jünger (1895-1998), and the French Colonial soldier from West Africa, Kande Kamara.

Lloyd, Nick, “**‘With Faith and without Fear’: Sir Douglas Haig’s Command of First Army during 1915.**” Vol.71, No.4 (October, 2007), pp.1051-1076. Shines a light on the neglected performance of Sir Douglas Haig (1861-1928) as commander of the B.E.F.’s First Army during 1915.

Stice, Elizabeth, “**Men on the Margins: Representations of Colonial Troops in British and French Trench Newspapers of the Great War.**” Vol.83, No.2 (April, 2019), pp.435-454. Ascertains how, through the contents of trench newspapers, the war provided a new context for evaluating empires and their peoples and questioning existing imperial culture.

Dykstra, Bodie D. “**‘To Dig and Burrow like Rabbits’: British Field Fortifications at the Battle of the Aisne, September and October 1914.**” Vol.84, No.3 (July, 2020), pp.747-773.

ENGLAND / GREAT BRITAIN: WORLD WAR I (1914-18) – **THE WAR BEYOND THE WESTERN FRONT**

Travers, Tim, “**Liman von Sanders, the Capture of Lieutenant Palmer, and Ottoman Anticipation**

of the Allied Landings at Gallipoli on 25 April 1915.” Vol.65, No.4 (October, 2001), pp.965-979. Shines a light on the expectations of the Turks for a possible landing on the Gallipoli Peninsula and, in particular, the neglected issue of the impact of information from a captured British intelligence officer shortly before the actual landing.

Celik, Birten and Travers, Tim, “**‘Not One of Them Ever came Back’: What Happened to the 1/5 Norfolk Battalion on 12 August 1915 at Gallipoli?’**” Vol.66, No.2 (April, 2002), pp.389-406.

Hall, Brian N. “**Technological Adaptation in Global Conflict: The British Army and Communications beyond the Western Front, 1914-1918.**” Vol.78, No.1 (January, 2014), pp.37-71.

ENGLAND / GREAT BRITAIN: WORLD WAR I (1914-18) – THE NAVAL WAR

Lambert, Nicholas A. “**‘Our Bloody Ships’ or ‘Our Bloody System’? Jutland and the Loss of the Battle Cruisers, 1916.**” Vol.62, No.1 (January, 1998), pp.29-55. Speculates that an emphasis on rapid fire led gunnery personnel to stockpile far more shells in their turrets than the regulated maximum of eight projectiles, resulting in catastrophic explosions when German shells found their mark.

Sumida, Jon Tetsuro, “**A Matter of Timing: The Royal Navy and the Tactics of Decisive Battle, 1912-1916.**” Vol.67, No.1 (January, 2003), pp.85-136. Advances the explanation that the Admiralty’s adoption of a secret tactical system in 1912 interfered with the development of equipment and methods suitable for alternate forms of battle fleet action, with consequences for the Battle of Jutland.

Karau, Mark, “**Twisting the Dragon’s Tail: The Zeebrugge and Ostend Raids of 1918.**” Vol.67, No.2 (April, 2003), pp.455-481.

Lambert, Nicholas A. “**Strategic Command and Control for Maneuver Warfare: Creation of the Royal Navy’s ‘War Room’ System, 1905-1915.**” Vol.69, No.2 (April, 2005), pp.361-410.

Hines, Jason, “**Sins of Omission and Commission: A Reassessment of the Role of Intelligence in the Battle of Jutland.**” Vol.72, No.4 (October, 2008), pp.1117-1153. Sets forth the explanation that it was the higher priority that the Admiralty placed on security, at the expense of operational use, that interfered with British Admirals successfully exploiting the fruits of the Admiralty’s cryptographic organization at the Battle of Jutland.

Morgan-Owen, David, “**War as it Might Have Been: British Sea Power and the First World War.**” Vol.83, No.4 (October, 2019), pp.1095-1131. Argues that because of shortcomings in Britain’s strategic decision-making apparatus, the alternatives to the attrition on the Western

Front offered by British Sea Power never received due consideration.

ENGLAND / GREAT BRITAIN: INTERWAR PERIOD (1919-39)

Bell, Christopher M. “**‘Our Most Exposed Outpost’: Hong Kong and British Far Eastern Strategy, 1921-1941.**” Vol.60, No.1 (January, 1996), pp.61-88. Brings to light the vital, if overlooked role of Hong Kong as a base for offensive operations in British interwar plans for a war with Japan has been.

Meilinger, Phillip, “**Trenchard and ‘Morale Bombing’: The Evolution of Royal Air Force Doctrine before World War II.**” Vol.60, No.2 (April, 1996), pp.243-270. Deals with the inexact blend of the intended goals of the R.A.F.’s interwar strategic bombing doctrine: breaking the will of the enemy and / or breaking the enemy’s economy.

Corum, James S. “**The Spanish Civil War: Lessons Learned and not Learned by the Great Powers.**” Vol.62, No.2 (April, 1998), pp.313-334. Considers what the British, French, German, Italian, Soviet, and United States armed forces learned or failed to learn from the study of the air war in Spain within the context of how armed forces undergo reform.

Ferris, John, “**Fighter Defence before Fighter Command: The Rise of Strategic Air Defence in Great Britain, 1917-1934.**” Vol.63, No.4 (October, 1999), pp.845-884. Attests to the fact that the R.A.F. developed a sophisticated defense system against enemy bombers prior to the development of radar, laying the foundation for victory in the Battle of Britain.

Todman, Daniel, “***Sans peur et sans reproche*: The Retirement, Death, and Mourning of Sir Douglas Haig, 1918-1928.**” Vol.67, No.4 (October, 2003), pp.1083-1106.

Jones, Mark C. “**Give Credit where Credit is Due: The Dutch Role in the Development and Deployment of the Submarine Schnorkel.**” Vol.69, No.4 (October, 2005), pp.987-1012.

Orange, Vincent, “**The German Air Force is Already ‘The Most Powerful in Europe’: Two Royal Air Force Officers Report on a Visit to Germany, 6-15 October, 1936.**” Vol.70, No.4 (October, 2006), pp.1011-1028. Presents the contents of an unpublished report by two R.A.F. officers who toured Germany to investigate the *Luftwaffe*, where they were well received and given access to both the latest aircraft and high-ranking air force personnel.

Philpott, William and Alexander, Martin S. “**The French and the British Field Force: Moral Support or Material Contribution?**” Vol.71, No.3 (July, 2007), pp.743-772. Contends that, even though France viewed the military benefit of the British commitment of a field army if war broke out with Germany as unsubstantial, the moral value of such a promise meant that it played an important role in France’s preparations for war.

Parton, Neville, **“The Development of Early R.A.F. Doctrine.”** Vol.72, No.4 (October, 2008), pp.1155-1177. Rather than a monolithic focus on strategic bombing imposed by Hugh Trenchard (1873-1956), the article argues that R.A.F. doctrine between 1918 and 1923 was a more nuanced, balanced approach to developing and applying air power.

Reid, Brian Holden, **“‘Young Turks, or Not So Young?’: The Frustrated Quest of Major General J.F.C. Fuller and Captain B.H. Liddell Hart.”** Vol.73, No.1 (January, 2009), pp.147-175. A study of their motives and aspirations during the inter-war period.

Westphal, Raymond W., Jr. **“Postwar Planning: Parliamentary Politics and the Royal Navy, 1919-22.”** Vol.74, No.1 (January, 2010), pp.145-171. Delves into the conflict between governments that viewed cuts in the military budget as a means of achieving economic recovery versus the Royal Navy’s goal of achieving parity with their U.S. counterpart while fulfilling its mission of two-ocean imperial defense.

Kennedy, Greg, **“Anglo-American Strategic Relations and Intelligence Assessments of Japanese Air Power 1934-1941.”** Vol.74, No.3 (July, 2010), pp.737-773. Reassesses the influence of racism on Anglo-American views of Japanese air power, and how this influence evolved in the seven years leading up to Pearl Harbor.

Bell, Christopher M. **“Winston Churchill and the Ten Year Rule.”** Vol.74, No.4 (October, 2010), pp.1097-1128. Insists that criticisms of Churchill’s defense spending cutbacks during his tenure as Chancellor of the Exchequer (1924-29) exaggerate his authority and oversimplify his complex and shifting combination of political, financial, strategic, and bureaucratic goals.

Neilson, Keith, **“The Royal Navy, Japan, and British Strategic Foreign Policy, 1932-1934.”** Vol.75, No.2 (April, 2011), pp.505-531. Japan’s challenge to British interests affected British policy generally, and particularly Anglo-American relations, producing conflicting proposals from the Treasury, the Admiralty, and the Foreign Offices.

Stubbs, David, **“A Blind Spot? The Royal Air Force (R.A.F.) and Long-Range Fighters, 1936-1944.”** Vol.78, No.2 (April, 2014), pp.673-702. Explores why Bomber Command maintained its view that it would be neither appropriate nor prudent to protect its bombers with long-range fighter escort.

Hughes, Matthew, **“Women, Violence, and the Arab Revolt in Palestine, 1936-39.”** Vol.83, No.2 (April, 2019), pp.487-507. Seeks to understand what part Palestinian women played in the Arab Revolt, how British colonial pacification affected the latter, and how British soldiers treated Palestinian women.

ENGLAND / GREAT BRITAIN: WORLD WAR II (1939-45)

Vance, Jonathan F. **“Men in Manacles: The Shackling of Prisoners of War, 1942-1943.”** Vol.59, No.3 (July, 1995), pp.483-504. Appraises the wartime relationship of the Dominion nations with Great Britain as reflected in the success of Canadian Prime Minister Mackenzie King’s (1874-1950) government in convincing Churchill (1874-1965) to abandon the retaliatory shackling of German P.O.W.s.

Lund, Erik, **“The Industrial History of Strategy: Re-evaluating the Wartime Record of the British Aviation Industry in Comparative Perspective, 1919-1945.”** Vol.62, No.1 (January, 1998), pp.75-99. Rejects the conventional notion that the Allies achieved victory by outproducing the Axis, insisting that, instead, more factors than mere volume played a role, as demonstrated by the British air sector that displayed greater flexibility, technological sophistication, and effectiveness than either its German or United States counterparts.

Jackson, Ashley, **“Supplying War: The High Commission Territories’ Military-Logistical Contribution in the Second World War.”** Vol.66, No.3 (July, 2002), pp.719-760. Assesses the mobilization of manpower from Basutoland, Bechuanaland, and Swaziland for use in logistics in the North African and Italian Campaigns.

Hill, Alexander, **“British Lend Lease Aid and the Soviet War Effort, June 1941 – June 1942.”** Vol.71, No.3 (July, 2007), pp.773-808. Measures the significance of the aid provided by Great Britain during the First Moscow Protocol to the end of June, 1942.

Benbow, Tim, **“ ‘Menace’ to ‘Ironclad’: The British Operations against Dakar (1940) and Madagascar (1942).”** Vol.75, No.3 (July, 2011), pp.769-809. Investigates why, regarding two separate British operations against Vichy French colonies in Africa, ‘Menace’ failed, while ‘Ironclad’ succeeded.

Fedorowich, Kent, **“ ‘Caught in the Crossfire’: Sir Gerald Campbell, Lord Beaverbrook and the Near Demise of the British Commonwealth Air Training Plan, May-October 1940.”** Vol.79, No.1 (January, 2015), pp.37-68. The program was threatened by intemperate remarks by Lord Beaverbrook (1879-1964) which rattled Anglo-Canadian relations.

Hobbins, Peter, **“Engineering the Fighter Pilot: Aviators, Anti-G suits, and Allied Air Power, 1940-53.”** Vol.84, No.1 (January, 2020), pp.115-149. Probes the failure of the Cotton Aerodynamic Anti-G suit championed by the Australian Air Force to be adopted by the British and United States Air Forces during the period marked by World War II and the Korean War.

ENGLAND / GREAT BRITAIN: WORLD WAR II (1939-45) –
THE WAR IN EUROPE AND THE MEDITERRANEAN

Shepardson, Donald E. **“The Fall of Berlin and the Rise of a Myth.”** Vol.62, No.1 (January, 1998), pp.135-154. Refutes the notions of United States naiveté and British realism in dealing with both their German enemy and their Soviet ally in the spring of 1945.

Bechthold, B. Michael, **“A Question of Success: Tactical Air Doctrine and Practice in North Africa, 1942-43.”** Vol.68, No.3 (July, 2004), 821-851. Reveals that the tactical doctrine of the U.S. Army Air Force was found wanting in North Africa in 1942, leading to the adoption of the proven British Eighth Army Western Desert Air Force model of ground-air cooperation.

Mann, Christopher, **“Combined Operations, the Commandos, and Norway, 1941-1944.”** Vol.73, No.2 (April, 2009), pp.471-495. Displays the broader strategic consequences of a series of British raids on the coast of Norway, including valuable experience in joint operations and the commitment of German forces for the defense of Norway.

Buckley, John, **“Tackling the Tiger: The Development of British Armoured Doctrine for Normandy 1944.”** Vol.74, No.4 (October, 2010), pp.1161-1184. Asserts that the British Army’s loose approach to developing and imposing doctrine, despite inherent shortcomings, actually facilitated a flexibility that allowed the armoured forces to quickly and effectively modify their doctrines in the heat of battle.

Ewer, Peter, **“The British Campaign in Greece 1941: Assumptions about the Operational Art and Their Influence on Strategy.”** Vol.76, No.3 (July, 2012), pp.727-745. Inquires into the British decision to dispatch an expeditionary force to Greece and what it tells us about contemporary British Army doctrine.

Fagan, Brennen; Horwood, Ian; MacKay, Niall; Price, Christopher; Richards, Ed, and Wood, A. Jamie, **“Bootstrapping the Battle of Britain.”** Vol.84, No.1 (January, 2020), pp.151-186. Using the statistical technique of weighted bootstrapping to provide a quantified assessment of the likelihood of German achievement of air superiority.

Stubbs, David, **“Reappraising the Royal Air Force Contribution to the Defense of Crete, 1941.”** Vol.84, No.2 (April, 2020), pp.459-486. Points out that the failure of the British and Commonwealth ground troops to retain control over the airfields was not the primary reason for defeat, given that the fighter squadrons necessary for the defense of the island were not scheduled to arrive in the Mediterranean Sea in time to participate in the battle, a fact known to decision makers in London.

ENGLAND / GREAT BRITAIN: WORLD WAR II (1939-45) – **ALLIED STRATEGIC BOMBING OFFENSIVE, EUROPE**

Gray, Peter, **“A Culture of Official Squeamishness? Britain’s Air Ministry and the Strategic**

Air Offensive against Germany?" Vol.77, No.4 (October, 2013), pp.1349-1377. Endeavors to determine if the reluctance of the Air Ministry to issue a campaign medal for the R.A.F.s strategic bombing campaign was due to a discomfort with the tactics of area bombing, particularly in the wake of the attack on Dresden.

Stubbs, David, **"A Blind Spot? The Royal Air Force (R.A.F.) and Long-Range Fighters, 1936-1944."** Vol.78, No.2 (April, 2014), pp.673-702. Explores why Bomber Command maintained its view that it would be neither appropriate nor prudent to protect its bombers with long-range fighter escort.

Jacobs, W.A. **"Royal Air Force Bomber Command, the 'Overlord Air Diversion', and 'Precision' Bombing at Night."** Vol.83, No.4 (October, 2019), pp.1161-1188. Takes account of the significant changes in procedure developed and adopted by Bomber Command and seeks to answer why further progress was limited through 1944 to 1945.

ENGLAND / GREAT BRITAIN: WORLD WAR II (1939-45) – THE NAVAL WAR

Coles, Michael, **"Ernest King and the British Pacific Fleet: The Conference at Quebec, 1944 ('Octagon')."** Vol.65, No.1 (January, 2001), pp.105-129. While not excluding complications from Fleet Admiral King's (1878-1956) personality, the author insists that there were valid political, economic, and operational factors against the deployment of the British Fleet alongside the U.S. Navy in the Pacific Theater.

Jones, Mark C. **"Experiment at Dundee: The Royal Navy's 9th Submarine Flotilla and Multinational Naval Cooperation during World War II."** Vol.72, No.4 (October, 2008), pp.1179-1212. The 9th Flotilla included British, Dutch, Free French, Norwegian, and Polish submariners.

Lasterle, Philippe, **"Could Admiral Gensoul have Averted the Tragedy of Mers el-Kébir?"** Vol.67, No.3 (July, 2003), pp.835-844. Admiral Marcel-Bruno Gensoul (1880-1973) commanded the French fleet at Mers el-Kébir, Algeria, when it was bombarded by a British force commanded by Admiral James Somerville (1882-1949) on 3 July, 1940.

Jones, Mark C. **"Not Just along for the Ride: The Role of Royal Navy Liaison Personnel in Multinational Naval Operations during World War II."** Vol.76, No.1 (January, 2012), pp.127-158. The liaison system as a means of cooperation with European navies in exile from France, Greece, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, and Yugoslavia.

Hein, David, **"Vulnerable: H.M.S. *Prince of Wales* in 1941."** Vol.77, No.3 (July, 2013), pp.955-989. The storied career of the H.M.S. *Prince of Wales*, involving fighting the K.M.S. *Bismarck*, the first Churchill-F.D.R. summit, service in the Mediterranean, and its sinking off the coast of Malaya.

Jones, Mark C. **“Friend and Advisor to the Allied Navies: The Royal Navy’s Principal Liaison Officer and Multinational Naval Operations in World War II.”** Vol.77, No.3 (July, 2013), pp.991-1023. The work of Principal Liaison Officer, Allied Navies (P.N.L.O.) with the Belgian, Dutch, French, Greek, Norwegian, Polish, and Yugoslav navies in exile.

Bell, Christopher M. **“Air Power and the Battle of the Atlantic: Very Long Range Aircraft and the Delay in Closing the Atlantic ‘Air Gap’.”** Vol.79, No.3 (July, 2015), pp.691-719. Places the blame involving this failure to address this problem on the Royal Air Force’s Coastal Command rather than a prioritization of strategic bombing over the protection of maritime convoys.

ENGLAND / GREAT BRITAIN: WORLD WAR II (1939-45) – **THE ASIA-PACIFIC THEATER**

Coles, Michael, **“Ernest King and the British Pacific Fleet: The Conference at Quebec, 1944 (‘Octagon’).”** Vol.65, No.1 (January, 2001), pp.105-129. While not excluding complications from Fleet Admiral King’s (1878-1956) personality, the author insists that there were valid political, economic, and operational factors against the deployment of the British Fleet alongside the U.S. Navy in the Pacific Theater.

Ford, Douglas, **“British Intelligence on Japanese Army Moral during the Pacific War: Logical Analysis or Racial Stereotyping?”** Vol.69, No.2 (April, 2005), pp.439-474.

Wilkins, Thomas S. **“Review Essay: Anatomy of a Military Disaster: The Fall of ‘Fortress Singapore’ 1942.”** Vol.73, No.1 (January, 2009), pp.221-230.

Macri, Franco David, **“‘C’ Force to Hong Kong: The Price of Collective Security in China, 1941.”** Vol.77, No.1 (January, 2013), pp.141-171. Concerning the strategic and political influences on the deployment of two Canadian infantry battalions to Hong Kong in November, 1941.

Hein, David, **“Vulnerable: H.M.S. *Prince of Wales* in 1941.”** Vol.77, No.3 (July, 2013), pp.955-989. The storied career of the H.M.S. *Prince of Wales*, involving fighting the K.M.S. *Bismarck*, the first Churchill-F.D.R. summit, service in the Mediterranean, and its sinking off the coast of Malaya.

Charles, Patrick J. **“Dissecting the Origins of Air-Centric Special Operations Theory.”** Vol.81, No.3 (July, 2017), pp.803-828. Seeks to find the answers to the controversy surrounding whether British or U.S. officers deserve the most credit for developing the concepts that led to Operation THURSDAY, the airlanding of a specialized force behind Japanese lines in Burma in March, 1944, to disrupt enemy infrastructure and communications.

Lim, Preston Jordan, **“Churchill’s Butchers: Mission 204’s Operations in China, 1942-1945.”**

Vol.84, No.4 (October, 2020), pp.1127-1156. Whereas previous studies have focused on the mission's record in 1942, the author examines the entire length of service of this combined British-Australian commando unit tasked with training Nationalist guerrillas, suggesting that it was more successful than previously thought.

ENGLAND / GREAT BRITAIN: COLD WAR (1945-91)

Priest, Andrew, “**‘In Common Cause’: The N.A.T.O. Multilateral Force and the Mixed-Manning Demonstration on the U.S.S. *Claude V. Ricketts*, 1964-1965.**” Vol.69, No.3 (July, 2005), pp.759-789. The crew of the destroyer (DDG-5) U.S.S. *Claude V. Ricketts* included U.S., British, Dutch, Greek, Italian, Turkish, and West German officers and men.

Spector, Ronald H. “**After Hiroshima: Allied Military Occupations and the Fate of Japan’s Empire, 1945-1947.**” Vol.69, No.4 (October, 2005), pp.1121-1136. The Allies confronted problems far beyond the disarming of Japanese troops in occupied China, Korea, and Southeast Asia, where internal conflicts rendered the plans of the Allied powers irrelevant.

Young, Ken, “**No Blank Cheque: Anglo-American (Mis)Understandings and the Use of the English Airbases.**” Vol.71, No.4 (October, 2007), pp.1133-1167. Deals with the diplomatic, political, and military issues surrounding the deployment of U.S. nuclear-capable strategic bombers to bases in Great Britain following the Berlin crisis of 1948.

Hatzivassiliou, Evanthis, “**Cold War Pressures, Regional Strategies, and Relative Decline: British Military and Strategic Planning for Cyprus, 1950-1960.**” Vol.73, No.4 (October, 2009), pp.1143-1166. Highlights the significance of Cyprus as a secure base in the Middle East for Great Britain during the Cold War, particularly after the loss of the Suez Canal.

Stapleton, Tim, “**‘Bad Boys’: Infiltration and Sedition in the African Military Units of the Central African Federation (Malawi, Zambia and Zimbabwe) 1953-63.**” Vol.73, No.4 (October, 2009), pp.1167-1193. Illustrates that nationalists exploited the rising unpopularity of colonialism, discontent with participation in the war in Malaya, the Mau Mau uprising in Kenya, and the Congo Crisis, which led white officers doubt the dependability of their African troops.

Young, Ken, “**Special Weapon, Special Relationship: The Atomic Bomb Comes to Britain.**” Vol.77, No.2 (April, 2013), pp.569-598. Beginning in 1950, the United States Air Force based strategic bombers with atomic bombs in East Anglia, England.

Goulter, Christine J.M. “**The Greek Civil War: A National Army’s Counter-Insurgency Triumph.**” Vol.78, No.3 (July, 2014), pp.1017-1055. Challenges the assumption that victory resulted from Anglo-American training and equipment, rather than the Greek National Army’s successful development of an effective counter-insurgency strategy.

Hughes, Geraint, **“Demythologising Dhofar: British Policy, Military Strategy, and Counter-Insurgency in Oman, 1963-1976.”** Vol.79, No.2 (April, 2015), pp.423-456. Demonstrates that the UK backed C.O.I.N. operations of the Sultanate of Oman placed a heavier reliance on military force than civil engagement and that specific historical circumstances make the ‘lessons learned’ less applicable for other conflicts.

Phimister, Ian, **“Developing and Defending Britain and Her Empire: Montgomery’s 1947 Tour of Africa.”** Vol.79, No.3 (July, 2015), pp.745-766. An overlooked event of the immediate postwar era that provides a window into both Field Marshal Bernard Montgomery’s (1887-1976) post-1945 career and the attitudes of the new Labour government towards defense.

Eames, Anthony, **“The Trident Sales Agreement and Cold War Diplomacy.”** Vol.81, No.1 (January, 2017), pp.163-186. The ‘Special Relationship’ was bolstered by the sale of U.S. Trident submarine-launched ballistic missile technology to Great Britain in 1982.

Campbell, Isabel, **“A Tale of Submarine Sightings and a Golden Goose: American-British-Canadian Intelligence Sharing in the Early Cold War.”** Vol.85, No.4 (October, 2021), pp.980-1003. The consequences of efforts to establish trilateral intelligence of the sighting of Soviet submarines in the Davis Strait in 1946.

ENGLAND / GREAT BRITAIN: KOREAN WAR (1950-53)

MacKenzie, S.P. **“Progressives and Reactionaries among British Prisoners of War at Pyoktong and Chongson, North Korea, 1951-1953.”** Vol.77, No.1 (January, 2013), pp.203-228. From the Chinese perspective, why were the British P.O.W.s at Chongson (Camp 1) more troublesome than those at Pyoktong (Camp 5).

Grey, Jeffrey, **“The Formation of the Commonwealth Division, 1950-1951.”** Vol.81, No.4 (October, 2017), pp.1097-1107. The saga of the military and political challenges of forming a division composed of units from the Australian, British, Canadian, Indian, and New Zealand armies.

Tian Ser Seah, Joshua-John, **“Singapore, Hong Kong, and the Royal Navy’s War in Korea, c.1950-1953: Part 1.”** Vol.83, No.4 (October, 2018), pp.1213-1234; **“Part 2.”** Vol.84, No.1 (January, 2020), pp.237-260.

Hobbins, Peter, **“Engineering the Fighter Pilot: Aviators, Anti-G suits, and Allied Air Power, 1940-53.”** Vol.84, No.1 (January, 2020), pp.115-149. Probes the failure of the Cotton Aerodynamic Anti-G suit championed by the Australian Air Force to be adopted by the British and United States Air Forces during the period marked by World War II and the Korean War.

ENGLAND / GREAT BRITAIN:

INDONESIA-MALAYSIA CONFRONTATION (1963-66)

Tuck, Christopher, “**‘Cut the bonds which bind our hands’: Deniable Operations during the Confrontation with Indonesia, 1963-1966.**” Vol.77, No.2 (April, 2013), pp.599-623. Describes the British confrontation with Indonesia and the problems with cross-border operations.

Tuck, Christopher, “**Measuring Victory: Assessing the outcomes of *Konfrontasi*, 1963-66.**” Vol.82, No.3 (July, 2018), pp.873-898. Suggests that the outcome of the British low intensity conflict with Indonesia, known as the ‘Confrontation’, is far more complex than either the triumphal or revisionist interpretations suggest.

ENGLAND / GREAT BRITAIN:

THE ‘TROUBLES’ IN NORTHERN IRELAND (1969-98)

Drohan, Brian, “**Unintended Consequences: Baton Rounds, Riots, and Counterinsurgency in Northern Ireland, 1970-1981.**” Vol.82, No.2 (April, 2018), pp.491-514. Designed to be a non-lethal means of employing force, the misuse of baton rounds by British soldiers resulting in serious injuries and even deaths, produced exactly the opposite public relations impact that was intended.

ERICSSON, JOHN (1803-89)

Roberts, William H. “**‘The Name of Ericsson’: Political Engineering in the Union Ironclad Program, 1861-1863.**” Vol.63, No.4 (October, 1999), pp.823-843.

Fuller, Howard J. “**Review Essay: Much in Little: John Ericsson and His Monitor Save the Republic.**” Vol.83, No.3 (July, 2019), pp.861-864.

ESPARTERO, BALDOMERO (1793-1879)

Rodriguez, Manuel Santirso, “**Under the Uniform: Tyrants and Praetorians in the Aftermath of the Revolution (1829-1854).**” Vol.83, No.2 (April, 2019), pp.379-407. Weighs the parallels and differences in the lives and careers of Nicholas Jean-de-Dieu Soult of France (1769-1851), Arthur Wellesley, the Duke of Wellington of Great Britain (1769-1852), Baldomero Espartero of Spain (1793-1879), and Andrew Jackson of the United States (1767-1845).

ERITREA

Weldemichael, Awet T. **“The Eritrean Long March: The Strategic Withdrawal of the Eritrean People’s Liberation Front (E.P.L.F.), 1978-1979.”** Vol.73, No.4 (October, 2009), pp.1231-1271. Despite the battlefield victories achieved by the Soviet backed Ethiopian offensives, as a guerrilla force, the Eritrean proved to be more adaptable to the changing circumstances, enabling them to go over to the tactical offensive by 1980.

ESTONIA

Sproule, Joseph, **“Raiding, Pillaging, and Violent Social Change in Late Sixteenth-Century Livonia.”** Vol.85, No.2 (April, 2021), pp.317-341. Establishes how the pervasiveness of raiding dictated tactical and strategic considerations, influenced military policy, shaped civil-military relations, and played a role in breaking down longstanding social mores, transforming societies, normalizing violence.

ETHIOPIA

Weldemichael, Awet T. **“The Eritrean Long March: The Strategic Withdrawal of the Eritrean People’s Liberation Front (E.P.L.F.), 1978-1979.”** Vol.73, No.4 (October, 2009), pp.1231-1271. Despite the battlefield victories achieved by the Soviet backed Ethiopian offensives, as a guerrilla force, the Eritrean proved to be more adaptable to the changing circumstances, enabling them to go over to the tactical offensive by 1980.

Wagner, Erich, **“Ingenuity, Excess, Incompetence, and Luck: Air-Resupply Anecdotes in Military History.”** Vol.84, No.2 (April, 2020), pp.427-457. Reviews six case studies from taken the Second Italo-Ethiopian War (1935-1936), the Spanish Civil War (1936-1939), the Battle of Stalingrad (1942), Operation Market Garden (1944), the Battle of the Chosin Reservoir (1950), and the Battle of Dien Bien Phu (1954).

ETHNIC AND RACIAL ISSUES

See Also: IMPERIALISM

Vandervort, Bruce, **“Review Essay: The Thin Black Line of Heroes.”** Vol.65, No.4 (October, 2001), pp.1067-1073. Recent work on European Colonial and, especially, African troops, 1700-1964.

Black, Jeremy, **“Frontiers and Military History.”** Vol.72, No.4 (October, 2008), pp.1047-1059.

As zones of interaction and contested sovereignty, it is not surprising that frontiers, throughout history, have witnessed armed conflict, just as armed conflicts have both established and changed frontiers.

Vandervort, Bruce, “**Review Essay: African Military History Comes of Age.**” Vol.81, No.1 (January, 2017), pp.205-208. A look at two significant works on the military history of the continent, one an encyclopedia of colonial conflicts, the other a three-volume narrative account of conflict, edited and written by Timothy J. Stapleton, respectively.

ETHNIC AND RACIAL ISSUES: arranged chronologically by historical period
or conflict - ANCIENT AND MEDIEVAL PERIODS

Bachrach, Bernard S. “**Review Essay: The Barbarian Hordes that never were.**” Vol.74, No.3 (July, 2010), pp.901-904. A critical assessment of Peter Heather’s 2009 book *Empires and Barbarians: Migration, Development and the Birth of Europe*, which covers the period from the decline of the Roman Empire to the age of the Viking.

ETHNIC AND RACIAL ISSUES arranged chronologically by historical period
or conflict - EARLY MODERN PERIOD (1480-1789)

Kerner, Alex, “**Espionage and Field Intelligence in the Conquest of México, 1519-1521.**” Vol.78, No.2 (April, 2014), pp.469-501. Identifies the types of intelligence sources and information-gathering systems available to both sides during the fateful events of 1519-1521, and their role in the outcome of this milestone in the New World’s history.

ETHNIC AND RACIAL ISSUES arranged chronologically by historical period
or conflict - U.S. REVOLUTIONARY WAR (1775-83)

Krebs, Daniel, “**Useful Enemies: The Treatment of German Prisoners of War during the American War of Independence.**” Vol.77, No.1 (January, 2013), pp.9-39. Narrates how, to boost morale, revolutionaries staged elaborate rituals with P.O.W.s, that local citizens hired captive soldiers as laborers, and that, after the victory at Yorktown, 1781, Congress and the Continental Army allowed P.O.W.s to go free after a cash payments and even sold some into indentured servitude.

ETHNIC AND RACIAL ISSUES arranged chronologically by historical period
or conflict - FRENCH REVOLUTIONARY AND NAPOLEONIC WARS (1792-1815)

Robertson, Claire, “**Racism, the Military, and Abolitionism in the Late Eighteenth- and Early Nineteenth-Century Caribbean.**” Vol.77, No.2 (April, 2013), pp.433-461. Examines Governor
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of Guadeloupe, Victor Hugues (1762-1826), General Sir John Moore (1761-1809), Captain Thomas Southey, and Sir John Jeremie (1795-1841) and the impact of racism on the differences between the British and French conduct of warfare in the Caribbean.

Tozzi, Christopher, **“Soldiers without a Country: Foreign Veterans in the Transition from Empire to Restoration.”** Vol.80, No.1 (January, 2016), pp.93-120. The article identifies and explores three trends: the exclusion of foreign veterans from the program of social healing that the Restoration Bourbons undertook, the limits of the modern French state’s care for veterans, and the ambiguity of national identity after the revolutionary era.

ETHNIC AND RACIAL ISSUES arranged chronologically by historical period
or conflict - 19th CENTURY

Dunn, John P. **“Americans in the Nineteenth Century Egyptian Army: A Selected Bibliography.”** Vol.70, No.1 (January, 2006), pp.123-136. Ismail (r.1863-1879), grandson of Muhammad Ali Pasha, employed officers from the United States, including both veterans from both sides in the Civil War and serving officers in the postwar United States Army.

Arndt, Jochen S. **“Treacherous Savages & Merciless Barbarian: Knowledge, Discourse and Violence during the Cape Frontier Wars, 1834 and 1853.”** Vol.74, No.3 (July, 2010), pp.709-735. Concludes that the British stereotypes of the Xhosa people of the eastern frontier of the Cape Colony, South Africa, that evolved during three wars fought between 1834 and 1853 were used to justify policies of dispossession and subjugation in the name of colonial security.

Varnava, Andrekos, **“‘Martial Races’ in the Isle of Aphrodite.”** Vol.74, No.4 (October, 2010), pp.1047-1067. The British attempt in the 1890s to form an indigenous defense force on Cyprus based on the ‘Martial Races’ concept and its enduring consequences.

Miller, Stephen M. **“The British Way of War: Cultural Assumption and Practices in the South African War, 1899-1902.”** Vol.77, No.4 (October, 2013), pp.1329-1347. Cosmopolitanism, political egalitarianism, and attitudes towards race influenced the British conduct of the war.

Connor, John, **“Climate, Environment, and Australian Frontier Wars: New South Wales, 1788-1841.”** Vol.81, No.4 (October, 2017), pp.985-1006. Attests that there was a strong correlation between the onset of drought in the inland region of south-eastern Australia and the eruption of armed conflict from 1824 to 1841, advocating a consideration of the impact of weather on the outbreak of war throughout history.

Hagstrom, Jacob, **“‘My Soldiers Above All’: Justifying Violence against Noncombatants in French Algeria, 1830-1847.”** Vol.86, No.1 (January, 2022), pp.32-53. Shows that French

officers participating in the conquest of Algeria defended the actions of their soldiers against civilians, which were motivated by fear, anger, and greed, on the basis of the necessity of preserving their lives and the lives of indigenous allies.

**ETHNIC AND RACIAL ISSUES arranged chronologically by historical period
or conflict - U.S. CIVIL WAR (1861-65)**

Dawson, Joseph G. **“Review Essay: Civil War Soldiers and Leaders: A Glatthaar Trio.”** Vol.63, No.1 (January, 1999), pp.165-168. Contains a single study on the relationships between high-ranking commanders and two involving the enlisted men’s experience, included African American soldiers and their officers and the troops who participated in Sherman’s march.

Bruce, Susannah Ural, **“ ‘Remember Your Country and Keep up Its Credit’: Irish Volunteers and the Union Army, 1861-1865.”** Vol.69, No.2 (April, 2005), pp.331-359. Puts forward the explanation that a central theme in the support of Irish immigrants for the Union cause was their dual loyalties to both their new and original homelands, support that was tested by the rising casualties, Emancipation Proclamation, and the introduction of the draft.

Keller, Christian B. **“Flying Dutchmen and Drunken Irishmen: The Myths and Realities of Ethnic Civil War Soldiers.”** Vol.73, No.1 (January, 2009), pp.117-145. Contrasts the myths, misconceptions, and stereotypes developed by Anglo-Americans regarding German- and Irish-American soldiers fighting in the United States Civil War with the historical truth about ethnic participation in the conflict.

**ETHNIC AND RACIAL ISSUES arranged chronologically by historical period
or conflict - FROM U.S. CIVIL WAR TO WORLD WAR II**

Budreau, Lisa M. **“The Politics of Remembrance: The Gold Star Mothers’ Pilgrimage and America’s Fading Memory of the Great War.”** Vol.72, No.2 (April, 2008), pp.371-411. Collectively, the Gold Star Mothers offer a multidimensional model of the ethnic, cultural, economic, and religious diversity prevalent in the United States during the interwar years.

Schubert, Frank N. **“The 25th Infantry at Brownsville, Texas: Buffalo Soldiers, the ‘Brownsville Six’, and the Medal of Honor.”** Vol.75, No.4 (October, 2011), pp.1217-1224. Addresses the myth that there were six holders of the Medal of Honor among the Buffalo Soldiers who were dismissed after the August, 1906, shooting in Brownsville, Texas.

Schubert, Frank N. **“Commemorative Essay: Sesquicentennial Reflection on the Black Regulars.”** Vol.80, No.4 (October, 2016), pp.1011-1016. To honor the sesquicentennial of the inclusion of African Americans in the regular U.S. Army, this brief essay considers how this precedent that came about in the wake of the service Black Volunteers in the Civil War pushed forward, albeit

all too slowly, social change in American society.

ETHNIC AND RACIAL ISSUES arranged chronologically by historical period
or conflict -WORLD WAR I (1914-18)

Stice, Elizabeth, “**Men on the Margins: Representations of Colonial Troops in British and French Trench Newspapers of the Great War.**” Vol.83, No.2 (April, 2019), pp.435-454. Ascertains how, through the contents of trench newspapers, the war provided a new context for evaluating empires and their peoples and questioning existing imperial culture.

ETHNIC AND RACIAL ISSUES arranged chronologically by historical period
or conflict -WORLD WAR II (1939-45)

Percy, William Alexander, “**Jim Crow and Uncle Sam: The Tuskegee Flying Units and the U.S. Army Air Forces in Europe during World War II.**” Vol.67, No.3 (July, 2003), pp.773-810. Links the success of the African American 99th Fighter Squadron and the 332nd Fighter Group with President Harry S. Truman’s decision to end segregation in the Armed Forces.

Ford, Douglas, “**British Intelligence on Japanese Army Moral during the Pacific War: Logical Analysis or Racial Stereotyping?**” Vol.69, No.2 (April, 2005), pp.439-474.

Roy, Kaushik, “**Military Loyalty in the Colonial Context: A Case Study of the Indian Army during World War II.**” Vol.73, No.2 (April, 2009), pp.497-529. Uncovers the motives for and extent of loyalty to the British colonial regime of the Indian Army troops fighting in Burma in the context of the British elite’s concerns about the loyalty of Indian soldiers.

Kennedy, Greg, “**Anglo-American Strategic Relations and Intelligence Assessments of Japanese Air Power 1934-1941.**” Vol.74, No.3 (July, 2010), pp.737-773. Reassesses the influence of racism on Anglo-American views of Japanese air power, and how this influence evolved in the seven years leading up to Pearl Harbor.

Kranjc, Gregor, “**Fight or Flight: Desertion, Defection, and Draft-Dodging in Occupied Slovenia, 1941-1945.**” Vol.81, No.1 (January, 2017), pp.133-162. Questions the motives for Slovenes to avoid or escape from military service for three occupying powers, Germany, Hungary, and Italy, and these powers efforts to combat draft-dodging, desertion, and defection.

Biddiscombe, Perry, “**The Mufti’s Men: Haj Amin-al-Husayni and S.S. Parachute Expeditions to Palestine and Iraq, 1944-1945.**” Vol.82, No.3 (July, 2018), pp.783-815.

Lawlor, Ruth, “**Bibliographic Essay: Contested Crimes: Race, Gender, and Nation in Histories of GI Sexual Violence, World War II.**” Vol.84, No.2 (April, 2020), pp.541-569.

**ETHNIC AND RACIAL ISSUES arranged chronologically by historical period
or conflict - THE COLD WAR (1945-91)**

Stapleton, Tim, “**‘Bad Boys’: Infiltration and Sedition in the African Military Units of the Central African Federation (Malawi, Zambia and Zimbabwe) 1953-63.**” Vol.73, No.4 (October, 2009), pp.1167-1193. Illustrates that nationalists exploited the rising unpopularity of colonialism, discontent with participation in the war in Malaya, the Mau Mau uprising in Kenya, and the Congo Crisis, which led white officers doubt the dependability of their African troops.

Thomas, Martin, “**Colonial Violence in Algeria and the Distorted Logic of State Retribution: The Sétif Uprising of 1945.**” Vol.75, No.1 (January, 2011), pp.125-157. Charts the rapid escalation of French security and vigilante violence in response to the uprising that broke out on VE-Day, 8 May, 1945, arguing that in the long run this was counterproductive.

Hutchinson, Robert W. “**The Weight of History: *Wehrmacht* Officers, the U.S. Army Historical Division, and U.S. Military Doctrine, 1945-1956.**” Vol.78, No.4 (October, 2014), pp.1321-1348. Suggests that, even within the ‘purely operational’ lessons provided by veteran German officers to the U.S. Army, a considerable element of Nazi racist ideology was transmitted.

**ETHNIC AND RACIAL ISSUES arranged chronologically by historical period
or conflict – KOREAN WAR (1950-53)**

Lerner, Mitchell, “**‘Is It for This We Fought and Bled?’: The Korean War and the Struggle for Civil Rights.**” Vol.82, No.2 (April, 2018), pp.515-545. Explains the role of the Korean War in the African American struggle for Civil Rights.

**ETHNIC AND RACIAL ISSUES arranged chronologically by historical period
or conflict - YUGOSLAV WARS (1991-2001)**

Sadkovich, James J. “**Review Essay: Balkan Battlefields.**” Vol.70, No.1 (January, 2006), pp.187-194. Concerns works on the violent breakup of Yugoslavia in the 1990s.

**ETHNIC AND RACIAL ISSUES arranged alphabetically by country –
ENGLAND / GREAT BRITAIN**

Boyce, D. George, “**From Assaye to the *Assaye*: Reflections on British Government, Force, and Moral Authority in India.**” Vol.63, No.3 (July, 1999), pp.643-668. Appraises the role of the threat and use of force in British rule, from the Battle of Assaye (1803) to the naval mutiny

of 1946, including how the reliance on force shaped the moral and ethical justifications for the British governing India.

Sundaram, Chandar S. “**‘Treated with Scant Attention’: The Imperial Cadet Corps, Indian Nobles, and Anglo-Indian Policy, 1897-1917.**” Vol.77, No.1 (January, 2013), pp.41-70.

Foreshadowing the Indianization of the Indian Army’s officer corps and the opening of the Indian Military Academy in 1932, the Imperial Cadet Corps offered officer training to Indian princes and gentlemen between 1901 and 1917.

Miller, Stephen M. “**The British Way of War: Cultural Assumption and Practices in the South African War, 1899-1902.**” Vol.77, No.4 (October, 2013), pp.1329-1347.

Cosmopolitanism, political egalitarianism, and attitudes towards race influenced the British conduct of the war.

Stapleton, Timothy J. “**Sexual Health in Britain’s West African Colonial Army (1898-1960).**”

Vol.85, No.3 (July, 2021), pp.619-645. Following an initial neglect due to greater concern over tropical diseases, British officers became obsessed with the threat of venereal diseases, reflecting colonial stereotypes surrounding race and gender.

ETHNIC AND RACIAL ISSUES arranged alphabetically by country - FRANCE

Vandervort, Bruce, “**When the French Colonial Mind Turns to Thoughts of War.**” Vol.76, No.3

(July, 2012), pp.847-851. Looks at two recent works on French imperialism: one a two-volume collection of twenty-eight essays, the overwhelming majority of which are devoted to Africa, the other book is an attempt at a synthesis of French colonialism exclusively in Africa.

Woodfork, Jacqueline, “**It is a Crime to be a *Tirailleur* in the Army.**” Vol.77, No.1 (January,

2013), pp.115-139. Presents the contrast between the rights of indigenous civilians in the French colony of Senegal and those of the *Tirailleur sénégalais*.

EUGENE OF SAVOY (1663-1736)

Paoletti, Ciro, “**Prince Eugene of Savoy, the Toulon Expedition of 1707, and the English**

Historians: A Dissenting View.” Vol.70, No.4 (October, 2006), pp.939-962. Using the siege of Toulon as an example, the author insists that most of the military histories of the period between 1688 and 1748 written by English speaking authors are flawed due to a failure to consult non-English contemporary sources.

EUROPE – See: AUSTRIA; BELGIUM; BULGARIA; CZECHOSLOVAKIA; DENMARK;

ENGLAND / GREAT BRITAIN; ESTONIA; FINLAND; FRANCE; GERMANY;

**GREECE; HUNGARY; IRELAND; ITALY; LATVIA; THE NETHERLANDS;
NORWAY; POLAND; PORTUGAL; ROMANIA; RUSSIA / SOVIET UNION;
SCOTLAND; SERBIA; SPAIN; SWEDEN; SWITZERLAND;
TURKEY / OTTOMAN EMPIRE; YUGOSLAVIA**

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FAIRFAX, THOMAS (1612-71)

Brady, Andrea, **“Dying with Honour: Literary Propaganda and the Second English Civil War.”** Vol.70, No.1 (January, 2006), pp.9-30. Deals with the coverage in Parliamentary versus Royalist propaganda of the executions of Sir Charles Lucas and Sir George Lisle in 1648, following General Thomas Fairfax’s (1612-1671) siege of Colchester.

FARRAGUT, GLASGOW (1801-70)

McPherson, James M. **“The 2014 George C. Marshall Lecture in Military History: The Rewards of Risk-Taking: Two Civil War Admirals.”** Vol.78, No.4 (October, 2014), pp.1225-1237. Comparison between Rear Admiral David Glasgow Farragut (1801-1870) and Rear Admiral Samuel Francis Du Pont (1803-1865).

FAYMONVILLE, PHILIP R. (1888-1962)

Glantz, Mary, **“An Officer and a Diplomat? The Ambiguous Position of Philip R. Faymonville and United States-Soviet Relations, 1941-1943.”** Vol.72, No.1 (January, 2008), pp.141-177. Appraises the role played by Colonel Philip Faymonville (1888-1962) in U.S.-Soviet relations, an officer who served as the United States’ first military attaché and as expeditor of Lend-Lease Aid during the war, but who had a contentious relationship with U.S. diplomatic personnel.

FINLAND

DiNardo, R.L. **“The Dysfunctional Coalition: The Axis Powers and the Eastern Front in World War II.”** Vol.60, No.4 (October, 1996), pp.711-730. Illustrates that German arrogance, compounded by muddled political and strategic thinking, inadequate resources, widely varying capabilities, and linguistic differences, rendered the Axis Coalition a costly failure.

Reese, Roger R. **“Lessons of the Winter War: A Study in the Military Effectiveness of the Red Army, 1939-1940.”** Vol.72, No.3 (July, 2008), pp.825-852. Based on newly consulted primary sources, this article confronts the notion of a uniformly dismal performance of the Red Army during the Winter War.

Rislakki, Jukka, **“‘Without Mercy’ – U.S. Strategic Intelligence and Finland in the Cold War.”** Vol.79, No.1 (January, 2015), pp.127-149. Unbeknownst to Finland’s political leaders, a secret channel for the exchange of information regarding the U.S.S.R. existed between Finnish military intelligence and the United States.

Kuronen, Jarmo O.; Heikkinen, Jarmo K., and Lewis, Aidan Mark, **“A Research Note on Military Medicine in Finland, 1555-1945.”** Vol.85, No.3 (July, 2021), pp.765-770.

FIREARMS – See: TECHNOLOGY

FISHER, JOHN ‘JACKIE’ (1841-1920)

Sumida, Jon Tetsuro, **“Sir John Fisher and the Dreadnought: The Sources of Naval Mythology.”** Vol.59, No.4 (October, 1995), pp.619-637.

Lambert, Nicholas A. **“Admiral Sir John Fisher and the Concept of Flotilla Defence, 1904-1909.”** Vol.59, No.4 (October, 1995), pp.639-660. Asks whether Admiral Fisher’s (1841-1920) embracing of a submarine and flotilla strategy represented an abandonment of the Mahanian approach to winning control of the seas through victory in a decisive clash between battle fleets.

Martin, Christopher, **“The Complexity of Strategy: ‘Jackie’ Fischer and the Trouble with Submarines.”** Vol.75, No.2 (April, 2011), pp.441-470. The problems of re-formulating strategy in the wake of the introduction of submarines for Admiral ‘Jackie’ Fischer (1841-1920), Prime Minister A.J. Balfour (r.1902-1905), and Julian Corbett (1854-1922).

Ferreiro, Larrie D. **“Horatio Nelson never Wrote ‘A Ship’s a Fool to Fight a Fort’: It was Jackie Fisher Who Invented the Attribution.”** Vol.80, No.3 (July, 2016), pp.855-856.

Dunley, Richard, **“Operation Q: Churchill and Fisher’s Invasion of Germany, 1915?”** Vol.86, No.3 (July, 2022), pp.612-641. Reveals the pursuit of a naval strategy by First Lord of the Admiralty, Winston Churchill (1874-1965), and Admiral of the Fleet, John Arbuthnot Fisher (1841-1920) that came withing hours of execution in May, 1915, but was never acted upon.

FOCH, FERDINAND (1851-1929)

Greenhalgh, Elizabeth, **“Myth and memory: Sir Douglas Haig and the Imposition of Allied Unified Command in March, 1918.”** Vol.68, No.3 (July, 2004), pp.771-820. Debunks Field Marshal Haig’s (1861-1928) claim that he deserves credit for Chief of the French General Staff, Ferdinand Foch’s (1851-1929), appointment as Allied Supreme Commander.

Greenhalgh, Elizabeth. **“General Ferdinand Foch and Unified Allied Command in 1918.”** Vol.79, No.4 (October, 2015), pp.997-1023. Examines the actions and decisions of General Foch (1851-1929), including four during the German Spring Offensives, two during the Allied counteroffensive, and one during the armistice negotiations.

FOREIGN VOLUNTEERS – See: RECRUITMENT AND ORGANIZATION

FORTIFICATIONS AND SIEGE WARFARE

Greenhalgh, Michael, **“French Military Reconnaissance in the Ottoman Empire during the Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries as a Source for Our Knowledge of Ancient Monuments.”** Vol.66, No.2 (April, 2002), pp.359-388. Displays how a combination of the intellectual background of many French officers and the Ottoman reuse of Classical Greek and Roman ruins for military purposes resulted in valuable archaeological information in reports preserved in French military archives.

FORTIFICATIONS AND SIEGE WARFARE: ANCIENT PERIOD (to 476)

Hanson, Victor Davis, **“Historiographical Essay: The Status of Ancient Military History: Traditional Work, Recent Research, and On-Going Controversies.”** Vol.63, No.2 (April, 1999), pp.379-413. A very thorough survey covering works on every conceivable topic concerning the armed forces and conduct of warfare in the age of ancient Greece and Rome.

Wheeler, Everett L. **“The Archaeology of War in Late Antiquity.”** Vol.78, No.3 (July, 2014), pp.1081-1093. A critical examination of a two-volume collection of papers originally presented at a 2007 Oxford conference.

FORTIFICATIONS AND SIEGE WARFARE: MEDIEVAL PERIOD (476-1480)

France, John, **“Historiographical Essay: Recent Writing on Medieval Warfare: From the Fall of Rome to c.1300.”** Vol.65, No.2 (April, 2001), pp.441-473. Primarily covering works that have been publishing in the last twenty-five years, the author reviews studies on the successor states to Rome, the Byzantine Empire, the thorny subject of feudalism, fortifications and siege operations, the naval dimension, the manner in which warfare was conducted in Europe

during the High Middle Ages, 1000-1300, the employment of mercenaries, and the Crusades.

Bachrach, David S. **“The Military Administration of England: The Royal Artillery (1216-1272).”** Vol.68, No.4 (October, 2004), pp.1083-1104. By describing an example of the sophisticated military administration during the reign of King Henry III, specifically involving siege engines, the author argues that much of the military innovations that have been attributed to Henry III’s successor, King Edward I, already existed before he ascended the throne.

Bachrach, David S. **“Early Ottonian Warfare: The Perspective from Corvey.”** Vol.75, No.2 (April, 2011), pp.393-409. A critical reassessment of the depiction of warfare in Widukind of Corvey’s *Res gestae Saxonicae*, which concludes that, rather than small bands of heavily armed, mounted warriors, King Henry I (r.919-936) and Emperor Otto (r.936-973) deployed large armies for placing fortresses under siege.

Hale, Brian J. **“Review Essay: Recent Literature on the Crusades.”** Vol.75, No.4 (October, 2011), pp.1225-1272. Includes twenty-three recent titles that cover a wide variety of topics, such as the pre-Crusades struggles of Byzantium with the Turks, the Albigensian Crusade, fortifications in the Holy Land, logistics, and the role of women.

Bachrach, David S. **“Restructuring the Eastern Frontier: Henry I of Germany, 924-936.”** Vol.78, No.1 (January, 2014), pp.9-35. Analyzes the establishment of a defense in depth against Magyar raiders, relying on garrisoned fortifications.

Fulton, Michael S. **“The Siege of Montfort and Mamluk Artillery Technology in 1271: Integrating the Archaeology and Topography with the Narrative Sources.”** Vol.83, No.3 (July, 2019), pp.689-717. An investigation into the development of mechanical artillery, specifically the trebuchet, through the study of archaeologically unearthed projectiles and the suitability of the surrounding terrain for the deployment of trebuchets.

FORTIFICATIONS AND SIEGE WARFARE: EARLY MODERN PERIOD (1480-1789)

Brady, Andrea, **“Dying with Honour: Literary Propaganda and the Second English Civil War.”** Vol.70, No.1 (January, 2006), pp.9-30. Deals with the coverage in Parliamentary versus Royalist propaganda of the executions of Sir Charles Lucas and Sir George Lisle in 1648, following General Thomas Fairfax’s (1612-1671) siege of Colchester.

Paoletti, Ciro, **“Prince Eugene of Savoy, the Toulon Expedition of 1707, and the English Historians: A Dissenting View.”** Vol.70, No.4 (October, 2006), pp.939-962. Using the siege of Toulon as an example, the author insists that most of the military histories of the period between 1688 and 1748 written by English speaking authors are flawed due to a failure to consult non-English contemporary sources.

Kingsley, Ronald F. and Alexander, Harvey J. **“The Failure of Abercromby’s Attack on Fort Carillon, July 1758, and the Scapegoating of Matthew Clerk.”** Vol.72, No.1 (January, 2008), pp.43-70. A reassessment, based on letters and other documents, that calls into question the degree that the young engineer, Matthew Clerk, contributed to the defeat of the British attack on Fort Carillon (Fort Ticonderoga) during the French and Indian War. See also: McCulloch, Ian Macpherson, **“ ‘A Blanket of Inconsistencies’: The Battle of Ticonderoga, 2008.”** Vol.72, No.3 (July, 2008), Vol.72, No.1 (January, 2008), pp.889-900.

McCulloch, Ian Macpherson, **“ ‘A Blanket of Inconsistencies’: The Battle of Ticonderoga, 2008.”** Vol.72, No.3 (July, 2008), pp.889-900. A response to Ronald F. Kingsley and Harvey J. Alexander’s article, **“The Failure of Abercomby’s Attack on Fort Carillon, July 1758, and the Scapegoating of Matthew Clerk.”** Vol.72, No.1 (January, 2008), pp.43-70.

McMahon, Daniel, **“Geomancy and Walled Fortifications in Late Eighteenth Century China.”** Vol.76, No.2 (April, 2012), pp.373-393. Takes account of the role of geomancy based on *fengshui* in military planning and activity during the Qing Dynasty, including intelligence gathering, sabotage, and fortifications.

Ansani, Fabrizio, **“ ‘This French Artillery is very good and very effective’: Hypotheses on the Diffusion of a New Military Technology in Renaissance Italy.”** Vol.83, No.2 (April, 2019), pp.347-378. Scrutinizes the development of the production of heavy cannons in Italy before and after the French Neapolitan Campaign of 1494.

Vigus, Robert T. **“The Military Revolution and the Ancient Origins of the *Trace Italienne*.”** Vol.84, No.3 (July, 2020), pp.698-712. Points out that the *trace italienne*, in the form of angled bastions, that have been identified as a key and novel feature of the Early-Modern ‘Military Revolution’, had its roots in Ancient Greek and Roman treatises and the actual works constructed by Roman and Byzantine engineers, surviving examples of which could be seen in important trading and pilgrimage routes.

FORTIFICATIONS AND SIEGE WARFARE: NATIVE AMERICAN CONFLICTS

Lee, Wayne E. **“Fortify, Fight, or Flee: Tuscarora and Cherokee Defensive Warfare and Military Culture Adaptation.”** Vol.68, No.3 (July, 2004), pp.713-770.

FORTIFICATIONS AND SIEGE WARFARE: 19th CENTURY

Stamp, Jeffrey, **“Aero-Static Warfare: A Brief Survey of Ballooning in Mid-nineteenth-century Siege Warfare.”** Vol.79, No.3 (July, 2015), Pp.767-782. Includes usage in the U.S. Civil War, War of the Triple Alliance / Paraguayan War, and the Franco-Prussian War.

FORTIFICATIONS AND SIEGE WARFARE: WORLD WAR I (1914-18)

Erickson, Edward J. **“Strength against Weakness: Ottoman Military Effectiveness at Gallipoli, 1915.”** Vol.65, No.4 (October, 2001), pp.981-1011. In contrast to most studies, the author concentrates on Turkish preparations and performance, showing that the peninsula was heavily fortified and defended by the Empire’s finest divisions.

Dykstra, Bodie D. **“ ‘To Dig and Burrow like Rabbits’: British Field Fortifications at the Battle of the Aisne, September and October 1914.”** Vol.84, No.3 (July, 2020), pp.747-773.

FORTIFICATIONS AND SIEGE WARFARE: 1st INDOCHINA WAR (1946-54)

Boylan, Kevin M. **“No ‘Technical Knockout’: Giap’s Artillery at Dien Bien Phu.”** Vol.78, No.4 (October, 2014), pp.1349-1383. Contests the common explanation for the victory of the Vietnamese People’s Army based on a flood of Vietnamese publications around the 2004 fiftieth anniversary of the siege, 13 March – 7 May, 1954.

FORTIFICATIONS AND SIEGE WARFARE:

VIETNAM WAR (2nd Indochina War) (1955-75)

Cole, Bernard D. **“Memoirs: A Noglow in Vietnam, 1968: Air Power at the Battle of Khe Sanh.”** Vol.64, No.1 (January, 2000), pp.141-158. Both a memoir and an analysis by a U.S. Marine who experienced first-hand the fighting at Khe Sanh.

FOULOIS, BENJAMIN (1879-1967)

Meilinger, Phillip S. **“Historiographical Essay: U.S. Air Force Leaders: A Biographical Tour.”** Vol.62, No.4 (October, 1998), pp.833-870.

FOX, GUSTAVUS (1821-83)

Weddle, Kevin J. **“The Fall of Satan’s Kingdom: Civil-Military Relations and the Union Navy’s Attack on Charleston, April 1863.”** Vol.75, No.2 (April, 2011), pp.411-439. Describes the conflict between Rear Admiral Samuel Francis Du Pont (1803-1865) and the members of Lincoln’s administration, Secretary of the Navy Gideon Welles (1802-1878) and his assistant, Gustavus Fox (1821-1883).

FRANCE

Greenhalgh, Michael, **“French Military Reconnaissance in the Ottoman Empire during the Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries as a Source for Our Knowledge of Ancient Monuments.”** Vol.66, No.2 (April, 2002), pp.359-388. Displays how a combination of the intellectual background of many French officers and the Ottoman reuse of Classical Greek and Roman ruins for military purposes resulted in valuable archaeological information in reports preserved in French military archives.

Kiesling, Eugenia C. **“Historiographical Essays: Illuminating ‘Strange Defeat’ and ‘Pyrrhic Victory’: The Historian Robert A. Doughty.”** Vol.71, No.3 (July, 2007), pp.875-888. Reviews the English language publications on the performance of France in both World Wars and how Brigadier General (Rtd.) Robert A. Doughty (b.1943) has sought to teach the U.S. Army how to harness historical study in the interest of doctrinal development.

Vandervort, Bruce, **“When the French Colonial Mind Turns to Thoughts of War.”** Vol.76, No.3 (July, 2012), pp.847-851. Looks at two recent works on French imperialism: one a two-volume collection of twenty-eight essays, the overwhelming majority of which are devoted to Africa, the other book is an attempt at a synthesis of French colonialism exclusively in Africa.

Woodfork, Jacqueline, **“It is a Crime to be a *Tirailleur* in the Army.”** Vol.77, No.1 (January, 2013), pp.115-139. Presents the contrast between the rights of indigenous civilians in the French colony of Senegal and those of the *Tirailleur sénégalais*.

FRANCE: MEDIEVAL PERIOD (476-1480)

Bachrach, Bernard, **“Charlemagne and the Carolingian General Staff.”** Vol.66, No.2 (April, 2002), pp.313-357. Contends that the personnel and procedures relied upon by Emperor Charlemagne (747-814) for intelligence and planning fulfill the qualifications for a modern general staff.

Çeçen, Zeynep Kocabiyoikoğlu, **“Two Different Views of Knighthood in the Early Fifteenth Century: *Le Livre de Bouciquaut* and the Works of Christine de Pizan.”** Vol.76, No.1 (January, 2012), pp.9-35. Comparing the different contemporary views of knighthood, the author considers whether its depiction in the biography of Marshal of France, Jean le Meingre Bouciquaut (1366-1421), is consistent with its image in the works of Christine de Pizan (1363-1430).

Isaac, Steven, **“The Role of Towns in the Battle of Bouvines (1214).”** Vol.79, No.2 (April, 2015), pp.317-344. Uses the French King, Philip Augustus’ (1165-1223), victory at Bouvines as an example of the military contributions of urban centers in the form of non-noble troops, the production of arms and armor, financial resources, and contributors to policy.

FRANCE: EARLY MODERN PERIOD (1480-1789)

Lynn, John A. **“Historiographical Essay: The Treatment of Military Subjects in Diderot’s**

Encyclopedie.” Vol.65, No.1 (January, 2001), pp.131-165. Concludes that while Denis Diderot’s (1713-1784) coverage of military topics was not the basis for reforms, they provide an excellent picture of the European art of war in the mid-eighteenth century.

Powers, Sandra L. **“Historiographical Essay: Studying the Art of War: Military Books known to American Officers and Their French Counterparts during the Second Half of the Eighteenth Century.”** Vol.70, No.3 (July, 2006), pp.781-814.

Vandervort, Bruce, **“Review Essay: Remembering the Empire of France in America.”** Vol.74, No.1 (January, 2010), pp.195-199.

Osman, Julia, **“Guibert vs. Guibert: Competing Notions in the *Essai general de Tactique* and the *Défense du système de guerre modern.*”** Vol.83, No.1 (January, 2019), pp.43-65. Examines the apparently contradictory ideas about the conduct of war in two books written by the Enlightenment-era author, Jacques Antoine Hippolyte, the Comte de Guibert (1743-1790), who has been credited as the prophet of French Revolutionary and Napoleonic warfare.

Ansani, Fabrizio, **“ ‘This French Artillery is very good and very effective’: Hypotheses on the Diffusion of a New Military Technology in Renaissance Italy.”** Vol.83, No.2 (April, 2019), pp.347-378. Scrutinizes the development of the production of heavy cannons in Italy before and after the French Neapolitan Campaign of 1494.

FRANCE: WAR OF THE SPANISH SUCCESSION (1701-15)

Paoletti, Ciro, **“Prince Eugene of Savoy, the Toulon Expedition of 1707, and the English Historians: A Dissenting View.”** Vol.70, No.4 (October, 2006), pp.939-962. Using the siege of Toulon as an example, the author insists that most of the military histories of the period between 1688 and 1748 written by English speaking authors are flawed due to a failure to consult non-English contemporary sources.

Dee, Darryl, **“The Survival of France: Logistics and Strategy in the 1709 Flanders Campaign.”** Vol.84, No.4 (October, 2020), pp.1021-1050. Shines a light on the significant role of logistics in the debate concerning whether the French field army in Flanders should pursue an aggressive or cautious strategy during the first year of the War of the Spanish Succession, 1701-1715, arguing that this established a pattern for the remainder of the conflict.

FRANCE: JACOBITE RISING OF 1745 (1745-46)

Paoletti, Ciro, **“The Battle of Culloden: A Pivotal Moment in World History.”** Vol.81, No.1 (January, 2017), pp.187-198. Highlights the international context of the Battle of Culloden, 16 April, 1746, and speculates on the wider consequences of a Hanoverian defeat.

FRANCE: SEVEN YEARS WAR (1756-63)

Willis, Sam, **“The Battle of Lagos, 1759.”** Vol.73, No.3 (July, 2009), pp.745-765. Though an indecisive engagement, Royal Navy Vice-Admiral Edward Boscawen’s (1711-1761) squadron weakened the French Mediterranean fleet that was sailing to join the French Atlantic fleet, thus serving as an important precursor to the Battle of Quiberon Bay, November, 1759.

FRANCE: FRENCH REVOLUTIONARY AND NAPOLEONIC WARS (1792-1815)

See Also: VON CLAUSEWITZ, CARL

Schneid, Frederick C. **“The Dynamics of Defeat: French Army Leadership, December 1812 – March 1813.”** Vol.63, No.1 (January, 1999), pp.7-28. Examines how, in the wake of the catastrophe in Russia, the remnants of the *Grande Armée* were preserved despite the departure of Emperor Napoleon Bonaparte (1769-1821).

Barker, Thomas M. **“A Debacle of the Peninsular War: The British-led Amphibious Assault against Fort Fuengirola 14-15 October 1810.”** Vol.64, No.1 (January, 2000), pp.9-52. Reassesses the failed amphibious assault by a multi-national force under the command of the Eleventh Lord Blayney, General Andrews Thomas.

McConachy, Bruce, **“The Roots of Artillery Doctrine: Napoleonic Artillery Tactics Reconsidered.”** Vol.65, No.3 (July, 2001), pp.617-640. Puts forward the explanation that the changes in Napoleonic artillery practices beginning in 1807 were the results of years of experimentation and innovation, rather than compensation for a general decline in standards throughout the *Grande Armée*.

Leggiere, Michael V. **“From Berlin to Leipzig: Napoleon’s Gamble in North Germany, 1813.”** Vol.67, No.1 (January, 2003), pp.39-48. Claims that the Allies’ defense of Berlin defeated Napoleon’s strategy. Significantly contributing to his expulsion from Germany.

North, Johnathan, **“General Hoche and Counterinsurgency.”** Vol.67, No.2 (April, 2003), pp.529-540. Louis Lazare Hoche (1768-1797) was a General of Revolutionary France whose service included the successful suppression of the Catholic Royalist Revolt in the Vendée.

Arnold, James R. **“A Reappraisal of Column Versus Line in the Peninsular War.”** Vol.68, No.2 (April, 2004), pp.535-552. Disputes the influential English historian of the Napoleonic Wars, Sir Charles Oman’s (1860-1946), explanation for the superiority of the British line over the French column.

Liaropoulos, Andrew N. **“Revolutions in Warfare: Theoretical Paradigms and Historical Evidence: The Napoleonic and First World War Revolutions in Military Affairs.”** Vol.70,

No.2 (April, 2006), pp.363-384.

Black, Jeremy, **“A Revolution in Military Cartography?: Europe 1650-1815.”** Vol.73, No.1 (January, 2009), pp.49-68. This article approaches the issue of cartography not only in tactical, operational and strategic terms, but also with reference to the mapping of war for public interest.

Morgan, John, **“War Feeding War? The Impact of Logistics on the Napoleonic Occupation of Catalonia.”** Vol.73, No.1 (January, 2009), pp.83-116. The inability of the French occupation forces to live off the land meant that alternate sources and modes of supply had to be relied upon in the midst of guerrilla resistance and the British blockade of Catalan ports, all of which negatively impacted French operations.

Esdaile, Charles, **“Review Essay: Recent Writing on Napoleon and His Wars.”** Vol.73, No.1 (January, 2009), pp.209-220. Contains four works that cover the struggle specifically between Britain and France from 1792 to 1815, Napoleon’s (1769-1821) skill as a commander on all levels of warfare, and the guerrilla war in Spain.

Esdaile, Charles, **“Spain 1808 – Iraq 2003: Some Thoughts on the Use and Abuse of History.”** Vol.74, No.1 (January, 2010), pp.173-188. Disputes comparisons of Napoleon’s intervention in Spain, George Bush’s (r.2001-2009) intervention in Iraq, and the subsequent counterinsurgency campaigns, arguing that they are based on false notions about the war in Spain.

Mikaberidze, Alexander, **“Historiographical Essay: Recent Trends in the Russian Historiography of the Napoleonic Wars.”** Vol.74, No.1 (January, 2010), pp.189-194.

Davey, James, **“The Repatriation of Spanish Troops from Denmark, 1808: The British Government, Logistics, and Maritime Supremacy.”** Vol.74, No.3 (July, 2010), pp.689-707. When Spain rebelled against French occupation, the British government responded by, among other things, preparing and executing the repatriation of the Spanish regiments formerly fighting for Napoleon in northern Europe.

Esdaile, Charles J. **“Review Essay: Recent Works of Note on the Peninsular War (1808-1815).”** Vol.74, No.4 (October, 2010), pp.1243-1252.

Germani, Ian, **“Terror in the Army: Representatives on Mission and Military Discipline.”** Vol.75, No.3 (July, 2011), pp.733-768. The French National Convention’s Representatives on Mission and the exercise of military justice in the French Revolutionary armies.

Dodman, Thomas, **“1814 and the Melancholy of War.”** Vol.80, No.1 (January, 2016), pp.31-55. Through contemporary accounts, this article explores the emotional reaction of state officials, soldiers, military doctors, etc. to the collapse of Napoleon’s Empire.

Hantraye, Jacques, **“The Silence of the Woods: The 1815 Murder of a Prussian Soldier in Western France.”** Vol.80, No.1 (January, 2016), pp.57-76. Focuses on the murder of a Prussian soldier on 22 July, 1815, outside of the village of Unverre, located roughly ninety miles southwest of Paris, as a means of exploring the interactions between the forces of occupation and the civilian population of postwar France.

Calvet, Stéphane, **“The Painful Demobilization of the Napoleonic Grande Armée’s Officers.”** Vol.80, No.1 (January, 2016), pp.77-92. By examining the Western French Department of Charente, the author illustrates the diverse loyalties, motivations, and subsequent careers of the officers of Napoleon’s Grande Armée.

Heuer, Jennifer, **“Soldiers as Victims or Villains? Demobilization, Masculinity, and Family in French Royalist Pamphlets, 1814-1815.”** Vol.80, No.1 (January, 2016), pp.121-144.

Osman, Julia, **“Guibert vs. Guibert: Competing Notions in the *Essai general de Tactique* and the *Défense du système de guerre modern*.”** Vol.83, No.1 (January, 2019), pp.43-65. Examines the apparently contradictory ideas about the conduct of war in two books written by the Enlightenment-era author, Jacques Antoine Hippolyte, the Comte de Guibert (1743-1790), who has been credited as the prophet of French Revolutionary and Napoleonic warfare.

Hickey, Donald R. **“Research Note: The Quasi-War.”** Vol.85, No.2 (April, 2021), pp.475-484. Traces the origins and use of the term ‘Quasi-War’ to identify the naval conflict fought between the United States and Revolutionary France, 1798-1801.

Campos, Jorge Planas and De Blas, Antonio Grjal, **“French and Allied Officer Casualties in the Peninsular War (1808-1814): A New Examination.”** Vol.85, No.4 (October, 2021), pp.889-905.

FRANCE: FROM 1815 TO 1914

Ripperger, Robert M. **“The Development of the French Artillery for the Offensive, 1890-1914.”** Vol.59, No.4 (October, 1995), pp.599-618. Advances the proposition that the French Army’s embrace of *offensive à l’outrance* produced strategies and tactics in which there was little room for heavy artillery.

Schneid, Frederick C. **“A Well-Coordinated Affair: Franco-Piedmontese War Planning in 1859.”** Vol.76, No.2 (April, 2012), pp.395-425. Demonstrates that the Franco-Piedmontese general staffs undertook extensive planning that incorporating the new technologies of railways and steam ships, so that the Second War of Italian Unification (1859-1861) qualifies, alongside the more familiar U.S. Civil War and German Wars of Unification, as one of the first ‘modern’ wars of the industrial age.

Otte, T.G. **“From *Can-Can Diabolique* to *Sitzkrieg*: The International China Expeditionary Force, 1900-1901.”** Vol.77, No.4 (October, 2013), pp.1277-1302. Analyzes a neglected example of coalition warfare.

Stamp, Jeffrey, **“Aero-Static Warfare: A Brief Survey of Ballooning in Mid-nineteenth-century Siege Warfare.”** Vol.79, No.3 (July, 2015), Pp.767-782. Includes usage in the U.S. Civil War, War of the Triple Alliance / Paraguayan War, and the Franco-Prussian War.

Tozzi, Christopher, **“Soldiers without a Country: Foreign Veterans in the Transition from Empire to Restoration.”** Vol.80, No.1 (January, 2016), pp.93-120. The article identifies and explores three trends: the exclusion of foreign veterans from the program of social healing that the Restoration Bourbons undertook, the limits of the modern French state’s care for veterans, and the ambiguity of national identity after the revolutionary era.

Rodriguez, Manuel Santirso, **“Under the Uniform: Tyrants and Praetorians in the Aftermath of the Revolution (1829-1854).”** Vol.83, No.2 (April, 2019), pp.379-407. Weighs the parallels and differences in the lives and careers of Nicholas Jean-de-Dieu Soult of France (1769-1851), Arthur Wellesley, the Duke of Wellington of Great Britain (1769-1852), Baldomero Espartero of Spain (1793-1879), and Andrew Jackson of the United States (1767-1845).

Hagstrom, Jacob, **“‘My Soldiers Above All’: Justifying Violence against Noncombatants in French Algeria, 1830-1847.”** Vol.86, No.1 (January, 2022), pp.32-53. Shows that French officers participating in the conquest of Algeria defended the actions of their soldiers against civilians, which were motivated by fear, anger, and greed, on the basis of the necessity of preserving their lives and the lives of indigenous allies.

FRANCE: WORLD WAR I (1914-18)

Greenhalgh, Elizabeth, **“‘Parade Ground Soldiers’: French Army Assessments of the British on the Somme in 1916.”** Vol.63, No.2 (April, 1999), pp.283-312. Assesses the attitudes among the *Poilus* towards their British counterparts in a battle in which roughly equal numbers of French and British troops fought alongside each other.

Bruce, Robert B. **“America Embraces France: Marshal Joseph Joffre and the French Mission to the United States, April-May 1917.”** Vol.66, No.2 (April, 2002), pp.407-441. Proposes that Marshal Joffre (1852-1931), more than any other individual, established strong-Franco-American military, political, and social ties, contributing mightily to U.S. public support for a commitment of a large expeditionary force to the Western Front.

Doughty, Robert A. **“French Strategy in 1914: Joffre’s Own.”** Vol.67, No.2 (April, 2003), pp.427-454.

Lunn, Joe, **“Male Identity and Martial Codes of Honor: A Comparison of the War Memoirs of Robert Graves, Ernst Jünger, and Kande Kamara.”** Vol.69, No.3 (July, 2005), pp.713-735. The memoirs of the British officer and author, Robert Graves (1895-1985), the German soldier and author, Ernst Jünger (1895-1998), and the French Colonial soldier from West Africa, Kande Kamara.

Krause, Jonathan, **“The French Battle for Vimy Ridge, Spring 1915.”** Vol.77, No.1 (January, 2013), pp.91-113. Analyzes the early French efforts to solve the challenge of the trench stalemate.

Doughty, Robert A. **“Papa’ Joffre and the Great War.”** Vol.79, No.4 (October, 2015), pp.959-979. Asks whether General Joseph Joffre’s (1852-1931) achievements are outweighed by his failures.

Moore, Andrew, **“Monuments Men and Martyred Towns: *The Arras Belfry* by Fernand Sabatté.”** Vol.79, No.4 (October, 2015), pp.1047-1057. Sabatté (1874-1940) served as a French officer in charge of evacuating artworks from Medieval churches and town halls that were under the threat of destruction as well as painting an example of the ‘martyred towns’ genre.

Armes, Keith, **“French Intelligence on the Russian Army on the Eve of the First World War.”** Vol.82, No.3 (July, 2018), pp.759-782.

Stice, Elizabeth, **“Men on the Margins: Representations of Colonial Troops in British and French Trench Newspapers of the Great War.”** Vol.83, No.2 (April, 2019), pp.435-454. Ascertains how, through the contents of trench newspapers, the war provided a new context for evaluating empires and their peoples and questioning existing imperial culture.

FRANCE: INTERWAR PERIOD (1919-39)

Gershovich, Moshe, **“The Ait Ya’qub Incident and the Crisis of French Military Policy in Morocco.”** Vol.62, No.1 (January, 1998), pp.57-73. Though small in scale, the author suggests that defeat at Ait Ya’qub, 8 June, 1929, was the final straw that led the French government to call into question the twin concepts of *Maroc utile* and peaceful penetration.

Corum, James S. **“The Spanish Civil War: Lessons Learned and not Learned by the Great Powers.”** Vol.62, No.2 (April, 1998), pp.313-334. Considers what the British, French, German, Italian, Soviet, and United States armed forces learned or failed to learn from the study of the air war in Spain within the context of how armed forces undergo reform.

Philpott, William and Alexander, Martin S. **“The French and the British Field Force: Moral Support or Material Contribution?”** Vol.71, No.3 (July, 2007), pp.743-772. Contends that, even though France viewed the military benefit of the British commitment of a field army if war broke out with Germany as unsubstantial, the moral value of such a promise meant that it

played an important role in France's preparations for war.

Orr, Andrew, “**‘We call you to holy war’: Mustafa Kemal, Communism, and Germany in French Intelligence Nightmare, 1919-1923.**” Vol.75, No.4 (October, 2011), pp.1095-1123. Explains how French military intelligence analysts chose to identify Mustafa Kemal (1881-1938) as the central figure in a communist-inspired, German controlled, anti-colonial enterprise that was closely allied to Islamist political movements, rather than the nationalist, secular, westernizing leader that he was.

FRANCE: WORLD WAR II (1939-45)

Rossi, Mario, “**United States Military Authorities and Free France, 1942-1944.**” Vol.61, No.1 (January, 1997), pp.49-64. Probes the political and military consequences of the clash between U.S. policy towards liberated French territory and Charles De Gaulle's (1890-1970) claim to be the legitimate representative of the French people.

Gunsburg, Jeffrey A. “**The Battle of Gembloux, 14-15 May 1940: The ‘Blitzkrieg’ Checked.**” Vol.64, No.1 (January, 2000), pp.97-140. Uses an examination of the effectiveness of the French forces holding a defensive position at the Belgium town of Gembloux as a test case for French doctrine and performance.

Lasterle, Philippe, “**Could Admiral Gensoul have Averted the Tragedy of Mers el-Kébir?**” Vol.67, No.3 (July, 2003), pp.835-844. Admiral Marcel-Bruno Gensoul (1880-1973) commanded the French fleet at Mers el-Kébir, Algeria, when it was bombarded by a British force commanded by Admiral James Somerville (1882-1949) on 3 July, 1940.

Jones, Mark C. “**Experiment at Dundee: The Royal Navy's 9th Submarine Flotilla and Multinational Naval Cooperation during World War II.**” Vol.72, No.4 (October, 2008), pp.1179-1212. The 9th Flotilla included British, Dutch, Free French, Norwegian, and Polish submariners.

Benbow, Tim, “**‘Menace’ to ‘Ironclad’: The British Operations against Dakar (1940) and Madagascar (1942).**” Vol.75, No.3 (July, 2011), pp.769-809. Investigates why, regarding two separate British operations against Vichy French colonies in Africa, ‘Menace’ failed, while ‘Ironclad’ succeeded.

Jones, Mark C. “**Not Just along for the Ride: The Role of Royal Navy Liaison Personnel in Multinational Naval Operations during World War II.**” Vol.76, No.1 (January, 2012), pp.127-158. The liaison system as a means of cooperation with European navies in exile from France, Greece, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, and Yugoslavia.

Jones, Mark C. “**Friend and Advisor to the Allied Navies: The Royal Navy's Principal Liaison**

Officer and Multinational Naval Operations in World War II.” Vol.77, No.3 (July, 2013), pp.991-1023. The work of Principal Liaison Officer, Allied Navies (P.N.L.O.) with the Belgian, Dutch, French, Greek, Norwegian, Polish, and Yugoslav navies in exile.

Hammond, Richard, **“Fighting under a Different Flag: Multinational Naval Cooperation and Submarine Warfare in the Mediterranean, 1940-1944.”** Vol.80, No.2 (April, 2016), pp.447-476. In contrast to their experience in the British home theatre, the submarines in the Mediterranean operated by the exiled governments of the Free French, Greece, the Netherlands, Poland, and Yugoslavia, along with those of Italy beginning in 1943, found it difficult to cooperate with the Royal Navy, as well as each other.

Goldstein, Cora Sol, **“A Comparative Analysis of Cultural Control: The German Military Occupation of France (1940-1942) and the American Military Occupation of Germany (1945-1949).”** Vol.80, No.4 (October, 2016), pp.1083-1116. Although their respective agendas were inspired by opposite ideologies, the author proposes that the mechanisms of control over information by both occupiers shared significant similarities.

FRANCE: COLD WAR (1945-91)

Regnault, Jean-Marc, **“France’s Search for Nuclear Test Sites, 1957-1963.”** Vol.67, No.4 (October, 2003), pp.1223-1248. Reckons with the consequences for French Polynesia and New Caledonia of the mother country’s search for an alternative to the Sahara Desert in Algeria as a nuclear test site.

Spector, Ronald H. **“After Hiroshima: Allied Military Occupations and the Fate of Japan’s Empire, 1945-1947.”** Vol.69, No.4 (October, 2005), pp.1121-1136. The Allies confronted problems far beyond the disarming of Japanese troops in occupied China, Korea, and Southeast Asia, where internal conflicts rendered the plans of the Allied powers irrelevant.

Thomas, Martin, **“Colonial Violence in Algeria and the Distorted Logic of State Retribution: The Sétif Uprising of 1945.”** Vol.75, No.1 (January, 2011), pp.125-157. Charts the rapid escalation of French security and vigilante violence in response to the uprising that broke out on VE-Day, 8 May, 1945, arguing that in the long run this was counterproductive.

FRANCE: 1st INDOCHINA WAR (1946-54)

Boylan, Kevin M. **“No ‘Technical Knockout’: Giap’s Artillery at Dien Bien Phu.”** Vol.78, No.4 (October, 2014), pp.1349-1383. Contests the common explanation for the victory of the Vietnamese People’s Army based on a flood of Vietnamese publications around the 2004 fiftieth anniversary of the siege, 13 March – 7 May, 1954.

FRANCO, FRANCISCO (1892-1975)

See Also: SPAIN: CIVIL WAR

Cerdá, Néstor, **“Political Ascent and Military Commander: General Franco in the Early Months of the Spanish Civil War, July-October 1936.”** Vol.75, No.4 (October, 2011), pp.1125-1157. Displays how General Francisco Franco (1892-1975) exploited the opportunities presented by the setbacks to the coup plotters in July through August, 1936, to rise from being merely another general supporting the uprising to the position of commander-in-chief of the Nationalist Army and head of the government.

Lines, Lisa, **“Francisco Franco as Warrior: Is It Time for a Reassessment of His Military Leadership?”** Vol.81, No.2 (April, 2017), pp.513-534. Critiques Franco’s (1892-1975) performance as a military commander within the context of his cultural and political environment.

FRANCO-PRUSSIAN WAR (1870-71)

Jackman, Steven D. **“Shoulder to Shoulder: Close Control and ‘Old Prussian Drill’ in German Offensive Infantry Tactics, 1871-1914.”** Vol.68, No.1 (January, 2004), pp.73-104.

Stamp, Jeffrey, **“Aero-Static Warfare: A Brief Survey of Ballooning in Mid-nineteenth-century Siege Warfare.”** Vol.79, No.3 (July, 2015), Pp.767-782. Includes usage in the U.S. Civil War, War of the Triple Alliance / Paraguayan War, and the Franco-Prussian War.

FRASER, SIMON (1729-77)

Harrington, Hugh T. and Jordan, Jim, **“The Other Mystery Shot of the American Revolution: Did Timothy Murphy Kill British Brigadier General Simon Fraser at Saratoga?”** Vol.74, No.4 (October, 2010), pp.1037-1045. Attempts to disentangle the various accounts of the Battle of Saratoga, 1777, to determine the origins and validity of the Murphy legend, and its repetition by subsequent historians, along with the physics of musket fire.

FREDERICK THE GREAT (1712-86)

Browning, Reed, **“Review Essay: New Views on the Silesian Wars.”** Vol.69, No.2 (April, 2005), pp.521-534. Concerning the series of conflicts, 1740-42, 1744-45, and 1756-63, fought between Austria and the Kingdom of Prussia, led by Frederick the Great (1712-1786).

Paret, Peter, **“Clausewitz and Schlieffen as Interpreters of Frederick the Great: Three Phases in the History of Grand Strategy.”** Vol.76, No.3 (July, 2012), pp.837-845. Compares how Carl von Clausewitz (1780-1831) and Count Alfred von Schlieffen (1833-1913) interpreted Frederick the Great’s generalship, illustrating the function of historical study in the development of Clausewitz’s theories.

FULLER, BEN HEBARD (1870-1937)

Bartlett, Merrill L. **“Ben Hebard Fuller and the Genesis of a Modern United States Marine Corps, 1891-1934.”** Vol.69, No.1 (January, 2005), pp.73-91.

FULLER, J.F.C. (1878-1966)

Reid, Brian Holden, **“ ‘A Signpost that was Missing?’ Reconsidering British Lessons from the American Civil War.”** Vol.70, No.2 (April, 2006), pp.385-414. Focuses on the works of the military authors, notably General J.F.C. Fuller (1878-1966) and Captain Basil Liddell Hart (1895-1970), to consider the ‘lessons’ they perceived from their study of the U.S. Civil War.

Reid, Brian Holden, **“ ‘Young Turks, or Not So Young?’: The Frustrated Quest of Major General J.F.C. Fuller and Captain B.H. Liddell Hart.”** Vol.73, No.1 (January, 2009), pp.147-175. A study of their motives and aspirations during the inter-war period.

FUNSTON, FREDERICK (1865-1917)

Beckstrand, Alex, **“Woodrow Wilson and the Struggle of Civil-Military Relations during the Punitive Expedition of 1916-1917.”** Vol.86, No.2 (April, 2022), pp.372-398. Argues that President Woodrow Wilson’s (1913-1921) decision to defer to his military commanders, Major General Frederick Funston (1865-1917) and Brigadier General John J. Pershing (1860-1948), was the cause of the failure to achieve the goals of the Punitive Expedition.

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GALLIPOLI – See: WORLD WAR I: THE GALLIPOLI CAMPAIGN

THE GAMBIA

Stapleton, Timothy J. **“Sexual Health in Britain’s West African Colonial Army (1898-1960).”** Vol.85, No.3 (July, 2021), pp.619-645. Following an initial neglect due to greater concern over tropical diseases, British officers became obsessed with the threat of venereal diseases, reflecting colonial stereotypes surrounding race and gender.

GENDER ISSUES

Pennington, Reina, **“Review Essay: Women, War, and the Military.”** Vol.71, No.4 (October, 2007), pp.1203-1210. Reference works covering antiquity to the present.

GENDER ISSUES arranged chronologically by period – MEDIEVAL PERIOD (476-1480)

Hale, Brian J. **“Review Essay: Recent Literature on the Crusades.”** Vol.75, No.4 (October, 2011), pp.1225-1272. Includes twenty-three recent titles that cover a wide variety of topics, such as the pre-Crusades struggles of Byzantium with the Turks, the Albigenian Crusade, fortifications in the Holy Land, logistics, and the role of women.

GENDER ISSUES arranged chronologically by period – WORLD WAR I (1914-18)

Lunn, Joe, **“Male Identity and Martial Codes of Honor: A Comparison of the War Memoirs of Robert Graves, Ernst Jünger, and Kande Kamara.”** Vol.69, No.3 (July, 2005), pp.713-735. The memoirs of the British officer and author, Robert Graves (1895-1985), the German soldier and author, Ernst Jünger (1895-1998), and the French Colonial soldier from West Africa, Kande Kamara.

GENDER ISSUES arranged alphabetically by country – ENGLAND / GREAT BRITAIN

Hughes, Matthew, **“Women, Violence, and the Arab Revolt in Palestine, 1936-39.”** Vol.83, No.2 (April, 2019), pp.487-507. Seeks to understand what part Palestinian women played in the Arab Revolt, how British colonial pacification affected the latter, and how British soldiers treated Palestinian women.

Stapleton, Timothy J. **“Sexual Health in Britain’s West African Colonial Army (1898-1960).”** Vol.85, No.3 (July, 2021), pp.619-645. Following an initial neglect due to greater concern over tropical diseases, British officers became obsessed with the threat of venereal diseases, reflecting colonial stereotypes surrounding race and gender.

GENDER ISSUES arranged alphabetically by country - FRANCE

Heuer, Jennifer, **“Soldiers as Victims or Villains? Demobilization, Masculinity, and Family in French Royalist Pamphlets, 1814-1815.”** Vol.80, No.1 (January, 2016), pp.121-144.

GENDER ISSUES arranged alphabetically by country - GERMANY

Willoughby, John, **“The Sexual Behavior of American G.I.s during the Early Years of the Occupation of Germany.”** Vol.62, No.1 (January, 1998), pp.155-174. Investigates the U.S. Army’s search for a form of sexual relations between G.I.’s and German girls that would be acceptable to young German men, young U.S. women, and the mothers and fathers of both lands, a topic that illuminates much about the social and political relations between the American and German people in the immediate aftermath of World War II.

Kuhlman, Erika, **“American Doughboys and German Fräuleins: Sexuality, Patriarchy, and the Privilege in the American-Occupied Rhineland, 1918-23.”** Vol.71, No.4 (October, 2007), pp.1077-1106.

Hagemann, Karen, **“Mobilizing Women for War: The History, Historiography, and Memory of German Women’s War Service in the Two World Wars.”** Vol.75, No.4 (October, 2011), pp.1055-1093. An effort to understand why the large-scale mobilization of women in Germany during the course of both world wars is missing from the historiography.

GENDER ISSUES arranged alphabetically by country – ISRAEL / PALESTINE

Hughes, Matthew, **“Women, Violence, and the Arab Revolt in Palestine, 1936-39.”** Vol.83, No.2 (April, 2019), pp.487-507. Seeks to understand what part Palestinian women played in the Arab Revolt, how British colonial pacification affected the latter, and how British soldiers treated Palestinian women.

GENDER ISSUES arranged alphabetically by country – JAPAN

Walsh, Brian, **“Sexual Violence during the Occupation of Japan.”** Vol.82, No.4 (October, 2018), pp.1199-1230. Insists that the accusations of recent publications of the widespread rape of Japanese women by Allied troops during the occupation (1945-1952) are grossly exaggerated.

Walsh, Brian, **“‘This Degrading Slavery’: MacArthur’s General Headquarters and Prostitution Policy during the Occupation of Japan.”** Vol.85, No.3 (July, 2021), pp.678-712. The Allied occupation government (1945-1952) outlawed the old Imperial system of licensed prostitution because it relied on human trafficking, but did not outlaw prostitution in general based on respect for individual autonomy and an appreciation for the situation in Japan.

GENDER ISSUES arranged alphabetically by country – RUSSIA / SOVIET UNION

Pennington, Reina, **“Offensive Women: Women in Combat in the Red Army in the Second World War.”** Vol.74, No.3 (July, 2010), pp.775-820. Reports on the nature and variety of

women's combat experiences.

GENDER ISSUES arranged alphabetically by country - U.S.A.

Willoughby, John, **"The Sexual Behavior of American G.I.s during the Early Years of the Occupation of Germany."** Vol.62, No.1 (January, 1998), pp.155-174. Investigates the U.S. Army's search for a form of sexual relations between G.I.'s and German girls that would be acceptable to young German men, young U.S. women, and the mothers and fathers of both lands, a topic that illuminates much about the social and political relations between the American and German people in the immediate aftermath of World War II.

Nelson, Anna Kasten, **"Anna M. Rosenberg, an 'Honorary Man'."** Vol.68, No.1 (January, 2004), pp.133-161. Considers how and why Defense Secretary George C. Marshall (1880-1959) bucked political and gender assumptions when he appointed a pro-New Deal, Jewish immigrant woman, Anna M. Rosenberg (1899-1983), as the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower.

Reiss, Matthias, **"Bronzed Bodies behind Barbed Wire: Masculinity and the Treatment of German Prisoners of War in the United States in World War II."** Vol.69, No.2 (April, 2005), pp.475-504. In contrast to other Allied nations, the War Department chose not to parole German P.O.W.s being held in the United States into the custody of employers because of concerns over the potential for women being attracted to these prisoners.

Kuhlman, Erika, **"American Doughboys and German Fräuleins: Sexuality, Patriarchy, and the Privilege in the American-Occupied Rhineland, 1918-23."** Vol.71, No.4 (October, 2007), pp.1077-1106.

Budreau, Lisa M. **"The Politics of Remembrance: The Gold Star Mothers' Pilgrimage and America's Fading Memory of the Great War."** Vol.72, No.2 (April, 2008), pp.371-411. Collectively, the Gold Star Mothers offer a multidimensional model of the ethnic, cultural, economic, and religious diversity prevalent in the United States during the interwar years.

Cashin, Joan, **"Bibliographic Essay: American Women and the American Civil War."** Vol.81, No.1 (January, 2017), pp.199-204.

Daddis, Gregory A. **"Historiographical Essay: Mansplaining Vietnam: Male Veterans and America's Popular Image of the Vietnam War."** Vol.82, No.1 (January, 2018), pp.181-207. Explores how various media, such as memoirs, have excluded the story of the roughly 7,500 U.S. women who served in the Vietnam War.

Walsh, Brian, **"Sexual Violence during the Occupation of Japan."** Vol.82, No.4 (October, 2018), pp.1199-1230. Insists that the accusations of recent publications of the widespread rape of Japanese women by Allied troops during the occupation (1945-1952) are grossly exaggerated.

Krueger, David, **“The Red Cross, the Daughters of the American Revolution, and the Origins of the Army Nurse Corps in the Spanish-American War.”** Vol.83, No.2 (April, 2019), pp.409-434. Determines that the work of contract nurses, promoted by the Daughters of the American Revolution Hospital Corps and the Red Cross, demonstrated the capability and necessity of female nurses in the military, the Army chose to establish a professional nurse corps rather than rely on volunteers.

Lawlor, Ruth, **“Bibliographic Essay: Contested Crimes: Race, Gender, and Nation in Histories of GI Sexual Violence, World War II.”** Vol.84, No.2 (April, 2020), pp.541-569.

Walsh, Brian, **“‘This Degrading Slavery’: MacArthur’s General Headquarters and Prostitution Policy during the Occupation of Japan.”** Vol.85, No.3 (July, 2021), pp.678-712. The Allied occupation government (1945-1952) outlawed the old Imperial system of licensed prostitution because it relied on human trafficking, but did not outlaw prostitution in general based on respect for individual autonomy and an appreciation for the situation in Japan.

GENSOUL, MARCEL-BRUNO (1880-1973)

Lasterle, Philippe, **“Could Admiral Gensoul have Averted the Tragedy of Mers el-Kébir?”** Vol.67, No.3 (July, 2003), pp.835-844. Admiral Marcel-Bruno Gensoul (1880-1973) commanded the French fleet at Mers el-Kébir, Algeria, when it was bombarded by a British force commanded by Admiral James Somerville (1882-1949) on 3 July, 1940.

GERMANY: MEDIEVAL PERIOD (476-1480)

Bachrach, David S. **“The Military Organization of Ottonian Germany, c.900-1018: The Views of Bishop Thietmar of Merseburg.”** Vol.72, No.4 (October, 2008), pp.1061-1088.

Bachrach, David S. **“Early Ottonian Warfare: The Perspective from Corvey.”** Vol.75, No.2 (April, 2011), pp.393-409. A critical reassessment of the depiction of warfare in Widukind of Corvey’s *Res gestae Saxonicae*, which concludes that, rather than small bands of heavily armed, mounted warriors, King Henry I (r.919-936) and Emperor Otto (r.936-973) deployed large armies for placing fortresses under siege.

Bachrach, David S. **“Restructuring the Eastern Frontier: Henry I of Germany, 924-936.”** Vol.78, No.1 (January, 2014), pp.9-35. Analyzes the establishment of a defense in depth against Magyar raiders, relying on garrisoned fortifications.

Bachrach, Bernard S. and Bachrach, David S. **“Bruno of Mersburg Saxon War: A Study in**

Eleventh-Century German Military History.” Vol.81, No.2 (April, 2017), pp.341-367. Bruno of Mersburg’s account of the civil wars fought by King Henry IV (1056-1106) provides valuable information on the nature and conduct of warfare in north-central Europe during this period.

GERMANY: EARLY MODERN PERIOD (1480-1789)

Croxton, Derek, “**‘The Prosperity of Arms is Never Continual’: Military Intelligence, Surprise, and Diplomacy in 1640s Germany.**” Vol.64, No.4 (October, 2000), pp.981-1003.

Tzoref-Ashkenazi, Chen, “**German Military Participation in Early Modern European Colonialism.**” Vol.80, No.3 (July, 2016), pp.671-695. Brings to light the employment of German mercenaries in the colonial ventures of different European kingdoms.

GERMANY: WAR OF THE AUSTRIAN SUCCESSION (1740-48)

Browning, Reed, “**Review Essay: New Views on the Silesian Wars.**” Vol.69, No.2 (April, 2005), pp.521-534. Concerning the series of conflicts, 1740-42, 1744-45, and 1756-63, fought between Austria and the Kingdom of Prussia, led by Frederick the Great (1712-1786).

GERMANY: U.S. REVOLUTIONARY WAR (1775-83)

Krebs, Daniel, “**Useful Enemies: The Treatment of German Prisoners of War during the American War of Independence.**” Vol.77, No.1 (January, 2013), pp.9-39. Narrates how, to boost morale, revolutionaries staged elaborate rituals with P.O.W.s, that local citizens hired captive soldiers as laborers, and that, after the victory at Yorktown, 1781, Congress and the Continental Army allowed P.O.W.s to go free after a cash payments and even sold some into indentured servitude.

GERMANY: FRENCH REVOLUTIONARY AND NAPOLEONIC WARS (1792-1815)

Leggiere, Michael V. “**From Berlin to Leipzig: Napoleon’s Gamble in North Germany, 1813.**” Vol.67, No.1 (January, 2003), pp.39-48. Claims that the Allies’ defense of Berlin defeated Napoleon’s strategy. Significantly contributing to his expulsion from Germany.

Paret, Peter, “**Clausewitz: ‘Half against my will, I have become a Professor.’**” Vol.75, No.2 (April, 2011), pp.591-601. Carl von Clausewitz’ (1780-1831) lectures on ‘Little War’ during the Prussian reform era.

Hantraye, Jacques, “**The Silence of the Woods: The 1815 Murder of a Prussian Soldier in Western France.**” Vol.80, No.1 (January, 2016), pp.57-76. Focuses on the murder of a Prussian soldier on 22 July, 1815, outside of the village of Unverre, located roughly ninety miles southwest of Paris, as a means of exploring the interactions between the forces of

occupation and the civilian population of postwar France.

GERMANY: 19th CENTURY

Echevarria, Antulio, “**General Staff Historian Hugo Freiherr von Freytag-Loringhoven and the Dialectics of German Military Thought.**” Vol.60, No.3 (July, 1996), pp.471-494. Von Freytag-Loringhoven (1855-1924) was arguably the most prolific of Imperial Germany’s military authors and, notably, a historian of the Great General Staff, whose opposition to change served as an antithesis that forced his critics to justify and further develop their ideas.

Showalter, Dennis, “**From Deterrence to Doomsday Machine: The German Way of War, 1890-1914.**” Vol.64, No.3 (July, 2000), pp.679-710. Proposes that between 1890 and 1914 the German Army developed a siege mentality, the only solution for which was believed to be the refinement of operational capabilities, pursued at the expense of policy and strategy.

DiNardo, Richard L. “**Southern by the Grace of God but Prussian by Common Sense: James Longstreet and the Exercise of Command in the U.S. Civil War.**” Vol.66, No.4 (October, 2002), pp.1011-1032. Compares the manner in which General James Longstreet (1821-1904) organized and utilized his staff with the staff practices developed by the Prussian Army under Helmuth von Moltke the Elder (1800-1891).

Jackman, Steven D. “**Shoulder to Shoulder: Close Control and ‘Old Prussian Drill’ in German Offensive Infantry Tactics, 1871-1914.**” Vol.68, No.1 (January, 2004), pp.73-104.

Larson, Robert H. “**Max Jähns and the Writing of Military History in Imperial Germany.**” Vol.72, No.2 (April, 2008), pp.345-370. A career Prussian officer who taught military history at the elite War Academy for fourteen years and was a prolific author, Max Jähns’ (1837-1900) studies focused on the place of military institutions and practices in the context of general history.

Keller, Christian B. “**Flying Dutchmen and Drunken Irishmen: The Myths and Realities of Ethnic Civil War Soldiers.**” Vol.73, No.1 (January, 2009), pp.117-145. Contrasts the myths, misconceptions, and stereotypes developed by Anglo-Americans regarding German- and Irish-American soldiers fighting in the United States Civil War with the historical truth about ethnic participation in the conflict.

Paret, Peter, “**Clausewitz and Schlieffen as Interpreters of Frederick the Great: Three Phases in the History of Grand Strategy.**” Vol.76, No.3 (July, 2012), pp.837-845. Compares how Carl von Clausewitz (1780-1831) and Count Alfred von Schlieffen (1833-1913) interpreted Frederick the Great’s generalship, illustrating the function of historical study in the development of Clausewitz’s theories.

Otte, T.G. “**From *Can-Can Diabolique* to *Sitzkrieg*: The International China Expeditionary**

Force, 1900-1901.” Vol.77, No.4 (October, 2013), pp.1277-1302. Analyzes a neglected example of coalition warfare.

GERMANY: 20th CENTURY

Corum, James S. **“The *Luftwaffe*’s Army Support Doctrine, 1918-1941.”** Vol.59, No.1 (January, 1995), pp.53-76. Covers close air support doctrine and training, development and implementation, from the Spanish Civil War to Operation Barbarossa.

Echevarria, Antulio, **“General Staff Historian Hugo Freiherr von Freytag-Loringhoven and the Dialectics of German Military Thought.”** Vol.60, No.3 (July, 1996), pp.471-494. Von Freytag-Loringhoven (1855-1924) was arguably the most prolific of Imperial Germany’s military authors and, notably, a historian of the Great General Staff, whose opposition to change served as an antithesis that forced his critics to justify and further develop their ideas.

Epkenhans, Michael, **“Krupp and the Imperial German Navy, 1898-1914: A Reassessment.”** Vol.64, No.2 (April, 2000), pp.335-369.

Showalter, Dennis, **“From Deterrence to Doomsday Machine: The German Way of War, 1890-1914.”** Vol.64, No.3 (July, 2000), pp.679-710. Proposes that between 1890 and 1914 the German Army developed a siege mentality, the only solution for which was believed to be the refinement of operational capabilities, pursued at the expense of policy and strategy.

Jackman, Steven D. **“Shoulder to Shoulder: Close Control and ‘Old Prussian Drill’ in German Offensive Infantry Tactics, 1871-1914.”** Vol.68, No.1 (January, 2004), pp.73-104.

Bird, Keith, **“Review Essay: The Tirpitz Legacy: The Political Ideology of German Sea Power.”** Vol.69, No.3 (July, 2005), pp.821-825.

Peifer, Douglas C. **“The Past in the Present: Passion, Politics, and the Historical Profession in the German and British Pardon Campaigns.”** Vol.71, No.4 (October, 2007), pp.1107-1132. Long a peripheral matter, by the 1990s military justice during the World Wars had vaulted from the field of grassroots activism to the legislative, executive, and judicial arenas of government in Germany and Great Britain, resulting in official pardons for soldiers who had been court martialed in these conflicts.

Grimes, Shawn, **“The Baltic and Admiralty War Planning, 1906-1907.”** Vol.74, No.2 (April, 2010), pp.407-437. Reassessment of the Ballard Committee’s 1907 War Plans against Germany in the context of Norway’s gaining independence in 1905.

Hagemann, Karen, **“Mobilizing Women for War: The History, Historiography, and Memory of German Women’s War Service in the Two World Wars.”** Vol.75, No.4 (October, 2011),

pp.1055-1093. An effort to understand why the large-scale mobilization of women in Germany during the course of both world wars is missing from the historiography.

GERMANY: WORLD WAR I (1914-18)

Overlack, Peter, **“The Force of Circumstances: Graf Spee’s Options for the East Asian Cruiser Squadron in 1914.”** Vol.60, No.4 (October, 1996), pp.657-682. Investigates how the denial of coaling stations by both Japan’s decision to join the Entente Powers and the actions of Australia and New Zealand severely constricted the choices available to Vice-Admiral Maximilian Reichsgraf von Spee (1861-1914).

Westermann, Edward B. **“Fighting for the Heavens from the Ground: German Ground-Based Air Defenses in the Great War, 1914-1918.”** Vol.65, No.3 (July, 2001), pp.641-669.

Herwig, Holger H. **“Germany and the ‘Short War’ Illusion: Toward a New Interpretation?”** Vol.66, No.3 (July, 2002), pp.681-693. A reassessment based on newly accessed documents from the *Reichsarchiv* in the former East Germany suggest that Imperial Germany’s military leaders recognized that a conflict that they initiated might last up to two or more years.

Holmes, Terence M. **“ ‘One Throw of the Gambler’s Dice’: A Comment on Holger Herwig’s View of the Schlieffen Plan.”** Vol.67, No.2 (April, 2003), pp.513-516.

Steffen, Dirk, **“The Holtzendorff Memorandum of 22 December, 1916, and Germany’s Declaration of Unrestricted U-Boat Warfare.”** Vol.68, No.1 (January, 2004), pp.215-224. Examines how the Chief of the Imperial German Navy’s Admiralty Staff, Henning von Holtzendorff (1853-1919), successfully argued that Germany could risk provoking the United States entering the war in return for starving Great Britain into submission.

Lunn, Joe, **“Male Identity and Martial Codes of Honor: A Comparison of the War Memoirs of Robert Graves, Ernst Jünger, and Kande Kamara.”** Vol.69, No.3 (July, 2005), pp.713-735. The memoirs of the British officer and author, Robert Graves (1895-1985), the German soldier and author, Ernst Jünger (1895-1998), and the French Colonial soldier from West Africa, Kande Kamara.

McRandle, James and Quirk, James, **“The Blood Test Revisited: A New Look at German Casualty Counts in World War I.”** Vol.70, No.3 (July, 2006), pp.667-701. Tests Winston Churchill’s (1874-1965) claim that the Allies generally suffered higher casualties in battle on the Western Front than their German opponents by examining the German Medical Corps’ official history.

McCall, Jack H., Jr. **“ ‘Amazingly Indiscreet’: The Plot to Capture Wilhelm II.”** Vol.73, No.2 (April, 2009), pp.449-469. Relates how former U.S. Senator, Col. Luke Lea (1879-1945), planned to kidnap the deposed Kaiser from his exile in the Netherlands and bring him to

the Paris Peace Conference to be tried as a war criminal.

Winkler, Jonathan Reed, **“Information Warfare in World War I.”** Vol.73, No.3 (July, 2009), pp.845-867. Presents both the British success in destroying the pre-war German system and the simultaneous German campaign against Allied communications, all within the broader economic, political, intelligence, and military context of modern conflict.

Foley, Robert T. **“Learning War’s Lessons: The German Army and the Battle of the Somme 1916.”** Vol.75, No.2 (April, 2011), pp.471-504. Over the course of the Battle of the Somme, the Germans were forced by superior Anglo-French weaponry and tactics to improvise a new defensive tactical doctrine, the evolution of which is examined through the study of German ‘lessons-learned’ reports which display intellectual flexibility.

DiNardo, Richard L. **“The Limits of Technology: The Invasion of Serbia, 1915.”** Vol.79, No.4 (October, 2015), pp.981-995. By focusing on the different forms of technology employed by the invading forces of the Central Powers, the author explains how they benefitted the invaders, but also had their limitations.

Wiens, Gavin, **“Guardians and Go-betweens: Germany’s Military Plenipotentiaries during the First World War.”** Vol.86, No.2 (April, 2022), pp.344-371. Imperial German federalism was present in the German General Headquarters in the form of military plenipotentiaries from Bavaria, Saxony, and Württemberg who had some degree of responsibility over the units from these former kingdoms.

GERMANY: INTERWAR PERIOD (1919-39)

Hancock, Eleanor, **“Ernst Rohm and the Experience of World War I.”** Vol.60, No.1 (January, 1996), pp.39-60. Inspects the role of the Great War service in the political rhetoric of the Chief of Staff of the National Socialist Sturmabteilung, including Rohm’s version of his war experiences as recounted in his 1928 autobiography.

Corum, James S. **“The Spanish Civil War: Lessons Learned and not Learned by the Great Powers.”** Vol.62, No.2 (April, 1998), pp.313-334. Considers what the British, French, German, Italian, Soviet, and United States armed forces learned or failed to learn from the study of the air war in Spain within the context of how armed forces undergo reform.

Orange, Vincent, **“The German Air Force is Already ‘The Most Powerful in Europe’: Two Royal Air Force Officers Report on a Visit to Germany, 6-15 October, 1936.”** Vol.70, No.4 (October, 2006), pp.1011-1028. Presents the contents of an unpublished report by two R.A.F. officers who toured Germany to investigate the *Luftwaffe*, where they were well received and given access to both the latest aircraft and high-ranking air force personnel.

Kuhlman, Erika, "American Doughboys and German Fräuleins: Sexuality, Patriarchy, and the Privilege in the American-Occupied Rhineland, 1918-23." Vol.71, No.4 (October, 2007), pp.1077-1106.

GERMANY: WORLD WAR II (1939-45)

Foregger, Richard, "Two Sketch Maps of the Auschwitz-Birkenau Extermination Camps." Vol.59, No.4 (October, 1995), pp.687-696. Asks whether or not the sketch maps in question would have provided the Allies with adequate information for the bombing of gas chambers.

Weinberg, Gerhard L. "Historiographical Essay: World War II Scholarship, now and in the Future." Vol.61, No.2 (April, 1997), pp.335-345. Includes issues surrounding the use of the memoirs of German military leaders, the revelations of Field Marshal Lord Alanbrooke's (1883-1963) unabridged diary, and the declassification of materials pertaining to Magic and Ultra.

Weinberg, Gerhard L. "Unexplored Questions about the German Military during World War II." Vol.62, No.2 (April, 1998), pp.371-380. Touches upon the 1934 oath to Hitler, reasons why high-ranking German commanders felt the need to justify to their troops their orders to slaughter Jewish civilians, the role of high-ranking German commanders in approving the execution of tens-of-thousands of their own troops, *Luftwaffe* field divisions, the creation of new airborne divisions after the use of paratroopers had been all but abandoned, and the organizing of *Kriegsmarine* and *Luftwaffe* suicide units.

Geller, Jay Howard, "The Role of Military Administration in German-Occupied Belgium, 1940-1944." Vol.63, No.1 (January, 1999), pp.99-125. Attempts to determine how the German Military Administration viewed its role in occupying and governing the Kingdom of Belgium.

Yelton, David K. "*Ein Volk Steht Auf: The German Volkssturm and Nazi Strategy, 1944-45.*" Vol.64, No.4 (October, 2000), pp.1061-1083. Explains that the *Volkssturm*, though based on flawed assumptions, was part of a coherent strategy that was intended to simultaneously fanaticize the civilian population and maximize Allied casualties beyond what their governments were willing to bare.

Hull, Mark M. "The Irish Interlude: German Intelligence in Ireland, 1939-1943." Vol.66, No.3 (July, 2002), pp.695-717.

Moore, Bob, "Unwanted Guests in Troubled Times: German Prisoners of War in the Union of South Africa, 1942-1943." Vol.70, No.1 (January, 2006), pp.63-90. Contrasts the potential threats to domestic security in South Africa during a time of internal dissention of holding German P.O.W.s with the less troublesome experience with Italian prisoners.

Schmider, Klaus, **“Review Essay: The Last of the First: Veterans of the *Jagdwaaffe* Tell Their Story.”** Vol.73, No.1 (January, 2009), pp.231-249. Covers five memoirs of *Luftwaaffe* fighter pilots.

Mann, Christopher, **“Combined Operations, the Commandos, and Norway, 1941-1944.”** Vol.73, No.2 (April, 2009), pp.471-495. Displays the broader strategic consequences of a series of British raids on the coast of Norway, including valuable experience in joint operations and the commitment of German forces for the defense of Norway.

Goldstein, Cora Sol, **“A Comparative Analysis of Cultural Control: The German Military Occupation of France (1940-1942) and the American Military Occupation of Germany (1945-1949).”** Vol.80, No.4 (October, 2016), pp.1083-1116. Although their respective agendas were inspired by opposite ideologies, the author proposes that the mechanisms of control over information by both occupiers shared significant similarities.

Yelton, David K. **“Older German Officers and National Socialist Activism: Evidence from the German *Volksturm*.”** Vol.83, No.2 (April, 2019), pp.455-485. Addresses the question of to what degree older, lower-level German officers serving in the *Volksturm* embraced National Socialist ideology.

GERMANY: WORLD WAR II (1939-45) – EUROPEAN CAMPAIGNS (1939-40)

Gunsburg, Jeffrey A. **“The Battle of Gembloux, 14-15 May 1940: The ‘Blitzkrieg’ Checked.”** Vol.64, No.1 (January, 2000), pp.97-140. Uses an examination of the effectiveness of the French forces holding a defensive position at the Belgium town of Gembloux as a test case for French doctrine and performance.

GERMANY: WORLD WAR II (1939-45) – THE NAVAL WAR

Jones, Mark C. **“Give Credit where Credit is Due: The Dutch Role in the Development and Deployment of the Submarine Schnorkel.”** Vol.69, No.4 (October, 2005), pp.987-1012.

Mulligan, Timothy P. **“Ship-of-the-Line or Atlantic Raider? Battleship *Bismarck* between Design Limitations and Naval Strategy.”** Vol.69, No.4 (October, 2005), pp.1013-1044.

Wilson, Evan and Schapira, Ruth, **“German Perspectives on the U-Boat War, 1939-1941.”** Vol.85, No.2 (April, 2021), pp.369-398. Probes the conflict between what the Germans’ needed to secure a quick, decisive result, and the fact that the U-Boat was designed for a war of attrition, resulting in a pessimistic outlook on the part of Germany’s Naval leaders.

GERMANY: WORLD WAR II (1939-45) – THE BATTLE OF BRITAIN

Fagan, Brennen; Horwood, Ian; MacKay, Niall; Price, Christopher; Richards, Ed, and Wood,

A. Jamie, **“Bootstrapping the Battle of Britain.”** Vol.84, No.1 (January, 2020), pp.151-186. Using the statistical technique of weighted bootstrapping to provide a quantified assessment of the likelihood of German achievement of air superiority.

GERMANY: WORLD WAR II (1939-45) –

ALLIED STRATEGIC BOMBING OFFENSIVE, EUROPE

Anon. **“The Air War Over Germany: Claims and Counter-claims.”** Vol.73, No.3 (July, 2009), pp.925-932.

GERMANY: WORLD WAR II (1939-45) –

MEDITERRANEAN AND NORTH AFRICAN THEATERS (1941-43)

Scianna, Bastian Matteo, **“Rommel Almighty? Italian Assessment of the ‘Desert Fox’ during and after the Second World War.”** Vol.82, No.1 (January, 2018), pp.125-145. The Italian view based on new primary material, including the eavesdropping by British intelligence on Italian officers held as P.O.W.s in both Egypt and Britain.

Biddiscombe, Perry, **“The Mufti’s Men: Haj Amin-al-Husayni and S.S. Parachute Expeditions to Palestine and Iraq, 1944-1945.”** Vol.82, No.3 (July, 2018), pp.783-815.

GERMANY: WORLD WAR II (1939-45) – THE BALKANS THEATER

Stockings, Craig and Hancock, Eleanor, **“Reconsidering the *Luftwaffe* in Greece, 1941.”** Vol.76, No.3 (July, 2012), pp.747-773. Despite its complete dominance of the Greek skies, the terror it inspired, and its almost continual operations against Allied positions, the author challenges the assumption that the *Luftwaffe* had a decisive impact on the campaign.

Kranjc, Gregor, **“Fight or Flight: Desertion, Defection, and Draft-Dodging in Occupied Slovenia, 1941-1945.”** Vol.81, No.1 (January, 2017), pp.133-162. Questions the motives for Slovenes to avoid or escape from military service for three occupying powers, Germany, Hungary, and Italy, and these powers efforts to combat draft-dodging, desertion, and defection.

Trifković, Gaj, **“The Yugoslav Partisans’ Lost Victories: Operations in Montenegro and Bosnia-Herzegovina, 1944-1945.”** Vol.82, No.1 (January, 2018), pp.95-124. Seeks to understand why the Germans were able to extricate their XXI Mountain Corps from two consecutive attempts at encirclement during October 1944 through April 1945.

GERMANY: WORLD WAR II (1939-45) – THE EASTERN FRONT

Fritz, Stephen G. **“ ‘We are Trying...to Change the Face of the World’ – Ideology and**

Motivation in the Wehrmacht on the Eastern Front: The View from Below.” Vol.60, No.4 (October, 1996), pp.683-710. Appraises the influence of ‘positive’ National Socialist ideological beliefs on the average *Landser*’s motives to engage in combat.

Stolfi, Russell H.S. **“A Critique of Pure Success: Inchon Revisited, Revised, and Contrasted.”** Vol.68, No.2 (April, 2004), pp.505-525. Critiques the performance of the ground forces that were successfully landed at Inchon, proposing that a comparative example of German operations in the Baltic in 1941 suggests greater boldness would have rewarded U.S. forces.

Glantz, David M. **“Review Essay: Stalingrad Revisited.”** Vol.72, No.3 (July, 2008), pp.907-910.

Toprani, Anand, **“The First War for Oil: The Caucasus, German Strategy, and the Turning Point of the War on the Eastern Front, 1942.”** Vol.80, No.3 (July, 2016), pp.815-854.

Lak, Martijn, **“Review Essay: The Death Ride of the Panzers? Recent Historiography on the Battle of Kursk.”** Vol.82, No.3 (July, 2018), pp.909-919.

Wildermuth, David W. **“ ‘I am fully aware of my guilt...’: Insights from a Soviet Military Tribunal’s Investigation of the German Army’s 35th Division, 1946-47.”** Vol.83, No.4 (October, 2019), pp.1189-1212. Weighing the credibility of both perpetrator and eyewitness statements from Soviet tribunals for information on the actions of officers and soldiers of the German 35th Division during anti-partisan operations in April, 1944.

López, Miguel A. **“The Survival of *Auftragstaktik* during the Soviet Counterattack in the Battle for Moscow, December 1941 to January 1942.”** Vol.84, No.1 (January, 2020), pp.187-212. Claims that Adolf Hitler’s 16 December, 1941, *Haltbefehl* (Halt Order) did not mark the end of the Prussian-German principle of *Auftragstaktik*, that in the face of the Soviet counterattacks German field commanders did retain their command independence and conducted withdrawals regardless of the *Haltbefehl*.

Rutherford, Jeff, **“Germany’s Total War: Combat and Occupation around the Kursk Salient, 1943.”** Vol.85, No.4 (October, 2021), pp.954-979. Examines the changing approach of three German divisions to extract resources from the population living near the frontlines.

GERMANY: WORLD WAR II (1939-45) – NORTHWEST EUROPE THEATER (1944-45)

Biddle, Tami Davis, **“On the Crest of Fear: V-Weapons, the Battle of the Bulge, and the Last Stages of World War II in Europe.”** Vol.83, No.1 (January, 2019), pp.157-194. Puts forward a causal relationship between Germany’s introduction of the use of the ‘V’ weapons, the impact of Germany’s Ardennes offensive on the Allied High Command, the Allied manpower crisis, and the acceleration of the Strategic Bombing Campaign during the last months of the war.

Lahey, R.J. **“Hitler’s ‘Intuition’, *Luftwaffe* Photoreconnaissance, and the Reinforcement of Normandy.”** Vol.86, No.1 (January, 2022), pp.77-109. Contends that it was *Luftwaffe* photoreconnaissance, rather than mere intuition, that led Hitler to significantly reinforce the forces tasked with defending the Normandy beaches.

GERMANY: WORLD WAR II (1939-45) – THE HOLOCAUST

Foregger, Richard, **“Two Sketch Maps of the Auschwitz-Birkenau Extermination Camps.”** Vol.59, No.4 (October, 1995), pp.687-696. Asks whether or not the sketch maps in question would have provided the Allies with adequate information for the bombing of gas chambers.

Weinberg, Gerhard L. **“Unexplored Questions about the German Military during World War II.”** Vol.62, No.2 (April, 1998), pp.371-380. Touches upon the 1934 oath to Hitler, reasons why high-ranking German commanders felt the need to justify to their troops their orders to slaughter Jewish civilians, the role of high-ranking German commanders in approving the execution of tens-of-thousands of their own troops, *Luftwaffe* field divisions, the creation of new airborne divisions after the use of paratroopers had been all but abandoned, and the organizing of *Kreigsmarine* and *Luftwaffe* suicide units.

Seipp, Adam R. **“Buchenwald Stories: Testimony, Military History, and the American Encounter with the Holocaust.”** Vol.79, No.3 (July, 2015), pp.721-744. Demonstrates how the testimonies of American servicemen have evolved in tandem with changes in public perceptions of the war and the Holocaust.

GERMANY: COLD WAR (1945-1991)

Willoughby, John, **“The Sexual Behavior of American G.I.s during the Early Years of the Occupation of Germany.”** Vol.62, No.1 (January, 1998), pp.155-174. Investigates the U.S. Army’s search for a form of sexual relations between G.I.’s and German girls that would be acceptable to young German men, young U.S. women, and the mothers and fathers of both lands, a topic that illuminates much about the social and political relations between the American and German people in the immediate aftermath of World War II.

Peifer, Douglas, **“Commemoration of Mutiny, Rebellion, and Resistance in Postwar Germany: Public memory, History, and the Formation of ‘Memory Beacons’.”** Vol.65, No.4 (October, 2001), pp.1013-1052. Analyzes three ‘memory beacons’ that have been cultivated in German public and social memory: the naval mutinies of 1917-18, the 20th July, 1944, plot, and *Wehrmacht* deserters during World War II.

Snyder, David R. **“Arming the *Bundesmarine*: The United States and the Build-Up of the German Federal Navy, 1950-1960.”** Vol.66, No.2 (April, 2002), pp.477-500.

Priest, Andrew, “**‘In Common Cause’: The N.A.T.O. Multilateral Force and the Mixed-Manning Demonstration on the U.S.S. *Claude V. Ricketts*, 1964-1965.**” Vol.69, No.3 (July, 2005), pp.759-789. The crew of the destroyer (DDG-5) U.S.S. *Claude V. Ricketts* included U.S., British, Dutch, Greek, Italian, Turkish, and West German officers and men.

Trauschweizer, Ingo Wolfgang, “**Learning with an Ally: The U.S. Army and the Bundeswehr in the Cold War.**” Vol.72, No.2 (April, 2008), pp.477-508. Discusses four areas of German-U.S. defense cooperation, including aid for West German rearmament, the reorganization of German and U.S. combat formations in the post-Korean War period, the failure of a shared attempt at tank design, and the impact of German tactical and operational concepts on post-Vietnam U.S. Army doctrine.

Lockenour, Jay, “**Black and White Memories of War: Victimization and Violence in West German War Films of the 1950s.**” Vol.76, No.1 (January, 2012), pp.159-191. Contends that war films helped to construct a specifically West German identity as helpless victims or heroic nonconformists rather than historical actors and compliant, or even eager, collaborators by creating myths and memories important to the legitimacy of the new Federal Republic.

Boghardt, Thomas, “**Dirty Work? The Use of Nazi Informants by U.S. Army Intelligence in Postwar Europe.**” Vol.79, No.2 (April, 2015), pp.387-422. Probes ethical issues and utility of the Allied enlistment of war criminals and suspected war criminals for collecting information on Soviet and Communist Party activities in Europe.

Goldstein, Cora Sol, “**A Comparative Analysis of Cultural Control: The German Military Occupation of France (1940-1942) and the American Military Occupation of Germany (1945-1949).**” Vol.80, No.4 (October, 2016), pp.1083-1116. Although their respective agendas were inspired by opposite ideologies, the author proposes that the mechanisms of control over information by both occupiers shared significant similarities.

GERNSBACK, HUGO (1884-1967)

Krome, Frederic, “**‘Will the Germans Bombard New York?’: Hugo Gernsback and the Future War Tale.**” Vol.86, No.1 (January, 2022), pp.54-76. Appraises the role of ‘Future War’ fiction, particularly works produced by Hugo Gernsback (1884-1967), in engaging the American public’s interest in military affairs in the early 20th century.

Stapleton, Timothy J. **“Sexual Health in Britain’s West African Colonial Army (1898-1960).”**

Vol.85, No.3 (July, 2021), pp.619-645. Following an initial neglect due to greater concern over tropical diseases, British officers became obsessed with the threat of venereal diseases, reflecting colonial stereotypes surrounding race and gender.

GHORMLEY, ROBERT L. (1883-1958)

Reardon, Jeff T. **“Reevaluating Ghormley and Halsey at Guadalcanal.”** Vol.86, No.4 (October, 2022), pp.915-948. Presents a reassessment of Vice Admiral Robert L. Ghormley (1883-1958) service as commander in chief of the South Pacific Area during 1942.

GOETHALS, GEORGE W. (1858-1928)

McGovern, Rory M. **“The School of Experience: George W. Goethals and the U.S. Army, 1867-1907.”** Vol.81, No.2 (April, 2017), pp.395-424. Observes George W. Goethals (1858-1928) pre-Panama Canal / World War I career as an example of the career path of officers within the Gilded Age Army.

GRANT, ULYSSES S. (1822-85)

Rafuse, Ethan S. **“Historiographical Essays: Still a Mystery? General Grant and the Histories, 1981-2006.”** Vol.71, No.3 (July, 2007), pp.849-874. Traces the evolution of the assessment of General Ulysses S. Grant (1822-1885), from William S. McFeely’s 1981 Pulitzer Prize-winning study to the present day.

Kaplan, Mike, **“Review Essay: Grant’s Drinking... The Beast that will not Die.”** Vol.79, No.4 (October, 2015), pp.1109-1119.

Ferraro, William M. **“Old and New Views of Ulysses S. Grant: The Soldier and the Man.”** Vol.83, No.1 (January, 2019), pp.195-212.

GREECE

See Also: ANCIENT PERIOD: GREEK CIVILIZATION

Priest, Andrew, “**‘In Common Cause’: The N.A.T.O. Multilateral Force and the Mixed-Manning Demonstration on the U.S.S. *Claude V. Ricketts*, 1964-1965.**” Vol.69, No.3 (July, 2005), pp.759-789. The crew of the destroyer (DDG-5) U.S.S. *Claude V. Ricketts*

included U.S., British, Dutch, Greek, Italian, Turkish, and West German officers and men.

Jones, Mark C. **“Not Just along for the Ride: The Role of Royal Navy Liaison Personnel in Multinational Naval Operations during World War II.”** Vol.76, No.1 (January, 2012), pp.127-158. The liaison system as a means of cooperation with European navies in exile from France, Greece, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, and Yugoslavia.

Ewer, Peter, **“The British Campaign in Greece 1941: Assumptions about the Operational Art and Their Influence on Strategy.”** Vol.76, No.3 (July, 2012), pp.727-745. Inquires into the British decision to dispatch an expeditionary force to Greece and what it tells us about contemporary British Army doctrine.

Jones, Mark C. **“Friend and Advisor to the Allied Navies: The Royal Navy’s Principal Liaison Officer and Multinational Naval Operations in World War II.”** Vol.77, No.3 (July, 2013), pp.991-1023. The work of Principal Liaison Officer, Allied Navies (P.N.L.O.) with the Belgian, Dutch, French, Greek, Norwegian, Polish, and Yugoslav navies in exile.

Goulter, Christine J.M. **“The Greek Civil War: A National Army’s Counter-Insurgency Triumph.”** Vol.78, No.3 (July, 2014), pp.1017-1055. Challenges the assumption that victory resulted from Anglo-American training and equipment, rather than the Greek National Army’s successful development of an effective counter-insurgency strategy.

Hammond, Richard, **“Fighting under a Different Flag: Multinational Naval Cooperation and Submarine Warfare in the Mediterranean, 1940-1944.”** Vol.80, No.2 (April, 2016), pp.447-476. In contrast to their experience in the British home theatre, the submarines in the Mediterranean operated by the exiled governments of the Free French, Greece, the Netherlands, Poland, and Yugoslavia, along with those of Italy beginning in 1943, found it difficult to cooperate with the Royal Navy, as well as each other.

Delis, Panagiotis, **“The Treatment of Prisoners of War Captured by the Greek Army during the Balkans Wars of 1912-13.”** Vol.82, No.4 (October, 2018), pp.1123-1147. Due to a combination of the inability of the Greeks to pay for the care of Bulgarian and Ottoman P.O.W.s and negative stereotypes held about the same, the laws concerning the treatment of prisoners established by international conventions in 1899 and 1907 were not honored by the Greek Army.

Stubbs, David, **“Reappraising the Royal Air Force Contribution to the Defense of Crete, 1941.”** Vol.84, No.2 (April, 2020), pp.459-486. Points out that the failure of the British and Commonwealth ground troops to retain control over the airfields was not the primary reason for defeat, given that the fighter squadrons necessary for the defense of the island were not scheduled to arrive in the Mediterranean Sea in time to participate in the battle, a fact known to decision makers in London.

GREY, JEFFREY (1959-2016)

Dennis, Peter, “**Historiographical Note: The Books that Influenced Jeff Grey.**” Vol.81, No.4 (October, 2017), pp.1109-1112. Professor Jeffrey Grey (1959-2016, Australia’s most prominent military historian and the first President of the Society for Military History from outside of the United States.

GROVES, LESLIE R. (1896-1970)

Bernstein, Barton J. “**Reconsidering the ‘Atomic General’: Leslie R. Groves.**” Vol.67, No.3 (July, 2003), pp.883-920. A critical review of the influential published works, the substantial archival sources, and an attempt to separate fact from fiction regarding specific controversial issues.

GRUNERT, GEORGE (1881-1971)

Meixsel, Richard B. “**Major General George Grunert, WPO-3, and the Philippine Army, 1940-1941.**” Vol.59, No.2 (April, 1995), pp.303-324. Challenges the conventional account of the initial abandonment of War Plan Orange – 3 by the Commanding General of the Philippine Department, General Grunert (1881-1971), and Philippine Army Field Marshal, Douglas MacArthur (1880-1964).

GUATEMALA

Moulton, Aaron Coy, “**The Dominican Dictator’s Funds and Guns in Costa Rica’s Wars of 1948.**” Vol.85, No.3 (July, 2021), pp.713-733. Whereas past studies of the conflicts in Costa Rica have focused on the involvement of Anastasio Somoza García of Nicaragua (1896-1956) and Juan José Arévalo of Guatemala (1904-1990), the author demonstrates that Costa Ricans sought to obtain arms from the Dominican Dictator Rafael Trujillo (1891-1961).

GUINEA-BISSAU

Dhada, Mustafah, “**The Liberation War in Guinea-Bissau Reconsidered.**” Vol.62, No.3 (July, 1998), pp.571-593. Disputes the image of a straightforward march to victory for the *Partido Africano de Independência de Guiné e Cabo Verde* (P.A.I.G.C.), demonstrating that, instead, it was a struggle involving moves and countermoves by Portuguese forces and the P.A.I.G.C.,

each designed to maintain or regain specific initiatives, each designed to check or checkmate the opponent.

GUNPOWDER WEAPONS – See: TECHNOLOGY

H

HACKETT, JOHN (1910-97)

Seipp, Adam R. “‘Visionary Battle Scenes’: Reading Sir John Hackett’s *The Third World War, 1977-85*.” Vol.83, No.4 (October, 2019), pp.1235-1257. Suggests that the success of Sir John Hackett’s (1910-1997) 1978 best-selling novel reflected rising Cold War tensions, as well as inspiring the modern literary genre of the techno-thriller.

HAIG, DOUGLAS (1861-1928)

Marble, Sanders, “**Document of Note: General Haig Dismisses Attritional Warfare, January 1916.**” Vol.65, No.4 (October, 2001), pp.1061-1065.

Todman, Daniel, “*Sans peur et sans reproche: The Retirement, Death, and Mourning of Sir Douglas Haig, 1918-1928.*” Vol.67, No.4 (October, 2003), pp.1083-1106.

Greenhalgh, Elizabeth, “**Myth and memory: Sir Douglas Haig and the Imposition of Allied Unified Command in March, 1918.**” Vol.68, No.3 (July, 2004), pp.771-820. Debunks Field Marshal Haig’s (1861-1928) claim that he deserves credit for Chief of the French General Staff, Ferdinand Foch’s (1851-1929), appointment as Allied Supreme Commander.

Lloyd, Nick, “‘**With Faith and without Fear’: Sir Douglas Haig’s Command of First Army during 1915.**” Vol.71, No.4 (October, 2007), pp.1051-1076. Shines a light on the neglected performance of Sir Douglas Haig (1861-1928) as commander of the B.E.F.’s First Army during 1915.

HAITI

McPherson, Alan, “**Lid Sitters and Prestige Seekers: The U.S. Navy versus the State Department and the End of U.S. Occupations.**” Vol.78, No.1 (January, 2014), pp.73-99. Conflicting outlooks between the State Department and the Marine Corps on the U.S.

military occupation of the Dominican Republic, from 1912 to 1924, Haiti, from 1915 to 1934, and Nicaragua, from 1927 to 1932.

HALLECK, HENRY (1815-1872)

Swenson, Benjamin J. “**‘Measures of Conciliation’: Winfield Scott, Henry Halleck, and the Origins of U.S. Army Counterinsurgency Doctrine.**” Vol.86, No.4 (October, 2022), pp.859-881. Explores the collaboration between Major General Winfield Scott (1786-1866), who implemented policies intended to forestall insurgency, and General Henry Halleck (1815-1872), who made a study of Napoleon’s failed occupation of Spain, in developing U.S. Army counterinsurgency doctrine, which impacted the formation of international laws of war.

HALSEY, WILLIAM, Jr. (1882-1959)

Hughes, Thomas, “**Learning to Fight: Bill Halsey and the Early American Destroyer Force.**” Vol.77, No.1 (January, 2013), pp.71-90. The outcome of Admiral Halsey’s (1882-1959) service under Admiral William Sims (1858-1936) as a destroyer Captain, 1914-1922.

Reardon, Jeff T. “**Reevaluating Ghormley and Halsey at Guadalcanal.**” Vol.86, No.4 (October, 2022), pp.915-948. Presents a reassessment of Vice Admiral Robert L. Ghormley (1883-1958) service as commander in chief of the South Pacific Area during 1942.

HANSELL, HAYWOOD S., Jr. (1903-88)

Meilinger, Phillip S. “**Historiographical Essay: U.S. Air Force Leaders: A Biographical Tour.**” Vol.62, No.4 (October, 1998), pp.833-870.

Venable, Heather, “**Rescuing a General: General Haywood ‘Possum’ Hansell and the Burden of Command.**” Vol.84, No.2 (April, 2020), pp.487-509. Reappraises the negative assessment of General Haywood Hansell’s (1903-1988) command of the U.S. 8th Air Force.

HAWKINS, HAMILTON S., III (1872-1950)

Bielakowski, Alexander M. “**General Hawkins’ War: The Future of the Horse in the U.S. Cavalry.**” Vol.71, No.1 (January, 2007), pp.127-138. Provides an account of the career of Brigadier General Hamilton S. Hawkins III (1872-1950), who, despite the increasing significance of mechanized forces, steadfastly advocated for horse cavalry throughout the interwar period and into the Second World War.

HE YINGQIN (1890-1987)

Worthing, Peter, “**The Road through Whampoa: The Early Career of He Yingqin.**” Vol.69, No.4 (October, 2005), pp.953-985. Determines that He Yingqin (1890-1987) owed his repeated promotions to his good working relationship with Jiang Jieshi (Chiang Kai-shek, 1887-1975), a relationship that was based on shared experiences and values.

HENDERSON, ARCHIBALD (1783-1859)

Dawson, Joseph G. “**With Fidelity and Effectiveness: Archibald Henderson’s Lasting Legacy to the U.S. Marine Corps.**” Vol.62, No.4 (October, 1998), pp.727-753. Affirms Henderson’s importance as Commandant of the Corps (1821-1859), during which he expanded the roles and capabilities of Marines, such as the deployment of a Marine battalion alongside Army units against the Creeks and Seminoles and the addition of an artillery component to strengthen landing forces.

HERWIG, HOLGER (b.1941)

Holmes, Terence M. “**‘One Throw of the Gambler’s Dice’: A Comment on Holger Herwig’s View of the Schlieffen Plan.**” Vol.67, No.2 (April, 2003), pp.513-516.

HIPPOLYTE, JACQUES ANTOINE (1743-90)

Osman, Julia, “**Guibert vs. Guibert: Competing Notions in the *Essai general de Tactique* and the *Défense du système de guerre modern.*” Vol.83, No.1 (January, 2019), pp.43-65. Examines the apparently contradictory ideas about the conduct of war in two books written by the Enlightenment-era author, Jacques Antoine Hippolyte, the Comte de Guibert (1743-1790), who has been credited as the prophet of French Revolutionary and Napoleonic warfare.**

HISTORIOGRAPHY

See Also: ACADEMIC RESEARCH AND STUDY

Black, Jeremy, “**Historiographical Essay: Military Organisations and Military Change in Historical Perspective.**” Vol.62, No.4 (October, 1998), pp.871-892. Presents an explanatory model of change based on military organization, including both unit and command structures,

and intersection and interaction with wider social patterns and practices.

Meilinger, Phillip S. **“Historiographical Essay: The Historiography of Airpower: Theory and Doctrine.”** Vol.64, No.2 (April, 2000), pp.467-501.

Black, Jeremy, **“Determinisms and Other Issues.”** Vol.68, No.4 (October, 2004), pp.1217-1232.
Addresses the multiple problems surrounding the ways in which the role of technology in history has been interpreted.

Liaropoulos, Andrew N. **“Revolutions in Warfare: Theoretical Paradigms and Historical Evidence: The Napoleonic and First World War Revolutions in Military Affairs.”** Vol.70, No.2 (April, 2006), pp.363-384.

Spiller, Roger, **“Historiographical Essay: Military History and Its Fictions.”** Vol.70, No.4 (October, 2006), pp.1081-1097. Observes that military history’s intellectual authority has declined as other disciplines have taken more adventurous approaches to the study of war and assumed a more prominent role in contemporary military criticism.

Shy, John, **“The 2008 George C. Marshall Lecture in Military History: History and the History of War.”** Vol.72, No.4 (October, 2008), pp.1033-1046. A consideration of the works of military history written by distinguished non-military historians over the past twenty years.

Reid, Brian Holden, **“Michael Howard and the Evolution of Modern War Studies.”** Vol.73, No.3 (July, 2009), pp.869-904. Chart the efforts of Sir Michael Howard (1922-2019), beginning in 1950, to impart a framework on the study of the relationship between war and society to the extent that it has been shaped by organizational and moral forces.

Paret, Peter, **“Review Essay: The Annales School and the History of War.”** Vol.73, No.4 (October, 2009), pp.1289-1295.

Bacevich, Andrew J. **“The Revisionist Imperative: Rethinking Twentieth Century Wars.”** Vol.76, No.2 (April, 2012), pp.333-342. Insists that historians need to replace the familiar and morally reassuring story of a Short Twentieth Century with a less familiar and morally ambiguous story of a still unfolding Long Twentieth Century.

Trauschweizer, Ingo, **“Historiographical Essay: On Militarism.”** Vol.76, No.2 (April, 2012), pp.507-543. The definition(s) of European militarism, beginning in the late eighteenth century, and the question of U.S. militarism.

Hitchens, Ralph M. **“Review Essay: Casting Light on a Dark Territory.”** Vol.80, No.3 (July, 2016), pp.857-862. Works concerning cyber warfare.

Hosler, John D. "Status Report: Pre-Modern Military History in American Doctoral Programs: Figures and Implications." Vol.82, No.2 (April, 2018), pp.565-582.

HISTORIOGRAPHY arranged chronologically by historical periods or conflict –

ANCIENT PERIOD (to 476)

Sheldon, Rose Mary, "Review Essay: *The Military History of Ancient Israel* by Richard A. Gabriel." Vol.69, No.1 (January, 2005), pp.197-204.

Tucci, Jim, "Historiographical Essay: Warfare in the Ancient World." Vol.74, No.3 (July, 2010), pp.878-899.

HISTORIOGRAPHY arranged chronologically by historical periods or conflict –

LATE ANTIQUITY (235-750)

Bachrach, Bernard S. "Review Essay: The Barbarian Hordes that never were." Vol.74, No.3 (July, 2010), pp.901-904. A critical assessment of Peter Heather's 2009 book *Empires and Barbarians: Migration, Development and the Birth of Europe*, which covers the period from the decline of the Roman Empire to the age of the Viking.

HISTORIOGRAPHY arranged chronologically by historical periods or conflict –

MEDIEVAL PERIOD (476-1480)

France, John, "Historiographical Essay: Recent Writing on Medieval Warfare: From the Fall of Rome to c.1300." Vol.65, No.2 (April, 2001), pp.441-473. Primarily covering works that have been publishing in the last twenty-five years, the author reviews studies on the successor states to Rome, the Byzantine Empire, the thorny subject of feudalism, fortifications and siege operations, the naval dimension, the manner in which warfare was conducted in Europe during the High Middle Ages, 1000-1300, the employment of mercenaries, and the Crusades.

HISTORIOGRAPHY arranged chronologically by historical periods or conflict –

EARLY MODERN PERIOD (1480-1789)

Raudzens, George, "Military Revolution or Maritime Evolution? Military Superiorities or Transportation Advantages as Main Causes of European Colonial Conquests to 1788." Vol.63, No.3 (July, 1999), pp.631-641.

Lynn, John A. "Historiographical Essay: The Treatment of Military Subjects in Diderot's *Encyclopedie*." Vol.65, No.1 (January, 2001), pp.131-165. Concludes that while Denis Diderot's (1713-1784) coverage of military topics was not the basis for reforms, they

provide an excellent picture of the European art of war in the mid-eighteenth century.

Parker, Geoffrey, **“Review Essay: The ‘Military Revolution’, 1955-2005: From Belfast to Barcelona and the Hague.”** Vol.69, No.1 (January, 2005), pp.205-209.

Paoletti, Ciro, **“Prince Eugene of Savoy, the Toulon Expedition of 1707, and the English Historians: A Dissenting View.”** Vol.70, No.4 (October, 2006), pp.939-962. Using the siege of Toulon as an example, the author insists that most of the military histories of the period between 1688 and 1748 written by English speaking authors are flawed due to a failure to consult non-English contemporary sources.

Chet, Guy, **“Teaching in the Shadow of the Military Revolution.”** Vol.78, No.3 (July, 2014), pp.1069-1075.

Murteira, André, **“Historiographical Essay: The Military Revolution and European Wars Outside of Europe: The Dutch-Portuguese War in Asia in the First Quarter of the Seventeenth Century.”** Vol.84, No.2 (April, 2020), pp.511-535. Challenges the notion of Early Modern Western Military exceptionalism that, in Portuguese historiography, has blamed their defeat on Portuguese naval forces that were inferior to their Dutch opponents supposedly because of Asian military influence that was absent among the Dutch.

HISTORIOGRAPHY arranged chronologically by historical periods or conflict – U.S. REVOLUTIONARY WAR (1775-83)

Syrett, David, **“Historiographical Essay: The British Armed Forces in the American Revolutionary War: Publications, 1875-1998.”** Vol.63, No.1 (January, 1999), pp.147-164.

Hall, John W. **“An Irregular Reconsideration of George Washington and the American Military Tradition.”** Vol.78, No.3 (July, 2014), pp.961-993. Attempts to reconcile the contradictory interpretations of George Washington’s (1732-1799) approach to and performance in the conduct of war.

HISTORIOGRAPHY arranged chronologically by historical periods or conflict – FRENCH REVOLUTIONARY AND NAPOLEONIC WARS (1792-1815)

Esdaile, Charles, **“Review Essay: Recent Writing on Napoleon and His Wars.”** Vol.73, No.1 (January, 2009), pp.209-220. Contains four works that cover the struggle specifically between Britain and France from 1792 to 1815, Napoleon’s (1769-1821) skill as a commander on all levels of warfare, and the guerrilla war in Spain.

Mikaberidze, Alexander, **“Historiographical Essay: Recent Trends in the Russian Historiography**

of the Napoleonic Wars.” Vol.74, No.1 (January, 2010), pp.189-194.

HISTORIOGRAPHY arranged chronologically by historical periods or conflict –

WAR OF 1812 (1812-15)

Skaggs, David Curtis, “**Aiming at the Truth: James Fenimore Cooper and the Battle of Lake Erie.**” Vol.59, No.2 (April, 1995), pp.237-255. Disentangles the disputed account of the Battle of Lake Erie, 10 September, 1813, written by Cooper (1789-1851) in his *History of the Navy of the United States* (1839).

Hickey, Donald R. “**Historiographical Essay: The War of 1812: Still a Forgotten Conflict?**” Vol.65, No.3 (July, 2001), pp.741-769.

Graves, Donald E. “**Why the White House was Burned: An Investigation into the British Destruction of Public Buildings at Washington in August 1814.**” Vol.76, No.4 (October, 2012), pp.1095-1127. Encrusted with mythology by nineteenth century historians motivated by national chauvinism, the article considers whether the actions of the British forces were justified by the contemporary laws of war and / or as retaliation for the U.S. destruction of Canadian towns.

Grodzinski, John R. “**Review Essay: Opening Shots from the Bicentenary of the War of 1812: A Canadian Perspective on Recent Titles.**” Vol.76, No.4 (October, 2012), pp.1187-1201.

Graves, Donald E. “**Review Essay: U.S. Army Campaigns of the War of 1812.**” Vol.79, No.1 (January, 2015), pp.181-185.

Trautsch, Jasper M. “**The Causes of the War of 1812: 200 Years of Debate.**” Vol.77, No.1 (January, 2013), pp.273-293.

HISTORIOGRAPHY arranged chronologically by historical periods or conflict –

U.S. CIVIL WAR (1861-65)

Castel, Albert, “**Liddell Hart’s *Sherman: Propaganda as History.***” Vol.67, No.2 (April, 2003), pp.405-426. Concludes that Liddell Hart’s 1929 biography of U.S. Civil War General William Tecumseh Sherman (1820-1891) is seriously flawed, both factually and analytically, because it was written to validate the author’s concept of the ‘indirect approach’ in warfare.

Rafuse, Ethan S. “**Historiographical Essays: Still a Mystery? General Grant and the Histories, 1981-2006.**” Vol.71, No.3 (July, 2007), pp.849-874. Traces the evolution of the assessment of General Ulysses S. Grant (1822-1885), from William S. McFeely’s 1981 Pulitzer Prize-winning study to the present day.

Dawson, Joseph G., III; Badsey, Stephen, and Stoker, Donald, **“Forum: Confederate Military Strategy in the U.S. Civil War – Revisited.”** Vol.73, No.4 (October, 2009), pp.1273-1287.

Matsui, John H. **“Historiographical Essay: Seven Score and Ten: American Civil War Historiography at the Close of the Sesquicentennial.”** Vol.80, No.2 (April, 2016), pp.487-509.

Cashin, Joan, **“Bibliographic Essay: American Women and the American Civil War.”** Vol.81, No.1 (January, 2017), pp.199-204.

Petty, Adam H. **“Reconsidering the Wilderness’s Role in Battle, 4-6 May 1864.”** Vol.82, No.2 (April, 2018), pp.413-438. Questions the existing consensus regarding the influence of the forest known as the Wilderness on the battle of the same name.

HISTORIOGRAPHY arranged chronologically by historical periods or conflict –
WORLD WAR I (1914-18)

Black, Jeremy, **“Review Essay: War Stories.”** Vol.69, No.3 (July, 2005), pp.827-832. The author critiques a pair of books by John Mosier that purport to address myths about the World Wars.

Sheffy, Yigal, **“Chemical Warfare and the Palestine Campaign, 1916-1918.”** Vol.73, No.3 (July, 2009), pp.803-844. Brings light to the British use of chemical warfare in the Second (April, 1917) and Third (October-November, 1917) Battles of Gaza, the Ottoman response, and the reasons why this aspect of the Palestine Campaign have been disregarded in the historiography.

HISTORIOGRAPHY arranged chronologically by historical periods or conflict –
2nd SINO-JAPANESE WAR (1937-45)

Gordon, David M. **“Historiographical Essay: The China-Japan War, 1931-1945.”** Vol.70, No.1 (January, 2006), pp.137-182.

HISTORIOGRAPHY arranged chronologically by historical periods or conflict –
WORLD WAR II (1939-45)

Weinberg, Gerhard L. **“Historiographical Essay: World War II Scholarship, now and in the Future.”** Vol.61, No.2 (April, 1997), pp.335-345. Includes issues surrounding the use of the memoirs of German military leaders, the revelations of Field Marshal Lord Alanbrooke’s (1883-1963) unabridged diary, and the declassification of materials pertaining to Magic and Ultra.

Giangreco, D.M. **“Casualty Projections for the U.S. Invasion of Japan, 1945-1946: Planning**

and Policy Implications.” Vol.61, No.3 (July, 1997), pp.521-581. Demonstrates that those historians who have rejected President Harry Truman’s (1945-1953) claim that he expected huge losses from an invasion of the Japanese Home Islands have based their conclusions on a combination of superficial research in the mass of related documents and specifically misinterpreting planning documents.

Glantz, David M. **“Historiographical Essay: The Red Army at War, 1941-1945: Sources and Interpretations.”** Vol.62, No.3 (July, 1998), pp.595-617.

Rohwer, Jurgen, **“Historiographical Essay: Signal Intelligence and World War II: The Unfolding Story,”** Vol.63, No.4 (October, 1999), pp.939-951.

Burrell, Robert S. **“Breaking the Cycle of Iwo Jima Mythology: A Strategic Study of Operation Detachment.”** Vol.68, No.4 (October, 2004), pp.1143-1186. Questions the justification for the invasion of Iwo Jima, 19 February, 1945, explaining that the decision to invade was a matter of the competing agendas of the Navy, Army, and Army Air Force.

Hanley, Brian and Burrell, Robert S. **“The Myth of Iwo Jima: A Rebuttal [And Response].”** Vol.69, No.3 (July, 2005), pp.801-809.

Black, Jeremy, **“Review Essay: War Stories.”** Vol.69, No.3 (July, 2005), pp.827-832. The author critiques a pair of books by John Mosier that purport to address myths about the World Wars.

Orbach, Danny, **“Criticism Reconsidered: The German Resistance to Hitler in Critical German Scholarship.”** Vol.75, No.2 (April, 2011), pp.565-590. Establishes that, beginning in the 1960s, some of the so-called ‘critical’ historiography of the 20 July, 1944, conspirators suffer from erroneous reading of the sources, one-sided evaluations, moral condescension, and rhetorical manipulation.

Lak, Martijn, **“Review Essay: The Death Ride of the Panzers? Recent Historiography on the Battle of Kursk.”** Vol.82, No.3 (July, 2018), pp.909-919.

HISTORIOGRAPHY arranged chronologically by historical periods or conflict – **ARAB-ISRAELI WARS**

Rudd, Gordon W. **“Review Essay: The Israeli Revisionist Historians and the Arab-Israeli Conflict Part One: From the Founding of Zionism to the 1967 War.”** Vol.67, No.4 (October, 2003), pp.1263-1270; **“Part Two: From the 1967 War to the Present.”** Vol.68, No.1 (January, 2004), pp.225-231.

HISTORIOGRAPHY arranged chronologically by historical periods or conflict –

KOREAN WAR (1950-53)

Millett, Allan R. "A Reader's Guide to the Korean War." Vol.61, No.3 (July, 1997), pp.583-597.

HISTORIOGRAPHY arranged chronologically by historical periods or conflict –

1st INDOCHINA WAR (1946-54)

Boylan, Kevin M. "No 'Technical Knockout': Giap's Artillery at Dien Bien Phu." Vol.78, No.4 (October, 2014), pp.1349-1383. Contests the common explanation for the victory of the Vietnamese People's Army based on a flood of Vietnamese publications around the 2004 fiftieth anniversary of the siege, 13 March – 7 May, 1954.

HISTORIOGRAPHY arranged chronologically by historical periods or conflict –

VIETNAM WAR (2nd Indochina War) (1955-75)

Birtle, Andrew J. "PROVN, Westmoreland, and the Historians: A Reappraisal." Vol.72, No.4 (October, 2008), pp.1213-1247. A reassessment of the U.S. Army report, nicknamed PROVN, that, in the past, had been mined for information with which to criticize General William C. Westmoreland (1914-2004) and praise his successor as commander of U.S. forces in South Vietnam, General Creighton Abrams (1914-1974).

Carland, John M. "Review Essay: Scorecard on CIA C.O.I.N. in Vietnam." Vol.75, No.3 (July, 2011), pp.887-891.

Daddis, Gregory A. "Historiographical Essay: Mansplaining Vietnam: Male Veterans and America's Popular Image of the Vietnam War." Vol.82, No.1 (January, 2018), pp.181-207. Explores how various media, such as memoirs, have excluded the story of the roughly 7,500 U.S. women who served in the Vietnam War.

HISTORIOGRAPHY arranged chronologically by historical periods or conflict –

INDONESIA-MALAYSIA CONFRONTATION (1963-66)

Tuck, Christopher, "Measuring Victory: Assessing the outcomes of *Konfrontasi*, 1963-66." Vol.82, No.3 (July, 2018), pp.873-898. Suggests that the outcome of the British low intensity conflict with Indonesia, known as the 'Confrontation', is far more complex than either the triumphal or revisionist interpretations suggest.

HISTORIOGRAPHY arranged alphabetically by country - AUSTRALIA

Parkin, Russell, "Colonel E.G. Keogh and the Making of the *Australian Army Journal*." Vol.81,

No.4 (October, 2017), pp.1075-1096. Shines a light on the overlooked contribution to professional education and military history in Australia by Eustace Graham Keogh (1899-1981).

Dennis, Peter, **“Historiographical Note: The Books that Influenced Jeff Grey.”** Vol.81, No.4 (October, 2017), pp.1109-1112. Professor Jeffrey Grey (1959-2016, Australia’s most prominent military historian and the first President of the Society for Military History from outside of the United States.

HISTORIOGRAPHY arranged alphabetically by country - ENGLAND / GREAT BRITAIN

Rodger, N.A.M. **“Historiographical Essay: Recent Books on the Royal Navy of the Eighteenth Century.”** Vol.63, No.3 (July, 1999), pp.683-703. A very thorough survey of the latest works.

Black, Jeremy, **“Historiographical Essay: Britain as a Military Power, 1688-1815.”** Vol.64, No.1 (January, 2000), pp.159-177.

Nasson, Bill, **“Historiographical Essay: Waging Total War in South Africa: Some Centenary Writings on the Anglo-Boer War, 1899-1902.”** Vol.66, No.3 (July, 2002), pp.813-828.

HISTORIOGRAPHY arranged alphabetically by country - FRANCE

Kiesling, Eugenia C. **“Historiographical Essays: Illuminating ‘Strange Defeat’ and ‘Pyrrhic Victory’: The Historian Robert A. Doughty.”** Vol.71, No.3 (July, 2007), pp.875-888. Reviews the English language publications on the performance of France in both World Wars and how Brigadier General (Rtd.) Robert A. Doughty (b.1943) has sought to teach the U.S. Army how to harness historical study in the interest of doctrinal development.

HISTORIOGRAPHY arranged alphabetically by country - GERMANY

Hagemann, Karen, **“Mobilizing Women for War: The History, Historiography, and Memory of German Women’s War Service in the Two World Wars.”** Vol.75, No.4 (October, 2011), pp.1055-1093. An effort to understand why the large-scale mobilization of women in Germany during the course of both world wars is missing from the historiography.

HISTORIOGRAPHY arranged alphabetically by country - ITALY

Sullivan, Brian R. **“Review Essay: Fascist Italy’s Military Involvement in the Spanish Civil War.”** Vol.59, No.4 (October, 1995), pp.697-727. Surveys the existing literature concerning Benito Mussolini’s (1883-1945) commitment some 70,000 soldiers of the *Corpo Truppe Volontarie* and over 700 warplanes of the *Aviazione Legionaria* to the Nationalist cause, including the publications of official histories.

HISTORIOGRAPHY arranged alphabetically by country - NORWAY

Thompson, David G. **“Norwegian Military Policy, 1905-1940: A Critical Appraisal and Review of the Literature.”** Vol.61, No.3 (July, 1997), pp.503-520. Questions the reliance exclusively on British and German sources for an understanding of the 1940 Norwegian campaign, insisting that without knowledge of the role of the Norwegian government and armed forces, the picture is incomplete.

HISTORIOGRAPHY arranged alphabetically by country - POLAND

Peszke, Michael Alfred, **“Historiographical Essay: An Introduction to English-Language Literature on the Polish Armed Forces in World War II.”** Vol.70, No.4 (October, 2006), pp.1029-1064.

HISTORIOGRAPHY arranged alphabetically by country - U.S.A.

Skelton, William B. **“Samuel P. Huntington and the Roots of the American Military Tradition.”** Vol.60, No.2 (April, 1996), pp.325-338.

Kohn, Richard H. (ed.) **“The Practice of Military History in the U.S. Government: The Department of Defense.”** Vol.61, No.1 (January, 1997), pp.121-147. Includes contributions from Alfred Goldberg, Elizabeth A. Muenger, and Harold W. Nelson.

Coffman, Edward M. **“The Course of Military History in the United States since World War II.”** Vol.61, No.4 (October, 1997), pp.761-775.

Linn, Brian M. and Weigley, Russell F. **“*The American Way of War Revisited.*”** Vol.66, No.2 (April, 2002), pp.501-533. The author challenges some of the conclusions in Dr. Weigley’s (1930-2004) classic study of the manner in which the United States Army has conducted warfare through the length of its history.

Atkinson, Rick, **“Speech to the U.S. Commission on Military History: Washington, 1 November, 2003.”** Vol.68, No.2 (April, 2004), pp.527-533.

Watson, Samuel, **“Historiographical Essay: Continuity in Civil-Military Relations and Expertise: The U.S. Army during the Decade before the Civil War.”** Vol.75, No.1 (January, 2011), pp.221-250.

Epstein, Katherine C. **“‘No One can Afford to Say ‘Damn the Torpedoes’: Battle Tactics and the U.S. Naval History before World War I.’”** Vol.77, No.2 (April, 2013), pp.491-520.

Grimsley, Mark, “**Review Essay: The American Military History Master Narrative: Three Textbooks on the American Military Experience.**” Vol.79, No.3 (July, 2015), pp.783-802.

Finch, Michael P.M. “**Edward Mead Earle and the Unfinished *Makers of Modern Strategy*.**” Vol.80, No.3 (July, 2016), pp.781-814.

Finch, Michael P.M. “**Theodore Ropp’s *Makers of Modern Strategy* Revisited and the Course of Military History, 1945-1981.**” Vol.82, No.4 (October, 2018), pp.1231-1257. Though it was never completed, Theodore Ropp’s (1911-2000) project to update his 1943 edition reflected some of the ways in which military history had developed since the conclusion of World War II.

HITLER, ADOLF (1889-1945)

Weinberg, Gerhard L. “**The George C. Marshall Lecture in Military History: Some Myths of World War II.**” Vol.75, No.3 (July, 2011), pp.701-718. Includes issues surrounding Winston Churchill, Adolf Hitler, Yamamoto Isoroku, Benito Mussolini, Franklin Roosevelt, and Josef Stalin, as well as the Yalta Conference, the Morgenthau Plan for Germany, and the ubiquity of horses in the Second World War.

Douglas, Sarah K. “**The Search for Hitler: Hugh Trevor-Roper, Humphrey Searle, and the Last Days of Adolf Hitler.**” Vol.78, No.1 (January, 2014), pp.159-210. The means by which British intelligence officer Hugh Trevor-Roper (1914-2003) obtained his information for his book, *The Last Days of Hitler* (1947).

Lahey, R.J. “**Hitler’s ‘Intuition’, *Luftwaffe* Photoreconnaissance, and the Reinforcement of Normandy.**” Vol.86, No.1 (January, 2022), pp.77-109. Contends that it was *Luftwaffe* photoreconnaissance, rather than mere intuition, that led Hitler to significantly reinforce the forces tasked with defending the Normandy beaches.

HITTITES – See: ANCIENT PERIOD

HOCHE, LOUIS LAZARE (1768-97)

North, Johnathan, “**General Hoche and Counterinsurgency.**” Vol.67, No.2 (April, 2003), pp.529-540. Louis Lazare Hoche (1768-1797) was a General of Revolutionary France whose service included the successful suppression of the Catholic Royalist Revolt in the Vendée.

THE HOLOCAUST

Foregger, Richard, **“Two Sketch Maps of the Auschwitz-Birkenau Extermination Camps.”** Vol.59, No.4 (October, 1995), pp.687-696. Asks whether or not the sketch maps in question would have provided the Allies with adequate information for the bombing of gas chambers.

Weinberg, Gerhard L. **“Unexplored Questions about the German Military during World War II.”** Vol.62, No.2 (April, 1998), pp.371-380. Touches upon the 1934 oath to Hitler, reasons why high-ranking German commanders felt the need to justify to their troops their orders to slaughter Jewish civilians, the role of high-ranking German commanders in approving the execution of tens-of-thousands of their own troops, *Luftwaffe* field divisions, the creation of new airborne divisions after the use of paratroopers had been all but abandoned, and the organizing of *Kriegsmarine* and *Luftwaffe* suicide units.

Seipp, Adam R. **“Buchenwald Stories: Testimony, Military History, and the American Encounter with the Holocaust.”** Vol.79, No.3 (July, 2015), pp.721-744. Demonstrates how the testimonies of American servicemen have evolved in tandem with changes in public perceptions of the war and the Holocaust.

HOME FRONT: ENGLAND / GREAT BRITAIN - EARLY MODERN PERIOD (1481-1788)

Hurl-Eamon, Jennine, **“Husbands, Sons, Brothers, and Neighbors: Eighteenth-Century Soldiers’ Efforts to Maintain Civilian Ties.”** Vol.86, No.2 (April, 2022), pp.299-320. Endeavors to understand the conflict between army regulations restricting British servicemen’s ability to visit and provide for their kin with the efforts of soldiers to maintain the connections to the communities they left.

HOME FRONT: GERMANY - 20th CENTURY

Hagemann, Karen, **“Mobilizing Women for War: The History, Historiography, and Memory of German Women’s War Service in the Two World Wars.”** Vol.75, No.4 (October, 2011), pp.1055-1093. An effort to understand why the large-scale mobilization of women in Germany during the course of both world wars is missing from the historiography.

HOME FRONT: U.S. CIVIL WAR (1861-65)

Bruce, Susannah Ural, **“‘Remember Your Country and Keep up Its Credit’: Irish Volunteers and the Union Army, 1861-1865.”** Vol.69, No.2 (April, 2005), pp.331-359. Puts forward the explanation that a central theme in the support of Irish immigrants for the Union cause was their dual loyalties to both their new and original homelands, support that was tested by the rising casualties, Emancipation Proclamation, and the introduction of the draft.

Smith, David G. “**‘Clear the Valley’: The Shenandoah Valley and the Genesis of the Gettysburg Campaign.**” Vol.74, No.4 (October, 2010), pp.1069-1096. Brings to light an overlooked motivation for General Robert E. Lee’s (1807-1870) Gettysburg Campaign, the need to clear the Shenandoah Valley of occupying U.S. troops due to a combination of home front discontent and logistical issues.

Cashin, Joan, “**Bibliographic Essay: American Women and the American Civil War.**” Vol.81, No.1 (January, 2017), pp.199-204.

Hunter, Antwain K. “**‘Patriots, Cowards, and Men Disloyal at Heart’: Labor and Politics at the Springfield Armory, 1861-1865.**” Vol.84, No.1 (January, 2020), pp.51-81. Demonstrates that while the Springfield Armory was vocal in its support for the cause of the Union during the Civil War, it nevertheless contained employees who expressed criticism of the Lincoln administration and support for the Confederacy.

HOME FRONT: U.S.A. - WORLD WAR I (1914-18)

Bruce, Robert B. “**America Embraces France: Marshal Joseph Joffre and the French Mission to the United States, April-May 1917.**” Vol.66, No.2 (April, 2002), pp.407-441. Proposes that Marshal Joffre (1852-1931), more than any other individual, established strong-Franco-American military, political, and social ties, contributing mightily to U.S. public support for a commitment of a large expeditionary force to the Western Front.

Lukasik, Sebastian H. “**Doughboys, the Y.M.C.A., and the Moral Economy of Sacrifice in the First World War.**” Vol.84, No.3 (July, 2020), pp.774-797. Contends that U.S. soldiers’ complaints about the Y.M.C.A. in France reflected larger concerns about the Home Front, perceptions of which shaped soldiers’ notions about the value of their sacrifices.

HOME FRONT: U.S.A. - WORLD WAR II (1939-41)

Dooley, Edwin L. “**Memoirs: Wartime San Juan, Puerto Rico: The Forgotten American Home Front, 1941-1945.**” Vol.63, No.4 (October, 1999), pp.921-938. The author provides an account of his father’s experiences as a young U.S. Army Private from Astoria, New York, who was deployed to Puerto Rico in 1939.

Reiss, Matthias, “**Bronzed Bodies behind Barbed Wire: Masculinity and the Treatment of German Prisoners of War in the United States in World War II.**” Vol.69, No.2 (April, 2005), pp.475-504. In contrast to other Allied nations, the War Department chose not to parole German P.O.W.s being held in the United States into the custody of employers because of concerns over the potential for women being attracted to these prisoners.

Jeans, Roger B., Jr. **“Alarm in Washington: A Wartime ‘Expose’ of Japan’s Biological Warfare Program.”** Vol.71, No.2 (April, 2007), pp.411-439. Discusses a book published in the summer of 1944 describing both Japan’s biological warfare program and the failure of the U.S. government to meet this threat, and the government and the media’s response to this publication, considering parallels with the 2001 anthrax ‘scares.’

Flint, Fr. James, O.S.B. **“A Chaplain’s Diary: Reverend Victor Laketek, O.S.B., 1942-1946.”** Vol.72, No.3 (July, 2008), pp.853-867. The account of a World War II Army Air Force Chaplain stationed in Maine, Florida, California, and Canton Island in the Pacific.

Dudley, William S. **“A Soldier, His Family, and the Impact of the Pacific War, 1942-1945.”** Vol.80, No.1 (January, 2016), pp.187-192. A three-volume biography of Wilber Bradt of Washington State who served as a Field Artillery officer in the 43rd Infantry Division as it fought its way through the Solomons, New Guinea, and the Philippines. Based on a trove of preserved correspondence and interviews, this account is as much about his family on the home front as it is about Bradt on the frontlines.

Symonds, Craig, **“The 2017 George C. Marshall Lecture in Military History: For Want of a Nail: The Impact of Shipping on Grand Strategy in World War II.”** Vol.81, No.3 (July, 2017), pp.657-666. The remarkable success of U.S. ship building and its impact on Allied strategy.

HOME FRONT: U.S.A. - THE COLD WAR (1945-91)

Clymer, Kenton, **“U.S. Homeland Defense in the 1950s: The Origin of the Ground Observer Corps.”** Vol.75, No.3 (July, 2011), pp.835-859. Quasi-auxiliary of the U.S. Air Force from 1950 to 1959.

Dingman, Roger, **“Review Essay: American Bases in Japan.”** Vol.78, No.2 (April, 2014), pp.753-755. A collection of essays by Japanese academics and public historians providing a balanced study of the impact of U.S. bases Kanagawa Prefecture, just southwest of Tokyo.

HOME FRONT: U.S.A. - KOREAN WAR (1950-53)

Lerner, Mitchell, **“‘Is It for This We Fought and Bled?’: The Korean War and the Struggle for Civil Rights.”** Vol.82, No.2 (April, 2018), pp.515-545. Explains the role of the Korean War in the African American struggle for Civil Rights.

HONG KONG

See Also: CHINA

Strategy, 1921-1941.” Vol.60, No.1 (January, 1996), pp.61-88. Brings to light the vital, if overlooked role of Hong Kong as a base for offensive operations in British interwar plans for a war with Japan has been.

Macri, Franco David, “**‘C’ Force to Hong Kong: The Price of Collective Security in China, 1941.**” Vol.77, No.1 (January, 2013), pp.141-171. Concerning the strategic and political influences on the deployment of two Canadian infantry battalions to Hong Kong in November, 1941.

Chi Man Kwong, “**The Failure of Japanese Land-Sea Cooperation during the Second World War: Hong Kong and the South China Coast as an Example, 1942-1945.**” Vol.79, No.1 (January, 2015), pp.69-91.

Tian Ser Seah, Joshua-John, “**Singapore, Hong Kong, and the Royal Navy’s War in Korea, c.1950-1953: Part 1.**” Vol.83, No.4 (October, 2018), pp.1213-1234; “**Part 2.**” Vol.84, No.1 (January, 2020), pp.237-260.

HOPLITES – See: ANCIENT PERIOD: GREEK CIVILIZATION

HORSES – See: ANIMALS, USE OF IN WAR; CAVALRY

HOWARD, MICHAEL (1922-1019)

Reid, Brian Holden, “**Michael Howard and the Evolution of Modern War Studies.**” Vol.73, No.3 (July, 2009), pp.869-904. Chart the efforts of Sir Michael Howard (1922-2019), beginning in 1950, to impart a framework on the study of the relationship between war and society to the extent that it has been shaped by organizational and moral forces.

HUNGARY

DiNardo, R.L. “**The Dysfunctional Coalition: The Axis Powers and the Eastern Front in World War II.**” Vol.60, No.4 (October, 1996), pp.711-730. Illustrates that German arrogance, compounded by muddled political and strategic thinking, inadequate resources, widely varying capabilities, and linguistic differences, rendered the Axis Coalition a costly failure.

Szabó, Miklós, “**The Development of the Hungarian Aircraft Industry, 1938-1944.**” Vol.65, No.1 (January, 2001), pp.53-76.

Kranjc, Gregor, **“Fight or Flight: Desertion, Defection, and Draft-Dodging in Occupied Slovenia, 1941-1945.”** Vol.81, No.1 (January, 2017), pp.133-162. Questions the motives for Slovenes to avoid or escape from military service for three occupying powers, Germany, Hungary, and Italy, and these powers efforts to combat draft-dodging, desertion, and defection.

Gyucha, Attila; Lee, Wayne E. and Rózsa, Zoltán, **“The Mongol Campaign in Hungary, 1241-1242: The Archaeology and History of Nomadic Conquest and Massacre.”** Vol.83, No.4 (October, 2019), pp.1021-1066. This article integrates conquest process theory, literary evidence, and data from substantial new archaeological work to explore the motivation and nature of Mongol invasions and the consequences for rural settlements on the Great Hungarian Plain.

HUNTINGTON, SAMUEL P. (1927-2008)

Skelton, William B. **“Samuel P. Huntington and the Roots of the American Military Tradition.”** Vol.60, No.2 (April, 1996), pp.325-338.

HUSSEIN, SADDAM (1937-2006)

Brands, Hal, **“Why did Saddam Invade Iran [1980]? New Evidence on Motives, Complexity, and the Israel Factor.”** Vol.75, No.3 (July, 2011), pp.861-885.

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THE IMJIN WAR (1592-98)

Swope, Kenneth M. **“Crouching Tigers, Secret Weapons: Military Technology Employed during the Sino-Japanese War, 1592-1598.”** Vol.69, No.1 (January, 2005), pp.11-41. Reviews the major military technology employed by the belligerents, showing, contesting the conventional explanation that superior numbers and the death of Toyotomi Hideyoshi's (1537-1598) death were the deciding factors in Japan's defeat.

IMPERIALISM

Black, Jeremy, **“War and the World, 1450-2000.”** Vol.63, No.3 (July, 1999), pp.669-681. After a consideration of the circumstances of the study of military in the academy, the author focuses primarily on European states' military interaction with civilizations throughout the

globe in the context of the 'Military Revolution' theory.

Vandervort, Bruce, **"Review Essay: The Thin Black Line of Heroes."** Vol.65, No.4 (October, 2001), pp.1067-1073. Recent work on European Colonial and, especially, African troops, 1700-1964.

Spector, Ronald H. **"After Hiroshima: Allied Military Occupations and the Fate of Japan's Empire, 1945-1947."** Vol.69, No.4 (October, 2005), pp.1121-1136. The Allies confronted problems far beyond the disarming of Japanese troops in occupied China, Korea, and Southeast Asia, where internal conflicts rendered the plans of the Allied powers irrelevant.

Black, Jeremy, **"Frontiers and Military History."** Vol.72, No.4 (October, 2008), pp.1047-1059. As zones of interaction and contested sovereignty, it is not surprising that frontiers, throughout history, have witnessed armed conflict, just as armed conflicts have both established and changed frontiers.

Tzoref-Ashkenazi, Chen, **"German Military Participation in Early Modern European Colonialism."** Vol.80, No.3 (July, 2016), pp.671-695. Brings to light the employment of German mercenaries in the colonial ventures of different European kingdoms.

Laband, John, **"The Slave Soldiers of Africa."** Vol.81, No.1 (January, 2017), pp.9-38. Presents a broad overview of the long history of African military slavery, which the author notes was not limited to Muslim states, was adapted by European colonial powers, and has re-emerged in the phenomenon of child soldiers.

Vandervort, Bruce, **"Review Essay: African Military History Comes of Age."** Vol.81, No.1 (January, 2017), pp.205-208. A look at two significant works on the military history of the continent, one an encyclopedia of colonial conflicts, the other a three-volume narrative account of conflict, edited and written by Timothy J. Stapleton, respectively.

Stice, Elizabeth, **"Men on the Margins: Representations of Colonial Troops in British and French Trench Newspapers of the Great War."** Vol.83, No.2 (April, 2019), pp.435-454. Ascertains how, through the contents of trench newspapers, the war provided a new context for evaluating empires and their peoples and questioning existing imperial culture.

Eichhorn, Niels, **"A 'Century of Peace' that was not: War in the Nineteenth Century."** Vol.84, No.4 (October, 2020), pp.1051-1077. Challenges the notion of a century of peace between 1815 and 1914, pointing to a series of devastating wars that were fought, not only in Europe, but throughout the globe.

Paine, Sarah C.M. **"The 2022 George C. Marshall Lecture in Military History: Centuries of Security: Chinese, Russian and U.S. Continental versus Maritime Approaches."** Vol.86,

No.4 (October, 2022), pp.813-836.

IMPERIALISM: ENGLAND / GREAT BRITAIN

Bell, Christopher M. “**‘Our Most Exposed Outpost’: Hong Kong and British Far Eastern Strategy, 1921-1941.**” Vol.60, No.1 (January, 1996), pp.61-88. Brings to light the vital, if overlooked role of Hong Kong as a base for offensive operations in British interwar plans for a war with Japan has been.

Boyce, D. George, “**From Assaye to the Assaye: Reflections on British Government, Force, and Moral Authority in India.**” Vol.63, No.3 (July, 1999), pp.643-668. Appraises the role of the threat and use of force in British rule, from the Battle of Assaye (1803) to the naval mutiny of 1946, including how the reliance on force shaped the moral and ethical justifications for the British governing India.

Tan Tai-Yong, “**An Imperial Home-Front: Punjab and the First World War.**” Vol.64, No.2 (April, 2000), pp.371-410. Looks at how, during the war, the civil administration of the State of Punjab ended up concentrating on recruiting men for the Indian Army.

Jackson, Ashley, “**Supplying War: The High Commission Territories’ Military-Logistical Contribution in the Second World War.**” Vol.66, No.3 (July, 2002), pp.719-760. Assesses the mobilization of manpower from Basutoland, Bechuanaland, and Swaziland for use in logistics in the North African and Italian Campaigns.

Johnson, R.A. “**‘Russians at the Gates of India’?: Planning the Defence of India, 1885-1900.**” Vol.67, No.3 (July, 2003), pp.697-743.

Bryant, G.J. “**Asymmetric Warfare: The British Experience in Eighteenth-Century India.**” Vol.68, No.2 (April, 2004), pp.431-469. Juxtaposes the adaption to new circumstance of Indian versus British military forces, proposing that while the British were able to retain their military superiority, Indian rulers were unable to overcome political obstacles that interfered with the adoption of European methods.

Roy, Kaushik, “**Military Synthesis in South Asia: Armies, Warfare, and Indian Society, c.1740-1849.**” Vol.69, No.3 (July, 2005), pp.651-690. Attempts to determine why, with both the British East India Company and the Mughal successor states developing hybrid military forces, it was the E.I.C.’s armies that, more often than not, achieved victory.

Miller, Stephen M. “**In Support of the ‘Imperial Mission’? Volunteering for the South African War, 1899-1902.**” Vol.69, No.3 (July, 2005), pp.691-711. Inquires into the motives of British civilians who responded to the call for recruits by enlisting in the Volunteers, the Militia, or the Imperial Yeomanry.

Badsey, Stephen, **“The Boer War (1899-1902) and British Cavalry Doctrine: A Re-Evaluation.”** Vol.71, No.1 (January, 2007), pp.75-97. Rejecting the traditional interpretation, the article proposes that a cavalry reform movement incorporating dismounted tactics pre-dated the Second Anglo-Boer War, a mixture of mounted and dismounted tactics were used by both sides in the conflict, and that the problems experienced by cavalry were largely not of their own making

Roy, Kaushik, **“Military Loyalty in the Colonial Context: A Case Study of the Indian Army during World War II.”** Vol.73, No.2 (April, 2009), pp.497-529. Uncovers the motives for and extent of loyalty to the British colonial regime of the Indian Army troops fighting in Burma in the context of the British elite’s concerns about the loyalty of Indian soldiers.

Tripodi, Christian, **“ ‘Good for one but not the other’: The ‘Sandeman System’ of Pacification as Applied to Baluchistan and the North-West Frontier, 1877-1947.”** Vol.73, No.3 (July, 2009), pp.767-802. Looks at why the Government of India declared Colonel Sir Robert Groves Sandeman’s (1835-1892) innovative doctrine of tribal administration inapplicable for the troubled North West Frontier, despite its having achieved success in Baluchistan.

Stapleton, Tim, **“ ‘Bad Boys’: Infiltration and Sedition in the African Military Units of the Central African Federation (Malawi, Zambia and Zimbabwe) 1953-63.”** Vol.73, No.4 (October, 2009), pp.1167-1193. Illustrates that nationalists exploited the rising unpopularity of colonialism, discontent with participation in the war in Malaya, the Mau Mau uprising in Kenya, and the Congo Crisis, which led white officers doubt the dependability of their African troops.

Gordon, Andrew, **“Time after Time in the Horn of Africa.”** Vol.74, No.1 (January, 2010), pp.107-144. Provides an examination of the British joint, amphibious assault on the Dervish stronghold of Illig, Somaliland, in 1904.

Arndt, Jochen S. **“Treacherous Savages & Merciless Barbarian: Knowledge, Discourse and Violence during the Cape Frontier Wars, 1834 and 1853.”** Vol.74, No.3 (July, 2010), pp.709-735. Concludes that the British stereotypes of the Xhosa people of the eastern frontier of the Cape Colony, South Africa, that evolved during three wars fought between 1834 and 1853 were used to justify policies of dispossession and subjugation in the name of colonial security.

Sundaram, Chandar S. **“ ‘Treated with Scant Attention’: The Imperial Cadet Corps, Indian Nobles, and Anglo-Indian Policy, 1897-1917.”** Vol.77, No.1 (January, 2013), pp.41-70. Foreshadowing the Indianization of the Indian Army’s officer corps and the opening of the Indian Military Academy in 1932, the Imperial Cadet Corps offered officer training to Indian princes and gentlemen between 1901 and 1917.

Collins, Bruce, **“Defining Victory in Victorian Warfare, 1860-1882.”** Vol.77, No.3 (July, 2013),

pp.895-929. Catalogues the range of pressures on the commanders of expeditions in Africa to declare victory. See Also: Beckett, Ian F. "How Wars End: Victorian Colonial Conflicts." Vol.82, No.1 (January, 2018), pp.29-44.

Beckett, Ian F.W. **"The Road to Kandahar: The Politics of Retention and Withdrawal in Afghanistan, 1880-81."** Vol.78, No.4 (October, 2014), pp.1263-1294.

Phimister, Ian, **"Developing and Defending Britain and Her Empire: Montgomery's 1947 Tour of Africa."** Vol.79, No.3 (July, 2015), pp.745-766. An overlooked event of the immediate postwar era that provides a window into both Field Marshal Bernard Montgomery's (1887-1976) post-1945 career and the attitudes of the new Labour government towards defense.

Downs, Troy, **"The Raj in Peril: The City of Benares [Varanasi] during the Indian Uprising of 1857."** Vol.81, No.1 (January, 2017), pp.39-73.

Connor, John, **"Climate, Environment, and Australian Frontier Wars: New South Wales, 1788-1841."** Vol.81, No.4 (October, 2017), pp.985-1006. Attests that there was a strong correlation between the onset of drought in the inland region of south-eastern Australia and the eruption of armed conflict from 1824 to 1841, advocating a consideration of the impact of weather on the outbreak of war throughout history.

Beckett, Ian F. **"How Wars End: Victorian Colonial Conflicts."** Vol.82, No.1 (January, 2018), pp.29-44. The author challenges the conclusions of Bruce Collins' in his article "Defining Victory in Victorian Warfare, 1860-1882." *The Journal of Military History*, Vol.77, No.3 (July, 2013), pp.895-929.

Hughes, Matthew, **"Women, Violence, and the Arab Revolt in Palestine, 1936-39."** Vol.83, No.2 (April, 2019), pp.487-507. Seeks to understand what part Palestinian women played in the Arab Revolt, how British colonial pacification affected the latter, and how British soldiers treated Palestinian women.

Tian Ser Seah, Joshua-John, **"Singapore, Hong Kong, and the Royal Navy's War in Korea, c.1950-1953: Part 1."** Vol.83, No.4 (October, 2018), pp.1213-1234; **"Part 2."** Vol.84, No.1 (January, 2020), pp.237-260.

IMPERIALISM: FRANCE

Gershovich, Moshe, **"The Ait Ya'qub Incident and the Crisis of French Military Policy in Morocco."** Vol.62, No.1 (January, 1998), pp.57-73. Though small in scale, the author suggests that defeat at Ait Ya'qub, 8 June, 1929, was the final straw that led the French government to call into question the twin concepts of *Maroc utile* and peaceful penetration.

Regnault, Jean-Marc, **“France’s Search for Nuclear Test Sites, 1957-1963.”** Vol.67, No.4 (October, 2003), pp.1223-1248. Reckons with the consequences for French Polynesia and New Caledonia of the mother country’s search for an alternative to the Sahara Desert in Algeria as a nuclear test site.

Vandervort, Bruce, **“Review Essay: Remembering the Empire of France in America.”** Vol.74, No.1 (January, 2010), pp.195-199.

Thomas, Martin, **“Colonial Violence in Algeria and the Distorted Logic of State Retribution: The Sétif Uprising of 1945.”** Vol.75, No.1 (January, 2011), pp.125-157. Charts the rapid escalation of French security and vigilante violence in response to the uprising that broke out on VE-Day, 8 May, 1945, arguing that in the long run this was counterproductive.

Benbow, Tim, **“‘Menace’ to ‘Ironclad’: The British Operations against Dakar (1940) and Madagascar (1942).”** Vol.75, No.3 (July, 2011), pp.769-809. Investigates why, regarding two separate British operations against Vichy French colonies in Africa, ‘Menace’ failed, while ‘Ironclad’ succeeded.

Vandervort, Bruce, **“When the French Colonial Mind Turns to Thoughts of War.”** Vol.76, No.3 (July, 2012), pp.847-851. Looks at two recent works on French imperialism: one a two-volume collection of twenty-eight essays, the overwhelming majority of which are devoted to Africa, the other book is an attempt at a synthesis of French colonialism exclusively in Africa.

Woodfork, Jacqueline, **“It is a Crime to be a *Tirailleur* in the Army.”** Vol.77, No.1 (January, 2013), pp.115-139. Presents the contrast between the rights of indigenous civilians in the French colony of Senegal and those of the *Tirailleur sénégalais*.

Boylan, Kevin M. **“No ‘Technical Knockout’: Giap’s Artillery at Dien Bien Phu.”** Vol.78, No.4 (October, 2014), pp.1349-1383. Contests the common explanation for the victory of the Vietnamese People’s Army based on a flood of Vietnamese publications around the 2004 fiftieth anniversary of the siege, 13 March – 7 May, 1954.

Hagstrom, Jacob, **“‘My Soldiers Above All’: Justifying Violence against Noncombatants in French Algeria, 1830-1847.”** Vol.86, No.1 (January, 2022), pp.32-53. Shows that French officers participating in the conquest of Algeria defended the actions of their soldiers against civilians, which were motivated by fear, anger, and greed, on the basis of the necessity of preserving their lives and the lives of indigenous allies.

IMPERIALISM: ITALY

Vandervort, Bruce, **“Review Essay: Italian Imperialism and the Onset of the Great War.”** Vol.79, No.4 (October, 2015), pp.1121-1126. Three books about the Italo-Turkish War, 1911-1912, and a

third covering the wars that immediately preceding the outbreak of World War I which, of course, include both Italy's war and the Balkan Wars.

IMPERIALISM: THE NETHERLANDS

Murteira, André, "**Historiographical Essay: The Military Revolution and European Wars Outside of Europe: The Dutch-Portuguese War in Asia in the First Quarter of the Seventeenth Century.**" Vol.84, No.2 (April, 2020), pp.511-535. Challenges the notion of Early Modern Western Military exceptionalism that, in Portuguese historiography, has blamed their defeat on Portuguese naval forces that were inferior to their Dutch opponents supposedly because of Asian military influence that was absent among the Dutch.

IMPERIALISM: PORTUGAL

Dhada, Mustafah, "**The Liberation War in Guinea-Bissau Reconsidered.**" Vol.62, No.3 (July, 1998), pp.571-593. Disputes the image of a straightforward march to victory for the *Partido Africano de Independência de Guiné e Cabo Verde* (P.A.I.G.C.), demonstrating that, instead, it was a struggle involving moves and countermoves by Portuguese forces and the P.A.I.G.C., each designed to maintain or regain specific initiatives, each designed to check or checkmate the opponent.

Monteiro, Armando da Silva Saturnino, "**The Decline and Fall of Portuguese Seapower, 1588-1663.**" Vol.65, No.1 (January, 2001), pp.9-20.

Murteira, André, "**Historiographical Essay: The Military Revolution and European Wars Outside of Europe: The Dutch-Portuguese War in Asia in the First Quarter of the Seventeenth Century.**" Vol.84, No.2 (April, 2020), pp.511-535. Challenges the notion of Early Modern Western Military exceptionalism that, in Portuguese historiography, has blamed their defeat on Portuguese naval forces that were inferior to their Dutch opponents supposedly because of Asian military influence that was absent among the Dutch.

IMPERIALISM: SPAIN

Tone, John Lawrence, "**The Machete and the Liberation of Cuba.**" Vol.62, No.1 (January, 1998), pp.7-28. Disputes the importance attached to the machete, arguing that the significance of its symbolic value has overshadowed the fact that the Cuban Liberation Army relied, first and foremost, on the use of rifles, in which they surpassed their Spanish opponents.

Alvarez, Jose E. "**Between Gallipoli and D-Day: Alhucemas, 1925.**" Vol.63, No.1 (January, 1999), pp.75-98. Recounts the Spanish amphibious landing at Alhucemas Bay on 8 September, 1925, during the Rif Rebellion in North Africa.

IMPERIALISM: TURKEY / OTTOMAN EMPIRE

DeVries, Kelly, **“The Lack of a Western European Military Response to the Ottoman Invasions of Eastern Europe from Nicopolis (1396) to Mohacs (1526).”** Vol.63, No.3 (July, 1999), pp.539-559. Inquires into the reasons behind a failure to respond to the Turkish threat, proposing that it was a combination of the intimidating power of the Ottomans and changing attitudes towards the duties expected of a Christian soldier.

IMPERIALISM: U.S.A.

Birtle, Andrew J. **“The U.S. Army’s Pacification of Marinduque, Philippine Islands, April 1900 – April 1901.”** Vol.61, No.2 (April, 1997), pp.255-282. Observes that the common image of the U.S. counterinsurgency campaign in the Philippines that emphasizes the political ‘Nation Building’ approach obscures the equally if not more important harsh military measures indispensable for pacification.

INDIA

Jackson, Aaron P. **“Review Essay: Expanding the Scope and Accessibility of Non-Western Military History.”** Vol.75, No.2 (April, 2011), pp.603-613. Covering works on China, India, and Russia.

INDIA: ANCIENT PERIOD

Boesche, Roger, **“Kautilya’s *Arthaśāstra* on War and Diplomacy in Ancient India.”** Vol.67, No.1 (January, 2003), pp.9-37. Kautilya is believed to have been an adviser to the founder of the Mauryan Empire, Chandragupta (c.317-293 B.C.E.).

Lonsdale, David J. **“Alexander the Great and the Art of adaptation.”** Vol.77, No.3 (July, 2013), pp.817-835. Uses the examples of Alexander’s (356-323 B.C.E.) operations in the Balkans, against the Persian navy, counterinsurgency in Central Asia, and the Battle of Hydaspes (326 B.C.E.).

INDIA: EARLY MODERN PERIOD (1480-1789)

Bryant, G.J. **“Asymmetric Warfare: The British Experience in Eighteenth-Century India.”** Vol.68, No.2 (April, 2004), pp.431-469. Juxtaposes the adaption to new circumstance of Indian versus British military forces, proposing that while the British were able to retain their military superiority, Indian rulers were unable to overcome political obstacles that interfered with the adoption of European methods.

De la Garza, Andrew, **“The Mughal Battlefield: Personnel, Technology, and Tactics in the Early Empire, 1500-1605.”** Vol.78, No.3 (July, 2014), pp.927-960. Challenges the assumptions of inferiority in comparison with the ‘European Military Revolution.’

Tzoref-Ashkenazi, Chen, **“German Military Participation in Early Modern European Colonialism.”** Vol.80, No.3 (July, 2016), pp.671-695. Brings to light the employment of German mercenaries in the colonial ventures of different European kingdoms.

Nath, Pratyay, **“Looking beyond the Military Revolution: Variations in Early Modern Warfare and the Mughal Case.”** Vol.86, No.1 (January, 2022), pp.9-31. Argues that the heterogeneous nature of Mughal strategy, tactics, and the deployment of technology over time and across space was due to a wide range of factors, including environmental conditions, military pragmatism, financial considerations, and distance from the imperial heartland, challenging the simplistic early modern ‘Military Revolution’ thesis.

INDIA: LATE 18th TO EARLY 19th CENTURY

Roy, Kaushik, **“Military Synthesis in South Asia: Armies, Warfare, and Indian Society, c.1740-1849.”** Vol.69, No.3 (July, 2005), pp.651-690. Attempts to determine why, with both the British East India Company and the Mughal successor states developing hybrid military forces, it was the E.I.C.’s armies that, more often than not, achieved victory.

INDIA: THE BRITISH RAJ (1858-1947)

Boyce, D. George, **“From Assaye to the *Assaye*: Reflections on British Government, Force, and Moral Authority in India.”** Vol.63, No.3 (July, 1999), pp.643-668. Appraises the role of the threat and use of force in British rule, from the Battle of Assaye (1803) to the naval mutiny of 1946, including how the reliance on force shaped the moral and ethical justifications for the British governing India.

Fitzpatrick, David J. **“Emory Upton and the Citizen Soldier.”** Vol.65, No.2 (April, 2001), pp.355-389. Refutes the accepted notion of Upton’s opposition to citizen-soldiers and democracy. The article includes a review of Upton’s (1839-1881) reflections on the military systems in India and Serbia.

Roy, Kaushik, **“Coercion through Leniency: British Manipulation of the Courts-Martial System in the Post-Mutiny Indian Army, 1859-1913.”** Vol.65, No.4 (October, 2001), pp.937-964.

Johnson, R.A. **“‘Russians at the Gates of India’?: Planning the Defence of India, 1885-1900.”** Vol.67, No.3 (July, 2003), pp.697-743.

Tripodi, Christian, “**‘Good for one but not the other’: The ‘Sandeman System’ of Pacification as Applied to Baluchistan and the North-West Frontier, 1877-1947.**” Vol.73, No.3 (July, 2009), pp.767-802. Looks at why the Government of India declared Colonel Sir Robert Groves Sandeman’s (1835-1892) innovative doctrine of tribal administration inapplicable for the troubled North West Frontier, despite its having achieved success in Baluchistan.

Sundaram, Chandar S. “**‘Treated with Scant Attention’: The Imperial Cadet Corps, Indian Nobles, and Anglo-Indian Policy, 1897-1917.**” Vol.77, No.1 (January, 2013), pp.41-70. Foreshadowing the Indianization of the Indian Army’s officer corps and the opening of the Indian Military Academy in 1932, the Imperial Cadet Corps offered officer training to Indian princes and gentlemen between 1901 and 1917.

Beckett, Ian F.W. “**The Road to Kandahar: The Politics of Retention and Withdrawal in Afghanistan, 1880-81.**” Vol.78, No.4 (October, 2014), pp.1263-1294.

Downs, Troy, “**The Raj in Peril: The City of Benares [Varanasi] during the Indian Uprising of 1857.**” Vol.81, No.1 (January, 2017), pp.39-73.

INDIA: WORLD WAR I (1914-18)

Tan Tai-Yong, “**An Imperial Home-Front: Punjab and the First World War.**” Vol.64, No.2 (April, 2000), pp.371-410. Looks at how, during the war, the civil administration of the State of Punjab ended up concentrating on recruiting men for the Indian Army.

INDIA: WORLD WAR II (1939-45)

Roy, Kaushik, “**Military Loyalty in the Colonial Context: A Case Study of the Indian Army during World War II.**” Vol.73, No.2 (April, 2009), pp.497-529. Uncovers the motives for and extent of loyalty to the British colonial regime of the Indian Army troops fighting in Burma in the context of the British elite’s concerns about the loyalty of Indian soldiers.

INDIA: KOREAN WAR (1950-53)

Grey, Jeffrey, “**The Formation of the Commonwealth Division, 1950-1951.**” Vol.81, No.4 (October, 2017), pp.1097-1107. The saga of the military and political challenges of forming a division composed of units from the Australian, British, Canadian, Indian, and New Zealand armies.

INDIANS, AMERICAN – See: NATIVE AMERICAN CONFLICTS

1st INDOCHINA WAR (1946-54)

Boylan, Kevin M. “No ‘Technical Knockout’: Giap’s Artillery at Dien Bien Phu.” Vol.78, No.4 (October, 2014), pp.1349-1383. Contests the common explanation for the victory of the Vietnamese People’s Army based on a flood of Vietnamese publications around the 2004 fiftieth anniversary of the siege, 13 March – 7 May, 1954.

Wagner, Erich, “Ingenuity, Excess, Incompetence, and Luck: Air-Resupply Anecdotes in **Military History**.” Vol.84, No.2 (April, 2020), pp.427-457. Reviews six case studies from taken the Second Italo-Ethiopian War (1935-1936), the Spanish Civil War (1936-1939), the Battle of Stalingrad (1942), Operation Market Garden (1944), the Battle of the Chosin Reservoir (1950), and the Battle of Dien Bien Phu (1954).

INDONESIA

Tuck, Christopher, “ ‘Cut the bonds which bind our hands’: Deniable Operations during the Confrontation with Indonesia, 1963-1966.” Vol.77, No.2 (April, 2013), pp.599-623. Describes the British confrontation with Indonesia and the problems with cross-border operations.

Borch, Fred L. “ ‘In the Name of the Queen’: Military Trials of Japanese War Criminals in the Netherlands East Indies (1946-1949).” Vol.79, No.1 (January, 2015), pp.93-125.

Tuck, Christopher, “Measuring Victory: Assessing the outcomes of *Konfrontasi*, 1963-66.” Vol.82, No.3 (July, 2018), pp.873-898. Suggests that the outcome of the British low intensity conflict with Indonesia, known as the ‘Confrontation’, is far more complex than either the triumphal or revisionist interpretations suggest.

INSURGENCY AND COUNTERINSURGENCY

Drew, Dennis M. “U.S. Airpower Theory and the Insurgent Challenge: A Short Journey to Confusion.” Vol.62, No.4 (October, 1998), pp.809-832. Covering the period from 1945 to 1992, the article contends that the U.S. Air Force has failed to account for the realities of guerrilla warfare in its theory of airpower.

Tripodi, Christian, “ ‘Good for one but not the other’: The ‘Sandeman System’ of Pacification as Applied to Baluchistan and the North-West Frontier, 1877-1947.” Vol.73, No.3 (July, 2009), pp.767-802. Looks at why the Government of India declared Colonel Sir Robert Groves Sandeman’s (1835-1892) innovative doctrine of tribal administration inapplicable for the troubled North West Frontier, despite its having achieved success in Baluchistan.

Esdaile, Charles, **“Spain 1808 – Iraq 2003: Some Thoughts on the Use and Abuse of History.”** Vol.74, No.1 (January, 2010), pp.173-188. Disputes comparisons of Napoleon’s intervention in Spain, George Bush’s (r.2001-2009) intervention in Iraq, and the subsequent counterinsurgency campaigns, arguing that they are based on false notions about the war in Spain.

Vandervort, Bruce, **“Review Essay: African Military History Comes of Age.”** Vol.81, No.1 (January, 2017), pp.205-208. A look at two significant works on the military history of the continent, one an encyclopedia of colonial conflicts, the other a three-volume narrative account of conflict, edited and written by Timothy J. Stapleton, respectively.

INSURGENCY AND COUNTERINSURGENCY: ANCIENT PERIOD (to 476)

Lonsdale, David J. **“Alexander the Great and the Art of adaptation.”** Vol.77, No.3 (July, 2013), pp.817-835. Uses the examples of Alexander’s (356-323 B.C.E.) operations in the Balkans, against the Persian navy, counterinsurgency in Central Asia, and the Battle of Hydaspes (326 B.C.E.).

INSURGENCY AND COUNTERINSURGENCY: NATIVE AMERICAN CONFLICTS

Lee, Wayne E. **“Fortify, Fight, or Flee: Tuscarora and Cherokee Defensive Warfare and Military Culture Adaptation.”** Vol.68, No.3 (July, 2004), pp.713-770.

Watt, Robert N. **“‘An Exodus to Nowhere’?: Victorio’s Tres Castillos Campaign, September-October 1880.”** Vol.80, No.4 (October, 2016), pp.1037-1072. Undertakes to show that, rather than being the conclusion to aimless wandering in the deserts of northern Mexico, the campaign was based on the traditional Apache conduct of guerrilla warfare.

INSURGENCY AND COUNTERINSURGENCY:

FRENCH REVOLUTIONARY AND NAPOLEONIC WARS (1792-1815)

North, Johnathan, **“General Hoche and Counterinsurgency.”** Vol.67, No.2 (April, 2003), pp.529-540. Louis Lazare Hoche (1768-1797) was a General of Revolutionary France whose service included the successful suppression of the Catholic Royalist Revolt in the Vendée.

Morgan, John, **“War Feeding War? The Impact of Logistics on the Napoleonic Occupation of Catalonia.”** Vol.73, No.1 (January, 2009), pp.83-116. The inability of the French occupation forces to live off the land meant that alternate sources and modes of supply had to be relied upon in the midst of guerrilla resistance and the British blockade of Catalan ports, all of which negatively impacted French operations.

Esdaile, Charles, **“Review Essay: Recent Writing on Napoleon and His Wars.”** Vol.73, No.1 (January, 2009), pp.209-220. Contains four works that cover the struggle specifically between Britain and France from 1792 to 1815, Napoleon’s (1769-1821) skill as a commander on all levels of warfare, and the guerrilla war in Spain.

INSURGENCY AND COUNTERINSURGENCY: U.S. CIVIL WAR (1861-65)

Rafuse, Ethan S. **“ ‘Little Phil’, a ‘Bad Old Man’, and the ‘Gray Ghost’: Hybrid Warfare and the Fight for the Shenandoah Valley, August-November 1864.”** Vol.81, No.3 (July, 2017), pp.775-801. Uses Major General Philip Sheridan’s (1831-1888) successful campaign against the combination of Confederate regular and irregular forces as a case study of addressing the challenges of hybrid warfare.

Swenson, Benjamin J. **“ ‘Measures of Conciliation’: Winfield Scott, Henry Halleck, and the Origins of U.S. Army Counterinsurgency Doctrine.”** Vol.86, No.4 (October, 2022), pp.859-881. Explores the collaboration between Major General Winfield Scott (1786-1866), who implemented policies intended to forestall insurgency, and General Henry Halleck (1815-1872), who made a study of Napoleon’s failed occupation of Spain, in developing U.S. Army counterinsurgency doctrine, which impacted the formation of international laws of war.

INSURGENCY AND COUNTERINSURGENCY:

CUBAN WAR OF INDEPENDENCE (1895-98)

Tone, John Lawrence, **“The Machete and the Liberation of Cuba.”** Vol.62, No.1 (January, 1998), pp.7-28. Disputes the importance attached to the machete, arguing that the significance of its symbolic value has overshadowed the fact that the Cuban Liberation Army relied, first and foremost, on the use of rifles, in which they surpassed their Spanish opponents.

INSURGENCY AND COUNTERINSURGENCY: 2nd ANGLO-BOER WAR (1899-1902)

Nasson, Bill, **“Historiographical Essay: Waging Total War in South Africa: Some Centenary Writings on the Anglo-Boer War, 1899-1902.”** Vol.66, No.3 (July, 2002), pp.813-828.

Vergolina, Joseph R. **“ ‘Methods of Barbarism’ or Western Tradition? Britain, South Africa, and the Evolution of Escalatory Violence as Policy.”** Vol.77, No.4 (October, 2013), pp.1303-1327. Investigates British counterinsurgency methods in the Second Anglo-Boer War (1899-1902).

INSURGENCY AND COUNTERINSURGENCY: PHILIPPINE-U.S. WAR (1899-1902)

Birtle, Andrew J. **“The U.S. Army’s Pacification of Marinduque, Philippine Islands, April 1900 – April 1901.”** Vol.61, No.2 (April, 1997), pp.255-282. Observes that the common image of the U.S. counterinsurgency campaign in the Philippines that emphasizes the political ‘Nation Building’ approach obscures the equally if not more important harsh military measures indispensable for pacification.

INSURGENCY AND COUNTERINSURGENCY: INTERWAR PERIOD (1919-39)

Gershovich, Moshe, **“The Ait Ya’qub Incident and the Crisis of French Military Policy in Morocco.”** Vol.62, No.1 (January, 1998), pp.57-73. Though small in scale, the author suggests that defeat at Ait Ya’qub, 8 June, 1929, was the final straw that led the French government to call into question the twin concepts of *Maroc utile* and peaceful penetration.

Hughes, Matthew, **“Women, Violence, and the Arab Revolt in Palestine, 1936-39.”** Vol.83, No.2 (April, 2019), pp.487-507. Seeks to understand what part Palestinian women played in the Arab Revolt, how British colonial pacification affected the latter, and how British soldiers treated Palestinian women.

Xiaogang Lai, Sherman, **“ ‘The Devil is in the Details’: Mao Zedong before and after the Luochuan Conference, August 1937.”** Vol.85, No.4 (October, 2021), pp.930-953. Relates how Mao Zedong (1893-1976) succeeded in convincing both the Chinese Communist Party and Joseph Stalin (1878-1953) to adopt his strategy of guerrilla warfare.

INSURGENCY AND COUNTERINSURGENCY: WORLD WAR II (1939-45)

Pennington, Reina, **“Offensive Women: Women in Combat in the Red Army in the Second World War.”** Vol.74, No.3 (July, 2010), pp.775-820. Reports on the nature and variety of women’s combat experiences.

Trifković, Gaj, **“The Yugoslav Partisans’ Lost Victories: Operations in Montenegro and Bosnia-Herzegovina, 1944-1945.”** Vol.82, No.1 (January, 2018), pp.95-124. Seeks to understand why the Germans were able to extricate their XXI Mountain Corps from two consecutive attempts at encirclement during October 1944 through April 1945.

Wildermuth, David W. **“ ‘I am fully aware of my guilt...’: Insights from a Soviet Military Tribunal’s Investigation of the German Army’s 35th Division, 1946-47.”** Vol.83, No.4 (October, 2019), pp.1189-1212. Weighing the credibility of both perpetrator and eyewitness statements from Soviet tribunals for information on the actions of officers and soldiers of the German 35th Division during anti-partisan operations in April, 1944.

Lim, Preston Jordan, **“Churchill’s Butchers: Mission 204’s Operations in China, 1942-1945.”** Vol.84, No.4 (October, 2020), pp.1127-1156. Whereas previous studies have focused on the

mission's record in 1942, the author examines the entire length of service of this combined British-Australian commando unit tasked with training Nationalist guerrillas, suggesting that it was more successful than previously thought.

INSURGENCY AND COUNTERINSURGENCY: CHINESE CIVIL WAR (1946-49)

Tanner, Harold M. **"Guerrilla, Mobile, and Base Warfare in Communist Military Operations in Manchuria, 1945-1947."** Vol.67, No.4 (October, 2003), pp.1177-1222. Relates how, after initial setbacks while relying on a conventional war strategy, the Communists developed a hybrid strategy that turned the tide of the Civil War, enabling them to make a more successful transition from guerrilla to conventional warfare.

Jeans, Roger B., Jr. **"Ghost Guerrillas: The C.I.A. and 'Tiger General' Li Zongren's Third Force during the Early Cold War."** Vol.81, No.2 (April, 2017), pp.491-512. The attempt by the C.I.A. to develop an anti-Communist faction as an alternative to Chiang Kai-Shek's (1887-1975) Nationalists and the broader impact of this approach on the C.I.A.

INSURGENCY AND COUNTERINSURGENCY: GREEK CIVIL WAR (1946-49)

Goulter, Christine J.M. **"The Greek Civil War: A National Army's Counter-Insurgency Triumph."** Vol.78, No.3 (July, 2014), pp.1017-1055. Challenges the assumption that victory resulted from Anglo-American training and equipment, rather than the Greek National Army's successful development of an effective counter-insurgency strategy.

INSURGENCY AND COUNTERINSURGENCY: VIETNAM WAR (1955-75): U.S.A.

Carland, John M. **"Winning the Vietnam War: Westmoreland's Approach in Two Documents."** Vol.68, No.2 (April, 2004), pp.553-574.

Malkasian, Carter, **"Toward a Better Understanding of Attrition: The Korean and Vietnam Wars."** Vol.68, No.3 (July, 2004), pp.911-942.

Birtle, Andrew J. **"PROVN, Westmoreland, and the Historians: A Reappraisal."** Vol.72, No.4 (October, 2008), pp.1213-1247. A reassessment of the U.S. Army report, nicknamed PROVN, that, in the past, had been mined for information with which to criticize General William C. Westmoreland (1914-2004) and praise his successor as commander of U.S. forces in South Vietnam, General Creighton Abrams (1914-1974).

Boylan, Kevin M. **"The Red Queen's Race: Operation Washington Green and Pacification in Binh Dinh Province, 1969-70."** Vol.73, No.4 (October, 2009), pp.1195-1230. Examines the operations conducted by the 173rd Airborne Brigade in Binh Dinh Province closely, which matched recommendations made by many of the critics of the way U.S. military forces was

conducted the war and, therefore, offers insight into the likely effectiveness of an alternate strategy focused on population control.

Carland, John M. **“Review Essay: Scorecard on CIA C.O.I.N. in Vietnam.”** Vol.75, No.3 (July, 2011), pp.887-891.

Daddis, Gregory A. **“Eating Soup with a Spoon: The U.S. Army as a ‘Learning Organization’ in the Vietnam War.”** Vol.77, No.1 (January, 2013), pp.229-254. The U.S. Army’s strategic approach, operational experience, and organizational changes.

Lenaburg, Jerry, **“Review Essay: Four Slices of the Iraq War Apple.”** Vol.77, No.1 (January, 2013), pp.299-303. Includes an assessment of four recent titles about the United States war in Iraq, 2003-2011, in one case comparing counterinsurgency efforts in Iraq with those conducted by the U.S. forces in Vietnam.

Harris, J.P. **“The Early Military History of the Second Indochina War and the Mayor Thesis.”** Vol.85, No.3 (July, 2021), pp.734-763. Contests the interpretation of Mark Moyar that by mid-1962 the South Vietnamese government was conducting a successful counter-insurgency campaign that was cut short by the overthrow of Ngo Dinh Diem (1901-1963).

INSURGENCY AND COUNTERINSURGENCY:

ERITREAN WAR OF INDEPENDENCE (1961-91)

Weldemichael, Awet T. **“The Eritrean Long March: The Strategic Withdrawal of the Eritrean People’s Liberation Front (E.P.L.F.), 1978-1979.”** Vol.73, No.4 (October, 2009), pp.1231-1271. Despite the battlefield victories achieved by the Soviet backed Ethiopian offensives, as a guerrilla force, the Eritrean proved to be more adaptable to the changing circumstances, enabling them to go over to the tactical offensive by 1980.

INSURGENCY AND COUNTERINSURGENCY:

NORTHERN YEMEN CIVIL WAR (1962-70)

Witty, David M. **“A Regular Army in Counterinsurgency Operations: Egypt in North Yemen, 1962-1967.”** Vol.65, No.2 (April, 2001), pp.401-439. The Egyptian campaign in Yemen may have contributed to a compromise peace settlement, but it adversely impacted the Egyptian Army’s capacity to fight conventional wars.

INSURGENCY AND COUNTERINSURGENCY:

THE GUINEA-BISSAU WAR OF INDEPENDENCE (1963-74)

Dhada, Mustafah, **“The Liberation War in Guinea-Bissau Reconsidered.”** Vol.62, No.3 (July, 1998), pp.571-593. Disputes the image of a straightforward march to victory for the *Partido Africano de Independência de Guiné e Cabo Verde* (P.A.I.G.C.), demonstrating that, instead, it was a struggle involving moves and countermoves by Portuguese forces and the P.A.I.G.C., each designed to maintain or regain specific initiatives, each designed to check or checkmate the opponent.

INSURGENCY AND COUNTERINSURGENCY: OMAN (1963-76)

Hughes, Geraint, **“Demythologising Dhofar: British Policy, Military Strategy, and Counter-Insurgency in Oman, 1963-1976.”** Vol.79, No.2 (April, 2015), pp.423-456. Demonstrates that the UK backed C.O.I.N. operations of the Sultanate of Oman placed a heavier reliance on military force than civil engagement and that specific historical circumstances make the ‘lessons learned’ less applicable for other conflicts.

INSURGENCY AND COUNTER INSURGENCY: THE AFGHANISTAN WAR (2001-21)

Lenaburg, Jerry, **“Review Essay: Iraq & Afghanistan.”** Vol.77, No.3 (July, 2013), pp.1079-1084.
Exploration of three recent studies of the wars in both Afghanistan, 2001-2021, and Iraq, 2003-2011.

INSURGENCY AND COUNTER INSURGENCY: THE IRAQ WAR (2003-11)

Lenaburg, Jerry, **“Review Essay: Four Slices of the Iraq War Apple.”** Vol.77, No.1 (January, 2013), pp.299-303. Includes an assessment of four recent titles about the United States war in Iraq, 2003-2011, in one case comparing counterinsurgency efforts in Iraq with those conducted by the U.S.

Lenaburg, Jerry, **“Review Essay: Iraq & Afghanistan.”** Vol.77, No.3 (July, 2013), pp.1079-1084.
Exploration of three recent studies of the wars in both Afghanistan, 2001-2021, and Iraq, 2003-2011. forces in Vietnam.

INTELLIGENCE – See: DECEPTION AND INTELLIGENCE

INTERPRETERS

Dingman, Roger V. **“Language at War: U.S. Marine Corps Japanese Language Officers in the Pacific.”** Vol.68, No.3 (July, 2004), pp.853-883. Analyzes the origins, training, experiences, and recollections of Caucasian Japanese language officers, including the shift from translating to facilitate life-taking to lifesaving.

INTERWAR PERIOD (1919-38) arranged chronologically by conflict –

RUSSO-POLISH WAR (1919-21)

Borzęcki, “**Battle of Warsaw, 1920: Was Radio Intelligence the Key to Polish Victory over the Red Army?**” Vol.81, No.2 (April, 2017), pp.447-468. A look at what recent Polish literature has to say about the role of radio-intelligence in the Russo-Polish War, 1919-1920.

INTERWAR PERIOD (1919-38) arranged chronologically by conflict –

THE RIF WAR (1921-26)

Alvarez, Jose E. “**Between Gallipoli and D-Day: Alhucemas, 1925.**” Vol.63, No.1 (January, 1999), pp.75-98. Recounts the Spanish amphibious landing at Alhucemas Bay on 8 September, 1925, during the Rif Rebellion in North Africa.

INTERWAR PERIOD (1919-38) arranged chronologically by conflict –

THE CHACO WAR (1932-35)

Hughes, Matthew, “**Logistics and the Chaco War: Bolivia versus Paraguay, 1932-1935.**” Vol.69, No.2 (April, 2005), pp.411-437. Employs a broad definition of logistics that includes the acquisition of matériel before the outbreak of war, as well as the establishment of national and international supply lines during the war.

INTERWAR PERIOD (1919-38) arranged chronologically by conflict –

THE SPANISH CIVIL WAR (1936-39)

Cerdá, Néstor, “**Political Ascent and Military Commander: General Franco in the Early Months of the Spanish Civil War, July-October 1936.**” Vol.75, No.4 (October, 2011), pp.1125-1157. Displays how General Francisco Franco (1892-1975) exploited the opportunities presented by the setbacks to the coup plotters in July through August, 1936, to rise from being merely another general supporting the uprising to the position of commander-in-chief of the Nationalist Army and head of the government.

INTERWAR PERIOD (1919-38) arranged chronologically by conflict –

2nd SINO-JAPANESE WAR (1937-45)

Gordon, David M. “**Historiographical Essay: The China-Japan War, 1931-1945.**” Vol.70, No.1 (January, 2006), pp.137-182.

Henriot, Christian, “**The Battle of Shanghai (January-March 1932): A Study in the Space-Time**

of War.” Vol.85, No.1 (January, 2021), pp.76-94. Focuses on the impact of urban and rural environments on the manner in which the Imperial Japanese and Nationalist Chinese forces fought one another.

INTERWAR PERIOD (1919-39) arranged alphabetically by country –

ENGLAND / GREAT BRITAIN

Bell, Christopher M. “**‘Our Most Exposed Outpost’: Hong Kong and British Far Eastern Strategy, 1921-1941.**” Vol.60, No.1 (January, 1996), pp.61-88. Brings to light the vital, if overlooked role of Hong Kong as a base for offensive operations in British interwar plans for a war with Japan has been.

Kennedy, Greg, “**Anglo-American Strategic Relations and Intelligence Assessments of Japanese Air Power 1934-1941.**” Vol.74, No.3 (July, 2010), pp.737-773. Reassesses the influence of racism on Anglo-American views of Japanese air power, and how this influence evolved in the seven years leading up to Pearl Harbor.

Bell, Christopher M. “**Winston Churchill and the Ten Year Rule.**” Vol.74, No.4 (October, 2010), pp.1097-1128. Insists that criticisms of Churchill’s defense spending cutbacks during his tenure as Chancellor of the Exchequer (1924-29) exaggerate his authority and oversimplify his complex and shifting combination of political, financial, strategic, and bureaucratic goals.

Neilson, Keith, “**The Royal Navy, Japan, and British Strategic Foreign Policy, 1932-1934.**” Vol.75, No.2 (April, 2011), pp.505-531. Japan’s challenge to British interests affected British policy generally, and particularly Anglo-American relations, producing conflicting proposals from the Treasury, the Admiralty, and the Foreign Offices.

INTERWAR PERIOD (1919-39) arranged alphabetically by country – FRANCE

Philpott, William and Alexander, Martin S. “**The French and the British Field Force: Moral Support or Material Contribution?**” Vol.71, No.3 (July, 2007), pp.743-772. Contends that, even though France viewed the military benefit of the British commitment of a field army if war broke out with Germany as unsubstantial, the moral value of such a promise meant that it played an important role in France’s preparations for war.

INTERWAR PERIOD (1919-39) arranged alphabetically by country – ITALY

Sullivan, Brian R. “**Review Essay: Fascist Italy’s Military Involvement in the Spanish Civil War.**” Vol.59, No.4 (October, 1995), pp.697-727. Surveys the existing literature concerning Benito Mussolini’s (1883-1945) commitment some 70,000 soldiers of the *Corpo Truppe Volontarie* and over 700 warplanes of the *Aviazione Legionaria* to the Nationalist cause, including the publications

of official histories.

De Ninno, Fabio, **“A Technological Fiasco: Scientific Research, Institutional Culture, and Fascism in the Italian Navy (1919-1940).”** Vol.84, No.3 (July, 2020), pp.798-824. Explains that the failure of the Italian Navy to develop and adopt new technologies, such as radar and sonar, was rooted in an opposition to technological change within the culture of the officer corps, compounded by inter-service rivalry and the chaos of the Fascist regime.

INTERWAR PERIOD (1919-39) arranged alphabetically by country – POLAND

Peszke, Michael Alfred, **“Historiographical Essay: An Introduction to English-Language Literature on the Polish Armed Forces in World War II.”** Vol.70, No.4 (October, 2006), pp.1029-1064.

Czarnecki, Jacek, **“The Rebirth and Progress of the Polish Military during the Interwar Years.”** Vol.83, No.3 (July, 2019), pp.747-768. Challenges the notion that the Polish Army’s cavalry reflected a failure of modernization, enshrined in the myth of Polish lancers charging Panzers in 1939.

INTERWAR PERIOD (1919-1939) arranged alphabetically by country – ROMANIA

Statiev, Alexander, **“Antonescu’s Eagles against Stalin’s Falcons: The Romanian Air Force, 1920-1941.”** Vol.66, No.4 (October, 2002), pp.1085-1113. Gives an account of how, though it was favored over the Army, the Air Force was assigned missions that exceeded its capacity so that it was brought to the brink of extinction.

INTERWAR PERIOD (1919-1939) arranged alphabetically by country – RUSSIA / SOVIET UNION

Reese, Roger R. **“Red Army Professionalism and the Communist Party, 1918-1941.”** Vol.66, No.1 (January, 2002), pp.71-102. Explores the social and institutional dynamics that shaped the Red Army’s officer corps and determined the extent of its ability to face the Nazi invasion.

Stone, David R. **“Misreading Svechin: Attrition, Annihilation, and Historicism.”** Vol.76, No.3 (July, 2012), pp.673-693. Debunks the interpretation that the Soviet military theorist Aleksandr Svechin (1878-1938) favored attrition over annihilation, demonstrating, instead, that he was a historicist, who saw the precise balance between attrition and annihilation, or defense and offense, as constantly shifting as a result of changing material circumstances.

Harrison, Richard W. **“Soviet Planning for War, 1936-1941: The ‘Preventative Attack’ Thesis in Historical Context.”** Vol.83, No.3 (July, 2019), pp.769-794.

Plotnikov, Dmitry, **“Still Misreading Svechin: Annihilation, Attrition, and the Strategic and Operational Implications.”** Vol.86, No.3 (July, 2022), pp.670-687. Addresses misunderstanding relating to the concepts of annihilation and attrition in the writings of the Imperial Russian and Soviet military theorist Aleksandr Svechin (1878-1938).

INTERWAR PERIOD (1919-1939) arranged alphabetically by country – U.S.A.

Ferrell, Henry C., Jr. **“Guns for Vermont: Military Land Acquisition in the 1920s.”** Vol.61, No.1 (January, 1997), pp.31-47. Presents the remarkable achievement of Vermont Senator, Frank Lester Greene (1870-1930), of arranging for the purchase of additional land for Fort Ethan Allen at a time of severely constrained defense budgets.

Hofmann, George F. **“The Tactical and Strategic Use of Attaché Intelligence: The Spanish Civil War and the U.S. Army’s Misguided Quest for a Modern Tank Doctrine.”** Vol.62, No.1 (January, 1998), pp.101-134. Asserts that the analysis of the employment of tanks in the war was distorted by the cultural bias of the infantry, cavalry, and artillery branch chiefs, leaving the U.S. Army without an armored doctrine on the eve of World War II.

Winton, Harold R. **“Toward an American Philosophy of Command.”** Vol.64, No.4 (October, 2000), pp.1035-1060. Considers the particular blend of intellectual and psychological qualities articulated within the practice of command in the U.S. Army during the interwar period.

Hone, Trent, **“The Evolution of Fleet Tactical Doctrine in the U.S. Navy, 1922-1941.”** Vol.67, No.4 (October, 2003), pp.1107-1148. Establishes how the Navy intended to use the battleships stationed at Pearl Harbor in battle, including Admiral Husband E. Kimmel’s (1882-1968) plans for a decisive fleet engagement in the Central Pacific.

Irish, Kerry E. **“Apt Pupil: Dwight Eisenhower and the 1930 Industrial Mobilization Plan.”** Vol.70, No.1 (January, 2006), pp.31-61. While the detailed plan for industrial mobilization drawn up by Eisenhower (1890-1969) as a staff officer was not formally implemented, it nevertheless provided the basis for a more efficient transition to war production than had taken place in World War I.

Bielakowski, Alexander M. **“General Hawkins’ War: The Future of the Horse in the U.S. Cavalry.”** Vol.71, No.1 (January, 2007), pp.127-138. Provides an account of the career of Brigadier General Hamilton S. Hawkins III (1872-1950), who, despite the increasing significance of mechanized forces, steadfastly advocated for horse cavalry throughout the interwar period and into the Second World War.

Ulbrich, David J. **“The Long Lost ‘Tentative Manual for Defense of Advance Bases’ (1936).”** Vol.71, No.3 (July, 2007), pp.889-901. In 1998 a copy of the Marine Corps’ previously lost

1936 Tentative Manual for Defense of Advance Bases was uncovered, a manual that displays the culmination of decades of doctrinal thinking about the defense of island bases against enemy amphibious, naval, and aerial assaults.

Kellner, Katrina E. and Perras, Galen Roger, “**‘A Perfectly Logical and Sensible Thing’: Billy Mitchell Advocates a Canadian-American Aerial Alliance Against Japan.**” Vol.72, No.3 (July, 2008), pp.785-823. As a result of his overlooked trip to Canada in 1923, Brigadier General Billy Mitchell (1879-1936) formulated a plan for employing an allied U.S.-Canadian strategic bombing force based in Alaska to wage war on Japan.

Irish, Kerry, “**Dwight Eisenhower and Douglas MacArthur in the Philippines: There Must Be a Day of Reckoning [1935-39].**” Vol.74, No.2 (April, 2010), pp.439-473. Demonstrates that Eisenhower’s (1890-1969) dislike of MacArthur (1880-1964) was less about personalities and more about disagreements over the building of an army in an impoverished country and the proper qualities that a U.S. Army officer should exhibit and develop in his subordinates.

Kennedy, Greg, “**Anglo-American Strategic Relations and Intelligence Assessments of Japanese Air Power 1934-1941.**” Vol.74, No.3 (July, 2010), pp.737-773. Reassesses the influence of racism on Anglo-American views of Japanese air power, and how this influence evolved in the seven years leading up to Pearl Harbor.

Holwitt, Joel I. “**Review Essay: Reappraising the Interwar U.S. Navy.**” Vol.76, No.1 (January, 2012), pp.193-210. New studies demonstrate that the interwar U.S. was frequently led by innovative leaders, willing to experiment with new technologies and able to use fleet exercises and an internal review process to creatively, but realistically, generate a strategy that worked within the geographical and treaty constraints of an expected war in the Pacific.

IRAN

Cogan, Charles G. “**Desert One and Its Disorders.**” Vol.67, No.1 (January, 2003), pp.201-216. Argues that the failure of the attempt to rescue the hostages in Iran, 1980, provoked the principle of joint operations in the U.S. Armed Forces and the consolidation of Special Forces under a Special Operations Command.

Brands, Hal, “**Why did Saddam Invade Iran [1980]? New Evidence on Motives, Complexity, and the Israel Factor.**” Vol.75, No.3 (July, 2011), pp.861-885.

Lonsdale, David J. “**Alexander the Great and the Art of adaptation.**” Vol.77, No.3 (July, 2013), pp.817-835. Uses the examples of Alexander’s (356-323 B.C.E.) operations in the Balkans, against the Persian navy, counterinsurgency in Central Asia, and the Battle of Hydaspes (326 B.C.E.).

IRAQ: WORLD WAR II (1939-45)

Biddiscombe, Perry, **“The Mufti’s Men: Haj Amin-al-Husayni and S.S. Parachute Expeditions to Palestine and Iraq, 1944-1945.”** Vol.82, No.3 (July, 2018), pp.783-815.

IRAQ: ARAB-ISRAELI WARS

Rudd, Gordon W. **“Review Essay: The Israeli Revisionist Historians and the Arab-Israeli Conflict Part One: From the Founding of Zionism to the 1967 War.”** Vol.67, No.4 (October, 2003), pp.1263-1270; **“Part Two: From the 1967 War to the Present.”** Vol.68, No.1 (January, 2004), pp.225-231.

IRAQ: THE IRAN-IRAQ WAR (1980-88)

Brands, Hal, **“Why did Saddam Invade Iran [1980]? New Evidence on Motives, Complexity, and the Israel Factor.”** Vol.75, No.3 (July, 2011), pp.861-885.

IRAQ: THE IRAQ WAR (2003-11)

Esdaile, Charles, **“Spain 1808 – Iraq 2003: Some Thoughts on the Use and Abuse of History.”** Vol.74, No.1 (January, 2010), pp.173-188. Disputes comparisons of Napoleon’s intervention in Spain, George Bush’s (r.2001-2009) intervention in Iraq, and the subsequent counterinsurgency campaigns, arguing that they are based on false notions about the war in Spain.

Lenaburg, Jerry, **“Review Essay: Four Slices of the Iraq War Apple.”** Vol.77, No.1 (January, 2013), pp.299-303. Includes an assessment of four recent titles about the United States war in Iraq, 2003-2011, in one case comparing counterinsurgency efforts in Iraq with those conducted by the U.S. forces in Vietnam.

Lenaburg, Jerry, **“Review Essay: Iraq & Afghanistan.”** Vol.77, No.3 (July, 2013), pp.1079-1084. Exploration of three recent studies of the wars in both Afghanistan, 2001-2021, and Iraq, 2003-2011.

IRELAND: U.S. CIVIL WAR (1861-65)

Bruce, Susannah Ural, **“‘Remember Your Country and Keep up Its Credit’: Irish Volunteers and the Union Army, 1861-1865.”** Vol.69, No.2 (April, 2005), pp.331-359. Puts forward the explanation that a central theme in the support of Irish immigrants for the Union cause was their dual loyalties to both their new and original homelands, support that was tested by the rising casualties, Emancipation Proclamation, and the introduction of the draft.

Keller, Christian B. **“Flying Dutchmen and Drunken Irishmen: The Myths and Realities of Ethnic Civil War Soldiers.”** Vol.73, No.1 (January, 2009), pp.117-145. Contrasts the myths, misconceptions, and stereotypes developed by Anglo-Americans regarding German- and Irish-American soldiers fighting in the United States Civil War with the historical truth about ethnic participation in the conflict.

IRELAND: WORLD WAR II (1939-45)

Hull, Mark M. **“The Irish Interlude: German Intelligence in Ireland, 1939-1943.”** Vol.66, No.3 (July, 2002), pp.695-717.

IRELAND: THE ‘TROUBLES’ IN NORTHERN IRELAND (1969-98)

Drohan, Brian, **“Unintended Consequences: Baton Rounds, Riots, and Counterinsurgency in Northern Ireland, 1970-1981.”** Vol.82, No.2 (April, 2018), pp.491-514. Designed to be a non-lethal means of employing force, the misuse of baton rounds by British soldiers resulting in serious injuries and even deaths, produced exactly the opposite public relations impact that was intended.

ISOROKU YAMAMOTO (1884-1943)

Weinberg, Gerhard L. **“The George C. Marshall Lecture in Military History: Some Myths of World War II.”** Vol.75, No.3 (July, 2011), pp.701-718. Includes issues surrounding Winston Churchill, Adolf Hitler, Yamamoto Isoroku, Benito Mussolini, Franklin Roosevelt, and Josef Stalin, as well as the Yalta Conference, the Morgenthau Plan for Germany, and the ubiquity of horses in the Second World War.

ISRAEL / PALESTINE: ANCIENT PERIOD (to 476)

Sheldon, Rose Mary, **“Review Essay: *The Military History of Ancient Israel* by Richard A. Gabriel.”** Vol.69, No.1 (January, 2005), pp.197-204.

ISRAEL / PALESTINE: MEDIEVAL PERIOD (476-1480)

Ehrlich, Michael, **“The Battle of Ain al-Mallāha, 19 June 1157.”** Vol.83, No.1 (January, 2019), pp.31-42. An examination of the victory of Nūr al-Dīn’s (1146-1174) Syrian forces over a Frankish army led by the King of Jerusalem, Baldwin III (r.1143-1163), in the northern Jordan Valley that relates written sources to a careful examination of the terrain of the actual battlefield.

Fulton, Michael S. **“The Siege of Montfort and Mamluk Artillery Technology in 1271: Integrating the Archaeology and Topography with the Narrative Sources.”** Vol.83, No.3 (July, 2019), pp.689-717. An investigation into the development of mechanical artillery, specifically the trebuchet, through the study of archaeologically unearthed projectiles and the suitability of the surrounding terrain for the deployment of trebuchets.

ISRAEL / PALESTINE: WORLD WAR I (1914-18)

Bou, Jean, **“Cavalry, Firepower, and Swords: The Australian Light Horse and the Tactical Lessons of Cavalry Operations in Palestine, 1916-1918.”** Vol.71, No.1 (January, 2007), pp.99-125. Contrary to the traditions of the Australian mounted service, by the end of the Campaign in Palestine more than half of the Australian Light Horse were armed with both rifles and swords, relying on both fire and modern shock tactics.

Sheffy, Yigal, **“Chemical Warfare and the Palestine Campaign, 1916-1918.”** Vol.73, No.3 (July, 2009), pp.803-844. Brings light to the British use of chemical warfare in the Second (April, 1917) and Third (October-November, 1917) Battles of Gaza, the Ottoman response, and the reasons why this aspect of the Palestine Campaign have been disregarded in the historiography.

ISRAEL / PALESTINE: INTERWAR PERIOD (1919-39)

Hughes, Matthew, **“Women, Violence, and the Arab Revolt in Palestine, 1936-39.”** Vol.83, No.2 (April, 2019), pp.487-507. Seeks to understand what part Palestinian women played in the Arab Revolt, how British colonial pacification affected the latter, and how British soldiers treated Palestinian women.

ISRAEL / PALESTINE: WORLD WAR II (1939-45)

Biddiscombe, Perry, **“The Mufti’s Men: Haj Amin-al-Husayni and S.S. Parachute Expeditions to Palestine and Iraq, 1944-1945.”** Vol.82, No.3 (July, 2018), pp.783-815.

ISRAEL / PALESTINE: ARAB-ISRAELI WARS

Rudd, Gordon W. **“Review Essay: The Israeli Revisionist Historians and the Arab-Israeli Conflict Part One: From the Founding of Zionism to the 1967 War.”** Vol.67, No.4 (October, 2003), pp.1263-1270; **“Part Two: From the 1967 War to the Present.”** Vol.68, No.1 (January, 2004), pp.225-231.

ISRAEL / PALESTINE: ARAB-ISRAELI WAR (1948)

Tal, David, **“Between Intuition and Professionalism: Israeli Military Leadership during the 1948 Palestine War.”** Vol.68, No.3 (July, 2004), pp.885-909.

Cline, Eric H. and Sutter, Anthony, **“Battlefield Archaeology at Armageddon: Cartridge Cases and the 1948 Battle for Megiddo, Israel.”** Vol.75, No.1 (January, 2011), pp.159-190. Israeli Archaeologists investigating the ancient history of Megiddo, came across 213 spent Czechoslovakian cartridge cases, with which they attempted to reconstruct the fighting that took place at that location during the 1948 war.

Arielli, Nir, **“When are Foreign Volunteers Useful? Israel’s Transnational Soldiers in the War of 1948 Re-examined.”** Vol.78, No.2 (April, 2014), pp.703-724. Assesses the military and political utility for Israel of *Machal* (overseas volunteers) by comparing them with alternate examples of this phenomenon in other twentieth century conflicts.

ISRAEL / PALESTINE: ARAB-ISRAELI WAR (1967)

Gat, Moshe, **“On the Use of Air Power and Its Effect on the Outbreak of the Six Day War.”** Vol.68, No.4 (October, 2004), pp.1187-1215. Insists that, whatever advantages Israel’s increased reliance on air power following the Suez Campaign, 1956, it inadvertently led to a deterioration of Arab-Israeli relations. [Elron, Zeev and Gat, Moshe, “Remarks on Air Power and the Six-Day War [And Response].” Vol.69, No.3 (July, 2005), pp.811-820.]

Elron, Zeev and Gat, Moshe, **“Remarks on Air Power and the Six-Day War [And Response].”** Vol.69, No.3 (July, 2005), pp.811-820.

ISRAEL / PALESTINE: ARAB-ISRAELI WAR (1973)

Bronfeld, Saul, **“Fighting Outnumbered: The Impact of the Yom Kippur War on the U.S. Army.”** Vol.71, No.2 (April, 2007), pp.465-498. Illustrates the different ways in which the Yom Kippur War impacted the work of Generals William E. DePuy (1919-1992) and Donn A. Starry (1925-2011) in reforming the U.S. Army.

Joseph, Uri Bar, **“Strategic Surprise or Fundamental Flaws? The Source of Israel’s Military Defeat at the Beginning of the 1973 War.”** Vol.72, No.2 (April, 2008), pp.509-530. Suggests that that the deficient deployment of Israeli forces that met the Egyptian assault was due to a failure of intelligence to provide sufficient warning.

Young, James L., Jr. **“The Heights of Ineptitude: The Syrian Army’s Assault on the Golan Heights.”** Vol.74, No.3 (July, 2010), pp.847-870. Argues that, during the 1973 Yom Kippur War, it was primarily the Syrian’s tactical incompetence and failure to adhere to Soviet operational doctrine that ensured Israeli victory on the Golan Heights, notwithstanding the bravery of the Israeli troops.

Rodman, David, **“Review Essay: A Tale of Two Fronts: Israeli Military Performance during**

the Early Days of the 1973 Yom Kippur War.” Vol.82, No.1 (January, 2018), pp.208-218.

Ezov, Amiram, **“The Crossing Challenge: The Suez Canal Crossing by the Israeli Defense Forces during the Yom Kippur War of 1973.”** Vol.82, No.2 (April, 2018), pp.461-490.

Compares the setting of objectives, planning, and execution of the Egyptian Army’s crossing with that of the Israeli Defense Forces.

ISRAEL / PALESTINE: IRAN-IRAQ WAR (1980-88)

Brands, Hal, **“Why did Saddam Invade Iran [1980]? New Evidence on Motives, Complexity, and the Israel Factor.”** Vol.75, No.3 (July, 2011), pp.861-885.

ITALY: ANCIENT PERIOD: LATE ANTIQUITY (235-750)

Linn, Jason, **“Attila’s Appetite: The Logistics of Attila the Hun’s Invasion of Italy in 452.”**

Vol.83, No.2 (April, 2019), pp.325-246. Offers the explanation that Attila the Hun’s (406-453) decision to withdraw from Italy was not due to either Pope Leo the Great (400-461) or hunger and disease, but the approach of winter.

ITALY: EARLY MODERN PERIOD (1481-1788)

Sherer, Idan, **“ ‘All of Us, in One Voice, Demand what’s Owed Us’: Mutiny in the Spanish Infantry during the Italian Wars, 1525-1538.”** Vol.78, No.3 (July, 2014), pp.893-926.

The author notes the similarities between these all too frequent mutinies and strikes initiated and resolved by modern employees.

Ansani, Fabrizio, **“ ‘This French Artillery is very good and very effective’: Hypotheses on the Diffusion of a New Military Technology in Renaissance Italy.”** Vol.83, No.2 (April, 2019), pp.347-378. Scrutinizes the development of the production of heavy cannons in Italy before and after the French Neapolitan Campaign of 1494.

Arfaioi, Maurizio, **“Bastion of Empire: The Italian *terzo Vecchio* of the Army of Flanders (1597-1682).”** Vol.85, No.1 (January, 2021), pp.27-50. An examination of the service of the longest-lived infantry unit, the *terzo Vecchio*, in an effort to better understand Italian involvement in the long conflict within the Spanish Low Countries.

ITALY: 19th CENTURY TO 1914

Schneid, Frederick C. **“A Well-Coordinated Affair: Franco-Piedmontese War Planning in 1859.”** Vol.76, No.2 (April, 2012), pp.395-425. Demonstrates that the Franco-Piedmontese general staffs undertook extensive planning that incorporating the new technologies of railways and steam ships,

so that the Second War of Italian Unification (1859-1861) qualifies, alongside the more familiar U.S. Civil War and German Wars of Unification, as one of the first ‘modern’ wars of the industrial age.

Otte, T.G. “**From *Can-Can Diabolique* to *Sitzkrieg*: The International China Expeditionary Force, 1900-1901.**” Vol.77, No.4 (October, 2013), pp.1277-1302. Analyzes a neglected example of coalition warfare.

Vandervort, Bruce, “**Review Essay: Italian Imperialism and the Onset of the Great War.**” Vol.79, No.4 (October, 2015), pp.1121-1126. Three books about the Italo-Turkish War, 1911-1912, and a third covering the wars that immediately preceding the outbreak of World War I which, of course, include both Italy’s war and the Balkan Wars.

Wulff, Petter, “**Artillery, Light and Heavy: Sardinia-Piedmont and Sweden in the Nineteenth Century.**” Vol.80, No.1 (January, 2016), pp.173-185. Despite contrary requirements for polar opposite strategic circumstances, the cooperation of these two states produced path-breaking artillery technology.

ITALY: WORLD WAR I (1914-1918)

Ungari, Andrea, “**The Official Inquiry into the Italian Defeat at the Battle of Caporetto (October 1917).**” Vol.76, No.3 (July, 2012), pp.695-726. Addresses the question of why the general officer most responsible for the catastrophe not only managed to evade being charged for his failures but instead ended up as the Chief of Staff of the Italian Army.

ITALY: INTERWAR PERIOD (1919-1939)

Sullivan, Brian R. “**Review Essay: Fascist Italy’s Military Involvement in the Spanish Civil War.**” Vol.59, No.4 (October, 1995), pp.697-727. Surveys the existing literature concerning Benito Mussolini’s (1883-1945) commitment some 70,000 soldiers of the *Corpo Truppe Volontarie* and over 700 warplanes of the *Aviazione Legionaria* to the Nationalist cause, including the publications of official histories.

Corum, James S. “**The Spanish Civil War: Lessons Learned and not Learned by the Great Powers.**” Vol.62, No.2 (April, 1998), pp.313-334. Considers what the British, French, German, Italian, Soviet, and United States armed forces learned or failed to learn from the study of the air war in Spain within the context of how armed forces undergo reform.

Jones, Mark C. “**Give Credit where Credit is Due: The Dutch Role in the Development and Deployment of the Submarine Schnorkel.**” Vol.69, No.4 (October, 2005), pp.987-1012.

Wagner, Erich, “**Ingenuity, Excess, Incompetence, and Luck: Air-Resupply Anecdotes in**

Military History.” Vol.84, No.2 (April, 2020), pp.427-457. Reviews six case studies from taken the Second Italo-Ethiopian War (1935-1936), the Spanish Civil War (1936-1939), the Battle of Stalingrad (1942), Operation Market Garden (1944), the Battle of the Chosin Reservoir (1950), and the Battle of Dien Bien Phu (1954).

De Ninno, Fabio, **“A Technological Fiasco: Scientific Research, Institutional Culture, and Fascism in the Italian Navy (1919-1940).”** Vol.84, No.3 (July, 2020), pp.798-824. Explains that the failure of the Italian Navy to develop and adopt new technologies, such as radar and sonar, was rooted in an opposition to technological change within the culture of the officer corps, compounded by inter-service rivalry and the chaos of the Fascist regime.

ITALY: WORLD WAR II (1939-45)

DiNardo, R.L. **“The Dysfunctional Coalition: The Axis Powers and the Eastern Front in World War II.”** Vol.60, No.4 (October, 1996), pp.711-730. Illustrates that German arrogance, compounded by muddled political and strategic thinking, inadequate resources, widely varying capabilities, and linguistic differences, rendered the Axis Coalition a costly failure.

Moore, Bob, **“Unwanted Guests in Troubled Times: German Prisoners of War in the Union of South Africa, 1942-1943.”** Vol.70, No.1 (January, 2006), pp.63-90. Contrasts the potential threats to domestic security in South Africa during a time of internal dissension of holding German P.O.W.s with the less troublesome experience with Italian prisoners.

Anselmo, Frank A. **“The Battle for Hill K-9 and the Fall of Rome, 2 June 1944.”** Vol.76, No.1 (January, 2012), pp.99-126. The author seeks to ascertain which version of the capture of Hill K-9 by the U.S. 179th Infantry Regiment is the most accurate.

Muschamp, Amy, **“Living Under Allied Military Government in Southern Italy during the Second World War: A Case Study of the Region of Molise.”** Vol.79, No.2 (April, 2015), pp.369-386. Based on a combination of archival research at the regional capital of Campobasso and oral history.

Hammond, Richard, **“Fighting under a Different Flag: Multinational Naval Cooperation and Submarine Warfare in the Mediterranean, 1940-1944.”** Vol.80, No.2 (April, 2016), pp.447-476. In contrast to their experience in the British home theatre, the submarines in the Mediterranean operated by the exiled governments of the Free French, Greece, the Netherlands, Poland, and Yugoslavia, along with those of Italy beginning in 1943, found it difficult to cooperate with the Royal Navy, as well as each other.

Kranjc, Gregor, **“Fight or Flight: Desertion, Defection, and Draft-Dodging in Occupied Slovenia, 1941-1945.”** Vol.81, No.1 (January, 2017), pp.133-162. Questions the motives for Slovenes to avoid or escape from military service for three occupying powers, Germany,

Hungary, and Italy, and these powers efforts to combat draft-dodging, desertion, and defection.

Scianna, Bastian Matteo, **“Rommel Almighty? Italian Assessment of the ‘Desert Fox’ during and after the Second World War.”** Vol.82, No.1 (January, 2018), pp.125-145. The Italian view based on new primary material, including the eavesdropping by British intelligence on Italian officers held as P.O.W.s in both Egypt and Britain.

ITALY: COLD WAR (1945-91)

Priest, Andrew, **“ ‘In Common Cause’: The N.A.T.O. Multilateral Force and the Mixed-Manning Demonstration on the U.S.S. *Claude V. Ricketts*, 1964-1965.”** Vol.69, No.3 (July, 2005), pp.759-789. The crew of the destroyer (DDG-5) U.S.S. *Claude V. Ricketts* included U.S., British, Dutch, Greek, Italian, Turkish, and West German officers and men.

J

JACOBITE RISINGS – See: SCOTLAND

JACKSON, ANDREW (1767-1845)

Rodriguez, Manuel Santirso, **“Under the Uniform: Tyrants and Praetorians in the Aftermath of the Revolution (1829-1854).”** Vol.83, No.2 (April, 2019), pp.379-407. Weighs the parallels and differences in the lives and careers of Nicholas Jean-de-Dieu Soult of France (1769-1851), Arthur Wellesley, the Duke of Wellington of Great Britain (1769-1852), Baldomero Espartero of Spain (1793-1879), and Andrew Jackson of the United States (1767-1845).

JACKSON, THOMAS JONATHAN ‘STONEWALL’ (1824-63)

Richenbacher, Wayne E. **“The Demise of Stonewall Jackson: A Civil War Medical Case Study.”** Vol.79, No.3 (July, 2015), pp.635-655. Chronicles the eight days between General Stonewall Jackson’s (1824-1863) wounding at the Battle of Chancellorsville, 2 May, 1863, and his death, considering the care provided his surgeon,

JAMES, DANIEL, Jr. (1920-78)

Meilinger, Phillip S. **“Historiographical Essay: U.S. Air Force Leaders: A Biographical Tour.”** Vol.62, No.4 (October, 1998), pp.833-870.

JÄHNS, MAX (1837-1900)

Larson, Robert H. “**Max Jähns and the Writing of Military History in Imperial Germany.**” Vol.72, No.2 (April, 2008), pp.345-370. A career Prussian officer who taught military history at the elite War Academy for fourteen years and was a prolific author, Max Jähns’ (1837-1900) studies focused on the place of military institutions and practices in the context of general history.

JAPAN: PRE-MODERN PERIOD

Parker, Geoffrey, “**The Limits to Revolutions in Military Affairs: Maurice of Nassau, the Battle of Nieuwpoort (1600), and the Legacy.**” Vol.71, No.2 (April, 2007), pp.331-372. Probes the evolution of the use of volley fire by matchlock armed infantry, beginning with its use in Japan in the 1560s and by the Dutch in the 1590s, with its first use in combat in Europe at the battle of Nieuwpoort, 2 July, 1600.

Serebriakova, Polina and Orbach, Danny, “**Irregular Warfare in Late Medieval Japan: Towards a Historical Understanding of the Ninja.**” Vol.84, No.4 (October, 2020), pp.997-1020. Separating the contemporary myth from what we can actually determine based on surviving primary sources.

JAPAN: IMJIN WAR (1592-98)

Swope, Kenneth M. “**Crouching Tigers, Secret Weapons: Military Technology Employed during the Sino-Japanese War, 1592-1598.**” Vol.69, No.1 (January, 2005), pp.11-41. Reviews the major military technology employed by the belligerents, showing, contesting the conventional explanation that superior numbers and the death of Toyotomi Hideyoshi’s (1537-1598) death were the deciding factors in Japan’s defeat.

JAPAN: BOXER REBELLION (1899-1901)

Otte, T.G. “**From *Can-Can Diabolique* to *Sitzkrieg*: The International China Expeditionary Force, 1900-1901.**” Vol.77, No.4 (October, 2013), pp.1277-1302. Analyzes a neglected example of coalition warfare.

JAPAN: WORLD WAR I (1914-18)

Overlack, Peter, “**The Force of Circumstances: Graf Spee’s Options for the East Asian Cruiser Squadron in 1914.**” Vol.60, No.4 (October, 1996), pp.657-682. Investigates how the denial of coaling stations by both Japan’s decision to join the Entente Powers and the actions of Australia

and New Zealand severely constricted the choices available to Vice-Admiral Maximilian Reichsgraf von Spee (1861-1914).

JAPAN: INTERWAR PERIOD (1919-39)

Kennedy, Greg, “**Anglo-American Strategic Relations and Intelligence Assessments of Japanese Air Power 1934-1941.**” Vol.74, No.3 (July, 2010), pp.737-773. Reassesses the influence of racism on Anglo-American views of Japanese air power, and how this influence evolved in the seven years leading up to Pearl Harbor.

Neilson, Keith, “**The Royal Navy, Japan, and British Strategic Foreign Policy, 1932-1934.**” Vol.75, No.2 (April, 2011), pp.505-531. Japan’s challenge to British interests affected British policy generally, and particularly Anglo-American relations, producing conflicting proposals from the Treasury, the Admiralty, and the Foreign Offices.

JAPAN: 2nd SINO-JAPANESE WAR (1937-45)

Gordon, David M. “**Historiographical Essay: The China-Japan War, 1931-1945.**” Vol.70, No.1 (January, 2006), pp.137-182.

Henriot, Christian, “**The Battle of Shanghai (January-March 1932): A Study in the Space-Time of War.**” Vol.85, No.1 (January, 2021), pp.76-94. Focuses on the impact of urban and rural environments on the manner in which the Imperial Japanese and Nationalist Chinese forces fought one another.

JAPAN: WORLD WAR II (1941-45)

Boyd, Carl, “**U.S. Navy Radio Intelligence during the Second World War and the Sinking of the Japanese Submarine I-52.**” Vol.63, No.2 (April, 1999), pp.339-354. Determines the role of Ultra in the June, 1944, sinking of the blockade runner, I-52, in the Atlantic Ocean by aircraft from the escort carrier U.S.S. *Bogue*.

Ford, Douglas, “**British Intelligence on Japanese Army Moral during the Pacific War: Logical Analysis or Racial Stereotyping?**” Vol.69, No.2 (April, 2005), pp.439-474.

Krebs, Gerhard, “**Operation Super Sunrise? Japanese-United States Peace Feelers in Switzerland, 1945.**” Vol.69, No.4 (October, 2005), pp.1081-1120. Explains why informal discussions between the Japanese Naval Commander from the embassy in Berlin, Fujimura Yoshikazu, and Allen W. Dulles (1893-1969) of the U.S. Office of Strategic Services failed to develop into formal communications.

Hadley, Gregory and Oglethorpe, James, “**Mackay’s ‘Betrayal’: Solving the Mystery of the**

‘Sado Island Prisoner-of-War Massacre’.” Vol.71, No.2 (April, 2007), pp.441-464.

Conclusively demonstrates that the suppression of a supposed Japanese massacre of Allied prisoners working in a gold mine in Aikawa on Sado island in 1945 as presented in James MacKay’s 1996 book, *Betrayal in High Places*, is an intentional forgery.

Chi Man Kwong, **“The Failure of Japanese Land-Sea Cooperation during the Second World War: Hong Kong and the South China Coast as an Example, 1942-1945.”** Vol.79, No.1 (January, 2015), pp.69-91.

JAPAN: WORLD WAR II (1941-45): PACIFIC THEATER

Lofgren, Stephen J. (ed.) **“Diary of First Lieutenant Sugihara Kinrū: Iwo Jima, January-February 1945.”** Vol.59, No.1 (January, 1995), pp.97-134. Served in the 11th Antitank Battalion which was manned by reservists from Hiroshima and Shimane prefectures.

Mann, B. David, **“Japanese Defense of Bataan, Luzon, Philippine Islands, 16 December 1944 – 4 September, 1945.”** Vol.67, No.4 (October, 2003), pp.1149-1176.

Fuquea, David C. **“Advantage Japan: The Imperial Japanese Navy’s Superior High Seas Refueling Capability.”** Vol.84, No.1 (January, 2020), pp.213-235. Addresses an understudied factor that made the Japanese victories at Pearl Harbor and beyond possible, one that at least initially, was not available to the U.S. Navy.

JAPAN: WORLD WAR II (1941-45): AUSTRALASIA THEATER

Wilkins, Thomas S. **“Review Essay: Anatomy of a Military Disaster: The Fall of ‘Fortress Singapore’ 1942.”** Vol.73, No.1 (January, 2009), pp.221-230.

Borch, Fred L. **“‘In the Name of the Queen’: Military Trials of Japanese War Criminals in the Netherlands East Indies (1946-1949).”** Vol.79, No.1 (January, 2015), pp.93-125.

JAPAN: WORLD WAR II (1941-45): U.S. STRATEGIC BOMBING CAMPAIGN, ASIA

Bernstein, Barton J. **“Truman and the A-Bomb: Targeting Noncombatants, Using the Bomb, and His Defending the ‘Decision’.”** Vol.62, No.3 (July, 1998), pp.547-570. Focuses on the 1996 publication *Harry S. Truman and the Bomb: A Documentary History*. Edited and with commentary by Robert Ferrell.

JAPAN: COLD WAR AND POST COLD WAR PERIODS

Jeans, Roger B. **“Victims or Victimizers? Museums, Textbooks, and the War Debate in Contemporary Japan.”** Vol.69, No.1 (January, 2005), pp.149-195. Shows that, rather than

possessing a unified view of the war, the ‘correct history’ of the conflict is contested between conservatives, the right-wing, moderates, and the left-wing.

Spector, Ronald H. **“After Hiroshima: Allied Military Occupations and the Fate of Japan’s Empire, 1945-1947.”** Vol.69, No.4 (October, 2005), pp.1121-1136. The Allies confronted problems far beyond the disarming of Japanese troops in occupied China, Korea, and Southeast Asia, where internal conflicts rendered the plans of the Allied powers irrelevant.

Dingman, Roger, **“Review Essay: American Bases in Japan.”** Vol.78, No.2 (April, 2014), pp.753-755. A collection of essays by Japanese academics and public historians providing a balanced study of the impact of U.S. bases Kanagawa Prefecture, just southwest of Tokyo.

Walsh, Brian, **“Sexual Violence during the Occupation of Japan.”** Vol.82, No.4 (October, 2018), pp.1199-1230. Insists that the accusations of recent publications of the widespread rape of Japanese women by Allied troops during the occupation (1945-1952) are grossly exaggerated.

Walsh, Brian, **“ ‘This Degrading Slavery’: MacArthur’s General Headquarters and Prostitution Policy during the Occupation of Japan.”** Vol.85, No.3 (July, 2021), pp.678-712. The Allied occupation government (1945-1952) outlawed the old Imperial system of licensed prostitution because it relied on human trafficking, but did not outlaw prostitution in general based on respect for individual autonomy and an appreciation for the situation in Japan.

JEFFERSON, THOMAS (1743-1826)

Watson, Samuel, **“Trusting to ‘the Chapter of Accidents’: Contingency, Necessity, and Self-Constraint in Jeffersonian National Security Policy.”** Vol.76, No.4 (October, 2012), pp.973-1000. Ascertains how the U.S. war effort was crippled by the antipathy of the Democratic-Republican Party of Thomas Jefferson (1743-1826) towards taxation, debt, a standing army, federal aid to infrastructure, and a national bank

JOFFRE, JOSEPH (1852-1931)

Bruce, Robert B. **“America Embraces France: Marshal Joseph Joffre and the French Mission to the United States, April-May 1917.”** Vol.66, No.2 (April, 2002), pp.407-441. Proposes that Marshal Joffre (1852-1931), more than any other individual, established strong-Franco-American military, political, and social ties, contributing mightily to U.S. public support for a commitment of a large expeditionary force to the Western Front.

Doughty, Robert A. **“French Strategy in 1914: Joffre’s Own.”** Vol.67, No.2 (April, 2003), pp.427-454.

Prete, Roy A. **“Joffre and the Origins of the Somme: A Study in Allied Military Planning.”** Vol.73, No.2 (April, 2009), pp.417-448.

Doughty, Robert A. **“Papa’ Joffre and the Great War.”** Vol.79, No.4 (October, 2015), pp.959-979.
Asks whether General Joseph Joffre’s (1852-1931) achievements are outweighed by his failures.

JOHNSON, LYNDON B. (1908-73)

Carland, John M. **“War, Politics, Diplomacy, and the Presidency: Off the Record Comments by Lyndon B. Johnson in Retirement.”** Vol.72, No.4 (October, 2008), pp.1257-1263.

Trauschweizer, Ingo, **“Cautious Hawk: Maxwell Taylor and the Path to War in Vietnam.”** Vol.83, No.3 (July, 2019), pp.831-859. Relates the U.S. ambassador to Saigon’s, 1964-1965, opinions regarding the efficacy of bombing Hanoi and deploying ground forces to South Vietnam and their possible influence on the decisions of President Lyndon Johnson (1963-69).

JOINT OPERATIONS

See Also: AMPHIBIOUS WARFARE

JOINT OPERATIONS: ENGLAND / GREAT BRITAIN - EARLY 20th CENTURY

Gordon, Andrew, **“Time after Time in the Horn of Africa.”** Vol.74, No.1 (January, 2010), pp.107-144. Provides an examination of the British joint, amphibious assault on the Dervish stronghold of Illig, Somaliland, in 1904.

JOINT OPERATIONS: ENGLAND / GREAT BRITAIN - WORLD WAR II (1939-45)

Benbow, Tim, **“ ‘Menace’ to ‘Ironclad’: The British Operations against Dakar (1940) and Madagascar (1942).”** Vol.75, No.3 (July, 2011), pp.769-809. Investigates why, regarding two separate British operations against Vichy French colonies in Africa, ‘Menace’ failed, while ‘Ironclad’ succeeded.

JOINT OPERATIONS: GERMANY - WORLD WAR II (1939-45)

Corum, James S. **“The *Luftwaffe*’s Army Support Doctrine, 1918-1941.”** Vol.59, No.1 (January, 1995), pp.53-76. Covers close air support doctrine and training, development and implementation, from the Spanish Civil War to Operation Barbarossa.

JOINT OPERATIONS: JAPAN - WORLD WAR II (1939-45)

Chi Man Kwong, **“The Failure of Japanese Land-Sea Cooperation during the Second World War: Hong Kong and the South China Coast as an Example, 1942-1945.”** Vol.79, No.1 (January, 2015), pp.69-91.

JOINT OPERATIONS: U.S.A. - SEMINOLE WARS (1816-1858)

Dawson, Joseph G. **“With Fidelity and Effectiveness: Archibald Henderson’s Lasting Legacy to the U.S. Marine Corps.”** Vol.62, No.4 (October, 1998), pp.727-753. Affirms Henderson’s importance as Commandant of the Corps (1821-1859), during which he expanded the roles and capabilities of Marines, such as the deployment of a Marine battalion alongside Army units against the Creeks and Seminoles and the addition of an artillery component to strengthen landing forces.

JOINT OPERATIONS: U.S. CIVIL WAR (1861-65)

Canfield, Daniel T. **“Opportunity Lost: Combined Operations and the Development of Union Military Strategy, April 1861 – April 1862.”** Vol.79, No.3 (July, 2015), pp.657-690.

JOINT OPERATIONS: U.S.A. - INTERWAR PERIOD (1919-39)

Wadle, Ryan, **“Failing to Speak the same Language: The Roots of ‘Jointness’ in the United States, 1919-1941.”** Vol.84, No.4 (October, 2020), pp.1097-1126. Sizes up the problems that interfered with attempts to create an interservice culture, promoted in efforts to integrate strategic planning, in professional military education, and large-scale joint exercises.

JOINT OPERATIONS: U.S.A. - WORLD WAR II (1939-45)

Bartsch, William H. **“Operation Dovetail: Bungled Guadalcanal Rehearsal, July 1942.”** Vol.66, No.2 (April, 2002), pp.443-476. Reports on the all-but-forgotten rehearsal conducted at Koro Island in the Fijis, held ten days before the landing on Guadalcanal.

Burrell, Robert S. **“Breaking the Cycle of Iwo Jima Mythology: A Strategic Study of Operation Detachment.”** Vol.68, No.4 (October, 2004), pp.1143-1186. Questions the justification for the invasion of Iwo Jima, 19 February, 1945, explaining that the decision to invade was a matter of the competing agendas of the Navy, Army, and Army Air Force.

Hanley, Brian and Burrell, Robert S. **“The Myth of Iwo Jima: A Rebuttal [And Response].”** Vol.69, No.3 (July, 2005), pp.801-809.

JOINT OPERATIONS: U.S.A. - COLD WAR (1945-91)

Cogan, Charles G. **“Desert One and Its Disorders.”** Vol.67, No.1 (January, 2003), pp.201-216. Argues that the failure of the attempt to rescue the hostages in Iran, 1980, provoked the principle of joint operations in the U.S. Armed Forces and the consolidation of Special Forces under a Special Operations Command.

Haun, Phil, **“Foundation Bias: The Impact of the Air Corps Tactical School on United States Air Force Doctrine.”** Vol.85, No.2 (April, 2021), pp.453-474. Contrasts the steadfast belief in the role of strategic bombing at the Air Corps Tactical School with the effectiveness of joint operations demonstrated in the Korean, Vietnam, Iraq, and Afghanistan wars.

JOINT OPERATIONS: U.S.A. - VIETNAM WAR (1955-75)

Kirkland, Faris R. **“The Attack on Cap Mui Lay, Vietnam, July 1968.”** Vol.61, No.4 (October, 1997), pp.735-760. Shines light on Operation Thor, a neglected example of joint operation in Vietnam and one that significantly disrupted North Vietnam’s strategic plans.

Marolda, Edward J. **“Orphan of the Mekong Delta: The Army-Navy Mobile Riverine Force.”** Vol.80, No.4 (October, 2016), pp.1149-1181. Despite its success during the Tet Offensive of 1968, the failure of Army and Navy leaders to fully embrace the creation of the Army-Navy Mobile Riverine Force resulting in its disbanding by Gen. Creighton Abrams (1914-1974).

JOINT OPERATIONS: U.S.A. - POST COLD WAR PERIOD

Coleman, Bradley Lynn and Schultz, Timothy A. **“The Cornerstone of Joint Force Transformation: The Standing Joint Force Headquarters at U.S. Southern Command, 2001-2011.”** Vol.85, No.4 (October, 2021), pp.1029-1060. The difficulties of Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld (1932-2021) to establish Standing Joint Force Headquarters for each of the geographic combatant commands is examined by using the U.S. Southern Command as an example.

JORDON

Rudd, Gordon W. **“Review Essay: The Israeli Revisionist Historians and the Arab-Israeli Conflict Part One: From the Founding of Zionism to the 1967 War.”** Vol.67, No.4 (October, 2003), pp.1263-1270; **“Part Two: From the 1967 War to the Present.”** Vol.68, No.1 (January, 2004), pp.225-231.

JOURNALISTS – See: MEDIA

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KATANGA – See: CONGO

KENNY, GEORGE C. (1889-1977)

Meilinger, Phillip S. **“Historiographical Essay: U.S. Air Force Leaders: A Biographical Tour.”**
Vol.62, No.4 (October, 1998), pp.833-870.

KENYA

Stapleton, Tim, **“ ‘Bad Boys’: Infiltration and Sedition in the African Military Units of the Central African Federation (Malawi, Zambia and Zimbabwe) 1953-63.”** Vol.73, No.4 (October, 2009), pp.1167-1193. Illustrates that nationalists exploited the rising unpopularity of colonialism, discontent with participation in the war in Malaya, the Mau Mau uprising in Kenya, and the Congo Crisis, which led white officers doubt the dependability of their African troops.

KEOGH, EUSTACE GRAHAM (1899-1981)

Parkin, Russell, **“Colonel E.G. Keogh and the Making of the *Australian Army Journal*.”** Vol.81, No.4 (October, 2017), pp.1075-1096. Shines a light on the overlooked contribution to professional education and military history in Australia by Eustace Graham Keogh (1899-1981).

KIMMEL, HUSBAND E. (1882-1968)

Hone, Trent, **“The Evolution of Fleet Tactical Doctrine in the U.S. Navy, 1922-1941.”** Vol.67, No.4 (October, 2003), pp.1107-1148. Establishes how the Navy intended to use the battleships stationed at Pearl Harbor in battle, including Admiral Husband E. Kimmel’s (1882-1968) plans for a decisive fleet engagement in the Central Pacific.

KING, ERNEST J. (1878-1956)

Coles, Michael, **“Ernest King and the British Pacific Fleet: The Conference at Quebec, 1944 (‘Octagon’).”** Vol.65, No.1 (January, 2001), pp.105-129. While not excluding complications from Fleet Admiral King’s (1878-1956) personality, the author insists that there were valid

political, economic, and operational factors against the deployment of the British Fleet alongside the U.S. Navy in the Pacific Theater.

KING, MACKENZIE (1874-1950)

Vance, Jonathan F. **“Men in Manacles: The Shackling of Prisoners of War, 1942-1943.”** Vol.59, No.3 (July, 1995), pp.483-504. Appraises the wartime relationship of the Dominion nations with Great Britain as reflected in the success of Canadian Prime Minister Mackenzie King’s (1874-1950) government in convincing Churchill (1874-1965) to abandon the retaliatory shackling of German P.O.W.s.

KOREA: THE IMJIN WAR (1592-98)

Swope, Kenneth M. **“Crouching Tigers, Secret Weapons: Military Technology Employed during the Sino-Japanese War, 1592-1598.”** Vol.69, No.1 (January, 2005), pp.11-41. Reviews the major military technology employed by the belligerents, showing, contesting the conventional explanation that superior numbers and the death of Toyotomi Hideyoshi’s (1537-1598) death were the deciding factors in Japan’s defeat.

KOREA: COLD WAR (1945-91)

Sarantakes, Nicholas Evan, **“The Quiet War: Combat Operations along the Korean Demilitarized Zone, 1966-1969.”** Vol.64, No.2 (April, 2000), pp.439-457. Describes how South Korea and the United States responded differently to the provocations of North Korea and how this impacted the war in Vietnam.

Spector, Ronald H. **“After Hiroshima: Allied Military Occupations and the Fate of Japan’s Empire, 1945-1947.”** Vol.69, No.4 (October, 2005), pp.1121-1136. The Allies confronted problems far beyond the disarming of Japanese troops in occupied China, Korea, and Southeast Asia, where internal conflicts rendered the plans of the Allied powers irrelevant.

Gibby, Bryan, **“The Best Little Army.”** Vol.77, No.1 (January, 2013), pp.173-201. Surveys the results of the work of the U.S. Korean Military Advisory Group (K.M.A.G.) prior to the outbreak of the Korean War.

KOREA: KOREAN WAR (1950-53)

Millett, Allan R. **“A Reader’s Guide to the Korean War.”** Vol.61, No.3 (July, 1997), pp.583-597.

Millett, Allan R. **“The George C. Marshall Lecture in Military History: Introduction to**

the Korean War.” Vol.65, No.4 (October, 2001), pp.921-935.

Stolfi, Russell H.S. **“A Critique of Pure Success: Inchon Revisited, Revised, and Contrasted.”** Vol.68, No.2 (April, 2004), pp.505-525. Critiques the performance of the ground forces that were successfully landed at Inchon, proposing that a comparative example of German operations in the Baltic in 1941 suggests greater boldness would have rewarded U.S. forces.

Malkasian, Carter, **“Toward a Better Understanding of Attrition: The Korean and Vietnam Wars.”** Vol.68, No.3 (July, 2004), pp.911-942.

Werrell, Kenneth P. **“Across the Yalu: Rules of Engagement and the Communist Air Sanctuary during the Korean War.”** Vol.72, No.2 (April, 2008), pp.451-475. U.S. warplanes violated Chinese air space during the Korean War more frequently than was generally acknowledged, often encouraged and sometimes led by field grade officers, with few pilots suffering punishment.

Casey, Steven, **“Wilfred Burchett and the United Nations Command’s Media Relations during the Korean War, 1951-1952.”** Vol.74, No.3 (July, 2010), pp.821-845. Assesses the Australian journalist, Wilfred Burchett’s (1911-1983), observations concerning the U.S. Army’s relations with the media during the Korean armistice negotiations.

Stoler, Mark A. **“The 2015 George C. Marshall Lecture in Military History: George C. Marshall and the ‘Europe-First Strategy, 1939-1951: A Study in Diplomatic as well as Military History.’”** Vol.79, No.2 (April, 2015), pp.293-316. Examines the relationship between diplomatic and military history regarding Marshall’s (1880-1959) support for the strategy of ‘Germany First’ during World War II, for the postwar European Recovery Program, and the relief of Gen. Douglas MacArthur (1880-1964) during the Korean War.

KOREAN WAR (1950-53): UNITED NATIONS COALITION

Coleman, Bradley Lynn, **“The Colombian Army in Korea, 1950-1954.”** Vol.69, No.4 (October, 2005), pp.1137-1177. Uses the service history of the Colombian Battalion as an example of the United Nations’ multi-national coalition force.

Uyar, Mesut and Güvenç, Serhat, **“One Battle and Two Accounts: The Turkish Brigade at Kunu-ri in November 1950.”** Vol.80, No.4 (October, 2016), pp.1117-1147. Assesses the impact of U.S. military assistance provided to the Turkish Army and why the official U.S. and Turkish accounts of the Battle of Kunu-ri / Chongchon differ significantly.

KOREAN WAR (1950-53): U.S. FORCES

Fautua, David T. **“The ‘Long Pull’ Army: NSC 68, the Korean War, and the Creation of the Cold War Army.”** Vol.61, No.1 (January, 1997), pp.93-120. Endeavors to distinguish the

changes to the U.S. Army in the early 1950s resulting from National Security Council paper 68 from those prompted by the Korean War (1950-1953).

Donnelly, William M. **“Thunderbirds in Korea: The U.S. 45th Infantry Division, 1950-1952.”**

Vol.64, No.4 (October, 2000), pp.1113-1139. Investigates the performance of one of two National Guard divisions deployed to Korea, concentrating on the division’s officers.

Jordan, Kelly C. **“Right for the Wrong Reasons: S.L.A. Marshall and the Ratio of Fire in Korea.”** Vol.66, No.1 (January, 2002), pp.135-162.

Donnelly, William M. **“ ‘The Best Army that can be put in the Field in the Circumstances’: The U.S. Army, July 1951 – July 1953.”** Vol.71, No.3 (July, 2007), pp.809-847.

Reckons with the difficulties faced by career soldiers during the Korean War due to limited national mobilization and the cuts to the Army’s budget by President Harry S. Truman (1945-1953).

Coleman, Bradley Lynn, **“Recovering the Korean War Dead, 1950-1958: Graves Registration, Forensic Anthropology, and Wartime Memorialization.”** Vol.72, No.1 (January, 2008),

pp.179-222. The Graves Registration Service, U.S. Quartermaster Corps, developed an innovative system during the Korean War in which the dead were recovered and repatriated to the United States during major combat operations.

Donnelly, William M. **“A Damn Hard Job: James A. Van Fleet and the Combat Effectiveness of U.S. Army Infantry, July 1951 – February 1953.”** Vol.82, No.1 (January, 2018), pp.147-179.

The difficulties faced by the Eighth Army commander, Gen. Van Fleet (1892-1992), to maintain ‘the will to win’ during the Korean War.

Lerner, Mitchell, **“ ‘Is It for This We Fought and Bled?’: The Korean War and the Struggle for Civil Rights.”** Vol.82, No.2 (April, 2018), pp.515-545.

Explains the role of the Korean War in the African American struggle for Civil Rights.

KOREAN WAR (1950-53): BRITISH COMMONWEALTH FORCES

MacKenzie, S.P. **“Progressives and Reactionaries among British Prisoners of War at Pyoktong and Chongson, North Korea, 1951-1953.”** Vol.77, No.1 (January, 2013),

pp.203-228. From the Chinese perspective, why were the British P.O.W.s at Chongson (Camp 1) more troublesome than those at Pyoktong (Camp 5).

McGibbon, Ian, **“Australian-New Zealand Relations and Commitments to Asian Conflicts 1950-1972.”** Vol.81, No.4 (October, 2017), pp.1059-1074.

Despite the replacement of the British security framework by alliance with the United States, New Zealand resisted pressure to commit troops to the Vietnam War in direct contrast to its larger neighbor.

Grey, Jeffrey, **“The Formation of the Commonwealth Division, 1950-1951.”** Vol.81, No.4 (October, 2017), pp.1097-1107. The saga of the military and political challenges of forming a division composed of units from the Australian, British, Canadian, Indian, and New Zealand armies.

Tian Ser Seah, Joshua-John, **“Singapore, Hong Kong, and the Royal Navy’s War in Korea, c.1950-1953: Part 1.”** Vol.83, No.4 (October, 2018), pp.1213-1234; **“Part 2.”** Vol.84, No.1 (January, 2020), pp.237-260.

KOREAN WAR (1950-53): THE AIR WAR

Xiaoming Zhang, **“China and the Air War in Korea, 1950-1953.”** Vol.62, No.2 (April, 1998), pp.335-370. Looks at the development of the People’s Republic of China’s Air Force during the war, the role played by the Soviet Union, and the emergence of an air warfare strategy.

Crane, Conrad C. **“Raiding the Beggar’s Pantry: The Search for Airpower Strategy in the Korean War.”** Vol.63, No.4 (October, 1999), pp.885-920. Contrasts the need to fight a limited war with the newly independent U.S. Air Force’s focus on nuclear warfare.

Hobbins, Peter, **“Engineering the Fighter Pilot: Aviators, Anti-G suits, and Allied Air Power, 1940-53.”** Vol.84, No.1 (January, 2020), pp.115-149. Probes the failure of the Cotton Aerodynamic Anti-G suit championed by the Australian Air Force to be adopted by the British and United States Air Forces during the period marked by World War II and the Korean War.

Wagner, Erich, **“Ingenuity, Excess, Incompetence, and Luck: Air-Resupply Anecdotes in Military History.”** Vol.84, No.2 (April, 2020), pp.427-457. Reviews six case studies from taken the Second Italo-Ethiopian War (1935-1936), the Spanish Civil War (1936-1939), the Battle of Stalingrad (1942), Operation Market Garden (1944), the Battle of the Chosin Reservoir (1950), and the Battle of Dien Bien Phu (1954).

Haun, Phil, **“Foundation Bias: The Impact of the Air Corps Tactical School on United States Air Force Doctrine.”** Vol.85, No.2 (April, 2021), pp.453-474. Contrasts the steadfast belief in the role of strategic bombing at the Air Corps Tactical School with the effectiveness of joint operations demonstrated in the Korean, Vietnam, Iraq, and Afghanistan wars.

KRUEGER, WALTER (1881-1967)

Holizimmer, Kevin C. **“Walter Krueger, Douglas MacArthur, and the Pacific War: The Wakde-Sarmi Campaign as a Case Study.”** Vol.59, No.4 (October, 1995), pp.661-685. Uses the Wakde-Sarmi operation in Northern New Guinea, 17-21 May, 1944, to demonstrate that General Krueger’s (1881-1967) performance as a commander

has to be judged within the context of circumstances beyond anyone's control.

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LANSDALE, EDWARD G. (1908-87)

Meilinger, Phillip S. **"Historiographical Essay: U.S. Air Force Leaders: A Biographical Tour."**
Vol.62, No.4 (October, 1998), pp.833-870.

LAOS

Leary, William M. **"The C.I.A. and the 'Secret War' in Laos: The Battle for Skyline Ridge, 1971-1971."** Vol.59, No.3 (July, 1995), pp.505-517. Narrates an all-but-forgotten victory of a force of Hmong, Lao, and Thai defenders against the North Vietnamese Army.

Xiaoming Zhang, **"China's Involvement in Laos during the Vietnam War, 1963-1975."** Vol.66, No.4 (October, 2002), pp.1141-1166. Shows that the competition between Hanoi and Beijing for control over the Laotian Communists reflected an underlying mistrust between the two governments.

Spector, Ronald H. **"After Hiroshima: Allied Military Occupations and the Fate of Japan's Empire, 1945-1947."** Vol.69, No.4 (October, 2005), pp.1121-1136. The Allies confronted problems far beyond the disarming of Japanese troops in occupied China, Korea, and Southeast Asia, where internal conflicts rendered the plans of the Allied powers irrelevant.

Deitchman, Seymour J. **"The 'Electronic Battlefield' in the Vietnam War."** Vol.72, No.3 (July, 2008), pp.869-887. Concludes that the proposal of the Jason Group of scientists for a network of sensors and aircraft to detect activity on the Ho Chi-Minh Trail in Laos, though not totally successful, impacted the course of the war and foreshadowed key aspects of the equipment and operation of the U.S. Armed Forces today.

LATVIA

Sproule, Joseph, **"Raiding, Pillaging, and Violent Social Change in Late Sixteenth-Century Livonia."** Vol.85, No.2 (April, 2021), pp.317-341. Establishes how the pervasiveness of raiding dictated tactical and strategic considerations, influenced military policy, shaped civil-military relations, and played a role in breaking down longstanding social mores, transforming societies, normalizing violence.

LAWS OF WAR AND WAR CRIMES

Reid, Brian Holden, **“Michael Howard and the Evolution of Modern War Studies.”** Vol.73, No.3 (July, 2009), pp.869-904. Chart the efforts of Sir Michael Howard (1922-2019), beginning in 1950, to impart a framework on the study of the relationship between war and society to the extent that it has been shaped by organizational and moral forces.

Borch, Fred L. **“Review Essay: Lieber’s Code: A Landmark in the Law of War but not Lincoln’s Code.”** Vol.77, No.2 (April, 2013), pp.671-674. Critiques John Fabian Witt’s *Lincoln’s Code: The Laws of War in American History* (2012), which concludes with the Philippine Insurrection, 1898.

Hitchens, Ralph M. **“Review Essay: Casting Light on a Dark Territory.”** Vol.80, No.3 (July, 2016), pp.857-862. Works concerning cyber warfare.

Hoffman, F.G. **“To Drone or not to Drone.”** Vol.81, No.2 (April, 2017), pp.535-538.

LAWS OF WAR AND WAR CRIMES: EARLY MODERN PERIOD (1480-1789)

Brady, Andrea, **“Dying with Honour: Literary Propaganda and the Second English Civil War.”** Vol.70, No.1 (January, 2006), pp.9-30. Deals with the coverage in Parliamentary versus Royalist propaganda of the executions of Sir Charles Lucas and Sir George Lisle in 1648, following General Thomas Fairfax’s (1612-1671) siege of Colchester.

Lee, Wayne E. **“Peace Chiefs and Blood Revenge: Patterns of Restraint in Native American Warfare, 1500-1800.”** Vol.71, No.3 (July, 2007), pp.701-741. Although eastern Native American societies were willing to attempt to destroy an enemy, including indiscriminate killing, patterns of restraint inherent to their social authority, cultural values, and methods of warfare tended to limit escalation and the overall level of violence.

Rommelse, Gijs and Downing, Roger, **“Victims of an Ideological Rift? Dutch Prisoners of War during the First Anglo-Dutch War (1652-1654).”** Vol.80, No.3 (July, 2016), pp.649-669. Rather than ideology, the author shows that it was a combination of logistical problems and a lack of funds that produced the dire conditions experienced by Dutch P.O.W.s.

LAWS OF WAR AND WAR CRIMES: U.S. REVOLUTIONARY WAR (1775-83)

Krebs, Daniel, **“Useful Enemies: The Treatment of German Prisoners of War during the American War of Independence.”** Vol.77, No.1 (January, 2013), pp.9-39. Narrates how, to boost morale, revolutionaries staged elaborate rituals with P.O.W.s, that local citizens hired captive soldiers as laborers, and that, after the victory at Yorktown, 1781, Congress

and the Continental Army allowed P.O.W.s to go free after a cash payments and even sold some into indentured servitude.

Jones, T. Cole, “**‘The Rage of Tory-Hunting’: Loyalist Prisoners, Civil War, and the Violence of American Independence.**” Vol.81, No.3 (July, 2017), pp.719-746.

Lender, Mark Edward and Martin, James Kirby, “**Target New London: Benedict Arnold’s Raid, Just War, and ‘Homegrown Terror’ Reconsidered.**” Vol.83, No.1 (January, 2019), pp.67-95. Challenges the traditional Patriot depiction of Benedict Arnold’s (1741-1801) attack on the privateer base of New London, Connecticut, 6 September, 1781, arguing that it was conducted according to the contemporary rules of ‘civilized warfare.’

LAWS OF WAR AND WAR CRIMES: 19th CENTURY

Janda, Lance, “**Shutting the Gates of Mercy: The American Origins of Total War, 1860-1880.**” Vol.59, No.1 (January, 1995), pp.7-26. Links the evolution of ‘total war’ with the nature of armed conflict during the U.S. Civil War through to the late nineteenth century campaigns against the Native American tribes.

Van de Logt, Mark, “**‘The Powers of the Heavens Shall Eat of my Smoke’: The Significance of Scalping in Pawnee Warfare.**” Vol.72, No.1 (January, 2008), pp.71-104. Explains that there were a range of motives for Pawnee warriors to seek scalps, including improved status and marriage prospects for the warrior, revenge for the killing of tribal members, to end the mourning period of those who had lost a relative or friend, and, when sacrificed in a special ceremony, to improve the spiritual well-being of the Pawnee people.

Crawford, Michael J. “**The Abolition of Prize Money in the United States Navy Reconsidered.**” Vol.81, No.1 (January, 2017), pp.105-132. Sizes up the efforts to eliminate prize money for the capture of enemy warships and merchant ships, which began shortly after the War of 1812, but only came about in 1899 due to a confluence of motives.

Hagstrom, Jacob, “**‘My Soldiers Above All’: Justifying Violence against Noncombatants in French Algeria, 1830-1847.**” Vol.86, No.1 (January, 2022), pp.32-53. Shows that French officers participating in the conquest of Algeria defended the actions of their soldiers against civilians, which were motivated by fear, anger, and greed, on the basis of the necessity of preserving their lives and the lives of indigenous allies.

LAWS OF WAR AND WAR CRIMES: WAR OF 1812 (1812-15)

Leiner, Frederick C. “**The Squadron Commander’s Share: Decatur and the Prize Money for the *Chesapeake*’s First War of 1812 Cruise.**” Vol.73, No.1 (January, 2009), pp.69-82. An examination of the prize case of Decatur vs. Chew that displays the tensions between ranking

officers over their contrasting views of their appropriate shares.

Graves, Donald E. **“Why the White House was Burned: An Investigation into the British Destruction of Public Buildings at Washington in August 1814.”** Vol.76, No.4 (October, 2012), pp.1095-1127. Encrusted with mythology by nineteenth century historians motivated by national chauvinism, the article considers whether the actions of the British forces were justified by the contemporary laws of war and / or as retaliation for the U.S. destruction of Canadian towns.

Leiner, Frederick C. **“ ‘The Sport of Arbitrary Men’: The Privateer *Nonsuch* and a Search at Sea in the War of 1812.”** Vol.76, No.4 (October, 2012), pp.1147-1164. An incident involving the Baltimore Privateer *Nonsuch*’s seizure of the schooner *Ann Maria*, which resulted in court cases that led all the way to the U.S. Supreme Court.

Leiner, Frederick C. **“Privateers in the War of 1812.”** Vol.77, No.4 (October, 2013), Pp.1225-1250. Seeks to answer the question, ‘Was privateering profitable?’

LAWS OF WAR AND WAR CRIMES: U.S. CIVIL WAR (1861-65)

Janda, Lance, **“Shutting the Gates of Mercy: The American Origins of Total War, 1860-1880.”** Vol.59, No.1 (January, 1995), pp.7-26. Links the evolution of ‘total war’ with the nature of armed conflict during the U.S. Civil War through to the late nineteenth century campaigns against the Native American tribes.

Dawson, Joseph G. **“Review Essay: Civil War Soldiers and Leaders: A Glatthaar Trio.”** Vol.63, No.1 (January, 1999), pp.165-168. Contains a single study on the relationships between high-ranking commanders and two involving the enlisted men’s experience, included African American soldiers and their officers and the troops who participated in Sherman’s march.

Davis, Robert S. **“Escape from Andersonville: A Study in Isolation and Imprisonment.”** Vol.67, No.4 (October, 2003), pp.1065-1081. Seeks to understand why only some two dozen Union prisoners escaped from Andersonville within the larger context of the P.O.W. experience in later conflicts.

Swenson, Benjamin J. **“ ‘Measures of Conciliation’: Winfield Scott, Henry Halleck, and the Origins of U.S. Army Counterinsurgency Doctrine.”** Vol.86, No.4 (October, 2022), pp.859-881. Explores the collaboration between Major General Winfield Scott (1786-1866), who implemented policies intended to forestall insurgency, and General Henry Halleck (1815-1872), who made a study of Napoleon’s failed occupation of Spain, in developing U.S. Army counterinsurgency doctrine, which impacted the formation of international laws of war.

LAWS OF WAR AND WAR CRIMES: 2nd ANGLO-BOER WAR (1899-1902)

Nasson, Bill, **“Historiographical Essay: Waging Total War in South Africa: Some Centenary Writings on the Anglo-Boer War, 1899-1902.”** Vol.66, No.3 (July, 2002), pp.813-828.

Vergolina, Joseph R. **“ ‘Methods of Barbarism’ or Western Tradition? Britain, South Africa, and the Evolution of Escalatory Violence as Policy.”** Vol.77, No.4 (October, 2013), pp.1303-1327. Investigates British counterinsurgency methods in the Second Anglo-Boer War (1899-1902).

LAWS OF WAR AND WAR CRIMES: BALKAN WARS (1912-13)

Delis, Panagiotis, **“The Treatment of Prisoners of War Captured by the Greek Army during the Balkans Wars of 1912-13.”** Vol.82, No.4 (October, 2018), pp.1123-1147. Due to a combination of the inability of the Greeks to pay for the care of Bulgarian and Ottoman P.O.W.s and negative stereotypes held about the same, the laws concerning the treatment of prisoners established by international conventions in 1899 and 1907 were not honored by the Greek Army.

LAWS OF WAR AND WAR CRIMES: WORLD WAR I (1914-18)

Cook, Tim, **“The Politics of Surrender: Canadian Soldiers and the Killing of Prisoners in the Great War.”** Vol.70, No.3 (July, 2006), pp.637-665.

McCall, Jack H., Jr. **“ ‘Amazingly Indiscreet’: The Plot to Capture Wilhelm II.”** Vol.73, No.2 (April, 2009), pp.449-469. Relates how former U.S. Senator, Col. Luke Lea (1879-1945), planned to kidnap the deposed Kaiser from his exile in the Netherlands and bring him to the Paris Peace Conference to be tried as a war criminal.

LAWS OF WAR AND WAR CRIMES: INTERWAR PERIOD (1919-39)

Meilinger, Phillip, **“Trenchard and ‘Morale Bombing’: The Evolution of Royal Air Force Doctrine before World War II.”** Vol.60, No.2 (April, 1996), pp.243-270. Deals with the inexact blend of the intended goals of the R.A.F.’s interwar strategic bombing doctrine: breaking the will of the enemy and / or breaking the enemy’s economy.

LAWS OF WAR AND WAR CRIMES: WORLD WAR II (1939-45)

See Also: THE HOLOCAUST

Vance, Jonathan F. **“Men in Manacles: The Shackling of Prisoners of War, 1942-1943.”** Vol.59, No.3 (July, 1995), pp.483-504. Appraises the wartime relationship of the Dominion nations with Great Britain as reflected in the success of Canadian Prime Minister Mackenzie King’s (1874-

1950) government in convincing Churchill (1874-1965) to abandon the retaliatory shackling of German P.O.W.s.

Searle, Thomas R. “**‘It made a Lot of Sense to Kill Skilled Workers’: The Firebombing of Tokyo in March 1945.**” Vol.66, No.1 (January, 2002), pp.103-133. Demonstrates that the firebombing of Japanese cities was not a radical departure from U.S.A.A.F. tactics used against Germany, that it was not an abandonment of concentrating on targeting industry, and that it was based on long-term planning.

Jeans, Roger B. “**Victims or Victimizers? Museums, Textbooks, and the War Debate in Contemporary Japan.**” Vol.69, No.1 (January, 2005), pp.149-195. Shows that, rather than possessing a unified view of the war, the ‘correct history’ of the conflict is contested between conservatives, the right-wing, moderates, and the left-wing.

Hadley, Gregory and Oglethorpe, James, “**Mackay’s ‘Betrayal’: Solving the Mystery of the ‘Sado Island Prisoner-of-War Massacre’.**” Vol.71, No.2 (April, 2007), pp.441-464. Conclusively demonstrates that the suppression of a supposed Japanese massacre of Allied prisoners working in a gold mine in Aikawa on Sado island in 1945 as presented in James MacKay’s 1996 book, *Betrayal in High Places*, is an intentional forgery.

Hughes, Matthew, “**War without Mercy? American Armed Forces and the Deaths of Civilians during the Battle for Saipan, 1944.**” Vol.75, No.1 (January, 2011), pp.93-123. Despite this being the first Central Pacific Island on which U.S. forces encountered large numbers of civilians, including Japanese and Korean migrants, and native Chamorro and Carolinian peoples, the military histories of the battle for Saipan generally neglect how noncombatants were treated.

Gray, Peter, “**A Culture of Official Squeamishness? Britain’s Air Ministry and the Strategic Air Offensive against Germany?**” Vol.77, No.4 (October, 2013), pp.1349-1377. Endeavors to determine if the reluctance of the Air Ministry to issue a campaign medal for the R.A.F.s strategic bombing campaign was due to a discomfort with the tactics of area bombing, particularly in the wake of the attack on Dresden.

Borch, Fred L. “**‘In the Name of the Queen’: Military Trials of Japanese War Criminals in the Netherlands East Indies (1946-1949).**” Vol.79, No.1 (January, 2015), pp.93-125.

Boghardt, Thomas, “**Dirty Work? The Use of Nazi Informants by U.S. Army Intelligence in Postwar Europe.**” Vol.79, No.2 (April, 2015), pp.387-422. Probes ethical issues and utility of the Allied enlistment of war criminals and suspected war criminals for collecting information on Soviet and Communist Party activities in Europe.

Wildermuth, David W. “**‘I am fully aware of my guilt...’: Insights from a Soviet Military**

Tribunal's Investigation of the German Army's 35th Division, 1946-47." Vol.83, No.4 (October, 2019), pp.1189-1212. Weighing the credibility of both perpetrator and eyewitness statements from Soviet tribunals for information on the actions of officers and soldiers of the German 35th Division during anti-partisan operations in April, 1944.

Rutherford, Jeff, **"Germany's Total War: Combat and Occupation around the Kursk Salient, 1943."** Vol.85, No.4 (October, 2021), pp.954-979. Examines the changing approach of three German divisions to extract resources from the population living near the frontlines.

LAWS OF WAR AND WAR CRIMES: KOREAN WAR (1950-53)

MacKenzie, S.P. **"Progressives and Reactionaries among British Prisoners of War at Pyoktong and Chongson, North Korea, 1951-1953."** Vol.77, No.1 (January, 2013), pp.203-228. From the Chinese perspective, why were the British P.O.W.s at Chongson (Camp 1) more troublesome than those at Pyoktong (Camp 5).

LAWS OF WAR AND WAR CRIMES: VIETNAM WAR (2nd Indochina War) (1955-75)

Borch, Fred L. **"Review Essay: My Lai at Fifty: A History of Literature on the 'My Lai Incident' Fifty Years Later."** Vol.82, No.2 (April, 2018), pp.551-564. Concerning the killing of unarmed civilians by U.S. Army troops during the Vietnam War at the village of My Lai in the Son Tinh district on 16 March, 1968.

LAWS OF WAR AND WAR CRIMES:

EL SALVADORAN CIVIL WAR (1980-92)

Courtney, Jocelyn, **"The Civil War that was fought by Children: Understanding the Role of Child Combatants in El Salvador's Civil War, 1980-1992."** Vol.74, No.2 (April, 2010), pp.523-556. Explores the legacy of the extensive reliance on child soldiers by both the Salvadoran government and the Farabundo Martí Front for National Liberation in terms of demobilization issues and postwar societal problems.

LEA, LUKE (1879-1945)

McCall, Jack H., Jr. **"'Amazingly Indiscreet': The Plot to Capture Wilhelm II."** Vol.73, No.2 (April, 2009), pp.449-469. Relates how former U.S. Senator, Col. Luke Lea (1879-1945), planned to kidnap the deposed Kaiser from his exile in the Netherlands and bring him to the Paris Peace Conference to be tried as a war criminal.

LEBANON

Rudd, Gordon W. “**Review Essay: The Israeli Revisionist Historians and the Arab-Israeli Conflict Part One: From the Founding of Zionism to the 1967 War.**” Vol.67, No.4 (October, 2003), pp.1263-1270; “**Part Two: From the 1967 War to the Present.**” Vol.68, No.1 (January, 2004), pp.225-231.

LEE, CHARLES (1732-82)

Lender, Mark Edward, “**Review Essay: The Ever Controversial General Charles Lee.**” Vol.78, No.4 (October, 2014), pp.1395-1405. Charles Lee (1732-1782), a veteran of service in the British, Portuguese, and Polish armies, served as a high-ranking commander in George Washington’s Continental Army until his court martial over behavior associated with the Battle of Monmouth, June 28, 1778.

LEE, HENRY, III (1756-1818)

Herrera, Ricardo A. “**‘[T]he zealous activity of Capt. Lee’: Light-Horse Harry Lee and *Petite Guerre*.**” Vol.79, No.1 (January, 2015), pp.9-36. Captain ‘Light Horse Harry’ Lee’s (1756-1818) foraging mission in Delaware and Maryland, during February and March, 1778, as an example of command at the company level.

LEE, ROBERT E. (1807-70)

Smith, David G. “**‘Clear the Valley’: The Shenandoah Valley and the Genesis of the Gettysburg Campaign.**” Vol.74, No.4 (October, 2010), pp.1069-1096. Brings to light an overlooked motivation for General Robert E. Lee’s (1807-1870) Gettysburg Campaign, the need to clear the Shenandoah Valley of occupying U.S. troops due to a combination of home front discontent and logistical issues.

Carney, James T. “**The Great Silence of Robert E. Lee.**” Vol.83, No.1 (January, 2019), pp.97-126. Concludes that the primary reason Gen. Robert E. Lee (1807-1870) failed to advocate for an end to the war when, by November, 1864, it was clear that the Confederacy had lost, was his loyalty to his friend, President Jefferson Davis (1808-1889).

LeMAY, CURTIS E. (1906-90)

Meilinger, Phillip S. **“Historiographical Essay: U.S. Air Force Leaders: A Biographical Tour.”** Vol.62, No.4 (October, 1998), pp.833-870.

LÊ MINH ĐÀO (1933-2020)

Veith, George J. and Pribbenow, Merle L., II, **“ ‘Fighting is an Art’: The Army of the Republic of Vietnam’s Defense of Xuan Loc, 9 – 21 April, 1975.”** Vol.68, No.1 (January, 2004), pp.163-213. Provides an account of the successful defensive operation of Brigadier General Lê Minh Đào’s (1933-2020) 18th Division, demonstrating what A.R.V.N. units were capable of accomplishing when commanded by inspiring leaders.

LEND-LEASE: WORLD WAR II (1939-45)

Hill, Alexander, **“British Lend Lease Aid and the Soviet War Effort, June 1941 – June 1942.”** Vol.71, No.3 (July, 2007), pp.773-808. Measures the significance of the aid provided by Great Britain during the First Moscow Protocol to the end of June, 1942.

Glantz, Mary, **“An Officer and a Diplomat? The Ambiguous Position of Philip R. Faymonville and United States-Soviet Relations, 1941-1943.”** Vol.72, No.1 (January, 2008), pp.141-177. Appraises the role played by Colonel Philip Faymonville (1888-1962) in U.S.-Soviet relations, an officer who served as the United States’ first military attaché and as expediter of Lend-Lease Aid during the war, but who had a contentious relationship with U.S. diplomatic personnel.

LIBERIA

Shellum, Brian G. **“African American Officers in Liberia, 1910-1942.”** Vol.82, No.3 (July, 2018), pp.739-757. Seventeen African American officers from the U.S. Army reorganized, trained, and commanded the Liberian Frontier Force that enabled it to defend the nation’s borders and defeat a number of indigenous uprisings.

LIBYA

Vandervort, Bruce, **“Review Essay: Italian Imperialism and the Onset of the Great War.”** Vol.79, No.4 (October, 2015), pp.1121-1126. Three books about the Italo-Turkish War, 1911-1912, and a third covering the wars that immediately preceding the outbreak of World War I which, of course, include both Italy’s war and the Balkan Wars.

LIDDELL HART, BASIL (1895-1970)

Danchev, Alex, “**Liddell Hart and the Indirect Approach.**” Vol.63, No.2 (April, 1999), pp.313-337.

Castel, Albert, “**Liddell Hart’s *Sherman*: Propaganda as History.**” Vol.67, No.2 (April, 2003), pp.405-426. Concludes that Liddell Hart’s 1929 biography of U.S. Civil War General William Tecumseh Sherman (1820-1891) is seriously flawed, both factually and analytically, because it was written to validate the author’s concept of the ‘indirect approach’ in warfare.

Reid, Brian Holden, “**‘A Signpost that was Missing?’ Reconsidering British Lessons from the American Civil War.**” Vol.70, No.2 (April, 2006), pp.385-414. Focuses on the works of the military authors, notably General J.F.C. Fuller (1878-1966) and Captain Basil Liddell Hart (1895-1970), to consider the ‘lessons’ they perceived from their study of the U.S. Civil War.

Reid, Brian Holden, “**‘Young Turks, or Not So Young?’: The Frustrated Quest of Major General J.F.C. Fuller and Captain B.H. Liddell Hart.**” Vol.73, No.1 (January, 2009), pp.147-175. A study of their motives and aspirations during the inter-war period.

LOGISTICS: ANCIENT PERIOD (to 476)

Hanson, Victor Davis, “**Historiographical Essay: The Status of Ancient Military History: Traditional Work, Recent Research, and On-Going Controversies.**” Vol.63, No.2 (April, 1999), pp.379-413. A very thorough survey covering works on every conceivable topic concerning the armed forces and conduct of warfare in the age of ancient Greece and Rome.

Rogers, Clifford J. “**Review Essay: The Field & the Forge.**” Vol.68, No.4 (October, 2004), pp.1233-1239. Population, production, and power in the pre-industrial West.

Kagan, Kimberly, “**Redefining Roman Grand Strategy.**” Vol.70, No.2 (April, 2006), pp.333-362. By scrutinizing the patterns of troop movements provided by surviving sources, the author proposes that Roman Emperors directed how to allocate resources empire-wide to meet objectives, which satisfies the definition of a grand strategy.

Linn, Jason, “**Attila’s Appetite: The Logistics of Attila the Hun’s Invasion of Italy in 452.**” Vol.83, No.2 (April, 2019), pp.325-246. Offers the explanation that Attila the Hun’s (406-453) decision to withdraw from Italy was not due to either Pope Leo the Great (400-461) or hunger and disease, but the approach of winter.

LOGISTICS: MEDIEVAL PERIOD (476-1480)

Harari, Yuval Noah, **“Strategy and Supply in Fourteenth-Century Western European Invasion Campaigns.”** Vol.64, No.2 (April, 2000), pp.297-333. Seeks to understand both how food for men and animals was ensured by logistical trains versus plunder, and to what extent the chosen or imposed form of supply placed restrictions on strategy.

Rogers, Clifford J. **“Review Essay: The Field & the Forge.”** Vol.68, No.4 (October, 2004), pp.1233-1239. Population, production, and power in the pre-industrial West.

Larnach, Matthew, **“The Battle of the Gates of Trajan, 986: A Reassessment.”** Vol.84, No.1 (January, 2020), pp.9-34. An investigation of the destruction of Emperor Basil II’s (r.976-1025) Byzantine army by the Bulgarians that incorporates the issue of logistics and an examination of terrain to ascertain the reasons for victory and defeat.

LOGISTICS: EARLY MODERN PERIOD (1480-1789)

Sproule, Joseph, **“Raiding, Pillaging, and Violent Social Change in Late Sixteenth-Century Livonia.”** Vol.85, No.2 (April, 2021), pp.317-341. Establishes how the pervasiveness of raiding dictated tactical and strategic considerations, influenced military policy, shaped civil-military relations, and played a role in breaking down longstanding social mores, transforming societies, normalizing violence.

LOGISTICS: CHINA - ANCIENT PERIOD

Dreyer, Edward L. **“Zhao Chongguo: A Professional Soldier of the Former Han Dynasty.”** Vol.72, No.3 (July, 2008), pp.665-725. Claims that the Former Han Dynasty general, Zhao Chongguo (137-52 B.C.E.) best known innovation, *tuntian* (military farms), was intended to deny the enemy land for grazing and growing crops, rather than as a means of providing food for troops involved in distant campaigns.

LOGISTICS: ENGLAND / GREAT BRITAIN - EARLY MODERN PERIOD (1480-1789)

Rommelse, Gijs and Downing, Roger, **“Victims of an Ideological Rift? Dutch Prisoners of War during the First Anglo-Dutch War (1652-1654).”** Vol.80, No.3 (July, 2016), pp.649-669. Rather than ideology, the author shows that it was a combination of logistical problems and a lack of funds that produced the dire conditions experienced by Dutch P.O.W.s.

LOGISTICS: ENGLAND / GREAT BRITAIN -

FRENCH REVOLUTIONARY AND NAPOLEONIC WARS (1792-1815)

Speelman, Patrick J. **“Review Essay: The Logistics of British Naval Supremacy in the Age of Sail.”** Vol.77, No.2 (April, 2013), pp.667-670. Consists of three recent books, two covering

systems of supply during the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars, 1793-1815, and a third concerning medical care from 1805 to 1916.

LOGISTICS: ENGLAND / GREAT BRITAIN - WAR OF 1812 (1812-15)

Compeau, Timothy, “**The Royal Navy’s *Psyche* on Lake Ontario: A British Experiment with Prefabricated Warships in the War of 1812.**” Vol.86, No.2 (April, 2022), pp.321-343.

Narrates the British effort to transport four pre-fabricated vessels to Lake Ontario, of which only one, the 56-gun frigate H.M.S. *Psyche*, reached its destination.

LOGISTICS: ENGLAND / GREAT BRITAIN - WORLD WAR II (1939-45)

Jackson, Ashley, “**Supplying War: The High Commission Territories’ Military-Logistical Contribution in the Second World War.**” Vol.66, No.3 (July, 2002), pp.719-760. Assesses the mobilization of manpower from Basutoland, Bechuanaland, and Swaziland for use in logistics in the North African and Italian Campaigns.

LOGISTICS: ENGLAND / GREAT BRITAIN - KOREAN WAR (1950-53)

Tian Ser Seah, Joshua-John, “**Singapore, Hong Kong, and the Royal Navy’s War in Korea, c.1950-1953: Part 1.**” Vol.83, No.4 (October, 2018), pp.1213-1234; “**Part 2.**” Vol.84, No.1 (January, 2020), pp.237-260.

LOGISTICS: FRANCE - WAR OF THE SPANISH SUCCESSION (1701-15)

Dee, Darryl, “**The Survival of France: Logistics and Strategy in the 1709 Flanders Campaign.**” Vol.84, No.4 (October, 2020), pp.1021-1050. Shines a light on the significant role of logistics in the debate concerning whether the French field army in Flanders should pursue an aggressive or cautious strategy during the first year of the War of the Spanish Succession, 1701-1715, arguing that this established a pattern for the remainder of the conflict.

LOGISTICS: FRANCE -

FRENCH REVOLUTIONARY AND NAPOLEONIC WARS (1792-1815)

Morgan, John, “**War Feeding War? The Impact of Logistics on the Napoleonic Occupation of Catalonia.**” Vol.73, No.1 (January, 2009), pp.83-116. The inability of the French occupation forces to live off the land meant that alternate sources and modes of supply had to be relied upon in the midst of guerrilla resistance and the British blockade of Catalan ports, all of which negatively impacted French operations.

LOGISTICS: FRANCE - 2nd ITALIAN WAR OF UNIFICATION

Schneid, Frederick C. **“A Well-Coordinated Affair: Franco-Piedmontese War Planning in 1859.”** Vol.76, No.2 (April, 2012), pp.395-425. Demonstrates that the Franco-Piedmontese general staffs undertook extensive planning that incorporating the new technologies of railways and steam ships, so that the Second War of Italian Unification (1859-1861) qualifies, alongside the more familiar U.S. Civil War and German Wars of Unification, as one of the first ‘modern’ wars of the industrial age.

LOGISTICS: GERMANY - WORLD WAR II (1939-45)

Tunwell, David Passmore and Harrison, Stephan, **“An Evaluation of Allied Intelligence in the Tactical Bombing of German Supply Depots during the Normandy Campaign, 1944.”** Vol.84, No.3 (July, 2020), pp.825-842. Sets forth the proposition that had Allied intelligence regarding German supply activities been more accurate, a decisive crippling of German logistics could have enabled Allied troops to achieve victory sooner than was the case.

Rutherford, Jeff, **“Germany’s Total War: Combat and Occupation around the Kursk Salient, 1943.”** Vol.85, No.4 (October, 2021), pp.954-979. Examines the changing approach of three German divisions to extract resources from the population living near the frontlines.

LOGISTICS: ITALY - 2nd ITALIAN WAR OF UNIFICATION

Schneid, Frederick C. **“A Well-Coordinated Affair: Franco-Piedmontese War Planning in 1859.”** Vol.76, No.2 (April, 2012), pp.395-425. Demonstrates that the Franco-Piedmontese general staffs undertook extensive planning that incorporating the new technologies of railways and steam ships, so that the Second War of Italian Unification (1859-1861) qualifies, alongside the more familiar U.S. Civil War and German Wars of Unification, as one of the first ‘modern’ wars of the industrial age.

LOGISTICS: JAPAN - WORLD WAR II (1939-45)

Fuquea, David C. **“Advantage Japan: The Imperial Japanese Navy’s Superior High Seas Refueling Capability.”** Vol.84, No.1 (January, 2020), pp.213-235. Addresses an understudied factor that made the Japanese victories at Pearl Harbor and beyond possible, one that at least initially, was not available to the U.S. Navy.

LOGISTICS: NORTH VIETNAM - VIETNAM WAR (1955-75)

Deitchman, Seymour J. **“The ‘Electronic Battlefield’ in the Vietnam War.”** Vol.72, No.3 (July, 2008), pp.869-887. Concludes that the proposal of the Jason Group of scientists for a network of sensors and aircraft to detect activity on the Ho Chi-Minh Trail in Laos, though not totally

successful, impacted the course of the war and foreshadowed key aspects of the equipment and operation of the U.S. Armed Forces today.

LOGISTICS: PARAGUAY - CHACO WAR (1932-35)

Hughes, Matthew, **“Logistics and the Chaco War: Bolivia versus Paraguay, 1932-1935.”**

Vol.69, No.2 (April, 2005), pp.411-437. Employs a broad definition of logistics that includes the acquisition of matériel before the outbreak of war, as well as the establishment of national and international supply lines during the war.

LOGISTICS: RUSSIA / SOVIET UNION - WORLD WAR II (1939-45)

Hayward, Joel, **“Too Little, Too Late: An Analysis of Hitler’s Failure in August 1942**

to Damage Soviet Oil Production.” Vol.64, No.3 (July, 2000), pp.769-794. Claims that, had Adolf Hitler not been so fixated on Stalingrad, *Luftwaffe* assets could have been used to significantly disrupt the supply of oil to Soviet factories and forces.

Gilbin, Daniel F. **“Seeds of Victory: Satisfying the needs of the Red Army and the Soviet State**

during the Formation of the Kursk Salient, February – May 1943.” Vol.84, No.4 (October, 2020), pp.1157-1188. Reviews an example of the Soviet Army’s practice of incorporating the civilian population in the rear areas near the frontlines in various forms of support, including the role of re-installed civilian government in recently liberated territory.

LOGISTICS: SPAIN - PORTUGUESE RESTORATION WAR (1640-68)

White, Lorraine, **“Strategic Geography and the Spanish Habsburg Monarchy’s Failure to**

Recover Portugal, 1640-1668.” Vol.71, No.2 (April, 2007), pp.373-409. Contrasting Alba’s (1507-1582) successful campaign in 1580 with the course of this mid-17th century conflict, the article considers the impact of geographic and climactic factors on the strategy, tactics, and logistics of the Spanish forces.

LOGISTICS: U.S.A. - REVOLUTIONARY WAR (1775-83)

Syrett, David, **“Historiographical Essay: The British Armed Forces in the American**

Revolutionary War: Publications, 1875-1998.” Vol.63, No.1 (January, 1999), pp.147-164.

Herrera, Ricardo A. **“‘[T]he zealous activity of Capt. Lee’: Light-Horse Harry Lee and**

***Petite Guerre.*”** Vol.79, No.1 (January, 2015), pp.9-36. Captain ‘Light Horse Harry’ Lee’s (1756-1818) foraging mission in Delaware and Maryland, during February and March, 1778, as an example of command at the company level.

LOGISTICS: U.S.A. - CIVIL WAR (1861-65)

Smith, David G. “**‘Clear the Valley’: The Shenandoah Valley and the Genesis of the Gettysburg Campaign.**” Vol.74, No.4 (October, 2010), pp.1069-1096. Brings to light an overlooked motivation for General Robert E. Lee’s (1807-1870) Gettysburg Campaign, the need to clear the Shenandoah Valley of occupying U.S. troops due to a combination of home front discontent and logistical issues.

Kemmerly, Phillip R. “**Rivers, Rails, and Rebels: Logistics and Struggle to Supply U.S. Army Depot at Nashville, 1862-1865.**” Vol.84, No.3 (July, 2020), pp.713-746. Highlights the indispensable support provided by the U.S. Army depot at Nashville, Tennessee, for Union operations in the Western Theater, which, in turn, depended upon the Louisville-Nashville railway line and the Cumberland River kept open by the U.S. Navy.

Kemmerly, Phillip R. “**Logistics of U.S. Grant’s 1863 Mississippi Campaign: From the Amphibious Landing at Bruinsburg to the Siege of Vicksburg.**” Vol.86, No.3 (July, 2022), pp.573-611. Approaches the much-studied Vicksburg Campaign of General Ulysses S. Grant (1869-1877) from the neglected perspective of logistics, assessing how the interactions of the environment and logistical requirements impacted battle plans, command decisions, and tactics.

LOGISTICS: U.S.A. - WORLD WAR II (1939-45)

Ganz, A. Harding, “**Questionable Objective: The Brittany Ports, 1944.**” Vol.59, No.1 (January, 1995), pp.77-96.

Atkinson, Rick, “**The 2016 George C. Marshall Lecture in Military History: Projecting American Power in the Second World War.**” Vol.80, No.2 (April, 2016), pp.345-354. In spite of devoting a smaller proportion of the country’s gross domestic product to the war than any other major belligerent, the United States demonstrated logistical brilliance, firepower, mobility, mechanical aptitude, and an economic preponderance that outproduced the Axis powers.

Symonds, Craig, “**The 2017 George C. Marshall Lecture in Military History: For Want of a Nail: The Impact of Shipping on Grand Strategy in World War II.**” Vol.81, No.3 (July, 2017), pp.657-666. The remarkable success of U.S. ship building and its impact on Allied strategy.

LOGISTICS: U.S.A. - VIETNAM WAR (2nd Indochina War) (1955-75)

Ruth, Richard A. “**Ham and Mothers: C-Ration Revelry and Revulsion in the Vietnam War.**” Vol.85, No.4 (October, 2021), pp.1004-1028. observes that the comradery of troops was facilitated by the love-hate relations with their rations.

LONGSTREET, JAMES (1821-1904)

DiNardo, Richard L. **“Southern by the Grace of God but Prussian by Common Sense: James Longstreet and the Exercise of Command in the U.S. Civil War.”** Vol.66, No.4 (October, 2002), pp.1011-1032. Compares the manner in which General James Longstreet (1821-1904) organized and utilized his staff with the staff practices developed by the Prussian Army under Helmuth von Moltke the Elder (1800-1891).

LOW COUNTRIES – See: BELGIUM; THE NETHERLANDS

M

MacARTHUR, DOUGLAS (1880-1964)

Meixsel, Richard B. **“Major General George Grunert, WPO-3, and the Philippine Army, 1940-1941.”** Vol.59, No.2 (April, 1995), pp.303-324. Challenges the conventional account of the initial abandonment of War Plan Orange – 3 by the Commanding General of the Philippine Department, General Grunert (1881-1971), and Philippine Army Field Marshal, Douglas MacArthur (1880-1964).

Holizimmer, Kevin C. **“Walter Krueger, Douglas MacArthur, and the Pacific War: The Wakde-Sarmi Campaign as a Case Study.”** Vol.59, No.4 (October, 1995), pp.661-685. Uses the Wakde-Sarmi operation in Northern New Guinea, 17-21 May, 1944, to demonstrate that General Krueger’s (1881-1967) performance as a commander has to be judged within the context of circumstances beyond anyone’s control.

Meixsel, Richard, **“A Uniform Story.”** Vol.69, No.3 (July, 2005), pp.791-799. Debunks the often-repeated story that Douglas MacArthur (1880-1964) designed a field marshal’s uniform for his role as Philippine military advisor in the 1930s.

Irish, Kerry, **“Dwight Eisenhower and Douglas MacArthur in the Philippines: There Must Be a Day of Reckoning [1935-39].”** Vol.74, No.2 (April, 2010), pp.439-473. Demonstrates that Eisenhower’s (1890-1969) dislike of MacArthur (1880-1964) was less about personalities and more about disagreements over the building of an army in an impoverished country and the proper qualities that a U.S. Army officer should exhibit and develop in his subordinates.

Stoler, Mark A. **“The 2015 George C. Marshall Lecture in Military History: George C. Marshall and the ‘Europe-First Strategy, 1939-1951: A Study in Diplomatic as well as Military History.”** Vol.79, No.2 (April, 2015), pp.293-316. Examines the relationship between diplomatic and military history regarding Marshall’s (1880-1959) support for the

strategy of ‘Germany First’ during World War II, for the postwar European Recovery Program, and the relief of Gen. Douglas MacArthur (1880-1964) during the Korean War.

MACHIAVELLI, NICCOLÒ (1469-1527)

Kubik, Timothy R.W. **“Is Machiavelli’s Canon Spiked? Practical Reading in Military History.”** Vol.61, No.1 (January, 1997), pp.7-30. Argues that Niccolò Machiavelli’s (1469-1527) *The Art of War* functioned as a prompt for debate, an exercise of prudent judgement, rather than offering a stock of handy maxims for use in a crisis.

Cassidy, Ben, **“Machiavelli and the Ideology of the Offensive: Gunpowder Weapons in *The Art of War*.”** Vol.67, No.2 (April, 2003), pp.381-404. Disputes the interpretation that, in his *Art of War*, Niccolò Machiavelli (1469-1527) completely rejects the use of both cannon and hand-held firearms, explaining that his downplaying of the use of gunpowder weapons was due to Machiavelli’s association of cannons and handguns with the defensive, while he endorsed the offensive.

MacKINDER, HALFORD (1861-1947)

Paine, Sarah C.M. **“The 2022 George C. Marshall Lecture in Military History: Centuries of Security: Chinese, Russian and U.S. Continental versus Maritime Approaches.”** Vol.86, No.4 (October, 2022), pp.813-836.

MADAGASCAR

Benbow, Tim, **“‘Menace’ to ‘Ironclad’: The British Operations against Dakar (1940) and Madagascar (1942).”** Vol.75, No.3 (July, 2011), pp.769-809. Investigates why, regarding two separate British operations against Vichy French colonies in Africa, ‘Menace’ failed, while ‘Ironclad’ succeeded.

MADISON, JAMES (1751-1836)

Kastor, Peter J. **“Toward ‘The Maritime War Only’: The Question of Naval Mobilization, 1811-1812.”** Vol.61, No.3 (July, 1997), pp.455-480. Applies the broader context of the ‘New Military History’, particularly political circumstances, in an effort to better understand President James Madison’s (1809-1817) naval policy and strategy leading up to the outbreak of the War of 1812.

MAGYARS – See: MEDIEVAL PERIOD: EARLY MIDDLE AGES

MAHAN, ALFRED THAYER (1840-1914)

Ferreiro, Larrie D. “**Mahan and the ‘English Club’ of Lima, Peru: The Genesis of *The Influence of Sea Power upon History*.**” Vol.72, No.3 (July, 2008), pp.901-906.

MAHAN, DENNIS (1802-71)

Geissler, Suzanne, “**Professor Dennis Mahan Speaks out on West Point Chapel Issues, 1850.**” Vol.69, No.2 (April, 2005), pp.505-519. An 1850 letter from West Point professor to the Secretary of War in which Mahan (1802-1871) expressed his opposition to the academy’s Chaplain always having to be Episcopalian and mandatory chapel attendance for staff.

MALARIA – See: BIOLOGICAL AND MEDICAL ISSUES

MALAWI

Stapleton, Tim, “**‘Bad Boys’: Infiltration and Sedition in the African Military Units of the Central African Federation (Malawi, Zambia and Zimbabwe) 1953-63.**” Vol.73, No.4 (October, 2009), pp.1167-1193. Illustrates that nationalists exploited the rising unpopularity of colonialism, discontent with participation in the war in Malaya, the Mau Mau uprising in Kenya, and the Congo Crisis, which led white officers doubt the dependability of their African troops.

MALAYA

See Also: INDONESIA; SINGAPORE

Stapleton, Tim, “**‘Bad Boys’: Infiltration and Sedition in the African Military Units of the Central African Federation (Malawi, Zambia and Zimbabwe) 1953-63.**” Vol.73, No.4 (October, 2009), pp.1167-1193. Illustrates that nationalists exploited the rising unpopularity of colonialism, discontent with participation in the war in Malaya, the Mau Mau uprising in Kenya, and the Congo Crisis, which led white officers doubt the dependability of their African troops.

Tuck, Christopher, “**‘Cut the bonds which bind our hands’: Deniable Operations during the Confrontation with Indonesia, 1963-1966.**” Vol.77, No.2 (April, 2013), pp.599-623. Describes the British confrontation with Indonesia and the problems with cross-border operations.

Tuck, Christopher, “**Measuring Victory: Assessing the outcomes of *Konfrontasi*, 1963-66.**” Vol.82, No.3 (July, 2018), pp.873-898. Suggests that the outcome of the British low intensity conflict with Indonesia, known as the ‘Confrontation’, is far more complex than either the triumphal or revisionist interpretations suggest.

MAO ZEDONG (1893-1976)

Xiaogang Lai, Sherman, “**‘The Devil is in the Details’: Mao Zedong before and after the Luochuan Conference, August 1937.**” Vol.85, No.4 (October, 2021), pp.930-953. Relates how Mao Zedong (1893-1976) succeeded in convincing both the Chinese Communist Party and Joseph Stalin (1878-1953) to adopt his strategy of guerrilla warfare.

MARCH, PEYTON C. (1864-1955)

Neumann, Brian, “**‘A Question of Authority’: Reassessing the March-Pershing ‘Feud’ in the First World War.**” Vol.73, No.4 (October, 2009), pp.1117-1142. Ascertains that the conflict between John J. Pershing (1860-1940) and Peyton C. March (1864-1955) was the result of a lack of a clearly defined command structure within the U.S. Army rather than a matter of opposing personalities.

MARINES: BRITISH ROYAL MARINES

Bittner, Donald F. “**Shattering Images: Officers of the Royal Marines, 1867-1913.**” Vol.59, No.1 (January, 1995), pp.27-52. Demonstrates that Great Britain’s Royal Marines provided members of the middle class with the opportunity to earn a commission.

MARINES: U.S. MARINE CORPS

Shulimson, Jack, “**Military Professionalism: The Case of the U.S. Marine Officer Corps, 1880-1898.**” Vol.60, No.2 (April, 1996), pp.231-242. Views the transformation of the officer corps of the Marines into a professional body as part of the late nineteenth century, society wide ‘organizational revolution.’

Jablon, Howard, “**General David M. Shoup, U.S.M.C.: Warrior and War Protester.**” Vol.60,

No.3 (July, 1996), pp.513-538. Claims that the same hard-headed pragmatism that made General Shoup (1904-83) a reliable Marine Corps officer led him to conclude that U.S. involvement in Vietnam was ultimately a pointless waste of American lives.

Millett, Allan R. **“A Reader’s Guide to the Korean War.”** Vol.61, No.3 (July, 1997), pp.583-597.

Dawson, Joseph G. **“With Fidelity and Effectiveness: Archibald Henderson’s Lasting Legacy to the U.S. Marine Corps.”** Vol.62, No.4 (October, 1998), pp.727-753. Affirms Henderson’s importance as Commandant of the Corps (1821-1859), during which he expanded the roles and capabilities of Marines, such as the deployment of a Marine battalion alongside Army units against the Creeks and Seminoles and the addition of an artillery component to strengthen landing forces.

Cole, Bernard D. **“Memoirs: A Noglow in Vietnam, 1968: Air Power at the Battle of Khe Sanh.”** Vol.64, No.1 (January, 2000), pp.141-158. Both a memoir and an analysis by a U.S. Marine who experienced first-hand the fighting at Khe Sanh.

Stevenson, Matthew, **“Memoirs: War’s End on Okinawa: In Search of Captain Robert Fowler.”** Vol.67, No.2 (April, 2003), pp.517-528. U.S.M.C. Captain Fowler, who was killed on Okinawa on 12 June, 1945, was a close friend of the author’s father.

Dingman, Roger V. **“Language at War: U.S. Marine Corps Japanese Language Officers in the Pacific.”** Vol.68, No.3 (July, 2004), pp.853-883. Analyzes the origins, training, experiences, and recollections of Caucasian Japanese language officers, including the shift from translating to facilitate life-taking to lifesaving.

Bartlett, Merrill L. **“Ben Hebard Fuller and the Genesis of a Modern United States Marine Corps, 1891-1934.”** Vol.69, No.1 (January, 2005), pp.73-91.

Ulbrich, David J. **“The Long Lost ‘Tentative Manual for Defense of Advance Bases’ (1936).”** Vol.71, No.3 (July, 2007), pp.889-901. In 1998 a copy of the Marine Corps’ previously lost 1936 Tentative Manual for Defense of Advance Bases was uncovered, a manual that displays the culmination of decades of doctrinal thinking about the defense of island bases against enemy amphibious, naval, and aerial assaults.

Terrar, Toby, **“First Landing on Guam: The Difficulties of a Naval Aviator during the Invasion.”** Vol.72, No.4 (October, 2008), pp.1265-1270. Gives an account of the rivalry between the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps for landing the first plane on the newly liberated island of Guam, in which the Navy pilot, Ed Terrar, won the honor on 30 July, 1944.

McPherson, Alan, **“Lid Sitters and Prestige Seekers: The U.S. Navy versus the State Department and the End of U.S. Occupations.”** Vol.78, No.1 (January, 2014), pp.73-99.

Conflicting outlooks between the State Department and the Marine Corps on the U.S. military occupation of the Dominican Republic, from 1912 to 1924, Haiti, from 1915 to 1934, and Nicaragua, from 1927 to 1932.

Williamson, Corbin, **“Mediterranean Marines: The Challenges of Forward Deployment, 1948-1958.”** Vol.85, No.2 (April, 2021), pp.426-452. Considers the challenges to U.S. Marine Corps units deployed in the Mediterranean as part of President Truman’s commitment to containment of the Soviet Union.

MARSHALL, GEORGE C. (1880-1959)

Bland, Larry I.; Marshall, George C. and the Duke of Wellington, **“Document of Note: Wellington Instructs the Yanks.”** Vol.63, No.2 (April, 1999), pp.427-428.

Bland, Larry I. **“Document of Note: Marlene Dietrich’s Firepower.”** Vol.66, No.3 (July, 2002), pp.829-831. Chief-of-Staff George C. Marshall (1880-1959) sought a means to stop the flow of firearms being brought back to the U.S. as war trophies.

May, Ernest R. **“The George C. Marshall Lecture in Military History: 1947-48: When Marshall kept the U.S. Out of War in China.”** Vol.66, No.4 (October, 2002), pp.1001-1010.

Nelson, Anna Kasten, **“Anna M. Rosenberg, an ‘Honorary Man’.**” Vol.68, No.1 (January, 2004), pp.133-161. Considers how and why Defense Secretary George C. Marshall (1880-1959) bucked political and gender assumptions when he appointed a pro-New Deal, Jewish immigrant woman, Anna M. Rosenberg (1899-1983), as the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower.

Weintraub, Stanley, **“Review Essay: The Conscript: George Catlett Marshall.”** Vol.72, No.3 (July, 2008), pp.911-919. The fifth volume of The Papers of George Catlett Marshall, covering 1945 to 1947.

Stoler, Mark A. **“The 2015 George C. Marshall Lecture in Military History: George C. Marshall and the ‘Europe-First Strategy, 1939-1951: A Study in Diplomatic as well as Military History.”** Vol.79, No.2 (April, 2015), pp.293-316. Examines the relationship between diplomatic and military history regarding Marshall’s (1880-1959) support for the strategy of ‘Germany First’ during World War II, for the postwar European Recovery Program, and the relief of Gen. Douglas MacArthur (1880-1964) during the Korean War.

MARSHALL, SAMUEL LYMAN ATWOOD (1900-77)

Jordan, Kelly C. **“Right for the Wrong Reasons: S.L.A. Marshall and the Ratio of Fire in**

Korea.” Vol.66, No.1 (January, 2002), pp.135-162.

MASSACHUSETTS, U.S.A.

Stentiford, Barry M. **“The Meaning of a Name: The Rise of the National Guard and the End of a Town Militia.”** Vol.72, No.3 (July, 2008), pp.727-754. Recounts the changing relationship between the community of Wakefield, Massachusetts, and its town militia, the Richardson Light Guard, when the unit became part of the National Guard in 1916.

MEADE, GEORGE GORDON (1815-72)

Lovelace, Alexander G. **“Meade and the Media: Civil War Journalism and the New History of War Reporting.”** Vol.85, No.4 (October, 2021), pp.907-929. Employs a new approach in which War Correspondents are seen as powerful actors who could influence the decision-making process of commanders.

MECHANIZED WARFARE

Lofgren, Stephen J. (ed.) **“Diary of First Lieutenant Sugihara Kinrū: Iwo Jima, January-February 1945.”** Vol.59, No.1 (January, 1995), pp.97-134. Served in the 11th Antitank Battalion which was manned by reservists from Hiroshima and Shimane prefectures.

Fanning, William J., Jr. **“The Origin of the Term ‘Blitzkrieg’: Another View.”** Vol.61, No.2 (April, 1997), pp.283-302.

Hofmann, George F. **“The Tactical and Strategic Use of Attaché Intelligence: The Spanish Civil War and the U.S. Army’s Misguided Quest for a Modern Tank Doctrine.”** Vol.62, No.1 (January, 1998), pp.101-134. Asserts that the analysis of the employment of tanks in the war was distorted by the cultural bias of the infantry, cavalry, and artillery branch chiefs, leaving the U.S. Army without an armored doctrine on the eve of World War II.

Gunsburg, Jeffrey A. **“The Battle of Gembloux, 14-15 May 1940: The ‘Blitzkrieg’ Checked.”** Vol.64, No.1 (January, 2000), pp.97-140. Uses an examination of the effectiveness of the French forces holding a defensive position at the Belgium town of Gembloux as a test case for French doctrine and performance.

Holmes, Terence M. **“Classical Blitzkrieg: The Untimely Modernity of Schlieffen’s Cannae Programme.”** Vol.67, No.3 (July, 2003), pp.745-771. Reveals that the Chief of the Prussian General Staff, Count Alfred von Schlieffen (1891-1906), only adopted the Cannae paradigm

in 1909, four years *after* he had formulated his plans for war with France, and that this paradigm inadvertently fit subsequent concepts for mechanized warfare.

Pribbenow, Merle L., II, **“A Tale of Five Generals: Vietnam’s Invasion of Cambodia.”**

Vol.70, No.2 (April, 2006), pp.459-486. Concerned the meticulously planned and well executed 1978-79 invasion of neighboring Cambodia by the Communist forces of the newly united Vietnam, which included both an amphibious assault and combined arms mechanized columns.

Trauschweizer, Ingo Wolfgang, **“Learning with an Ally: The U.S. Army and the Bundeswehr**

in the Cold War.” Vol.72, No.2 (April, 2008), pp.477-508. Discusses four areas of German-U.S. defense cooperation, including aid for West German rearmament, the reorganization of German and U.S. combat formations in the post-Korean War period, the failure of a shared attempt at tank design, and the impact of German tactical and operational concepts on post-Vietnam U.S. Army doctrine.

Milner, Marc, **“Stopping the Panzers: Reassessing the Role of 3rd Canadian Infantry Division in Normandy, 7-10 June, 1944.”** Vol.74, No.2 (April, 2010), pp.491-522. Reveals that the 3rd

Canadian Infantry Division’s beachhead battles of 7-10 June against the 12th Hitler Youth Panzer Division are fundamentally misunderstood as failed breakout attempts when, in fact, they were successful defensive operations.

Pennington, Reina, **“Offensive Women: Women in Combat in the Red Army in the Second**

World War.” Vol.74, No.3 (July, 2010), pp.775-820. Reports on the nature and variety of women’s combat experiences.

Buckley, John, **“Tackling the Tiger: The Development of British Armoured Doctrine for Normandy 1944.”** Vol.74, No.4 (October, 2010), pp.1161-1184. Asserts that the British Army’s

loose approach to developing and imposing doctrine, despite inherent shortcomings, actually facilitated a flexibility that allowed the armoured forces to quickly and effectively modify their doctrines in the heat of battle.

Forrester, Charles, **“Field Marshal Montgomery’s Role in the Creation of the British 21st Army Group’s Combined Arms Doctrine for the Final Assault on Germany.”** Vol.78,

No.4 (October, 2014), pp.1295-1320.

Lak, Martijn, **“Review Essay: The Death Ride of the Panzers? Recent Historiography on the Battle of Kursk.”** Vol.82, No.3 (July, 2018), pp.909-919.

Zaloga, Steven J. **“Debunking an Omaha Beach Legend: The Use of the ‘Armored Funnies’**

on D-Day.” Vol.85, No.1 (January, 2021), pp.134-162. Confronts the notion that one of the reasons the landing force on Omaha Beach suffered heavy casualties was the U.S. Army’s

resistance to the use of specialized tanks developed by the British for the D-Day invasion.

MEDIA

Danchev, Alex, **“Review Essay: War Stories.”** Vol.69, No.1 (January, 2005), pp.211-215.

Covers works about the occupation of war photographers.

Turner, Blair P. **“Capturing the many Faces of War.”** Vol.78, No.2 (April, 2014), pp.741-746.

A look at a 2012 catalogue of the exposition of war photography by the Museum of Fine Arts at Houston, Texas.

Goldstein, Cora Sol, **“A Comparative Analysis of Cultural Control: The German Military Occupation of France (1940-1942) and the American Military Occupation of Germany (1945-1949).”** Vol.80, No.4 (October, 2016), pp.1083-1116. Although their respective agendas were inspired by opposite ideologies, the author proposes that the mechanisms of control over information by both occupiers shared significant similarities.

Parkin, Russell, **“Colonel E.G. Keogh and the Making of the *Australian Army Journal*.”** Vol.81, No.4 (October, 2017), pp.1075-1096. Shines a light on the overlooked contribution to professional education and military history in Australia by Eustace Graham Keogh (1899-1981).

Wolters, Timothy S. **“Harvey A. De Weerd and the Dawn of Academic Military History in the United States.”** Vol.85, No.1 (January, 2021), pp.95-133. Chronicles the career of Harvey A. De Weerd (1902-1979), a significant member of early academic military historians who was an editor of the *Infantry Journal* during World War II, early editor of the *Journal of Military History*, taught some of the first dedicated military history courses in the United States, and was the second military historian hired by the R.A.N.D. corporation.

Krome, Frederic, **“‘Will the Germans Bombard New York?’: Hugo Gernsback and the Future War Tale.”** Vol.86, No.1 (January, 2022), pp.54-76. Appraises the role of ‘Future War’ fiction, particularly works produced by Hugo Gernsback (1884-1967), in engaging the American public’s interest in military affairs in the early 20th century.

MEDIA: EARLY MODERN PERIOD (1481-1788)

Lynn, John A. **“Historiographical Essay: The Treatment of Military Subjects in Diderot’s *Encyclopedie*.”** Vol.65, No.1 (January, 2001), pp.131-165. Concludes that while Denis Diderot’s (1713-1784) coverage of military topics was not the basis for reforms, they provide an excellent picture of the European art of war in the mid-eighteenth century.

Brady, Andrea, **“Dying with Honour: Literary Propaganda and the Second English Civil War.”**

Vol.70, No.1 (January, 2006), pp.9-30. Deals with the coverage in Parliamentary versus Royalist propaganda of the executions of Sir Charles Lucas and Sir George Lisle in 1648, following General Thomas Fairfax's (1612-1671) siege of Colchester.

Powers, Sandra L. **"Historiographical Essay: Studying the Art of War: Military Books known to American Officers and Their French Counterparts during the Second Half of the Eighteenth Century."** Vol.70, No.3 (July, 2006), pp.781-814.

Black, Jeremy, **"A Revolution in Military Cartography?: Europe 1650-1815."** Vol.73, No.1 (January, 2009), pp.49-68. This article approaches the issue of cartography not only in tactical, operational and strategic terms, but also with reference to the mapping of war for public interest.

Probasco, Nate, **"The Role of Commoners and Print in Elizabethan England's Acceptance of Firearms."** Vol.76, No.2 (April, 2012), pp.343-372. Looks at the debate in print between, on the one hand, common citizens and local officials, who were skeptical of firearms, the expense and safety of which they criticized, and those who promoted the replacement of longbows with firearms, who often employed dubious information.

MEDIA: FRENCH REVOLUTIONARY AND NAPOLEONIC WARS (1792-1815)

Black, Jeremy, **"A Revolution in Military Cartography?: Europe 1650-1815."** Vol.73, No.1 (January, 2009), pp.49-68. This article approaches the issue of cartography not only in tactical, operational and strategic terms, but also with reference to the mapping of war for public interest.

Heuer, Jennifer, **"Soldiers as Victims or Villains? Demobilization, Masculinity, and Family in French Royalist Pamphlets, 1814-1815."** Vol.80, No.1 (January, 2016), pp.121-144.

MEDIA: WAR OF 1812 (1812-15)

Jensen, Richard, **"Military History on the Electronic Frontier: Wikipedia Fights the War of 1812."** Vol.76, No.4 (October, 2012), pp.1165-1182.

Hickey, Donald R. **"'War Hawks': Using Newspapers to Trace a Phrase, 1792-1812."** Vol.78, No.2 (April, 2014), pp.725-740.

MEDIA: SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR (1898)

Hooper, Candice Shy, **"The War that Made Hollywood: How the Spanish-American War Saved the U.S. Film Industry."** Vol.76, No.1 (January, 2012), pp.69-97. By 1897 the embryonic film industry was in decline, but the industry's exploitation of the public's

interest in the explosion of the U.S.S. *Maine* and the subsequent war made the business of movies lucrative once more.

MEDIA: WORLD WAR I (1914-18)

Laurie, Clayton D. “**‘The Chanting of Crusaders’: Captain Heber Blankenhorn and A.E.F. Combat Propaganda in World War I.**” Vol.59, No.3 (July, 1995), pp.457-481.

Moore, Andrew, “**Monuments Men and Martyred Towns: *The Arras Belfry* by Fernand Sabatté.**” Vol.79, No.4 (October, 2015), pp.1047-1057. Sabatté (1874-1940) served as a French officer in charge of evacuating artworks from Medieval churches and town halls that were under the threat of destruction as well as painting an example of the ‘martyred towns’ genre.

Stice, Elizabeth, “**Men on the Margins: Representations of Colonial Troops in British and French Trench Newspapers of the Great War.**” Vol.83, No.2 (April, 2019), pp.435-454. Ascertains how, through the contents of trench newspapers, the war provided a new context for evaluating empires and their peoples and questioning existing imperial culture.

Donaldson, Peter, “**‘A New and Deadly Game’: British Sporting Culture in the First World War.**” Vol.84, No.1 (January, 2020), pp.83-114. Popular journalism, memoirs, novels, and poetry provided the British public with a diet of war stories and reportage in which athletic endeavor and organized games featured prominently, demonstrating that the association between games and combat survived the horrors of industrial killing between 1914 and 1918.

Hauser, Mark T. “**‘A Violent Desire for Amusements’: Boxing, Libraries, and the Distribution and Management of Welfare During the First World War.**” Vol.86, No.4 (October, 2022), pp.883-913. Illustrates the impact of U.S. wartime recreation programs during World War I on the development of mass culture.

MEDIA: WORLD WAR II (1939-45)

Loss, Christopher P. “**Reading between Enemy Lines: Armed Services Editions and World War II.**” Vol.67, No.3 (July, 2003), pp.811-834.

Warren, Mame, “**Focal Point of the Fleet: U.S. Navy Photographic Activities in World War II.**” Vol.69, No.4 (October, 2005), pp.1045-1079. Concerned with the work of Edward Streichen (1879-1973) and his team of professional photographers.

Jeans, Roger B., Jr. “**Alarm in Washington: A Wartime ‘Expose’ of Japan’s Biological Warfare Program.**” Vol.71, No.2 (April, 2007), pp.411-439. Discusses a book published in the summer of 1944 describing both Japan’s biological warfare program and the failure of the U.S. government to meet this threat, and the government and the media’s response to this

publication, considering parallels with the 2001 anthrax ‘scares.’

Khan, David, **“How the Allies Suppressed the Second Greatest Secret of World War II.”** Vol.74, No.4 (October, 2010), pp.1229-1241. Concerning the post-war classification of information about the Allies’ success in breaking German codes.

Souchen, Alex, **“The Culture of Morale: Battalion Newspapers in the 3rd Canadian Infantry Division, June-August 1944.”** Vol.77, No.2 (April, 2013), pp.543-567.

MEDIA: COLD WAR (1945-91)

Grandstaff, Mark R. **“Making the Military American: Advertising, Reform, and the Demise of an Antistanding Military Tradition, 1945-1955.”** Vol.60, No.2 (April, 1996), pp.299-323. Establishes that, while concerns over the spread of communism and nuclear war played a role, both reforms within the military and a national public relations campaign also helped citizens view the armed forces as an acceptable American institution.

Settle, Frank; Whaley, Tom and Blackmer, Elizabeth, **“Alsos Digital Library for Nuclear Issues.”** Vol.67, No.3 (July, 2003), pp.921-923.

Lockenour, Jay, **“Black and White Memories of War: Victimization and Violence in West German War Films of the 1950s.”** Vol.76, No.1 (January, 2012), pp.159-191. Contends that war films helped to construct a specifically West German identity as helpless victims or heroic nonconformists rather than historical actors and compliant, or even eager, collaborators by creating myths and memories important to the legitimacy of the new Federal Republic.

Seipp, Adam R. **“‘Visionary Battle Scenes’: Reading Sir John Hackett’s *The Third World War*, 1977-85.”** Vol.83, No.4 (October, 2019), pp.1235-1257. Suggests that the success of Sir John Hackett’s (1910-1997) 1978 best-selling novel reflected rising Cold War tensions, as well as inspiring the modern literary genre of the techno-thriller.

MEDIA: KOREAN WAR (1950-53)

Casey, Steven, **“Wilfred Burchett and the United Nations Command’s Media Relations during the Korean War, 1951-1952.”** Vol.74, No.3 (July, 2010), pp.821-845. Assesses the Australian journalist, Wilfred Burchett’s (1911-1983), observations concerning the U.S. Army’s relations with the media during the Korean armistice negotiations.

MEDIA: VIETNAM WAR (2nd Indochina War) (1955-75)

Daddis, Gregory A. **“Historiographical Essay: Mansplaining Vietnam: Male Veterans and**

America's Popular Image of the Vietnam War." Vol.82, No.1 (January, 2018), pp.181-207. Explores how various media, such as memoirs, have excluded the story of the roughly 7,500 U.S. women who served in the Vietnam War.

MEDIA: POST COLD WAR PERIOD

Wetta, Frank J. and Novelli, Martin A. **"Review Essay: 'Now a Major Motion Picture': War Films and Hollywood's New Patriotism."** Vol.67, No.3 (July, 2003), pp.861-882. Suggests that the 'New Patriotism' displayed in films (1998-2002) celebrates loyalty to one's comrades in battle and the ability to survive the horrific experience of modern combat rather than any stated or understood national or public rationales for whatever a war is being fought.

MEDIEVAL PERIOD (476-1480)

Rose, Susan, **"Islam Versus Christendom: The Naval Dimension, 1000-1600."** Vol.63, No.3 (July, 1999), pp.561-578. Surveys developments from the Crusades to the dominance of the Ottoman Empire within the geographic framework of the Mediterranean Sea.

France, John, **"Historiographical Essay: Recent Writing on Medieval Warfare: From the Fall of Rome to c.1300."** Vol.65, No.2 (April, 2001), pp.441-473. Primarily covering works that have been publishing in the last twenty-five years, the author reviews studies on the successor states to Rome, the Byzantine Empire, the thorny subject of feudalism, fortifications and siege operations, the naval dimension, the manner in which warfare was conducted in Europe during the High Middle Ages, 1000-1300, the employment of mercenaries, and the Crusades.

May, Timothy, **"The Training of an Inner Asian Nomad Army in the Pre-Modern Period."** Vol.70, No.3 (July, 2006), pp.617-635. Confirms that nomadic 'horse people', such as the Mongols, employed more sophisticated training for war than had previously been imagined.

Hale, Brian J. **"Review Essay: Recent Literature on the Crusades."** Vol.75, No.4 (October, 2011), pp.1225-1272. Includes twenty-three recent titles that cover a wide variety of topics, such as the pre-Crusades struggles of Byzantium with the Turks, the Albigensian Crusade, fortifications in the Holy Land, logistics, and the role of women.

Hosler, John D. **"Status Report: Pre-Modern Military History in American Doctoral Programs: Figures and Implications."** Vol.82, No.2 (April, 2018), pp.565-582.

Rogers, Clifford J. **"Medieval Strategy and the Economics of Conquest."** Vol.82, No.3 (July, 2018), pp.709-738. Approaching the question in a quantitative fashion, the author seeks to show how Medieval kings could make war pay for war, especially in urbanized areas and in times and places where it was permitted to enslave enemy populations.

Stoyanov, Aleksandar, **“The Size of Bulgaria’s Medieval Field Armies: A Case Study of Military Mobilization Capacity in the Middle Ages.”** Vol.83, No.3 (July, 2019), pp.719-746. Broadens the scope of time and sources to ascertain estimates of the actual size of Bulgarian field Armies from the First Bulgarian Empire (681-1018) to the Second Bulgarian Empire (1185-1422).

Vigus, Robert T. **“The Military Revolution and the Ancient Origins of the *Trace Italienne*.”** Vol.84, No.3 (July, 2020), pp.698-712. Points out that the *trace italienne*, in the form of angled bastions, that have been identified as a key and novel feature of the Early-Modern ‘Military Revolution’, had its roots in Ancient Greek and Roman treatises and the actual works constructed by Roman and Byzantine engineers, surviving examples of which could be seen in important trading and pilgrimage routes.

MEDIEVAL PERIOD (476-1480): EARLY MIDDLE AGES (476-1000)

Bachrach, Bernard, **“Charlemagne and the Carolingian General Staff.”** Vol.66, No.2 (April, 2002), pp.313-357. Contends that the personnel and procedures relied upon by Emperor Charlemagne (747-814) for intelligence and planning fulfill the qualifications for a modern general staff.

Bachrach, David S. **“The Military Organization of Ottonian Germany, c.900-1018: The Views of Bishop Thietmar of Merseburg.”** Vol.72, No.4 (October, 2008), pp.1061-1088.

Bachrach, Bernard S. **“Review Essay: The Barbarian Hordes that never were.”** Vol.74, No.3 (July, 2010), pp.901-904. A critical assessment of Peter Heather’s 2009 book *Empires and Barbarians: Migration, Development and the Birth of Europe*, which covers the period from the decline of the Roman Empire to the age of the Viking.

Bachrach, David S. **“Early Ottonian Warfare: The Perspective from Corvey.”** Vol.75, No.2 (April, 2011), pp.393-409. A critical reassessment of the depiction of warfare in Widukind of Corvey’s *Res gestae Saxonicae*, which concludes that, rather than small bands of heavily armed, mounted warriors, King Henry I (r.919-936) and Emperor Otto (r.936-973) deployed large armies for placing fortresses under siege.

Bachrach, David S. **“Restructuring the Eastern Frontier: Henry I of Germany, 924-936.”** Vol.78, No.1 (January, 2014), pp.9-35. Analyzes the establishment of a defense in depth against Magyar raiders, relying on garrisoned fortifications.

Bachrach, Bernard S. and Bachrach, David S. **“Bruno of Mersburg *Saxon War*: A Study in Eleventh-Century German Military History.”** Vol.81, No.2 (April, 2017), pp.341-367. Bruno of Mersburg’s account of the civil wars fought by King Henry IV (1056-1106) provides valuable information on the nature and conduct of warfare in north-central Europe during this period.

Kolberg, Are Skarstein, **“Did Vikings Really go Berserk? An Interdisciplinary Critical Analysis of Berserks.”** Vol.82, No.3 (July, 2018), pp.899-908.

Kolberg, Are Skarstein, **“There is Power in a Cohort: Development of Warfare in Iron Age to Early Medieval Scandinavia.”** Vol.83, No.1 (January, 2019), pp.9-30. Questions the degree to which Scandinavian society was organized for warfare and the extent to which tactics in Iron Age to Early Medieval Scandinavia were influenced by external examples.

Larnach, Matthew, **“The Battle of the Gates of Trajan, 986: A Reassessment.”** Vol.84, No.1 (January, 2020), pp.9-34. An investigation of the destruction of Emperor Basil II's (r.976-1025) Byzantine army by the Bulgarians that incorporates the issue of logistics and an examination of terrain to ascertain the reasons for victory and defeat.

MEDIEVAL PERIOD (476-1480): HIGH MIDDLE AGES (1000-1300)

Bachrach, David S. **“The Military Administration of England: The Royal Artillery (1216-1272).”** Vol.68, No.4 (October, 2004), pp.1083-1104. By describing an example of the sophisticated military administration during the reign of King Henry III, specifically involving siege engines, the author argues that much of the military innovations that have been attributed to Henry III's successor, King Edward I, already existed before he ascended the throne.

Harari, Tuval Noah, **“Armchairs, Coffee, and Authority: Eye-witnesses and Flesh-witnesses Speak about War, 1100-1200.”** Vol.74, No.1 (January, 2010), pp.53-78. The possibility and utility of understanding the experience of war from first-hand accounts.

Isaac, Steven, **“The Role of Towns in the Battle of Bouvines (1214).”** Vol.79, No.2 (April, 2015), pp.317-344. Uses the French King, Philip Augustus' (1165-1223), victory at Bouvines as an example of the military contributions of urban centers in the form of non-noble troops, the production of arms and armor, financial resources, and contributors to policy.

Gyucha, Attila; Lee, Wayne E. and Rózsa, Zoltán, **“The Mongol Campaign in Hungary, 1241-1242: The Archaeology and History of Nomadic Conquest and Massacre.”** Vol.83, No.4 (October, 2019), pp.1021-1066. This article integrates conquest process theory, literary evidence, and data from substantial new archaeological work to explore the motivation and nature of Mongol invasions and the consequences for rural settlements on the Great Hungarian Plain.

MEDIEVAL PERIOD: CRUSADES IN THE MIDDLE EAST (1095-1291)

Nicolle, David, **“Medieval Warfare: The Unfriendly Interface.”** Vol.63, No.3 (July, 1999), pp.579-599. Probes the nature of and reasons for the adoption of military technology and techniques, focusing on the influence of the Islamic world on Christian Europe.

Kostick, Conor, **“*Iuvenes* and the First Crusade (1096-99): Knights in Search of Glory?”**

Vol.73, No.2 (April, 2009), pp.369-392. *Iuvenes* was a term applied to a category of knights who were not necessarily young in age, but were ‘young’ in their careers, a category of knights who, despite a degree of recklessness and indiscipline, played an important role in the First Crusade.

Berkovich, Ilya, **“The Battle of Forbie and the Second Frankish Kingdom of Jerusalem.”**

Vol.75, No.1 (January, 2011), pp.9-44. Inquires into the disastrous defeat of the Second Kingdom of Jerusalem’ coalition Franko-Syrian army at the Battle of Forbie, 1244, which reduced it to a pawn in the power politics of neighboring Muslim kingdoms.

Hale, Brian J. **“Review Essay: Recent Literature on the Crusades.”** Vol.75, No.4 (October, 2011), pp.1225-1272. Includes twenty-three recent titles that cover a wide variety of topics, such as the pre-Crusades struggles of Byzantium with the Turks, the Albigensian Crusade, fortifications in the Holy Land, logistics, and the role of women.

Ehrlich, Michael, **“The Battle of Ain al-Mallāha, 19 June 1157.”** Vol.83, No.1 (January, 2019), pp.31-42. An examination of the victory of Nūr al-Dīn’s (1146-1174) Syrian forces over a Frankish army led by the King of Jerusalem, Baldwin III (r.1143-1163), in the northern Jordan Valley that relates written sources to a careful examination of the terrain of the actual battlefield.

Fulton, Michael S. **“The Siege of Montfort and Mamluk Artillery Technology in 1271: Integrating the Archaeology and Topography with the Narrative Sources.”** Vol.83, No.3 (July, 2019), pp.689-717. An investigation into the development of mechanical artillery, specifically the trebuchet, through the study of archaeologically unearthed projectiles and the suitability of the surrounding terrain for the deployment of trebuchets.

Marvin, Laurence W. **“The Battle of Fariskur (29 August 1219) and the Fifth Crusade: Causes, Course, and Consequences.”** Vol.85, No.3 (July, 2021), pp.597-618. Seeks to understand the neglected Battle of Fariskur, fought between a force of Crusaders and the army of the Sultan of Egypt, Al-Kamil (circa 1177-1238).

MEDIEVAL PERIOD (476-1480): LATE MIDDLE AGES (1300-1480)

DeVries, Kelly, **“The Lack of a Western European Military Response to the Ottoman Invasions of Eastern Europe from Nicopolis (1396) to Mohacs (1526).”** Vol.63, No.3 (July, 1999), pp.539-559. Inquires into the reasons behind a failure to respond to the Turkish threat, proposing that it was a combination of the intimidating power of the Ottomans and changing attitudes towards the duties expected of a Christian soldier.

Harari, Yuval Noah, **“Strategy and Supply in Fourteenth-Century Western European Invasion Campaigns.”** Vol.64, No.2 (April, 2000), pp.297-333. Seeks to understand both how food for

men and animals was ensured by logistical trains versus plunder, and to what extent the chosen or imposed form of supply placed restrictions on strategy.

Stone, John, **“Technology, Society, and the Infantry Revolution of the Fourteenth Century.”**

Vol.68, No.2 (April, 2004), pp.361-380. Challenges the concept of changes in warfare provoking changes in society, insisting, instead, that the opposite was case, calling for a new approach to understanding late-Medieval military developments based on a greater appreciation of the societies from which armies were raised.

Kagay, Donald J. **“The Defense of the Crown of Aragon during the War of the Two Pedros (1356-1366).”**

Vol.71, No.1 (January, 2007), pp.11-33. Undertakes to show that the War of the Two Pedros established the administrative and military forces that would ultimately lead toward a unified Spanish kingdom in the fifteenth century.

Guilmartin, John F., Jr. **“The Earliest Shipboard Gunpowder Ordnance: An Analysis of its Technical Parameters and Tactical Capabilities.”**

Vol.71, No.3 (July, 2007), pp.649-669. Various obstacles presented difficulties to the effective use of early cannons onboard ships, but shortly after 1400 these were swiftly overcome, so that ordnance became an increasingly important weapon on Mediterranean war galleys and Portuguese caravels.

Çeçen, Zeynep Kocabiyoikoğlu, **“Two Different Views of Knighthood in the Early Fifteenth Century: *Le Livre de Bouciquaut* and the Works of Christine de Pizan.”**

Vol.76, No.1 (January, 2012), pp.9-35. Comparing the different contemporary views of knighthood, the author considers whether its depiction in the biography of Marshal of France, Jean le Meingre Bouciquaut (1366-1421), is consistent with its image in the works of Christine de Pizan (1363-1430).

MEMORIALS – See: REMEMBRANCE

MEXICO: SPANISH CONQUEST OF THE AZTEC EMPIRE (1519-21)

Kerner, Alex, **“Espionage and Field Intelligence in the Conquest of México, 1519-1521.”**

Vol.78, No.2 (April, 2014), pp.469-501. Identifies the types of intelligence sources and information-gathering systems available to both sides during the fateful events of 1519-1521, and their role in the outcome of this milestone in the New World's history.

MEXICO: U.S.-MEXICAN WAR (1846-48)

Levinson, Irving W. **“A New Paradigm for an Old Conflict: The Mexico-United States War.”**

Vol.73, No.2 (April, 2009), pp.393-416. The victorious U.S. Army that found itself in possession of Mexico City had to provide assistance to the dominant political and socio-economic groups in

order to obtain a peace treaty that would conclude the war.

Arndt, Jochen S. **“The True Napoleon of the West: General Winfield Scott’s Mexico City Campaign [1847] and the Origins of the U.S. Army’s Combined-Arms Combat Division.”** Vol.76, No.3 (July, 2012), pp.649-671. Ventures to prove that General Winfield Scott (1786-1866) organized the Army of the Invasion of Mexico according to the French system of combined arms divisions, enabling him to replicate the Napoleonic era’s aggressive operational tactics.

MEXICO: NATIVE AMERICAN CONFLICTS

Watt, Robert N. **“ ‘An Exodus to Nowhere’?: Victorio’s Tres Castillos Campaign, September-October 1880.”** Vol.80, No.4 (October, 2016), pp.1037-1072. Undertakes to show that, rather than being the conclusion to aimless wandering in the deserts of northern Mexico, the campaign was based on the traditional Apache conduct of guerrilla warfare.

MEXICO: PUNATIVE EXPEDITION (1916-17)

Beckstrand, Alex, **“Woodrow Wilson and the Struggle of Civil-Military Relations during the Punitive Expedition of 1916-1917.”** Vol.86, No.2 (April, 2022), pp.372-398. Argues that President Woodrow Wilson’s (1913-1921) decision to defer to his military commanders, Major General Frederick Funston (1865-1917) and Brigadier General John J. Pershing (1860-1948), was the cause of the failure to achieve the goals of the Punitive Expedition.

MEXICO: WORLD WAR II (1939-45)

Schwab, Stephen I. **“The Role of the Mexican Expeditionary Air Force in World War II: Late, Limited, but Symbolically Significant.”** Vol.66, No.4 (October, 2002), pp.1115-1140. Recounts the raising and service of the 201st Mexican P-47 Squadron in the Philippines beginning in May, 1945.

**MIDDLE EAST – See: CYPRUS; IRAN; IRAQ; ISRAEL / PALESTINE; JORDON;
LEBANON; OMAN; SYRIA; TURKEY / OTTOMAN EMPIRE;
YEMEN**

MILITARY OPERATIONS OTHER THAN WAR

See Also: OCCUPATION, MILITARY

Dorn, Walter, **“The U.N.’s First ‘Air Force’: Peacekeepers in Combat, Congo 1960-64.”** Vol.77,

No.4 (October, 2013), pp.1399-1425. Recounts O.N.U.C.'s Operation Grand Slam in December, 1962, during which Swedish jets neutralized Katanga's air force.

Lipman, Jana K. “**‘A Precedent Worth Setting...’ Military Humanitarianism: The U.S. Military and the 1975 Vietnamese Evacuation.**” Vol.79, No.1 (January, 2015), pp.151-179. Proposes that the U.S. Armed Forces' involvement in the evacuation of over 100,000 Vietnamese to the United States represented a turning point in how these institutions viewed humanitarian operations.

Little, Branden, “**Evacuating Wartime Europe: U.S. Policy, Strategy, and Relief Operations for Overseas American Travelers, 1914-15.**” Vol.79, No.4 (October, 2015), pp.929-958. The evacuation by the U.S. Relief Commission of 125,000 U.S. citizens stranded in Europe and its far-ranging impact on war preparedness and subsequent humanitarian operations.

Drohan, Brian, “**Unintended Consequences: Baton Rounds, Riots, and Counterinsurgency in Northern Ireland, 1970-1981.**” Vol.82, No.2 (April, 2018), pp.491-514. Designed to be a non-lethal means of employing force, the misuse of baton rounds by British soldiers resulting in serious injuries and even deaths, produced exactly the opposite public relations impact that was intended.

Fitzgerald, David, “**Warriors Who don't Fight: The Post-Cold War United States Army and debates over Peacekeeping Operations.**” Vol.85, No.1 (January, 2021), pp.163-190.

MILITARY REVOLUTION DEBATE

Raudzens, George, “**Military Revolution or Maritime Evolution? Military Superiorities or Transportation Advantages as Main Causes of European Colonial Conquests to 1788.**” Vol.63, No.3 (July, 1999), pp.631-641.

Black, Jeremy, “**War and the World, 1450-2000.**” Vol.63, No.3 (July, 1999), pp.669-681. After a consideration of the circumstances of the study of military in the academy, the author focuses primarily on European states' military interaction with civilizations throughout the globe in the context of the 'Military Revolution' theory.

Paul, Michael C. “**The Military Revolution in Russia, 1550-1682.**” Vol.68, No.1 (January, 2004), pp.9-45. Asserts that the Armed Forces of the tsars underwent truly revolutionary changes between the mid-sixteenth and late-seventeenth centuries that made Imperial Russia a significant power and laid the groundwork for the reforms of Peter the Great.

Bryant, G.J. “**Asymmetric Warfare: The British Experience in Eighteenth-Century India.**” Vol.68, No.2 (April, 2004), pp.431-469. Juxtaposes the adaption to new circumstance of Indian

versus British military forces, proposing that while the British were able to retain their military superiority, Indian rulers were unable to overcome political obstacles that interfered with the adoption of European methods.

Black, Jeremy, **“Determinisms and Other Issues.”** Vol.68, No.4 (October, 2004), pp.1217-1232.

Addresses the multiple problems surrounding the ways in which the role of technology in history has been interpreted.

Rogers, Clifford J. **“Review Essay: The Field & the Forge.”** Vol.68, No.4 (October, 2004), pp.1233-1239. Population, production, and power in the pre-industrial West.

Parker, Geoffrey, **“Review Essay: The ‘Military Revolution’, 1955-2005: From Belfast to Barcelona and the Hague.”** Vol.69, No.1 (January, 2005), pp.205-209.

Liaropoulos, Andrew N. **“Revolutions in Warfare: Theoretical Paradigms and Historical Evidence: The Napoleonic and First World War Revolutions in Military Affairs.”** Vol.70, No.2 (April, 2006), pp.363-384.

Black, Jeremy, **“Frontiers and Military History.”** Vol.72, No.4 (October, 2008), pp.1047-1059.

As zones of interaction and contested sovereignty, it is not surprising that frontiers, throughout history, have witnessed armed conflict, just as armed conflicts have both established and changed frontiers.

Lee, Wayne E. **“Research Note: Military History in a Global Frame.”** Vol.78, No.1 (January, 2014), pp.333-336. Three works by the prolific military historian, Jeremy Black that explore the conduct and consequences of warfare throughout the globe from the mid-fifteenth century to the conclusion of the eighteenth century.

De la Garza, Andrew, **“The Mughal Battlefield: Personnel, Technology, and Tactics in the Early Empire, 1500-1605.”** Vol.78, No.3 (July, 2014), pp.927-960. Challenges the assumptions of inferiority in comparison with the ‘European Military Revolution.’

Chet, Guy, **“Teaching in the Shadow of the Military Revolution.”** Vol.78, No.3 (July, 2014), pp.1069-1075.

Staiano-Daniels, Lucian E. **“Determining Early Modern Army Strength: The Case of Electoral Saxony.”** Vol.83, No.4 (October, 2019), pp.1001-1020. Questions the issues of the ‘Military Revolution’ thesis that larger armies both reflected a revolution in warfare and forced states to adopt more efficient means of raising revenue by examining the experience of Saxony during the Thirty Years War (1618-1648).

Murteira, André, **“Historiographical Essay: The Military Revolution and European Wars**

Outside of Europe: The Dutch-Portuguese War in Asia in the First Quarter of the Seventeenth Century.” Vol.84, No.2 (April, 2020), pp.511-535. Challenges the notion of Early Modern Western Military exceptionalism that, in Portuguese historiography, has blamed their defeat on Portuguese naval forces that were inferior to their Dutch opponents supposedly because of Asian military influence that was absent among the Dutch.

Vigus, Robert T. **“The Military Revolution and the Ancient Origins of the *Trace Italienne*.”** Vol.84, No.3 (July, 2020), pp.698-712. Points out that the *trace italienne*, in the form of angled bastions, that have been identified as a key and novel feature of the Early-Modern ‘Military Revolution’, had its roots in Ancient Greek and Roman treatises and the actual works constructed by Roman and Byzantine engineers, surviving examples of which could be seen in important trading and pilgrimage routes.

Nath, Pratyay, **“Looking beyond the Military Revolution: Variations in Early Modern Warfare and the Mughal Case.”** Vol.86, No.1 (January, 2022), pp.9-31. Argues that the heterogeneous nature of Mughal strategy, tactics, and the deployment of technology over time and across space was due to a wide range of factors, including environmental conditions, military pragmatism, financial considerations, and distance from the imperial heartland, challenging the simplistic early modern ‘Military Revolution’ thesis.

MITCHELL, ‘BILLEY’ WILLIAM (1879-1936)

Meilinger, Phillip S. **“Historiographical Essay: U.S. Air Force Leaders: A Biographical Tour.”** Vol.62, No.4 (October, 1998), pp.833-870.

Kellner, Katrina E. and Perras, Galen Roger, **“‘A Perfectly Logical and Sensible Thing’: Billy Mitchell Advocates a Canadian-American Aerial Alliance Against Japan.”** Vol.72, No.3 (July, 2008), pp.785-823. As a result of his overlooked trip to Canada in 1923, Brigadier General Billy Mitchell (1879-1936) formulated a plan for employing an allied U.S.-Canadian strategic bombing force based in Alaska to wage war on Japan.

MONGOLS

See Also: CHINA; MEDIEVAL PERIOD

May, Timothy, **“The Training of an Inner Asian Nomad Army in the Pre-Modern Period.”** Vol.70, No.3 (July, 2006), pp.617-635. Confirms that nomadic ‘horse people’, such as the Mongols, employed more sophisticated training for war than had previously been imagined.

Gyucha, Attila; Lee, Wayne E. and Rózsa, Zoltán, **“The Mongol Campaign in Hungary, 1241-**

1242: The Archaeology and History of Nomadic Conquest and Massacre.” Vol.83, No.4 (October, 2019), pp.1021-1066. This article integrates conquest process theory, literary evidence, and data from substantial new archaeological work to explore the motivation and nature of Mongol invasions and the consequences for rural settlements on the Great Hungarian Plain.

MONTGOMERY, BERNARD (1887-1976)

Forrester, Charles, **“Field Marshal Montgomery’s Role in the Creation of the British 21st Army Group’s Combined Arms Doctrine for the Final Assault on Germany.”** Vol.78, No.4 (October, 2014), pp.1295-1320.

Phimister, Ian, **“Developing and Defending Britain and Her Empire: Montgomery’s 1947 Tour of Africa.”** Vol.79, No.3 (July, 2015), pp.745-766. An overlooked event of the immediate postwar era that provides a window into both Field Marshal Bernard Montgomery’s (1887-1976) post-1945 career and the attitudes of the new Labour government towards defense.

MOROCCO

Gershovich, Moshe, **“The Ait Ya’qub Incident and the Crisis of French Military Policy in Morocco.”** Vol.62, No.1 (January, 1998), pp.57-73. Though small in scale, the author suggests that defeat at Ait Ya’qub, 8 June, 1929, was the final straw that led the French government to call into question the twin concepts of *Maroc utile* and peaceful penetration.

MOVIES, See: MEDIA

MOYAR, MARK (b.1971)

Harris, J.P. **“The Early Military History of the Second Indochina War and the Mayor Thesis.”** Vol.85, No.3 (July, 2021), pp.734-763. Contests the interpretation of Mark Moyar that by mid-1962 the South Vietnamese government was conducting a successful counter-insurgency campaign that was cut short by the overthrow of Ngo Dinh Diem (1901-1963).

MUHAMMAD ALI PASHA (1769-1849)

Dunn, John, **“Egypt’s Nineteenth-Century Armaments Industry.”** Vol.61, No.2 (April, 1997), pp.231-254. Explains that the efforts of Muhammad Ali Pasha (1769-1849) and Khedive

Ismail to establish a modern arms industry in Egypt was doomed in part due to haphazard implementation and inadequate funding, but, in a broader context, failure sprang from an unwillingness and / or inability to impose major political, cultural, and social changes.

MUNITIONS MANUFACTURING: MEDIEVAL PERIOD (476-1480)

Rogers, Clifford J. **“Review Essay: The Field & the Forge.”** Vol.68, No.4 (October, 2004), pp.1233-1239. Population, production, and power in the pre-industrial West.

Isaac, Steven, **“The Role of Towns in the Battle of Bouvines (1214).”** Vol.79, No.2 (April, 2015), pp.317-344. Uses the French King, Philip Augustus’ (1165-1223), victory at Bouvines as an example of the military contributions of urban centers in the form of non-noble troops, the production of arms and armor, financial resources, and contributors to policy.

MUNITIONS MANUFACTURING: EARLY MODERN PERIOD (1480-1789)

Rogers, Clifford J. **“Review Essay: The Field & the Forge.”** Vol.68, No.4 (October, 2004), pp.1233-1239. Population, production, and power in the pre-industrial West.

Ansani, Fabrizio, **“ ‘This French Artillery is very good and very effective’: Hypotheses on the Diffusion of a New Military Technology in Renaissance Italy.”** Vol.83, No.2 (April, 2019), pp.347-378. Scrutinizes the development of the production of heavy cannons in Italy before and after the French Neapolitan Campaign of 1494.

MUNITIONS MANUFACTURING: U.S. CIVIL WAR (1861-65)

Roberts, William H. **“ ‘The Name of Ericsson’: Political Engineering in the Union Ironclad Program, 1861-1863.”** Vol.63, No.4 (October, 1999), pp.823-843.

Hunter, Antwain K. **“ ‘Patriots, Cowards, and Men Disloyal at Heart’: Labor and Politics at the Springfield Armory, 1861-1865.”** Vol.84, No.1 (January, 2020), pp.51-81. Demonstrates that while the Springfield Armory was vocal in its support for the cause of the Union during the Civil War, it nevertheless contained employees who expressed criticism of the Lincoln administration and support for the Confederacy.

MUNITIONS MANUFACTURING: 19th to EARLY 20th CENTURY

Oyos, Matthew M. **“Theodore Roosevelt and the Implements of War.”** Vol.60, No.4 (October, 1996), pp.631-655. Brings to light an overlooked aspect of Roosevelt’s presidency (1901-1909), his role in accelerating the pace of military technological modernization, including involvement with battleships, submarines, aircraft, and machine guns.

Dunn, John, **“Egypt’s Nineteenth-Century Armaments Industry.”** Vol.61, No.2 (April, 1997), pp.231-254. Explains that the efforts of Muhammad Ali Pasha (1769-1849) and Khedive Ismail to establish a modern arms industry in Egypt was doomed in part due to haphazard implementation and inadequate funding, but, in a broader context, failure sprang from an unwillingness and / or inability to impose major political, cultural, and social changes.

Epkenhans, Michael, **“Krupp and the Imperial German Navy, 1898-1914: A Reassessment.”** Vol.64, No.2 (April, 2000), pp.335-369.

Grant, Jonathan, **“The Sword of the Sultan: Ottoman Arms Imports, 1854-1914.”** Vol.66, No.1 (January, 2002), pp.9-36. Attempts to ascertain why the Ottoman Empire changed from being self-sufficient in the production of armaments, including warships, to relying entirely on imports by 1914.

Podsoblyaev, Evgenii; King, Francis and Biggart, John, **“The Russian Naval General Staff and the Evolution of Naval Policy, 1905-1914.”** Vol.66, No.1 (January, 2002), pp.37-69. Addresses the neglected perspective of the connections between the formulation of naval strategy for the Baltic Sea, warship construction, and Imperial Russia’s aspirations to become a great naval power.

Beaver, Daniel R. **“The U.S. War Department in the Gaslight Era: Stephen Vincent Benét at the Ordnance Department, 1870-91.”** Vol.68, No.1 (January, 2004), pp.105-132.

MUNITIONS MANUFACTURING: WORLD WAR I (1914-18)

Williams, William J. **“Josephus Daniels and the U.S. Navy’s Shipbuilding Program During World War I.”** Vol.60, No.1 (January, 1996), pp.7-38. Observes how Daniels (1862-1948), with no naval or maritime background, applied himself conscientiously to shifting the Navy’s building program from capitol ships to destroyers designed to address the U-Boat threat.

MUNITIONS MANUFACTURING: WORLD WAR II (1939-45)

Lund, Erik, **“The Industrial History of Strategy: Re-evaluating the Wartime Record of the British Aviation Industry in Comparative Perspective, 1919-1945.”** Vol.62, No.1 (January, 1998), pp.75-99. Rejects the conventional notion that the Allies achieved victory by outproducing the Axis, insisting that, instead, more factors than mere volume played a role, as demonstrated by the British air sector that displayed greater flexibility, technological sophistication, and effectiveness than either its German or United States counterparts.

Szabó, Miklós, **“The Development of the Hungarian Aircraft Industry, 1938-1944.”** Vol.65, No.1 (January, 2001), pp.53-76.

Irish, Kerry E. **“Apt Pupil: Dwight Eisenhower and the 1930 Industrial Mobilization Plan.”**

Vol.70, No.1 (January, 2006), pp.31-61. While the detailed plan for industrial mobilization drawn up by Eisenhower (1890-1969) as a staff officer was not formally implemented, it nevertheless provided the basis for a more efficient transition to war production than had taken place in World War I.

Lacey, James, **“World War II’s Real Victory Program.”** Vol.75, No.3 (July, 2011), pp.811-834.

Challenges Maj. Albert C. Wedemeyer’s assertion that he was the author of the United States’ Victory Program.

Lacey, James, **“Historical Truth and Tilting at Windmills.”** Vol.77, No.1 (January, 2013),

pp.267-272. Addresses the controversy surrounding U.S. Army General Albert C. Wedemeyer (1896-1989).

McLaughlin, John J. and Lomazow, Steven, **“Counterpoint: Albert Coady Wedemeyer.”** Vol.77,

No.1 (January, 2013), pp.255-272.

Atkinson, Rick, **“The 2016 George C. Marshall Lecture in Military History: Projecting American**

Power in the Second World War.” Vol.80, No.2 (April, 2016), pp.345-354. In spite of devoting a smaller proportion of the country’s gross domestic product to the war than any other major belligerent, the United States demonstrated logistical brilliance, firepower, mobility, mechanical aptitude, and an economic preponderance that outproduced the Axis powers.

Symonds, Craig, **“The 2017 George C. Marshall Lecture in Military History: For Want of a**

Nail: The Impact of Shipping on Grand Strategy in World War II.” Vol.81, No.3 (July, 2017), pp.657-666. The remarkable success of U.S. ship building and its impact on Allied strategy.

MUSIC – See: CULTURE: MUSIC

MUSSOLINI, BENITO (1883-1945)

Sullivan, Brian R. **“Review Essay: Fascist Italy’s Military Involvement in the Spanish Civil War.”**

Vol.59, No.4 (October, 1995), pp.697-727. Surveys the existing literature concerning Benito Mussolini’s (1883-1945) commitment some 70,000 soldiers of the *Corpo Truppe Volontarie* and over 700 warplanes of the *Aviazione Legionaria* to the Nationalist cause, including the publications of official histories.

Weinberg, Gerhard L. **“The George C. Marshall Lecture in Military History: Some Myths of**

World War II.” Vol.75, No.3 (July, 2011), pp.701-718. Includes issues surrounding Winston

Churchill, Adolf Hitler, Yamamoto Isoroku, Benito Mussolini, Franklin Roosevelt, and Josef Stalin, as well as the Yalta Conference, the Morgenthau Plan for Germany, and the ubiquity of horses in the Second World War.

N

NAPOLEONIC WARS – See: FRANCE:

FRENCH REVOLUTIONARY AND NAPOLEONIC WARS

NATIONAL GUARD, UNITED STATES

Donnelly, William M. **“Thunderbirds in Korea: The U.S. 45th Infantry Division, 1950-1952.”** Vol.64, No.4 (October, 2000), pp.1113-1139. Investigates the performance of one of two National Guard divisions deployed to Korea, concentrating on the division’s officers.

Stentiford, Barry M. **“The Meaning of a Name: The Rise of the National Guard and the End of a Town Militia.”** Vol.72, No.3 (July, 2008), pp.727-754. Recounts the changing relationship between the community of Wakefield, Massachusetts, and its town militia, the Richardson Light Guard, when the unit became part of the National Guard in 1916.

NATIVE AMERICAN CONFLICTS

Vandervort, Bruce, **“Review Essay: Small Wars in North America.”** Vol.68, No.1 (January, 2004), pp.233-238. Covers works on conflicts with Native American peoples, particularly in the Old West.

Vandervort, Bruce, **“Review Essay: From the Halls of Montezuma.”** Vol.71, No.2 (April, 2007), pp.505-511. Native American resistance to European conquest to the 19th century.

Van de Logt, Mark, **“‘The Powers of the Heavens Shall Eat of my Smoke’: The Significance of Scalping in Pawnee Warfare.”** Vol.72, No.1 (January, 2008), pp.71-104. Explains that there were a range of motives for Pawnee warriors to seek scalps, including improved status and marriage prospects for the warrior, revenge for the killing of tribal members, to end the mourning period of those who had lost a relative or friend, and, when sacrificed in a special ceremony, to improve the spiritual well-being of the Pawnee people.

Vandervort, Bruce, **“Review Essay: The Indian Wars of North America: From East to West.”** Vol.74, No.2 (April, 2010), pp.557-560.

Watson, Samuel, **“Military Learning and Adaptation Shaped by Social Context: The U.S. Army and its ‘Indian Wars’, 1790-1890.”** Vol.82, No.2 (April, 2018), pp.373-412.

NATIVE AMERICAN CONFLICTS: EARLY MODERN PERIOD (1480-1789)

Lee, Wayne E. **“Fortify, Fight, or Flee: Tuscarora and Cherokee Defensive Warfare and Military Culture Adaptation.”** Vol.68, No.3 (July, 2004), pp.713-770.

Lee, Wayne E. **“Peace Chiefs and Blood Revenge: Patterns of Restraint in Native American Warfare, 1500-1800.”** Vol.71, No.3 (July, 2007), pp.701-741. Although eastern Native American societies were willing to attempt to destroy an enemy, including indiscriminate killing, patterns of restraint inherent to their social authority, cultural values, and methods of warfare tended to limit escalation and the overall level of violence.

Vandervort, Bruce, **“Review Essay: Remembering the Empire of France in America.”** Vol.74, No.1 (January, 2010), pp.195-199.

Kerner, Alex, **“Espionage and Field Intelligence in the Conquest of México, 1519-1521.”** Vol.78, No.2 (April, 2014), pp.469-501. Identifies the types of intelligence sources and information-gathering systems available to both sides during the fateful events of 1519-1521, and their role in the outcome of this milestone in the New World’s history.

Muehlbauer, Matthew S. **“Holy War and Just War in Early New England, 1630-1655.”** Vol.81, No.3 (July, 2017), pp.667-692. Questions the uneven application of these concepts by the New England colonies in relation to both wars and efforts to avoid war with both Native American tribes and the neighboring colony of New Netherlands.

Haggard, Dixie Ray, **“The First Invasion of Georgia and the myth of Westo Power, 1656-1684.”** Vol.86, No.3 (July, 2022), pp.533-556. Narrates the two decades long assault on Native American towns of central Georgia by a mysterious people known as the ‘Westos’, seeking to better understand the reasons for their success.

NATIVE AMERICAN CONFLICTS: EARLY U.S. REPUBLIC TO CIVIL WAR (1783-1861)

Birtle, Andrew J. **“The Origins of the Legion of the United States.”** Vol.67, No.4 (October, 2003), pp.1249-1262. Offers the possibility that the reorganization of the U.S. Army in 1792 was based on the writings of Colonel Henry Bouquet (1719-1765), a noted veteran of the Indian Frontier.

NATIVE AMERICAN CONFLICTS: WAR OF 1812 (1812-15)

Bowes, John P. **“Transformation and Transition: American Indians and the War of 1812 in the Lower Great Lakes.”** Vol.76, No.4 (October, 2012), pp.1129-1146. Focusing on the

Wyandot communities in the Old Northwest within a broader temporal context beyond the beginning and end dates of the War of 1812.

NATIVE AMERICAN CONFLICTS: LATE 19th CENTURY

Janda, Lance, **“Shutting the Gates of Mercy: The American Origins of Total War, 1860-1880.”**

Vol.59, No.1 (January, 1995), pp.7-26. Links the evolution of ‘total war’ with the nature of armed conflict during the U.S. Civil War through to the late nineteenth century campaigns against the Native American tribes.

McGinnis, Anthony R. **“When Courage was not Enough: Plains Indians at War with the United States Army.”** Vol.76, No.2 (April, 2012), pp.454-473. Considers why the Native American tribes of the Great Plains continued to rely on their own specific style of limited warfare in the face of the U.S. Army newcomers when this style of warfare was unable to achieve any permanent success against the ‘Blue Coats’.

Watt, Robert N. **“ ‘An Exodus to Nowhere’?: Victorio’s Tres Castillos Campaign, September-October 1880.”** Vol.80, No.4 (October, 2016), pp.1037-1072. Undertakes to show that, rather than being the conclusion to aimless wandering in the deserts of northern Mexico, the campaign was based on the traditional Apache conduct of guerrilla warfare.

Mears, Dwight S. **“ ‘Neither an Officer nor an Enlisted Man;: Contract Surgeons’ Eligibility for the Medal of Honor.”** Vol.85, No.1 (January, 2021), pp.51-75. Presents four instances in the Nineteenth century U.S. Army of contract surgeons who claimed entitlement to the Medal of Honor.

NAVAL WARFARE

NAVAL WARFARE – See Also: AMPHIBIOUS WARFARE

Paine, Sarah C.M. **“The 2022 George C. Marshall Lecture in Military History: Centuries of Security: Chinese, Russian and U.S. Continental versus Maritime Approaches.”** Vol.86, No.4 (October, 2022), pp.813-836.

NAVAL WARFARE arranged chronologically by historical period or conflict – PREMODERN PERIOD (to 1789)

Palmer, Michael A. **“ ‘The Soul’s Right Hand’: Command and Control in the Age of Fighting Sail, 1652-1827.”** Vol.61, No.4 (October, 1997), pp.679-705. Suggests that the ‘rationalism’ of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries had a detrimental impact on methods of command

and control, emphasizing centralization which, in turn, favored the single line ahead formation that has been blamed for the indecisiveness of naval battles in this period.

Hanson, Victor Davis, **“Historiographical Essay: The Status of Ancient Military History: Traditional Work, Recent Research, and On-Going Controversies.”** Vol.63, No.2 (April, 1999), pp.379-413. A very thorough survey covering works on every conceivable topic concerning the armed forces and conduct of warfare in the age of ancient Greece and Rome.

Rose, Susan, **“Islam Versus Christendom: The Naval Dimension, 1000-1600.”** Vol.63, No.3 (July, 1999), pp.561-578. Surveys developments from the Crusades to the dominance of the Ottoman Empire within the geographic framework of the Mediterranean Sea.

Raudzens, George, **“Military Revolution or Maritime Evolution? Military Superiorities or Transportation Advantages as Main Causes of European Colonial Conquests to 1788.”** Vol.63, No.3 (July, 1999), pp.631-641.

France, John, **“Historiographical Essay: Recent Writing on Medieval Warfare: From the Fall of Rome to c.1300.”** Vol.65, No.2 (April, 2001), pp.441-473. Primarily covering works that have been publishing in the last twenty-five years, the author reviews studies on the successor states to Rome, the Byzantine Empire, the thorny subject of feudalism, fortifications and siege operations, the naval dimension, the manner in which warfare was conducted in Europe during the High Middle Ages, 1000-1300, the employment of mercenaries, and the Crusades.

Swope, Kenneth M. **“Crouching Tigers, Secret Weapons: Military Technology Employed during the Sino-Japanese War, 1592-1598.”** Vol.69, No.1 (January, 2005), pp.11-41. Reviews the major military technology employed by the belligerents, showing, contesting the conventional explanation that superior numbers and the death of Toyotomi Hideyoshi's (1537-1598) death were the deciding factors in Japan's defeat.

Guilmartin, John F., Jr. **“The Earliest Shipboard Gunpowder Ordnance: An Analysis of its Technical Parameters and Tactical Capabilities.”** Vol.71, No.3 (July, 2007), pp.649-669. Various obstacles presented difficulties to the effective use of early cannons onboard ships, but shortly after 1400 these were swiftly overcome, so that ordnance became an increasingly important weapon on Mediterranean war galleys and Portuguese caravels.

Naiden, F.S. **“Spartan Naval Performance in the Decelean War, 413-404 B.C.E.”** Vol.73, No.3 (July, 2009), pp.729-744. Identifies improvements in Sparta's cadre of naval officers as the reason for Spartan naval victories during the final phase of the Peloponnesian War.

Willis, Sam, **“The Battle of Lagos, 1759.”** Vol.73, No.3 (July, 2009), pp.745-765. Though an indecisive engagement, Royal Navy Vice-Admiral Edward Boscawen's (1711-1761) squadron weakened the French Mediterranean fleet that was sailing to join the French Atlantic fleet, thus

serving as an important precursor to the Battle of Quiberon Bay, November, 1759.

Lonsdale, David J. **“Alexander the Great and the Art of adaptation.”** Vol.77, No.3 (July, 2013), pp.817-835. Uses the examples of Alexander’s (356-323 B.C.E.) operations in the Balkans, against the Persian navy, counterinsurgency in Central Asia, and the Battle of Hydaspes (326 B.C.E.).

Murteira, André, **“Historiographical Essay: The Military Revolution and European Wars Outside of Europe: The Dutch-Portuguese War in Asia in the First Quarter of the Seventeenth Century.”** Vol.84, No.2 (April, 2020), pp.511-535. Challenges the notion of Early Modern Western Military exceptionalism that, in Portuguese historiography, has blamed their defeat on Portuguese naval forces that were inferior to their Dutch opponents supposedly because of Asian military influence that was absent among the Dutch.

NAVAL WARFARE arranged chronologically by historical period or conflict –
19th CENTURY

Jamison, Thomas M. **“The War of the Pacific, Technology and U.S. Naval Development: An International History of a Regional War.”** Vol.82, No.4 (October, 2018), pp.1093-1122. The observations by foreign nations of the war between Chile and a coalition of Bolivia and Peru, 1879-1884, influenced naval developments around the globe, including contributing to the U.S. building of the ‘New Navy’ in the 1890s.

NAVAL WARFARE arranged chronologically by historical period or conflict –
INTERWAR PERIOD (1919-39)

Neilson, Keith, **“The Royal Navy, Japan, and British Strategic Foreign Policy, 1932-1934.”** Vol.75, No.2 (April, 2011), pp.505-531. Japan’s challenge to British interests affected British policy generally, and particularly Anglo-American relations, producing conflicting proposals from the Treasury, the Admiralty, and the Foreign Offices.

NAVAL WARFARE arranged chronologically by historical period or conflict –
WORLD WAR II (1939-45)

Jones, Mark C. **“Not Just along for the Ride: The Role of Royal Navy Liaison Personnel in Multinational Naval Operations during World War II.”** Vol.76, No.1 (January, 2012), pp.127-158. The liaison system as a means of cooperation with European navies in exile from France, Greece, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, and Yugoslavia.

Jones, Mark C. **“Friend and Advisor to the Allied Navies: The Royal Navy’s Principal Liaison**

Officer and Multinational Naval Operations in World War II.” Vol.77, No.3 (July, 2013), pp.991-1023. The work of Principal Liaison Officer, Allied Navies (P.N.L.O.) with the Belgian, Dutch, French, Greek, Norwegian, Polish, and Yugoslav navies in exile.

FitzSimonds, James R. **“Aircraft Carrier versus Battleships in War and Myth: Demythologizing Carrier Air Dominance at Sea.”** Vol.84, No.3 (July, 2020), pp.843-865. Claims that a closer examination of the evidence from World War II demonstrates that the battleship was far from powerless in the face of air strikes and that it was the battleship, and not the Aircraft Carrier, that determined control of the sea.

NAVAL WARFARE arranged chronologically by historical period or conflict –

WORLD WAR II (1939-45): MEDITERRANEAN THEATER

Lasterle, Philippe, **“Could Admiral Gensoul have Averted the Tragedy of Mers el-Kébir?”** Vol.67, No.3 (July, 2003), pp.835-844. Admiral Marcel-Bruno Gensoul (1880-1973) commanded the French fleet at Mers el-Kébir, Algeria, when it was bombarded by a British force commanded by Admiral James Somerville (1882-1949) on 3 July, 1940.

Hammond, Richard, **“Fighting under a Different Flag: Multinational Naval Cooperation and Submarine Warfare in the Mediterranean, 1940-1944.”** Vol.80, No.2 (April, 2016), pp.447-476. In contrast to their experience in the British home theatre, the submarines in the Mediterranean operated by the exiled governments of the Free French, Greece, the Netherlands, Poland, and Yugoslavia, along with those of Italy beginning in 1943, found it difficult to cooperate with the Royal Navy, as well as each other.

NAVAL WARFARE arranged chronologically by historical period or conflict –

WORLD WAR II (1939-45): PACIFIC THEATER

Coles, Michael, **“Ernest King and the British Pacific Fleet: The Conference at Quebec, 1944 (‘Octagon’).”** Vol.65, No.1 (January, 2001), pp.105-129. While not excluding complications from Fleet Admiral King’s (1878-1956) personality, the author insists that there were valid political, economic, and operational factors against the deployment of the British Fleet alongside the U.S. Navy in the Pacific Theater.

Reardon, Jeff, **“Breaking the U.S. Navy’s ‘Gun Club’ Mentality in the South Pacific.”** Vol.75, No.2 (April, 2011), pp.533-564. Analyzing the adjustment of pre-war doctrine in the face of defeat in nighttime naval engagements with the Imperial Japanese Navy.

Jones, Mark C. **“In Need of a Home Away from Home: The Royal Netherlands Navy in Australia, 1942-1947.”** Vol.85, No.2 (April, 2021), pp.399-425. With the fall of the Netherlands’ East Indies, units of the Royal Netherlands Navy relocated to Australia,

from where they continued their operations against the Japanese enemy.

Reardon, Jeff T. **“Reevaluating Ghormley and Halsey at Guadalcanal.”** Vol.86, No.4 (October, 2022), pp.915-948. Presents a reassessment of Vice Admiral Robert L. Ghormley (1883-1958) service as commander in chief of the South Pacific Area during 1942.

Bankoff, Greg, **“From the Art of Practical Sailing to the Electronic Science of Navigation: Typhoons, Seamanship, and U.S. Naval Operations in the Northwest Pacific, 1944-1945.”** Vol.86, No.4 (October, 2022), pp.949-972. Concerned with the challenges faced by ship’s commanders of choosing between entrusting the safety of his vessel to his own judgement based on years of practical experience at sea or relying on the new technology at a time when some of the largest armadas of warships were ever assembled in wartime conditions.

NAVAL WARFARE arranged chronologically by historical period or conflict –
COLD WAR (1945-91)

Bernstein, Barton J. **“Review Essay: The Making of the Atomic Admiral: ‘Deak’ Parsons and Modernizing the U.S. Navy.”** Vol.63, No.2 (April, 1999), pp.415-426. William Sterling Parsons (1901-1953) was an ordnance expert who participated in the Manhattan project and was involved in post-war nuclear tests.

Priest, Andrew, **“ ‘In Common Cause’: The N.A.T.O. Multilateral Force and the Mixed-Manning Demonstration on the U.S.S. *Claude V. Ricketts*, 1964-1965.”** Vol.69, No.3 (July, 2005), pp.759-789. The crew of the destroyer (DDG-5) U.S.S. *Claude V. Ricketts* included U.S., British, Dutch, Greek, Italian, Turkish, and West German officers and men.

Eames, Anthony, **“The Trident Sales Agreement and Cold War Diplomacy.”** Vol.81, No.1 (January, 2017), pp.163-186. The ‘Special Relationship’ was bolstered by the sale of U.S. Trident submarine-launched ballistic missile technology to Great Britain in 1982.

Campbell, Isabel, **“A Tale of Submarine Sightings and a Golden Goose: American-British-Canadian Intelligence Sharing in the Early Cold War.”** Vol.85, No.4 (October, 2021), pp.980-1003. The consequences of efforts to establish trilateral intelligence of the sighting of Soviet submarines in the Davis Strait in 1946.

NAVAL WARFARE arranged chronologically by historical period or conflict –
KOREAN WAR (1950-53)

Millett, Allan R. **“A Reader’s Guide to the Korean War.”** Vol.61, No.3 (July, 1997), pp.583-597.

Tian Ser Seah, Joshua-John, **“Singapore, Hong Kong, and the Royal Navy’s War in Korea,**

c.1950-1953: Part 1. Vol.83, No.4 (October, 2018), pp.1213-1234; **“Part 2.”** Vol.84, No.1 (January, 2020), pp.237-260.

NAVAL WARFARE arranged alphabetically by country –

CANADA: WORLD WAR II (1939-45)

Whitby, Michael J. **“Matelots, Martinets, and Mutineers: The Mutiny in H.M.C.S. *Iroquois*, 19 July 1943.”** Vol.65, No.1 (January, 2001), pp.77-103. The author identifies the substantial expansion of the Royal Canadian Navy, bringing together inexperienced officers with inexperienced crews, as the cause of the Destroyer *Iroquois*.

NAVAL WARFARE arranged alphabetically by country –

ENGLAND / GREAT BRITAIN

Rodger, N.A.M. **“Historiographical Essay: Recent Books on the Royal Navy of the Eighteenth Century.”** Vol.63, No.3 (July, 1999), pp.683-703. A very thorough survey of the latest works.

Black, Jeremy, **“Historiographical Essay: Britain as a Military Power, 1688-1815.”** Vol.64, No.1 (January, 2000), pp.159-177.

Ferreiro, Larrie D. **“Horatio Nelson never Wrote ‘A Ship’s a Fool to Fight a Fort’: It was Jackie Fisher Who Invented the Attribution.”** Vol.80, No.3 (July, 2016), pp.855-856.

NAVAL WARFARE arranged alphabetically by country –

**ENGLAND / GREAT BRITAIN: FRENCH REVOLUTIONARY AND
NAPOLEONIC WARS (1792-1815)**

Morgan, John, **“War Feeding War? The Impact of Logistics on the Napoleonic Occupation of Catalonia.”** Vol.73, No.1 (January, 2009), pp.83-116. The inability of the French occupation forces to live off the land meant that alternate sources and modes of supply had to be relied upon in the midst of guerrilla resistance and the British blockade of Catalan ports, all of which negatively impacted French operations.

Davey, James, **“The Repatriation of Spanish Troops from Denmark, 1808: The British Government, Logistics, and Maritime Supremacy.”** Vol.74, No.3 (July, 2010), pp.689-707. When Spain rebelled against French occupation, the British government responded by, among other things, preparing and executing the repatriation of the Spanish regiments formerly fighting for Napoleon in northern Europe.

Speelman, Patrick J. **“Review Essay: The Logistics of British Naval Supremacy in the Age of Sail.”** Vol.77, No.2 (April, 2013), pp.667-670. Consists of three recent books, two covering systems of supply during the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars, 1793-1815, and a third concerning medical care from 1805 to 1916.

Rodger, N.A.M. **“Historiographical Essay: Recent Books on the Royal Navy of the Eighteenth Century.”** Vol.63, No.3 (July, 1999), pp.683-703. A very thorough survey of the latest works.

NAVAL WARFARE arranged alphabetically by country –

ENGLAND / GREAT BRITAIN: 19th CENTURY

Dunley, Richard, **“Technology and Tradition: Mine Warfare and the Royal Navy’s Strategy of Coastal Assault, 1870-1890.”** Vol.80, No.2 (April, 2016), pp.398-409.

NAVAL WARFARE arranged alphabetically by country –

ENGLAND / GREAT BRITAIN: WAR OF 1812 (1812-15)

McCranie, Kevin D. **“The War of 1812 in the ongoing Napoleonic Wars: The Response of Britain’s Royal Navy.”** Vol.76, No.4 (October, 2012), pp.1067-1094. The challenge for Great Britain to balance the demands of different naval commitments, particularly in 1812 and 1813.

McCranie, Kevin D. **“Perception and Naval Dominance.: The British Experience during the War of 1812.”** Vol.82, No.4 (October, 2018), pp.1067-1091. The defeat of three British frigates by U.S. counterparts had no actual effect on British sea power, but provoked a disproportionate reaction within society and the Royal Navy, inadvertently leading to beneficial changes.

Compeau, Timothy, **“The Royal Navy’s *Psyche* on Lake Ontario: A British Experiment with Prefabricated Warships in the War of 1812.”** Vol.86, No.2 (April, 2022), pp.321-343. Narrates the British effort to transport four pre-fabricated vessels to Lake Ontario, of which only one, the 56-gun frigate H.M.S. *Psyche*, reached its destination.

NAVAL WARFARE arranged alphabetically by country –

ENGLAND / GREAT BRITAIN: 19th CENTURY TO 1914

Sumida, Jon Tetsuro, **“Sir John Fisher and the Dreadnought: The Sources of Naval Mythology.”** Vol.59, No.4 (October, 1995), pp.619-637.

Lambert, Nicholas A. **“Admiral Sir John Fisher and the Concept of Flotilla Defence, 1904-**

1909.” Vol.59, No.4 (October, 1995), pp.639-660. Asks whether Admiral Fisher’s (1841-1920) embracing of a submarine and flotilla strategy represented an abandonment of the Mahanian approach to winning control of the seas through victory in a decisive clash between battle fleets.

Sumida, Jon Tetsuro, **“Review Essay: Gunnery, Procurement, and Strategy in the *Dreadnought* Era.”** Vol.69, No.4 (October, 2005), pp.1179-1187.

Grimes, Shawn, **“The Baltic and Admiralty War Planning, 1906-1907.”** Vol.74, No.2 (April, 2010), pp.407-437. Reassessment of the Ballard Committee’s 1907 War Plans against Germany in the context of Norway’s gaining independence in 1905.

Martin, Christopher, **“The Complexity of Strategy: ‘Jackie’ Fischer and the Trouble with Submarines.”** Vol.75, No.2 (April, 2011), pp.441-470. The problems of re-formulating strategy in the wake of the introduction of submarines for Admiral ‘Jackie’ Fischer (1841-1920), Prime Minister A.J. Balfour (r.1902-1905), and Julian Corbett (1854-1922).

Lambert, Nicholas A. **“Review Essay: False Prophet?: The Maritime Theory of Julian Corbett and Professional Education.”** Vol.77, No.3 (July, 2013), pp.1055-1078.

NAVAL WARFARE arranged alphabetically by country –

ENGLAND / GREAT BRITAIN: WORLD WAR I (1914-18)

Lambert, Nicholas A. **“ ‘Our Bloody Ships’ or ‘Our Bloody System’? Jutland and the Loss of the Battle Cruisers, 1916.”** Vol.62, No.1 (January, 1998), pp.29-55. Speculates that an emphasis on rapid fire led gunnery personnel to stockpile far more shells in their turrets than the regulated maximum of eight projectiles, resulting in catastrophic explosions when German shells found their mark.

Sumida, Jon Tetsuro, **“A Matter of Timing: The Royal Navy and the Tactics of Decisive Battle, 1912-1916.”** Vol.67, No.1 (January, 2003), pp.85-136. Advances the explanation that the Admiralty’s adoption of a secret tactical system in 1912 interfered with the development of equipment and methods suitable for alternate forms of battle fleet action, with consequences for the Battle of Jutland.

Karau, Mark, **“Twisting the Dragon’s Tail: The Zeebrugge and Ostend Raids of 1918.”** Vol.67, No.2 (April, 2003), pp.455-481.

Lambert, Nicholas A. **“Strategic Command and Control for Maneuver Warfare: Creation of the Royal Navy’s ‘War Room’ System, 1905-1915.”** Vol.69, No.2 (April, 2005), pp.361-410.

Hines, Jason, **“Sins of Omission and Commission: A Reassessment of the Role of Intelligence**

in the Battle of Jutland.” Vol.72, No.4 (October, 2008), pp.1117-1153. Sets forth the explanation that it was the higher priority that the Admiralty placed on security, at the expense of operational use, that interfered with British Admirals successfully exploiting the fruits of the Admiralty’s cryptographic organization at the Battle of Jutland.

Morgan-Owen, David, **“War as it Might Have Been: British Sea Power and the First World War.”** Vol.83, No.4 (October, 2019), pp.1095-1131. Argues that because of shortcomings in Britain’s strategic decision-making apparatus, the alternatives to the attrition on the Western Front offered by British Sea Power never received due consideration.

NAVAL WARFARE arranged alphabetically by country –

ENGLAND / GREAT BRITAIN: INTERWAR PERIOD (1919-39)

Westphal, Raymond W., Jr. **“Postwar Planning: Parliamentary Politics and the Royal Navy, 1919-22.”** Vol.74, No.1 (January, 2010), pp.145-171. Delves into the conflict between governments that viewed cuts in the military budget as a means of achieving economic recovery versus the Royal Navy’s goal of achieving parity with their U.S. counterpart while fulfilling its mission of two-ocean imperial defense.

NAVAL WARFARE arranged alphabetically by country –

ENGLAND / GREAT BRITAIN: WORLD WAR II (1939-45)

Jones, Mark C. **“Experiment at Dundee: The Royal Navy’s 9th Submarine Flotilla and Multinational Naval Cooperation during World War II.”** Vol.72, No.4 (October, 2008), pp.1179-1212. The 9th Flotilla included British, Dutch, Free French, Norwegian, and Polish submariners.

Hein, David, **“Vulnerable: H.M.S. *Prince of Wales* in 1941.”** Vol.77, No.3 (July, 2013), pp.955-989. The storied career of the H.M.S. *Prince of Wales*, involving fighting the K.M.S. *Bismarck*, the first Churchill-F.D.R. summit, service in the Mediterranean, and its sinking off the coast of Malaya.

Bell, Christopher M. **“Air Power and the Battle of the Atlantic: Very Long Range Aircraft and the Delay in Closing the Atlantic ‘Air Gap’.”** Vol.79, No.3 (July, 2015), pp.691-719. Places the blame involving this failure to address this problem on the Royal Air Force’s Coastal Command rather than a prioritization of strategic bombing over the protection of maritime convoys.

NAVAL WARFARE arranged alphabetically by country –

GERMANY: 19th CENTURY TO 1914

Epkenhans, Michael, **“Krupp and the Imperial German Navy, 1898-1914: A Reassessment.”**

Vol.64, No.2 (April, 2000), pp.335-369.

Kelly, Patrick J. “**Strategy, Tactics, and Turf Wars: Tirpitz and the *Oberkommando der Marine*, 1892-1895.**” Vol.66, No.4 (October, 2002), pp.1033-1060. Relies on previously ignored archival material to reexamine the development of Grand Admiral Alfred von Tirpitz’s (1849-1930) strategic and tactical thought, including some significant contradictions.

NAVAL WARFARE arranged alphabetically by country – GERMANY: 20th CENTURY

Bird, Keith, “**Review Essay: The Tirpitz Legacy: The Political Ideology of German Sea Power.**” Vol.69, No.3 (July, 2005), pp.821-825.

**NAVAL WARFARE arranged alphabetically by country –
GERMANY: WORLD WAR I (1914-18)**

Overlack, Peter, “**The Force of Circumstances: Graf Spee’s Options for the East Asian Cruiser Squadron in 1914.**” Vol.60, No.4 (October, 1996), pp.657-682. Investigates how the denial of coaling stations by both Japan’s decision to join the Entente Powers and the actions of Australia and New Zealand severely constricted the choices available to Vice-Admiral Maximilian Reichsgraf von Spee (1861-1914).

Steffen, Dirk, “**The Holtzendorff Memorandum of 22 December, 1916, and Germany’s Declaration of Unrestricted U-Boat Warfare.**” Vol.68, No.1 (January, 2004), pp.215-224. Examines how the Chief of the Imperial German Navy’s Admiralty Staff, Henning von Holtzendorff (1853-1919), successfully argued that Germany could risk provoking the United States entering the war in return for starving Great Britain into submission.

**NAVAL WARFARE arranged alphabetically by country –
GERMANY: WORLD WAR II (1939-45)**

Weinberg, Gerhard L. “**Unexplored Questions about the German Military during World War II.**” Vol.62, No.2 (April, 1998), pp.371-380. Touches upon the 1934 oath to Hitler, reasons why high-ranking German commanders felt the need to justify to their troops their orders to slaughter Jewish civilians, the role of high-ranking German commanders in approving the execution of tens-of-thousands of their own troops, *Luftwaffe* field divisions, the creation of new airborne divisions after the use of paratroopers had been all but abandoned, and the organizing of *Kriegsmarine* and *Luftwaffe* suicide units.

Mulligan, Timothy P. “**Ship-of-the-Line or Atlantic Raider? Battleship *Bismarck* between Design Limitations and Naval Strategy.**” Vol.69, No.4 (October, 2005), pp.1013-1044.

Wilson, Evan and Schapira, Ruth, “**German Perspectives on the U-Boat War, 1939-1941.**” Vol.85, No.2 (April, 2021), pp.369-398. Probes the conflict between what the Germans’ needed to secure a quick, decisive result, and the fact that the U-Boat was designed for a war of attrition, resulting in a pessimistic outlook on the part of Germany’s Naval leaders.

NAVAL WARFARE arranged alphabetically by country –

GERMANY: COLD WAR (1945-91)

Snyder, David R. “**Arming the *Bundesmarine*: The United States and the Build-Up of the German Federal Navy, 1950-1960.**” Vol.66, No.2 (April, 2002), pp.477-500.

NAVAL WARFARE arranged alphabetically by country –

ITALY: INTERWAR PERIOD (1919-1939)

Sullivan, Brian R. “**Review Essay: Fascist Italy’s Military Involvement in the Spanish Civil War.**” Vol.59, No.4 (October, 1995), pp.697-727. Surveys the existing literature concerning Benito Mussolini’s (1883-1945) commitment some 70,000 soldiers of the *Corpo Truppe Volontarie* and over 700 warplanes of the *Aviazione Legionaria* to the Nationalist cause, including the publications of official histories.

De Ninno, Fabio, “**A Technological Fiasco: Scientific Research, Institutional Culture, and Fascism in the Italian Navy (1919-1940).**” Vol.84, No.3 (July, 2020), pp.798-824. Explains that the failure of the Italian Navy to develop and adopt new technologies, such as radar and sonar, was rooted in an opposition to technological change within the culture of the officer corps, compounded by inter-service rivalry and the chaos of the Fascist regime.

NAVAL WARFARE arranged alphabetically by country –

JAPAN: WORLD WAR II (1939-45)

Chi Man Kwong, “**The Failure of Japanese Land-Sea Cooperation during the Second World War: Hong Kong and the South China Coast as an Example, 1942-1945.**” Vol.79, No.1 (January, 2015), pp.69-91.

Fuquea, David C. “**Advantage Japan: The Imperial Japanese Navy’s Superior High Seas Refueling Capability.**” Vol.84, No.1 (January, 2020), pp.213-235. Addresses an understudied factor that made the Japanese victories at Pearl Harbor and beyond possible, one that at least initially, was not available to the U.S. Navy.

NAVAL WARFARE arranged alphabetically by country –

THE NETHERLANDS: INTERWAR PERIOD (1919-38)

Jones, Mark C. **“Give Credit where Credit is Due: The Dutch Role in the Development and Deployment of the Submarine Schnorkel.”** Vol.69, No.4 (October, 2005), pp.987-1012.

NAVAL WARFARE arranged alphabetically by country –

POLAND: WORLD WAR II (1939-45)

Peszke, Michael Alfred, **“Historiographical Essay: An Introduction to English-Language Literature on the Polish Armed Forces in World War II.”** Vol.70, No.4 (October, 2006), pp.1029-1064.

NAVAL WARFARE arranged alphabetically by country –

PORTUGAL: EARLY MODERN PERIOD (1480-1789)

Monteiro, Armando da Silva Saturnino, **“The Decline and Fall of Portuguese Seapower, 1588-1663.”** Vol.65, No.1 (January, 2001), pp.9-20.

NAVAL WARFARE arranged alphabetically by country –

RUSSIA / SOVIET UNION: EARLY MODERN PERIOD (1480-1789)

Davies, Brian, **“The Russian Baltic Fleet in the Seven Years’ War.”** Vol.86, No.3 (July, 2022), pp.557-572. Charts the rise and fall and rise again of the Russian Baltic Fleet, from the reign of Peter ‘the Great’ (r.1682-1725) to that of Catherine ‘the Great’ (r.1762-1796).

NAVAL WARFARE arranged alphabetically by country –

RUSSIA / SOVIET UNION: EARLY 20th CENTURY

Podsoblyaev, Evgenii; King, Francis and Biggart, John, **“The Russian Naval General Staff and the Evolution of Naval Policy, 1905-1914.”** Vol.66, No.1 (January, 2002), pp.37-69. Addresses the neglected perspective of the connections between the formulation of naval strategy for the Baltic Sea, warship construction, and Imperial Russia’s aspirations to become a great naval power.

Wilson, Timothy, **“Broken Wings: The Curtis Aeroplane Company, K-Boats, and the Russian Navy, 1914-1916.”** Vol.66, No.4 (October, 2002), pp.1061-1083. Indicates that the contention between Curtiss and the Imperial Russian Government over the purchase of fifty-six flying boats impeded Russia’s operations in the Black Sea for the first eighteen months of World War I.

NAVAL WARFARE arranged alphabetically by country –

TURKEY / OTTOMAN EMPIRE: LATE 19th CENTURY

Karsten, Peter, **"The 'Naval Aristocracy' and the 'Young Turks' of the *Fin de Siècle*: A Dotting of the 'I's and Crossing of the 'T's."** Vol.66, No.4 (October, 2002), pp.1177-1180. Undertakes to determine whether the social backgrounds of the 'Young Turk' generation of officers of the late-nineteenth century 'New Navy' played a role in their careers.

NAVAL WARFARE arranged alphabetically by country – U.S.A.: 19th CENTURY

Kastor, Peter J. **"Toward 'The Maritime War Only': The Question of Naval Mobilization, 1811-1812."** Vol.61, No.3 (July, 1997), pp.455-480. Applies the broader context of the 'New Military History', particularly political circumstances, in an effort to better understand President James Madison's (1809-1817) naval policy and strategy leading up to the outbreak of the War of 1812.

Angevine, Robert G. **"The Rise and Fall of the Office of Naval Intelligence, 1882-1892: A Technological Perspective."** Vol.62, No.2 (April, 1998), pp.291-312. Advances the argument that the first peacetime military intelligence organization, by successfully gathering, overtly and covertly, information on foreign naval technology, enabled the United States to build a modern fleet as quickly and inexpensively as possible.

Weddle, Kevin J. **"'The Magic Touch of Reform': Samuel Francis Du Pont and the Efficiency Board of 1855."** Vol.68, No.2 (April, 2004), pp.471-504. Using previously neglected sources, this article considers how political and military leaders, notably Commander Du Pont (1803-1865), broke the logjam produced by a system of promotion based exclusively on seniority.

Hunter, Mark C. **"The U.S. Naval Academy and Its Summer Cruises: Professionalization in the Antebellum U.S. Navy, 1845-1861."** Vol.70, No.4 (October, 2006), pp.963-994.

Ferreiro, Larrie D. **"Mahan and the 'English Club' of Lima, Peru: The Genesis of *The Influence of Sea Power upon History*."** Vol.72, No.3 (July, 2008), pp.901-906.

Crawford, Michael J. **"U.S. Navy Petty Officers in the Era of the War of 1812."** Vol.76, No.4 (October, 2012), pp.1035-1051. Scrutinizes the Navy's process of recruiting and training petty officers between the years 1797 and 1812.

Epstein, Katherine C. **"'No One can Afford to Say 'Damn the Torpedoes': Battle Tactics and the U.S. Naval History before World War I."** Vol.77, No.2 (April, 2013), pp.491-520.

Crawford, Michael J. **"The Abolition of Prize Money in the United States Navy Reconsidered."** Vol.81, No.1 (January, 2017), pp.105-132. Sizes up the efforts to eliminate prize money for the capture of enemy warships and merchant ships, which began shortly after the War of 1812, but only came about in 1899 due to a confluence of motives.

Crawford, Michael J. **“Avast Swabbing! The Medical Campaign to reform Swabbing the Decks in the U.S. Navy.”** Vol.83, No.1 (January, 2019), pp.127-156. Delves into the conflict between Navy officers, who prioritized the clean appearance of their ships, and Navy doctors, who believed that the humid air produced by swabbing the decks facilitated the spread of diseases that afflicted sailors.

Sheppard, Thomas, **“There will still remain Heroes and Patriots: The Politics of Resignation in the Early American Navy, 1794-1815.”** Vol.84, No.2 (April, 2020), pp.369-394. Establishes that early secretaries of the navy worked to end the practice of officers resigning their commissions, or using the threat to do so, as a bargaining tactic with the Navy Department, something that they had largely accomplished by the end of the War of 1812.

NAVAL WARFARE arranged alphabetically by country –

U.S.A.: WAR OF 1812 (1812-15)

Skaggs, David Curtis, **“Aiming at the Truth: James Fenimore Cooper and the Battle of Lake Erie.”** Vol.59, No.2 (April, 1995), pp.237-255. Disentangles the disputed account of the Battle of Lake Erie, 10 September, 1813, written by Cooper (1789-1851) in his *History of the Navy of the United States* (1839).

Leiner, Frederick C. **“The Squadron Commander’s Share: Decatur and the Prize Money for the Chesapeake’s First War of 1812 Cruise.”** Vol.73, No.1 (January, 2009), pp.69-82. An examination of the prize case of Decatur vs. Chew that displays the tensions between ranking officers over their contrasting views of their appropriate shares.

NAVAL WARFARE arranged alphabetically by country –

U.S.A.: CIVIL WAR (1861-65)

Roberts, William H. **“‘The Name of Ericsson’: Political Engineering in the Union Ironclad Program, 1861-1863.”** Vol.63, No.4 (October, 1999), pp.823-843.

Wolters, Timothy S. **“Electric Torpedoes in the Confederacy: Reconciling Conflicting Histories.”** Vol.72, No.3 (July, 2008), pp.755-783. The article seeks to clarify the linkages between memory, history, and technology by examining the claims of Hunter Davidson, Beverley Kennon, Stephen Mallory, Matthew, and Gabriel Rains to contributing to the development of electric torpedoes for the Confederacy.

Weddle, Kevin J. **“The Fall of Satan’s Kingdom: Civil-Military Relations and the Union Navy’s Attack on Charleston, April 1863.”** Vol.75, No.2 (April, 2011), pp.411-439. Describes the conflict between Rear Admiral Samuel Francis Du Pont (1803-1865) and the members of

Lincoln's administration, Secretary of the Navy Gideon Welles (1802-1878) and his assistant, Gustavus Fox (1821-1883).

McPherson, James M. **"The 2014 George C. Marshall Lecture in Military History: The Rewards of Risk-Taking: Two Civil War Admirals."** Vol.78, No.4 (October, 2014), pp.1225-1237. Comparison between Rear Admiral David Glasgow Farragut (1801-1870) and Rear Admiral Samuel Francis Du Pont (1803-1865).

Fuller, Howard J. **"Review Essay: Much in Little: John Ericsson and His Monitor Save the Republic."** Vol.83, No.3 (July, 2019), pp.861-864.

Kemmerly, Phillip R. **"Rivers, Rails, and Rebels: Logistics and Struggle to Supply U.S. Army Depot at Nashville, 1862-1865."** Vol.84, No.3 (July, 2020), pp.713-746. Highlights the indispensable support provided by the U.S. Army depot at Nashville, Tennessee, for Union operations in the Western Theater, which, in turn, depended upon the Louisville-Nashville railway line and the Cumberland River kept open by the U.S. Navy.

NAVAL WARFARE arranged alphabetically by country –

U.S.A.: FROM CIVIL WAR TO WORLD WAR I (1865-1914)

Oyos, Matthew M. **"Theodore Roosevelt and the Implements of War."** Vol.60, No.4 (October, 1996), pp.631-655. Brings to light an overlooked aspect of Roosevelt's presidency (1901-1909), his role in accelerating the pace of military technological modernization, including involvement with battleships, submarines, aircraft, and machine guns.

Smith, Jason W. **"Twixt the Devil and the Deep Blue Sea: Hydrography, Sea Power, and the Marine Environment, 1898-1901."** Vol.78, No.2 (April, 2014), pp.575-604. Endeavors to understand the role played by knowledge of the marine environment in the Spanish-American War, 1898.

Jeffrey, Thomas E. **"Commodore' Edison Joins the Navy: Thomas Alva Edison and the Naval Consulting Board."** Vol.80, No.2 (April, 2016), pp.411-445. Claims that the impetus for the formation of the Naval Consulting Board headed by Edison (1847-1931), which was intended to provide advice on naval warfare technology, was Edison's chief engineer, who conceived it as the centerpiece of a marketing campaign to sell Edison designed batteries to the Navy for their submarines.

NAVAL WARFARE arranged alphabetically by country –

U.S.A.: WORLD WAR I (1914-18)

Williams, William J. **"Josephus Daniels and the U.S. Navy's Shipbuilding Program During**

World War I.” Vol.60, No.1 (January, 1996), pp.7-38. Observes how Daniels (1862-1948), with no naval or maritime background, applied himself conscientiously to shifting the Navy’s building program from capitol ships to destroyers designed to address the U-Boat threat.

NAVAL WARFARE arranged alphabetically by country –

U.S.A.: INTERWAR PERIOD (1919-39)

Wildenberg, Thomas, **“In Support of the Battle Line: Gunnery’s Influence on the Development of Carrier Aviation in the U.S. Navy.”** Vol.65, No.3 (July, 2001), pp.697-711. Debunks the presumed anti-aviation attitude of ‘battleship admirals’ and describes how carrier aviation was a mission driven, rather than a technological driven, affair that proceeded incrementally over the course of several years.

Hone, Trent, **“The Evolution of Fleet Tactical Doctrine in the U.S. Navy, 1922-1941.”** Vol.67, No.4 (October, 2003), pp.1107-1148. Establishes how the Navy intended to use the battleships stationed at Pearl Harbor in battle, including Admiral Husband E. Kimmel’s (1882-1968) plans for a decisive fleet engagement in the Central Pacific.

Kuehn, John T. **“The U.S. Navy General Board and Naval Arms Limitations: 1922-1937.”** Vol.74, No.4 (October, 2010), pp.1129-1160. Highlights the critical link played by the Navy General Board between the U.S. Navy and 1922 Washington Naval Limitations Treaty.

Holwitt, Joel I. **“Review Essay: Reappraising the Interwar U.S. Navy.”** Vol.76, No.1 (January, 2012), pp.193-210. New studies demonstrate that the interwar U.S. was frequently led by innovative leaders, willing to experiment with new technologies and able to use fleet exercises and an internal review process to creatively, but realistically, generate a strategy that worked within the geographical and treaty constraints of an expected war in the Pacific.

Hughes, Thomas, **“Learning to Fight: Bill Halsey and the Early American Destroyer Force.”** Vol.77, No.1 (January, 2013), pp.71-90. The outcome of Admiral Halsey’s (1882-1959) service under Admiral William Sims (1858-1936) as a destroyer Captain, 1914-1922.

NAVAL WARFARE arranged alphabetically by country –

U.S.A.: WORLD WAR II (1939-45)

Fuquea, David C. **“Task Force One: The Wasted Assets of the United States Pacific Battleship Fleet, 1942.”** Vol.61, No.4 (October, 1997), pp.707-734. Explores the reasons behind Task Force One’s battleships languishing as a last line of defense during the first year of the war following Pearl Harbor.

Boyd, Carl, **“U.S. Navy Radio Intelligence during the Second World War and the Sinking of**

the Japanese Submarine I-52.” Vol.63, No.2 (April, 1999), pp.339-354. Determines the role of Ultra in the June, 1944, sinking of the blockade runner, I-52, in the Atlantic Ocean by aircraft from the escort carrier U.S.S. *Bogue*.

Warren, Mame, **“Focal Point of the Fleet: U.S. Navy Photographic Activities in World War II.”** Vol.69, No.4 (October, 2005), pp.1045-1079. Concerned with the work of Edward Streichen (1879-1973) and his team of professional photographers.

Sturma, Michael, **“U.S. Submarine Patrol Reports during World War II: Historical Evidence and Literary Flair.”** Vol.74, No.2 (April, 2010), pp.475-490. Insists that the patrol reports of U.S. submariners should be approached with caution due, among other things, to the ‘fog of war’, intentional fabrication, and deliberate omissions for security reasons or to avoid censure.

McEvoy, William P. **“ ‘Experiences at Sea’: A Navy Doctor of War.”** Vol.75, No.4 (October, 2011), pp.1159-1182. U.S. Navy doctor serving in the Pacific from September 1944 to December 1945.

Sturma, Michael, **“Coco Solo Submarines: Protecting the Panama Canal, 1941-1942.”** Vol.81, No.4 (October, 2017), pp.1039-1057. While these submarine patrols may have contributed little to repelling any threat to the Canal Zone, they did provide useful training and experience for a significant number of U.S. submariners.

Hone, Trent, **“Learning to Win: The Evolution of U.S. Navy Tactical Doctrine During the Guadalcanal Campaign.”** Vol.82, No.3 (July, 2018), pp.817-841. Challenges the notion that the U.S. Navy suffered complete failure in surface night combat, contending, instead, that it was particularly skilled in integrating combat lessons and, accordingly, modifying its tactical doctrine.

NAVAL WARFARE arranged alphabetically by country –

U.S.A.: COLD WAR (1945-91)

Friedman, Hal M. **“Blue versus Orange: The United States Naval War College, Japan, and the Old Enemy in the Pacific, 1945-1946.”** Vol.78, No.1 (January, 2014), pp.211-231. Reports on the delay in adjusting to post-war circumstances that meant that the War College curriculum remained a mixture of interwar and wartime doctrine during the early Cold War.

Holwitt, Joel I. **“The Loss of U.S.S. *Thresher*: Technological and Cultural Change and the Cold War U.S. Navy.”** Vol.82, No.3 (July, 2018), pp.843-872. Advances the proposition that the response to the 10 April, 1963, loss of the U.S.S. *Thresher* with all hands led to a cultural shift within the U.S. naval officer development from a ‘generalist’ to a ‘technical specialist’ model.

NELSON, HORATIO (1858-1805)

Ferreiro, Larrie D. **“Horatio Nelson never Wrote ‘A Ship’s a Fool to Fight a Fort’: It was Jackie Fisher Who Invented the Attribution.”** Vol.80, No.3 (July, 2016), pp.855-856.

THE NETHERLANDS: EARLY MODERN PERIOD (1480-1789)

Muehlbauer, Matthew S. **“Holy War and Just War in Early New England, 1630-1655.”** Vol.81, No.3 (July, 2017), pp.667-692. Questions the uneven application of these concepts by the New England colonies in relation to both wars and efforts to avoid war with both Native American tribes and the neighboring colony of New Netherlands.

Murteira, André, **“Historiographical Essay: The Military Revolution and European Wars Outside of Europe: The Dutch-Portuguese War in Asia in the First Quarter of the Seventeenth Century.”** Vol.84, No.2 (April, 2020), pp.511-535. Challenges the notion of Early Modern Western Military exceptionalism that, in Portuguese historiography, has blamed their defeat on Portuguese naval forces that were inferior to their Dutch opponents supposedly because of Asian military influence that was absent among the Dutch.

THE NETHERLANDS: EIGHTY YEARS WAR (1566-1648)

Parker, Geoffrey, **“The Limits to Revolutions in Military Affairs: Maurice of Nassau, the Battle of Nieuwpoort (1600), and the Legacy.”** Vol.71, No.2 (April, 2007), pp.331-372. Probes the evolution of the use of volley fire by matchlock armed infantry, beginning with its use in Japan in the 1560s and by the Dutch in the 1590s, with its first use in combat in Europe at the battle of Nieuwpoort, 2 July, 1600.

Arfaoli, Maurizio, **“Bastion of Empire: The Italian *terzo Vecchio* of the Army of Flanders (1597-1682).”** Vol.85, No.1 (January, 2021), pp.27-50. An examination of the service of the longest-lived infantry unit, the *terzo Vecchio*, in an effort to better understand Italian involvement in the long conflict within the Spanish Low Countries.

THE NETHERLANDS: 1st ANGLO-DUTCH WAR (1652-54)

Rommelse, Gijs and Downing, Roger, **“Victims of an Ideological Rift? Dutch Prisoners of War during the First Anglo-Dutch War (1652-1654).”** Vol.80, No.3 (July, 2016), pp.649-669. Rather than ideology, the author shows that it was a combination of logistical problems and a lack of funds that produced the dire conditions experienced by Dutch P.O.W.s.

THE NETHERLANDS: WORLD WAR I (1914-18)

Van Tuyll, Hubert P. **“The Dutch Mobilization of 1914: Reading the ‘Enemy’s’ Intentions.”** Vol.64, No.3 (July, 2000), pp.711-737. Establishes that the Dutch Armed Forces were aware that Von Schlieffen intended to violate Dutch neutrality and their response resulted in a change in Germans plans for war with France.

THE NETHERLANDS: INTERWAR PERIOD (1919-39)

Gunsburg, Jeffrey A. **“*La Grand Illusion: Belgian and Dutch Strategy Facing Germany, 1919 – May, 1940.*”** Vol.78, No.1 (January, 2014), pp.101-158; Vol.78, No.2 (April, 2014), pp.605-671.

Van Tuyll, Hubert, **“Memory, Myth and Forgetting: The Netherlands and the World Wars.”** Vol.80, No.4 (October, 2016), pp.1073-1081. Advances the explanation that the inaccurate myths that evolved around Netherlands neutrality during World War I had an unfortunate impact on the country’s defensive preparations leading up to World War II.

THE NETHERLANDS: WORLD WAR II (1939-45)

Jones, Mark C. **“Experiment at Dundee: The Royal Navy’s 9th Submarine Flotilla and Multinational Naval Cooperation during World War II.”** Vol.72, No.4 (October, 2008), pp.1179-1212. The 9th Flotilla included British, Dutch, Free French, Norwegian, and Polish submariners.

Jones, Mark C. **“Not Just along for the Ride: The Role of Royal Navy Liaison Personnel in Multinational Naval Operations during World War II.”** Vol.76, No.1 (January, 2012), pp.127-158. The liaison system as a means of cooperation with European navies in exile from France, Greece, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, and Yugoslavia.

Jones, Mark C. **“Friend and Advisor to the Allied Navies: The Royal Navy’s Principal Liaison Officer and Multinational Naval Operations in World War II.”** Vol.77, No.3 (July, 2013), pp.991-1023. The work of Principal Liaison Officer, Allied Navies (P.N.L.O.) with the Belgian, Dutch, French, Greek, Norwegian, Polish, and Yugoslav navies in exile.

Borch, Fred L. **“‘In the Name of the Queen’: Military Trials of Japanese War Criminals in the Netherlands East Indies (1946-1949).”** Vol.79, No.1 (January, 2015), pp.93-125.

Hammond, Richard, **“Fighting under a Different Flag: Multinational Naval Cooperation and Submarine Warfare in the Mediterranean, 1940-1944.”** Vol.80, No.2 (April, 2016), pp.447-476. In contrast to their experience in the British home theatre, the submarines in the Mediterranean operated by the exiled governments of the Free French, Greece, the Netherlands, Poland, and Yugoslavia, along with those of Italy beginning in 1943, found it difficult to

cooperate with the Royal Navy, as well as each other.

Jones, Mark C. **“In Need of a Home Away from Home: The Royal Netherlands Navy in Australia, 1942-1947.”** Vol.85, No.2 (April, 2021), pp.399-425. With the fall of the Netherlands’ East Indies, units of the Royal Netherlands Navy relocated to Australia, from where they continued their operations against the Japanese enemy.

THE NETHERLANDS: COLD WAR (1945-91)

Hoffenaar, Jan, **“*Hannibal ante portas: The Soviet Military Threat and the Build-up of the Dutch Armed Forces, 1948-1958.*”** Vol.66, No.1 (January, 2002), pp.163-191.

Priest, Andrew, **“ ‘In Common Cause’: The N.A.T.O. Multilateral Force and the Mixed-Manning Demonstration on the U.S.S. *Claude V. Ricketts*, 1964-1965.”** Vol.69, No.3 (July, 2005), pp.759-789. The crew of the destroyer (DDG-5) U.S.S. *Claude V. Ricketts* included U.S., British, Dutch, Greek, Italian, Turkish, and West German officers and men.

NEUTRALITY

Thompson, David G. **“Norwegian Military Policy, 1905-1940: A Critical Appraisal and Review of the Literature.”** Vol.61, No.3 (July, 1997), pp.503-520. Questions the reliance exclusively on British and German sources for an understanding of the 1940 Norwegian campaign, insisting that without knowledge of the role of the Norwegian government and armed forces, the picture is incomplete.

Van Tuyll, Hubert P. **“The Dutch Mobilization of 1914: Reading the ‘Enemy’s’ Intentions.”** Vol.64, No.3 (July, 2000), pp.711-737. Establishes that the Dutch Armed Forces were aware that Von Schlieffen intended to violate Dutch neutrality and their response resulted in a change in Germans plans for war with France.

Hull, Mark M. **“The Irish Interlude: German Intelligence in Ireland, 1939-1943.”** Vol.66, No.3 (July, 2002), pp.695-717.

Steffen, Dirk, **“The Holtzendorff Memorandum of 22 December, 1916, and Germany’s Declaration of Unrestricted U-Boat Warfare.”** Vol.68, No.1 (January, 2004), pp.215-224. Examines how the Chief of the Imperial German Navy’s Admiralty Staff, Henning von Holtzendorff (1853-1919), successfully argued that Germany could risk provoking the United States entering the war in return for starving Great Britain into submission.

Mears, Dwight S. **“The Catch-22 Effect: The lasting Stigma of Wartime Cowardice in the U.S. Army Air Forces.”** Vol.77, No.3 (July, 2013), pp.1025-1054. Accusations of cowardice

by the air crews that landed in Switzerland and their consequences.

Gunsburg, Jeffrey A. **“*La Grand Illusion: Belgian and Dutch Strategy Facing Germany, 1919 – May, 1940.*”** Vol.78, No.1 (January, 2014), pp.101-158; Vol.78, No.2 (April, 2014), pp.605-671.

Little, Branden, **“*Evacuating Wartime Europe: U.S. Policy, Strategy, and Relief Operations for Overseas American Travelers, 1914-15.*”** Vol.79, No.4 (October, 2015), pp.929-958.
The evacuation by the U.S. Relief Commission of 125,000 U.S. citizens stranded in Europe and its far-ranging impact on war preparedness and subsequent humanitarian operations.

Peifer, Douglas, **“*The Sinking of the *Lusitania*, Wilson’s Response, and Paths Not Taken: Historical Revisionism, the Nye Committee, and the Ghost of William Jennings Bryan.*”** Vol.79, No.4 (October, 2015), pp.1025-1045. Assesses the way that the impact of the revisionist literature of the interwar period on the Neutrality Acts of the mid-1930s demonstrates how ‘history’s lessons’ without context can mislead rather than inform.

Van Tuyll, Hubert, **“*Memory, Myth and Forgetting: The Netherlands and the World Wars.*”** Vol.80, No.4 (October, 2016), pp.1073-1081. Advances the explanation that the inaccurate myths that evolved around Netherlands neutrality during World War I had an unfortunate impact on the country’s defensive preparations leading up to World War II.

NEW JERSEY, U.S.A.

Adelberg, Michael S. **“*The Scope and Severity of Civil Warfare in Revolutionary Monmouth County, New Jersey.*”** Vol.73, No.1 (January, 2009), pp.9-47. Examines both how many of the residents of Monmouth County chose to participate on the opposing sides and how many lives were adversely affected by the war.

NEW ZEALAND

Overlack, Peter, **“*The Force of Circumstances: Graf Spee’s Options for the East Asian Cruiser Squadron in 1914.*”** Vol.60, No.4 (October, 1996), pp.657-682. Investigates how the denial of coaling stations by both Japan’s decision to join the Entente Powers and the actions of Australia and New Zealand severely constricted the choices available to Vice-Admiral Maximilian Reichsgraf von Spee (1861-1914).

Tuck, Christopher, **“*‘Cut the bonds which bind our hands’: Deniable Operations during the Confrontation with Indonesia, 1963-1966.*”** Vol.77, No.2 (April, 2013), pp.599-623.
Describes the British confrontation with Indonesia and the problems with cross-border

operations.

McGibbon, Ian, **“Australian-New Zealand Relations and Commitments to Asian Conflicts 1950-1972.”** Vol.81, No.4 (October, 2017), pp.1059-1074. Despite the replacement of the British security framework by alliance with the United States, New Zealand resisted pressure to commit troops to the Vietnam War in direct contrast to its larger neighbor.

Grey, Jeffrey, **“The Formation of the Commonwealth Division, 1950-1951.”** Vol.81, No.4 (October, 2017), pp.1097-1107. The saga of the military and political challenges of forming a division composed of units from the Australian, British, Canadian, Indian, and New Zealand armies.

Tuck, Christopher, **“Measuring Victory: Assessing the outcomes of *Konfrontasi*, 1963-66.”** Vol.82, No.3 (July, 2018), pp.873-898. Suggests that the outcome of the British low intensity conflict with Indonesia, known as the ‘Confrontation’, is far more complex than either the triumphal or revisionist interpretations suggest.

Stubbs, David, **“Reappraising the Royal Air Force Contribution to the Defense of Crete, 1941.”** Vol.84, No.2 (April, 2020), pp.459-486. Points out that the failure of the British and Commonwealth ground troops to retain control over the airfields was not the primary reason for defeat, given that the fighter squadrons necessary for the defense of the island were not scheduled to arrive in the Mediterranean Sea in time to participate in the battle, a fact known to decision makers in London.

NEWSPAPERS, See: MEDIA

NICARAGUA

McPherson, Alan, **“Lid Sitters and Prestige Seekers: The U.S. Navy versus the State Department and the End of U.S. Occupations.”** Vol.78, No.1 (January, 2014), pp.73-99. Conflicting outlooks between the State Department and the Marine Corps on the U.S. military occupation of the Dominican Republic, from 1912 to 1924, Haiti, from 1915 to 1934, and Nicaragua, from 1927 to 1932.

Moulton, Aaron Coy, **“The Dominican Dictator’s Funds and Guns in Costa Rica’s Wars of 1948.”** Vol.85, No.3 (July, 2021), pp.713-733. Whereas past studies of the conflicts in Costa Rica have focused on the involvement of Anastasio Somoza García of Nicaragua (1896-1956) and Juan José Arévalo of Guatemala (1904-1990), the author demonstrates that Costa Ricans sought to obtain arms from the Dominican Dictator Rafael Trujillo (1891-1961).

NIGERIA

Stapleton, Timothy J. **“Sexual Health in Britain’s West African Colonial Army (1898-1960).”**
Vol.85, No.3 (July, 2021), pp.619-645. Following an initial neglect due to greater concern over tropical diseases, British officers became obsessed with the threat of venereal diseases, reflecting colonial stereotypes surrounding race and gender.

NINJA – See: JAPAN

NIXON, RICHARD (1913-94)

Goldman, David I. **“The Generals and the Germs: The Army Leadership’s Response to Nixon’s Review of Chemical and Biological Warfare Policies in 1969.”** Vol.73, No.2 (April, 2009), pp.531-569. The response of U.S. Army leadership to President Richard Nixon (1969-1974) unilateral elimination of biological warfare agents, retaining only a defensive research program, as well as placing limitations on the chemical weapons.

NGO DINH DIEM (1901-63)

Harris, J.P. **“The Early Military History of the Second Indochina War and the Mayor Thesis.”**
Vol.85, No.3 (July, 2021), pp.734-763. Contests the interpretation of Mark Moyar that by mid-1962 the South Vietnamese government was conducting a successful counter-insurgency campaign that was cut short by the overthrow of Ngo Dinh Diem (1901-1963).

**NORMANDY INVASION – See: WORLD WAR II (1939-45): NORTHWESTERN EUROPE
CAMPAIGN (1944-45)**

NORSTAD, LAURIS (1907-88)

Meilinger, Phillip S. **“Historiographical Essay: U.S. Air Force Leaders: A Biographical Tour.”**
Vol.62, No.4 (October, 1998), pp.833-870.

NORTH AFRICA – See: ALGERIA; EGYPT; LIBYA; MOROCCO

NORTH AMERICA – See: CANADA; MEXICO; UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

**NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION (N.A.T.O.) –
See: COALITION WARFARE: COLD WAR**

NORTH CAROLINA, U.S.A.

Maass, John R. “**‘Too Grievous for a People to Bear’: Impressment and Conscription in Revolutionary North Carolina.**” Vol.73, No.4 (October, 2009), pp.1091-1115.

The government of North Carolina, faced with the challenges of fighting a revolutionary war, chose to impose impressment and conscription, which produced antipathy and resistance to Patriot authorities, undermining support for the new state, and added to the disorders within the state during the war.

NORTHWEST FRONTIER – See: AFGHANISTAN; INDIA; PAKISTAN

NORWAY

Thompson, David G. “**Norwegian Military Policy, 1905-1940: A Critical Appraisal and Review of the Literature.**” Vol.61, No.3 (July, 1997), pp.503-520. Questions the reliance exclusively on British and German sources for an understanding of the 1940 Norwegian campaign, insisting that without knowledge of the role of the Norwegian government and armed forces, the picture is incomplete.

Jones, Mark C. “**Experiment at Dundee: The Royal Navy’s 9th Submarine Flotilla and Multinational Naval Cooperation during World War II.**” Vol.72, No.4 (October, 2008), pp.1179-1212. The 9th Flotilla included British, Dutch, Free French, Norwegian, and Polish submariners.

Mann, Christopher, “**Combined Operations, the Commandos, and Norway, 1941-1944.**” Vol.73, No.2 (April, 2009), pp.471-495. Displays the broader strategic consequences of a series of British raids on the coast of Norway, including valuable experience in joint operations and the commitment of German forces for the defense of Norway.

Grimes, Shawn, “**The Baltic and Admiralty War Planning, 1906-1907.**” Vol.74, No.2 (April, 2010), pp.407-437. Reassessment of the Ballard Committee’s 1907 War Plans against

Germany in the context of Norway's gaining independence in 1905.

Jones, Mark C. **"Not Just along for the Ride: The Role of Royal Navy Liaison Personnel in Multinational Naval Operations during World War II."** Vol.76, No.1 (January, 2012), pp.127-158. The liaison system as a means of cooperation with European navies in exile from France, Greece, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, and Yugoslavia.

Jones, Mark C. **"Friend and Advisor to the Allied Navies: The Royal Navy's Principal Liaison Officer and Multinational Naval Operations in World War II."** Vol.77, No.3 (July, 2013), pp.991-1023. The work of Principal Liaison Officer, Allied Navies (P.N.L.O.) with the Belgian, Dutch, French, Greek, Norwegian, Polish, and Yugoslav navies in exile.

NUCLEAR WEAPONS – See: WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION

O

OCCUPATION, MILITARY

Goldstein, Cora Sol, **"A Comparative Analysis of Cultural Control: The German Military Occupation of France (1940-1942) and the American Military Occupation of Germany (1945-1949)."** Vol.80, No.4 (October, 2016), pp.1083-1116. Although their respective agendas were inspired by opposite ideologies, the author proposes that the mechanisms of control over information by both occupiers shared significant similarities.

OCCUPATION, MILITARY:

FRENCH REVOLUTIONARY AND NAPOLEONIC WARS (1792-1815)

Morgan, John, **"War Feeding War? The Impact of Logistics on the Napoleonic Occupation of Catalonia."** Vol.73, No.1 (January, 2009), pp.83-116. The inability of the French occupation forces to live off the land meant that alternate sources and modes of supply had to be relied upon in the midst of guerrilla resistance and the British blockade of Catalan ports, all of which negatively impacted French operations.

Hantraye, Jacques, **"The Silence of the Woods: The 1815 Murder of a Prussian Soldier in Western France."** Vol.80, No.1 (January, 2016), pp.57-76. Focuses on the murder of a Prussian soldier on 22 July, 1815, outside of the village of Unverre, located roughly ninety miles southwest of Paris, as a means of exploring the interactions between the forces of occupation and the civilian population of postwar France.

OCCUPATION, MILITARY: U.S.-MEXICAN WAR (1846-48)

Levinson, Irving W. **“A New Paradigm for an Old Conflict: The Mexico-United States War.”** Vol.73, No.2 (April, 2009), pp.393-416. The victorious U.S. Army that found itself in possession of Mexico City had to provide assistance to the dominant political and socio-economic groups in order to obtain a peace treaty that would conclude the war.

OCCUPATION, MILITARY: EARLY 20TH CENTURY

McPherson, Alan, **“Lid Sitters and Prestige Seekers: The U.S. Navy versus the State Department and the End of U.S. Occupations.”** Vol.78, No.1 (January, 2014), pp.73-99. Conflicting outlooks between the State Department and the Marine Corps on the U.S. military occupation of the Dominican Republic, from 1912 to 1924, Haiti, from 1915 to 1934, and Nicaragua, from 1927 to 1932.

OCCUPATION, MILITARY: WORLD WAR I (1914-18)

Nelson, David T. and Cole, Richard G. **“Memoirs: Behind German Lines in 1915: The Letters Home of David T. Nelson.”** Vol.65, No.4 (October, 2001), pp.1053-1060. Nelson, who was from Decorah, Iowa, was a Rhodes Scholar at Oxford when the war broke out. He worked for the Commission for Relief in German occupied Belgium and, later in 1916, as a driver for the American Field Ambulance Corps.

OCCUPATION: INTERWAR PERIOD (1919-39)

Kuhlman, Erika, **“American Doughboys and German Fräuleins: Sexuality, Patriarchy, and the Privilege in the American-Occupied Rhineland, 1918-23.”** Vol.71, No.4 (October, 2007), pp.1077-1106.

OCCUPATION, MILITARY: WORLD WAR II (1939-45)

Geller, Jay Howard, **“The Role of Military Administration in German-Occupied Belgium, 1940-1944.”** Vol.63, No.1 (January, 1999), pp.99-125. Attempts to determine how the German Military Administration viewed its role in occupying and governing the Kingdom of Belgium.

McCreedy, Kenneth O. **“Planning the Peace: Operation Eclipse and the Occupation of Germany.”** Vol.65, No.3 (July, 2001), pp.713-739. Indicates that Operation Eclipse, which was planned simultaneously with Overlord, had the dual goals of thoroughly eliminating Nazism in Germany

Muschamp, Amy, **“Living Under Allied Military Government in Southern Italy during the**

Second World War: A Case Study of the Region of Molise.” Vol.79, No.2 (April, 2015), pp.369-386. Based on a combination of archival research at the regional capital of Campobasso and oral history.

Kranjc, Gregor, **“Fight or Flight: Desertion, Defection, and Draft-Dodging in Occupied Slovenia, 1941-1945.”** Vol.81, No.1 (January, 2017), pp.133-162. Questions the motives for Slovenes to avoid or escape from military service for three occupying powers, Germany, Hungary, and Italy, and these powers efforts to combat draft-dodging, desertion, and defection.

OCCUPATION, MILITARY: COLD WAR (1945-91)

Willoughby, John, **“The Sexual Behavior of American G.I.s during the Early Years of the Occupation of Germany.”** Vol.62, No.1 (January, 1998), pp.155-174. Investigates the U.S. Army’s search for a form of sexual relations between G.I.’s and German girls that would be acceptable to young German men, young U.S. women, and the mothers and fathers of both lands, a topic that illuminates much about the social and political relations between the American and German people in the immediate aftermath of World War II.

Spector, Ronald H. **“After Hiroshima: Allied Military Occupations and the Fate of Japan’s Empire, 1945-1947.”** Vol.69, No.4 (October, 2005), pp.1121-1136. The Allies confronted problems far beyond the disarming of Japanese troops in occupied China, Korea, and Southeast Asia, where internal conflicts rendered the plans of the Allied powers irrelevant.

Walsh, Brian, **“Sexual Violence during the Occupation of Japan.”** Vol.82, No.4 (October, 2018), pp.1199-1230. Insists that the accusations of recent publications of the widespread rape of Japanese women by Allied troops during the occupation (1945-1952) are grossly exaggerated.

Walsh, Brian, **“ ‘This Degrading Slavery’: MacArthur’s General Headquarters and Prostitution Policy during the Occupation of Japan.”** Vol.85, No.3 (July, 2021), pp.678-712. The Allied occupation government (1945-1952) outlawed the old Imperial system of licensed prostitution because it relied on human trafficking, but did not outlaw prostitution in general based on respect for individual autonomy and an appreciation for the situation in Japan.

OMAN

Hughes, Geraint, **“Demythologising Dhofar: British Policy, Military Strategy, and Counter-Insurgency in Oman, 1963-1976.”** Vol.79, No.2 (April, 2015), pp.423-456. Demonstrates that the UK backed C.O.I.N. operations of the Sultanate of Oman placed a heavier reliance on military force than civil engagement and that specific historical circumstances make the ‘lessons learned’ less applicable for other conflicts.

OMAN, CHARLES (1860-1946)

Arnold, James R. **“A Reappraisal of Column Versus Line in the Peninsular War.”** Vol.68, No.2 (April, 2004), pp.535-552. Disputes the influential English historian of the Napoleonic Wars, Sir Charles Oman’s (1860-1946), explanation for the superiority of the British line over the French column.

OPPOSITION TO WAR

Van De Mark, Brian, **“Review Essay: Thinking about the Vietnam War.”** Vol.60, No.2 (April, 1996), pp.339-357. Although the majority of the seven books reviewed are from the perspective of the involvement of the United States, including one on the anti-war movement and two on the Johnson administration, 1963-1969, there is a memoir from a rural woman living in South Vietnam and a comparative work about the reaction of academics to the wars in Algeria and Vietnam.

Jablon, Howard, **“General David M. Shoup, U.S.M.C.: Warrior and War Protester.”** Vol.60, No.3 (July, 1996), pp.513-538. Claims that the same hard-headed pragmatism that made General Shoup (1904-83) a reliable Marine Corps officer led him to conclude that U.S. involvement in Vietnam was ultimately a pointless waste of American lives.

Jeans, Roger B. **“Victims or Victimizers? Museums, Textbooks, and the War Debate in Contemporary Japan.”** Vol.69, No.1 (January, 2005), pp.149-195. Shows that, rather than possessing a unified view of the war, the ‘correct history’ of the conflict is contested between conservatives, the right-wing, moderates, and the left-wing.

Maass, John R. **“‘Too Grievous for a People to Bear’: Impressment and Conscription in Revolutionary North Carolina.”** Vol.73, No.4 (October, 2009), pp.1091-1115.

The government of North Carolina, faced with the challenges of fighting a revolutionary war, chose to impose impressment and conscription, which produced antipathy and resistance to Patriot authorities, undermining support for the new state, and added to the disorders within the state during the war.

Hogan, David W. **“Head and Heart: The Dilemmas of American Attitudes towards War.”** Vol.75, No.4 (October, 2011), pp.1021-1054. Modernist challenges to the old uniform attitudes towards war in a larger, more pluralistic society has made consensus difficult, if not impossible, to reach.

Peifer, Douglas, **“The Sinking of the *Lusitania*, Wilson’s Response, and Paths Not Taken: Historical Revisionism, the Nye Committee, and the Ghost of William Jennings Bryan.”** Vol.79, No.4 (October, 2015), pp.1025-1045. Assesses the way that the impact of the

revisionist literature of the interwar period on the Neutrality Acts of the mid-1930s demonstrates how ‘history’s lessons’ without context can mislead rather than inform.

Carland, John M. **“Daniel Ellsberg and the Tet Offensive.”** Vol.83, No.2 (April, 2019), pp.541-552.
An analyst for the RAND Corporation and employee of both the Defense and State Departments, Daniel Ellsberg’s (1931-2023) critical assessment of the impact of the Tet Offensive, January, 1968, reflected a stage in his growing disillusionment with the war in Vietnam.

ORGANIZATION – See: RECRUITMENT AND ORGANIZATION

OTTOMAN EMPIRE – See: TURKEY / OTTOMAN EMPIRE

OTTONIAN DYNAST (919-1024) – See: GERMANY: MEDIEVAL PERIOD (476-1480)

**OVERLORD, OPERATION - See: WORLD WAR II (1939-45): NORTHWESTERN EUROPE
CAMPAIGN (1944-45)**

P

PAIS, SIDÓNIO (1872-1918)

De Meneses, Filipe Rineiro, “**‘Not only Useless, but Dangerous?’ The Portuguese Expeditionary Corps in France in the Aftermath of the Battle of La Lys, 9 April 1918.**” Vol.82, No.4 (October, 2018), pp.1149-1174. Conflict between the wishes of the new President of Portugal, Sidónio Pais (1872-1918), the British High Command, and the soldiers and officers of the Portuguese Expeditionary Corps over the question of whether it should return to frontline duty.

PAKISTAN

Gill, John H. **“Review Essay: Glimpses Inside Pakistan’s Elusive Army.”** Vol.77, No.1 (January, 2013), pp.294-298. Covers five recent works on the Army of Pakistan, a very difficult subject to study due to a lack of access to archival sources.

PALESTINE – See: ISRAEL / PALESTINE

PAMPHLETS - See: MEDIA

PANAMA

Sturma, Michael, “**Coco Solo Submarines: Protecting the Panama Canal, 1941-1942.**” Vol.81, No.4 (October, 2017), pp.1039-1057. While these submarine patrols may have contributed little to repelling any threat to the Canal Zone, they did provide useful training and experience for a significant number of U.S. submariners.

PARAGUAYAN WAR / WAR OF THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE (1864-70)

Hughes, Matthew, “**Logistics and the Chaco War: Bolivia versus Paraguay, 1932-1935.**” Vol.69, No.2 (April, 2005), pp.411-437. Employs a broad definition of logistics that includes the acquisition of matériel before the outbreak of war, as well as the establishment of national and international supply lines during the war.

PARSONS, WILLIAM STERLING (1901-1953)

Bernstein, Barton J. “**Review Essay: The Making of the Atomic Admiral: ‘Deak’ Parsons and Modernizing the U.S. Navy.**” Vol.63, No.2 (April, 1999), pp.415-426. William Sterling Parsons (1901-1953) was an ordnance expert who participated in the Manhattan project and was involved in post-war nuclear tests.

PAWNEE – See: NATIVE AMERICAN CONFLICTS:

PEACE, SEEKING OF: EARLY MODERN PERIOD (1481-1788)

Muehlbauer, Matthew S. “**Holy War and Just War in Early New England, 1630-1655.**” Vol.81, No.3 (July, 2017), pp.667-692. Questions the uneven application of these concepts by the New England colonies in relation to both wars and efforts to avoid war with both Native American tribes and the neighboring colony of New Netherlands.

PEACE, SEEKING OF: U.S.-MEXICAN WAR (1846-48)

Levinson, Irving W. **“A New Paradigm for an Old Conflict: The Mexico-United States War.”**

Vol.73, No.2 (April, 2009), pp.393-416. The victorious U.S. Army that found itself in possession of Mexico City had to provide assistance to the dominant political and socio-economic groups in order to obtain a peace treaty that would conclude the war.

PEACE, SEEKING OF: U.S. CIVIL WAR (1861-65)

Carney, James T. **“The Great Silence of Robert E. Lee.”** Vol.83, No.1 (January, 2019), pp.97-126.

Concludes that the primary reason Gen. Robert E. Lee (1807-1870) failed to advocate for an end to the war when, by November, 1864, it was clear that the Confederacy had lost, was his loyalty to his friend, President Jefferson Davis (1808-1889).

PEACE, SEEKING OF: LATE 19th CENTURY

Collins, Bruce, **“Defining Victory in Victorian Warfare, 1860-1882.”** Vol.77, No.3 (July, 2013),

pp.895-929. Catalogues the range of pressures on the commanders of expeditions in Africa to declare victory. See Also: Beckett, Ian F. **“How Wars End: Victorian Colonial Conflicts.”** Vol.82, No.1 (January, 2018), pp.29-44.

Beckett, Ian F. **“How Wars End: Victorian Colonial Conflicts.”** Vol.82, No.1 (January, 2018),

pp.29-44. The author challenges the conclusions of Bruce Collins’ in his article **“Defining Victory in Victorian Warfare, 1860-1882.”** *The Journal of Military History*, Vol.77, No.3 (July, 2013), pp.895-929.

PEACE, SEEKING: WORLD WAR I (1914-18)

McCall, Jack H., Jr. **“‘Amazingly Indiscreet’: The Plot to Capture Wilhelm II.”** Vol.73, No.2

(April, 2009), pp.449-469. Relates how former U.S. Senator, Col. Luke Lea (1879-1945), planned to kidnap the deposed Kaiser from his exile in the Netherlands and bring him to the Paris Peace Conference to be tried as a war criminal.

Greenhalgh, Elizabeth. **“General Ferdinand Foch and Unified Allied Command in 1918.”**

Vol.79, No.4 (October, 2015), pp.997-1023. Examines the actions and decisions of General Foch (1851-1929), including four during the German Spring Offensives, two during the Allied counteroffensive, and one during the armistice negotiations.

PEACE, SEEKING OF: WORLD WAR II (1939-45)

Krebs, Gerhard, **“Operation Super Sunrise? Japanese-United States Peace Feelers in**

Switzerland, 1945.” Vol.69, No.4 (October, 2005), pp.1081-1120. Explains why informal discussions between the Japanese Naval Commander from the embassy in Berlin, Fujimura Yoshikazu, and Allen W. Dulles (1893-1969) of the U.S. Office of Strategic Services failed

to develop into formal communications.

PEACE, SEEKING OF: KOREAN WAR (1950-53)

Casey, Steven, **“Wilfred Burchett and the United Nations Command’s Media Relations during the Korean War, 1951-1952.”** Vol.74, No.3 (July, 2010), pp.821-845. Assesses the Australian journalist, Wilfred Burchett’s (1911-1983), observations concerning the U.S. Army’s relations with the media during the Korean armistice negotiations.

PEACE, SEEKING OF: VIETNAM WAR (2nd Indochina War) (1955-75)

Carland, John M. **“Review Essay: Abandoning Vietnam.”** Vol.70, No.1 (January, 2006), pp.183-186. Examines James H. Willbanks 2004 book about the withdrawal of direct U.S. involvement in the war, beginning in 1968, to the victorious conclusion of the North Vietnamese invasion in 1975.

PEACEKEEPING – See: MILITARY OPERATIONS OTHER THAN WAR

PERSHING, JOHN J. (1860-1940)

Neumann, Brian, **“ ‘A Question of Authority’: Reassessing the March-Pershing ‘Feud’ in the First World War.”** Vol.73, No.4 (October, 2009), pp.1117-1142. Ascertains that the conflict between John J. Pershing (1860-1940) and Peyton C. March (1864-1955) was the result of a lack of a clearly defined command structure within the U.S. Army rather than a matter of opposing personalities.

Beckstrand, Alex, **“Woodrow Wilson and the Struggle of Civil-Military Relations during the Punitive Expedition of 1916-1917.”** Vol.86, No.2 (April, 2022), pp.372-398. Argues that President Woodrow Wilson’s (1913-1921) decision to defer to his military commanders, Major General Frederick Funston (1865-1917) and Brigadier General John J. Pershing (1860-1948), was the cause of the failure to achieve the goals of the Punitive Expedition.

PERSIA – See: IRAN

PERU

Ferreiro, Larrie D. **“Mahan and the ‘English Club’ of Lima, Peru: The Genesis of *The Influence of Sea Power upon History*.”** Vol.72, No.3 (July, 2008), pp.901-906.

Jamison, Thomas M. **“The War of the Pacific, Technology and U.S. Naval Development: An International History of a Regional War.”** Vol.82, No.4 (October, 2018), pp.1093-1122.

The observations by foreign nations of the war between Chile and a coalition of Bolivia and Peru, 1879-1884, influenced naval developments around the globe, including contributing to the U.S. building of the ‘New Navy’ in the 1890s.

PETER THE GREAT (1672-1725)

Davies, Brian, **“The Russian Baltic Fleet in the Seven Years’ War.”** Vol.86, No.3 (July, 2022), pp.557-572. Charts the rise and fall and rise again of the Russian Baltic Fleet, from the reign of Peter ‘the Great’ (r.1682-1725) to that of Catherine ‘the Great’ (r.1762-1796).

PHILIPPINES: PHILIPPINE-U.S. WAR (1899-1902)

Birtle, Andrew J. **“The U.S. Army’s Pacification of Marinduque, Philippine Islands, April 1900 – April 1901.”** Vol.61, No.2 (April, 1997), pp.255-282. Observes that the common image of the U.S. counterinsurgency campaign in the Philippines that emphasizes the political ‘Nation Building’ approach obscures the equally if not more important harsh military measures indispensable for pacification.

PHILIPPINES: INTERWAR PERIOD (1919-38)

Meixsel, Richard, **“A Uniform Story.”** Vol.69, No.3 (July, 2005), pp.791-799. Debunks the often-repeated story that Douglas MacArthur (1880-1964) designed a field marshal’s uniform for his role as Philippine military advisor in the 1930s.

Irish, Kerry, **“Dwight Eisenhower and Douglas MacArthur in the Philippines: There Must Be a Day of Reckoning [1935-39].”** Vol.74, No.2 (April, 2010), pp.439-473. Demonstrates that Eisenhower’s (1890-1969) dislike of MacArthur (1880-1964) was less about personalities and more about disagreements over the building of an army in an impoverished country and the proper qualities that a U.S. Army officer should exhibit and develop in his subordinates.

PHILIPPINES: WORLD WAR II (1939-45)

Meixsel, Richard B. **“Major General George Grunert, WPO-3, and the Philippine Army, 1940-1941.”** Vol.59, No.2 (April, 1995), pp.303-324. Challenges the conventional account of the initial abandonment of War Plan Orange – 3 by the Commanding General of the Philippine Department, General Grunert (1881-1971), and Philippine Army Field Marshal, Douglas MacArthur (1880-1964).

Schwab, Stephen I. **“The Role of the Mexican Expeditionary Air Force in World War II: Late, Limited, but Symbolically Significant.”** Vol.66, No.4 (October, 2002), pp.1115-1140. Recounts the raising and service of the 201st Mexican P-47 Squadron in the Philippines beginning in May, 1945.

Mann, B. David, **“Japanese Defense of Bataan, Luzon, Philippine Islands, 16 December 1944 – 4 September, 1945.”** Vol.67, No.4 (October, 2003), pp.1149-1176.

POLAND: EARLY MODERN PERIOD (1480-1789)

Lender, Mark Edward, **“Review Essay: The Ever Controversial General Charles Lee.”** Vol.78, No.4 (October, 2014), pp.1395-1405. Charles Lee (1732-1782), a veteran of service in the British, Portuguese, and Polish armies, served as a high-ranking commander in George Washington’s Continental Army until his court martial over behavior associated with the Battle of Monmouth, June 28, 1778.

Parker, Geoffrey, **“Review Essay: A Soldier of Fortune in Seventeenth Century Eastern Europe.”** Vol.76, No.2 (April, 2012), pp.545-548. Examines Diary of General Patrick Gordon of Auchleuchries 1635-1699, the account of a Scottish Catholic who, like many Early-Modern Scots, served in the armies of Sweden, Poland, and Russia. See also: Parker, Geoffrey, “Review Essay: Patrick Gordon Rides Again.” Vol.79, No.4 (October, 2015), pp.1127-1129.

Parker, Geoffrey, **“Review Essay: Patrick Gordon Rides Again.”** Vol.79, No.4 (October, 2015), pp.1127-1129. Examines The remaining volumes of the diary of General Patrick Gordon of Auchleuchries 1635-1699, the account of a Scottish Catholic who, like many Early-Modern Scots, served in the armies of Sweden, Poland, and Russia. See also: Parker, Geoffrey, “Review Essay: A Soldier of Fortune in Seventeenth Century Eastern Europe.” Vol.76, No.2 (April, 2012), pp.545-548.

Sproule, Joseph, **“Raiding, Pillaging, and Violent Social Change in Late Sixteenth-Century Livonia.”** Vol.85, No.2 (April, 2021), pp.317-341. Establishes how the pervasiveness of raiding dictated tactical and strategic considerations, influenced military policy, shaped civil-military relations, and played a role in breaking down longstanding social mores, transforming societies, normalizing violence.

POLAND: INTERWAR PERIOD (1919-39)

Ponichtera, Robert M. **“The Military Thought of Wladyslaw Sikorski.”** Vol.59, No.2 (April, 1995), pp.279-301. Offers a description of Sikorski’ (1881-1943) pursuit of political goals through the promotion of Polish military strength throughout his career, from within the

Austro-Hungarian Empire to the leadership of the Polish state in exile.

Czarnecki, Jacek, **“The Rebirth and Progress of the Polish Military during the Interwar Years.”** Vol.83, No.3 (July, 2019), pp.747-768. Challenges the notion that the Polish Army’s cavalry reflected a failure of modernization, enshrined in the myth of Polish lancers charging Panzers in 1939.

POLAND: RUSSO-POLISH WAR (1919-21)

Borzęcki, **“Battle of Warsaw, 1920: Was Radio Intelligence the Key to Polish Victory over the Red Army?”** Vol.81, No.2 (April, 2017), pp.447-468. A look at what recent Polish literature has to say about the role of radio-intelligence in the Russo-Polish War, 1919-1920.

POLAND: WORLD WAR II (1939-45)

Ponichtera, Robert M. **“The Military Thought of Wladyslaw Sikorski.”** Vol.59, No.2 (April, 1995), pp.279-301. Offers a description of Sikorski’ (1881-1943) pursuit of political goals through the promotion of Polish military strength throughout his career, from within the Austro-Hungarian Empire to the leadership of the Polish state in exile.

Schwonek, Matthew R. **“Kazimierz Sosnkowski as Commander in Chief: The Government-in-Exile and Polish Strategy, 1932-1944.”** Vol.70, No.3 (July, 2006), pp.743-780.

Peszke, Michael Alfred, **“Historiographical Essay: An Introduction to English-Language Literature on the Polish Armed Forces in World War II.”** Vol.70, No.4 (October, 2006), pp.1029-1064.

Jones, Mark C. **“Experiment at Dundee: The Royal Navy’s 9th Submarine Flotilla and Multinational Naval Cooperation during World War II.”** Vol.72, No.4 (October, 2008), pp.1179-1212. The 9th Flotilla included British, Dutch, Free French, Norwegian, and Polish submariners.

Jones, Mark C. **“Not Just along for the Ride: The Role of Royal Navy Liaison Personnel in Multinational Naval Operations during World War II.”** Vol.76, No.1 (January, 2012), pp.127-158. The liaison system as a means of cooperation with European navies in exile from France, Greece, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, and Yugoslavia.

Jones, Mark C. **“Friend and Advisor to the Allied Navies: The Royal Navy’s Principal Liaison Officer and Multinational Naval Operations in World War II.”** Vol.77, No.3 (July, 2013), pp.991-1023. The work of Principal Liaison Officer, Allied Navies (P.N.L.O.) with the Belgian, Dutch, French, Greek, Norwegian, Polish, and Yugoslav navies in exile.

Hammond, Richard, **“Fighting under a Different Flag: Multinational Naval Cooperation and Submarine Warfare in the Mediterranean, 1940-1944.”** Vol.80, No.2 (April, 2016), pp.447-476. In contrast to their experience in the British home theatre, the submarines in the Mediterranean operated by the exiled governments of the Free French, Greece, the Netherlands, Poland, and Yugoslavia, along with those of Italy beginning in 1943, found it difficult to cooperate with the Royal Navy, as well as each other.

POLAND: COLD WAR (1945-91)

Marchio, James D. **“Risking General War in Pursuit of Limited Objectives: U.S. Military Contingency Planning for Poland in the Wake of the 1956 Hungarian Uprising.”** Vol.66, No.3 (July, 2002), pp.783-812. Reveals that the various problems in exploring options for coming to the defense of Poland in the wake of the suppression of the Hungarian uprising led the Eisenhower administration to develop more response options to compliment the doctrine of massive nuclear retaliation.

POLITICS, INTEREST AND INVOLVEMENT IN

See Also: CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS

Peifer, Douglas C. **“The Past in the Present: Passion, Politics, and the Historical Profession in the German and British Pardon Campaigns.”** Vol.71, No.4 (October, 2007), pp.1107-1132. Long a peripheral matter, by the 1990s military justice during the World Wars had vaulted from the field of grassroots activism to the legislative, executive, and judicial arenas of government in Germany and Great Britain, resulting in official pardons for soldiers who had been court martialed in these conflicts.

POLITICS, INTEREST AND INVOLVEMENT IN: U.S.A.

Herrera, Ricardo A. **“Self-Governance and the American Citizen as Soldier, 1775-1861.”** Vol.65, No.1 (January, 2001), pp.21-52. Attempts to understand the conception of the relationship between military service and the Republic held by enlisted men, including regulars, militiamen, and volunteers, from the Revolution to the first year of the Civil War.

Rodgers, Thomas E. **“Billy Yank and G.I. Joe: An Exploratory Essay on the Sociopolitical Dimensions of Soldier Motivation.”** Vol.69, No.1 (January, 2005), pp.93-121. Presents the assertion that the pre-war socialization of Civil War Volunteers that enabled them to perform effectively in combat was missing among the citizen-soldiers of World War II.

POLITICS: INTEREST AND INVOLVEMENT IN:

FRENCH REVOLUTIONARY AND NAPOLEONIC WARS (1792-1815)

Tozzi, Christopher, **“Soldiers without a Country: Foreign Veterans in the Transition from Empire to Restoration.”** Vol.80, No.1 (January, 2016), pp.93-120. The article identifies and explores three trends: the exclusion of foreign veterans from the program of social healing that the Restoration Bourbons undertook, the limits of the modern French state’s care for veterans, and the ambiguity of national identity after the revolutionary era.

Heuer, Jennifer, **“Soldiers as Victims or Villains? Demobilization, Masculinity, and Family in French Royalist Pamphlets, 1814-1815.”** Vol.80, No.1 (January, 2016), pp.121-144.

POLITICS, INTEREST AND INVOLVEMENT IN: U.S. CIVIL WAR (1961-65)

Grimsley, Mark, **“Review Essay: In Not so Dubious Battle: The Motivations of American Civil War Soldiers.”** Vol.62, No.1 (January, 1998), pp.175-188.

Frank, Joseph Allan and Duteau, Barbara, **“Measuring the Political Articulatness of United States Civil War Soldiers: The Wisconsin Militia.”** Vol.64, No.1 (January, 2000), pp.53-77.

Noe, Kenneth W, **“ ‘Damned North Carolinians’ and ‘Brave Virginians’: The Lane-Mahone Controversy, Honor, and Civil War Memory.”** Vol.72, No.4 (October, 2008), pp.1089-1115. Charts the feud between the North Carolina commander, James Henry, and William Mahone over the question of who deserved credit for capturing three enemy flags at the Battle of Spotsylvania, 1864, a feud that was influenced by a culture of honor and post-war politics.

Johnson, Mark W. **“Emory Upton’s Twenty-Six: Desertion and Divided Loyalty of the U.S. Army Soldiers, 1860-1861.”** Vol.81, No.3 (July, 2017), pp.747-774. Contrary to common assumptions, the enlisted men of the regular peace-time Army were as conflicted in their loyalties as their officers, resulting in over 500 deserting during the secession crisis to serve in what became the Army of the Confederate States of America.

POLITICS, INTEREST AND INVOLVEMENT IN: 2nd ANGLO-BOER WAR (1899-1902)

Miller, Stephen M. **“The British Way of War: Cultural Assumption and Practices in the South African War, 1899-1902.”** Vol.77, No.4 (October, 2013), pp.1329-1347. Cosmopolitanism, political egalitarianism, and attitudes towards race influenced the British conduct of the war.

POLITICS, INTEREST AND INVOLVEMENT IN: INTERWAR PERIOD (1919-39)

Hancock, Eleanor, **“Ernst Rohm and the Experience of World War I.”** Vol.60, No.1 (January, 1996), pp.39-60. Inspects the role of the Great War service in the political rhetoric of the Chief of Staff of the National Socialist Sturmabteilung, including Rohm’s version of his war

experiences as recounted in his 1928 autobiography.

Ortiz, Stephen R. **“The ‘New Deal’ for Veterans: The Economy Act [1934], the Veterans of Foreign Wars, and the Origins of New Deal Dissent.”** Vol.70, No.2 (April, 2006), pp.415-438.

POLITICS, INTEREST AND INVOLVEMENT IN: SPANISH CIVIL WAR (1936-39)

Cerdá, Néstor, **“Political Ascent and Military Commander: General Franco in the Early Months of the Spanish Civil War, July-October 1936.”** Vol.75, No.4 (October, 2011), pp.1125-1157. Displays how General Francisco Franco (1892-1975) exploited the opportunities presented by the setbacks to the coup plotters in July through August, 1936, to rise from being merely another general supporting the uprising to the position of commander-in-chief of the Nationalist Army and head of the government.

POLITICS, INTEREST AND INVOLVEMENT IN: WORLD WAR II (1939-45)

Fritz, Stephen G. **“ ‘We are Trying...to Change the Face of the World’ – Ideology and Motivation in the Wehrmacht on the Eastern Front: The View from Below.”** Vol.60, No.4 (October, 1996), pp.683-710. Appraises the influence of ‘positive’ National Socialist ideological beliefs on the average *Landser*’s motives to engage in combat.

Yelton, David K. **“*Ein Volk Steht Auf*: The German *Volkssturm* and Nazi Strategy, 1944-45.”** Vol.64, No.4 (October, 2000), pp.1061-1083. Explains that the *Volkssturm*, though based on flawed assumptions, was part of a coherent strategy that was intended to simultaneously fanaticize the civilian population and maximize Allied casualties beyond what their governments were willing to bare.

Peifer, Douglas, **“Commemoration of Mutiny, Rebellion, and Resistance in Postwar Germany: Public memory, History, and the Formation of ‘Memory Beacons’.”** Vol.65, No.4 (October, 2001), pp.1013-1052. Analyzes three ‘memory beacons’ that have been cultivated in German public and social memory: the naval mutinies of 1917-18, the 20th July, 1944, plot, and *Wehrmacht* deserters during World War II.

Yelton, David K. **“Older German Officers and National Socialist Activism: Evidence from the German *Volksturm*.”** Vol.83, No.2 (April, 2019), pp.455-485. Addresses the question of to what degree older, lower-level German officers serving in the *Volksturm* embraced National Socialist ideology.

POLITICS, INTEREST AND INVOLVEMENT IN: COLD WAR (1945-91)

Nelson, Anna Kasten, **“Anna M. Rosenberg, an ‘Honorary Man’.”** Vol.68, No.1 (January, 2004), pp.133-161. Considers how and why Defense Secretary George C. Marshall (1880-1959) bucked

political and gender assumptions when he appointed a pro-New Deal, Jewish immigrant woman, Anna M. Rosenberg (1899-1983), as the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower.

Stapleton, Tim, “**‘Bad Boys’: Infiltration and Sedition in the African Military Units of the Central African Federation (Malawi, Zambia and Zimbabwe) 1953-63.**” Vol.73, No.4 (October, 2009), pp.1167-1193. Illustrates that nationalists exploited the rising unpopularity of colonialism, discontent with participation in the war in Malaya, the Mau Mau uprising in Kenya, and the Congo Crisis, which led white officers doubt the dependability of their African troops.

POLITICS, INTEREST AND INVOLVEMENT IN: KOREAN WAR (1950-53)

MacKenzie, S.P. “**Progressives and Reactionaries among British Prisoners of War at Pyoktong and Chongson, North Korea, 1951-1953.**” Vol.77, No.1 (January, 2013), pp.203-228. From the Chinese perspective, why were the British P.O.W.s at Chongson (Camp 1) more troublesome than those at Pyoktong (Camp 5).

Lerner, Mitchell, “**‘Is It for This We Fought and Bled?’: The Korean War and the Struggle for Civil Rights.**” Vol.82, No.2 (April, 2018), pp.515-545. Explains the role of the Korean War in the African American struggle for Civil Rights.

POLYNESIA

Regnault, Jean-Marc, “**France’s Search for Nuclear Test Sites, 1957-1963.**” Vol.67, No.4 (October, 2003), pp.1223-1248. Reckons with the consequences for French Polynesia and New Caledonia of the mother country’s search for an alternative to the Sahara Desert in Algeria as a nuclear test site.

PORTUGAL: PRE-MODERN PERIOD (to 1789)

Monteiro, Armando da Silva Saturnino, “**The Decline and Fall of Portuguese Seapower, 1588-1663.**” Vol.65, No.1 (January, 2001), pp.9-20.

White, Lorraine, “**Strategic Geography and the Spanish Habsburg Monarchy’s Failure to Recover Portugal, 1640-1668.**” Vol.71, No.2 (April, 2007), pp.373-409. Contrasting Alba’s (1507-1582) successful campaign in 1580 with the course of this mid-17th century conflict, the article considers the impact of geographic and climactic factors on the strategy, tactics, and logistics of the Spanish forces.

Guilmartin, John F., Jr. “**The Earliest Shipboard Gunpowder Ordnance: An Analysis of its**

Technical Parameters and Tactical Capabilities.” Vol.71, No.3 (July, 2007), pp.649-669. Various obstacles presented difficulties to the effective use of early cannons onboard ships, but shortly after 1400 these were swiftly overcome, so that ordnance became an increasingly important weapon on Mediterranean war galleys and Portuguese caravels.

Lender, Mark Edward, “**Review Essay: The Ever Controversial General Charles Lee.**” Vol.78, No.4 (October, 2014), pp.1395-1405. Charles Lee (1732-1782), a veteran of service in the British, Portuguese, and Polish armies, served as a high-ranking commander in George Washington’s Continental Army until his court martial over behavior associated with the Battle of Monmouth, June 28, 1778.

Murteira, André, “**Historiographical Essay: The Military Revolution and European Wars Outside of Europe: The Dutch-Portuguese War in Asia in the First Quarter of the Seventeenth Century.**” Vol.84, No.2 (April, 2020), pp.511-535. Challenges the notion of Early Modern Western Military exceptionalism that, in Portuguese historiography, has blamed their defeat on Portuguese naval forces that were inferior to their Dutch opponents supposedly because of Asian military influence that was absent among the Dutch.

PORTUGAL: FRENCH REVOLUTIONARY AND NAPOLEONIC WARS (1792-1815)

Esdaile, Charles J. “**Review Essay: Recent Works of Note on the Peninsular War (1808-1815).**” Vol.74, No.4 (October, 2010), pp.1243-1252.

PORTUGAL: WORLD WAR I (1914-18)

De Meneses, Filipe Rineiro, “**‘Not only Useless, but Dangerous?’ The Portuguese Expeditionary Corps in France in the Aftermath of the Battle of La Lys, 9 April 1918.**” Vol.82, No.4 (October, 2018), pp.1149-1174. Conflict between the wishes of the new President of Portugal, Sidónio Pais (1872-1918), the British High Command, and the soldiers and officers of the Portuguese Expeditionary Corps over the question of whether it should return to frontline duty.

PORTUGAL: COLD WAR (1945-91)

Dhada, Mustafah, “**The Liberation War in Guinea-Bissau Reconsidered.**” Vol.62, No.3 (July, 1998), pp.571-593. Disputes the image of a straightforward march to victory for the *Partido Africano de Independência de Guiné e Cabo Verde* (P.A.I.G.C.), demonstrating that, instead, it was a struggle involving moves and countermoves by Portuguese forces and the P.A.I.G.C., each designed to maintain or regain specific initiatives, each designed to check or checkmate the opponent.

POST TRAUMATIC STRESS DISORDER (P.T.S.D.) – See: PSYCHOLOGICAL ISSUES

PRISONERS OF WAR: 1st ANGLO-DUTCH WAR (1652-54)

Rommelse, Gijs and Downing, Roger, “**Victims of an Ideological Rift? Dutch Prisoners of War during the First Anglo-Dutch War (1652-1654).**” Vol.80, No.3 (July, 2016), pp.649-669. Rather than ideology, the author shows that it was a combination of logistical problems and a lack of funds that produced the dire conditions experienced by Dutch P.O.W.s.

PRISONERS OF WAR: U.S. REVOLUTIONARY WAR (1775-83)

Krebs, Daniel, “**Useful Enemies: The Treatment of German Prisoners of War during the American War of Independence.**” Vol.77, No.1 (January, 2013), pp.9-39. Narrates how, to boost morale, revolutionaries staged elaborate rituals with P.O.W.s, that local citizens hired captive soldiers as laborers, and that, after the victory at Yorktown, 1781, Congress and the Continental Army allowed P.O.W.s to go free after a cash payments and even sold some into indentured servitude.

Jones, T. Cole, “**‘The Rage of Tory-Hunting’: Loyalist Prisoners, Civil War, and the Violence of American Independence.**” Vol.81, No.3 (July, 2017), pp.719-746.

PRISONERS OF WAR: U.S. CIVIL WAR (1861-65)

Davis, Robert S. “**Escape from Andersonville: A Study in Isolation and Imprisonment.**” Vol.67, No.4 (October, 2003), pp.1065-1081. Seeks to understand why only some two dozen Union prisoners escaped from Andersonville within the larger context of the P.O.W. experience in later conflicts.

PRISONERS OF WAR: BALKANS WARS (1912-13)

Delis, Panagiotis, “**The Treatment of Prisoners of War Captured by the Greek Army during the Balkans Wars of 1912-13.**” Vol.82, No.4 (October, 2018), pp.1123-1147. Due to a combination of the inability of the Greeks to pay for the care of Bulgarian and Ottoman P.O.W.s and negative stereotypes held about the same, the laws concerning the treatment of prisoners established by international conventions in 1899 and 1907 were not honored by the Greek Army.

PRISONERS OF WAR: WORLD WAR I (1914-18)

Travers, Tim, “**Liman von Sanders, the Capture of Lieutenant Palmer, and Ottoman Anticipation of the Allied Landings at Gallipoli on 25 April 1915.**” Vol.65, No.4 (October, 2001), pp.965-979.

Shines a light on the expectations of the Turks for a possible landing on the Gallipoli Peninsula and, in particular, the neglected issue of the impact of information from a captured British intelligence officer shortly before the actual landing.

Travers, Tim and Celik, Birten, “**‘Not One of Them Ever came Back’: What Happened to the 1/5 Norfolk Battalion on 12 August 1915 at Gallipoli?**” Vol.66, No.2 (April, 2002), pp.389-406.

Cook, Tim, “**The Politics of Surrender: Canadian Soldiers and the Killing of Prisoners in the Great War.**” Vol.70, No.3 (July, 2006), pp.637-665.

PRISONERS OF WAR: WORLD WAR II (1939-45)

Vance, Jonathan F. “**Men in Manacles: The Shackling of Prisoners of War, 1942-1943.**” Vol.59, No.3 (July, 1995), pp.483-504. Appraises the wartime relationship of the Dominion nations with Great Britain as reflected in the success of Canadian Prime Minister Mackenzie King’s (1874-1950) government in convincing Churchill (1874-1965) to abandon the retaliatory shackling of German P.O.W.s.

Nenninger, Timothy K. “**United States Prisoners of War and the Red Army, 1944-45: Myths and Realities.**” Vol.66, No.3 (July, 2002), pp.761-781. When the Soviets overran German P.O.W. camps, they came into the possession of some 28,000 U.S. soldiers, the repatriation of which proved complicated.

Dingman, Roger V. “**Language at War: U.S. Marine Corps Japanese Language Officers in the Pacific.**” Vol.68, No.3 (July, 2004), pp.853-883. Analyzes the origins, training, experiences, and recollections of Caucasian Japanese language officers, including the shift from translating to facilitate life-taking to lifesaving.

Reiss, Matthias, “**Bronzed Bodies behind Barbed Wire: Masculinity and the Treatment of German Prisoners of War in the United States in World War II.**” Vol.69, No.2 (April, 2005), pp.475-504. In contrast to other Allied nations, the War Department chose not to parole German P.O.W.s being held in the United States into the custody of employers because of concerns over the potential for women being attracted to these prisoners.

Moore, Bob, “**Unwanted Guests in Troubled Times: German Prisoners of War in the Union of South Africa, 1942-1943.**” Vol.70, No.1 (January, 2006), pp.63-90. Contrasts the potential threats to domestic security in South Africa during a time of internal dissention of holding German P.O.W.s with the less troublesome experience with Italian prisoners.

Hadley, Gregory and Oglethorpe, James, “**Mackay’s ‘Betrayal’: Solving the Mystery of the ‘Sado Island Prisoner-of-War Massacre’.**” Vol.71, No.2 (April, 2007), pp.441-464.

Conclusively demonstrates that the suppression of a supposed Japanese massacre of Allied prisoners working in a gold mine in Aikawa on Sado island in 1945 as presented in James MacKay's 1996 book, *Betrayal in High Places*, is an intentional forgery.

Borch, Fred L. “**‘In the Name of the Queen’: Military Trials of Japanese War Criminals in the Netherlands East Indies (1946-1949).**” Vol.79, No.1 (January, 2015), pp.93-125.

Wylie, Neville, “**Allied Special Forces and Prisoner of War Recovery Operations in Europe, 1944-1945.**” Vol.81, No.2 (April, 2017), pp.469-489. Contrary to contemporary and historical judgements, Allied plans to secure the safety of P.O.W.s in German hands were reasonable, realistic, and provided a template for similar operations in the Pacific Theater and beyond.

Scianna, Bastian Matteo, “**Rommel Almighty? Italian Assessment of the ‘Desert Fox’ during and after the Second World War.**” Vol.82, No.1 (January, 2018), pp.125-145. The Italian view based on new primary material, including the eavesdropping by British intelligence on Italian officers held as P.O.W.s in both Egypt and Britain.

PRISONERS OF WAR: KOREAN WAR (1950-53)

MacKenzie, S.P. “**Progressives and Reactionaries among British Prisoners of War at Pyoktong and Chongson, North Korea, 1951-1953.**” Vol.77, No.1 (January, 2013), pp.203-228. From the Chinese perspective, why were the British P.O.W.s at Chongson (Camp 1) more troublesome than those at Pyoktong (Camp 5).

PRIVATEERS – See: NAVAL WARFARE

PROMOTION AND MILITARY RANK: 19th CENTURY

Rodriguez, Manuel Santirso, “**Under the Uniform: Tyrants and Praetorians in the Aftermath of the Revolution (1829-1854).**” Vol.83, No.2 (April, 2019), pp.379-407. Weighs the parallels and differences in the lives and careers of Nicholas Jean-de-Dieu Soult of France (1769-1851), Arthur Wellesley, the Duke of Wellington of Great Britain (1769-1852), Baldomero Espartero of Spain (1793-1879), and Andrew Jackson of the United States (1767-1845).

PROMOTION AND MILITARY RANK: CANADA - WORLD WAR II (1939-45)

D'Amours, Caroline, “**Canadian Military Culture and Tactical Training, 1940-1944: The Making of Infantry Junior N.C.O.s.**” Vol.82, No.4 (October, 2018), pp.1175-1198.

PROMOTION AND MILITARY RANK: CHINA - EARLY 20th CENTURY

Worthing, Peter, **“The Road through Whampoa: The Early Career of He Yingqin.”** Vol.69, No.4 (October, 2005), pp.953-985. Determines that He Yingqin (1890-1987) owed his repeated promotions to his good working relationship with Jiang Jieshi (Chiang Kai-shek, 1887-1975), a relationship that was based on shared experiences and values.

Sacca, John Wanda, **“Like Strangers in a Foreign Land: Chinese Officers Prepared at American Military Colleges, 1904-37.”** Vol.70, No.3 (July, 2006), pp.703-742. Relates how those Chinese officers who received military education in the United States during the turbulent period marked by the end of the Qing Dynasty and the establishment of the Republic were tainted by their foreign education and hampered by their lack of membership in any alumni associations.

PROMOTION AND MILITARY RANK - EGYPT: 19th CENTURY

Dunn, John P. **“Americans in the Nineteenth Century Egyptian Army: A Selected Bibliography.”** Vol.70, No.1 (January, 2006), pp.123-136. Ismail (r.1863-1879), grandson of Muhammad Ali Pasha, employed officers from the United States, including both veterans from both sides in the Civil War and serving officers in the postwar United States Army.

PROMOTION AND MILITARY RANK: ENGLAND / GREAT BRITAIN

Bittner, Donald F. **“Shattering Images: Officers of the Royal Marines, 1867-1913.”** Vol.59, No.1 (January, 1995), pp.27-52. Demonstrates that Great Britain’s Royal Marines provided members of the middle class with the opportunity to earn a commission.

PROMOTION AND MILITARY RANK:

ENGLAND / GREAT BRITAIN - WORLD WAR II (1939-45)

Carland, John M. **“High Maintenance Generals.”** Vol.71, No.4 (October, 2007), pp.1201-1202. A passage from Anthony Dymoke Powell’s 1968 novel, *The Military Philosophers*, concerning dealing with demanding superiors.

PROMOTION AND MILITARY RANK: FRANCE - 19th CENTURY

Calvet, Stéphane, **“The Painful Demobilization of the Napoleonic Grande Armée’s Officers.”** Vol.80, No.1 (January, 2016), pp.77-92. By examining the Western French Department of Charente, the author illustrates the diverse loyalties, motivations, and subsequent careers of the officers of Napoleon’s Grande Armée.

PROMOTION AND MILITARY RANK: ITALY - WORLD WAR I (1914-18)

Ungari, Andrea, **“The Official Inquiry into the Italian Defeat at the Battle of Caporetto (October 1917).”** Vol.76, No.3 (July, 2012), pp.695-726. Addresses the question of why the general officer most responsible for the catastrophe not only managed to evade being charged for his failures but instead ended up as the Chief of Staff of the Italian Army.

**PROMOTION AND MILITARY RANK: RUSSIA / SOVIET UNION -
INTERWAR PERIOD (1919-39)**

Reese, Roger R. **“Red Army Professionalism and the Communist Party, 1918-1941.”** Vol.66, No.1 (January, 2002), pp.71-102. Explores the social and institutional dynamics that shaped the Red Army’s officer corps and determined the extent of its ability to face the Nazi invasion.

PROMOTION AND MILITARY RANK: SPAIN - CIVIL WAR (1936-39)

Cerdá, Néstor, **“Political Ascent and Military Commander: General Franco in the Early Months of the Spanish Civil War, July-October 1936.”** Vol.75, No.4 (October, 2011), pp.1125-1157. Displays how General Francisco Franco (1892-1975) exploited the opportunities presented by the setbacks to the coup plotters in July through August, 1936, to rise from being merely another general supporting the uprising to the position of commander-in-chief of the Nationalist Army and head of the government.

PROMOTION AND MILITARY RANK: TURKEY / OTTOMAN EMPIRE

Karsten, Peter, **“The ‘Naval Aristocracy’ and the ‘Young Turks’ of the *Fin de Siècle*: A Dotting of the ‘I’s and Crossing of the ‘T’s.’”** Vol.66, No.4 (October, 2002), pp.1177-1180. Undertakes to determine whether the social backgrounds of the ‘Young Turk’ generation of officers of the late-nineteenth century ‘New Navy’ played a role in their careers.

PROMOTION AND MILITARY RANK: U.S.A. - REVOLUTIONARY WAR (1775-83)

Lapp, Derrick E. **“Did They Really ‘Take None but Gentlemen’? Henry Hardman, the Maryland Line, and a Reconsideration of the Socioeconomic Composition of the Continental Officer Corps.”** Vol.78, No.4 (October, 2014), pp.1239-1261.

**PROMOTION AND MILITARY RANK: U.S.A. -
EARLY REPUBLIC TO CIVIL WAR (1787-1861)**

Weddle, Kevin J. **“‘The Magic Touch of Reform’: Samuel Francis Du Pont and the Efficiency Board of 1855.”** Vol.68, No.2 (April, 2004), pp.471-504. Using previously neglected sources, this article considers how political and military leaders, notably Commander Du Pont (1803-1865),

broke the logjam produced by a system of promotion based exclusively on seniority.

Hunter, Mark C. **“The U.S. Naval Academy and Its Summer Cruises: Professionalization in the Antebellum U.S. Navy, 1845-1861.”** Vol.70, No.4 (October, 2006), pp.963-994.

Crawford, Michael J. **“U.S. Navy Petty Officers in the Era of the War of 1812.”** Vol.76, No.4 (October, 2012), pp.1035-1051. Scrutinizes the Navy’s process of recruiting and training petty officers between the years 1797 and 1812.

Smith, Mark A. **“The Politics of Military Professionalism: The Engineer Company and the Political Activities of the Antebellum U.S. Army Corps of Engineers.”** Vol.80, No.2 (April, 2016), pp.355-387. Addresses the tensions presented by both internal politicking in the Corps and the lobbying of officers in promoting the nation’s defensive needs.

PROMOTION AND MILITARY RANK: U.S.A. - WAR OF 1812 (1812-15)

Leiner, Frederick C. **“The Squadron Commander’s Share: Decatur and the Prize Money for the Chesapeake’s First War of 1812 Cruise.”** Vol.73, No.1 (January, 2009), pp.69-82. An examination of the prize case of Decatur vs. Chew that displays the tensions between ranking officers over their contrasting views of their appropriate shares.

Leiner, Frederick C. **“‘The Sport of Arbitrary Men’: The Privateer *Nonsuch* and a Search at Sea in the War of 1812.”** Vol.76, No.4 (October, 2012), pp.1147-1164. An incident involving the Baltimore Privateer *Nonsuch*’s seizure of the schooner *Ann Maria*, which resulted in court cases that led all the way to the U.S. Supreme Court.

Leiner, Frederick C. **“Privateers in the War of 1812.”** Vol.77, No.4 (October, 2013), Pp.1225-1250. Seeks to answer the question, ‘Was privateering profitable?’

PROMOTION AND MILITARY RANK: U.S.A. - LATE 19th CENTURY

McGovern, Rory M. **“The School of Experience: George W. Goethals and the U.S. Army, 1867-1907.”** Vol.81, No.2 (April, 2017), pp.395-424. Observes George W. Goethals (1858-1928) pre-Panama Canal / World War I career as an example of the career path of officers within the Gilded Age Army.

PROMOTION AND MILITARY RANK: U.S.A. - INTERWAR PERIOD (1919-39)

Meixsel, Richard, **“A Uniform Story.”** Vol.69, No.3 (July, 2005), pp.791-799. Debunks the often-repeated story that Douglas MacArthur (1880-1964) designed a field marshal’s uniform for his role as Philippine military advisor in the 1930s.

PROMOTION AND MILITARY RANK: U.S.A. - COLD WAR (1945-91)

Donnelly, William M. **“From Sergeant Snorkels to Drill Sergeants: Basic Training of Male Soldiers in the U.S. Army, 1953-1964.”** Vol.86, No.2 (April, 2022), pp.399-426. Assesses the much-criticized quality of officers and non-commissioned officers assigned to shepherd recruits through basic training, an issue that wasn’t addressed until the Secretaries of the Army Cyrus R. Vance Sr. (1917-2002) and Stephen Ailes (1912-2001).

PROMOTION AND MILITARY RANK:

U.S.A. - VIETNAM WAR (2nd Indochina War) (1955-75)

Birtle, Andrew James, **“Advisory Service in Vietnam: Detrimental to an Officer’s Career?”** Vol.74, No.3 (July, 2010), pp.871-877. By examining the extent to which former Vietnam advisers achieved general officer rank in the U.S. Army, the article seeks to test the common belief among officers that the Army did not assign its best men for service as advisors and that promotion boards discriminated against these advisors.

PROPAGANDA – See: MEDIA

PRUSSIA, KINGDOM OF – See: GERMANY

PSYCHOLOGICAL ISSUES: ANCIENT PERIOD (to 476)

Pearson, Elizabeth, **“Decimation and Unit Cohesion: Why were Roman Legionaries willing to Perform Decimation?”** Vol.83, No.3 (July, 2019), pp.665-688. Analyzes the practice in light of ‘primary group’ theory, arguing that it reintegrated offending units through collective acceptance of both guilt and the necessity for punishment.

PSYCHOLOGICAL ISSUES: MEDIEVAL PERIOD (476-1480)

Kolberg, Are Skarstein, **“Did Vikings Really go Berserk? An Interdisciplinary Critical Analysis of Berserks.”** Vol.82, No.3 (July, 2018), pp.899-908.

PSYCHOLOGICAL ISSUES:

FRENCH REVOLUTIONARY AND NAPOLEONIC WARS (1792-1815)

Dodman, Thomas, **“1814 and the Melancholy of War.”** Vol.80, No.1 (January, 2016), pp.31-55. Through contemporary accounts, this article explores the emotional reaction of state officials,

soldiers, military doctors, etc. to the collapse of Napoleon's Empire.

PSYCHOLOGICAL ISSUES: WAR OF 1812 (1812-15)

Stagg, J.C.A. **"United States Army Officers in the War of 1812: A Statistical and Behavioral Portrait."** Vol.76, No.4 (October, 2012), pp.1001-1034. An examination of 334 general court martials demonstrates that officers were judged more harshly for their moral and character defects than for their shortcomings in performing routine duties.

Stagg, J.C.A. **"Freedom and Subordination: Disciplinary Problems in the U.S. Army of 1812."** Vol.78, No.2 (April, 2014), pp.537-574. Based on general court martial case files and the question of proper forms of punishment.

PSYCHOLOGICAL ISSUES: 19th CENTURY TO 1914

Showalter, Dennis, **"From Deterrence to Doomsday Machine: The German Way of War, 1890-1914."** Vol.64, No.3 (July, 2000), pp.679-710. Proposes that between 1890 and 1914 the German Army developed a siege mentality, the only solution for which was believed to be the refinement of operational capabilities, pursued at the expense of policy and strategy.

Paret, Peter, **"The Impact of Clausewitz's Early Life on His Theories and Politics."** Vol.84, No.1 (January, 2020), pp.35-50. Proposes that the angry quarrels with his father led Clausewitz (1780-1831) to develop a combative relationship with authority throughout his life that impacted the development of his theories.

PSYCHOLOGICAL ISSUES: U.S. CIVIL WAR (1861-65)

Davis, Robert S. **"Escape from Andersonville: A Study in Isolation and Imprisonment."** Vol.67, No.4 (October, 2003), pp.1065-1081. Seeks to understand why only some two dozen Union prisoners escaped from Andersonville within the larger context of the P.O.W. experience in later conflicts.

Bell, Andrew McIlwaine, **"'Gallinippers & Glory': The Links between Mosquito-borne Diseases and U.S. Civil War Operations and Strategy, 1862."** Vol.74, No.2 (April, 2010), pp.379-405. Covers the physiological and psychological effects of malaria and yellow fever and their impact on military operations and strategy in 1862.

Hackemer, Kurt, **"Wartime Trauma and the Lure of the Frontier: Civil War Veterans in Dakota Territory."** Vol.81, No.1 (January, 2017), pp.75-103. Surveys a sample of 6,000 veterans based on the 1885 Dakota Territory census.

PSYCHOLOGICAL ISSUES: WORLD WAR I (1914-18)

Nordlund, Alexander, “**‘Done My Bit’: British Soldiers, the 1918 Armistice, and Understanding the First World War.**” Vol.81, No.2 (April, 2017), pp.425-446. Contrasts British soldiers’ reactions to the Armistice and their war experience with their later reflections.

PSYCHOLOGICAL ISSUES: INTERWAR PERIOD (1919-39)

Winton, Harold R. “**Toward an American Philosophy of Command.**” Vol.64, No.4 (October, 2000), pp.1035-1060. Considers the particular blend of intellectual and psychological qualities articulated within the practice of command in the U.S. Army during the interwar period.

PSYCHOLOGICAL ISSUES: WORLD WAR II (1939-45)

Wanke, Paul, “**American Military Psychiatry and its Role among Ground Forces in World War II.**” Vol.63, No.1 (January, 1999), pp.127-146. Explains how the role of U.S. military psychiatrists evolved from one of screening recruits as a preventative measure to one of responding to battlefield psychiatric casualties.

Jones, Edgar, “**‘L.M.F.’: The Use of Psychiatric Stigma in the Royal Air Force during the Second World War.**” Vol.70, No.2 (April, 2006), pp.439-458. Explores the consequences of the introduction by the R.A.F. of the term ‘Lack of Moral Fibre’ in April, 1940, which was intended to stigmatize aircrew who, without a medical reason, refused to fly.

Stockings, Craig and Hancock, Eleanor, “**Reconsidering the *Luftwaffe* in Greece, 1941.**” Vol.76, No.3 (July, 2012), pp.747-773. Despite its complete dominance of the Greek skies, the terror it inspired, and its almost continual operations against Allied positions, the author challenges the assumption that the *Luftwaffe* had a decisive impact on the campaign.

Mears, Dwight S. “**The Catch-22 Effect: The lasting Stigma of Wartime Cowardice in the U.S. Army Air Forces.**” Vol.77, No.3 (July, 2013), pp.1025-1054. Accusations of cowardice by the air crews that landed in Switzerland and their consequences.

PSYCHOLOGICAL ISSUES: KOREAN WAR (1950-53)

Jordan, Kelly C. “**Right for the Wrong Reasons: S.L.A. Marshall and the Ratio of Fire in Korea.**” Vol.66, No.1 (January, 2002), pp.135-162.

PSYCHOLOGICAL ISSUES: VIETNAM WAR (2nd Indochina War) (1955-75)

Ruth, Richard A. “**Ham and Mothers: C-Ration Revelry and Revulsion in the Vietnam War.**” Vol.85, No.4 (October, 2021), pp.1004-1028. observes that the comradery of troops was facilitated by the love-hate relations with their rations.

PSYCHOLOGICAL ISSUES: POST COLD WAR PERIOD

Wetta, Frank J. and Novelli, Martin A. **“Review Essay: ‘Now a Major Motion Picture’: War Films and Hollywood’s New Patriotism.”** Vol.67, No.3 (July, 2003), pp.861-882. Suggests that the ‘New Patriotism’ displayed in films (1998-2002) celebrates loyalty to one’s comrades in battle and the ability to survive the horrific experience of modern combat rather than any stated or understood national or public rationales for whatever a war is being fought.

PUBLIC OPINION: ENGLAND / GREAT BRITAIN -

EARLY MODERN PERIOD (1480-1789)

Probasco, Nate, **“The Role of Commoners and Print in Elizabethan England’s Acceptance of Firearms.”** Vol.76, No.2 (April, 2012), pp.343-372. Looks at the debate in print between, on the one hand, common citizens and local officials, who were skeptical of firearms, the expense and safety of which they criticized, and those who promoted the replacement of longbows with firearms, who often employed dubious information.

PUBLIC OPINION: ENGLAND / GREAT BRITAIN - LATE 19th CENTURY TO 1914

Miller, Stephen M. **“In Support of the ‘Imperial Mission’? Volunteering for the South African War, 1899-1902.”** Vol.69, No.3 (July, 2005), pp.691-711. Inquires into the motives of British civilians who responded to the call for recruits by enlisting in the Volunteers, the Militia, or the Imperial Yeomanry.

Collins, Bruce, **“Defining Victory in Victorian Warfare, 1860-1882.”** Vol.77, No.3 (July, 2013), pp.895-929. Catalogues the range of pressures on the commanders of expeditions in Africa to declare victory. See Also: Beckett, Ian F. **“How Wars End: Victorian Colonial Conflicts.”** Vol.82, No.1 (January, 2018), pp.29-44.

Beckett, Ian F. **“How Wars End: Victorian Colonial Conflicts.”** Vol.82, No.1 (January, 2018), pp.29-44. The author challenges the conclusions of Bruce Collins’ in his article **“Defining Victory in Victorian Warfare, 1860-1882.”** *The Journal of Military History*, Vol.77, No.3 (July, 2013), pp.895-929.

PUBLIC OPINION: ENGLAND / GREAT BRITAIN - WORLD WAR I (1914-18)

Donaldson, Peter, **“‘A New and Deadly Game’: British Sporting Culture in the First World War.”** Vol.84, No.1 (January, 2020), pp.83-114. Popular journalism, memoirs, novels, and poetry provided the British public with a diet of war stories and reportage in which athletic

endeavor and organized games featured prominently, demonstrating that the association between games and combat survived the horrors of industrial killing between 1914 and 1918.

PUBLIC OPINION: ENGLAND / GREAT BRITAIN - WORLD WAR II (1939-45)

Gray, Peter, **“A Culture of Official Squeamishness? Britain’s Air Ministry and the Strategic Air Offensive against Germany?”** Vol.77, No.4 (October, 2013), pp.1349-1377. Endeavors to determine if the reluctance of the Air Ministry to issue a campaign medal for the R.A.F.s strategic bombing campaign was due to a discomfort with the tactics of area bombing, particularly in the wake of the attack on Dresden.

PUBLIC OPINION: ENGLAND / GREAT BRITAIN -
THE ‘TROUBLES’ IN NORTHERN IRELAND (1969-98)

Drohan, Brian, **“Unintended Consequences: Baton Rounds, Riots, and Counterinsurgency in Northern Ireland, 1970-1981.”** Vol.82, No.2 (April, 2018), pp.491-514. Designed to be a non-lethal means of employing force, the misuse of baton rounds by British soldiers resulting in serious injuries and even deaths, produced exactly the opposite public relations impact that was intended.

PUBLIC OPINION: FRANCE -
FRENCH REVOLUTIONARY AND NAPOLEONIC WARS (1792-1815)

Heuer, Jennifer, **“Soldiers as Victims or Villains? Demobilization, Masculinity, and Family in French Royalist Pamphlets, 1814-1815.”** Vol.80, No.1 (January, 2016), pp.121-144.

PUBLIC OPINION: GERMANY - COLD WAR (1945-91)

Peifer, Douglas, **“Commemoration of Mutiny, Rebellion, and Resistance in Postwar Germany: Public memory, History, and the Formation of ‘Memory Beacons’.”** Vol.65, No.4 (October, 2001), pp.1013-1052. Analyzes three ‘memory beacons’ that have been cultivated in German public and social memory: the naval mutinies of 1917-18, the 20th July, 1944, plot, and *Wehrmacht* deserters during World War II.

PUBLIC OPINION: JAPAN - COLD WAR AND POST COLD WAR

Jeans, Roger B. **“Victims or Victimizers? Museums, Textbooks, and the War Debate in Contemporary Japan.”** Vol.69, No.1 (January, 2005), pp.149-195. Shows that, rather than possessing a unified view of the war, the ‘correct history’ of the conflict is contested between conservatives, the right-wing, moderates, and the left-wing.

Dingman, Roger, **“Review Essay: American Bases in Japan.”** Vol.78, No.2 (April, 2014), pp.753-755. A collection of essays by Japanese academics and public historians providing a balanced study of the impact of U.S. bases Kanagawa Prefecture, just southwest of Tokyo.

PUBLIC OPINION: RUSSIA / SOVIET UNION - EARLY 20th CENTURY

Wright, Donald P. **“ ‘Clouds Gathering on the Horizon’: The Russian Army and the Preparation of the Imperial Population for War, 1906-1914.”** Vol.83, No.4 (October, 2019), pp.1133-1160.

PUBLIC OPINION: U.S.A.

Herrera, Ricardo A. **“Self-Governance and the American Citizen as Soldier, 1775-1861.”** Vol.65, No.1 (January, 2001), pp.21-52. Attempts to understand the conception of the relationship between military service and the Republic held by enlisted men, including regulars, militiamen, and volunteers, from the Revolution to the first year of the Civil War.

Rodgers, Thomas E. **“Billy Yank and G.I. Joe: An Exploratory Essay on the Sociopolitical Dimensions of Soldier Motivation.”** Vol.69, No.1 (January, 2005), pp.93-121. Presents the assertion that the pre-war socialization of Civil War Volunteers that enabled them to perform effectively in combat was missing among the citizen-soldiers of World War II.

Hogan, David W. **“Head and Heart: The Dilemmas of American Attitudes towards War.”** Vol.75, No.4 (October, 2011), pp.1021-1054. Modernist challenges to the old uniform attitudes towards war in a larger, more pluralistic society has made consensus difficult, if not impossible, to reach.

PUBLIC OPINION: U.S.A. - CIVIL WAR (1861-65)

Keller, Christian B. **“Flying Dutchmen and Drunken Irishmen: The Myths and Realities of Ethnic Civil War Soldiers.”** Vol.73, No.1 (January, 2009), pp.117-145. Contrasts the myths, misconceptions, and stereotypes developed by Anglo-Americans regarding German- and Irish-American soldiers fighting in the United States Civil War with the historical truth about ethnic participation in the conflict.

Kaplan, Mike, **“Review Essay: Grant’s Drinking... The Beast that will not Die.”** Vol.79, No.4 (October, 2015), pp.1109-1119.

Hunter, Antwain K. **“ ‘Patriots, Cowards, and Men Disloyal at Heart’: Labor and Politics at the Springfield Armory, 1861-1865.”** Vol.84, No.1 (January, 2020), pp.51-81. Demonstrates that while the Springfield Armory was vocal in its support for the cause of the Union during the Civil War, it nevertheless contained employees who expressed criticism of the Lincoln administration and support for the Confederacy.

Lovelace, Alexander G. **“Meade and the Media: Civil War Journalism and the New History of War Reporting.”** Vol.85, No.4 (October, 2021), pp.907-929. Employs a new approach in which War Correspondents are seen as powerful actors who could influence the decision-making process of commanders.

PUBLIC OPINION: U.S.A. - LATE 19th TO EARLY 20th CENTURY

Pope, Steven W. **“An Army of Athletes: Playing Fields, Battlefields, and the American Military Sporting Experience, 1890-1920.”** Vol.59, No.3 (July, 1995), pp.435-456. Looks at the efforts of a reformist generation of officers, who were committed to their soldiers’ welfare, to utilize athletics and sports as a means of combatting desertion and vice, which contributed to a transformation in the public image of both sports and the Army.

Hooper, Candice Shy, **“The War that Made Hollywood: How the Spanish-American War Saved the U.S. Film Industry.”** Vol.76, No.1 (January, 2012), pp.69-97. By 1897 the embryonic film industry was in decline, but the industry’s exploitation of the public’s interest in the explosion of the U.S.S. *Maine* and the subsequent war made the business of movies lucrative once more.

Baker, Anni, **“The Abolition of the U.S. Army Canteen, 1898-1914.”** Vol.80, No.3 (July, 2016), pp.697-724. The impact of Progressive era activists on conditions in the Army and the debate over the role of the Army in U.S. society.

Schubert, Frank N. **“Commemorative Essay: Sesquicentennial Reflection on the Black Regulars.”** Vol.80, No.4 (October, 2016), pp.1011-1016. To honor the sesquicentennial of the inclusion of African Americans in the regular U.S. Army, this brief essay considers how this precedent that came about in the wake of the service Black Volunteers in the Civil War pushed forward, albeit all too slowly, social change in American society.

Krome, Frederic, **“‘Will the Germans Bombard New York?’: Hugo Gernsback and the Future War Tale.”** Vol.86, No.1 (January, 2022), pp.54-76. Appraises the role of ‘Future War’ fiction, particularly works produced by Hugo Gernsback (1884-1967), in engaging the American public’s interest in military affairs in the early 20th century.

PUBLIC OPINION: U.S.A. - WORLD WAR I (1914-18)

Bruce, Robert B. **“America Embraces France: Marshal Joseph Joffre and the French Mission to the United States, April-May 1917.”** Vol.66, No.2 (April, 2002), pp.407-441. Proposes that Marshal Joffre (1852-1931), more than any other individual, established strong-Franco-American military, political, and social ties, contributing mightily to U.S. public support for a commitment of a large expeditionary force to the Western Front.

Budreau, Lisa M. **“The Politics of Remembrance: The Gold Star Mothers’ Pilgrimage and America’s Fading Memory of the Great War.”** Vol.72, No.2 (April, 2008), pp.371-411. Collectively, the Gold Star Mothers offer a multidimensional model of the ethnic, cultural, economic, and religious diversity prevalent in the United States during the interwar years.

PUBLIC OPINION: U.S.A. - INTERWAR PERIOD (1919-39)

Stentiford, Barry M. **“The Meaning of a Name: The Rise of the National Guard and the End of a Town Militia.”** Vol.72, No.3 (July, 2008), pp.727-754. Recounts the changing relationship between the community of Wakefield, Massachusetts, and its town militia, the Richardson Light Guard, when the unit became part of the National Guard in 1916.

PUBLIC OPINION: U.S.A. - WORLD WAR II (1939-45)

Jeans, Roger B., Jr. **“Alarm in Washington: A Wartime ‘Expose’ of Japan’s Biological Warfare Program.”** Vol.71, No.2 (April, 2007), pp.411-439. Discusses a book published in the summer of 1944 describing both Japan’s biological warfare program and the failure of the U.S. government to meet this threat, and the government and the media’s response to this publication, considering parallels with the 2001 anthrax ‘scares.’

PUBLIC OPINION: U.S.A. - COLD WAR (1945-91)

Grandstaff, Mark R. **“Making the Military American: Advertising, Reform, and the Demise of an Antistanding Military Tradition, 1945-1955.”** Vol.60, No.2 (April, 1996), pp.299-323. Establishes that, while concerns over the spread of communism and nuclear war played a role, both reforms within the military and a national public relations campaign also helped citizens view the armed forces as an acceptable American institution.

Willoughby, John, **“The Sexual Behavior of American G.I.s during the Early Years of the Occupation of Germany.”** Vol.62, No.1 (January, 1998), pp.155-174. Investigates the U.S. Army’s search for a form of sexual relations between G.I.’s and German girls that would be acceptable to young German men, young U.S. women, and the mothers and fathers of both lands, a topic that illuminates much about the social and political relations between the American and German people in the immediate aftermath of World War II.

Martini, Edwin A. **“Incinerating Agent Orange: Operations Pacer HO, Pacer IVY, and the Rise of Environmentalist Thinking.”** Vol.76, No.3 (July, 2012), pp.809-836.

Seipp, Adam R. **“Buchenwald Stories: Testimony, Military History, and the American Encounter with the Holocaust.”** Vol.79, No.3 (July, 2015), pp.721-744. Demonstrates how the testimonies of American servicemen have evolved in tandem with changes in public

perceptions of the war and the Holocaust.

Seipp, Adam R. “**‘Visionary Battle Scenes’: Reading Sir John Hackett’s *The Third World War*, 1977-85.**” Vol.83, No.4 (October, 2019), pp.1235-1257. Suggests that the success of Sir John Hackett’s (1910-1997) 1978 best-selling novel reflected rising Cold War tensions, as well as inspiring the modern literary genre of the techno-thriller.

PUBLIC OPINION: U.S.A. - POST COLD WAR PERIOD

Wetta, Frank J. and Novelli, Martin A. “**Review Essay: ‘Now a Major Motion Picture’: War Films and Hollywood’s New Patriotism.**” Vol.67, No.3 (July, 2003), pp.861-882. Suggests that the ‘New Patriotism’ displayed in films (1998-2002) celebrates loyalty to one’s comrades in battle and the ability to survive the horrific experience of modern combat rather than any stated or understood national or public rationales for whatever a war is being fought.

Kohn, Richard H. “**The Danger of Militarization in an Endless ‘War’ on Terrorism.**” Vol.73, No.1 (January, 2009), pp.177-208. The identification of Americans with and use of war images and thinking, and a belief in the primacy of standing military forces for the safety of the country, have become normalized, so that the pursuit of an endless ‘war’ on terrorism only further threatens to militarize the nation.

PUERTO RICO

Dooley, Edwin L. “**Memoirs: Wartime San Juan, Puerto Rico: The Forgotten American Home Front, 1941-1945.**” Vol.63, No.4 (October, 1999), pp.921-938. The author provides an account of his father’s experiences as a young U.S. Army Private from Astoria, New York, who was deployed to Puerto Rico in 1939.

Q

QUASI-WAR BETWEEN THE U.S.A. AND FRANCE (1798-1801)

Hickey, Donald R. “**Research Note: The Quasi-War.**” Vol.85, No.2 (April, 2021), pp.475-484. Traces the origins and use of the term ‘Quasi-War’ to identify the naval conflict fought between the United States and Revolutionary France, 1798-1801.

QUESADA, ELWOOD R. (1904-93)

Meilinger, Phillip S. **“Historiographical Essay: U.S. Air Force Leaders: A Biographical Tour.”**
Vol.62, No.4 (October, 1998), pp.833-870.

R

RACIAL ISSUES – See: ETHNIC AND RACIAL ISSUES

RAILWAYS – See: LOGISTICS

RECRUITMENT AND ORGANIZATION

Black, Jeremy, **“Historiographical Essay: Military Organisations and Military Change in Historical Perspective.”** Vol.62, No.4 (October, 1998), pp.871-892. Presents an explanatory model of change based on military organization, including both unit and command structures, and intersection and interaction with wider social patterns and practices.

Wilson, Peter H. **“Defining Military Culture.”** Vol.72, No.1 (January, 2008), pp.11-41. Puts forward the notion that military culture is a specific form of institutional culture and that viewing armies from this perspective offers new insight into both how they functioned and the nature of their interaction with state and society.

RECRUITMENT AND ORGANIZATION arranged chronologically by historical period or conflict - ANCIENT PERIOD (to 476)

Hanson, Victor Davis, **“Historiographical Essay: The Status of Ancient Military History: Traditional Work, Recent Research, and On-Going Controversies.”** Vol.63, No.2 (April, 1999), pp.379-413. A very thorough survey covering works on every conceivable topic concerning the armed forces and conduct of warfare in the age of ancient Greece and Rome.

Bertosa, Brian, **“The Supply of Hoplite Equipment by the Athenian State down to the Lamian War [323-322 B.C.E.]”** Vol.67, No.2 (April, 2003), pp.361-379. Covers the break with tradition in the *polis* of Athens in 335 B.C.E. when arms and armor were provided to citizens, including, for the first time, the *thetes* (poor), who had not previously been able to serve as hoplites.

Wheeler, Everett L. **“The Archaeology of War in Late Antiquity.”** Vol.78, No.3 (July, 2014), pp.1081-1093. A critical examination of a two-volume collection of papers originally presented at a 2007 Oxford conference.

Kolberg, Are Skarstein, **“There is Power in a Cohort: Development of Warfare in Iron Age to Early Medieval Scandinavia.”** Vol.83, No.1 (January, 2019), pp.9-30. Questions the degree to which Scandinavian society was organized for warfare and the extent to which tactics in Iron Age to Early Medieval Scandinavia were influenced by external examples.

McArthur, Tony, **“Should Roman Soldiers be Called ‘Professional’ Prior to Augustus?”** Vol.85, No.1 (January, 2021), pp.9-26. Raises the question of to what extent, if any, could soldiers in Roman armies during the period between 200 B.C.E. and the Battle of Actium in 31 B.C.E. qualify as professionals.

RECRUITMENT AND ORGANIZATION arranged chronologically by historical period or conflict - MEDIEVAL PERIOD (476-1480)

France, John, **“Historiographical Essay: Recent Writing on Medieval Warfare: From the Fall of Rome to c.1300.”** Vol.65, No.2 (April, 2001), pp.441-473. Primarily covering works that have been publishing in the last twenty-five years, the author reviews studies on the successor states to Rome, the Byzantine Empire, the thorny subject of feudalism, fortifications and siege operations, the naval dimension, the manner in which warfare was conducted in Europe during the High Middle Ages, 1000-1300, the employment of mercenaries, and the Crusades.

Stone, John, **“Technology, Society, and the Infantry Revolution of the Fourteenth Century.”** Vol.68, No.2 (April, 2004), pp.361-380. Challenges the concept of changes in warfare provoking changes in society, insisting, instead, that the opposite was case, calling for a new approach to understanding late-Medieval military developments based on a greater appreciation of the societies from which armies were raised.

Kagay, Donald J. **“The Defense of the Crown of Aragon during the War of the Two Pedros (1356-1366).”** Vol.71, No.1 (January, 2007), pp.11-33. Undertakes to show that the War of the Two Pedros established the administrative and military forces that would ultimately lead toward a unified Spanish kingdom in the fifteenth century.

Bachrach, David S. **“The Military Organization of Ottonian Germany, c.900-1018: The Views of Bishop Thietmar of Merseburg.”** Vol.72, No.4 (October, 2008), pp.1061-1088.

Bachrach, David S. **“Early Ottonian Warfare: The Perspective from Corvey.”** Vol.75, No.2 (April, 2011), pp.393-409. A critical reassessment of the depiction of warfare in Widukind of Corvey’s *Res gestae Saxonicae*, which concludes that, rather than small bands of heavily armed, mounted warriors, King Henry I (r.919-936) and Emperor Otto (r.936-973) deployed large armies for placing fortresses under siege.

Bachrach, David S. **“Restructuring the Eastern Frontier: Henry I of Germany, 924-936.”**

Vol.78, No.1 (January, 2014), pp.9-35. Analyzes the establishment of a defense in depth against Magyar raiders, relying on garrisoned fortifications.

Kolberg, Are Skarstein, “**There is Power in a Cohort: Development of Warfare in Iron Age to Early Medieval Scandinavia.**” Vol.83, No.1 (January, 2019), pp.9-30. Questions the degree to which Scandinavian society was organized for warfare and the extent to which tactics in Iron Age to Early Medieval Scandinavia were influenced by external examples.

Stoyanov, Aleksandar, “**The Size of Bulgaria’s Medieval Field Armies: A Case Study of Military Mobilization Capacity in the Middle Ages.**” Vol.83, No.3 (July, 2019), pp.719-746. Broadens the scope of time and sources to ascertain estimates of the actual size of Bulgarian field Armies from the First Bulgarian Empire (681-1018) to the Second Bulgarian Empire (1185-1422).

RECRUITMENT AND ORGANIZATION arranged chronologically by historical period or conflict - EIGHTY YEARS WAR (1566-1648)

Arfaioi, Maurizio, “**Bastion of Empire: The Italian *terzo Vecchio* of the Army of Flanders (1597-1682).**” Vol.85, No.1 (January, 2021), pp.27-50. An examination of the service of the longest-lived infantry unit, the *terzo Vecchio*, in an effort to better understand Italian involvement in the long conflict within the Spanish Low Countries.

RECRUITMENT AND ORGANIZATION arranged chronologically by historical period or conflict - 19th CENTURY

Dunn, John P. “**Americans in the Nineteenth Century Egyptian Army: A Selected Bibliography.**” Vol.70, No.1 (January, 2006), pp.123-136. Ismail (r.1863-1879), grandson of Muhammad Ali Pasha, employed officers from the United States, including both veterans from both sides in the Civil War and serving officers in the postwar United States Army.

RECRUITMENT AND ORGANIZATION arranged chronologically by historical period or conflict - U.S.-MEXICAN WAR (1846-48)

Arndt, Jochen S. “**The True Napoleon of the West: General Winfield Scott’s Mexico City Campaign [1847] and the Origins of the U.S. Army’s Combined-Arms Combat Division.**” Vol.76, No.3 (July, 2012), pp.649-671. Ventures to prove that General Winfield Scott (1786-1866) organized the Army of the Invasion of Mexico according to the French system of combined arms divisions, enabling him to replicate the Napoleonic era’s aggressive operational tactics.

RECRUITMENT AND ORGANIZATION arranged chronologically by historical period or conflict - U.S. CIVIL WAR (1861-65)

Bruce, Susannah Ural, “**‘Remember Your Country and Keep up Its Credit’: Irish Volunteers and the Union Army, 1861-1865.**” Vol.69, No.2 (April, 2005), pp.331-359. Puts forward the explanation that a central theme in the support of Irish immigrants for the Union cause was their dual loyalties to both their new and original homelands, support that was tested by the rising casualties, Emancipation Proclamation, and the introduction of the draft.

RECRUITMENT AND ORGANIZATION arranged chronologically by historical period or conflict - 2nd ANGLO-BOER WAR (1899-1902)

Miller, Stephen M. “**In Support of the ‘Imperial Mission’? Volunteering for the South African War, 1899-1902.**” Vol.69, No.3 (July, 2005), pp.691-711. Inquires into the motives of British civilians who responded to the call for recruits by enlisting in the Volunteers, the Militia, or the Imperial Yeomanry.

RECRUITMENT AND ORGANIZATION arranged chronologically by historical period or conflict - WORLD WAR II (1939-45)

Jackson, Ashley, “**Supplying War: The High Commission Territories’ Military-Logistical Contribution in the Second World War.**” Vol.66, No.3 (July, 2002), pp.719-760. Assesses the mobilization of manpower from Basutoland, Bechuanaland, and Swaziland for use in logistics in the North African and Italian Campaigns.

RECRUITMENT AND ORGANIZATION arranged chronologically by historical period or conflict - ARAB-ISRAELI WAR (1948)

Arielli, Nir, “**When are Foreign Volunteers Useful? Israel’s Transnational Soldiers in the War of 1948 Re-examined.**” Vol.78, No.2 (April, 2014), pp.703-724. Assesses the military and political utility for Israel of *Machal* (overseas volunteers) by comparing them with alternate examples of this phenomenon in other twentieth century conflicts.

RECRUITMENT AND ORGANIZATION arranged chronologically by historical period or conflict - KOREAN WAR (1950-53)

Grey, Jeffrey, “**The Formation of the Commonwealth Division, 1950-1951.**” Vol.81, No.4 (October, 2017), pp.1097-1107. The saga of the military and political challenges of forming a division composed of units from the Australian, British, Canadian, Indian, and New Zealand armies.

RECRUITMENT AND ORGANIZATION arranged alphabetically by country –

AFGHANISTAN

Cronin, Stephanie, **“Building and Rebuilding Afghanistan’s Army: An Historical Perspective.”** Vol.75, No.1 (January, 2011), pp.45-91. The repeated failure of the efforts of successive Afghan governments, from the nineteenth-century to the present, to create a modern regular army.

RECRUITMENT AND ORGANIZATION arranged alphabetically by country –

AUSTRIA: MID 19th CENTURY

Wawro, Geoffrey, **“An ‘Army of Pigs’: The technical, Social, and Political Basis of Austrian Shock Tactics, 1859-1866.”** Vol.59, No.3 (July, 1995), pp.407-433. Contends that, like the French after 1871, the Austrian Army responded to their defeat in the Second Italian War of Unification, 1859, by a commitment to aggressive shock tactics.

RECRUITMENT AND ORGANIZATION arranged alphabetically by country –

CANADA: WORLD WAR II (1939-45)

Dickson, Paul D. **“The Politics of Army Expansion: General H.D.G. Crerar and the Creation of the First Canadian Army, 1940-41.”** Vol.60, No.2 (April, 1996), pp.271-298. Explains that General Henry Duncan Graham Crerar’s (1888-1965) success in winning approval for raising and deploying a Field Army represented an aberration in the balance of Canadian civil-military relations and illustrates aspects of Canadian military and its impact on the war.

RECRUITMENT AND ORGANIZATION arranged alphabetically by country –

CHINA: EARLY 20th CENTURY

Sacca, John Wanda, **“Like Strangers in a Foreign Land: Chinese Officers Prepared at American Military Colleges, 1904-37.”** Vol.70, No.3 (July, 2006), pp.703-742. Relates how those Chinese officers who received military education in the United States during the turbulent period marked by the end of the Qing Dynasty and the establishment of the Republic were tainted by their foreign education and hampered by their lack of membership in any alumni associations.

RECRUITMENT AND ORGANIZATION arranged alphabetically by country –

CHINA: CHINESE CIVIL WAR (1946-49)

Tanner, Harold M. **“Guerrilla, Mobile, and Base Warfare in Communist Military Operations in Manchuria, 1945-1947.”** Vol.67, No.4 (October, 2003), pp.1177-1222. Relates how, after initial setbacks while relying on a conventional war strategy, the Communists developed a hybrid strategy

that turned the tide of the Civil War, enabling them to make a more successful transition from guerrilla to conventional warfare.

RECRUITMENT AND ORGANIZATION arranged alphabetically by country -

ENGLAND / GREAT BRITAIN: EARLY MODERN PERIOD (1481-1788)

Phillips, Gervase, “To Cry ‘Home! Home!’: Mutiny, Morale, and Indiscipline in Tudor Armies.” Vol.65, No.2 (April, 2001), pp.313-332. Points to the study of the unrest within Tudor armies as a means of better understanding common notions of equitable treatment, mutual obligations, and obedience within society as a whole.

RECRUITMENT AND ORGANIZATION arranged alphabetically by country - FRANCE

Vandervort, Bruce, “When the French Colonial Mind Turns to Thoughts of War.” Vol.76, No.3 (July, 2012), pp.847-851. Looks at two recent works on French imperialism: one a two-volume collection of twenty-eight essays, the overwhelming majority of which are devoted to Africa, the other book is an attempt at a synthesis of French colonialism exclusively in Africa.

Woodfork, Jacqueline, “It is a Crime to be a *Tirailleur* in the Army.” Vol.77, No.1 (January, 2013), pp.115-139. Presents the contrast between the rights of indigenous civilians in the French colony of Senegal and those of the *Tirailleur sénégalais*.

RECRUITMENT AND ORGANIZATION arranged alphabetically by country –

GERMANY: EARLY MODERN PERIOD (1480-1789)

Tzoref-Ashkenazi, Chen, “German Military Participation in Early Modern European Colonialism.” Vol.80, No.3 (July, 2016), pp.671-695. Brings to light the employment of German mercenaries in the colonial ventures of different European kingdoms.

RECRUITMENT AND ORGANIZATION arranged alphabetically by country –

GERMANY: THIRTY YEARS WAR (1618-48)

Staiano-Daniels, Lucian E. “Determining Early Modern Army Strength: The Case of Electoral Saxony.” Vol.83, No.4 (October, 2019), pp.1001-1020. Questions the issues of the ‘Military Revolution’ thesis that larger armies both reflected a revolution in warfare and forced states to adopt more efficient means of raising revenue by examining the experience of Saxony during the Thirty Years War (1618-1648).

RECRUITMENT AND ORGANIZATION arranged alphabetically by country –

GERMANY: WORLD WAR II (1939-45)

Weinberg, Gerhard L. **“Unexplored Questions about the German Military during World War II.”** Vol.62, No.2 (April, 1998), pp.371-380. Touches upon the 1934 oath to Hitler, reasons why high-ranking German commanders felt the need to justify to their troops their orders to slaughter Jewish civilians, the role of high-ranking German commanders in approving the execution of tens-of-thousands of their own troops, *Luftwaffe* field divisions, the creation of new airborne divisions after the use of paratroopers had been all but abandoned, and the organizing of *Kriegsmarine* and *Luftwaffe* suicide units.

Yelton, David K. **“Ein Volk Steht Auf: The German Volkssturm and Nazi Strategy, 1944-45.”** Vol.64, No.4 (October, 2000), pp.1061-1083. Explains that the *Volkssturm*, though based on flawed assumptions, was part of a coherent strategy that was intended to simultaneously fanaticize the civilian population and maximize Allied casualties beyond what their governments were willing to bare.

Yelton, David K. **“Older German Officers and National Socialist Activism: Evidence from the German Volksturm.”** Vol.83, No.2 (April, 2019), pp.455-485. Addresses the question of to what degree older, lower-level German officers serving in the *Volksturm* embraced National Socialist ideology.

RECRUITMENT AND ORGANIZATION arranged alphabetically by country –
GERMANY: COLD WAR (1945-91)

Trauschweizer, Ingo Wolfgang, **“Learning with an Ally: The U.S. Army and the Bundeswehr in the Cold War.”** Vol.72, No.2 (April, 2008), pp.477-508. Discusses four areas of German-U.S. defense cooperation, including aid for West German rearmament, the reorganization of German and U.S. combat formations in the post-Korean War period, the failure of a shared attempt at tank design, and the impact of German tactical and operational concepts on post-Vietnam U.S. Army doctrine.

RECRUITMENT AND ORGANIZATION arranged alphabetically by country –
INDIA: EARLY MODERN PERIOD (1480-1789)

Roy, Kaushik, **“Military Synthesis in South Asia: Armies, Warfare, and Indian Society, c.1740-1849.”** Vol.69, No.3 (July, 2005), pp.651-690. Attempts to determine why, with both the British East India Company and the Mughal successor states developing hybrid military forces, it was the E.I.C.’s armies that, more often than not, achieved victory.

De la Garza, Andrew, **“The Mughal Battlefield: Personnel, Technology, and Tactics in the Early Empire, 1500-1605.”** Vol.78, No.3 (July, 2014), pp.927-960. Challenges the assumptions of inferiority in comparison with the ‘European Military Revolution.’

RECRUITMENT AND ORGANIZATION arranged alphabetically by country –

INDIA: WORLD WAR I (1914-18)

Tan Tai-Yong, “**An Imperial Home-Front: Punjab and the First World War.**” Vol.64, No.2 (April, 2000), pp.371-410. Looks at how, during the war, the civil administration of the State of Punjab ended up concentrating on recruiting men for the Indian Army.

RECRUITMENT AND ORGANIZATION arranged alphabetically by country –

LIBERIA: EARLY 20th CENTURY

Shellum, Brian G. “**African American Officers in Liberia, 1910-1942.**” Vol.82, No.3 (July, 2018), pp.739-757. Seventeen African American officers from the U.S. Army reorganized, trained, and commanded the Liberian Frontier Force that enabled it to defend the nation’s borders and defeat a number of indigenous uprisings.

RECRUITMENT AND ORGANIZATION arranged alphabetically by country -

THE NETHERLANDS: WORLD WAR I (1914-18)

Van Tuyll, Hubert P. “**The Dutch Mobilization of 1914: Reading the ‘Enemy’s’ Intentions.**” Vol.64, No.3 (July, 2000), pp.711-737. Establishes that the Dutch Armed Forces were aware that Von Schlieffen intended to violate Dutch neutrality and their response resulted in a change in Germans plans for war with France.

RECRUITMENT AND ORGANIZATION arranged alphabetically by country -

THE NETHERLANDS: INTERWAR PERIOD (1919-38)

Van Tuyll, Hubert, “**Memory, Myth and Forgetting: The Netherlands and the World Wars.**” Vol.80, No.4 (October, 2016), pp.1073-1081. Advances the explanation that the inaccurate myths that evolved around Netherlands neutrality during World War I had an unfortunate impact on the country’s defensive preparations leading up to World War II.

RECRUITMENT AND ORGANIZATION arranged alphabetically by country –

THE NETHERLANDS: COLD WAR (1945-91)

Hoffenaar, Jan, “***Hannibal ante portas: The Soviet Military Threat and the Build-up of the Dutch Armed Forces, 1948-1958.***” Vol.66, No.1 (January, 2002), pp.163-191.

RECRUITMENT AND ORGANIZATION arranged alphabetically by country –

PHILIPPINES: INTERWAR PERIOD (1919-39)

Irish, Kerry, **“Dwight Eisenhower and Douglas MacArthur in the Philippines: There Must Be a Day of Reckoning [1935-39].”** Vol.74, No.2 (April, 2010), pp.439-473. Demonstrates that Eisenhower’s (1890-1969) dislike of MacArthur (1880-1964) was less about personalities and more about disagreements over the building of an army in an impoverished country and the proper qualities that a U.S. Army officer should exhibit and develop in his subordinates.

RECRUITMENT AND ORGANIZATION arranged alphabetically by country –

RUSSIA / SOVIET UNION

Wirtschaft, Elise Kimerling, **“Social Misfits: Veterans and Soldier’s Families in Service Russia [1682-1874].”** Vol.59, No.2 (April, 1995), pp.215-235. Endeavors to understand the relationship between military service and social categories in Imperial Russia, beginning with the reign of Peter the Great in 1682 up to the introduction of universal conscription in 1874.

RECRUITMENT AND ORGANIZATION arranged alphabetically by country –

RUSSIA / SOVIET UNION: EARLY MODERN PERIOD (1480-1789)

Paul, Michael C. **“The Military Revolution in Russia, 1550-1682.”** Vol.68, No.1 (January, 2004), pp.9-45. Asserts that the Armed Forces of the tsars underwent truly revolutionary changes between the mid-sixteenth and late-seventeenth centuries that made Imperial Russia a significant power and laid the groundwork for the reforms of Peter the Great.

Parker, Geoffrey, **“Review Essay: A Soldier of Fortune in Seventeenth Century Eastern Europe.”** Vol.76, No.2 (April, 2012), pp.545-548. Examines Diary of General Patrick Gordon of Auchleuchries 1635-1699, the account of a Scottish Catholic who, like many Early-Modern Scots, served in the armies of Sweden, Poland, and Russia. See also: Parker, Geoffrey, “Review Essay: Patrick Gordon Rides Again.” Vol.79, No.4 (October, 2015), pp.1127-1129.

Parker, Geoffrey, **“Review Essay: Patrick Gordon Rides Again.”** Vol.79, No.4 (October, 2015), pp.1127-1129. Examines The remaining volumes of the diary of General Patrick Gordon of Auchleuchries 1635-1699, the account of a Scottish Catholic who, like many Early-Modern Scots, served in the armies of Sweden, Poland, and Russia. See also: Parker, Geoffrey, “Review Essay: A Soldier of Fortune in Seventeenth Century Eastern Europe.” Vol.76, No.2 (April, 2012), pp.545-548.

Halperin, Charles J. **“Ivan IV’s State Cossacks.”** Vol.82, No.2 (April, 2018), pp.357-371. During the reign of Ivan IV (1533-1584) Muscovite ‘State Cossacks’ lived in urban enclaves, fought under the command of a government-appointed colonels, most were infantry, and a large

percentage were armed with firearms.

RECRUITMENT AND ORGANIZATION arranged alphabetically by country -
RUSSIA / SOVIET UNION: INTERWAR PERIOD (1919-39)

Reese, Roger R. “Red Army Professionalism and the Communist Party, 1918-1941.” Vol.66, No.1 (January, 2002), pp.71-102. Explores the social and institutional dynamics that shaped the Red Army’s officer corps and determined the extent of its ability to face the Nazi invasion.

RECRUITMENT AND ORGANIZATION arranged alphabetically by country -
RUSSIA / SOVIET UNION: WORLD WAR II (1939-45)

Pennington, Reina, “Offensive Women: Women in Combat in the Red Army in the Second World War.” Vol.74, No.3 (July, 2010), pp.775-820. Reports on the nature and variety of women’s combat experiences.

RECRUITMENT AND ORGANIZATION arranged alphabetically by country –
SERBIA: WORLD WAR I (1914-18)

Lyon, James M.B. “ ‘A Peasant Mob’: The Serbian Army on the Eve of the Great War.” Vol.61, No.3 (July, 1997), pp.481-502. In contrast to previous studies, this article seeks to assess the Army’s preparedness on the eve of World War I based on Serbian archival sources, as opposed to Hapsburg sources.

RECRUITMENT AND ORGANIZATION arranged alphabetically by country –
SPAIN: THE ITALIAN WARS (1494-1559)

Sherer, Idan, “ ‘All of Us, in One Voice, Demand what’s Owed Us’: Mutiny in the Spanish Infantry during the Italian Wars, 1525-1538.” Vol.78, No.3 (July, 2014), pp.893-926. The author notes the similarities between these all too frequent mutinies and strikes initiated and resolved by modern employees.

RECRUITMENT AND ORGANIZATION arranged alphabetically by country - U.S.A.

Coffman, Edward M. “The George C. Marshall Lecture of Military History: The Duality of the American Military Tradition: A Commentary.” Vol.64, No.4 (October, 2000), pp.967-980. Discusses the duality of a standing, professional regular Armed Forces versus the citizen-soldier tradition.

RECRUITMENT AND ORGANIZATION arranged alphabetically by country –

U.S.A.: REVOLUTIONARY WAR (1775-83)

Maass, John R. “**‘Too Grievous for a People to Bear’: Impressment and Conscription in Revolutionary North Carolina.**” Vol.73, No.4 (October, 2009), pp.1091-1115.

The government of North Carolina, faced with the challenges of fighting a revolutionary war, chose to impose impressment and conscription, which produced antipathy and resistance to Patriot authorities, undermining support for the new state, and added to the disorders within the state during the war.

Mayer, Holly A. “**Canada, Congress, and the Continental Army: Strategic Accommodations, 1774-1776.**” Vol.78, No.2 (April, 2014), pp.503-535. Discusses the challenge of reconciling the Continental Congress’ policy of encouraging the enlistment of French Catholics in Canada with anti-Catholic bigotry among the members of the Continental Army.

Lapp, Derrick E. “**‘Did They Really ‘Take None but Gentlemen’? Henry Hardman, the Maryland Line, and a Reconsideration of the Socioeconomic Composition of the Continental Officer Corps.**” Vol.78, No.4 (October, 2014), pp.1239-1261.

RECRUITMENT AND ORGANIZATION arranged alphabetically by country –

U.S.A.: EARLY REPUBLIC TO CIVIL WAR (1783-1861)

Kastor, Peter J. “**Toward ‘The Maritime War Only’: The Question of Naval Mobilization, 1811-1812.**” Vol.61, No.3 (July, 1997), pp.455-480. Applies the broader context of the ‘New Military History’, particularly political circumstances, in an effort to better understand President James Madison’s (1809-1817) naval policy and strategy leading up to the outbreak of the War of 1812.

Birtle, Andrew J. “**The Origins of the Legion of the United States.**” Vol.67, No.4 (October, 2003), pp.1249-1262. Offers the possibility that the reorganization of the U.S. Army in 1792 was based on the writings of Colonel Henry Bouquet (1719-1765), a noted veteran of the Indian Frontier.

Watson, Samuel, “**Trusting to ‘the Chapter of Accidents’: Contingency, Necessity, and Self-Constraint in Jeffersonian National Security Policy.**” Vol.76, No.4 (October, 2012), pp.973-1000. Ascertains how the U.S. war effort was crippled by the antipathy of the Democratic-Republican Party of Thomas Jefferson (1743-1826) towards taxation, debt, a standing army, federal aid to infrastructure, and a national bank

Crawford, Michael J. “**U.S. Navy Petty Officers in the Era of the War of 1812.**” Vol.76, No.4 (October, 2012), pp.1035-1051. Scrutinizes the Navy’s process of recruiting and training petty officers between the years 1797 and 1812.

RECRUITMENT AND ORGANIZATION arranged alphabetically by country –

U.S.A.: CIVIL WAR (1861-65)

Grimsley, Mark, “**Review Essay: In Not so Dubious Battle: The Motivations of American Civil War Soldiers.**” Vol.62, No.1 (January, 1998), pp.175-188.

Keller, Christian B. “**Flying Dutchmen and Drunken Irishmen: The Myths and Realities of Ethnic Civil War Soldiers.**” Vol.73, No.1 (January, 2009), pp.117-145. Contrasts the myths, misconceptions, and stereotypes developed by Anglo-Americans regarding German- and Irish-American soldiers fighting in the United States Civil War with the historical truth about ethnic participation in the conflict.

Johnson, Mark W. “**Emory Upton’s Twenty-Six: Desertion and Divided Loyalty of the U.S. Army Soldiers, 1860-1861.**” Vol.81, No.3 (July, 2017), pp.747-774. Contrary to common assumptions, the enlisted men of the regular peace-time Army were as conflicted in their loyalties as their officers, resulting in over 500 deserting during the secession crisis to serve in what became the Army of the Confederate States of America.

RECRUITMENT AND ORGANIZATION arranged alphabetically by country –

U.S.A.: LATE 19th CENTURY

Fitzpatrick, David J. “**Emory Upton and the Citizen Soldier.**” Vol.65, No.2 (April, 2001), pp.355-389. Refutes the accepted notion of Upton’s opposition to citizen-soldiers and democracy. The article includes a review of Upton’s (1839-1881) reflections on the military systems in India and Serbia.

Fitzpatrick, David J. “**Emory Upton and the Army of Democracy.**” Vol.77, No.2 (April, 2013), pp.463-490. Challenges the depiction of Emory Upton (1839-1881) as an anti-democracy militarist.

RECRUITMENT AND ORGANIZATION arranged alphabetically by country –

U.S.A.: WORLD WAR II (1939-45)

Wanke, Paul, “**American Military Psychiatry and its Role among Ground Forces in World War II.**” Vol.63, No.1 (January, 1999), pp.127-146. Explains how the role of U.S. military psychiatrists evolved from one of screening recruits as a preventative measure to one of responding to battlefield psychiatric casualties.

Sorley, Lewis and Pernell, Ralph McT. “**Too Good for the Infantry?**” Vol.63, No.3 (July, 1999), pp.704-705. This is a 1942 letter from New Mexico Congressman Clinton P. Anderson in response to a request for an individual to be reassigned out of a rifle squad.

RECRUITMENT AND ORGANIZATION arranged alphabetically by country –

U.S.A.: COLD WAR (1945-91):

Fautua, David T. **“The ‘Long Pull’ Army: NSC 68, the Korean War, and the Creation of the Cold War Army.”** Vol.61, No.1 (January, 1997), pp.93-120. Endeavors to distinguish the changes to the U.S. Army in the early 1950s resulting from National Security Council paper 68 from those prompted by the Korean War (1950-1953).

Lock-Pullan, Richard, **“ ‘An Inward Looking Time’: The United States Army, 1973-1976.”** Vol.67, No.2 (April, 2003), pp.483-511. Rejects the explanation that the immediate post-Vietnam War reforms were primarily shaped by the recent conflict in Southeast Asia, insisting, instead, that of greater importance was the end of the draft and the lessons drawn from the 1973 Arab-Israeli War by General William E. DePuy (1919-1992).

Percy, William Alexander, **“Jim Crow and Uncle Sam: The Tuskegee Flying Units and the U.S. Army Air Forces in Europe during World War II.”** Vol.67, No.3 (July, 2003), pp.773-810. Links the success of the African American 99th Fighter Squadron and the 332nd Fighter Group with President Harry S. Truman’s decision to end segregation in the Armed Forces.

Clymer, Kenton, **“U.S. Homeland Defense in the 1950s: The Origin of the Ground Observer Corps.”** Vol.75, No.3 (July, 2011), pp.835-859. Quasi-auxiliary of the U.S. Air Force from 1950 to 1959.

RECRUITMENT AND ORGANIZATION arranged alphabetically by country –

U.S.A.: KOREAN WAR (1950-53)

Donnelly, William M. **“ ‘The Best Army that can be put in the Field in the Circumstances’: The U.S. Army, July 1951 – July 1953.”** Vol.71, No.3 (July, 2007), pp.809-847. Reckons with the difficulties faced by career soldiers during the Korean War due to limited national mobilization and the cuts to the Army’s budget by President Harry S. Truman (1945-1953).

RECRUITMENT AND ORGANIZATION arranged alphabetically by country –

U.S.A.: POST COLD WAR PERIOD

Kohn, Richard H. **“The Danger of Militarization in an Endless ‘War’ on Terrorism.”** Vol.73, No.1 (January, 2009), pp.177-208. The identification of Americans with and use of war images and thinking, and a belief in the primacy of standing military forces for the safety of the country, have become normalized, so that the pursuit of an endless ‘war’ on terrorism only further threatens to militarize the nation.

RED CROSS – See: BIOLOGICAL AND MEDICAL ISSUES

RELIGION

Loveland, Anne C. **“Character Education in the U.S. Army, 1947-1977.”** Vol.64, No.3 (July, 2000), pp.795-818. Scrutinizes the promotion of the Christian Faith in the Army Character Guidance program in the context of Cold War paranoia.

Bower, Stephen E. **“The Theology of the Battlefield: William Tecumseh Sherman and the U.S. Civil War.”** Vol.64, No.4 (October, 2000), pp.1005-1034. Focuses on the role of Sherman’s (1820-1891) nondenominational religious faith in his experiences in the Civil War.

Nelson, Anna Kasten, **“Anna M. Rosenberg, an ‘Honorary Man’.**” Vol.68, No.1 (January, 2004), pp.133-161. Considers how and why Defense Secretary George C. Marshall (1880-1959) bucked political and gender assumptions when he appointed a pro-New Deal, Jewish immigrant woman, Anna M. Rosenberg (1899-1983), as the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower.

Geissler, Suzanne, **“Professor Dennis Mahan Speaks out on West Point Chapel Issues, 1850.”** Vol.69, No.2 (April, 2005), pp.505-519. An 1850 letter from West Point professor to the Secretary of War in which Mahan (1802-1871) expressed his opposition to the academy’s Chaplain always having to be Episcopalian and mandatory chapel attendance for staff.

Van de Logt, Mark, **“ ‘The Powers of the Heavens Shall Eat of my Smoke’: The Significance of Scalping in Pawnee Warfare.”** Vol.72, No.1 (January, 2008), pp.71-104. Explains that there were a range of motives for Pawnee warriors to seek scalps, including improved status and marriage prospects for the warrior, revenge for the killing of tribal members, to end the mourning period of those who had lost a relative or friend, and, when sacrificed in a special ceremony, to improve the spiritual well-being of the Pawnee people.

Budreau, Lisa M. **“The Politics of Remembrance: The Gold Star Mothers’ Pilgrimage and America’s Fading Memory of the Great War.”** Vol.72, No.2 (April, 2008), pp.371-411. Collectively, the Gold Star Mothers offer a multidimensional model of the ethnic, cultural, economic, and religious diversity prevalent in the United States during the interwar years.

Flint, Fr. James, O.S.B. **“A Chaplain’s Diary: Reverend Victor Laketek, O.S.B., 1942-1946.”** Vol.72, No.3 (July, 2008), pp.853-867. The account of a World War II Army Air Force Chaplain stationed in Maine, Florida, California, and Canton Island in the Pacific.

McMahon, Daniel, **“Geomancy and Walled Fortifications in Late Eighteenth Century China.”**

Vol.76, No.2 (April, 2012), pp.373-393. Takes account of the role of geomancy based on *fengshui* in military planning and activity during the Qing Dynasty, including intelligence gathering, sabotage, and fortifications.

Cook, Tim, **“Grave Beliefs: Stories of the Supernatural and the Uncanny among Canada’s Great War Trench Soldiers.”** Vol.77, No.2 (April, 2013), pp.521-542.

Mayer, Holly A. **“Canada, Congress, and the Continental Army: Strategic Accommodations, 1774-1776.”** Vol.78, No.2 (April, 2014), pp.503-535. Discusses the challenge of reconciling the Continental Congress’ policy of encouraging the enlistment of French Catholics in Canada with anti-Catholic bigotry among the members of the Continental Army.

Muehlbauer, Matthew S. **“Holy War and Just War in Early New England, 1630-1655.”** Vol.81, No.3 (July, 2017), pp.667-692. Questions the uneven application of these concepts by the New England colonies in relation to both wars and efforts to avoid war with both Native American tribes and the neighboring colony of New Netherlands.

Goldman, David I. **“ ‘Charlie’ Chaplains in the Great War: Chaplains’ Experiences in the U.S. Army, 1917-1919.”** Vol.84, No.2 (April, 2020), pp.395-426. Due to budget cuts, the section of the U.S. Army’s official history of participation in world War I concerning the service of Chaplains was never completed. Nevertheless, the material for such a section in the form of letters, photos, and documents has survived and provides a largely overlooked source for the United States involvement in the Great War.

REMEMBREANCE

Harari, Yuval Noah, **“Martial Illusions: War and Disillusionment in Twentieth-Century and Renaissance Military memoirs.”** Vol.69, No.1 (January, 2005), pp.43-72. Sets forth the notion that the change in the image of war from one that was positive and romantic to disillusionment owed more to soldiers’ self-perceptions and expectations than developments in technology produced.

REMEMBREANCE: MEDIEVAL PERIOD (476-1480)

Harari, Yuval Noah, **“Armchairs, Coffee, and Authority: Eye-witnesses and Flesh-witnesses Speak about War, 1100-1200.”** Vol.74, No.1 (January, 2010), pp.53-78. The possibility and utility of understanding the experience of war from first-hand accounts.

REMEMBREANCE: U.S. REVOLUTIONARY WAR (1775-83)

Lender, Mark Edward and Martin, James Kirby, **“Target New London: Benedict Arnold’s Raid,**

Just War, and ‘Homegrown Terror’ Reconsidered.” Vol.83, No.1 (January, 2019), pp.67-95. Challenges the traditional Patriot depiction of Benedict Arnold’s (1741-1801) attack on the privateer base of New London, Connecticut, 6 September, 1781, arguing that it was conducted according to the contemporary rules of ‘civilized warfare.’

REMEMBREANCE: WAR OF 1812 (1812-15)

Hickey, Donald R. **“1812: Remembering a Forgotten War.”** Vol.76, No.4 (October, 2012), pp.969-972.

REMEMBREANCE: U.S. CIVIL WAR (1861-65)

Wolters, Timothy S. **“Electric Torpedoes in the Confederacy: Reconciling Conflicting Histories.”** Vol.72, No.3 (July, 2008), pp.755-783. The article seeks to clarify the linkages between memory, history, and technology by examining the claims of Hunter Davidson, Beverley Kennon, Stephen Mallory, Matthew, and Gabriel Rains to contributing to the development of electric torpedoes for the Confederacy.

Noe, Kenneth W, **“ ‘Damned North Carolinians’ and ‘Brave Virginians’: The Lane-Mahone Controversy, Honor, and Civil War Memory.”** Vol.72, No.4 (October, 2008), pp.1089-1115. Charts the feud between the North Carolina commander, James Henry, and William Mahone over the question of who deserved credit for capturing three enemy flags at the Battle of Spotsylvania, 1864, a feud that was influenced by a culture of honor and post-war politics.

Seidule, James Tyrus, **“Treason is Treason: Civil War Memory at West Point, 1861-1902.”** Vol.76, No.2 (April, 2012), pp.427-452. Asserts that West Point during the Gilded Age neither forgot nor forgave graduates who had chosen to fight against the U.S. Army as officers in the Confederate forces and that memorials were created during the 1890s to highlight the role of its graduates in preserving the Union.

Kaplan, Mike, **“Review Essay: Grant’s Drinking... The Beast that will not Die.”** Vol.79, No.4 (October, 2015), pp.1109-1119.

Matsui, John H. **“Historiographical Essay: Seven Score and Ten: American Civil War Historiography at the Close of the Sesquicentennial.”** Vol.80, No.2 (April, 2016), pp.487-509.

REMEMBREANCE: U.S.A.: EARLY 20th CENTURY

Schubert, Frank N. **“The 25th Infantry at Brownsville, Texas: Buffalo Soldiers, the ‘Brownsville Six’, and the Medal of Honor.”** Vol.75, No.4 (October, 2011), pp.1217-1224. Addresses the myth that there were six holders of the Medal of Honor among the Buffalo Soldiers who were dismissed after the August, 1906, shooting in Brownsville, Texas.

REMEMBRANCE: WORLD WAR I (1914-18)

Hancock, Eleanor, “**Ernst Rohm and the Experience of World War I.**” Vol.60, No.1 (January, 1996), pp.39-60. Inspects the role of the Great War service in the political rhetoric of the Chief of Staff of the National Socialist Sturmabteilung, including Rohm’s version of his war experiences as recounted in his 1928 autobiography.

Todman, Daniel, “*Sans peur et sans reproche: The Retirement, Death, and Mourning of Sir Douglas Haig, 1918-1928.*” Vol.67, No.4 (October, 2003), pp.1083-1106.

Greenhalgh, Elizabeth, “**Myth and memory: Sir Douglas Haig and the Imposition of Allied Unified Command in March, 1918.**” Vol.68, No.3 (July, 2004), pp.771-820. Debunks Field Marshal Haig’s (1861-1928) claim that he deserves credit for Chief of the French General Staff, Ferdinand Foch’s (1851-1929), appointment as Allied Supreme Commander.

Lunn, Joe, “**Male Identity and Martial Codes of Honor: A Comparison of the War Memoirs of Robert Graves, Ernst Jünger, and Kande Kamara.**” Vol.69, No.3 (July, 2005), pp.713-735. The memoirs of the British officer and author, Robert Graves (1895-1985), the German soldier and author, Ernst Jünger (1895-1998), and the French Colonial soldier from West Africa, Kande Kamara.

Budreau, Lisa M. “**The Politics of Remembrance: The Gold Star Mothers’ Pilgrimage and America’s Fading Memory of the Great War.**” Vol.72, No.2 (April, 2008), pp.371-411. Collectively, the Gold Star Mothers offer a multidimensional model of the ethnic, cultural, economic, and religious diversity prevalent in the United States during the interwar years.

Hagemann, Karen, “**Mobilizing Women for War: The History, Historiography, and Memory of German Women’s War Service in the Two World Wars.**” Vol.75, No.4 (October, 2011), pp.1055-1093. An effort to understand why the large-scale mobilization of women in Germany during the course of both world wars is missing from the historiography.

Anon. “**Forward: In Commemoration of the First World War.**” Vol.79, No.4 (October, 2015), pp.925-928.

Peifer, Douglas, “**The Sinking of the *Lusitania*, Wilson’s Response, and Paths Not Taken: Historical Revisionism, the Nye Committee, and the Ghost of William Jennings Bryan.**” Vol.79, No.4 (October, 2015), pp.1025-1045. Assesses the way that the impact of the revisionist literature of the interwar period on the Neutrality Acts of the mid-1930s demonstrates how ‘history’s lessons’ without context can mislead rather than inform.

Burns, Robert G.H. “**British Folk Songs of the Great War – Then and Now.**” Vol.79, No.4 (October, 2015), pp.1059-1071.

Van Tuyll, Hubert, **“Memory, Myth and Forgetting: The Netherlands and the World Wars.”** Vol.80, No.4 (October, 2016), pp.1073-1081. Advances the explanation that the inaccurate myths that evolved around Netherlands neutrality during World War I had an unfortunate impact on the country’s defensive preparations leading up to World War II.

Nordlund, Alexander, **“ ‘Done My Bit’: British Soldiers, the 1918 Armistice, and Understanding the First World War.”** Vol.81, No.2 (April, 2017), pp.425-446. Contrasts British soldiers’ reactions to the Armistice and their war experience with their later reflections.

Donaldson, Peter, **“ ‘A New and Deadly Game’: British Sporting Culture in the First World War.”** Vol.84, No.1 (January, 2020), pp.83-114. Popular journalism, memoirs, novels, and poetry provided the British public with a diet of war stories and reportage in which athletic endeavor and organized games featured prominently, demonstrating that the association between games and combat survived the horrors of industrial killing between 1914 and 1918.

Spears, Timothy B. **“Stone Truths: American Memorial Landscapes of World War I.”** Vol.85, No.2 (April, 2021), pp.342-368. Assesses the accuracy of summaries and maps displaying the operations of the American Expeditionary Force etched in stone by the American Battle Monuments Commission.

Blazich, Frank A. **“Notre Cher Ami: The Enduring Myth and Memory of a Humble Pigeon.”** Vol.85, No.3 (July, 2021), pp.646-677. The homing pigeon Cher Ami survived severe wounds transporting messages, but the question of whether or not it was the pigeon that helped save the ‘Lost Battalion’ of the American Expeditionary Force is explored in this article.

REMEMBREANCE: WORLD WAR II (1939-45)

Weinberg, Gerhard L. **“Historiographical Essay: World War II Scholarship, now and in the Future.”** Vol.61, No.2 (April, 1997), pp.335-345. Includes issues surrounding the use of the memoirs of German military leaders, the revelations of Field Marshal Lord Alanbrooke’s (1883-1963) unabridged diary, and the declassification of materials pertaining to Magic and Ultra.

Dooley, Edwin L. **“Memoirs: Wartime San Juan, Puerto Rico: The Forgotten American Home Front, 1941-1945.”** Vol.63, No.4 (October, 1999), pp.921-938. The author provides an account of his father’s experiences as a young U.S. Army Private from Astoria, New York, who was deployed to Puerto Rico in 1939.

Peifer, Douglas, **“Commemoration of Mutiny, Rebellion, and Resistance in Postwar Germany: Public memory, History, and the Formation of ‘Memory Beacons’.”** Vol.65, No.4 (October, 2001), pp.1013-1052. Analyzes three ‘memory beacons’ that have been cultivated in German public and social memory: the naval mutinies of 1917-18, the 20th July, 1944, plot, and

Wehrmacht deserters during World War II.

Stevenson, Matthew, “**Memoirs: War’s End on Okinawa: In Search of Captain Robert Fowler.**” Vol.67, No.2 (April, 2003), pp.517-528. U.S.M.C. Captain Fowler, who was killed on Okinawa on 12 June, 1945, was a close friend of the author’s father.

Dingman, Roger V. “**Language at War: U.S. Marine Corps Japanese Language Officers in the Pacific.**” Vol.68, No.3 (July, 2004), pp.853-883. Analyzes the origins, training, experiences, and recollections of Caucasian Japanese language officers, including the shift from translating to facilitate life-taking to lifesaving.

Wood, James A. “**Captive Historians, Captivated Audience: The German Military History Program, 1945-1961.**” Vol.69, No.1 (January, 2005), pp.123-147. Delves into the work and motivations of Wehrmacht officers who were employed the United States Government to describe their wartime experiences concerning Germany’s war effort.

Jeans, Roger B. “**Victims or Victimizers? Museums, Textbooks, and the War Debate in Contemporary Japan.**” Vol.69, No.1 (January, 2005), pp.149-195. Shows that, rather than possessing a unified view of the war, the ‘correct history’ of the conflict is contested between conservatives, the right-wing, moderates, and the left-wing.

Biddle, Tami Davis, “**Dresden 1945: Reality, History, and Memory.**” Vol.72, No.2 (April, 2008), pp.413-449. This essay is an effort to untangle a complicated and much misunderstood episode in the history of modern warfare and to make sense of it in the context in which it occurred.

Salaia, George D. “**Embellishing Omaha Beach.**” Vol.72, No.2 (April, 2008), pp.531-534. Clarifies the misconceptions surrounding Company ‘A’, 116th Infantry Regiment, 29th Infantry Division, a lead unit in the landing on Omaha Beach.

Schmider, Klaus, “**Review Essay: The Last of the First: Veterans of the *Jagdwaiffe* Tell Their Story.**” Vol.73, No.1 (January, 2009), pp.231-249. Covers five memoirs of *Luftwaiffe* fighter pilots.

Orbach, Danny, “**Criticism Reconsidered: The German Resistance to Hitler in Critical German Scholarship.**” Vol.75, No.2 (April, 2011), pp.565-590. Establishes that, beginning in the 1960s, some of the so-called ‘critical’ historiography of the 20 July, 1944, conspirators suffer from erroneous reading of the sources, one-sided evaluations, moral condescension, and rhetorical manipulation.

Hagemann, Karen, “**Mobilizing Women for War: The History, Historiography, and Memory of German Women’s War Service in the Two World Wars.**” Vol.75, No.4 (October, 2011), pp.1055-1093. An effort to understand why the large-scale mobilization of women in Germany during the course of both world wars is missing from the historiography.

Anselmo, Frank A. **“The Battle for Hill K-9 and the Fall of Rome, 2 June 1944.”** Vol.76, No.1 (January, 2012), pp.99-126. The author seeks to ascertain which version of the capture of Hill K-9 by the U.S. 179th Infantry Regiment is the most accurate.

Lockenour, Jay, **“Black and White Memories of War: Victimization and Violence in West German War Films of the 1950s.”** Vol.76, No.1 (January, 2012), pp.159-191. Contends that war films helped to construct a specifically West German identity as helpless victims or heroic nonconformists rather than historical actors and compliant, or even eager, collaborators by creating myths and memories important to the legitimacy of the new Federal Republic.

Rives, Tim, **“Like Footprints in the Sand: Searching for Eisenhower’s Climactic D-Day Words.”** Vol.78, No.3 (July, 2014), pp.1057-1067.

Seipp, Adam R. **“Buchenwald Stories: Testimony, Military History, and the American Encounter with the Holocaust.”** Vol.79, No.3 (July, 2015), pp.721-744. Demonstrates how the testimonies of American servicemen have evolved in tandem with changes in public perceptions of the war and the Holocaust.

Scianna, Bastian Matteo, **“Rommel Almighty? Italian Assessment of the ‘Desert Fox’ during and after the Second World War.”** Vol.82, No.1 (January, 2018), pp.125-145. The Italian view based on new primary material, including the eavesdropping by British intelligence on Italian officers held as P.O.W.s in both Egypt and Britain.

REMEMBRANCE: VIETNAM WAR (2nd Indochina War) (1955-75)

Daddis, Gregory A. **“Historiographical Essay: Mansplaining Vietnam: Male Veterans and America’s Popular Image of the Vietnam War.”** Vol.82, No.1 (January, 2018), pp.181-207. Explores how various media, such as memoirs, have excluded the story of the roughly 7,500 U.S. women who served in the Vietnam War.

Borch, Fred L. **“Review Essay: My Lai at Fifty: A History of Literature on the ‘My Lai Incident’ Fifty Years Later.”** Vol.82, No.2 (April, 2018), pp.551-564. Concerning the killing of unarmed civilians by U.S. Army troops during the Vietnam War at the village of My Lai in the Son Tinh district on 16 March, 1968.

REMEMBRANCE: POST COLD WAR PERIOD

Porch, Douglas, **“Historiographical Essay: Writing History in the ‘End of History’ Era: Reflections on Historians and the GWOT.”** Vol.70, No.4 (October, 2006), pp.1065-1079. Addresses the danger of history being twisted by partisans, polemicists, and ideologues into

an apologia for contemporary U.S. policy, and ultimately as a weapon of intimidation to silence doubt, dissent, disagreement, and even debate, which serves neither the cause of history, nor of policy and strategy formulation, nor even of democracy in a moment of national peril.

RHODESIA – See: ZIMBABWE / RHODESIA

RIDGWAY, MATTHEW (1895-1993)

Bacevich, A.J. **“The Paradox of Professionalism: Eisenhower, Ridgway, and the Challenge to Civilian Control, 1953-1955.”** Vol.61, No.2 (April, 1997), pp.303-333. By focusing on the U.S. Army’s efforts to undermine President Eisenhower’s (1953-1961) policy of massive nuclear retaliation, this article attempts to depict the actual terms of the civil-military relationship within the innermost circles of the U.S. government to determine the realities and limits of civilian control of the armed forces.

RIF WAR (1921-26)

Alvarez, Jose E. **“Between Gallipoli and D-Day: Alhucemas, 1925.”** Vol.63, No.1 (January, 1999), pp.75-98. Recounts the Spanish amphibious landing at Alhucemas Bay on 8 September, 1925, during the Rif Rebellion in North Africa.

RIVERINE WARFARE

Marolda, Edward J. **“Orphan of the Mekong Delta: The Army-Navy Mobile Riverine Force.”** Vol.80, No.4 (October, 2016), pp.1149-1181. Despite its success during the Tet Offensive of 1968, the failure of Army and Navy leaders to fully embrace the creation of the Army-Navy Mobile Riverine Force resulting in its disbanding by Gen. Creighton Abrams (1914-1974).

Kemmerly, Phillip R. **“Rivers, Rails, and Rebels: Logistics and Struggle to Supply U.S. Army Depot at Nashville, 1862-1865.”** Vol.84, No.3 (July, 2020), pp.713-746. Highlights the indispensable support provided by the U.S. Army depot at Nashville, Tennessee, for Union operations in the Western Theater, which, in turn, depended upon the Louisville-Nashville railway line and the Cumberland River kept open by the U.S. Navy.

ROBINS, AUGUSTINE WARNER (1882-1940)

Meilinger, Phillip S. **“Historiographical Essay: U.S. Air Force Leaders: A Biographical Tour.”**

Vol.62, No.4 (October, 1998), pp.833-870.

ROMANIA

DiNardo, R.L. **“The Dysfunctional Coalition: The Axis Powers and the Eastern Front in World War II.”** Vol.60, No.4 (October, 1996), pp.711-730. Illustrates that German arrogance, compounded by muddled political and strategic thinking, inadequate resources, widely varying capabilities, and linguistic differences, rendered the Axis Coalition a costly failure.

Statiev, Alexander, **“Antonescu’s Eagles against Stalin’s Falcons: The Romanian Air Force, 1920-1941.”** Vol.66, No.4 (October, 2002), pp.1085-1113. Gives an account of how, though it was favored over the Army, the Air Force was assigned missions that exceeded its capacity so that it was brought to the brink of extinction.

Werrell, Kenneth P. **“Friction in Action: Revisiting the U.S. Army Air Forces’ August 1943 Raid on Ploesti.”** Vol.83, No.2 (April, 2019), pp.509-540. Looks at the Ploesti Raid from the perspective of planning and outcomes, pointing to failure of flexible leadership in the face of minor unforeseen factors that had a major impact on the effectiveness of the mission.

ROMMEL, ERWIN (1891-1944)

Scianna, Bastian Matteo, **“Rommel Almighty? Italian Assessment of the ‘Desert Fox’ during and after the Second World War.”** Vol.82, No.1 (January, 2018), pp.125-145. The Italian view based on new primary material, including the eavesdropping by British intelligence on Italian officers held as P.O.W.s in both Egypt and Britain.

ROOSEVELT, FRANKLIN (1882-1945)

Weinberg, Gerhard L. **“The George C. Marshall Lecture in Military History: Some Myths of World War II.”** Vol.75, No.3 (July, 2011), pp.701-718. Includes issues surrounding Winston Churchill, Adolf Hitler, Yamamoto Isoroku, Benito Mussolini, Franklin Roosevelt, and Josef Stalin, as well as the Yalta Conference, the Morgenthau Plan for Germany, and the ubiquity of horses in the Second World War.

ROOSEVELT, THEODORE (1901-09)

Oyos, Matthew M. **“Theodore Roosevelt and the Implements of War.”** Vol.60, No.4 (October, 1996), pp.631-655. Brings to light an overlooked aspect of Roosevelt’s presidency (1901-1909),

his role in accelerating the pace of military technological modernization, including involvement with battleships, submarines, aircraft, and machine guns.

ROPP, THEODORE (1911-2000)

Finch, Michael P.M. “**Theodore Ropp’s *Makers of Modern Strategy* Revisited and the Course of Military History, 1945-1981.**” Vol.82, No.4 (October, 2018), pp.1231-1257. Though it was never completed, Theodore Ropp’s (1911-2000) project to update his 1943 edition reflected some of the ways in which military history had developed since the conclusion of World War II.

ROSENBERG, ANNA M. (1899-1983)

Nelson, Anna Kasten, “**Anna M. Rosenberg, an ‘Honorary Man’.**” Vol.68, No.1 (January, 2004), pp.133-161. Considers how and why Defense Secretary George C. Marshall (1880-1959) bucked political and gender assumptions when he appointed a pro-New Deal, Jewish immigrant woman, Anna M. Rosenberg (1899-1983), as the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower.

ROSTOW, WALT (1916-2003)

Milne, David, “**‘Our Equivalent of Guerrilla Warfare’: Walt Rostow and the Bombing of North Vietnam, 1961-1968.**” Vol.71, No.1 (January, 2007), pp.169-203. Claims that Walt Rostow’s (1916-2003) background as an economic historian led him to become one of the strongest advocates for the strategic bombing of North Vietnam.

RUMSFELD, DONALD H. (1932-2021)

Coleman, Bradley Lynn and Schultz, Timothy A. “**The Cornerstone of Joint Force Transformation: The Standing Joint Force Headquarters at U.S. Southern Command, 2001-2011.**” Vol.85, No.4 (October, 2021), pp.1029-1060. The difficulties of Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld (1932-2021) to establish Standing Joint Force Headquarters for each of the geographic combatant commands is examined by using the U.S. Southern Command as an example.

RUSSIA / SOVIET UNION

Wirtschafter, Elise Kimerling, “**Social Misfits: Veterans and Soldier’s Families in Servile Russia [1682-1874].**” Vol.59, No.2 (April, 1995), pp.215-235. Endeavors to understand

the relationship between military service and social categories in Imperial Russia, beginning with the reign of Peter the Great in 1682 up to the introduction of universal conscription in 1874.

Jackson, Aaron P. **“Review Essay: Expanding the Scope and Accessibility of Non-Western Military History.”** Vol.75, No.2 (April, 2011), pp.603-613. Covering works on China, India, and Russia.

Paine, Sarah C.M. **“The 2022 George C. Marshall Lecture in Military History: Centuries of Security: Chinese, Russian and U.S. Continental versus Maritime Approaches.”** Vol.86, No.4 (October, 2022), pp.813-836.

RUSSIA / SOVIET UNION: EARLY MODERN PERIOD (1480-1789)

Paul, Michael C. **“The Military Revolution in Russia, 1550-1682.”** Vol.68, No.1 (January, 2004), pp.9-45. Asserts that the Armed Forces of the tsars underwent truly revolutionary changes between the mid-sixteenth and late-seventeenth centuries that made Imperial Russia a significant power and laid the groundwork for the reforms of Peter the Great.

Parker, Geoffrey, **“Review Essay: A Soldier of Fortune in Seventeenth Century Eastern Europe.”** Vol.76, No.2 (April, 2012), pp.545-548. Examines Diary of General Patrick Gordon of Auchleuchries 1635-1699, the account of a Scottish Catholic who, like many Early-Modern Scots, served in the armies of Sweden, Poland, and Russia. See also: Parker, Geoffrey, “Review Essay: Patrick Gordon Rides Again.” Vol.79, No.4 (October, 2015), pp.1127-1129.

Parker, Geoffrey, **“Review Essay: Patrick Gordon Rides Again.”** Vol.79, No.4 (October, 2015), pp.1127-1129. Examines The remaining volumes of the diary of General Patrick Gordon of Auchleuchries 1635-1699, the account of a Scottish Catholic who, like many Early-Modern Scots, served in the armies of Sweden, Poland, and Russia. See also: Parker, Geoffrey, “Review Essay: A Soldier of Fortune in Seventeenth Century Eastern Europe.” Vol.76, No.2 (April, 2012), pp.545-548.

Halperin, Charles J. **“Ivan IV’s State Cossacks.”** Vol.82, No.2 (April, 2018), pp.357-371. During the reign of Ivan IV (1533-1584) Muscovite ‘State Cossacks’ lived in urban enclaves, fought under the command of a government-appointed colonels, most were infantry, and a large percentage were armed with firearms.

Sproule, Joseph, **“Raiding, Pillaging, and Violent Social Change in Late Sixteenth-Century Livonia.”** Vol.85, No.2 (April, 2021), pp.317-341. Establishes how the pervasiveness of raiding dictated tactical and strategic considerations, influenced military policy, shaped civil-military relations, and played a role in breaking down longstanding social mores, transforming societies, normalizing violence.

RUSSIA / SOVIET UNION: THE SEVEN YEARS WAR (1756-63)

Davies, Brian, **“The Russian Baltic Fleet in the Seven Years’ War.”** Vol.86, No.3 (July, 2022), pp.557-572. Charts the rise and fall and rise again of the Russian Baltic Fleet, from the reign of Peter ‘the Great’ (r.1682-1725) to that of Catherine ‘the Great’ (r.1762-1796).

RUSSIA / SOVIET UNION:

FRENCH REVOLUTIONARY AND NAPOLEONIC WARS (1792-1815)

Mikaberidze, Alexander, **“Historiographical Essay: Recent Trends in the Russian Historiography of the Napoleonic Wars.”** Vol.74, No.1 (January, 2010), pp.189-194.

RUSSIA / SOVIET UNION: BOXER REBELLION (1899-1901)

Otte, T.G. **“From *Can-Can Diabolique* to *Sitzkrieg*: The International China Expeditionary Force, 1900-1901.”** Vol.77, No.4 (October, 2013), pp.1277-1302. Analyzes a neglected example of coalition warfare.

RUSSIA / SOVIET UNION: EARLY 20th CENTURY

Podsoblyayev, Evgenii; King, Francis and Biggart, John, **“The Russian Naval General Staff and the Evolution of Naval Policy, 1905-1914.”** Vol.66, No.1 (January, 2002), pp.37-69. Addresses the neglected perspective of the connections between the formulation of naval strategy for the Baltic Sea, warship construction, and Imperial Russia’s aspirations to become a great naval power.

RUSSIA / SOVIET UNION: WORLD WAR I (1914-18)

Wilson, Timothy, **“Broken Wings: The Curtis Aeroplane Company, K-Boats, and the Russian Navy, 1914-1916.”** Vol.66, No.4 (October, 2002), pp.1061-1083. Indicates that the contention between Curtiss and the Imperial Russian Government over the purchase of fifty-six flying boats impeded Russia’s operations in the Black Sea for the first eighteen months of World War I.

Armes, Keith, **“French Intelligence on the Russian Army on the Eve of the First World War.”** Vol.82, No.3 (July, 2018), pp.759-782.

Wright, Donald P. **“ ‘Clouds Gathering on the Horizon’: The Russian Army and the Preparation of the Imperial Population for War, 1906-1914.”** Vol.83, No.4 (October, 2019), pp.1133-1160.

RUSSIA / SOVIET UNION: INTERWAR PERIOD (1919-39)

Corum, James S. **“The Spanish Civil War: Lessons Learned and not Learned by the Great**

Powers.” Vol.62, No.2 (April, 1998), pp.313-334. Considers what the British, French, German, Italian, Soviet, and United States armed forces learned or failed to learn from the study of the air war in Spain within the context of how armed forces undergo reform.

Reese, Roger R. **“Red Army Professionalism and the Communist Party, 1918-1941.”** Vol.66, No.1 (January, 2002), pp.71-102. Explores the social and institutional dynamics that shaped the Red Army’s officer corps and determined the extent of its ability to face the Nazi invasion.

Phillips, Gervase, **“Scapegoat Arm: Twentieth-Century Cavalry in Anglophone Historiography.”** Vol.71, No.1 (January, 2007), pp.37-74. Too often used as a scapegoat for failures in war and an obstacle to modernization in peacetime, this article reassesses the capabilities of early twentieth-century soldiers, with a consideration of the military history of Eastern Europe, presenting a more positive interpretation of role of cavalry in modern warfare.

Stone, David R. **“Misreading Svechin: Attrition, Annihilation, and Historicism.”** Vol.76, No.3 (July, 2012), pp.673-693. Debunks the interpretation that the Soviet military theorist Aleksandr Svechin (1878-1938) favored attrition over annihilation, demonstrating, instead, that he was a historicist, who saw the precise balance between attrition and annihilation, or defense and offense, as constantly shifting as a result of changing material circumstances.

Matthews, James, **“Battling Bolshevik Bogeymen: Spain’s Cordon Sanitaire against Revolution from a European Perspective, 1917-1923.”** Vol.80, No.3 (July, 2016), pp.725-755. The violent social unrest experienced by Spain after 1917 represented the broader impact of the Russian Revolution that effected countries, whether they were belligerents in the Great War or neutrals like Spain.

Harrison, Richard W. **“Soviet Planning for War, 1936-1941: The ‘Preventative Attack’ Thesis in Historical Context.”** Vol.83, No.3 (July, 2019), pp.769-794.

Plotnikov, Dmitry, **“Still Misreading Svechin: Annihilation, Attrition, and the Strategic and Operational Implications.”** Vol.86, No.3 (July, 2022), pp.670-687. Addresses misunderstanding relating to the concepts of annihilation and attrition in the writings of the Imperial Russian and Soviet military theorist Aleksandr Svechin (1878-1938).

RUSSIA / SOVIET UNION: RUSSO-POLISH WAR (1919-21)

Borzęcki, **“Battle of Warsaw, 1920: Was Radio Intelligence the Key to Polish Victory over the Red Army?”** Vol.81, No.2 (April, 2017), pp.447-468. A look at what recent Polish literature has to say about the role of radio-intelligence in the Russo-Polish War, 1919-1920.

RUSSIA / SOVIET UNION: RUSSO-FINISH WINTER WAR (1939-40)

Reese, Roger R. **“Lessons of the Winter War: A Study in the Military Effectiveness of the Red Army, 1939-1940.”** Vol.72, No.3 (July, 2008), pp.825-852. Based on newly consulted primary sources, this article confronts the notion of a uniformly dismal performance of the Red Army during the Winter War.

RUSSIA / SOVIET UNION: WORLD WAR II (1939-45)

Glantz, David M. **“Soviet Military Strategy during the Second Period of War (November 1942 – December 1943): A Reappraisal.”** Vol.60, No.1 (January, 1996), pp.115-150.

Seeks to clarify the broader strategic context of the goals the Soviets sought, but failed, to achieve during the ‘Second Period of the Great Patriotic War.’

Perras, Galen Roger, **“We have Opened the Door to Tokyo: United States Plans to Seize the Kurile Islands, 1943-1945.”** Vol.61, No.1 (January, 1997), pp.65-91. Proposals to defeat Imperial Japan by attacking the Home Islands through a campaign in the Northern Pacific, including the potential complications for U.S.-Soviet relations.

Shepardson, Donald E. **“The Fall of Berlin and the Rise of a Myth.”** Vol.62, No.1 (January, 1998), pp.135-154. Refutes the notions of United States naiveté and British realism in dealing with both their German enemy and their Soviet ally in the spring of 1945.

Glantz, David M. **“Historiographical Essay: The Red Army at War, 1941-1945: Sources and Interpretations.”** Vol.62, No.3 (July, 1998), pp.595-617.

Jacobs, Harry A. **“Operation Strakonice: In Pursuit of the Soviet Order of Battle.”** Vol.65, No.2 (April, 2001), pp.391-400. Chronicles the successful mission of the U.S. military intelligence unit, Order of Battle Team 24, to seize German documents detailing Soviet forces, documents that were located beyond the Line of Demarcation in Czechoslovakia.

Nenninger, Timothy K. **“United States Prisoners of War and the Red Army, 1944-45: Myths and Realities.”** Vol.66, No.3 (July, 2002), pp.761-781. When the Soviets overran German P.O.W. camps, they came into the possession of some 28,000 U.S. soldiers, the repatriation of which proved complicated.

Hill, Alexander, **“British Lend Lease Aid and the Soviet War Effort, June 1941 – June 1942.”** Vol.71, No.3 (July, 2007), pp.773-808. Measures the significance of the aid provided by Great Britain during the First Moscow Protocol to the end of June, 1942.

Glantz, David M. **“Review Essay: Stalingrad Revisited.”** Vol.72, No.3 (July, 2008), pp.907-910.

Pennington, Reina, **“Offensive Women: Women in Combat in the Red Army in the Second World War.”** Vol.74, No.3 (July, 2010), pp.775-820. Reports on the nature and variety of

women's combat experiences.

Statiev, Alexander, **"Blocking Units in the Red Army."** Vol.76, No.2 (April, 2012), pp.475-495. Concerning Joseph Stalin's (1878-1953) 'No Step Back!' Order No.227.

Wildermuth, David W. **" 'I am fully aware of my guilt...': Insights from a Soviet Military Tribunal's Investigation of the German Army's 35th Division, 1946-47."** Vol.83, No.4 (October, 2019), pp.1189-1212. Weighing the credibility of both perpetrator and eyewitness statements from Soviet tribunals for information on the actions of officers and soldiers of the German 35th Division during anti-partisan operations in April, 1944.

Gilbin, Daniel F. **"Seeds of Victory: Satisfying the needs of the Red Army and the Soviet State during the Formation of the Kursk Salient, February – May 1943."** Vol.84, No.4 (October, 2020), pp.1157-1188. Reviews an example of the Soviet Army's practice of incorporating the civilian population in the rear areas near the frontlines in various forms of support, including the role of re-installed civilian government in recently liberated territory.

RUSSIA / SOVIET UNION: COLD WAR PERIOD (1945-91)

Millett, Allan R. **"A Reader's Guide to the Korean War."** Vol.61, No.3 (July, 1997), pp.583-597.

Xiaoming Zhang, **"China and the Air War in Korea, 1950-1953."** Vol.62, No.2 (April, 1998), pp.335-370. Looks at the development of the People's Republic of China's Air Force during the war, the role played by the Soviet Union, and the emergence of an air warfare strategy.

Weldemichael, Awet T. **"The Eritrean Long March: The Strategic Withdrawal of the Eritrean People's Liberation Front (E.P.L.F.), 1978-1979."** Vol.73, No.4 (October, 2009), pp.1231-1271. Despite the battlefield victories achieved by the Soviet backed Ethiopian offensives, as a guerrilla force, the Eritrean proved to be more adaptable to the changing circumstances, enabling them to go over to the tactical offensive by 1980.

Young, James L., Jr. **"The Heights of Ineptitude: The Syrian Army's Assault on the Golan Heights."** Vol.74, No.3 (July, 2010), pp.847-870. Argues that, during the 1973 Yom Kippur War, it was primarily the Syrian's tactical incompetence and failure to adhere to Soviet operational doctrine that ensured Israeli victory on the Golan Heights, notwithstanding the bravery of the Israeli troops.

S

SABATTÉ, FERNAND (1874-1940)

Moore, Andrew, “**Monuments Men and Martyred Towns: *The Arras Belfry* by Fernand Sabatté.**” Vol.79, No.4 (October, 2015), pp.1047-1057. Sabatté (1874-1940) served as a French officer in charge of evacuating artworks from Medieval churches and town halls that were under the threat of destruction as well as painting an example of the ‘martyred towns’ genre.

EL SALVADOR

Courtney, Jocelyn, “**The Civil War that was fought by Children: Understanding the Role of Child Combatants in El Salvador’s Civil War, 1980-1992.**” Vol.74, No.2 (April, 2010), pp.523-556. Explores the legacy of the extensive reliance on child soldiers by both the Salvadoran government and the Farabundo Martí Front for National Liberation in terms of demobilization issues and postwar societal problems.

SANDEMAN, ROBERT GROVES (1835-92)

Tripodi, Christian, “**‘Good for one but not the other’: The ‘Sandeman System’ of Pacification as Applied to Baluchistan and the North-West Frontier, 1877-1947.**” Vol.73, No.3 (July, 2009), pp.767-802. Looks at why the Government of India declared Colonel Sir Robert Groves Sandeman’s (1835-1892) innovative doctrine of tribal administration inapplicable for the troubled North West Frontier, despite its having achieved success in Baluchistan.

SARDINIA, KINGDOM OF – See: ITALY

SAXONY – See: GERMANY

SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH: ITALY

De Ninno, Fabio, “**A Technological Fiasco: Scientific Research, Institutional Culture, and Fascism in the Italian Navy (1919-1940).**” Vol.84, No.3 (July, 2020), pp.798-824. Explains that the failure of the Italian Navy to develop and adopt new technologies, such as radar and sonar, was rooted in an opposition to technological change within the culture of the officer corps, compounded by inter-service rivalry and the chaos of the Fascist regime.

SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH: U.S.A.

Neufeld, Michael J. “**The End of the Army Space Program: Interservice Rivalry and the**

Transfer of the von Braun Group to N.A.S.A., 1958-1959.” Vol.69, No.3 (July, 2005), pp.737-757.

Deitchman, Seymour J. **“The ‘Electronic Battlefield’ in the Vietnam War.”** Vol.72, No.3 (July, 2008), pp.869-887. Concludes that the proposal of the Jason Group of scientists for a network of sensors and aircraft to detect activity on the Ho Chi-Minh Trail in Laos, though not totally successful, impacted the course of the war and foreshadowed key aspects of the equipment and operation of the U.S. Armed Forces today.

Smith, Jason W. **“Twixt the Devil and the Deep Blue Sea: Hydrography, Sea Power, and the Marine Environment, 1898-1901.”** Vol.78, No.2 (April, 2014), pp.575-604. Endeavors to understand the role played by knowledge of the marine environment in the Spanish-American War, 1898.

Petrina, Stephen, **“Scientific Ammunition to Fire at Congress: Intelligence, Reparations, and the U.S. Army Air Forces, 1944-1947.”** Vol.83, No.3 (July, 2019), pp.795-829. Appraises the place of intelligence and reparations in U.S. Army Air Force and U.S. Air Force postwar research and development.

SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH: ARCHAEOLOGY

Greenhalgh, Michael, **“French Military Reconnaissance in the Ottoman Empire during the Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries as a Source for Our Knowledge of Ancient Monuments.”** Vol.66, No.2 (April, 2002), pp.359-388. Displays how a combination of the intellectual background of many French officers and the Ottoman reuse of Classical Greek and Roman ruins for military purposes resulted in valuable archaeological information in reports preserved in French military archives.

Cline, Eric H. and Sutter, Anthony, **“Battlefield Archaeology at Armageddon: Cartridge Cases and the 1948 Battle for Megiddo, Israel.”** Vol.75, No.1 (January, 2011), pp.159-190. Israeli Archaeologists investigating the ancient history of Megiddo, came across 213 spent Czechoslovakian cartridge cases, with which they attempted to reconstruct the fighting that took place at that location during the 1948 war.

Wheeler, Everett L. **“The Archaeology of War in Late Antiquity.”** Vol.78, No.3 (July, 2014), pp.1081-1093. A critical examination of a two-volume collection of papers originally presented at a 2007 Oxford conference.

Fulton, Michael S. **“The Siege of Montfort and Mamluk Artillery Technology in 1271: Integrating the Archaeology and Topography with the Narrative Sources.”** Vol.83, No.3 (July, 2019), pp.689-717. An investigation into the development of mechanical artillery, specifically the trebuchet, through the study of archaeologically unearthed projectiles and

the suitability of the surrounding terrain for the deployment of trebuchets.

Gyucha, Attila; Lee, Wayne E. and Rózsa, Zoltán, **“The Mongol Campaign in Hungary, 1241-1242: The Archaeology and History of Nomadic Conquest and Massacre.”** Vol.83, No.4 (October, 2019), pp.1021-1066. This article integrates conquest process theory, literary evidence, and data from substantial new archaeological work to explore the motivation and nature of Mongol invasions and the consequences for rural settlements on the Great Hungarian Plain.

SCOTLAND

Parker, Geoffrey, **“Review Essay: A Soldier of Fortune in Seventeenth Century Eastern Europe.”** Vol.76, No.2 (April, 2012), pp.545-548. Examines Diary of General Patrick Gordon of Auchleuchries 1635-1699, the account of a Scottish Catholic who, like many Early-Modern Scots, served in the armies of Sweden, Poland, and Russia. See also: Parker, Geoffrey, “Review Essay: Patrick Gordon Rides Again.” Vol.79, No.4 (October, 2015), pp.1127-1129.

Parker, Geoffrey, **“Review Essay: Patrick Gordon Rides Again.”** Vol.79, No.4 (October, 2015), pp.1127-1129. Examines The remaining volumes of the diary of General Patrick Gordon of Auchleuchries 1635-1699, the account of a Scottish Catholic who, like many Early-Modern Scots, served in the armies of Sweden, Poland, and Russia. See also: Parker, Geoffrey, “Review Essay: A Soldier of Fortune in Seventeenth Century Eastern Europe.” Vol.76, No.2 (April, 2012), pp.545-548.

Paoletti, Ciro, **“The Battle of Culloden: A Pivotal Moment in World History.”** Vol.81, No.1 (January, 2017), pp.187-198. Highlights the international context of the Battle of Culloden, 16 April, 1746, and speculates on the wider consequences of a Hanoverian defeat.

Grummitt, David, **“Flodden 1513: Re-Examining British Warfare at the End of the Middle Ages.”** Vol.82, No.1 (January, 2018), pp.9-28. Asserts that the English Army that fought the forces lead by King James IV (1473-1513) on 9 September, 1513, was more modern than its Scottish counterpart, just as its commander, Thomas Howard, the Earl of Surrey (1443-1524), was more of a ‘Renaissance General’ than James IV.

SCOTT, WINFIELD (1786-1866)

Arndt, Jochen S. **“The True Napoleon of the West: General Winfield Scott’s Mexico City Campaign [1847] and the Origins of the U.S. Army’s Combined-Arms Combat Division.”** Vol.76, No.3 (July, 2012), pp.649-671. Ventures to prove that General Winfield Scott (1786-1866) organized the Army of the Invasion of Mexico according to the French system of combined arms divisions, enabling

him to replicate the Napoleonic era's aggressive operational tactics.

Arnold, James R. **"Winfield Scott Makes a Name for Himself."** Vol.76, No.4 (October, 2012), pp.1183-1185. General Winfield Scott (1786-1866) first came to public notice during the War of 1812, during which he demonstrated a talent for training troops, but did the Duke of Wellington (1769-1852) ever actually say "Scott is lost" when commenting on Scott's Mexico City Campaign (1847).

Swenson, Benjamin J. **"'Measures of Conciliation': Winfield Scott, Henry Halleck, and the Origins of U.S. Army Counterinsurgency Doctrine."** Vol.86, No.4 (October, 2022), pp.859-881. Explores the collaboration between Major General Winfield Scott (1786-1866), who implemented policies intended to forestall insurgency, and General Henry Halleck (1815-1872), who made a study of Napoleon's failed occupation of Spain, in developing U.S. Army counterinsurgency doctrine, which impacted the formation of international laws of war.

SENEGAL

Benbow, Tim, **"'Menace' to 'Ironclad': The British Operations against Dakar (1940) and Madagascar (1942)."** Vol.75, No.3 (July, 2011), pp.769-809. Investigates why, regarding two separate British operations against Vichy French colonies in Africa, 'Menace' failed, while 'Ironclad' succeeded.

Woodfork, Jacqueline, **"It is a Crime to be a *Tirailleur* in the Army."** Vol.77, No.1 (January, 2013), pp.115-139. Presents the contrast between the rights of indigenous civilians in the French colony of Senegal and those of the *Tirailleur sénégalais*.

SERBIA

Lyon, James M.B. **"'A Peasant Mob': The Serbian Army on the Eve of the Great War."** Vol.61, No.3 (July, 1997), pp.481-502. In contrast to previous studies, this article seeks to assess the Army's preparedness on the eve of World War I based on Serbian archival sources, as opposed to Hapsburg sources.

Fitzpatrick, David J. **"Emory Upton and the Citizen Soldier."** Vol.65, No.2 (April, 2001), pp.355-389. Refutes the accepted notion of Upton's opposition to citizen-soldiers and democracy. The article includes a review of Upton's (1839-1881) reflections on the military systems in India and Serbia.

DiNardo, Richard L. **"The Limits of Technology: The Invasion of Serbia, 1915."** Vol.79, No.4 (October, 2015), pp.981-995. By focusing on the different forms of technology employed by

the invading forces of the Central Powers, the author explains how they benefitted the invaders, but also had their limitations.

THE SEVEN YEARS WAR (1756-63)

Kingsley, Ronald F. and Alexander, Harvey J. **“The Failure of Abercromby’s Attack on Fort Carillon, July 1758, and the Scapegoating of Matthew Clerk.”** Vol.72, No.1 (January, 2008), pp.43-70. A reassessment, based on letters and other documents, that calls into question the degree that the young engineer, Matthew Clerk, contributed to the defeat of the British attack on Fort Carillon (Fort Ticonderoga) during the French and Indian War. See also: McCulloch, Ian Macpherson, **“ ‘A Blanket of Inconsistencies’: The Battle of Ticonderoga, 2008.”** Vol.72, No.3 (July, 2008), Vol.72, No.1 (January, 2008), pp.889-900.

McCulloch, Ian Macpherson, **“ ‘A Blanket of Inconsistencies’: The Battle of Ticonderoga, 2008.”** Vol.72, No.3 (July, 2008), pp.889-900. A response to Ronald F. Kingsley and Harvey J. Alexander’s article, **“The Failure of Abercomby’s Attack on Fort Carillon, July 1758, and the Scapegoating of Matthew Clerk.”** Vol.72, No.1 (January, 2008), pp.43-70.

Willis, Sam, **“The Battle of Lagos, 1759.”** Vol.73, No.3 (July, 2009), pp.745-765. Though an indecisive engagement, Royal Navy Vice-Admiral Edward Boscawen’s (1711-1761) squadron weakened the French Mediterranean fleet that was sailing to join the French Atlantic fleet, thus serving as an important precursor to the Battle of Quiberon Bay, November, 1759.

Vandervort, Bruce, **“Review Essay: Remembering the Empire of France in America.”** Vol.74, No.1 (January, 2010), pp.195-199.

Hall, John W. **“An Irregular Reconsideration of George Washington and the American Military Tradition.”** Vol.78, No.3 (July, 2014), pp.961-993. Attempts to reconcile the contradictory interpretations of George Washington’s (1732-1799) approach to and performance in the conduct of war.

Tzoref-Ashkenazi, Chen, **“German Military Participation in Early Modern European Colonialism.”** Vol.80, No.3 (July, 2016), pp.671-695. Brings to light the employment of German mercenaries in the colonial ventures of different European kingdoms.

Boutin, Cameron, **“Adversary and Ally: The Role of Weather in the Life and Career of George Washington.”** Vol.81, No.3 (July, 2017), pp.693-718.

Davies, Brian, **“The Russian Baltic Fleet in the Seven Years’ War.”** Vol.86, No.3 (July, 2022), pp.557-572. Charts the rise and fall and rise again of the Russian Baltic Fleet, from the reign of Peter ‘the Great’ (r.1682-1725) to that of Catherine ‘the Great’ (r.1762-1796).

SHERIDAN, PHILIP (1831-88)

Rafuse, Ethan S. “ ‘Little Phil’, a ‘Bad Old Man’, and the ‘Gray Ghost’: Hybrid Warfare and the Fight for the Shenandoah Valley, August-November 1864.” Vol.81, No.3 (July, 2017), pp.775-801. Uses Major General Philip Sheridan’s (1831-1888) successful campaign against the combination of Confederate regular and irregular forces as a case study of addressing the challenges of hybrid warfare.

SHERMAN, WILLIAM TECUMSEH (1820-91)

Grandstaff, Mark R. “Preserving the ‘Habits and Usages of War’: William Tecumseh Sherman, Professional Reform and the U.S. Army Officer Corps, 1865-1881, Revisited.” Vol.62, No.3 (July, 1998), pp.521-545.

Bower, Stephen E. “The Theology of the Battlefield: William Tecumseh Sherman and the U.S. Civil War.” Vol.64, No.4 (October, 2000), pp.1005-1034. Focuses on the role of Sherman’s (1820-1891) nondenominational religious faith in his experiences in the Civil War.

Castel, Albert, “Liddell Hart’s *Sherman: Propaganda as History*.” Vol.67, No.2 (April, 2003), pp.405-426. Concludes that Liddell Hart’s 1929 biography of U.S. Civil War General William Tecumseh Sherman (1820-1891) is seriously flawed, both factually and analytically, because it was written to validate the author’s concept of the ‘indirect approach’ in warfare.

SHOUP, DAVID M. (1904-83)

Jablon, Howard, “General David M. Shoup, U.S.M.C.: Warrior and War Protester.” Vol.60, No.3 (July, 1996), pp.513-538. Claims that the same hard-headed pragmatism that made General Shoup (1904-83) a reliable Marine Corps officer led him to conclude that U.S. involvement in Vietnam was ultimately a pointless waste of American lives.

SIERRA LEONE

Stapleton, Timothy J. “Sexual Health in Britain’s West African Colonial Army (1898-1960).” Vol.85, No.3 (July, 2021), pp.619-645. Following an initial neglect due to greater concern over tropical diseases, British officers became obsessed with the threat of venereal diseases, reflecting colonial stereotypes surrounding race and gender.

SIKORSKI, WLADYSLAW (1881-1943)

Ponichtera, Robert M. **“The Military Thought of Wladyslaw Sikorski.”** Vol.59, No.2 (April, 1995), pp.279-301. Offers a description of Sikorski’ (1881-1943) pursuit of political goals through the promotion of Polish military strength throughout his career, from within the Austro-Hungarian Empire to the leadership of the Polish state in exile.

SIMONDS, GUY (1930-74)

Perrun, Jody, **“Best-Laid Plans: Guy Simonds and Operation Totalize, 7-10 August 1944.”** Vol.67, No.1 (January, 2003), pp.137-173. Probes the role of airpower in Operation Totalize, which, the author claims, calls for a reassessment of Lieutenant General Simonds (1903-1974) leadership of the II Canadian Corps.

SIMS, WILLIAM (1858-1936)

Hughes, Thomas, **“Learning to Fight: Bill Halsey and the Early American Destroyer Force.”** Vol.77, No.1 (January, 2013), pp.71-90. The outcome of Admiral Halsey’s (1882-1959) service under Admiral William Sims (1858-1936) as a destroyer Captain, 1914-1922.

SINGAPORE

Wilkins, Thomas S. **“Review Essay: Anatomy of a Military Disaster: The Fall of ‘Fortress Singapore’ 1942.”** Vol.73, No.1 (January, 2009), pp.221-230.

Kwan, Toh Boon, **“ ‘It was a thrill to see rows of B-29s going through the sky’: The Strategic Bombing of Singapore, 1944-45.”** Vol.73, No.3 (July, 2009), pp.905-924. Reports on an overlooked campaign in the U.S. strategic Air War in Asia from the perspective of U.S. bomber crews, Japanese occupation forces in Singapore, local civilians, and internees, noting that the experiences of the latter have, in particular, been neglected.

Tian Ser Seah, Joshua-John, **“Singapore, Hong Kong, and the Royal Navy’s War in Korea, c.1950-1953: Part 1.”** Vol.83, No.4 (October, 2018), pp.1213-1234; **“Part 2.”** Vol.84, No.1 (January, 2020), pp.237-260.

SLAVERY

Krebs, Daniel, **“Useful Enemies: The Treatment of German Prisoners of War during the American War of Independence.”** Vol.77, No.1 (January, 2013), pp.9-39. Narrates how, to boost morale, revolutionaries staged elaborate rituals with P.O.W.s, that local citizens hired captive soldiers as laborers, and that, after the victory at Yorktown, 1781, Congress and the Continental Army allowed P.O.W.s to go free after a cash payments and even sold some into indentured servitude.

Laband, John, **“The Slave Soldiers of Africa.”** Vol.81, No.1 (January, 2017), pp.9-38. Presents a broad overview of the long history of African military slavery, which the author notes was not limited to Muslim states, was adapted by European colonial powers, and has re-emerged in the phenomenon of child soldiers.

Rogers, Clifford J. **“Medieval Strategy and the Economics of Conquest.”** Vol.82, No.3 (July, 2018), pp.709-738. Approaching the question in a quantitative fashion, the author seeks to show how Medieval kings could make war pay for war, especially in urbanized areas and in times and places where it was permitted to enslave enemy populations.

SMALLPOX – See: BIOLOGICAL AND MEDICAL ISSUES

SOMALILAND

Gordon, Andrew, **“Time after Time in the Horn of Africa.”** Vol.74, No.1 (January, 2010), pp.107-144. Provides an examination of the British joint, amphibious assault on the Dervish stronghold of Illig, Somaliland, in 1904.

SOMERVILLE, JAMES (1882-1949)

Lasterle, Philippe, **“Could Admiral Gensoul have Averted the Tragedy of Mers el-Kébir?”** Vol.67, No.3 (July, 2003), pp.835-844. Admiral Marcel-Bruno Gensoul (1880-1973) commanded the French fleet at Mers el-Kébir, Algeria, when it was bombarded by a British force commanded by Admiral James Somerville (1882-1949) on 3 July, 1940.

SOMOZA GARCIA, ANASTASIO (1896-1956)

Moulton, Aaron Coy, **“The Dominican Dictator’s Funds and Guns in Costa Rica’s Wars of 1948.”** Vol.85, No.3 (July, 2021), pp.713-733. Whereas past studies of the conflicts in Costa Rica have focused on the involvement of Anastasio Somoza García of Nicaragua (1896-1956) and Juan José Arévalo of Guatemala (1904-1990), the author demonstrates that Costa Ricans sought to obtain

arms from the Dominican Dictator Rafael Trujillo (1891-1961).

SOSNKOWSKI, KAZIMIERZ (1885-1969)

Schwonek, Matthew R. **“Kazimierz Sosnkowski as Commander in Chief: The Government-in-Exile and Polish Strategy, 1932-1944.”** Vol.70, No.3 (July, 2006), pp.743-780.

SOULT, NICHOLAS JEAN-DE-DIEU (1769-1851)

Rodriguez, Manuel Santirso, **“Under the Uniform: Tyrants and Praetorians in the Aftermath of the Revolution (1829-1854).”** Vol.83, No.2 (April, 2019), pp.379-407. Weighs the parallels and differences in the lives and careers of Nicholas Jean-de-Dieu Soult of France (1769-1851), Arthur Wellesley, the Duke of Wellington of Great Britain (1769-1852), Baldomero Espartero of Spain (1793-1879), and Andrew Jackson of the United States (1767-1845).

SOUTH AFRICA

See Also: 2nd ANGLO-BOER WAR

Moore, Bob, **“Unwanted Guests in Troubled Times: German Prisoners of War in the Union of South Africa, 1942-1943.”** Vol.70, No.1 (January, 2006), pp.63-90. Contrasts the potential threats to domestic security in South Africa during a time of internal dissention of holding German P.O.W.s with the less troublesome experience with Italian prisoners.

Badsey, Stephen, **“The Boer War (1899-1902) and British Cavalry Doctrine: A Re-Evaluation.”** Vol.71, No.1 (January, 2007), pp.75-97. Rejecting the traditional interpretation, the article proposes that a cavalry reform movement incorporating dismounted tactics pre-dated the Second Anglo-Boer War, a mixture of mounted and dismounted tactics were used by both sides in the conflict, and that the problems experienced by cavalry were largely not of their own making

Miller, Stephen M. **“The British Way of War: Cultural Assumption and Practices in the South African War, 1899-1902.”** Vol.77, No.4 (October, 2013), pp.1329-1347. Cosmopolitanism, political egalitarianism, and attitudes towards race influenced the British conduct of the war.

SOUTH ASIA – See: INDIA; PAKISTAN

SOVIET UNION – See: RUSSIA / SOVIET UNION

SPAATZ, CARL A. (1891-1974)

Meilinger, Phillip S. “**Historiographical Essay: U.S. Air Force Leaders: A Biographical Tour.**” Vol.62, No.4 (October, 1998), pp.833-870.

SPAIN: MEDIEVAL PERIOD (476-1480)

Kagay, Donald J. “**The Defense of the Crown of Aragon during the War of the Two Pedros (1356-1366).**” Vol.71, No.1 (January, 2007), pp.11-33. Undertakes to show that the War of the Two Pedros established the administrative and military forces that would ultimately lead toward a unified Spanish kingdom in the fifteenth century.

SPAIN: EARLY MODERN PERIOD (1480-1789)

Kerner, Alex, “**Espionage and Field Intelligence in the Conquest of México, 1519-1521.**” Vol.78, No.2 (April, 2014), pp.469-501. Identifies the types of intelligence sources and information-gathering systems available to both sides during the fateful events of 1519-1521, and their role in the outcome of this milestone in the New World’s history.

Sherer, Idan, “**‘All of Us, in One Voice, Demand what’s Owed Us’: Mutiny in the Spanish Infantry during the Italian Wars, 1525-1538.**” Vol.78, No.3 (July, 2014), pp.893-926. The author notes the similarities between these all too frequent mutinies and strikes initiated and resolved by modern employees.

SPAIN: EIGHTY YEARS WAR (1566-1648)

Arfaioli, Maurizio, “**Bastion of Empire: The Italian *terzo Vecchio* of the Army of Flanders (1597-1682).**” Vol.85, No.1 (January, 2021), pp.27-50. An examination of the service of the longest-lived infantry unit, the *terzo Vecchio*, in an effort to better understand Italian involvement in the long conflict within the Spanish Low Countries.

SPAIN: PORTUGUESE RESTORATION WAR (1640-68)

White, Lorraine, “**Strategic Geography and the Spanish Habsburg Monarchy’s Failure to Recover Portugal, 1640-1668.**” Vol.71, No.2 (April, 2007), pp.373-409. Contrasting Alba’s (1507-1582) successful campaign in 1580 with the course of this mid-17th century conflict, the article considers the impact of geographic and climactic factors on the strategy, tactics, and logistics of the Spanish forces.

SPAIN: FRENCH REVOLUTIONARY AND NAPOLEONIC WARS (1792-1815)

Barker, Thomas M. **“A Debacle of the Peninsular War: The British-led Amphibious Assault against Fort Fuengirola 14-15 October 1810.”** Vol.64, No.1 (January, 2000), pp.9-52.

Reassesses the failed amphibious assault by a multi-national force under the command of the Eleventh Lord Blayney, General Andrews Thomas.

Morgan, John, **“War Feeding War? The Impact of Logistics on the Napoleonic Occupation of Catalonia.”** Vol.73, No.1 (January, 2009), pp.83-116. The inability of the French occupation forces to live off the land meant that alternate sources and modes of supply had to be relied upon in the midst of guerrilla resistance and the British blockade of Catalan ports, all of which negatively impacted French operations.

Esdaile, Charles, **“Review Essay: Recent Writing on Napoleon and His Wars.”** Vol.73, No.1 (January, 2009), pp.209-220. Contains four works that cover the struggle specifically between Britain and France from 1792 to 1815, Napoleon’s (1769-1821) skill as a commander on all levels of warfare, and the guerrilla war in Spain.

Esdaile, Charles, **“Spain 1808 – Iraq 2003: Some Thoughts on the Use and Abuse of History.”** Vol.74, No.1 (January, 2010), pp.173-188. Disputes comparisons of Napoleon’s intervention in Spain, George Bush’s (r.2001-2009) intervention in Iraq, and the subsequent counterinsurgency campaigns, arguing that they are based on false notions about the war in Spain.

Davey, James, **“The Repatriation of Spanish Troops from Denmark, 1808: The British Government, Logistics, and Maritime Supremacy.”** Vol.74, No.3 (July, 2010), pp.689-707. When Spain rebelled against French occupation, the British government responded by, among other things, preparing and executing the repatriation of the Spanish regiments formerly fighting for Napoleon in northern Europe.

Esdaile, Charles J. **“Review Essay: Recent Works of Note on the Peninsular War (1808-1815).”** Vol.74, No.4 (October, 2010), pp.1243-1252.

Campos, Jorge Planas and De Blas, Antonio Grjal, **“French and Allied Officer Casualties in the Peninsular War (1808-1814): A New Examination.”** Vol.85, No.4 (October, 2021), pp.889-905.

SPAIN: 19th CENTURY

Rodriguez, Manuel Santirso, **“Under the Uniform: Tyrants and Praetorians in the Aftermath of the Revolution (1829-1854).”** Vol.83, No.2 (April, 2019), pp.379-407. Weighs the parallels and differences in the lives and careers of Nicholas Jean-de-Dieu Soult of France (1769-1851), Arthur Wellesley, the Duke of Wellington of Great Britain (1769-1852), Baldomero Espartero

of Spain (1793-1879), and Andrew Jackson of the United States (1767-1845).

SPAIN: EARLY 20th CENTURY

Matthews, James, **“Battling Bolshevik Bogeymen: Spain’s Cordon Sanitaire against Revolution from a European Perspective, 1917-1923.”** Vol.80, No.3 (July, 2016), pp.725-755. The violent social unrest experienced by Spain after 1917 represented the broader impact of the Russian Revolution that effected countries, whether they were belligerents in the Great War or neutrals like Spain.

SPAIN: RIF WAR (1921-26)

Alvarez, Jose E. **“Between Gallipoli and D-Day: Alhucemas, 1925.”** Vol.63, No.1 (January, 1999), pp.75-98. Recounts the Spanish amphibious landing at Alhucemas Bay on 8 September, 1925, during the Rif Rebellion in North Africa.

SPAIN: CIVIL WAR (1936-39)

Corum, James S. **“The *Luftwaffe*’s Army Support Doctrine, 1918-1941.”** Vol.59, No.1 (January, 1995), pp.53-76. Covers close air support doctrine and training, development and implementation, from the Spanish Civil War to Operation Barbarossa.

Sullivan, Brian R. **“Review Essay: Fascist Italy’s Military Involvement in the Spanish Civil War.”** Vol.59, No.4 (October, 1995), pp.697-727. Surveys the existing literature concerning Benito Mussolini’s (1883-1945) commitment some 70,000 soldiers of the *Corpo Truppe Volontarie* and over 700 warplanes of the *Aviazione Legionaria* to the Nationalist cause, including the publications of official histories.

Corum, James S. **“The Spanish Civil War: Lessons Learned and not Learned by the Great Powers.”** Vol.62, No.2 (April, 1998), pp.313-334. Considers what the British, French, German, Italian, Soviet, and United States armed forces learned or failed to learn from the study of the air war in Spain within the context of how armed forces undergo reform.

Cerdá, Néstor, **“Political Ascent and Military Commander: General Franco in the Early Months of the Spanish Civil War, July-October 1936.”** Vol.75, No.4 (October, 2011), pp.1125-1157. Displays how General Francisco Franco (1892-1975) exploited the opportunities presented by the setbacks to the coup plotters in July through August, 1936, to rise from being merely another general supporting the uprising to the position of commander-in-chief of the Nationalist Army and head of the government.

Lines, Lisa, **“Francisco Franco as Warrior: Is It Time for a Reassessment of His Military Leadership?”** Vol.81, No.2 (April, 2017), pp.513-534. Critiques Franco’s (1892-1975)

performance as a military commander within the context of his cultural and political environment.

Wagner, Erich, **“Ingenuity, Excess, Incompetence, and Luck: Air-Resupply Anecdotes in Military History.”** Vol.84, No.2 (April, 2020), pp.427-457. Reviews six case studies from taken the Second Italo-Ethiopian War (1935-1936), the Spanish Civil War (1936-1939), the Battle of Stalingrad (1942), Operation Market Garden (1944), the Battle of the Chosin Reservoir (1950), and the Battle of Dien Bien Phu (1954).

SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR (1898)

Smith, Jason W. **“Twixt the Devil and the Deep Blue Sea: Hydrography, Sea Power, and the Marine Environment, 1898-1901.”** Vol.78, No.2 (April, 2014), pp.575-604. Endeavors to understand the role played by knowledge of the marine environment in the Spanish-American War, 1898.

Krueger, David, **“The Red Cross, the Daughters of the American Revolution, and the Origins of the Army Nurse Corps in the Spanish-American War.”** Vol.83, No.2 (April, 2019), pp.409-434. Determines that the work of contract nurses, promoted by the Daughters of the American Revolution Hospital Corps and the Red Cross, demonstrated the capability and necessity of female nurses in the military, the Army chose to establish a professional nurse corps rather than rely on volunteers.

SPARTA – See: ANCIENT PERIOD

SPORTS – See: CULTURE: SPORTS

STACEY, CHARLES PERRY (1906-89)

Sarty, Roger, **“The American Origins of Academic Military History in Canada: Princeton University, the Carnegie Endowment, and C.P. Stacey’s *Canada and the British Army*.”** Vol.82, No.2 (April, 2018), pp.439-460.

STALIN, JOSEPH (1878-1953)

Weinberg, Gerhard L. **“The George C. Marshall Lecture in Military History: Some Myths of World War II.”** Vol.75, No.3 (July, 2011), pp.701-718. Includes issues surrounding Winston Churchill, Adolf Hitler, Yamamoto Isoroku, Benito Mussolini, Franklin Roosevelt, and Josef

Stalin, as well as the Yalta Conference, the Morgenthau Plan for Germany, and the ubiquity of horses in the Second World War.

Statiev, Alexander, **“Blocking Units in the Red Army.”** Vol.76, No.2 (April, 2012), pp.475-495. Concerning Joseph Stalin’s (1878-1953) ‘No Step Back!’ Order No.227.

Xiaogang Lai, Sherman, **“ ‘The Devil is in the Details’: Mao Zedong before and after the Luochuan Conference, August 1937.”** Vol.85, No.4 (October, 2021), pp.930-953. Relates how Mao Zedong (1893-1976) succeeded in convincing both the Chinese Communist Party and Joseph Stalin (1878-1953) to adopt his strategy of guerrilla warfare.

STARRY, DONN A. (1925-2011)

Bronfeld, Saul, **“Fighting Outnumbered: The Impact of the Yom Kippur War on the U.S. Army.”** Vol.71, No.2 (April, 2007), pp.465-498. Illustrates the different ways in which the Yom Kippur War impacted the work of Generals William E. DePuy (1919-1992) and Donn A. Starry (1925-2011) in reforming the U.S. Army.

STRATEGIC BOMBING – See: AIR WARFARE

STRATEGY

Paine, Sarah C.M. **“The 2022 George C. Marshall Lecture in Military History: Centuries of Security: Chinese, Russian and U.S. Continental versus Maritime Approaches.”** Vol.86, No.4 (October, 2022), pp.813-836.

STRATEGY: arranged chronologically by historical period or conflict – **ANCIENT PERIOD (to 476)**

Hanson, Victor Davis, **“Historiographical Essay: The Status of Ancient Military History: Traditional Work, Recent Research, and On-Going Controversies.”** Vol.63, No.2 (April, 1999), pp.379-413. A very thorough survey covering works on every conceivable topic concerning the armed forces and conduct of warfare in the age of ancient Greece and Rome.

Kagan, Kimberly, **“Redefining Roman Grand Strategy.”** Vol.70, No.2 (April, 2006), pp.333-362. By scrutinizing the patterns of troop movements provided by surviving sources, the author proposes that Roman Emperors directed how to allocate resources empire-wide to meet objectives, which satisfies the definition of a grand strategy.

Tucci, Jim, **“Historiographical Essay: Warfare in the Ancient World.”** Vol.74, No.3 (July, 2010), pp.878-899.

Wheeler, Everett L. **“The Archaeology of War in Late Antiquity.”** Vol.78, No.3 (July, 2014), pp.1081-1093. A critical examination of a two-volume collection of papers originally presented at a 2007 Oxford conference.

STRATEGY: arranged chronologically by historical period or conflict –

MEDIEVAL PERIOD (476-1480)

Harari, Yuval Noah, **“Strategy and Supply in Fourteenth-Century Western European Invasion Campaigns.”** Vol.64, No.2 (April, 2000), pp.297-333. Seeks to understand both how food for men and animals was ensured by logistical trains versus plunder, and to what extent the chosen or imposed form of supply placed restrictions on strategy.

Bachrach, Bernard, **“Charlemagne and the Carolingian General Staff.”** Vol.66, No.2 (April, 2002), pp.313-357. Contends that the personnel and procedures relied upon by Emperor Charlemagne (747-814) for intelligence and planning fulfill the qualifications for a modern general staff.

Bachrach, David S. **“Restructuring the Eastern Frontier: Henry I of Germany, 924-936.”** Vol.78, No.1 (January, 2014), pp.9-35. Analyzes the establishment of a defense in depth against Magyar raiders, relying on garrisoned fortifications.

Bachrach, Bernard S. and Bachrach, David S. **“Bruno of Mersburg Saxon War: A Study in Eleventh-Century German Military History.”** Vol.81, No.2 (April, 2017), pp.341-367. Bruno of Mersburg’s account of the civil wars fought by King Henry IV (1056-1106) provides valuable information on the nature and conduct of warfare in north-central Europe during this period.

Rogers, Clifford J. **“Medieval Strategy and the Economics of Conquest.”** Vol.82, No.3 (July, 2018), pp.709-738. Approaching the question in a quantitative fashion, the author seeks to show how Medieval kings could make war pay for war, especially in urbanized areas and in times and places where it was permitted to enslave enemy populations.

Gyucha, Attila; Lee, Wayne E. and Rózsa, Zoltán, **“The Mongol Campaign in Hungary, 1241-1242: The Archaeology and History of Nomadic Conquest and Massacre.”** Vol.83, No.4 (October, 2019), pp.1021-1066. This article integrates conquest process theory, literary evidence, and data from substantial new archaeological work to explore the motivation and nature of Mongol invasions and the consequences for rural settlements on the Great Hungarian Plain.

STRATEGY: arranged chronologically by historical period or conflict –

EARLY MODERN PERIOD (1480-1789)

Croxton, Derek, “**‘The Prosperity of Arms is Never Continual’: Military Intelligence, Surprise, and Diplomacy in 1640s Germany.**” Vol.64, No.4 (October, 2000), pp.981-1003.

Capponi, Niccolò, “***Le Palle di Marte: Military Strategy and Diplomacy in the Grand Duchy of Tuscany under Ferdinand II de’Medici (1621-1670).***” Vol.68, No.4 (October, 2004), pp.1105-1141.

White, Lorraine, “**Strategic Geography and the Spanish Habsburg Monarchy’s Failure to Recover Portugal, 1640-1668.**” Vol.71, No.2 (April, 2007), pp.373-409. Contrasting Alba’s (1507-1582) successful campaign in 1580 with the course of this mid-17th century conflict, the article considers the impact of geographic and climactic factors on the strategy, tactics, and logistics of the Spanish forces.

Sproule, Joseph, “**Raiding, Pillaging, and Violent Social Change in Late Sixteenth-Century Livonia.**” Vol.85, No.2 (April, 2021), pp.317-341. Establishes how the pervasiveness of raiding dictated tactical and strategic considerations, influenced military policy, shaped civil-military relations, and played a role in breaking down longstanding social mores, transforming societies, normalizing violence.

STRATEGY: arranged chronologically by historical period or conflict –

WAR OF THE SPANISH SUCCESSION (1701-15)

Ostwald, Jamel, “**The ‘Decisive’ Battle of Ramillies, 1706: Prerequisites for Decisiveness in Early Modern Warfare.**” Vol.64, No.3 (July, 2000), pp.649-677. Asks whether eighteenth century military strategy was indecisive by choice rather than by necessity by looking at the 1st Duke of Marlborough, John Churchill’s (1650-1722), Ramillies campaign.

Dee, Darryl, “**The Survival of France: Logistics and Strategy in the 1709 Flanders Campaign.**” Vol.84, No.4 (October, 2020), pp.1021-1050. Shines a light on the significant role of logistics in the debate concerning whether the French field army in Flanders should pursue an aggressive or cautious strategy during the first year of the War of the Spanish Succession, 1701-1715, arguing that this established a pattern for the remainder of the conflict.

STRATEGY: arranged chronologically by historical period or conflict –

U.S. REVOLUTIONARY WAR (1775-83)

Becker, Ann M. “**Smallpox in Washington’s Army: Strategic Implications of the Disease during**

the American Revolutionary War.” Vol.68, No.2 (April, 2004), pp.381-430.

Weddle, Kevin J. “**‘A Change of both Men and Measures’: British Reassessment of Military Strategy after Saratoga, 1777-1778.**” Vol.77, No.3 (July, 2013), pp.837-865.

STRATEGY: arranged chronologically by historical period or conflict –
FRENCH REVOLUTIONARY AND NAPOLEONIC WARS (1792-1815)

Leggiere, Michael V. “**From Berlin to Leipzig: Napoleon’s Gamble in North Germany, 1813.**” Vol.67, No.1 (January, 2003), pp.39-48. Claims that the Allies’ defense of Berlin defeated Napoleon’s strategy. Significantly contributing to his expulsion from Germany.

STRATEGY: arranged chronologically by historical period or conflict –
WAR OF 1812 (1812-15)

Kastor, Peter J. “**Toward ‘The Maritime War Only’: The Question of Naval Mobilization, 1811-1812.**” Vol.61, No.3 (July, 1997), pp.455-480. Applies the broader context of the ‘New Military History’, particularly political circumstances, in an effort to better understand President James Madison’s (1809-1817) naval policy and strategy leading up to the outbreak of the War of 1812.

STRATEGY: arranged chronologically by historical period or conflict –
2nd ITALIAN WAR OF UNIFICATION (1859-61)

Schneid, Frederick C. “**A Well-Coordinated Affair: Franco-Piedmontese War Planning in 1859.**” Vol.76, No.2 (April, 2012), pp.395-425. Demonstrates that the Franco-Piedmontese general staffs undertook extensive planning that incorporating the new technologies of railways and steam ships, so that the Second War of Italian Unification (1859-1861) qualifies, alongside the more familiar U.S. Civil War and German Wars of Unification, as one of the first ‘modern’ wars of the industrial age.

STRATEGY: arranged chronologically by historical period or conflict –
U.S. CIVIL WAR (1861-65)

Dwyer, Christopher S. “**Raiding Strategy: As Applied by the Western Confederate Cavalry in the American Civil War.**” Vol.63, No.2 (April, 1999), pp.263-281. Offers the explanation that the failure of the Confederate Cavalry in the Western Theater was not due to any lack of success in the raids that were conducted, but to the misuse made of these raids in the overall strategy of Confederate theater commanders.

Stoker, Donald, **“Forum: Confederate Military Strategy in the U.S. Civil War: There was no Offensive-Defensive Confederate Strategy.”** Vol.73, No.2 (April, 2009), pp.571-590.

Dawson, Joseph G., III, **“Forum: Confederate Military Strategy in the U.S. Civil War: Jefferson Davis and the Confederacy’s ‘Offensive-Defensive’ Strategy in the U.S. Civil War.”** Vol.73, No.2 (April, 2009), pp.591-613.

Badsey, Stephen; Stoker, Donald and Dawson, Joseph G., III **“Forum: Confederate Military Strategy in the U.S. Civil War – Revisited.”** Vol.73, No.4 (October, 2009), pp.1273-1287.

Bell, Andrew McIlwaine, **“ ‘Gallinippers & Glory’: The Links between Mosquito-borne Diseases and U.S. Civil War Operations and Strategy, 1862.”** Vol.74, No.2 (April, 2010), pp.379-405. Covers the physiological and psychological effects of malaria and yellow fever and their impact on military operations and strategy in 1862.

Smith, David G. **“ ‘Clear the Valley’: The Shenandoah Valley and the Genesis of the Gettysburg Campaign.”** Vol.74, No.4 (October, 2010), pp.1069-1096. Brings to light an overlooked motivation for General Robert E. Lee’s (1807-1870) Gettysburg Campaign, the need to clear the Shenandoah Valley of occupying U.S. troops due to a combination of home front discontent and logistical issues.

Canfield, Daniel T. **“Opportunity Lost: Combined Operations and the Development of Union Military Strategy, April 1861 – April 1862.”** Vol.79, No.3 (July, 2015), pp.657-690.

Petty, Adam H. **“Reconsidering the Wilderness’s Role in Battle, 4-6 May 1864.”** Vol.82, No.2 (April, 2018), pp.413-438. Questions the existing consensus regarding the influence of the forest known as the Wilderness on the battle of the same name.

STRATEGY: arranged chronologically by historical period or conflict –

LATE 19th THROUGH THE EARLY 20th CENTURY

Ripperger, Robert M. **“The Development of the French Artillery for the Offensive, 1890-1914.”** Vol.59, No.4 (October, 1995), pp.599-618. Advances the proposition that the French Army’s embrace of *offensive à l’outrance* produced strategies and tactics in which there was little room for heavy artillery.

Thompson, David G. **“Norwegian Military Policy, 1905-1940: A Critical Appraisal and Review of the Literature.”** Vol.61, No.3 (July, 1997), pp.503-520. Questions the reliance exclusively on British and German sources for an understanding of the 1940 Norwegian campaign, insisting that without knowledge of the role of the Norwegian government and armed forces, the picture is incomplete.

- Showalter, Dennis, **“From Deterrence to Doomsday Machine: The German Way of War, 1890-1914.”** Vol.64, No.3 (July, 2000), pp.679-710. Proposes that between 1890 and 1914 the German Army developed a siege mentality, the only solution for which was believed to be the refinement of operational capabilities, pursued at the expense of policy and strategy.
- Podsoblyayev, Evgenii; King, Francis and Biggart, John, **“The Russian Naval General Staff and the Evolution of Naval Policy, 1905-1914.”** Vol.66, No.1 (January, 2002), pp.37-69. Addresses the neglected perspective of the connections between the formulation of naval strategy for the Baltic Sea, warship construction, and Imperial Russia’s aspirations to become a great naval power.
- Johnson, R.A. **“ ‘Russians at the Gates of India’?: Planning the Defence of India, 1885-1900.”** Vol.67, No.3 (July, 2003), pp.697-743.
- Holmes, Terence M. **“Classical Blitzkrieg: The Untimely Modernity of Schlieffen’s Cannae Programme.”** Vol.67, No.3 (July, 2003), pp.745-771. Reveals that the Chief of the Prussian General Staff, Count Alfred von Schlieffen (1891-1906), only adopted the Cannae paradigm in 1909, four years *after* he had formulated his plans for war with France, and that this paradigm inadvertently fit subsequent concepts for mechanized warfare.
- Sumida, Jon Tetsuro, **“Review Essay: Gunnery, Procurement, and Strategy in the Dreadnought Era.”** Vol.69, No.4 (October, 2005), pp.1179-1187.
- Grimes, Shawn, **“The Baltic and Admiralty War Planning, 1906-1907.”** Vol.74, No.2 (April, 2010), pp.407-437. Reassessment of the Ballard Committee’s 1907 War Plans against Germany in the context of Norway’s gaining independence in 1905.
- Martin, Christopher, **“The Complexity of Strategy: ‘Jackie’ Fischer and the Trouble with Submarines.”** Vol.75, No.2 (April, 2011), pp.441-470. The problems of re-formulating strategy in the wake of the introduction of submarines for Admiral ‘Jackie’ Fischer (1841-1920), Prime Minister A.J. Balfour (r.1902-1905), and Julian Corbett (1854-1922).
- Paret, Peter, **“Clausewitz and Schlieffen as Interpreters of Frederick the Great: Three Phases in the History of Grand Strategy.”** Vol.76, No.3 (July, 2012), pp.837-845. Compares how Carl von Clausewitz (1780-1831) and Count Alfred von Schlieffen (1833-1913) interpreted Frederick the Great’s generalship, illustrating the function of historical study in the development of Clausewitz’s theories.
- Dunley, Richard, **“Technology and Tradition: Mine Warfare and the Royal Navy’s Strategy of Coastal Assault, 1870-1890.”** Vol.80, No.2 (April, 2016), pp.398-409.

STRATEGY: arranged chronologically by historical period or conflict –

WORLD WAR I (1914-18)

Overlack, Peter, **“The Force of Circumstances: Graf Spee’s Options for the East Asian Cruiser Squadron in 1914.”** Vol.60, No.4 (October, 1996), pp.657-682. Investigates how the denial of coaling stations by both Japan’s decision to join the Entente Powers and the actions of Australia and New Zealand severely constricted the choices available to Vice-Admiral Maximilian Reichsgraf von Spee (1861-1914).

Van Tuyll, Hubert P. **“The Dutch Mobilization of 1914: Reading the ‘Enemy’s’ Intentions.”** Vol.64, No.3 (July, 2000), pp.711-737. Establishes that the Dutch Armed Forces were aware that Von Schlieffen intended to violate Dutch neutrality and their response resulted in a change in Germans plans for war with France.

Herwig, Holger H. **“Germany and the ‘Short War’ Illusion: Toward a New Interpretation?”** Vol.66, No.3 (July, 2002), pp.681-693. A reassessment based on newly accessed documents from the *Reichsarchiv* in the former East Germany suggest that Imperial Germany’s military leaders recognized that a conflict that they initiated might last up to two or more years.

Kelly, Patrick J. **“Strategy, Tactics, and Turf Wars: Tirpitz and the *Oberkommando der Marine*, 1892-1895.”** Vol.66, No.4 (October, 2002), pp.1033-1060. Relies on previously ignored archival material to reexamine the development of Grand Admiral Alfred von Tirpitz’s (1849-1930) strategic and tactical thought, including some significant contradictions.

Doughty, Robert A. **“French Strategy in 1914: Joffre’s Own.”** Vol.67, No.2 (April, 2003), pp.427-454.

Karau, Mark, **“Twisting the Dragon’s Tail: The Zeebrugge and Ostend Raids of 1918.”** Vol.67, No.2 (April, 2003), pp.455-481.

Holmes, Terence M. **“‘One Throw of the Gambler’s Dice’: A Comment on Holger Herwig’s View of the Schlieffen Plan.”** Vol.67, No.2 (April, 2003), pp.513-516.

Steffen, Dirk, **“The Holtzendorff Memorandum of 22 December, 1916, and Germany’s Declaration of Unrestricted U-Boat Warfare.”** Vol.68, No.1 (January, 2004), pp.215-224. Examines how the Chief of the Imperial German Navy’s Admiralty Staff, Henning von Holtzendorff (1853-1919), successfully argued that Germany could risk provoking the United States entering the war in return for starving Great Britain into submission.

Lambert, Nicholas A. **“Strategic Command and Control for Maneuver Warfare: Creation of the Royal Navy’s ‘War Room’ System, 1905-1915.”** Vol.69, No.2 (April, 2005), pp.361-410.

Prete, Roy A. **“Joffre and the Origins of the Somme: A Study in Allied Military Planning.”**

Vol.73, No.2 (April, 2009), pp.417-448.

Doughty, Robert A. **“Papa’ Joffre and the Great War.”** Vol.79, No.4 (October, 2015), pp.959-979. Asks whether General Joseph Joffre’s (1852-1931) achievements are outweighed by his failures.

Morgan-Owen, David, **“War as it Might Have Been: British Sea Power and the First World War.”** Vol.83, No.4 (October, 2019), pp.1095-1131. Argues that because of shortcomings in Britain’s strategic decision-making apparatus, the alternatives to the attrition on the Western Front offered by British Sea Power never received due consideration.

Dunley, Richard, **“Operation Q: Churchill and Fisher’s Invasion of Germany, 1915?”** Vol.86, No.3 (July, 2022), pp.612-641. Reveals the pursuit of a naval strategy by First Lord of the Admiralty, Winston Churchill (1874-1965), and Admiral of the Fleet, John Arbuthnot Fisher (1841-1920) that came withing hours of execution in May, 1915, but was never acted upon.

STRATEGY: arranged chronologically by historical period or conflict –

MEXICAN PUNATIVE EXPEDITION (1916-17)

Beckstrand, Alex, **“Woodrow Wilson and the Struggle of Civil-Military Relations during the Punitive Expedition of 1916-1917.”** Vol.86, No.2 (April, 2022), pp.372-398. Argues that President Woodrow Wilson’s (1913-1921) decision to defer to his military commanders, Major General Frederick Funston (1865-1917) and Brigadier General John J. Pershing (1860-1948), was the cause of the failure to achieve the goals of the Punitive Expedition.

STRATEGY: arranged chronologically by historical period or conflict –

INTERWAR PERIOD (1919-39)

Thompson, David G. **“Norwegian Military Policy, 1905-1940: A Critical Appraisal and Review of the Literature.”** Vol.61, No.3 (July, 1997), pp.503-520. Questions the reliance exclusively on British and German sources for an understanding of the 1940 Norwegian campaign, insisting that without knowledge of the role of the Norwegian government and armed forces, the picture is incomplete.

Ferris, John, **“Fighter Defence before Fighter Command: The Rise of Strategic Air Defence in Great Britain, 1917-1934.”** Vol.63, No.4 (October, 1999), pp.845-884. Attests to the fact that the R.A.F. developed a sophisticated defense system against enemy bombers prior to the development of radar, laying the foundation for victory in the Battle of Britain.

Philpott, William and Alexander, Martin S. **“The French and the British Field Force: Moral Support or Material Contribution?”** Vol.71, No.3 (July, 2007), pp.743-772. Contends that, even though France viewed the military benefit of the British commitment of a field army if

war broke out with Germany as unsubstantial, the moral value of such a promise meant that it played an important role in France's preparations for war.

Kellner, Katrina E. and Perras, Galen Roger, “**‘A Perfectly Logical and Sensible Thing’: Billy Mitchell Advocates a Canadian-American Aerial Alliance Against Japan.**” Vol.72, No.3 (July, 2008), pp.785-823. As a result of his overlooked trip to Canada in 1923, Brigadier General Billy Mitchell (1879-1936) formulated a plan for employing an allied U.S.-Canadian strategic bombing force based in Alaska to wage war on Japan.

Neilson, Keith, “**The Royal Navy, Japan, and British Strategic Foreign Policy, 1932-1934.**” Vol.75, No.2 (April, 2011), pp.505-531. Japan's challenge to British interests affected British policy generally, and particularly Anglo-American relations, producing conflicting proposals from the Treasury, the Admiralty, and the Foreign Offices.

Holwitt, Joel I. “**Review Essay: Reappraising the Interwar U.S. Navy.**” Vol.76, No.1 (January, 2012), pp.193-210. New studies demonstrate that the interwar U.S. was frequently led by innovative leaders, willing to experiment with new technologies and able to use fleet exercises and an internal review process to creatively, but realistically, generate a strategy that worked within the geographical and treaty constraints of an expected war in the Pacific.

Gunsburg, Jeffrey A. “***La Grand Illusion: Belgian and Dutch Strategy Facing Germany, 1919 – May, 1940.***” Vol.78, No.1 (January, 2014), pp.101-158; Vol.78, No.2 (April, 2014), pp.605-671.

Van Tuyll, Hubert, “**Memory, Myth and Forgetting: The Netherlands and the World Wars.**” Vol.80, No.4 (October, 2016), pp.1073-1081. Advances the explanation that the inaccurate myths that evolved around Netherlands neutrality during World War I had an unfortunate impact on the country's defensive preparations leading up to World War II.

Harrison, Richard W. “**Soviet Planning for War, 1936-1941: The ‘Preventative Attack’ Thesis in Historical Context.**” Vol.83, No.3 (July, 2019), pp.769-794.

Wadle, Ryan, “**Failing to Speak the same Language: The Roots of ‘Jointness’ in the United States, 1919-1941.**” Vol.84, No.4 (October, 2020), pp.1097-1126. Sizes up the problems that interfered with attempts to create an interservice culture, promoted in efforts to integrate strategic planning, in professional military education, and large-scale joint exercises.

Xiaogang Lai, Sherman, “**‘The Devil is in the Details’: Mao Zedong before and after the Luochuan Conference, August 1937.**” Vol.85, No.4 (October, 2021), pp.930-953. Relates how Mao Zedong (1893-1976) succeeded in convincing both the Chinese Communist Party and Joseph Stalin (1878-1953) to adopt his strategy of guerrilla warfare.

Plotnikov, Dmitry, “**Still Misreading Svechin: Annihilation, Attrition, and the Strategic and Operational Implications.**” Vol.86, No.3 (July, 2022), pp.670-687. Addresses misunderstanding relating to the concepts of annihilation and attrition in the writings of the Imperial Russian and Soviet military theorist Aleksandr Svechin (1878-1938).

STRATEGY: arranged chronologically by historical period or conflict –

WORLD WAR II (1939-45): AXIS

DiNardo, R.L. “**The Dysfunctional Coalition: The Axis Powers and the Eastern Front in World War II.**” Vol.60, No.4 (October, 1996), pp.711-730. Illustrates that German arrogance, compounded by muddled political and strategic thinking, inadequate resources, widely varying capabilities, and linguistic differences, rendered the Axis Coalition a costly failure.

Yelton, David K. “***Ein Volk Steht Auf: The German Volkssturm and Nazi Strategy, 1944-45.***” Vol.64, No.4 (October, 2000), pp.1061-1083. Explains that the *Volkssturm*, though based on flawed assumptions, was part of a coherent strategy that was intended to simultaneously fanaticize the civilian population and maximize Allied casualties beyond what their governments were willing to bare.

Wilson, Evan and Schapira, Ruth, “**German Perspectives on the U-Boat War, 1939-1941.**” Vol.85, No.2 (April, 2021), pp.369-398. Probes the conflict between what the Germans’ needed to secure a quick, decisive result, and the fact that the U-Boat was designed for a war of attrition, resulting in a pessimistic outlook on the part of Germany’s Naval leaders.

STRATEGY: arranged chronologically by historical period or conflict –

WORLD WAR II (1939-45): ALLIES

Kimball, Warren F. “**Stalingrad: A Chance for Choices.**” Vol.60, No.1 (January, 1996), pp.89-114. Delves into the significance of the Battle of Stalingrad for United States foreign policy.

Van Courtland Moon, John Ellis, “**United States Chemical Warfare Policy in World War II: A Captive of Coalition Policy?**” Vol.60, No.3 (July, 1996), pp.495-511.

Mulligan, Timothy P. “**Ship-of-the-Line or Atlantic Raider? Battleship *Bismarck* between Design Limitations and Naval Strategy.**” Vol.69, No.4 (October, 2005), pp.1013-1044.

Schwonek, Matthew R. “**Kazimierz Sosnkowski as Commander in Chief: The Government-in-Exile and Polish Strategy, 1932-1944.**” Vol.70, No.3 (July, 2006), pp.743-780.

Kennedy, Paul, “**History from the Middle: The Case of the Second World War.**” Vol.74,

No.1 (January, 2010), pp.35-51. Investigates the middle levels of war through examples from the middle of World War II when the chief operational objectives of the Allies were clearly established but had yet to be realized.

Weinberg, Gerhard L. **“The George C. Marshall Lecture in Military History: Some Myths of World War II.”** Vol.75, No.3 (July, 2011), pp.701-718. Includes issues surrounding Winston Churchill, Adolf Hitler, Yamamoto Isoroku, Benito Mussolini, Franklin Roosevelt, and Josef Stalin, as well as the Yalta Conference, the Morgenthau Plan for Germany, and the ubiquity of horses in the Second World War.

Lacey, James, **“World War II’s Real Victory Program.”** Vol.75, No.3 (July, 2011), pp.811-834. Challenges Maj. Albert C. Wedemeyer’s assertion that he was the author of the United States’ Victory Program.

Lacey, James, **“Historical Truth and Tilting at Windmills.”** Vol.77, No.1 (January, 2013), pp.267-272. Addresses the controversy surrounding U.S. Army General Albert C. Wedemeyer (1896-1989).

McLaughlin, John J. and Lomazow, Steven, **“Counterpoint: Albert Coady Wedemeyer.”** Vol.77, No.1 (January, 2013), pp.255-272.

Stoler, Mark A. **“The 2015 George C. Marshall Lecture in Military History: George C. Marshall and the ‘Europe-First Strategy, 1939-1951: A Study in Diplomatic as well as Military History.”** Vol.79, No.2 (April, 2015), pp.293-316. Examines the relationship between diplomatic and military history regarding Marshall’s (1880-1959) support for the strategy of ‘Germany First’ during World War II, for the postwar European Recovery Program, and the relief of Gen. Douglas MacArthur (1880-1964) during the Korean War.

Symonds, Craig, **“The 2017 George C. Marshall Lecture in Military History: For Want of a Nail: The Impact of Shipping on Grand Strategy in World War II.”** Vol.81, No.3 (July, 2017), pp.657-666. The remarkable success of U.S. ship building and its impact on Allied strategy.

STRATEGY: arranged chronologically by historical period or conflict –

WORLD WAR II (1939-45): ALLIED STRATEGIC BOMBING OFFENSIVE, EUROPE

Gentile, Gian P.; Becker, Carl; Commager, Henry S.; Gottschalk; Schmitt, Bernadotte and Malone, Dumas, **“Document of Note: General Arnold and the Historians.”** Vol.64, No.1 (January, 2000), pp.179-180. Concerning U.S. Army Air Force General ‘Hap’ Arnold’s (1886-1950) commissioning of a group of leading historians to determine whether strategic bombing could force Germany to capitulate by the spring of 1944.

STRATEGY: arranged chronologically by historical period or conflict –

WORLD WAR II (1939-45): THE BALKANS THEATER

Ewer, Peter, “**The British Campaign in Greece 1941: Assumptions about the Operational Art and Their Influence on Strategy.**” Vol.76, No.3 (July, 2012), pp.727-745. Inquires into the British decision to dispatch an expeditionary force to Greece and what it tells us about contemporary British Army doctrine.

STRATEGY: arranged chronologically by historical period or conflict –

WORLD WAR II (1939-45): MEDITERRANEAN THEATER

Stubbs, David, “**Reappraising the Royal Air Force Contribution to the Defense of Crete, 1941.**” Vol.84, No.2 (April, 2020), pp.459-486. Points out that the failure of the British and Commonwealth ground troops to retain control over the airfields was not the primary reason for defeat, given that the fighter squadrons necessary for the defense of the island were not scheduled to arrive in the Mediterranean Sea in time to participate in the battle, a fact known to decision makers in London.

STRATEGY: arranged chronologically by historical period or conflict –

WORLD WAR II (1939-45): EASTERN FRONT

Glantz, David M. “**Soviet Military Strategy during the Second Period of War (November 1942 – December 1943): A Reappraisal.**” Vol.60, No.1 (January, 1996), pp.115-150. Seeks to clarify the broader strategic context of the goals the Soviets sought, but failed, to achieve during the ‘Second Period of the Great Patriotic War.’

Hayward, Joel, “**Too Little, Too Late: An Analysis of Hitler’s Failure in August 1942 to Damage Soviet Oil Production.**” Vol.64, No.3 (July, 2000), pp.769-794. Claims that, had Adolf Hitler not been so fixated on Stalingrad, *Luftwaffe* assets could have been used to significantly disrupt the supply of oil to Soviet factories and forces.

Glantz, David M. “**Review Essay: Stalingrad Revisited.**” Vol.72, No.3 (July, 2008), pp.907-910.

Toprani, Anand, “**The First War for Oil: The Caucasus, German Strategy, and the Turning Point of the War on the Eastern Front, 1942.**” Vol.80, No.3 (July, 2016), pp.815-854.

STRATEGY: arranged chronologically by historical period or conflict –

WORLD WAR II (1939-45): NORTHWESTERN EUROPE THEATER (1944-45)

Ganz, A. Harding, “**Questionable Objective: The Brittany Ports, 1944.**” Vol.59, No.1 (January, [520]

1995), pp.77-96.

Shepardson, Donald E. **“The Fall of Berlin and the Rise of a Myth.”** Vol.62, No.1 (January, 1998), pp.135-154. Refutes the notions of United States naiveté and British realism in dealing with both their German enemy and their Soviet ally in the spring of 1945.

STRATEGY: arranged chronologically by historical period or conflict –
WORLD WAR II (1939-45): CHINA-BURMA-INDIA THEATER

Wilkins, Thomas S. **“Review Essay: Anatomy of a Military Disaster: The Fall of ‘Fortress Singapore’ 1942.”** Vol.73, No.1 (January, 2009), pp.221-230.

Macri, Franco David, **“ ‘C’ Force to Hong Kong: The Price of Collective Security in China, 1941.”** Vol.77, No.1 (January, 2013), pp.141-171. Concerning the strategic and political influences on the deployment of two Canadian infantry battalions to Hong Kong in November, 1941.

Charles, Patrick J. **“Dissecting the Origins of Air-Centric Special Operations Theory.”** Vol.81, No.3 (July, 2017), pp.803-828. Seeks to find the answers to the controversy surrounding whether British or U.S. officers deserve the most credit for developing the concepts that led to Operation THURSDAY, the airlanding of a specialized force behind Japanese lines in Burma in March, 1944, to disrupt enemy infrastructure and communications.

STRATEGY: arranged chronologically by historical period or conflict –
WORLD WAR II (1939-45): PACIFIC THEATER

Meixsel, Richard B. **“Major General George Grunert, WPO-3, and the Philippine Army, 1940-1941.”** Vol.59, No.2 (April, 1995), pp.303-324. Challenges the conventional account of the initial abandonment of War Plan Orange – 3 by the Commanding General of the Philippine Department, General Grunert (1881-1971), and Philippine Army Field Marshal, Douglas MacArthur (1880-1964).

Perras, Galen Roger, **“We have Opened the Door to Tokyo: United States Plans to Seize the Kurile Islands, 1943-1945.”** Vol.61, No.1 (January, 1997), pp.65-91. Proposals to defeat Imperial Japan by attacking the Home Islands through a campaign in the Northern Pacific, including the potential complications for U.S.-Soviet relations.

Giangreco, D.M. **“Casualty Projections for the U.S. Invasion of Japan, 1945-1946: Planning and Policy Implications.”** Vol.61, No.3 (July, 1997), pp.521-581. Demonstrates that those historians who have rejected President Harry Truman’s (1945-1953) claim that he expected huge losses from an invasion of the Japanese Home Islands have based their conclusions on

a combination of superficial research in the mass of related documents and specifically misinterpreting planning documents.

Fuquea, David C. **“Task Force One: The Wasted Assets of the United States Pacific Battleship Fleet, 1942.”** Vol.61, No.4 (October, 1997), pp.707-734. Explores the reasons behind Task Force One’s battleships languishing as a last line of defense during the first year of the war following Pearl Harbor.

Coox, Alvin D. **“Needless Fear: The Compromise of U.S. Plans to Invade Japan in 1945.”** Vol.64, No.2 (April, 2000), pp.411-437. The disappearance of top-secret material from Manila caused a great deal of concern, but post-war access to Japanese documents demonstrates that these stolen papers had no impact on defensive plans for Kyushu.

Burrell, Robert S. **“Breaking the Cycle of Iwo Jima Mythology: A Strategic Study of Operation Detachment.”** Vol.68, No.4 (October, 2004), pp.1143-1186. Questions the justification for the invasion of Iwo Jima, 19 February, 1945, explaining that the decision to invade was a matter of the competing agendas of the Navy, Army, and Army Air Force.

Hanley, Brian and Burrell, Robert S. **“The Myth of Iwo Jima: A Rebuttal [And Response].”** Vol.69, No.3 (July, 2005), pp.801-809.

STRATEGY: arranged chronologically by historical period or conflict –

COLD WAR (1945-91)

Marchio, James D. **“Risking General War in Pursuit of Limited Objectives: U.S. Military Contingency Planning for Poland in the Wake of the 1956 Hungarian Uprising.”** Vol.66, No.3 (July, 2002), pp.783-812. Reveals that the various problems in exploring options for coming to the defense of Poland in the wake of the suppression of the Hungarian uprising led the Eisenhower administration to develop more response options to compliment the doctrine of massive nuclear retaliation.

Hatzivassiliou, Evanthis, **“Cold War Pressures, Regional Strategies, and Relative Decline: British Military and Strategic Planning for Cyprus, 1950-1960.”** Vol.73, No.4 (October, 2009), pp.1143-1166. Highlights the significance of Cyprus as a secure base in the Middle East for Great Britain during the Cold War, particularly after the loss of the Suez Canal.

Stoler, Mark A. **“The 2015 George C. Marshall Lecture in Military History: George C. Marshall and the ‘Europe-First Strategy, 1939-1951: A Study in Diplomatic as well as Military History.”** Vol.79, No.2 (April, 2015), pp.293-316. Examines the relationship between diplomatic and military history regarding Marshall’s (1880-1959) support for the strategy of ‘Germany First’ during World War II, for the postwar European Recovery

Program, and the relief of Gen. Douglas MacArthur (1880-1964) during the Korean War.

Hughes, Geraint, **“Demythologising Dhofar: British Policy, Military Strategy, and Counter-Insurgency in Oman, 1963-1976.”** Vol.79, No.2 (April, 2015), pp.423-456. Demonstrates that the UK backed C.O.I.N. operations of the Sultanate of Oman placed a heavier reliance on military force than civil engagement and that specific historical circumstances make the ‘lessons learned’ less applicable for other conflicts.

Williamson, Corbin, **“Mediterranean Marines: The Challenges of Forward Deployment, 1948-1958.”** Vol.85, No.2 (April, 2021), pp.426-452. Considers the challenges to U.S. Marine Corps units deployed in the Mediterranean as part of President Truman’s commitment to containment of the Soviet Union.

STRATEGY: arranged chronologically by historical period or conflict –

CHINESE CIVIL WAR (1946-49)

Tanner, Harold M. **“Guerrilla, Mobile, and Base Warfare in Communist Military Operations in Manchuria, 1945-1947.”** Vol.67, No.4 (October, 2003), pp.1177-1222. Relates how, after initial setbacks while relying on a conventional war strategy, the Communists developed a hybrid strategy that turned the tide of the Civil War, enabling them to make a more successful transition from guerrilla to conventional warfare.

STRATEGY: arranged chronologically by historical period or conflict –

GREEK CIVIL WAR (1946-49)

Goulter, Christine J.M. **“The Greek Civil War: A National Army’s Counter-Insurgency Triumph.”** Vol.78, No.3 (July, 2014), pp.1017-1055. Challenges the assumption that victory resulted from Anglo-American training and equipment, rather than the Greek National Army’s successful development of an effective counter-insurgency strategy.

STRATEGY: arranged chronologically by historical period or conflict –

KOREAN WAR (1950-53)

Crane, Conrad C. **“Raiding the Beggar’s Pantry: The Search for Airpower Strategy in the Korean War.”** Vol.63, No.4 (October, 1999), pp.885-920. Contrasts the need to fight a limited war with the newly independent U.S. Air Force’s focus on nuclear warfare.

Werrell, Kenneth P. **“Across the Yalu: Rules of Engagement and the Communist Air Sanctuary during the Korean War.”** Vol.72, No.2 (April, 2008), pp.451-475. U.S. warplanes violated Chinese air space during the Korean War more frequently than was generally acknowledged,

often encouraged and sometimes led by field grade officers, with few pilots suffering punishment.

STRATEGY: arranged chronologically by historical period or conflict –

VIETNAM WAR (2nd Indochina War) (1955-75)

Kirkland, Faris R. **“The Attack on Cap Mui Lay, Vietnam, July 1968.”** Vol.61, No.4 (October, 1997), pp.735-760. Shines light on Operation Thor, a neglected example of joint operation in Vietnam and one that significantly disrupted North Vietnam’s strategic plans.

Carland, John M. **“Winning the Vietnam War: Westmoreland’s Approach in Two Documents.”** Vol.68, No.2 (April, 2004), pp.553-574.

Boylan, Kevin M. **“The Red Queen’s Race: Operation Washington Green and Pacification in Binh Dinh Province, 1969-70.”** Vol.73, No.4 (October, 2009), pp.1195-1230. Examines the operations conducted by the 173rd Airborne Brigade in Binh Dinh Province closely, which matched recommendations made by many of the critics of the way U.S. military forces was conducted the war and, therefore, offers insight into the likely effectiveness of an alternate strategy focused on population control.

Daddis, Gregory A. **“Eating Soup with a Spoon: The U.S. Army as a ‘Learning Organization’ in the Vietnam War.”** Vol.77, No.1 (January, 2013), pp.229-254. The U.S. Army’s strategic approach, operational experience, and organizational changes.

Boylan, Kevin M. **“Goodnight Saigon: American Provincial Advisors’ Final Impressions of the Vietnam War.”** Vol.78, No.1 (January, 2014), pp.233-270. Scrutinizes the revisionist proposition that the United States had won the war in the wake of the Tet Offensive, 1968, by examining the assessments of U.S. Province Senior Advisors.

Carland, John M. **“Daniel Ellsberg and the Tet Offensive.”** Vol.83, No.2 (April, 2019), pp.541-552. An analyst for the RAND Corporation and employee of both the Defense and State Departments, Daniel Ellsberg’s (1931-2023) critical assessment of the impact of the Tet Offensive, January, 1968, reflected a stage in his growing disillusionment with the war in Vietnam.

Trauschweizer, Ingo, **“Cautious Hawk: Maxwell Taylor and the Path to War in Vietnam.”** Vol.83, No.3 (July, 2019), pp.831-859. Relates the U.S. ambassador to Saigon’s, 1964-1965, opinions regarding the efficacy of bombing Hanoi and deploying ground forces to South Vietnam and their possible influence on the decisions of President Lyndon Johnson (1963-69).

Prentice, David L. **“‘Waltzing Matilda’ Out of Vietnam: Grand Strategy, Politics, and the Decision to Remove Australian Military Forces from Vietnam.”** Vol.86, No.3 (July, 2022), pp.642-669. When the United States chose to pursue the policy of ‘Vietnamization’, withdrawing

increasing numbers of U.S. troops, Australian Prime Minister John Gorton (r.1968-1971) sought to encourage U.S. resolve by retaining Australian troops in South Vietnam until 1970, when Gorton's government collapsed.

STRATEGY: arranged chronologically by historical period or conflict –

GUINEA-BISSAU WAR OF INDEPENDENCE (1963-74)

Dhada, Mustafah, “**The Liberation War in Guinea-Bissau Reconsidered.**” Vol.62, No.3 (July, 1998), pp.571-593. Disputes the image of a straightforward march to victory for the *Partido Africano de Independência de Guiné e Cabo Verde* (P.A.I.G.C.), demonstrating that, instead, it was a struggle involving moves and countermoves by Portuguese forces and the P.A.I.G.C., each designed to maintain or regain specific initiatives, each designed to check or checkmate the opponent.

STRATEGY: arranged chronologically by historical period or conflict –

IRAN-IRAQ WAR (1980-88)

Brands, Hal, “**Why did Saddam Invade Iran [1980]? New Evidence on Motives, Complexity, and the Israel Factor.**” Vol.75, No.3 (July, 2011), pp.861-885.

STRATEGY: arranged chronologically by historical period or conflict –

POST COLD WAR PERIOD

Porch, Douglas, “**Historiographical Essay: Writing History in the ‘End of History’ Era: Reflections on Historians and the GWOT.**” Vol.70, No.4 (October, 2006), pp.1065-1079. Addresses the danger of history being twisted by partisans, polemicists, and ideologues into an apologia for contemporary U.S. policy, and ultimately as a weapon of intimidation to silence doubt, dissent, disagreement, and even debate, which serves neither the cause of history, nor of policy and strategy formulation, nor even of democracy in a moment of national peril.

McMaster, H.R. “**The 2020 George C. Marshall Lecture in Military History: Developing Strategic Empathy: History as a Foundation of Foreign Policy and National Security Strategy.**” Vol.84, No.3 (July, 2020), pp.689-697.

STRATEGY arranged alphabetically by country - CHINA: MING DYNASTY (1368-1644)

Swope, Kenneth M. “**Manifesting Awe: Grand Strategy and Imperial Leadership in the Ming Dynasty.**” Vol.79, No.3 (July, 2015), pp.597-634. Affirms the development and use of an overarching grand strategy by the Ming Dynasty (1368-1644) and considers its relationship with the actual policy decisions and military operations of the dynasty's Emperors.

STRATEGY arranged alphabetically by country - ENGLAND / GREAT BRITAIN

Bell, Christopher M. “**‘Our Most Exposed Outpost’: Hong Kong and British Far Eastern Strategy, 1921-1941.**” Vol.60, No.1 (January, 1996), pp.61-88. Brings to light the vital, if overlooked role of Hong Kong as a base for offensive operations in British interwar plans for a war with Japan has been.

Black, Jeremy, “**Historiographical Essay: Britain as a Military Power, 1688-1815.**” Vol.64, No.1 (January, 2000), pp.159-177.

Johnson, R.A. “**‘Russians at the Gates of India’?: Planning the Defence of India, 1885-1900.**” Vol.67, No.3 (July, 2003), pp.697-743.

Tripodi, Christian, “**‘Good for one but not the other’: The ‘Sandeman System’ of Pacification as Applied to Baluchistan and the North-West Frontier, 1877-1947.**” Vol.73, No.3 (July, 2009), pp.767-802. Looks at why the Government of India declared Colonel Sir Robert Groves Sandeman’s (1835-1892) innovative doctrine of tribal administration inapplicable for the troubled North West Frontier, despite its having achieved success in Baluchistan.

Bell, Christopher M. “**Winston Churchill and the Ten Year Rule.**” Vol.74, No.4 (October, 2010), pp.1097-1128. Insists that criticisms of Churchill’s defense spending cutbacks during his tenure as Chancellor of the Exchequer (1924-29) exaggerate his authority and oversimplify his complex and shifting combination of political, financial, strategic, and bureaucratic goals.

STRATEGY arranged alphabetically by country - INDIA

Boesche, Roger, “**Kautilya’s *Arthaśāstra* on War and Diplomacy in Ancient India.**” Vol.67, No.1 (January, 2003), pp.9-37. Kautilya is believed to have been an adviser to the founder of the Mauryan Empire, Chandragupta (c.317-293 B.C.E.).

STRATEGY arranged alphabetically by country - U.S.A.

Bruscino, Thomas, “**Naturally Clausewitzian: U.S. Army Theory and Education from Reconstruction to the Inter-War Years.**” Vol.77, No.4 (October, 2013), pp.1251-1275. Though familiar with Carl von Clausewitz (1780-1831), U.S. Army officers independently embraced concepts that Clausewitz advocated.

STREICHEN, EDWARD (1879-1973)

Warren, Mame, “**Focal Point of the Fleet: U.S. Navy Photographic Activities in World War II.**”

Vol.69, No.4 (October, 2005), pp.1045-1079. Concerned with the work of Edward Streichen (1879-1973) and his team of professional photographers.

SUBMARINES – See: NAVAL WARFARE

SVECHIN, ALEKSANDR (1878-1938)

Stone, David R. **“Misreading Svechin: Attrition, Annihilation, and Historicism.”** Vol.76, No.3 (July, 2012), pp.673-693. Debunks the interpretation that the Soviet military theorist Aleksandr Svechin (1878-1938) favored attrition over annihilation, demonstrating, instead, that he was a historicist, who saw the precise balance between attrition and annihilation, or defense and offense, as constantly shifting as a result of changing material circumstances.

Plotnikov, Dmitry, **“Still Misreading Svechin: Annihilation, Attrition, and the Strategic and Operational Implications.”** Vol.86, No.3 (July, 2022), pp.670-687. Addresses misunderstanding relating to the concepts of annihilation and attrition in the writings of the Imperial Russian and Soviet military theorist Aleksandr Svechin (1878-1938).

SWEDEN

Robinson, Gavin, **“Equine Battering Rams? A Reassessment of Cavalry Charge in the English Civil War.”** Vol.75, No.3 (July, 2011), pp.719-731. Challenges the traditional notion that shock cavalry tactics imported from Sweden had replaced the caracole during the English Civil War and, in particular, contemplates the mechanics of cavalry shock tactics.

Parker, Geoffrey, **“Review Essay: A Soldier of Fortune in Seventeenth Century Eastern Europe.”** Vol.76, No.2 (April, 2012), pp.545-548. Examines Diary of General Patrick Gordon of Auchleuchries 1635-1699, the account of a Scottish Catholic who, like many Early-Modern Scots, served in the armies of Sweden, Poland, and Russia. See also: Parker, Geoffrey, **“Review Essay: Patrick Gordon Rides Again.”** Vol.79, No.4 (October, 2015), pp.1127-1129.

Dorn, Walter, **“The U.N.’s First ‘Air Force’: Peacekeepers in Combat, Congo 1960-64.”** Vol.77, No.4 (October, 2013), pp.1399-1425. Recounts O.N.U.C.’s Operation Grand Slam in December, 1962, during which Swedish jets neutralized Katanga’s air force.

Parker, Geoffrey, **“Review Essay: Patrick Gordon Rides Again.”** Vol.79, No.4 (October, 2015), pp.1127-1129. Examines The remaining volumes of the diary of General Patrick Gordon of Auchleuchries 1635-1699, the account of a Scottish Catholic who, like many Early-Modern Scots, served in the armies of Sweden, Poland, and Russia. See also: Parker, Geoffrey, **“Review Essay:**

A Soldier of Fortune in Seventeenth Century Eastern Europe.” Vol.76, No.2 (April, 2012), pp.545-548.

Ottosen, Morten Nordhagen, **“Ending War and Making Peace in Scandinavia, 1814-1848: ‘Peace Crisis’, Demobilization, and Reconciliation.”** Vol.80, No.1 (January, 2016), pp.145-172.

Wulff, Petter, **“Artillery, Light and Heavy: Sardinia-Piedmont and Sweden in the Nineteenth Century.”** Vol.80, No.1 (January, 2016), pp.173-185. Despite contrary requirements for polar opposite strategic circumstances, the cooperation of these two states produced path-breaking artillery technology.

Sproule, Joseph, **“Raiding, Pillaging, and Violent Social Change in Late Sixteenth-Century Livonia.”** Vol.85, No.2 (April, 2021), pp.317-341. Establishes how the pervasiveness of raiding dictated tactical and strategic considerations, influenced military policy, shaped civil-military relations, and played a role in breaking down longstanding social mores, transforming societies, normalizing violence.

SWITZERLAND

Krebs, Gerhard, **“Operation Super Sunrise? Japanese-United States Peace Feelers in Switzerland, 1945.”** Vol.69, No.4 (October, 2005), pp.1081-1120. Explains why informal discussions between the Japanese Naval Commander from the embassy in Berlin, Fujimura Yoshikazu, and Allen W. Dulles (1893-1969) of the U.S. Office of Strategic Services failed to develop into formal communications.

Mears, Dwight S. **“The Catch-22 Effect: The lasting Stigma of Wartime Cowardice in the U.S. Army Air Forces.”** Vol.77, No.3 (July, 2013), pp.1025-1054. Accusations of cowardice by the air crews that landed in Switzerland and their consequences.

SYRIA

Santosuosso, Antonio, **“Kadesh Revisited: Reconstructing the Battle between the Egyptians and the Hittites [1274 B.C.E.].”** Vol.60, No.3 (July, 1996), pp.423-444.

Rudd, Gordon W. **“Review Essay: The Israeli Revisionist Historians and the Arab-Israeli Conflict Part One: From the Founding of Zionism to the 1967 War.”** Vol.67, No.4 (October, 2003), pp.1263-1270; **“Part Two: From the 1967 War to the Present.”** Vol.68, No.1 (January, 2004), pp.225-231.

Bronfeld, Saul, **“Fighting Outnumbered: The Impact of the Yom Kippur War on the U.S.**

Army.” Vol.71, No.2 (April, 2007), pp.465-498. Illustrates the different ways in which the Yom Kippur War impacted the work of Generals William E. DePuy (1919-1992) and Donn A. Starry (1925-2011) in reforming the U.S. Army.

Young, James L., Jr. **“The Heights of Ineptitude: The Syrian Army’s Assault on the Golan Heights.”** Vol.74, No.3 (July, 2010), pp.847-870. Argues that, during the 1973 Yom Kippur War, it was primarily the Syrian’s tactical incompetence and failure to adhere to Soviet operational doctrine that ensured Israeli victory on the Golan Heights, notwithstanding the bravery of the Israeli troops.

Ehrlich, Michael, **“The Battle of Ain al-Mallāha, 19 June 1157.”** Vol.83, No.1 (January, 2019), pp.31-42. An examination of the victory of Nūr al-Dīn’s (1146-1174) Syrian forces over a Frankish army led by the King of Jerusalem, Baldwin III (r.1143-1163), in the northern Jordan Valley that relates written sources to a careful examination of the terrain of the actual battlefield.

Fulton, Michael S. **“The Siege of Montfort and Mamluk Artillery Technology in 1271: Integrating the Archaeology and Topography with the Narrative Sources.”** Vol.83, No.3 (July, 2019), pp.689-717. An investigation into the development of mechanical artillery, specifically the trebuchet, through the study of archaeologically unearthed projectiles and the suitability of the surrounding terrain for the deployment of trebuchets.

I

TACTICS AND COMBAT EFFECTIVENESS

**See Also: AIR WARFARE; AIRBORNE WARFARE; AMPHIBIOUS WARFARE;
ARTILLERY; CAVALRY; INSURGENCY AND COUNTERINSURGENCY;
MECHANIZED WARFARE; NAVAL WARFARE; THEORY AND DOCTRINE;
URBAN WARFARE**

Black, Jeremy, **“War and the World, 1450-2000.”** Vol.63, No.3 (July, 1999), pp.669-681.

After a consideration of the circumstances of the study of military in the academy, the author focuses primarily on European states’ military interaction with civilizations throughout the globe in the context of the ‘Military Revolution’ theory.

Black, Jeremy, **“Determinisms and Other Issues.”** Vol.68, No.4 (October, 2004), pp.1217-1232.

Addresses the multiple problems surrounding the ways in which the role of technology in history has been interpreted.

TACTICS AND COMBAT EFFECTIVENESS: U.S.A.

Coffman, Edward M. **“The George C. Marshall Lecture of Military History: The Duality of the American Military Tradition: A Commentary.”** Vol.64, No.4 (October, 2000), pp.967-980. Discusses the duality of a standing, professional regular Armed Forces versus the citizen-soldier tradition.

TACTICS AND COMBAT EFFECTIVENESS: ANCIENT PERIOD (to 476)

Santosuosso, Antonio, **“Kadesh Revisited: Reconstructing the Battle between the Egyptians and the Hittites [1274 B.C.E.]”** Vol.60, No.3 (July, 1996), pp.423-444.

Hanson, Victor Davis, **“Historiographical Essay: The Status of Ancient Military History: Traditional Work, Recent Research, and On-Going Controversies.”** Vol.63, No.2 (April, 1999), pp.379-413. A very thorough survey covering works on every conceivable topic concerning the armed forces and conduct of warfare in the age of ancient Greece and Rome.

May, Timothy, **“The Training of an Inner Asian Nomad Army in the Pre-Modern Period.”** Vol.70, No.3 (July, 2006), pp.617-635. Confirms that nomadic ‘horse people’, such as the Mongols, employed more sophisticated training for war than had previously been imagined.

Naiden, F.S. **“Spartan Naval Performance in the Decelian War, 413-404 B.C.E.”** Vol.73, No.3 (July, 2009), pp.729-744. Identifies improvements in Sparta’s cadre of naval officers as the reason for Spartan naval victories during the final phase of the Peloponnesian War.

Bradley, Carl Meredith, **“The British War Chariot: A Case for Indirect Warfare.”** Vol.73, No.4 (October, 2009), pp.1073-1089. Weighs the capabilities of the Celtic tribes who fielded sturdy and fast two-horse chariots against Julius Caesar’s (100-44 B.C.E.) two landings in Britannia in 55-54 B.C.E. and the means used to sustain their resources and gauge their capabilities.

Tucci, Jim, **“Historiographical Essay: Warfare in the Ancient World.”** Vol.74, No.3 (July, 2010), pp.878-899.

Lonsdale, David J. **“Alexander the Great and the Art of adaptation.”** Vol.77, No.3 (July, 2013), pp.817-835. Uses the examples of Alexander’s (356-323 B.C.E.) operations in the Balkans, against the Persian navy, counterinsurgency in Central Asia, and the Battle of Hydaspes (326 B.C.E.).

Sears, Matthew A. and Willekes, Carolyn, **“Alexander’s Cavalry Charge at Chaeronea, 338 B.C.E.”** Vol.80, No.4 (October, 2016), pp.1017-1035. Confronts the controversy surrounding whether or not the eighteen year old Alexander the Great (356-322 B.C.E.) actually led a cavalry charge that contributed to the defeat of the forces of the Greek coalition.

McArthur, Tony, **“Should Roman Soldiers be Called ‘Professional’ Prior to Augustus?”** Vol.85, No.1 (January, 2021), pp.9-26. Raises the question of to what extent, if any, could soldiers in Roman armies during the period between 200 B.C.E. and the Battle of Actium in 31 B.C.E. qualify as professionals.

TACTICS AND COMBAT EFFECTIVENESS: MEDIEVAL PERIOD (476-1480)

May, Timothy, **“The Training of an Inner Asian Nomad Army in the Pre-Modern Period.”** Vol.70, No.3 (July, 2006), pp.617-635. Confirms that nomadic ‘horse people’, such as the Mongols, employed more sophisticated training for war than had previously been imagined.

Guilmartin, John F., Jr. **“The Earliest Shipboard Gunpowder Ordnance: An Analysis of its Technical Parameters and Tactical Capabilities.”** Vol.71, No.3 (July, 2007), pp.649-669. Various obstacles presented difficulties to the effective use of early cannons onboard ships, but shortly after 1400 these were swiftly overcome, so that ordnance became an increasingly important weapon on Mediterranean war galleys and Portuguese caravels.

Kostick, Conor, **“*Iuvenes* and the First Crusade (1096-99): Knights in Search of Glory?”** Vol.73, No.2 (April, 2009), pp.369-392. *Iuvenes* was a term applied to a category of knights who were not necessarily young in age, but were ‘young’ in their careers, a category of knights who, despite a degree of recklessness and indiscipline, played an important role in the First Crusade.

Berkovich, Ilya, **“The Battle of Forbie and the Second Frankish Kingdom of Jerusalem.”** Vol.75, No.1 (January, 2011), pp.9-44. Inquires into the disastrous defeat of the Second Kingdom of Jerusalem’ coalition Franko-Syrian army at the Battle of Forbie, 1244, which reduced it to a pawn in the power politics of neighboring Muslim kingdoms.

Wheeler, Everett L. **“The Archaeology of War in Late Antiquity.”** Vol.78, No.3 (July, 2014), pp.1081-1093. A critical examination of a two-volume collection of papers originally presented at a 2007 Oxford conference.

Kolberg, Are Skarstein, **“Did Vikings Really go Berserk? An Interdisciplinary Critical Analysis of Berserks.”** Vol.82, No.3 (July, 2018), pp.899-908.

Kolberg, Are Skarstein, **“There is Power in a Cohort: Development of Warfare in Iron Age to Early Medieval Scandinavia.”** Vol.83, No.1 (January, 2019), pp.9-30. Questions the degree to which Scandinavian society was organized for warfare and the extent to which tactics in Iron Age to Early Medieval Scandinavia were influenced by external examples.

Ehrlich, Michael, **“The Battle of Ain al-Mallāha, 19 June 1157.”** Vol.83, No.1 (January, 2019), pp.31-42. An examination of the victory of Nūr al-Dīn’s (1146-1174) Syrian forces over a

Frankish army led by the King of Jerusalem, Baldwin III (r.1143-1163), in the northern Jordan Valley that relates written sources to a careful examination of the terrain of the actual battlefield.

Larnach, Matthew, **“The Battle of the Gates of Trajan, 986: A Reassessment.”** Vol.84, No.1 (January, 2020), pp.9-34. An investigation of the destruction of Emperor Basil II’s (r.976-1025) Byzantine army by the Bulgarians that incorporates the issue of logistics and an examination of terrain to ascertain the reasons for victory and defeat.

Marvin, Laurence W. **“The Battle of Fariskur (29 August 1219) and the Fifth Crusade: Causes, Course, and Consequences.”** Vol.85, No.3 (July, 2021), pp.597-618. Seeks to understand the neglected Battle of Fariskur, fought between a force of Crusaders and the army of the Sultan of Egypt, Al-Kamil (circa 1177-1238).

TACTICS AND COMBAT EFFECTIVENESS: EARLY MODERN PERIOD (1480-1789)

DeVries, Kelly, **“The Lack of a Western European Military Response to the Ottoman Invasions of Eastern Europe from Nicopolis (1396) to Mohacs (1526).”** Vol.63, No.3 (July, 1999), pp.539-559. Inquires into the reasons behind a failure to respond to the Turkish threat, proposing that it was a combination of the intimidating power of the Ottomans and changing attitudes towards the duties expected of a Christian soldier.

Kleinschmidt, Harald, **“Using the Gun: Manual Drill and the Proliferation of Portable Firearms.”** Vol.63, No.3 (July, 1999), pp.601-630. Delves into the military, political, and social factors that led to an increase in the use of hand-held firearms throughout Europe, from the fifteenth through the eighteenth century.

Paul, Michael C. **“The Military Revolution in Russia, 1550-1682.”** Vol.68, No.1 (January, 2004), pp.9-45. Asserts that the Armed Forces of the tsars underwent truly revolutionary changes between the mid-sixteenth and late-seventeenth centuries that made Imperial Russia a significant power and laid the groundwork for the reforms of Peter the Great.

Bryant, G.J. **“Asymmetric Warfare: The British Experience in Eighteenth-Century India.”** Vol.68, No.2 (April, 2004), pp.431-469. Juxtaposes the adaption to new circumstance of Indian versus British military forces, proposing that while the British were able to retain their military superiority, Indian rulers were unable to overcome political obstacles that interfered with the adoption of European methods.

Roy, Kaushik, **“Military Synthesis in South Asia: Armies, Warfare, and Indian Society, c.1740-1849.”** Vol.69, No.3 (July, 2005), pp.651-690. Attempts to determine why, with both the British East India Company and the Mughal successor states developing hybrid military forces, it was the E.I.C.’s armies that, more often than not, achieved victory.

Parker, Geoffrey, **“The Limits to Revolutions in Military Affairs: Maurice of Nassau, the Battle of Nieuwpoort (1600), and the Legacy.”** Vol.71, No.2 (April, 2007), pp.331-372. Probes the evolution of the use of volley fire by matchlock armed infantry, beginning with its use in Japan in the 1560s and by the Dutch in the 1590s, with its first use in combat in Europe at the battle of Nieuwpoort, 2 July, 1600.

White, Lorraine, **“Strategic Geography and the Spanish Habsburg Monarchy’s Failure to Recover Portugal, 1640-1668.”** Vol.71, No.2 (April, 2007), pp.373-409. Contrasting Alba’s (1507-1582) successful campaign in 1580 with the course of this mid-17th century conflict, the article considers the impact of geographic and climactic factors on the strategy, tactics, and logistics of the Spanish forces.

Guilmartin, John F., Jr. **“The Earliest Shipboard Gunpowder Ordnance: An Analysis of its Technical Parameters and Tactical Capabilities.”** Vol.71, No.3 (July, 2007), pp.649-669. Various obstacles presented difficulties to the effective use of early cannons onboard ships, but shortly after 1400 these were swiftly overcome, so that ordnance became an increasingly important weapon on Mediterranean war galleys and Portuguese caravels.

De la Garza, Andrew, **“The Mughal Battlefield: Personnel, Technology, and Tactics in the Early Empire, 1500-1605.”** Vol.78, No.3 (July, 2014), pp.927-960. Challenges the assumptions of inferiority in comparison with the ‘European Military Revolution.’

Grummitt, David, **“Flodden 1513: Re-Examining British Warfare at the End of the Middle Ages.”** Vol.82, No.1 (January, 2018), pp.9-28. Asserts that the English Army that fought the forces led by King James IV (1473-1513) on 9 September, 1513, was more modern than its Scottish counterpart, just as its commander, Thomas Howard, the Earl of Surrey (1443-1524), was more of a ‘Renaissance General’ than James IV.

Nath, Pratyay, **“Looking beyond the Military Revolution: Variations in Early Modern Warfare and the Mughal Case.”** Vol.86, No.1 (January, 2022), pp.9-31. Argues that the heterogeneous nature of Mughal strategy, tactics, and the deployment of technology over time and across space was due to a wide range of factors, including environmental conditions, military pragmatism, financial considerations, and distance from the imperial heartland, challenging the simplistic early modern ‘Military Revolution’ thesis.

Davies, Brian, **“The Russian Baltic Fleet in the Seven Years’ War.”** Vol.86, No.3 (July, 2022), pp.557-572. Charts the rise and fall and rise again of the Russian Baltic Fleet, from the reign of Peter ‘the Great’ (r.1682-1725) to that of Catherine ‘the Great’ (r.1762-1796).

TACTICS AND COMBAT EFFECTIVENESS: NATIVE AMERICAN CONFLICTS

Lee, Wayne E. **“Fortify, Fight, or Flee: Tuscarora and Cherokee Defensive Warfare and**

Military Culture Adaptation.” Vol.68, No.3 (July, 2004), pp.713-770.

Lee, Wayne E. **“Peace Chiefs and Blood Revenge: Patterns of Restraint in Native American Warfare, 1500-1800.”** Vol.71, No.3 (July, 2007), pp.701-741. Although eastern Native American societies were willing to attempt to destroy an enemy, including indiscriminate killing, patterns of restraint inherent to their social authority, cultural values, and methods of warfare tended to limit escalation and the overall level of violence.

McGinnis, Anthony R. **“When Courage was not Enough: Plains Indians at War with the United States Army.”** Vol.76, No.2 (April, 2012), pp.454-473. Considers why the Native American tribes of the Great Plains continued to rely on their own specific style of limited warfare in the face of the U.S. Army newcomers when this style of warfare was unable to achieve any permanent success against the ‘Blue Coats’.

Haggard, Dixie Ray, **“The First Invasion of Georgia and the myth of Westo Power, 1656-1684.”** Vol.86, No.3 (July, 2022), pp.533-556. Narrates the two decades long assault on Native American towns of central Georgia by a mysterious people known as the ‘Westos’, seeking to better understand the reasons for their success.

TACTICS AND COMBAT EFFECTIVENESS: ENGLISH CIVIL WARS (1642-51)

Robinson, Gavin, **“Equine Battering Rams? A Reassessment of Cavalry Charge in the English Civil War.”** Vol.75, No.3 (July, 2011), pp.719-731. Challenges the traditional notion that shock cavalry tactics imported from Sweden had replaced the caracole during the English Civil War and, in particular, contemplates the mechanics of cavalry shock tactics.

Yun, Dukhee, **“The ‘Push of the Pike’ in Seventeenth-Century English Infantry Combat.”** Vol.86, No.4 (October, 2022), pp.837-857. Relying on a close reading of contemporary sources, the author seeks to develop a better understanding of how opposing pike formations actually fought one another.

TACTICS AND COMBAT EFFECTIVENESS:

WAR OF THE SPANISH SUCCESSION (1701-15)

Ostwald, Jamel, **“The ‘Decisive’ Battle of Ramillies, 1706: Prerequisites for Decisiveness in Early Modern Warfare.”** Vol.64, No.3 (July, 2000), pp.649-677. Asks whether eighteenth century military strategy was indecisive by choice rather than by necessity by looking at the 1st Duke of Marlborough, John Churchill’s (1650-1722), Ramillies campaign.

TACTICS AND COMBAT EFFECTIVENESS: U.S. REVOLUTIONARY WAR (1775-83)

Herrera, Ricardo A. “**[T]he zealous activity of Capt. Lee’: Light-Horse Harry Lee and *Petite Guerre*.**” Vol.79, No.1 (January, 2015), pp.9-36. Captain ‘Light Horse Harry’ Lee’s (1756-1818) foraging mission in Delaware and Maryland, during February and March, 1778, as an example of command at the company level.

TACTICS AND COMBAT EFFECTIVENESS:

FRENCH REVOLUTIONARY AND NAPOLEONIC WARS (1792-1815)

McConachy, Bruce, “**The Roots of Artillery Doctrine: Napoleonic Artillery Tactics Reconsidered.**” Vol.65, No.3 (July, 2001), pp.617-640. Puts forward the explanation that the changes in Napoleonic artillery practices beginning in 1807 were the results of years of experimentation and innovation, rather than compensation for a general decline in standards throughout the *Grande Armée*.

Arnold, James R. “**A Reappraisal of Column Versus Line in the Peninsular War.**” Vol.68, No.2 (April, 2004), pp.535-552. Disputes the influential English historian of the Napoleonic Wars, Sir Charles Oman’s (1860-1946), explanation for the superiority of the British line over the French column.

TACTICS AND COMBAT EFFECTIVENESS: EARLY 19th CENTURY

Roy, Kaushik, “**Military Synthesis in South Asia: Armies, Warfare, and Indian Society, c.1740-1849.**” Vol.69, No.3 (July, 2005), pp.651-690. Attempts to determine why, with both the British East India Company and the Mughal successor states developing hybrid military forces, it was the E.I.C.’s armies that, more often than not, achieved victory.

TACTICS AND COMBAT EFFECTIVENESS: THE SEMINOLE WARS (1816-1858)

Dawson, Joseph G. “**With Fidelity and Effectiveness: Archibald Henderson’s Lasting Legacy to the U.S. Marine Corps.**” Vol.62, No.4 (October, 1998), pp.727-753. Affirms Henderson’s importance as Commandant of the Corps (1821-1859), during which he expanded the roles and capabilities of Marines, such as the deployment of a Marine battalion alongside Army units against the Creeks and Seminoles and the addition of an artillery component to strengthen landing forces.

TACTICS AND COMBAT EFFECTIVENESS: MEXICAN-AMERICAN WAR (1846-48)

Arndt, Jochen S. “**The True Napoleon of the West: General Winfield Scott’s Mexico City Campaign [1847] and the Origins of the U.S. Army’s Combined-Arms Combat Division.**” Vol.76, No.3 (July, 2012), pp.649-671. Ventures to prove that General Winfield Scott (1786-1866) organized the Army of the Invasion of Mexico according to the French system of combined arms divisions, enabling him to replicate the Napoleonic era’s aggressive operational tactics.

TACTICS AND COMBAT EFFECTIVENESS: AUSTRIA: MID 19th CENTURY

Wawro, Geoffrey, **“An ‘Army of Pigs’: The technical, Social, and Political Basis of Austrian Shock Tactics, 1859-1866.”** Vol.59, No.3 (July, 1995), pp.407-433. Contends that, like the French after 1871, the Austrian Army responded to their defeat in the Second Italian War of Unification, 1859, by a commitment to aggressive shock tactics.

TACTICS AND COMBAT EFFECTIVENESS: U.S. CIVIL WAR (1861-65)

Weitz, Mark A. **“Drill, Training, and the Combat Performance of the Civil War Soldier: Dispelling the Myth of the Poor Soldier, Great Fight.”** Vol.62, No.2 (April, 1998), pp.263-289. Proposes that, contrary to conventional wisdom, the soldiers who fought in the war functioned effectively because of military skills that flowed directly from drill, training, and discipline rather than any innate fighting ability.

Dwyer, Christopher S. **“Raiding Strategy: As Applied by the Western Confederate Cavalry in the American Civil War.”** Vol.63, No.2 (April, 1999), pp.263-281. Offers the explanation that the failure of the Confederate Cavalry in the Western Theater was not due to any lack of success in the raids that were conducted, but to the misuse made of these raids in the overall strategy of Confederate theater commanders.

Noe, Kenneth W, **“‘Damned North Carolinians’ and ‘Brave Virginians’: The Lane-Mahone Controversy, Honor, and Civil War Memory.”** Vol.72, No.4 (October, 2008), pp.1089-1115. Charts the feud between the North Carolina commander, James Henry, and William Mahone over the question of who deserved credit for capturing three enemy flags at the Battle of Spotsylvania, 1864, a feud that was influenced by a culture of honor and post-war politics.

Kemmerly, Phillip R. **“Environment and the Course of Battle: Flooding at Shiloh (6-7 April, 1862).”** Vol.79, No.4 (October, 2015), pp.1079-1108.

Rafuse, Ethan S. **“‘Little Phil’, a ‘Bad Old Man’, and the ‘Gray Ghost’: Hybrid Warfare and the Fight for the Shenandoah Valley, August-November 1864.”** Vol.81, No.3 (July, 2017), pp.775-801. Uses Major General Philip Sheridan’s (1831-1888) successful campaign against the combination of Confederate regular and irregular forces as a case study of addressing the challenges of hybrid warfare.

Petty, Adam H. **“Reconsidering the Wilderness’s Role in Battle, 4-6 May 1864.”** Vol.82, No.2 (April, 2018), pp.413-438. Questions the existing consensus regarding the influence of the forest known as the Wilderness on the battle of the same name.

TACTICS AND COMBAT EFFECTIVENESS: SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR (1898)

Brereton, T.R. **“First Lessons in Modern War: Arthur Wagner, the 1898 Santiago Campaign, and the U.S. Army Lesson-Learning.”** Vol.64, No.1 (January, 2000), pp.79-96. Relates how Lieutenant Colonel Arthur Wagner (1853-1905) pioneered the U.S. Army’s practice of producing ‘lessons-learned’ studies of the Army’s recent military operations.

TACTICS AND COMBAT EFFECTIVENESS: 2nd ANGLO-BOER WAR (1899-1902)

Badsey, Stephen, **“The Boer War (1899-1902) and British Cavalry Doctrine: A Re-Evaluation.”** Vol.71, No.1 (January, 2007), pp.75-97. Rejecting the traditional interpretation, the article proposes that a cavalry reform movement incorporating dismounted tactics pre-dated the Second Anglo-Boer War, a mixture of mounted and dismounted tactics were used by both sides in the conflict, and that the problems experienced by cavalry were largely not of their own making

TACTICS AND COMBAT EFFECTIVENESS: EARLY 20th CENTURY

Ripperger, Robert M. **“The Development of the French Artillery for the Offensive, 1890-1914.”** Vol.59, No.4 (October, 1995), pp.599-618. Advances the proposition that the French Army’s embrace of *offensive à l’outrance* produced strategies and tactics in which there was little room for heavy artillery.

Gordon, Andrew, **“Time after Time in the Horn of Africa.”** Vol.74, No.1 (January, 2010), pp.107-144. Provides an examination of the British joint, amphibious assault on the Dervish stronghold of Illig, Somaliland, in 1904.

TACTICS AND COMBAT EFFECTIVENESS: WORLD WAR I (1914-18)

Gardner, Nikolas, **“Command and Control in the ‘Great Retreat of 1914: The Disintegration of the British Cavalry Division.”** Vol.63, No.1 (January, 1999), pp.29-54. Suggests that the lack of experience in operating as a division, the division’s unwieldy size, the inefficiency of its commander and staff, and the independent mindset of its brigade commanders prevented it from operating effectively.

Palazzo, Albert P. **“The British Army’s Counter-Battery Staff Office and Control of the Enemy in World War I.”** Vol.63, No.1 (January, 1999), pp.55-74. Sets forth the argument that the critical turning point for the artillery occurred during the winter of 1916-1917, when, drawing upon the lessons of the Battle of the Somme, a corps-level Counter-Battery Staff Office was created.

Greenhalgh, Elizabeth, **“ ‘Parade Ground Soldiers’: French Army Assessments of the British on the Somme in 1916.”** Vol.63, No.2 (April, 1999), pp.283-312. Assesses the attitudes among the *Poilus* towards their British counterparts in a battle in which roughly equal numbers of French

and British troops fought alongside each other.

Erickson, Edward J. **“Strength against Weakness: Ottoman Military Effectiveness at Gallipoli, 1915.”** Vol.65, No.4 (October, 2001), pp.981-1011. In contrast to most studies, the author concentrates on Turkish preparations and performance, showing that the peninsula was heavily fortified and defended by the Empire’s finest divisions.

Marble, Sanders, **“Document of Note: General Haig Dismisses Attritional Warfare, January 1916.”** Vol.65, No.4 (October, 2001), pp.1061-1065.

Jackman, Steven D. **“Shoulder to Shoulder: Close Control and ‘Old Prussian Drill’ in German Offensive Infantry Tactics, 1871-1914.”** Vol.68, No.1 (January, 2004), pp.73-104.

Phillips, Gervase, **“Scapegoat Arm: Twentieth-Century Cavalry in Anglophone Historiography.”** Vol.71, No.1 (January, 2007), pp.37-74. Too often used as a scapegoat for failures in war and an obstacle to modernization in peacetime, this article reassesses the capabilities of early twentieth-century soldiers, with a consideration of the military history of Eastern Europe, presenting a more positive interpretation of role of cavalry in modern warfare.

Bou, Jean, **“Cavalry, Firepower, and Swords: The Australian Light Horse and the Tactical Lessons of Cavalry Operations in Palestine, 1916-1918.”** Vol.71, No.1 (January, 2007), pp.99-125. Contrary to the traditions of the Australian mounted service, by the end of the Campaign in Palestine more than half of the Australian Light Horse were armed with both rifles and swords, relying on both fire and modern shock tactics.

Sheffy, Yigal, **“Chemical Warfare and the Palestine Campaign, 1916-1918.”** Vol.73, No.3 (July, 2009), pp.803-844. Brings light to the British use of chemical warfare in the Second (April, 1917) and Third (October-November, 1917) Battles of Gaza, the Ottoman response, and the reasons why this aspect of the Palestine Campaign have been disregarded in the historiography.

Foley, Robert T. **“Learning War’s Lessons: The German Army and the Battle of the Somme 1916.”** Vol.75, No.2 (April, 2011), pp.471-504. Over the course of the Battle of the Somme, the Germans were forced by superior Anglo-French weaponry and tactics to improvise a new defensive tactical doctrine, the evolution of which is examined through the study of German ‘lessons-learned’ reports which display intellectual flexibility.

Ungari, Andrea, **“The Official Inquiry into the Italian Defeat at the Battle of Caporetto (October 1917).”** Vol.76, No.3 (July, 2012), pp.695-726. Addresses the question of why the general officer most responsible for the catastrophe not only managed to evade being charged for his failures but instead ended up as the Chief of Staff of the Italian Army.

Krause, Jonathan, **“The French Battle for Vimy Ridge, Spring 1915.”** Vol.77, No.1

(January, 2013), pp.91-113. Analyzes the early French efforts to solve the challenge of the trench stalemate.

DiNardo, Richard L. **“The Limits of Technology: The Invasion of Serbia, 1915.”** Vol.79, No.4 (October, 2015), pp.981-995. By focusing on the different forms of technology employed by the invading forces of the Central Powers, the author explains how they benefitted the invaders, but also had their limitations.

Westerman, William, **“The Real Controller of the Battle: The Importance of Studying Tactical Battalion Command – A Case Study.”** Vol.81, No.4 (October, 2017), pp.1007-1038. Offers the experience of the 22nd Australian Infantry Battalion during the 1918 Hundred Days Campaign as an example of decentralized command and control.

De Meneses, Filipe Rineiro, **“ ‘Not only Useless, but Dangerous?’ The Portuguese Expeditionary Corps in France in the Aftermath of the Battle of La Lys, 9 April 1918.”** Vol.82, No.4 (October, 2018), pp.1149-1174. Conflict between the wishes of the new President of Portugal, Sidónio Pais (1872-1918), the British High Command, and the soldiers and officers of the Portuguese Expeditionary Corps over the question of whether it should return to frontline duty.

Dykstra, Bodie D. **“ ‘To Dig and Burrow like Rabbits’: British Field Fortifications at the Battle of the Aisne, September and October 1914.”** Vol.84, No.3 (July, 2020), pp.747-773.

TACTICS AND COMBAT EFFECTIVENESS: INTERWAR PERIOD (1919-39)

Corum, James S. **“The *Luftwaffe*’s Army Support Doctrine, 1918-1941.”** Vol.59, No.1 (January, 1995), pp.53-76. Covers close air support doctrine and training, development and implementation, from the Spanish Civil War to Operation Barbarossa.

Bielakowski, Alexander M. **“General Hawkins’ War: The Future of the Horse in the U.S. Cavalry.”** Vol.71, No.1 (January, 2007), pp.127-138. Provides an account of the career of Brigadier General Hamilton S. Hawkins III (1872-1950), who, despite the increasing significance of mechanized forces, steadfastly advocated for horse cavalry throughout the interwar period and into the Second World War.

Ulbrich, David J. **“The Long Lost ‘Tentative Manual for Defense of Advance Bases’ (1936).”** Vol.71, No.3 (July, 2007), pp.889-901. In 1998 a copy of the Marine Corps’ previously lost 1936 Tentative Manual for Defense of Advance Bases was uncovered, a manual that displays the culmination of decades of doctrinal thinking about the defense of island bases against enemy amphibious, naval, and aerial assaults.

Reese, Roger R. **“Lessons of the Winter War: A Study in the Military Effectiveness of the**

Red Army, 1939-1940.” Vol.72, No.3 (July, 2008), pp.825-852. Based on newly consulted primary sources, this article confronts the notion of a uniformly dismal performance of the Red Army during the Winter War.

Worthing, Peter, **“Continuity and Change: Chinese Nationalist Army Tactics, 1925-1938.”** Vol.78, No.3 (July, 2014), pp.995-1016.

TACTICS AND COMBAT EFFECTIVENESS: WORLD WAR II (1939-45)

Corum, James S. **“The *Luftwaffe*’s Army Support Doctrine, 1918-1941.”** Vol.59, No.1 (January, 1995), pp.53-76. Covers close air support doctrine and training, development and implementation, from the Spanish Civil War to Operation Barbarossa.

Holizimmer, Kevin C. **“Walter Krueger, Douglas MacArthur, and the Pacific War: The Wakde-Sarmi Campaign as a Case Study.”** Vol.59, No.4 (October, 1995), pp.661-685. Uses the Wakde-Sarmi operation in Northern New Guinea, 17-21 May, 1944, to demonstrate that General Krueger’s (1881-1967) performance as a commander has to be judged within the context of circumstances beyond anyone’s control.

Glantz, David M. **“Soviet Military Strategy during the Second Period of War (November 1942 – December 1943): A Reappraisal.”** Vol.60, No.1 (January, 1996), pp.115-150. Seeks to clarify the broader strategic context of the goals the Soviets sought, but failed, to achieve during the ‘Second Period of the Great Patriotic War.’

Lewis, Adriabn R. **“The Failure of Allied Planning and Doctrine for Operation Overlord: The Case of Minefield and Obstacle Clearance.”** Vol.62, No.4 (October, 1998), pp.787-807.

Gunsburg, Jeffrey A. **“The Battle of Gembloux, 14-15 May 1940: The ‘Blitzkrieg’ Checked.”** Vol.64, No.1 (January, 2000), pp.97-140. Uses an examination of the effectiveness of the French forces holding a defensive position at the Belgium town of Gembloux as a test case for French doctrine and performance.

Mann, B. David, **“Japanese Defense of Bataan, Luzon, Philippine Islands, 16 December 1944 – 4 September, 1945.”** Vol.67, No.4 (October, 2003), pp.1149-1176.

Bielakowski, Alexander M. **“General Hawkins’ War: The Future of the Horse in the U.S. Cavalry.”** Vol.71, No.1 (January, 2007), pp.127-138. Provides an account of the career of Brigadier General Hamilton S. Hawkins III (1872-1950), who, despite the increasing significance of mechanized forces, steadfastly advocated for horse cavalry throughout the interwar period and into the Second World War.

Glantz, David M. **“Review Essay: Stalingrad Revisited.”** Vol.72, No.3 (July, 2008), pp.907-910.

Buckley, John, **“Tackling the Tiger: The Development of British Armoured Doctrine for Normandy 1944.”** Vol.74, No.4 (October, 2010), pp.1161-1184. Asserts that the British Army’s loose approach to developing and imposing doctrine, despite inherent shortcomings, actually facilitated a flexibility that allowed the armoured forces to quickly and effectively modify their doctrines in the heat of battle.

Milner, Marc, **“Stopping the Panzers: Reassessing the Role of 3rd Canadian Infantry Division in Normandy, 7-10 June, 1944.”** Vol.74, No.2 (April, 2010), pp.491-522. Reveals that the 3rd Canadian Infantry Division’s beachhead battles of 7-10 June against the 12th Hitler Youth Panzer Division are fundamentally misunderstood as failed breakout attempts when, in fact, they were successful defensive operations.

Catagnus, Earl J. **“Infantry Field Manual 7-5 *Organization and Tactics of Infantry: The Rifle Battalion* (October 1940).”** Vol.77, No.2 (April, 2013), pp.657-666.

Atkinson, Rick, **“The 2016 George C. Marshall Lecture in Military History: Projecting American Power in the Second World War.”** Vol.80, No.2 (April, 2016), pp.345-354. In spite of devoting a smaller proportion of the country’s gross domestic product to the war than any other major belligerent, the United States demonstrated logistical brilliance, firepower, mobility, mechanical aptitude, and an economic preponderance that outproduced the Axis powers.

D’Amours, Caroline, **“Canadian Military Culture and Tactical Training, 1940-1944: The Making of Infantry Junior N.C.O.s.”** Vol.82, No.4 (October, 2018), pp.1175-1198.

Fagan, Brennen; Horwood, Ian; MacKay, Niall; Price, Christopher; Richards, Ed, and Wood, A. Jamie, **“Bootstrapping the Battle of Britain.”** Vol.84, No.1 (January, 2020), pp.151-186. Using the statistical technique of weighted bootstrapping to provide a quantified assessment of the likelihood of German achievement of air superiority.

FitzSimonds, James R. **“Aircraft Carrier versus Battleships in War and Myth: Demythologizing Carrier Air Dominance at Sea.”** Vol.84, No.3 (July, 2020), pp.843-865. Claims that a closer examination of the evidence from World War II demonstrates that the battleship was far from powerless in the face of air strikes and that it was the battleship, and not the Aircraft Carrier, that determined control of the sea.

TACTICS AND COMBAT EFFECTIVENESS: COLD WAR (1945-91)

Malkasian, Carter, **“Toward a Better Understanding of Attrition: The Korean and Vietnam Wars.”** Vol.68, No.3 (July, 2004), pp.911-942.

Dujmović, Nicholas, **“Drastic Actions Short of War: The Origins and Application of C.I.A.’s**

Covert Paramilitary Function in the Early Cold War.” Vol.76, No.3 (July, 2012), pp.775-808. In mid-1948, the Central Intelligence Agency was assigned a covert paramilitary function, which may explain why the C.I.A.’s paramilitary activities were never as effective as policy makers and Agency operations officers expected.

TACTICS AND COMBAT EFFECTIVENESS: GREEK CIVIL WAR (1946-49)

Goulter, Christine J.M. **“The Greek Civil War: A National Army’s Counter-Insurgency Triumph.”** Vol.78, No.3 (July, 2014), pp.1017-1055. Challenges the assumption that victory resulted from Anglo-American training and equipment, rather than the Greek National Army’s successful development of an effective counter-insurgency strategy.

TACTICS AND COMBAT EFFECTIVENESS: 1st INDOCHINA WAR (1946-54)

Boylan, Kevin M. **“No ‘Technical Knockout’: Giap’s Artillery at Dien Bien Phu.”** Vol.78, No.4 (October, 2014), pp.1349-1383. Contests the common explanation for the victory of the Vietnamese People’s Army based on a flood of Vietnamese publications around the 2004 fiftieth anniversary of the siege, 13 March – 7 May, 1954.

TACTICS AND COMBAT EFFECTIVENESS: ARAB-ISRAELI WARS

Elron, Zeev and Gat, Moshe, **“Remarks on Air Power and the Six-Day War [And Response].”** Vol.69, No.3 (July, 2005), pp.811-820.

Bronfeld, Saul, **“Fighting Outnumbered: The Impact of the Yom Kippur War on the U.S. Army.”** Vol.71, No.2 (April, 2007), pp.465-498. Illustrates the different ways in which the Yom Kippur War impacted the work of Generals William E. DePuy (1919-1992) and Donn A. Starry (1925-2011) in reforming the U.S. Army.

Joseph, Uri Bar, **“Strategic Surprise or Fundamental Flaws? The Source of Israel’s Military Defeat at the Beginning of the 1973 War.”** Vol.72, No.2 (April, 2008), pp.509-530. Suggests that that the deficient deployment of Israeli forces that met the Egyptian assault was due to a failure of intelligence to provide sufficient warning.

Young, James L., Jr. **“The Heights of Ineptitude: The Syrian Army’s Assault on the Golan Heights.”** Vol.74, No.3 (July, 2010), pp.847-870. Argues that, during the 1973 Yom Kippur War, it was primarily the Syrian’s tactical incompetence and failure to adhere to Soviet operational doctrine that ensured Israeli victory on the Golan Heights, notwithstanding the bravery of the Israeli troops.

Arielli, Nir, **“When are Foreign Volunteers Useful? Israel’s Transnational Soldiers in the War of 1948 Re-examined.”** Vol.78, No.2 (April, 2014), pp.703-724. Assesses the military and

political utility for Israel of *Machal* (overseas volunteers) by comparing them with alternate examples of this phenomenon in other twentieth century conflicts.

Rodman, David, **“Review Essay: A Tale of Two Fronts: Israeli Military Performance during the Early Days of the 1973 Yom Kippur War.”** Vol.82, No.1 (January, 2018), pp.208-218.

Ezov, Amiram, **“The Crossing Challenge: The Suez Canal Crossing by the Israeli Defense Forces during the Yom Kippur War of 1973.”** Vol.82, No.2 (April, 2018), pp.461-490.

Compares the setting of objectives, planning, and execution of the Egyptian Army’s crossing with that of the Israeli Defense Forces.

TACTICS AND COMBAT EFFECTIVENESS: KOREAN WAR (1950-53)

Donnelly, William M. **“Thunderbirds in Korea: The U.S. 45th Infantry Division, 1950-1952.”**

Vol.64, No.4 (October, 2000), pp.1113-1139. Investigates the performance of one of two National Guard divisions deployed to Korea, concentrating on the division’s officers.

Jordan, Kelly C. **“Right for the Wrong Reasons: S.L.A. Marshall and the Ratio of Fire in Korea.”** Vol.66, No.1 (January, 2002), pp.135-162.

Donnelly, William M. **“ ‘The Best Army that can be put in the Field in the Circumstances’: The U.S. Army, July 1951 – July 1953.”** Vol.71, No.3 (July, 2007), pp.809-847.

Reckons with the difficulties faced by career soldiers during the Korean War due to limited national mobilization and the cuts to the Army’s budget by President Harry S. Truman (1945-1953).

Gibby, Bryan, **“The Best Little Army.”** Vol.77, No.1 (January, 2013), pp.173-201. Surveys the results of the work of the U.S. Korean Military Advisory Group (K.M.A.G.) prior to the outbreak of the Korean War.

Uyar, Mesut and Güvenç, Serhat, **“One Battle and Two Accounts: The Turkish Brigade at Kunu-ri in November 1950.”** Vol.80, No.4 (October, 2016), pp.1117-1147.

Assesses the impact of U.S. military assistance provided to the Turkish Army and why the official U.S. and Turkish accounts of the Battle of Kunu-ri / Chongchon differ significantly.

Donnelly, William M. **“A Damn Hard Job: James A. Van Fleet and the Combat Effectiveness of U.S. Army Infantry, July 1951 – February 1953.”** Vol.82, No.1 (January, 2018), pp.147-179.

The difficulties faced by the Eighth Army commander, Gen. Van Fleet (1892-1992), to maintain ‘the will to win’ during the Korean War.

TACTICS AND COMBAT EFFECTIVENESS:

VIETNAM WAR (2nd Indochina War) (1955-75)

Leary, William M. **“The C.I.A. and the ‘Secret War’ in Laos: The Battle for Skyline Ridge, 1971-1971.”** Vol.59, No.3 (July, 1995), pp.505-517. Narrates an all-but-forgotten victory of a force of Hmong, Lao, and Thai defenders against the North Vietnamese Army.

Kirkland, Faris R. **“The Attack on Cap Mui Lay, Vietnam, July 1968.”** Vol.61, No.4 (October, 1997), pp.735-760. Shines light on Operation Thor, a neglected example of joint operation in Vietnam and one that significantly disrupted North Vietnam’s strategic plans.

Veith, George J. and Pribbenow, Merle L., II, **“ ‘Fighting is an Art’: The Army of the Republic of Vietnam’s Defense of Xuan Loc, 9 – 21 April, 1975.”** Vol.68, No.1 (January, 2004), pp.163-213. Provides an account of the successful defensive operation of Brigadier General Lê Minh Đảo’s (1933-2020) 18th Division, demonstrating what A.R.V.N. units were capable of accomplishing when commanded by inspiring leaders.

Daddis, Gregory A. **“Eating Soup with a Spoon: The U.S. Army as a ‘Learning Organization’ in the Vietnam War.”** Vol.77, No.1 (January, 2013), pp.229-254. The U.S. Army’s strategic approach, operational experience, and organizational changes.

Fino, Steven A. **“Breaking the Trance: The Perils of Technological Exuberance in the U.S. Air Force Entering Vietnam.”** Vol.77, No.2 (April, 2013), pp.625-655. The response of individual units to the need for guns, in addition to missiles, for air-to-air combat.

Marolda, Edward J. **“Orphan of the Mekong Delta: The Army-Navy Mobile Riverine Force.”** Vol.80, No.4 (October, 2016), pp.1149-1181. Despite its success during the Tet Offensive of 1968, the failure of Army and Navy leaders to fully embrace the creation of the Army-Navy Mobile Riverine Force resulting in its disbanding by Gen. Creighton Abrams (1914-1974).

TACTICS AND COMBAT EFFECTIVENESS:

ERITREAN WAR OF INDEPENDENCE (1961-91)

Weldemichael, Awet T. **“The Eritrean Long March: The Strategic Withdrawal of the Eritrean People’s Liberation Front (E.P.L.F.), 1978-1979.”** Vol.73, No.4 (October, 2009), pp.1231-1271. Despite the battlefield victories achieved by the Soviet backed Ethiopian offensives, as a guerrilla force, the Eritrean proved to be more adaptable to the changing circumstances, enabling them to go over to the tactical offensive by 1980.

TACTICS AND COMBAT EFFECTIVENESS:

CAMBODIA-VIETNAMESE WAR (1978-89)

Pribbenow, Merle L., II, **“A Tale of Five Generals: Vietnam’s Invasion of Cambodia.”**

Vol.70, No.2 (April, 2006), pp.459-486. Concerned the meticulously planned and well executed 1978-79 invasion of neighboring Cambodia by the Communist forces of the newly united Vietnam, which included both an amphibious assault and combined arms mechanized columns.

TAYLOR, MAXWELL (1901-1987)

Trauschweizer, Ingo, **“Cautious Hawk: Maxwell Taylor and the Path to War in Vietnam.”**

Vol.83, No.3 (July, 2019), pp.831-859. Relates the U.S. ambassador to Saigon’s, 1964-1965, opinions regarding the efficacy of bombing Hanoi and deploying ground forces to South Vietnam and their possible influence on the decisions of President Lyndon Johnson (1963-69).

TECHNOLOGY

Black, Jeremy, **“Determinisms and Other Issues.”** Vol.68, No.4 (October, 2004), pp.1217-1232.

Addresses the multiple problems surrounding the ways in which the role of technology in history has been interpreted.

Rogers, Clifford J. **“Review Essay: The Field & the Forge.”** Vol.68, No.4 (October, 2004), pp.1233-1239. Population, production, and power in the pre-industrial West.

Harari, Yuval Noah, **“Martial Illusions: War and Disillusionment in Twentieth-Century and Renaissance Military memoirs.”** Vol.69, No.1 (January, 2005), pp.43-72. Sets forth the notion that the change in the image of war from one that was positive and romantic to disillusionment owed more to soldiers’ self-perceptions and expectations that developments in technology produced.

TECHNOLOGY arranged chronologically by historical period or conflict –

ANCIENT PERIOD (to 476)

Santosuosso, Antonio, **“Kadesh Revisited: Reconstructing the Battle between the Egyptians and the Hittites [1274 B.C.E.]”** Vol.60, No.3 (July, 1996), pp.423-444.

Hanson, Victor Davis, **“Historiographical Essay: The Status of Ancient Military History: Traditional Work, Recent Research, and On-Going Controversies.”** Vol.63, No.2 (April, 1999), pp.379-413. A very thorough survey covering works on every conceivable topic concerning the armed forces and conduct of warfare in the age of ancient Greece and Rome.

Bertosa, Brian, **“The Supply of Hoplite Equipment by the Athenian State down to the Lamian**

War [323-322 B.C.E.]” Vol.67, No.2 (April, 2003), pp.361-379. Covers the break with tradition in the *polis* of Athens in 335 B.C.E. when arms and armor were provided to citizens, including, for the first time, the *thetes* (poor), who had not previously been able to serve as hoplites.

Bradley, Carl Meredith, **“The British War Chariot: A Case for Indirect Warfare.”** Vol.73, No.4 (October, 2009), pp.1073-1089. Weighs the capabilities of the Celtic tribes who fielded sturdy and fast two-horse chariots against Julius Caesar’s (100-44 B.C.E.) two landings in Britannia in 55-54 B.C.E. and the means used to sustain their resources and gauge their capabilities.

Wheeler, Everett L. **“The Archaeology of War in Late Antiquity.”** Vol.78, No.3 (July, 2014), pp.1081-1093. A critical examination of a two-volume collection of papers originally presented at a 2007 Oxford conference.

TECHNOLOGY arranged chronologically by historical period or conflict –

MEDIEVAL PERIOD (476-1480)

Nicolle, David, **“Medieval Warfare: The Unfriendly Interface.”** Vol.63, No.3 (July, 1999), pp.579-599. Probes the nature of and reasons for the adoption of military technology and techniques, focusing on the influence of the Islamic world on Christian Europe.

Stone, John, **“Technology, Society, and the Infantry Revolution of the Fourteenth Century.”** Vol.68, No.2 (April, 2004), pp.361-380. Challenges the concept of changes in warfare provoking changes in society, insisting, instead, that the opposite was case, calling for a new approach to understanding late-Medieval military developments based on a greater appreciation of the societies from which armies were raised.

Guilmartin, John F., Jr. **“The Earliest Shipboard Gunpowder Ordnance: An Analysis of its Technical Parameters and Tactical Capabilities.”** Vol.71, No.3 (July, 2007), pp.649-669. Various obstacles presented difficulties to the effective use of early cannons onboard ships, but shortly after 1400 these were swiftly overcome, so that ordnance became an increasingly important weapon on Mediterranean war galleys and Portuguese caravels.

Fulton, Michael S. **“The Siege of Montfort and Mamluk Artillery Technology in 1271: Integrating the Archaeology and Topography with the Narrative Sources.”** Vol.83, No.3 (July, 2019), pp.689-717. An investigation into the development of mechanical artillery, specifically the trebuchet, through the study of archaeologically unearthed projectiles and the suitability of the surrounding terrain for the deployment of trebuchets.

TECHNOLOGY arranged chronologically by historical period or conflict –

EARLY MODERN PERIOD (1480-1789)

Kleinschmidt, Harald, **“Using the Gun: Manual Drill and the Proliferation of Portable Firearms.”** Vol.63, No.3 (July, 1999), pp.601-630. Delves into the military, political, and social factors that led to an increase in the use of hand-held firearms throughout Europe, from the fifteenth through the eighteenth century.

Cassidy, Ben, **“Machiavelli and the Ideology of the Offensive: Gunpowder Weapons in *The Art of War*.”** Vol.67, No.2 (April, 2003), pp.381-404. Disputes the interpretation that, in his *Art of War*, Niccolò Machiavelli (1469-1527) completely rejects the use of both cannon and hand-held firearms, explaining that his downplaying of the use of gunpowder weapons was due to Machiavelli’s association of cannons and handguns with the defensive, while he endorsed the offensive.

Paul, Michael C. **“The Military Revolution in Russia, 1550-1682.”** Vol.68, No.1 (January, 2004), pp.9-45. Asserts that the Armed Forces of the tsars underwent truly revolutionary changes between the mid-sixteenth and late-seventeenth centuries that made Imperial Russia a significant power and laid the groundwork for the reforms of Peter the Great.

Swope, Kenneth M. **“Crouching Tigers, Secret Weapons: Military Technology Employed during the Sino-Japanese War, 1592-1598.”** Vol.69, No.1 (January, 2005), pp.11-41. Reviews the major military technology employed by the belligerents, showing, contesting the conventional explanation that superior numbers and the death of Toyotomi Hideyoshi’s (1537-1598) death were the deciding factors in Japan’s defeat.

Parker, Geoffrey, **“The Limits to Revolutions in Military Affairs: Maurice of Nassau, the Battle of Nieuwpoort (1600), and the Legacy.”** Vol.71, No.2 (April, 2007), pp.331-372. Probes the evolution of the use of volley fire by matchlock armed infantry, beginning with its use in Japan in the 1560s and by the Dutch in the 1590s, with its first use in combat in Europe at the battle of Nieuwpoort, 2 July, 1600.

Harrington, Hugh T. and Jordan, Jim, **“The Other Mystery Shot of the American Revolution: Did Timothy Murphy Kill British Brigadier General Simon Fraser at Saratoga?”** Vol.74, No.4 (October, 2010), pp.1037-1045. Attempts to disentangle the various accounts of the Battle of Saratoga, 1777, to determine the origins and validity of the Murphy legend, and its repetition by subsequent historians, along with the physics of musket fire.

TECHNOLOGY arranged chronologically by historical period or conflict – **U.S. CIVIL WAR (1861-65)**

Wolters, Timothy S. **“Electric Torpedoes in the Confederacy: Reconciling Conflicting Histories.”** Vol.72, No.3 (July, 2008), pp.755-783. The article seeks to clarify the linkages between memory, history, and technology by examining the claims of Hunter Davidson,

Beverley Kennon, Stephen Mallory, Matthew, and Gabriel Rains to contributing to the development of electric torpedoes for the Confederacy.

TECHNOLOGY arranged chronologically by historical period or conflict –

LATE 19th CENTURY

Jamison, Thomas M. **“The War of the Pacific, Technology and U.S. Naval Development: An International History of a Regional War.”** Vol.82, No.4 (October, 2018), pp.1093-1122.

The observations by foreign nations of the war between Chile and a coalition of Bolivia and Peru, 1879-1884, influenced naval developments around the globe, including contributing to the U.S. building of the ‘New Navy’ in the 1890s.

TECHNOLOGY arranged chronologically by historical period or conflict - 20th CENTURY

Jones, Mark C. **“Give Credit where Credit is Due: The Dutch Role in the Development and Deployment of the Submarine Schnorkel.”** Vol.69, No.4 (October, 2005), pp.987-1012.

TECHNOLOGY arranged chronologically by historical period or conflict –

WORLD WAR I (1914-18)

DiNardo, Richard L. **“The Limits of Technology: The Invasion of Serbia, 1915.”** Vol.79, No.4 (October, 2015), pp.981-995. By focusing on the different forms of technology employed by the invading forces of the Central Powers, the author explains how they benefitted the invaders, but also had their limitations.

TECHNOLOGY arranged chronologically by historical period or conflict –

WORLD WAR II (1939-45)

Lewis, Adriabn R. **“The Failure of Allied Planning and Doctrine for Operation Overlord: The Case of Minefield and Obstacle Clearance.”** Vol.62, No.4 (October, 1998), pp.787-807.

FitzSimonds, James R. **“Aircraft Carrier versus Battleships in War and Myth: Demythologizing Carrier Air Dominance at Sea.”** Vol.84, No.3 (July, 2020), pp.843-865. Claims that a closer examination of the evidence from World War II demonstrates that the battleship was far from powerless in the face of air strikes and that it was the battleship, and not the Aircraft Carrier, that determined control of the sea.

Bankoff, Greg, **“From the Art of Practical Sailing to the Electronic Science of Navigation: Typhoons, Seamanship, and U.S. Naval Operations in the Northwest Pacific, 1944-1945.”** Vol.86, No.4 (October, 2022), pp.949-972. Concerned with the challenges faced by ship’s

commanders of choosing between entrusting the safety of his vessel to his own judgement based on years of practical experience at sea or relying on the new technology at a time when some of the largest armadas of warships were ever assembled in wartime conditions.

TECHNOLOGY arranged chronologically by historical period or conflict –

COLD WAR (1945-91)

Seipp, Adam R. “ ‘Visionary Battle Scenes’: Reading Sir John Hackett’s *The Third World War*, 1977-85.” Vol.83, No.4 (October, 2019), pp.1235-1257. Suggests that the success of Sir John Hackett’s (1910-1997) 1978 best-selling novel reflected rising Cold War tensions, as well as inspiring the modern literary genre of the techno-thriller.

TECHNOLOGY arranged chronologically by historical period or conflict –

POST COLD WAR PERIOD

Hitchens, Ralph M. “Review Essay: Casting Light on a Dark Territory.” Vol.80, No.3 (July, 2016), pp.857-862. Works concerning cyber warfare.

Hoffman, F.G. “To Drone or not to Drone.” Vol.81, No.2 (April, 2017), pp.535-538.

TECHNOLOGY arranged alphabetically by country –

AUSTRALIA: WORLD WAR I (1914-18)

Bou, Jean, “Cavalry, Firepower, and Swords: The Australian Light Horse and the Tactical Lessons of Cavalry Operations in Palestine, 1916-1918.” Vol.71, No.1 (January, 2007), pp.99-125. Contrary to the traditions of the Australian mounted service, by the end of the Campaign in Palestine more than half of the Australian Light Horse were armed with both rifles and swords, relying on both fire and modern shock tactics.

TECHNOLOGY arranged alphabetically by country - AUSTRALIA: 1940s TO 1950s

Hobbins, Peter, “Engineering the Fighter Pilot: Aviators, Anti-G suits, and Allied Air Power, 1940-53.” Vol.84, No.1 (January, 2020), pp.115-149. Probes the failure of the Cotton Aerodynamic Anti-G suit championed by the Australian Air Force to be adopted by the British and United States Air Forces during the period marked by World War II and the Korean War.

TECHNOLOGY arranged alphabetically by country –

CANADA: WORLD WAR II (1939-45)

Rawling, William, “The Challenge of Modernization: The Royal Canadian Navy and

Antisubmarine Weapons, 1944-1945.” Vol.63, No.2 (April, 1999), pp.355-378.

TECHNOLOGY arranged alphabetically by country –

CUBA: WAR OF INDEPENDENCE (1895-98)

Tone, John Lawrence, **“The Machete and the Liberation of Cuba.”** Vol.62, No.1 (January, 1998), pp.7-28. Disputes the importance attached to the machete, arguing that the significance of its symbolic value has overshadowed the fact that the Cuban Liberation Army relied, first and foremost, on the use of rifles, in which they surpassed their Spanish opponents.

TECHNOLOGY arranged alphabetically by country - EGYPT: 19th CENTURY

Dunn, John, **“Egypt’s Nineteenth-Century Armaments Industry.”** Vol.61, No.2 (April, 1997), pp.231-254. Explains that the efforts of Muhammad Ali Pasha (1769-1849) and Khedive Ismail to establish a modern arms industry in Egypt was doomed in part due to haphazard implementation and inadequate funding, but, in a broader context, failure sprang from an unwillingness and / or inability to impose major political, cultural, and social changes.

TECHNOLOGY arranged alphabetically by country –

ENGLAND / GREAT BRITAIN: EARLY MODERN PERIOD (1480-1789)

Probasco, Nate, **“The Role of Commoners and Print in Elizabethan England’s Acceptance of Firearms.”** Vol.76, No.2 (April, 2012), pp.343-372. Looks at the debate in print between, on the one hand, common citizens and local officials, who were skeptical of firearms, the expense and safety of which they criticized, and those who promoted the replacement of longbows with firearms, who often employed dubious information.

TECHNOLOGY arranged alphabetically by country –

ENGLAND / GREAT BRITAIN: WAR OF 1812 (1812-15)

Compeau, Timothy, **“The Royal Navy’s *Psyche* on Lake Ontario: A British Experiment with Prefabricated Warships in the War of 1812.”** Vol.86, No.2 (April, 2022), pp.321-343. Narrates the British effort to transport four pre-fabricated vessels to Lake Ontario, of which only one, the 56-gun frigate H.M.S. *Psyche*, reached its destination.

TECHNOLOGY arranged alphabetically by country –

ENGLAND / GREAT BRITAIN: LATE 19th CENTURY

Dunley, Richard, **“Technology and Tradition: Mine Warfare and the Royal Navy’s Strategy of Coastal Assault, 1870-1890.”** Vol.80, No.2 (April, 2016), pp.398-409.

TECHNOLOGY arranged alphabetically by country –

ENGLAND / GREAT BRITAIN: WORLD WAR I (1914-18)

Lambert, Nicholas A. “**‘Our Bloody Ships’ or ‘Our Bloody System’? Jutland and the Loss of the Battle Cruisers, 1916.**” Vol.62, No.1 (January, 1998), pp.29-55. Speculates that an emphasis on rapid fire led gunnery personnel to stockpile far more shells in their turrets than the regulated maximum of eight projectiles, resulting in catastrophic explosions when German shells found their mark.

Sumida, Jon Tetsuro, “**A Matter of Timing: The Royal Navy and the Tactics of Decisive Battle, 1912-1916.**” Vol.67, No.1 (January, 2003), pp.85-136. Advances the explanation that the Admiralty’s adoption of a secret tactical system in 1912 interfered with the development of equipment and methods suitable for alternate forms of battle fleet action, with consequences for the Battle of Jutland.

Bullock, Mike; Lyons, Laurence, and Judkins, Philip, “**A Resolution of the Debate about British Wireless in World War I.**” Vol.84, No.4 (October, 2020), pp.1079-1096. Visits the debate over whether, as Dr. Brian Hall contends, the British Army utilized continuous wave radio as best as this technology allowed with how it was used by their French and U.S. counterparts.

TECHNOLOGY arranged alphabetically by country –

ENGLAND / GREAT BRITAIN: WORLD WAR II (1939-45)

Lund, Erik, “**The Industrial History of Strategy: Re-evaluating the Wartime Record of the British Aviation Industry in Comparative Perspective, 1919-1945.**” Vol.62, No.1 (January, 1998), pp.75-99. Rejects the conventional notion that the Allies achieved victory by outproducing the Axis, insisting that, instead, more factors than mere volume played a role, as demonstrated by the British air sector that displayed greater flexibility, technological sophistication, and effectiveness than either its German or United States counterparts.

Stubbs, David, “**A Blind Spot? The Royal Air Force (R.A.F.) and Long-Range Fighters, 1936-1944.**” Vol.78, No.2 (April, 2014), pp.673-702. Explores why Bomber Command maintained its view that it would be neither appropriate nor prudent to protect its bombers with long-range fighter escort.

Zaloga, Steven J. “**Debunking an Omaha Beach Legend: The Use of the ‘Armored Funnies’ on D-Day.**” Vol.85, No.1 (January, 2021), pp.134-162. Confronts the notion that one of the reasons the landing force on Omaha Beach suffered heavy casualties was the U.S. Army’s resistance to the use of specialized tanks developed by the British for the D-Day invasion.

TECHNOLOGY arranged alphabetically by country –

ENGLAND / GREAT BRITAIN: THE ‘TROUBLES’ IN NORTHERN IRELAND (1969-98)

Drohan, Brian, “**Unintended Consequences: Baton Rounds, Riots, and Counterinsurgency in Northern Ireland, 1970-1981.**” Vol.82, No.2 (April, 2018), pp.491-514. Designed to be a non-lethal means of employing force, the misuse of baton rounds by British soldiers resulting in serious injuries and even deaths, produced exactly the opposite public relations impact that was intended.

TECHNOLOGY arranged alphabetically by country –

GERMANY: WORLD WAR II (1939-45)

Mulligan, Timothy P. “**Ship-of-the-Line or Atlantic Raider? Battleship *Bismarck* between Design Limitations and Naval Strategy.**” Vol.69, No.4 (October, 2005), pp.1013-1044.

TECHNOLOGY arranged alphabetically by country –

INDIA: EARLY MODERN PERIOD (1480-1789)

De la Garza, Andrew, “**The Mughal Battlefield: Personnel, Technology, and Tactics in the Early Empire, 1500-1605.**” Vol.78, No.3 (July, 2014), pp.927-960. Challenges the assumptions of inferiority in comparison with the ‘European Military Revolution.’

Nath, Pratyay, “**Looking beyond the Military Revolution: Variations in Early Modern Warfare and the Mughal Case.**” Vol.86, No.1 (January, 2022), pp.9-31. Argues that the heterogeneous nature of Mughal strategy, tactics, and the deployment of technology over time and across space was due to a wide range of factors, including environmental conditions, military pragmatism, financial considerations, and distance from the imperial heartland, challenging the simplistic early modern ‘Military Revolution’ thesis.

TECHNOLOGY arranged alphabetically by country –

ITALY: 2nd WAR OF ITALIAN INDEPENDENCE (1859-61)

Schneid, Frederick C. “**A Well-Coordinated Affair: Franco-Piedmontese War Planning in 1859.**” Vol.76, No.2 (April, 2012), pp.395-425. Demonstrates that the Franco-Piedmontese general staffs undertook extensive planning that incorporating the new technologies of railways and steam ships, so that the Second War of Italian Unification (1859-1861) qualifies, alongside the more familiar U.S. Civil War and German Wars of Unification, as one of the first ‘modern’ wars of the industrial age.

TECHNOLOGY arranged alphabetically by country –

ITALY: INTERWAR PERIOD (1919-1939)

De Ninno, Fabio, “**A Technological Fiasco: Scientific Research, Institutional Culture, and Fascism in the Italian Navy (1919-1940).**” Vol.84, No.3 (July, 2020), pp.798-824. Explains that the failure of the Italian Navy to develop and adopt new technologies, such as radar and sonar, was rooted in an opposition to technological change within the culture of the officer corps, compounded by inter-service rivalry and the chaos of the Fascist regime.

TECHNOLOGY arranged alphabetically by country –

NORTH VIETNAM: VIETNAM WAR (2nd Indochina War) (1955-75)

Pribbenow II, Merle L. “**The -ology War: Technology and Ideology in the Vietnamese Defense of Hanoi, 1967.**” Vol.67, No.1 (January, 2003), pp.175-200. Considers the multiple factors in the recovery of the air defenses of Hanoi following near disaster in 1967.

TECHNOLOGY arranged alphabetically by country –

POLAND: INTERWAR PERIOD (1919-39)

Czarnecki, Jacek, “**The Rebirth and Progress of the Polish Military during the Interwar Years.**” Vol.83, No.3 (July, 2019), pp.747-768. Challenges the notion that the Polish Army’s cavalry reflected a failure of modernization, enshrined in the myth of Polish lancers charging Panzers in 1939.

TECHNOLOGY arranged alphabetically by country –

RUSSIA / SOVIET UNION: EARLY MODERN PERIOD (1480-1789)

Halperin, Charles J. “**Ivan IV’s State Cossacks.**” Vol.82, No.2 (April, 2018), pp.357-371. During the reign of Ivan IV (1533-1584) Muscovite ‘State Cossacks’ lived in urban enclaves, fought under the command of a government-appointed colonels, most were infantry, and a large percentage were armed with firearms.

TECHNOLOGY arranged alphabetically by country –

TURKEY / OTTOMAN EMPIRE: 19th CENTURY TO 1914

Grant, Jonathan, “**The Sword of the Sultan: Ottoman Arms Imports, 1854-1914.**” Vol.66, No.1 (January, 2002), pp.9-36. Attempts to ascertain why the Ottoman Empire changed from being self-sufficient in the production of armaments, including warships, to relying entirely on imports by 1914.

TECHNOLOGY arranged alphabetically by country - U.S.A.: 19th CENTURY:

Angevine, Robert G. **“The Rise and Fall of the Office of Naval Intelligence, 1882-1892: A Technological Perspective.”** Vol.62, No.2 (April, 1998), pp.291-312. Advances the argument that the first peacetime military intelligence organization, by successfully gathering, overtly and covertly, information on foreign naval technology, enabled the United States to build a modern fleet as quickly and inexpensively as possible.

Beaver, Daniel R. **“The U.S. War Department in the Gaslight Era: Stephen Vincent Benét at the Ordnance Department, 1870-91.”** Vol.68, No.1 (January, 2004), pp.105-132.

TECHNOLOGY arranged alphabetically by country - U.S.A.: CIVIL WAR (1861-65)

Roberts, William H. **“ ‘The Name of Ericsson’: Political Engineering in the Union Ironclad Program, 1861-1863.”** Vol.63, No.4 (October, 1999), pp.823-843.

Fuller, Howard J. **“Review Essay: Much in Little: John Ericsson and His Monitor Save the Republic.”** Vol.83, No.3 (July, 2019), pp.861-864.

**TECHNOLOGY arranged alphabetically by country –
U.S.A.: LATE 19th CENTURY TO 1914**

Jeffrey, Thomas E. **“Commodore’ Edison Joins the Navy: Thomas Alva Edison and the Naval Consulting Board.”** Vol.80, No.2 (April, 2016), pp.411-445. Claims that the impetus for the formation of the Naval Consulting Board headed by Edison (1847-1931), which was intended to provide advice on naval warfare technology, was Edison’s chief engineer, who conceived it as the centerpiece of a marketing campaign to sell Edison designed batteries to the Navy for their submarines.

TECHNOLOGY arranged alphabetically by country - U.S.A.: EARLY 20th CENTURY

Oyos, Matthew M. **“Theodore Roosevelt and the Implements of War.”** Vol.60, No.4 (October, 1996), pp.631-655. Brings to light an overlooked aspect of Roosevelt’s presidency (1901-1909), his role in accelerating the pace of military technological modernization, including involvement with battleships, submarines, aircraft, and machine guns.

**TECHNOLOGY arranged alphabetically by country –
U.S.A.: INTERWAR PERIOD (1919-39)**

Holwitt, Joel I. **“Review Essay: Reappraising the Interwar U.S. Navy.”** Vol.76, No.1 (January,

2012), pp.193-210. New studies demonstrate that the interwar U.S. was frequently led by innovative leaders, willing to experiment with new technologies and able to use fleet exercises and an internal review process to creatively, but realistically, generate a strategy that worked within the geographical and treaty constraints of an expected war in the Pacific.

TECHNOLOGY arranged alphabetically by country - U.S.A.: WORLD WAR II (1939-45)

Eddy, George G. **“Memoirs: The Birth of the Concrete-Piercing Fuze: How the Siegfried Line and Other Formidable Targets were Breached.”** Vol.64, No.2 (April, 2000), pp.459-465. Brigadier General George G. Eddy (1895-1969) relates the development of the concrete piercing fuze when he served as Director of the Ordnance Research Center at Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland, during World War II.

TECHNOLOGY arranged alphabetically by country - U.S.A.: COLD WAR (1945-91)

Eames, Anthony, **“The Trident Sales Agreement and Cold War Diplomacy.”** Vol.81, No.1 (January, 2017), pp.163-186. The ‘Special Relationship’ was bolstered by the sale of U.S. Trident submarine-launched ballistic missile technology to Great Britain in 1982.

Holwitt, Joel I. **“The Loss of U.S.S. *Thresher*: Technological and Cultural Change and the Cold War U.S. Navy.”** Vol.82, No.3 (July, 2018), pp.843-872. Advances the proposition that the response to the 10 April, 1963, loss of the U.S.S. *Thresher* with all hands led to a cultural shift within the U.S. naval officer development from a ‘generalist’ to a ‘technical specialist’ model.

TECHNOLOGY arranged alphabetically by country –

U.S.A.: VIETNAM WAR (2nd Indochina War) (1955-75)

Deitchman, Seymour J. **“The ‘Electronic Battlefield’ in the Vietnam War.”** Vol.72, No.3 (July, 2008), pp.869-887. Concludes that the proposal of the Jason Group of scientists for a network of sensors and aircraft to detect activity on the Ho Chi-Minh Trail in Laos, though not totally successful, impacted the course of the war and foreshadowed key aspects of the equipment and operation of the U.S. Armed Forces today.

Fino, Steven A. **“Breaking the Trance: The Perils of Technological Exuberance in the U.S. Air Force Entering Vietnam.”** Vol.77, No.2 (April, 2013), pp.625-655. The response of individual units to the need for guns, in addition to missiles, for air-to-air combat.

TERRORISM

Borch, Fred L. **“Comparing Pearl Harbor and ‘9/11’: Intelligence Failure? American**

Unpreparedness? Military Responsibility?" Vol.67, No.3 (July, 2003), pp.845-860.

Porch, Douglas, **"Historiographical Essay: Writing History in the 'End of History' Era:**

Reflections on Historians and the GWOT." Vol.70, No.4 (October, 2006), pp.1065-1079.

Addresses the danger of history being twisted by partisans, polemicists, and ideologues into an apologia for contemporary U.S. policy, and ultimately as a weapon of intimidation to silence doubt, dissent, disagreement, and even debate, which serves neither the cause of history, nor of policy and strategy formulation, nor even of democracy in a moment of national peril.

Jeans, Roger B., Jr. **"Alarm in Washington: A Wartime 'Expose' of Japan's Biological**

Warfare Program." Vol.71, No.2 (April, 2007), pp.411-439. Discusses a book published in the summer of 1944 describing both Japan's biological warfare program and the failure of the U.S. government to meet this threat, and the government and the media's response to this publication, considering parallels with the 2001 anthrax 'scares.'

Kohn, Richard H. **"The Danger of Militarization in an Endless 'War' on Terrorism."**

Vol.73, No.1 (January, 2009), pp.177-208. The identification of Americans with and use of war images and thinking, and a belief in the primacy of standing military forces for the safety of the country, have become normalized, so that the pursuit of an endless 'war' on terrorism only further threatens to militarize the nation.

TEXAS, U.S.A.

Schubert, Frank N. **"The 25th Infantry at Brownsville, Texas: Buffalo Soldiers, the 'Brownsville**

Six', and the Medal of Honor." Vol.75, No.4 (October, 2011), pp.1217-1224. Addresses the myth that there were six holders of the Medal of Honor among the Buffalo Soldiers who were dismissed after the August, 1906, shooting in Brownsville, Texas.

THAILAND

Leary, William M. **"The C.I.A. and the 'Secret War' in Laos: The Battle for Skyline Ridge,**

1971-1971." Vol.59, No.3 (July, 1995), pp.505-517. Narrates an all-but-forgotten victory of a force of Hmong, Lao, and Thai defenders against the North Vietnamese Army.

THEORY AND DOCTRINE

See Also: VON CLAUSEWITZ, CARL

Meilinger, Phillip S. **"Historiographical Essay: The Historiography of Airpower: Theory and**

Doctrine.” Vol.64, No.2 (April, 2000), pp.467-501.

THEORY AND DOCTRINE arranged chronologically by historical period or conflict -
ANCIENT PERIOD (to 476)

Hanson, Victor Davis, **“Historiographical Essay: The Status of Ancient Military History: Traditional Work, Recent Research, and On-Going Controversies.”** Vol.63, No.2 (April, 1999), pp.379-413. A very thorough survey covering works on every conceivable topic concerning the armed forces and conduct of warfare in the age of ancient Greece and Rome.

THEORY AND DOCTRINE arranged chronologically by historical period or conflict –
EARLY MODERN PERIOD (1480-1789)

Kubik, Timothy R.W. **“Is Machiavelli’s Canon Spiked? Practical Reading in Military History.”** Vol.61, No.1 (January, 1997), pp.7-30. Argues that Niccolò Machiavelli’s (1469-1527) *The Art of War* functioned as a prompt for debate, an exercise of prudent judgement, rather than offering a stock of handy maxims for use in a crisis.

Palmer, Michael A. **“‘The Soul’s Right Hand’: Command and Control in the Age of Fighting Sail, 1652-1827.”** Vol.61, No.4 (October, 1997), pp.679-705. Suggests that the ‘rationalism’ of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries had a detrimental impact on methods of command and control, emphasizing centralization which, in turn, favored the single line ahead formation that has been blamed for the indecisiveness of naval battles in this period.

Neill, Donald A. **“Ancestral Voices: The Influence of the Ancients on the Military Thought of the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries.”** Vol.62, No.3 (July, 1998), pp.487-520. Insists that the military developments of the Enlightenment were the result of the normal course of military innovation, simple evolutionary adaptation, as opposed to a sudden, revolutionary change stemming from the rediscovery of the military methods described by Classical authors.

Cassidy, Ben, **“Machiavelli and the Ideology of the Offensive: Gunpowder Weapons in *The Art of War*.”** Vol.67, No.2 (April, 2003), pp.381-404. Disputes the interpretation that, in his *Art of War*, Niccolò Machiavelli (1469-1527) completely rejects the use of both cannon and hand-held firearms, explaining that his downplaying of the use of gunpowder weapons was due to Machiavelli’s association of cannons and handguns with the defensive, while he endorsed the offensive.

THEORY AND DOCTRINE arranged chronologically by historical period or conflict -
FRENCH REVOLUTIONARY AND NAPOLEONIC WARS (1792-1815)

Arnold, James R. **“A Reappraisal of Column Versus Line in the Peninsular War.”** Vol.68, No.2 (April, 2004), pp.535-552. Disputes the influential English historian of the Napoleonic Wars, Sir Charles Oman’s (1860-1946), explanation for the superiority of the British line over the French column.

THEORY AND DOCTRINE arranged chronologically by historical period or conflict -
INTERWAR PERIOD (1919-1939)

Corum, James S. **“The Spanish Civil War: Lessons Learned and not Learned by the Great Powers.”** Vol.62, No.2 (April, 1998), pp.313-334. Considers what the British, French, German, Italian, Soviet, and United States armed forces learned or failed to learn from the study of the air war in Spain within the context of how armed forces undergo reform.

THEORY AND DOCTRINE arranged chronologically by historical period or conflict –
WORLD WAR II (1939-45): ALLIES

Lewis, Adriabn R. **“The Failure of Allied Planning and Doctrine for Operation Overlord: The Case of Minefield and Obstacle Clearance.”** Vol.62, No.4 (October, 1998), pp.787-807.

THEORY AND DOCTRINE arranged alphabetically by country –
ENGLAND / GREAT BRITAIN

Sumida, Jon Tetsuro, **“Sir John Fisher and the Dreadnought: The Sources of Naval Mythology.”** Vol.59, No.4 (October, 1995), pp.619-637.

Lambert, Nicholas A. **“Admiral Sir John Fisher and the Concept of Flotilla Defence, 1904-1909.”** Vol.59, No.4 (October, 1995), pp.639-660. Asks whether Admiral Fisher’s (1841-1920) embracing of a submarine and flotilla strategy represented an abandonment of the Mahanian approach to winning control of the seas through victory in a decisive clash between battle fleets.

Meilinger, Phillip, **“Trenchard and ‘Morale Bombing’: The Evolution of Royal Air Force Doctrine before World War II.”** Vol.60, No.2 (April, 1996), pp.243-270. Deals with the inexact blend of the intended goals of the R.A.F.’s interwar strategic bombing doctrine: breaking the will of the enemy and / or breaking the enemy’s economy.

Danchev, Alex, **“Liddell Hart and the Indirect Approach.”** Vol.63, No.2 (April, 1999), pp.313-337.

Marble, Sanders, **“Document of Note: General Haig Dismisses Attritional Warfare, January**

1916.” Vol.65, No.4 (October, 2001), pp.1061-1065.

Castel, Albert, “**Liddell Hart’s *Sherman: Propaganda as History.***” Vol.67, No.2 (April, 2003), pp.405-426. Concludes that Liddell Hart’s 1929 biography of U.S. Civil War General William Tecumseh Sherman (1820-1891) is seriously flawed, both factually and analytically, because it was written to validate the author’s concept of the ‘indirect approach’ in warfare.

Badsey, Stephen, “**The Boer War (1899-1902) and British Cavalry Doctrine: A Re-Evaluation.**” Vol.71, No.1 (January, 2007), pp.75-97. Rejecting the traditional interpretation, the article proposes that a cavalry reform movement incorporating dismounted tactics pre-dated the Second Anglo-Boer War, a mixture of mounted and dismounted tactics were used by both sides in the conflict, and that the problems experienced by cavalry were largely not of their own making

Parton, Neville, “**The Development of Early R.A.F. Doctrine.**” Vol.72, No.4 (October, 2008), pp.1155-1177. Rather than a monolithic focus on strategic bombing imposed by Hugh Trenchard (1873-1956), the article argues that R.A.F. doctrine between 1918 and 1923 was a more nuanced, balanced approach to developing and applying air power.

Reid, Brian Holden, “**‘Young Turks, or Not So Young?’: The Frustrated Quest of Major General J.F.C. Fuller and Captain B.H. Liddell Hart.**” Vol.73, No.1 (January, 2009), pp.147-175. A study of their motives and aspirations during the inter-war period.

Ewer, Peter, “**The British Campaign in Greece 1941: Assumptions about the Operational Art and Their Influence on Strategy.**” Vol.76, No.3 (July, 2012), pp.727-745. Inquires into the British decision to dispatch an expeditionary force to Greece and what it tells us about contemporary British Army doctrine.

Lambert, Nicholas A. “**Review Essay: False Prophet?: The Maritime Theory of Julian Corbett and Professional Education.**” Vol.77, No.3 (July, 2013), pp.1055-1078.

Forrester, Charles, “**Field Marshal Montgomery’s Role in the Creation of the British 21st Army Group’s Combined Arms Doctrine for the Final Assault on Germany.**” Vol.78, No.4 (October, 2014), pp.1295-1320.

Charles, Patrick J. “**Dissecting the Origins of Air-Centric Special Operations Theory.**” Vol.81, No.3 (July, 2017), pp.803-828. Seeks to find the answers to the controversy surrounding whether British or U.S. officers deserve the most credit for developing the concepts that led to Operation THURSDAY, the airlanding of a specialized force behind Japanese lines in Burma in March, 1944, to disrupt enemy infrastructure and communications.

THEORY AND DOCTRINE arranged alphabetically by country – FRANCE

Gunsburg, Jeffrey A. **“The Battle of Gembloux, 14-15 May 1940: The ‘Blitzkrieg’ Checked.”** Vol.64, No.1 (January, 2000), pp.97-140. Uses an examination of the effectiveness of the French forces holding a defensive position at the Belgium town of Gembloux as a test case for French doctrine and performance.

McConachy, Bruce, **“The Roots of Artillery Doctrine: Napoleonic Artillery Tactics Reconsidered.”** Vol.65, No.3 (July, 2001), pp.617-640. Puts forward the explanation that the changes in Napoleonic artillery practices beginning in 1807 were the results of years of experimentation and innovation, rather than compensation for a general decline in standards throughout the *Grande Armée*.

North, Johnathan, **“General Hoche and Counterinsurgency.”** Vol.67, No.2 (April, 2003), pp.529-540. Louis Lazare Hoche (1768-1797) was a General of Revolutionary France whose service included the successful suppression of the Catholic Royalist Revolt in the Vendée.

Osman, Julia, **“Guibert vs. Guibert: Competing Notions in the *Essai general de Tactique* and the *Défense du système de guerre modern*.”** Vol.83, No.1 (January, 2019), pp.43-65. Examines the apparently contradictory ideas about the conduct of war in two books written by the Enlightenment-era author, Jacques Antoine Hippolyte, the Comte de Guibert (1743-1790), who has been credited as the prophet of French Revolutionary and Napoleonic warfare.

THEORY AND DOCTRINE arranged alphabetically by country – GERMANY

Hughes, Daniel J. **“Schlichting, Schlieffen, and the Prussian Theory of War in 1914.”** Vol.59, No.2 (April, 1995), pp.257-277. Reviews the work of the controversial and influential Prussian Army theorist and critic of Alfred von Schlieffen, General Sigismund von Schlichting (1829-1909).

Echevarria, Antulio, **“General Staff Historian Hugo Freiherr von Freytag-Loringhoven and the Dialectics of German Military Thought.”** Vol.60, No.3 (July, 1996), pp.471-494. Von Freytag-Loringhoven (1855-1924) was arguably the most prolific of Imperial Germany’s military authors and, notably, a historian of the Great General Staff, whose opposition to change served as an antithesis that forced his critics to justify and further develop their ideas.

Showalter, Dennis, **“From Deterrence to Doomsday Machine: The German Way of War, 1890-1914.”** Vol.64, No.3 (July, 2000), pp.679-710. Proposes that between 1890 and 1914 the German Army developed a siege mentality, the only solution for which was believed to be the refinement of operational capabilities, pursued at the expense of policy and strategy.

Herwig, Holger H. **“Germany and the ‘Short War’ Illusion: Toward a New Interpretation?”** Vol.66, No.3 (July, 2002), pp.681-693. A reassessment based on newly accessed documents from the *Reichsarchiv* in the former East Germany suggest that Imperial Germany’s military leaders recognized that a conflict that they initiated might last up to two or more years.

Kelly, Patrick J. **“Strategy, Tactics, and Turf Wars: Tirpitz and the *Oberkommando der Marine*, 1892-1895.”** Vol.66, No.4 (October, 2002), pp.1033-1060. Relies on previously ignored archival material to reexamine the development of Grand Admiral Alfred von Tirpitz’s (1849-1930) strategic and tactical thought, including some significant contradictions.

Bird, Keith, **“Review Essay: The Tirpitz Legacy: The Political Ideology of German Sea Power.”** Vol.69, No.3 (July, 2005), pp.821-825.

Larson, Robert H. **“Max Jähns and the Writing of Military History in Imperial Germany.”** Vol.72, No.2 (April, 2008), pp.345-370. A career Prussian officer who taught military history at the elite War Academy for fourteen years and was a prolific author, Max Jähns’ (1837-1900) studies focused on the place of military institutions and practices in the context of general history.

Trauschweizer, Ingo Wolfgang, **“Learning with an Ally: The U.S. Army and the Bundeswehr in the Cold War.”** Vol.72, No.2 (April, 2008), pp.477-508. Discusses four areas of German-U.S. defense cooperation, including aid for West German rearmament, the reorganization of German and U.S. combat formations in the post-Korean War period, the failure of a shared attempt at tank design, and the impact of German tactical and operational concepts on post-Vietnam U.S. Army doctrine.

Foley, Robert T. **“Learning War’s Lessons: The German Army and the Battle of the Somme 1916.”** Vol.75, No.2 (April, 2011), pp.471-504. Over the course of the Battle of the Somme, the Germans were forced by superior Anglo-French weaponry and tactics to improvise a new defensive tactical doctrine, the evolution of which is examined through the study of German ‘lessons-learned’ reports which display intellectual flexibility.

López, Miguel A. **“The Survival of *Auftragstaktik* during the Soviet Counterattack in the Battle for Moscow, December 1941 to January 1942.”** Vol.84, No.1 (January, 2020), pp.187-212. Claims that Adolf Hitler’s 16 December, 1941, *Haltbefehl* (Halt Order) did not mark the end of the Prussian-German principle of *Auftragstaktik*, that in the face of the Soviet counterattacks German field commanders did retain their command independence and conducted withdrawals regardless of the *Haltbefehl*.

THEORY AND DOCTRINE arranged alphabetically by country – INDIA

Boesche, Roger, **“Kautilya’s *Arthaśāstra* on War and Diplomacy in Ancient India.”** Vol.67, No.1 (January, 2003), pp.9-37. Kautilya is believed to have been an adviser to the founder of the Mauryan Empire, Chandragupta (c.317-293 B.C.E.).

THEORY AND DOCTRINE arranged alphabetically by country – RUSSIA / SOVIET UNION

Stone, David R. **“Misreading Svechin: Attrition, Annihilation, and Historicism.”** Vol.76, No.3 (July, 2012), pp.673-693. Debunks the interpretation that the Soviet military theorist Aleksandr Svechin (1878-1938) favored attrition over annihilation, demonstrating, instead, that he was a historicist, who saw the precise balance between attrition and annihilation, or defense and offense, as constantly shifting as a result of changing material circumstances.

Plotnikov, Dmitry, **“Still Misreading Svechin: Annihilation, Attrition, and the Strategic and Operational Implications.”** Vol.86, No.3 (July, 2022), pp.670-687. Addresses misunderstanding relating to the concepts of annihilation and attrition in the writings of the Imperial Russian and Soviet military theorist Aleksandr Svechin (1878-1938).

THEORY AND DOCTRINE arranged alphabetically by country – U.S.A.

Hofmann, George F. **“The Tactical and Strategic Use of Attaché Intelligence: The Spanish Civil War and the U.S. Army’s Misguided Quest for a Modern Tank Doctrine.”** Vol.62, No.1 (January, 1998), pp.101-134. Asserts that the analysis of the employment of tanks in the war was distorted by the cultural bias of the infantry, cavalry, and artillery branch chiefs, leaving the U.S. Army without an armored doctrine on the eve of World War II.

Drew, Dennis M. **“U.S. Airpower Theory and the Insurgent Challenge: A Short Journey to Confusion.”** Vol.62, No.4 (October, 1998), pp.809-832. Covering the period from 1945 to 1992, the article contends that the U.S. Air Force has failed to account for the realities of guerrilla warfare in its theory of airpower.

Wildenberg, Thomas, **“In Support of the Battle Line: Gunnery’s Influence on the Development of Carrier Aviation in the U.S. Navy.”** Vol.65, No.3 (July, 2001), pp.697-711. Debunks the presumed anti-aviation attitude of ‘battleship admirals’ and describes how carrier aviation was a mission driven, rather than a technological driven, affair that proceeded incrementally over the course of several years.

Linn, Brian M. and Weigley, Russell F. **“*The American Way of War Revisited.*”** Vol.66, No.2 (April, 2002), pp.501-533. The author challenges some of the conclusions in Dr. Weigley’s (1930-2004) classic study of the manner in which the United States Army has conducted warfare through the length of its history.

Hone, Trent, **“The Evolution of Fleet Tactical Doctrine in the U.S. Navy, 1922-1941.”** Vol.67, No.4 (October, 2003), pp.1107-1148. Establishes how the Navy intended to use the battleships stationed at Pearl Harbor in battle, including Admiral Husband E. Kimmel’s (1882-1968) plans for a decisive fleet engagement in the Central Pacific.

Birtle, Andrew J. **“The Origins of the Legion of the United States.”** Vol.67, No.4 (October, 2003),

pp.1249-1262. Offers the possibility that the reorganization of the U.S. Army in 1792 was based on the writings of Colonel Henry Bouquet (1719-1765), a noted veteran of the Indian Frontier.

Malkasian, Carter, **“Toward a Better Understanding of Attrition: The Korean and Vietnam Wars.”** Vol.68, No.3 (July, 2004), pp.911-942.

Ferreiro, Larrie D. **“Mahan and the ‘English Club’ of Lima, Peru: The Genesis of *The Influence of Sea Power upon History*.”** Vol.72, No.3 (July, 2008), pp.901-906.

Reardon, Jeff, **“Breaking the U.S. Navy’s ‘Gun Club’ Mentality in the South Pacific.”** Vol.75, No.2 (April, 2011), pp.533-564. Analyzing the adjustment of pre-war doctrine in the face of defeat in nighttime naval engagements with the Imperial Japanese Navy.

Catagnus, Earl J. **“Infantry Field Manual 7-5 *Organization and Tactics of Infantry: The Rifle Battalion (October 1940)*.”** Vol.77, No.2 (April, 2013), pp.657-666.

Bruscino, Thomas, **“Naturally Clausewitzian: U.S. Army Theory and Education from Reconstruction to the Inter-War Years.”** Vol.77, No.4 (October, 2013), pp.1251-1275. Though familiar with Carl von Clausewitz (1780-1831), U.S. Army officers independently embraced concepts that Clausewitz advocated.

Hutchinson, Robert W. **“The Weight of History: *Wehrmacht* Officers, the U.S. Army Historical Division, and U.S. Military Doctrine, 1945-1956.”** Vol.78, No.4 (October, 2014), pp.1321-1348. Suggests that, even within the ‘purely operational’ lessons provided by veteran German officers to the U.S. Army, a considerable element of Nazi racist ideology was transmitted.

Finch, Michael P.M. **“Edward Mead Earle and the Unfinished *Makers of Modern Strategy*.”** Vol.80, No.3 (July, 2016), pp.781-814.

Charles, Patrick J. **“Dissecting the Origins of Air-Centric Special Operations Theory.”** Vol.81, No.3 (July, 2017), pp.803-828. Seeks to find the answers to the controversy surrounding whether British or U.S. officers deserve the most credit for developing the concepts that led to Operation THURSDAY, the airlanding of a specialized force behind Japanese lines in Burma in March, 1944, to disrupt enemy infrastructure and communications.

Hone, Trent, **“Learning to Win: The Evolution of U.S. Navy Tactical Doctrine During the Guadalcanal Campaign.”** Vol.82, No.3 (July, 2018), pp.817-841. Challenges the notion that the U.S. Navy suffered complete failure in surface night combat, contending, instead, that it was particularly skilled in integrating combat lessons and, accordingly, modifying its tactical doctrine.

Finch, Michael P.M. **“Theodore Ropp’s *Makers of Modern Strategy* Revisited and the Course**

of Military History, 1945-1981.” Vol.82, No.4 (October, 2018), pp.1231-1257. Though it was never completed, Theodore Ropp’s (1911-2000) project to update his 1943 edition reflected some of the ways in which military history had developed since the conclusion of World War II.

Haun, Phil, **“Foundation Bias: The Impact of the Air Corps Tactical School on United States Air Force Doctrine.”** Vol.85, No.2 (April, 2021), pp.453-474. Contrasts the steadfast belief in the role of strategic bombing at the Air Corps Tactical School with the effectiveness of joint operations demonstrated in the Korean, Vietnam, Iraq, and Afghanistan wars.

THIRTY-YEARS WAR (1618-48)

Croxton, Derek, **“ ‘The Prosperity of Arms is Never Continual’: Military Intelligence, Surprise, and Diplomacy in 1640s Germany.”** Vol.64, No.4 (October, 2000), pp.981-1003.

Staiano-Daniels, Lucian E. **“Determining Early Modern Army Strength: The Case of Electoral Saxony.”** Vol.83, No.4 (October, 2019), pp.1001-1020. Questions the issues of the ‘Military Revolution’ thesis that larger armies both reflected a revolution in warfare and forced states to adopt more efficient means of raising revenue by examining the experience of Saxony during the Thirty Years War (1618-1648).

TINKER, CLARENCE L. (1887-1942)

Meilinger, Phillip S. **“Historiographical Essay: U.S. Air Force Leaders: A Biographical Tour.”** Vol.62, No.4 (October, 1998), pp.833-870.

TOYOTOMI HIDEYOSHI (1537-98)

Swope, Kenneth M. **“Crouching Tigers, Secret Weapons: Military Technology Employed during the Sino-Japanese War, 1592-1598.”** Vol.69, No.1 (January, 2005), pp.11-41.

Reviews the major military technology employed by the belligerents, showing, contesting the conventional explanation that superior numbers and the death of Toyotomi Hideyoshi’s (1537-1598) death were the deciding factors in Japan’s defeat.

TRENCHARD, HUGH (1873-1956)

Parton, Neville, **“The Development of Early R.A.F. Doctrine.”** Vol.72, No.4 (October, 2008), pp.1155-1177. Rather than a monolithic focus on strategic bombing imposed by Hugh Trenchard (1873-1956), the article argues that R.A.F. doctrine between 1918 and 1923 was

a more nuanced, balanced approach to developing and applying air power.

TREVOR-ROPER, HUGH (1914-2003)

Douglas, Sarah K. **“The Search for Hitler: Hugh Trevor-Roper, Humphrey Searle, and the Last Days of Adolf Hitler.”** Vol.78, No.1 (January, 2014), pp.159-210. The means by which British intelligence officer Hugh Trevor-Roper (1914-2003) obtained his information for his book, *The Last Days of Hitler* (1947).

TRUJILLO, RAFAEL (1891-1961)

Moulton, Aaron Coy, **“The Dominican Dictator’s Funds and Guns in Costa Rica’s Wars of 1948.”** Vol.85, No.3 (July, 2021), pp.713-733. Whereas past studies of the conflicts in Costa Rica have focused on the involvement of Anastasio Somoza García of Nicaragua (1896-1956) and Juan José Arévalo of Guatemala (1904-1990), the author demonstrates that Costa Ricans sought to obtain arms from the Dominican Dictator Rafael Trujillo (1891-1961).

TRUMAN, HARRY S. (1884-1972)

Giangreco, D.M. **“Casualty Projections for the U.S. Invasion of Japan, 1945-1946: Planning and Policy Implications.”** Vol.61, No.3 (July, 1997), pp.521-581. Demonstrates that those historians who have rejected President Harry Truman’s (1945-1953) claim that he expected huge losses from an invasion of the Japanese Home Islands have based their conclusions on a combination of superficial research in the mass of related documents and specifically misinterpreting planning documents.

Bernstein, Barton J. **“Truman and the A-Bomb: Targeting Noncombatants, Using the Bomb, and His Defending the ‘Decision’.”** Vol.62, No.3 (July, 1998), pp.547-570. Focuses on the 1996 publication *Harry S. Truman and the Bomb: A Documentary History*. Edited and with commentary by Robert Ferrell.

Percy, William Alexander, **“Jim Crow and Uncle Sam: The Tuskegee Flying Units and the U.S. Army Air Forces in Europe during World War II.”** Vol.67, No.3 (July, 2003), pp.773-810. Links the success of the African American 99th Fighter Squadron and the 332nd Fighter Group with President Harry S. Truman’s decision to end segregation in the Armed Forces.

TURKEY / OTTOMAN EMPIRE

Karpat, Kemal H. **“Review Essay: The Rise of Modern Turkey.”** Vol.65, No.3 (July, 2001), pp.771-775. Covers two recent books that chronicle the transformation of the Turkish state from the late Ottoman Empire to a nation-state under Mustafa Kemal Atatürk (1881-1938).

TURKEY / OTTOMAN EMPIRE: PRE-MODERN PERIOD

DeVries, Kelly, **“The Lack of a Western European Military Response to the Ottoman Invasions of Eastern Europe from Nicopolis (1396) to Mohacs (1526).”** Vol.63, No.3 (July, 1999), pp.539-559. Inquires into the reasons behind a failure to respond to the Turkish threat, proposing that it was a combination of the intimidating power of the Ottomans and changing attitudes towards the duties expected of a Christian soldier.

Rose, Susan, **“Islam Versus Christendom: The Naval Dimension, 1000-1600.”** Vol.63, No.3 (July, 1999), pp.561-578. Surveys developments from the Crusades to the dominance of the Ottoman Empire within the geographic framework of the Mediterranean Sea.

TURKEY / OTTOMAN EMPIRE: 18th CENTURY TO 1900

Grant, Jonathan, **“The Sword of the Sultan: Ottoman Arms Imports, 1854-1914.”** Vol.66, No.1 (January, 2002), pp.9-36. Attempts to ascertain why the Ottoman Empire changed from being self-sufficient in the production of armaments, including warships, to relying entirely on imports by 1914.

Greenhalgh, Michael, **“French Military Reconnaissance in the Ottoman Empire during the Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries as a Source for Our Knowledge of Ancient Monuments.”** Vol.66, No.2 (April, 2002), pp.359-388. Displays how a combination of the intellectual background of many French officers and the Ottoman reuse of Classical Greek and Roman ruins for military purposes resulted in valuable archaeological information in reports preserved in French military archives.

Karsten, Peter, **“The ‘Naval Aristocracy’ and the ‘Young Turks’ of the *Fin de Siècle*: A Dotting of the ‘I’s and Crossing of the ‘T’s.’”** Vol.66, No.4 (October, 2002), pp.1177-1180. Undertakes to determine whether the social backgrounds of the ‘Young Turk’ generation of officers of the late-nineteenth century ‘New Navy’ played a role in their careers.

TURKEY / OTTOMAN EMPIRE: EARLY 20th CENTURY

Vandervort, Bruce, **“Review Essay: Italian Imperialism and the Onset of the Great War.”** Vol.79, No.4 (October, 2015), pp.1121-1126. Three books about the Italo-Turkish War, 1911-1912, and a third covering the wars that immediately preceding the outbreak of World War I which, of course, include both Italy’s war and the Balkan Wars.

Delis, Panagiotis, **“The Treatment of Prisoners of War Captured by the Greek Army during the Balkans Wars of 1912-13.”** Vol.82, No.4 (October, 2018), pp.1123-1147. Due to a combination of the inability of the Greeks to pay for the care of Bulgarian and Ottoman P.O.W.s and negative stereotypes held about the same, the laws concerning the treatment of prisoners established by international conventions in 1899 and 1907 were not honored by the Greek Army.

TURKEY / OTTOMAN EMPIRE: WORLD WAR I (1914-18)

Travers, Tim, **“Liman von Sanders, the Capture of Lieutenant Palmer, and Ottoman Anticipation of the Allied Landings at Gallipoli on 25 April 1915.”** Vol.65, No.4 (October, 2001), pp.965-979. Shines a light on the expectations of the Turks for a possible landing on the Gallipoli Peninsula and, in particular, the neglected issue of the impact of information from a captured British intelligence officer shortly before the actual landing.

Erickson, Edward J. **“Strength against Weakness: Ottoman Military Effectiveness at Gallipoli, 1915.”** Vol.65, No.4 (October, 2001), pp.981-1011. In contrast to most studies, the author concentrates on Turkish preparations and performance, showing that the peninsula was heavily fortified and defended by the Empire’s finest divisions.

Travers, Tim and Celik, Birten, **“ ‘Not One of Them Ever came Back’: What Happened to the 1/5 Norfolk Battalion on 12 August 1915 at Gallipoli?”** Vol.66, No.2 (April, 2002), pp.389-406.

Sheffy, Yigal, **“Chemical Warfare and the Palestine Campaign, 1916-1918.”** Vol.73, No.3 (July, 2009), pp.803-844. Brings light to the British use of chemical warfare in the Second (April, 1917) and Third (October-November, 1917) Battles of Gaza, the Ottoman response, and the reasons why this aspect of the Palestine Campaign have been disregarded in the historiography.

TURKEY / OTTOMAN EMPIRE: INTERWAR PERIOD (1919-39)

Orr, Andrew, **“ ‘We call you to holy war’: Mustafa Kemal, Communism, and Germany in French Intelligence Nightmare, 1919-1923.”** Vol.75, No.4 (October, 2011), pp.1095-1123. Explains how French military intelligence analysts chose to identify Mustafa Kemal (1881-1938) as the central figure in a communist-inspired, German controlled, anti-colonial enterprise that was closely allied to Islamist political movements, rather than the nationalist, secular, westernizing leader that he was.

TURKEY / OTTOMAN EMPIRE: COLD WAR (1945-91)

Priest, Andrew, **“ ‘In Common Cause’: The N.A.T.O. Multilateral Force and the Mixed-Manning Demonstration on the U.S.S. *Claude V. Ricketts*, 1964-1965.”** Vol.69, No.3

(July, 2005), pp.759-789. The crew of the destroyer (DDG-5) U.S.S. *Claude V. Ricketts* included U.S., British, Dutch, Greek, Italian, Turkish, and West German officers and men.

Uyar, Mesut and Güvenç, Serhat, **“One Battle and Two Accounts: The Turkish Brigade at Kunu-ri in November 1950.”** Vol.80, No.4 (October, 2016), pp.1117-1147. Assesses the impact of U.S. military assistance provided to the Turkish Army and why the official U.S. and Turkish accounts of the Battle of Kunu-ri / Chongchon differ significantly.

Kürkçü, Burak, **“The Question of U.S. Involvement in Turkish Military Coups during the Cold War: An Analysis via available C.I.A. Archives.”** Vol.86, No.1 (January, 2022), pp.110-131. Recently de-classified C.I.A. documents reveal no evidence for direct U.S. involvement in Turkish military coups during the Cold War.

TUSCARORA - See: NATIVE AMERICAN CONFLICTS

TWINING, NATHAN F. (1897-1982)

Meilinger, Phillip S. **“Historiographical Essay: U.S. Air Force Leaders: A Biographical Tour.”** Vol.62, No.4 (October, 1998), pp.833-870.

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See Also: MARINES; NATIVE AMERICAN CONFLICTS

Skelton, William B. **“Samuel P. Huntington and the Roots of the American Military Tradition.”** Vol.60, No.2 (April, 1996), pp.325-338.

Meilinger, Phillip S. **“Historiographical Essay: U.S. Air Force Leaders: A Biographical Tour.”** Vol.62, No.4 (October, 1998), pp.833-870.

Coffman, Edward M. **“The George C. Marshall Lecture of Military History: The Duality of the American Military Tradition: A Commentary.”** Vol.64, No.4 (October, 2000), pp.967-980. Discusses the duality of a standing, professional regular Armed Forces versus the citizen-soldier tradition.

Herrera, Ricardo A. **“Self-Governance and the American Citizen as Soldier, 1775-1861.”**

JOURNAL OF MILITARY HISTORY INDEX - Vol.59 (1995) to Vol.86 (2022)

Vol.65, No.1 (January, 2001), pp.21-52. Attempts to understand the conception of the relationship between military service and the Republic held by enlisted men, including regulars, militiamen, and volunteers, from the Revolution to the first year of the Civil War.

Linn, Brian M. and Weigley, Russell F. ***“The American Way of War Revisited.”*** Vol.66, No.2 (April, 2002), pp.501-533. The author challenges some of the conclusions in Dr. Weigley’s (1930-2004) classic study of the manner in which the United States Army has conducted warfare through the length of its history.

Atkinson, Rick, ***“Speech to the U.S. Commission on Military History: Washington, 1 November, 2003.”*** Vol.68, No.2 (April, 2004), pp.527-533.

Hogan, David W. ***“Head and Heart: The Dilemmas of American Attitudes towards War.”*** Vol.75, No.4 (October, 2011), pp.1021-1054. Modernist challenges to the old uniform attitudes towards war in a larger, more pluralistic society has made consensus difficult, if not impossible, to reach.

Trauschweizer, Ingo, ***“Historiographical Essay: On Militarism.”*** Vol.76, No.2 (April, 2012), pp.507-543. The definition(s) of European militarism, beginning in the late eighteenth century, and the question of U.S. militarism.

Borch, Fred L. ***“Review Essay: Lieber’s Code: A Landmark in the Law of War but not Lincoln’s Code.”*** Vol.77, No.2 (April, 2013), pp.671-674. Critiques John Fabian Witt’s *Lincoln’s Code: The Laws of War in American History* (2012), which concludes with the Philippine Insurrection, 1898.

Grimsley, Mark, ***“Review Essay: The American Military History Master Narrative: Three Textbooks on the American Military Experience.”*** Vol.79, No.3 (July, 2015), pp.783-802.

Watson, Samuel, ***“Military Learning and Adaptation Shaped by Social Context: The U.S. Army and its ‘Indian Wars’, 1790-1890.”*** Vol.82, No.2 (April, 2018), pp.373-412.

Krome, Frederic, ***“‘Will the Germans Bombard New York?’: Hugo Gernsback and the Future War Tale.”*** Vol.86, No.1 (January, 2022), pp.54-76. Appraises the role of ‘Future War’ fiction, particularly works produced by Hugo Gernsback (1884-1967), in engaging the American public’s interest in military affairs in the early 20th century.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: REVOLUTIONARY WAR (1775-83)

Syrett, David, ***“Historiographical Essay: The British Armed Forces in the American Revolutionary War: Publications, 1875-1998.”*** Vol.63, No.1 (January, 1999), pp.147-164.

Becker, Ann M. ***“Smallpox in Washington’s Army: Strategic Implications of the Disease during***

the American Revolutionary War.” Vol.68, No.2 (April, 2004), pp.381-430.

Powers, Sandra L. **“Historiographical Essay: Studying the Art of War: Military Books known to American Officers and Their French Counterparts during the Second Half of the Eighteenth Century.”** Vol.70, No.3 (July, 2006), pp.781-814.

Adelberg, Michael S. **“The Scope and Severity of Civil Warfare in Revolutionary Monmouth County, New Jersey.”** Vol.73, No.1 (January, 2009), pp.9-47. Examines both how many of the residents of Monmouth County chose to participate on the opposing sides and how many lives were adversely affected by the war.

Maass, John R. **“‘Too Grievous for a People to Bear’: Impressment and Conscription in Revolutionary North Carolina.”** Vol.73, No.4 (October, 2009), pp.1091-1115.

The government of North Carolina, faced with the challenges of fighting a revolutionary war, chose to impose impressment and conscription, which produced antipathy and resistance to Patriot authorities, undermining support for the new state, and added to the disorders within the state during the war.

Harrington, Hugh T. and Jordan, Jim, **“The Other Mystery Shot of the American Revolution: Did Timothy Murphy Kill British Brigadier General Simon Fraser at Saratoga?”** Vol.74, No.4 (October, 2010), pp.1037-1045. Attempts to disentangle the various accounts of the Battle of Saratoga, 1777, to determine the origins and validity of the Murphy legend, and its repetition by subsequent historians, along with the physics of musket fire.

Krebs, Daniel, **“Useful Enemies: The Treatment of German Prisoners of War during the American War of Independence.”** Vol.77, No.1 (January, 2013), pp.9-39. Narrates how, to boost morale, revolutionaries staged elaborate rituals with P.O.W.s, that local citizens hired captive soldiers as laborers, and that, after the victory at Yorktown, 1781, Congress and the Continental Army allowed P.O.W.s to go free after a cash payments and even sold some into indentured servitude.

Weddle, Kevin J. **“‘A Change of both Men and Measures’: British Reassessment of Military Strategy after Saratoga, 1777-1778.”** Vol.77, No.3 (July, 2013), pp.837-865.

Mayer, Holly A. **“Canada, Congress, and the Continental Army: Strategic Accommodations, 1774-1776.”** Vol.78, No.2 (April, 2014), pp.503-535. Discusses the challenge of reconciling the Continental Congress’ policy of encouraging the enlistment of French Catholics in Canada with anti-Catholic bigotry among the members of the Continental Army.

Hall, John W. **“An Irregular Reconsideration of George Washington and the American Military Tradition.”** Vol.78, No.3 (July, 2014), pp.961-993. Attempts to reconcile the contradictory interpretations of George Washington’s (1732-1799) approach to and

performance in the conduct of war.

Lapp, Derrick E. **“Did They Really ‘Take None but Gentlemen’? Henry Hardman, the Maryland Line, and a Reconsideration of the Socioeconomic Composition of the Continental Officer Corps.”** Vol.78, No.4 (October, 2014), pp.1239-1261.

Lender, Mark Edward, **“Review Essay: The Ever Controversial General Charles Lee.”** Vol.78, No.4 (October, 2014), pp.1395-1405. Charles Lee (1732-1782), a veteran of service in the British, Portuguese, and Polish armies, served as a high-ranking commander in George Washington’s Continental Army until his court martial over behavior associated with the Battle of Monmouth, June 28, 1778.

Herrera, Ricardo A. **“‘[T]he zealous activity of Capt. Lee’: Light-Horse Harry Lee and *Petite Guerre*.”** Vol.79, No.1 (January, 2015), pp.9-36. Captain ‘Light Horse Harry’ Lee’s (1756-1818) foraging mission in Delaware and Maryland, during February and March, 1778, as an example of command at the company level.

Tzoref-Ashkenazi, Chen, **“German Military Participation in Early Modern European Colonialism.”** Vol.80, No.3 (July, 2016), pp.671-695. Brings to light the employment of German mercenaries in the colonial ventures of different European kingdoms.

Soucier, Daniel S. **“‘Where there was no Signs of any Human Being’: Navigating the Eastern Country Wilderness on Arnold’s March to Quebec, 1775.”** Vol.81, No.2 (April, 2017), pp.369-393. Looks at soldiers’ attitudes towards and interaction with the natural environment.

Boutin, Cameron, **“Adversary and Ally: The Role of Weather in the Life and Career of George Washington.”** Vol.81, No.3 (July, 2017), pp.693-718.

Jones, T. Cole, **“‘The Rage of Tory-Hunting’: Loyalist Prisoners, Civil War, and the Violence of American Independence.”** Vol.81, No.3 (July, 2017), pp.719-746.

Lender, Mark Edward and Martin, James Kirby, **“Target New London: Benedict Arnold’s Raid, Just War, and ‘Homegrown Terror’ Reconsidered.”** Vol.83, No.1 (January, 2019), pp.67-95. Challenges the traditional Patriot depiction of Benedict Arnold’s (1741-1801) attack on the privateer base of New London, Connecticut, 6 September, 1781, arguing that it was conducted according to the contemporary rules of ‘civilized warfare.’

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: EARLY REPUBLIC TO CIVIL WAR (1783-1861)

Birtle, Andrew J. **“The Origins of the Legion of the United States.”** Vol.67, No.4 (October, 2003), pp.1249-1262. Offers the possibility that the reorganization of the U.S. Army in 1792 was based on the writings of Colonel Henry Bouquet (1719-1765), a noted veteran of the Indian Frontier.

Geissler, Suzanne, **“Professor Dennis Mahan Speaks out on West Point Chapel Issues, 1850.”** Vol.69, No.2 (April, 2005), pp.505-519. An 1850 letter from West Point professor to the Secretary of War in which Mahan (1802-1871) expressed his opposition to the academy’s Chaplain always having to be Episcopalian and mandatory chapel attendance for staff.

Hunter, Mark C. **“The U.S. Naval Academy and Its Summer Cruises: Professionalization in the Antebellum U.S. Navy, 1845-1861.”** Vol.70, No.4 (October, 2006), pp.963-994.

Rodriguez, Manuel Santirso, **“Under the Uniform: Tyrants and Praetorians in the Aftermath of the Revolution (1829-1854).”** Vol.83, No.2 (April, 2019), pp.379-407. Weighs the parallels and differences in the lives and careers of Nicholas Jean-de-Dieu Soult of France (1769-1851), Arthur Wellesley, the Duke of Wellington of Great Britain (1769-1852), Baldomero Espartero of Spain (1793-1879), and Andrew Jackson of the United States (1767-1845).

Hickey, Donald R. **“Research Note: The Quasi-War.”** Vol.85, No.2 (April, 2021), pp.475-484. Traces the origins and use of the term ‘Quasi-War’ to identify the naval conflict fought between the United States and Revolutionary France, 1798-1801.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: WAR OF 1812 (1812-15)

Skaggs, David Curtis, **“Aiming at the Truth: James Fenimore Cooper and the Battle of Lake Erie.”** Vol.59, No.2 (April, 1995), pp.237-255. Disentangles the disputed account of the Battle of Lake Erie, 10 September, 1813, written by Cooper (1789-1851) in his *History of the Navy of the United States* (1839).

Hickey, Donald R. **“Historiographical Essay: The War of 1812: Still a Forgotten Conflict?”** Vol.65, No.3 (July, 2001), pp.741-769.

Leiner, Frederick C. **“The Squadron Commander’s Share: Decatur and the Prize Money for the Chesapeake’s First War of 1812 Cruise.”** Vol.73, No.1 (January, 2009), pp.69-82. An examination of the prize case of Decatur vs. Chew that displays the tensions between ranking officers over their contrasting views of their appropriate shares.

Hickey, Donald R. **“1812: Remembering a Forgotten War.”** Vol.76, No.4 (October, 2012), pp.969-972.

Stagg, J.C.A. **“United States Army Officers in the War of 1812: A Statistical and Behavioral Portrait.”** Vol.76, No.4 (October, 2012), pp.1001-1034. An examination of 334 general court martials demonstrates that officers were judged more harshly for their moral and character defects than for their shortcomings in performing routine duties.

Crawford, Michael J. **“U.S. Navy Petty Officers in the Era of the War of 1812.”** Vol.76, No.4

(October, 2012), pp.1035-1051. Scrutinizes the Navy's process of recruiting and training petty officers between the years 1797 and 1812.

Black, Jeremy, **"The North American Theater of the Napoleonic Wars, or, as it is sometimes Called, the War of 1812."** Vol.76, No.4 (October, 2012), pp.1053-1066. The challenge for Great Britain was to balance the demands of different naval commitments.

McCranie, Kevin D. **"The War of 1812 in the ongoing Napoleonic Wars: The Response of Britain's Royal Navy."** Vol.76, No.4 (October, 2012), pp.1067-1094. The challenge for Great Britain to balance the demands of different naval commitments, particularly in 1812 and 1813.

Graves, Donald E. **"Why the White House was Burned: An Investigation into the British Destruction of Public Buildings at Washington in August 1814."** Vol.76, No.4 (October, 2012), pp.1095-1127. Encrusted with mythology by nineteenth century historians motivated by national chauvinism, the article considers whether the actions of the British forces were justified by the contemporary laws of war and / or as retaliation for the U.S. destruction of Canadian towns.

Leiner, Frederick C. **"'The Sport of Arbitrary Men': The Privateer *Nonsuch* and a Search at Sea in the War of 1812."** Vol.76, No.4 (October, 2012), pp.1147-1164. An incident involving the Baltimore Privateer *Nonsuch's* seizure of the schooner *Ann Maria*, which resulted in court cases that led all the way to the U.S. Supreme Court.

Jensen, Richard, **"Military History on the Electronic Frontier: Wikipedia Fights the War of 1812."** Vol.76, No.4 (October, 2012), pp.1165-1182.

Arnold, James R. **"Winfield Scott Makes a Name for Himself."** Vol.76, No.4 (October, 2012), pp.1183-1185. General Winfield Scott (1786-1866) first came to public notice during the War of 1812, during which he demonstrated a talent for training troops, but did the Duke of Wellington (1769-1852) ever actually say "Scott is lost" when commenting on Scott's Mexico City Campaign (1847).

Trautsch, Jasper M. **"The Causes of the War of 1812: 200 Years of Debate."** Vol.77, No.1 (January, 2013), pp.273-293.

Leiner, Frederick C. **"Privateers in the War of 1812."** Vol.77, No.4 (October, 2013), pp.1225-1250. Seeks to answer the question, 'Was privateering profitable?'

Stagg, J.C.A. **"Freedom and Subordination: Disciplinary Problems in the U.S. Army of 1812."** Vol.78, No.2 (April, 2014), pp.537-574. Based on general court martial case files and the question of proper forms of punishment.

Hickey, Donald R. “**‘War Hawks’: Using Newspapers to Trace a Phrase, 1792-1812.**” Vol.78, No.2 (April, 2014), pp.725-740.

Dudley, William S. “**Review Essay: War of 1812 Trilogy.**” Vol.78, No.2 (April, 2014), pp.747-751. Three works by the noted Canadian military historian, Donald E. Graves, on the Battles of the War of 1812 fought during the years 1813 to 1814.

Graves, Donald E. “**Review Essay: U.S. Army Campaigns of the War of 1812.**” Vol.79, No.1 (January, 2015), pp.181-185.

McCranie, Kevin D. “**Perception and Naval Dominance.: The British Experience during the War of 1812.**” Vol.82, No.4 (October, 2018), pp.1067-1091. The defeat of three British frigates by U.S. counterparts had no actual effect on British sea power, but provoked a disproportionate reaction within society and the Royal Navy, inadvertently leading to beneficial changes.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: SEMINOLE WARS (1816-1858)

Dawson, Joseph G. “**With Fidelity and Effectiveness: Archibald Henderson’s Lasting Legacy to the U.S. Marine Corps.**” Vol.62, No.4 (October, 1998), pp.727-753. Affirms Henderson’s importance as Commandant of the Corps (1821-1859), during which he expanded the roles and capabilities of Marines, such as the deployment of a Marine battalion alongside Army units against the Creeks and Seminoles and the addition of an artillery component to strengthen landing forces.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: U.S.-MEXICAN WAR (1846-48)

Levinson, Irving W. “**A New Paradigm for an Old Conflict: The Mexico-United States War.**” Vol.73, No.2 (April, 2009), pp.393-416. The victorious U.S. Army that found itself in possession of Mexico City had to provide assistance to the dominant political and socio-economic groups in order to obtain a peace treaty that would conclude the war.

Arndt, Jochen S. “**The True Napoleon of the West: General Winfield Scott’s Mexico City Campaign [1847] and the Origins of the U.S. Army’s Combined-Arms Combat Division.**” Vol.76, No.3 (July, 2012), pp.649-671. Ventures to prove that General Winfield Scott (1786-1866) organized the Army of the Invasion of Mexico according to the French system of combined arms divisions, enabling him to replicate the Napoleonic era’s aggressive operational tactics.

Arnold, James R. “**Winfield Scott Makes a Name for Himself.**” Vol.76, No.4 (October, 2012), pp.1183-1185. General Winfield Scott (1786-1866) first came to public notice during the War of 1812, during which he demonstrated a talent for training troops, but did the Duke of Wellington (1769-1852) ever actually say “Scott is lost” when commenting on Scott’s Mexico

City Campaign (1847).

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: CIVIL WAR (1861-65)

Janda, Lance, **“Shutting the Gates of Mercy: The American Origins of Total War, 1860-1880.”**

Vol.59, No.1 (January, 1995), pp.7-26. Links the evolution of ‘total war’ with the nature of armed conflict during the U.S. Civil War through to the late nineteenth century campaigns against the Native American tribes.

Grimsley, Mark, **“Review Essay: In Not so Dubious Battle: The Motivations of American Civil War Soldiers.”** Vol.62, No.1 (January, 1998), pp.175-188.

Weitz, Mark A. **“Drill, Training, and the Combat Performance of the Civil War Soldier: Dispelling the Myth of the Poor Soldier, Great Fight.”** Vol.62, No.2 (April, 1998), pp.263-289. Proposes that, contrary to conventional wisdom, the soldiers who fought in the war functioned effectively because of military skills that flowed directly from drill, training, and discipline rather than any innate fighting ability.

Dawson, Joseph G. **“Review Essay: Civil War Soldiers and Leaders: A Glatthaar Trio.”** Vol.63, No.1 (January, 1999), pp.165-168. Contains a single study on the relationships between high-ranking commanders and two involving the enlisted men’s experience, included African American soldiers and their officers and the troops who participated in Sherman’s march.

Dwyer, Christopher S. **“Raiding Strategy: As Applied by the Western Confederate Cavalry in the American Civil War.”** Vol.63, No.2 (April, 1999), pp.263-281. Offers the explanation that the failure of the Confederate Cavalry in the Western Theater was not due to any lack of success in the raids that were conducted, but to the misuse made of these raids in the overall strategy of Confederate theater commanders.

Roberts, William H. **“ ‘The Name of Ericsson’: Political Engineering in the Union Ironclad Program, 1861-1863.”** Vol.63, No.4 (October, 1999), pp.823-843.

Frank, Joseph Allan and Duteau, Barbara, **“Measuring the Political Articulatness of United States Civil War Soldiers: The Wisconsin Militia.”** Vol.64, No.1 (January, 2000), pp.53-77.

Bower, Stephen E. **“The Theology of the Battlefield: William Tecumseh Sherman and the U.S. Civil War.”** Vol.64, No.4 (October, 2000), pp.1005-1034. Focuses on the role of Sherman’s (1820-1891) nondenominational religious faith in his experiences in the Civil War.

DiNardo, Richard L. **“Southern by the Grace of God but Prussian by Common Sense: James Longstreet and the Exercise of Command in the U.S. Civil War.”** Vol.66, No.4 (October, 2002), pp.1011-1032. Compares the manner in which General James Longstreet (1821-1904)

organized and utilized his staff with the staff practices developed by the Prussian Army under Helmuth von Moltke the Elder (1800-1891).

Castel, Albert, **“Liddell Hart’s *Sherman: Propaganda as History*.”** Vol.67, No.2 (April, 2003), pp.405-426. Concludes that Liddell Hart’s 1929 biography of U.S. Civil War General William Tecumseh Sherman (1820-1891) is seriously flawed, both factually and analytically, because it was written to validate the author’s concept of the ‘indirect approach’ in warfare.

Davis, Robert S. **“Escape from Andersonville: A Study in Isolation and Imprisonment.”** Vol.67, No.4 (October, 2003), pp.1065-1081. Seeks to understand why only some two dozen Union prisoners escaped from Andersonville within the larger context of the P.O.W. experience in later conflicts.

Fitzharris, Joseph C. **“Field Officer Courts and the U.S. Civil War Military Justice.”** Vol.68, No.1 (January, 2004), pp.47-72. Looks at the neglected topic of field officer courts which, by a Congressional Act of July, 1862, was supposed to replace the more arbitrary regimental courts-martial system.

Rodgers, Thomas E. **“Billy Yank and G.I. Joe: An Exploratory Essay on the Sociopolitical Dimensions of Soldier Motivation.”** Vol.69, No.1 (January, 2005), pp.93-121. Presents the assertion that the pre-war socialization of Civil War Volunteers that enabled them to perform effectively in combat was missing among the citizen-soldiers of World War II.

Bruce, Susannah Ural, **“ ‘Remember Your Country and Keep up Its Credit’: Irish Volunteers and the Union Army, 1861-1865.”** Vol.69, No.2 (April, 2005), pp.331-359. Puts forward the explanation that a central theme in the support of Irish immigrants for the Union cause was their dual loyalties to both their new and original homelands, support that was tested by the rising casualties, Emancipation Proclamation, and the introduction of the draft.

Reid, Brian Holden, **“ ‘A Signpost that was Missing?’ Reconsidering British Lessons from the American Civil War.”** Vol.70, No.2 (April, 2006), pp.385-414. Focuses on the works of the military authors, notably General J.F.C. Fuller (1878-1966) and Captain Basil Liddell Hart (1895-1970), to consider the ‘lessons’ they perceived from their study of the U.S. Civil War.

Faust, Drew Gilpin, **“The 2006 George C. Marshall Lecture in Military History: ‘Numbers on Top of Numbers’: Counting the Civil War Dead.”** Vol.70, No.4 (October, 2006), pp.995-1009. The scale and destructiveness of the United States Civil War generated the assumption that the government had an obligation to accurately name and count the military dead.

Rafuse, Ethan S. **“Historiographical Essays: Still a Mystery? General Grant and the Histories, 1981-2006.”** Vol.71, No.3 (July, 2007), pp.849-874. Traces the evolution of the assessment of General Ulysses S. Grant (1822-1885), from William S. McFeely’s 1981 Pulitzer Prize-winning

study to the present day.

Wolters, Timothy S. **“Electric Torpedoes in the Confederacy: Reconciling Conflicting Histories.”** Vol.72, No.3 (July, 2008), pp.755-783. The article seeks to clarify the linkages between memory, history, and technology by examining the claims of Hunter Davidson, Beverley Kennon, Stephen Mallory, Matthew, and Gabriel Rains to contributing to the development of electric torpedoes for the Confederacy.

Noe, Kenneth W, **“ ‘Damned North Carolinians’ and ‘Brave Virginians’: The Lane-Mahone Controversy, Honor, and Civil War Memory.”** Vol.72, No.4 (October, 2008), pp.1089-1115. Charts the feud between the North Carolina commander, James Henry, and William Mahone over the question of who deserved credit for capturing three enemy flags at the Battle of Spotsylvania, 1864, a feud that was influenced by a culture of honor and post-war politics.

Keller, Christian B. **“Flying Dutchmen and Drunken Irishmen: The Myths and Realities of Ethnic Civil War Soldiers.”** Vol.73, No.1 (January, 2009), pp.117-145. Contrasts the myths, misconceptions, and stereotypes developed by Anglo-Americans regarding German- and Irish-American soldiers fighting in the United States Civil War with the historical truth about ethnic participation in the conflict.

Stoker, Donald, **“Forum: Confederate Military Strategy in the U.S. Civil War: There was no Offensive-Defensive Confederate Strategy.”** Vol.73, No.2 (April, 2009), pp.571-590.

Dawson, Joseph G., III, **“Forum: Confederate Military Strategy in the U.S. Civil War: Jefferson Davis and the Confederacy’s ‘Offensive-Defensive’ Strategy in the U.S. Civil War.”** Vol.73, No.2 (April, 2009), pp.591-613.

Badsey, Stephen; Stoker, Donald and Dawson, Joseph G., III **“Forum: Confederate Military Strategy in the U.S. Civil War – Revisited.”** Vol.73, No.4 (October, 2009), pp.1273-1287.

Davis, James A. **“Musical Reconnaissance and Deception in the American Civil War.”** Vol.74, No.1 (January, 2010), pp.79-105. Demonstrating both the intrinsic role of music in the lives of nineteenth century Americans and a growing understanding of battlefield psychology, the article looks at how music could provide scouts with clues about enemy locations and how this could be exploited to enhance tactical deception.

Jones, Spencer, **“The Influence of Horse Supply Upon Field Artillery in American Civil War.”** Vol.74, No.2 (April, 2010), pp.357-377. Proposes that the difficulties of both sides in finding and maintaining a sufficient supply of horses for artillery has implications for the wider debate on whether the U.S. Civil War marked the beginnings of ‘modern’ war.

Bell, Andrew McIlwaine, **“ ‘Gallinippers & Glory’: The Links between Mosquito-borne**

Diseases and U.S. Civil War Operations and Strategy, 1862.” Vol.74, No.2 (April, 2010), pp.379-405. Covers the physiological and psychological effects of malaria and yellow fever and their impact on military operations and strategy in 1862.

Smith, David G. “**‘Clear the Valley’: The Shenandoah Valley and the Genesis of the Gettysburg Campaign.**” Vol.74, No.4 (October, 2010), pp.1069-1096. Brings to light an overlooked motivation for General Robert E. Lee’s (1807-1870) Gettysburg Campaign, the need to clear the Shenandoah Valley of occupying U.S. troops due to a combination of home front discontent and logistical issues.

Weddle, Kevin J. “**The Fall of Satan’s Kingdom: Civil-Military Relations and the Union Navy’s Attack on Charleston, April 1863.**” Vol.75, No.2 (April, 2011), pp.411-439. Describes the conflict between Rear Admiral Samuel Francis Du Pont (1803-1865) and the members of Lincoln’s administration, Secretary of the Navy Gideon Welles (1802-1878) and his assistant, Gustavus Fox (1821-1883).

Seidule, James Tyrus, “**Treason is Treason: Civil War Memory at West Point, 1861-1902.**” Vol.76, No.2 (April, 2012), pp.427-452. Asserts that West Point during the Gilded Age neither forgot nor forgave graduates who had chosen to fight against the U.S. Army as officers in the Confederate forces and that memorials were created during the 1890s to highlight the role of its graduates in preserving the Union.

Newell, Clayton R. and Shrader, Charles R. “**The U.S. Army’s Transition to Peace, 1865-66.**” Vol.77, No.3 (July, 2013), pp.867-894.

McPherson, James M. “**The 2014 George C. Marshall Lecture in Military History: The Rewards of Risk-Taking: Two Civil War Admirals.**” Vol.78, No.4 (October, 2014), pp.1225-1237. Comparison between Rear Admiral David Glasgow Farragut (1801-1870) and Rear Admiral Samuel Francis Du Pont (1803-1865).

Richenbacher, Wayne E. “**The Demise of Stonewall Jackson: A Civil War Medical Case Study.**” Vol.79, No.3 (July, 2015), pp.635-655. Chronicles the eight days between General Stonewall Jackson’s (1824-1863) wounding at the Battle of Chancellorsville, 2 May, 1863, and his death, considering the care provided his surgeon,

Canfield, Daniel T. “**Opportunity Lost: Combined Operations and the Development of Union Military Strategy, April 1861 – April 1862.**” Vol.79, No.3 (July, 2015), pp.657-690.

Stamp, Jeffrey, “**Aero-Static Warfare: A Brief Survey of Ballooning in Mid-nineteenth-century Siege Warfare.**” Vol.79, No.3 (July, 2015), Pp.767-782. Includes usage in the U.S. Civil War, War of the Triple Alliance / Paraguayan War, and the Franco-Prussian War.

Kemmerly, Phillip R. **“Environment and the Course of Battle: Flooding at Shiloh (6-7 April, 1862).”** Vol.79, No.4 (October, 2015), pp.1079-1108.

Kaplan, Mike, **“Review Essay: Grant’s Drinking... The Beast that will not Die.”** Vol.79, No.4 (October, 2015), pp.1109-1119.

Matsui, John H. **“Historiographical Essay: Seven Score and Ten: American Civil War Historiography at the Close of the Sesquicentennial.”** Vol.80, No.2 (April, 2016), pp.487-509.

Schubert, Frank N. **“Commemorative Essay: Sesquicentennial Reflection on the Black Regulars.”** Vol.80, No.4 (October, 2016), pp.1011-1016. To honor the sesquicentennial of the inclusion of African Americans in the regular U.S. Army, this brief essay considers how this precedent that came about in the wake of the service Black Volunteers in the Civil War pushed forward, albeit all too slowly, social change in American society.

Cashin, Joan, **“Bibliographic Essay: American Women and the American Civil War.”** Vol.81, No.1 (January, 2017), pp.199-204.

Johnson, Mark W. **“Emory Upton’s Twenty-Six: Desertion and Divided Loyalty of the U.S. Army Soldiers, 1860-1861.”** Vol.81, No.3 (July, 2017), pp.747-774. Contrary to common assumptions, the enlisted men of the regular peace-time Army were as conflicted in their loyalties as their officers, resulting in over 500 deserting during the secession crisis to serve in what became the Army of the Confederate States of America.

Rafuse, Ethan S. **“ ‘Little Phil’, a ‘Bad Old Man’, and the ‘Gray Ghost’: Hybrid Warfare and the Fight for the Shenandoah Valley, August-November 1864.”** Vol.81, No.3 (July, 2017), pp.775-801. Uses Major General Philip Sheridan’s (1831-1888) successful campaign against the combination of Confederate regular and irregular forces as a case study of addressing the challenges of hybrid warfare.

Petty, Adam H. **“Reconsidering the Wilderness’s Role in Battle, 4-6 May 1864.”** Vol.82, No.2 (April, 2018), pp.413-438. Questions the existing consensus regarding the influence of the forest known as the Wilderness on the battle of the same name.

Carney, James T. **“The Great Silence of Robert E. Lee.”** Vol.83, No.1 (January, 2019), pp.97-126. Concludes that the primary reason Gen. Robert E. Lee (1807-1870) failed to advocate for an end to the war when, by November, 1864, it was clear that the Confederacy had lost, was his loyalty to his friend, President Jefferson Davis (1808-1889).

Ferraro, William M. **“Old and New Views of Ulysses S. Grant: The Soldier and the Man.”** Vol.83, No.1 (January, 2019), pp.195-212.

Fuller, Howard J. **“Review Essay: Much in Little: John Ericsson and His Monitor Save the Republic.”** Vol.83, No.3 (July, 2019), pp.861-864.

Hunter, Antwain K. **“‘Patriots, Cowards, and Men Disloyal at Heart’: Labor and Politics at the Springfield Armory, 1861-1865.”** Vol.84, No.1 (January, 2020), pp.51-81. Demonstrates that while the Springfield Armory was vocal in its support for the cause of the Union during the Civil War, it nevertheless contained employees who expressed criticism of the Lincoln administration and support for the Confederacy.

Kemmerly, Phillip R. **“Rivers, Rails, and Rebels: Logistics and Struggle to Supply U.S. Army Depot at Nashville, 1862-1865.”** Vol.84, No.3 (July, 2020), pp.713-746. Highlights the indispensable support provided by the U.S. Army depot at Nashville, Tennessee, for Union operations in the Western Theater, which, in turn, depended upon the Louisville-Nashville railway line and the Cumberland River kept open by the U.S. Navy.

Lovelace, Alexander G. **“Meade and the Media: Civil War Journalism and the New History of War Reporting.”** Vol.85, No.4 (October, 2021), pp.907-929. Employs a new approach in which War Correspondents are seen as powerful actors who could influence the decision-making process of commanders.

Kemmerly, Phillip R. **“Logistics of U.S. Grant’s 1863 Mississippi Campaign: From the Amphibious Landing at Bruinsburg to the Siege of Vicksburg.”** Vol.86, No.3 (July, 2022), pp.573-611. Approaches the much-studied Vicksburg Campaign of General Ulysses S. Grant (1869-1877) from the neglected perspective of logistics, assessing how the interactions of the environment and logistical requirements impacted battle plans, command decisions, and tactics.

Swenson, Benjamin J. **“‘Measures of Conciliation’: Winfield Scott, Henry Halleck, and the Origins of U.S. Army Counterinsurgency Doctrine.”** Vol.86, No.4 (October, 2022), pp.859-881. Explores the collaboration between Major General Winfield Scott (1786-1866), who implemented policies intended to forestall insurgency, and General Henry Halleck (1815-1872), who made a study of Napoleon’s failed occupation of Spain, in developing U.S. Army counterinsurgency doctrine, which impacted the formation of international laws of war.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: LATE 19th TO EARLY 20th CENTURY

Janda, Lance, **“Shutting the Gates of Mercy: The American Origins of Total War, 1860-1880.”** Vol.59, No.1 (January, 1995), pp.7-26. Links the evolution of ‘total war’ with the nature of armed conflict during the U.S. Civil War through to the late nineteenth century campaigns against the Native American tribes.

Pope, Steven W. **“An Army of Athletes: Playing Fields, Battlefields, and the American Military Sporting Experience, 1890-1920.”** Vol.59, No.3 (July, 1995), pp.435-456. Looks at the efforts

of a reformist generation of officers, who were committed to their soldiers' welfare, to utilize athletics and sports as a means of combatting desertion and vice, which contributed to a transformation in the public image of both sports and the Army.

Oyos, Matthew M. **"Theodore Roosevelt and the Implements of War."** Vol.60, No.4 (October, 1996), pp.631-655. Brings to light an overlooked aspect of Roosevelt's presidency (1901-1909), his role in accelerating the pace of military technological modernization, including involvement with battleships, submarines, aircraft, and machine guns.

Angevine, Robert G. **"The Rise and Fall of the Office of Naval Intelligence, 1882-1892: A Technological Perspective."** Vol.62, No.2 (April, 1998), pp.291-312. Advances the argument that the first peacetime military intelligence organization, by successfully gathering, overtly and covertly, information on foreign naval technology, enabled the United States to build a modern fleet as quickly and inexpensively as possible.

Grandstaff, Mark R. **"Preserving the 'Habits and Usages of War': William Tecumseh Sherman, Professional Reform and the U.S. Army Officer Corps, 1865-1881, Revisited."** Vol.62, No.3 (July, 1998), pp.521-545.

Fitzpatrick, David J. **"Emory Upton and the Citizen Soldier."** Vol.65, No.2 (April, 2001), pp.355-389. Refutes the accepted notion of Upton's opposition to citizen-soldiers and democracy. The article includes a review of Upton's (1839-1881) reflections on the military systems in India and Serbia.

Beaver, Daniel R. **"The U.S. War Department in the Gaslight Era: Stephen Vincent Benét at the Ordnance Department, 1870-91."** Vol.68, No.1 (January, 2004), pp.105-132.

Sacca, John Wanda, **"Like Strangers in a Foreign Land: Chinese Officers Prepared at American Military Colleges, 1904-37."** Vol.70, No.3 (July, 2006), pp.703-742. Relates how those Chinese officers who received military education in the United States during the turbulent period marked by the end of the Qing Dynasty and the establishment of the Republic were tainted by their foreign education and hampered by their lack of membership in any alumni associations.

Schubert, Frank N. **"The 25th Infantry at Brownsville, Texas: Buffalo Soldiers, the 'Brownsville Six', and the Medal of Honor."** Vol.75, No.4 (October, 2011), pp.1217-1224. Addresses the myth that there were six holders of the Medal of Honor among the Buffalo Soldiers who were dismissed after the August, 1906, shooting in Brownsville, Texas.

McGinnis, Anthony R. **"When Courage was not Enough: Plains Indians at War with the United States Army."** Vol.76, No.2 (April, 2012), pp.454-473. Considers why the Native American tribes of the Great Plains continued to rely on their own specific style of limited

warfare in the face of the U.S. Army newcomers when this style of warfare was unable to achieve any permanent success against the 'Blue Coats'.

Fitzpatrick, David J. **"Emory Upton and the Army of Democracy."** Vol.77, No.2 (April, 2013), pp.463-490. Challenges the depiction of Emory Upton (1839-1881) as an anti-democracy militarist.

Epstein, Katherine C. **"'No One can Afford to Say 'Damn the Torpedoes': Battle Tactics and the U.S. Naval History before World War I."** Vol.77, No.2 (April, 2013), pp.491-520.

Newell, Clayton R. and Shrader, Charles R. **"The U.S. Army's Transition to Peace, 1865-66."** Vol.77, No.3 (July, 2013), pp.867-894.

Otte, T.G. **"From *Can-Can Diabolique* to *Sitzkrieg*: The International China Expeditionary Force, 1900-1901."** Vol.77, No.4 (October, 2013), pp.1277-1302. Analyzes a neglected example of coalition warfare.

Smith, Mark A. **"The Politics of Military Professionalism: The Engineer Company and the Political Activities of the Antebellum U.S. Army Corps of Engineers."** Vol.80, No.2 (April, 2016), pp.355-387. Addresses the tensions presented by both internal politicking in the Corps and the lobbying of officers in promoting the nation's defensive needs.

Jeffrey, Thomas E. **"Commodore' Edison Joins the Navy: Thomas Alva Edison and the Naval Consulting Board."** Vol.80, No.2 (April, 2016), pp.411-445. Claims that the impetus for the formation of the Naval Consulting Board headed by Edison (1847-1931), which was intended to provide advice on naval warfare technology, was Edison's chief engineer, who conceived it as the centerpiece of a marketing campaign to sell Edison designed batteries to the Navy for their submarines.

Baker, Anni, **"The Abolition of the U.S. Army Canteen, 1898-1914."** Vol.80, No.3 (July, 2016), pp.697-724. The impact of Progressive era activists on conditions in the Army and the debate over the role of the Army in U.S. society.

Hackemer, Kurt, **"Wartime Trauma and the Lure of the Frontier: Civil War Veterans in Dakota Territory."** Vol.81, No.1 (January, 2017), pp.75-103. Surveys a sample of 6,000 veterans based on the 1885 Dakota Territory census.

Crawford, Michael J. **"The Abolition of Prize Money in the United States Navy Reconsidered."** Vol.81, No.1 (January, 2017), pp.105-132. Sizes up the efforts to eliminate prize money for the capture of enemy warships and merchant ships, which began shortly after the War of 1812, but only came about in 1899 due to a confluence of motives.

McGovern, Rory M. **"The School of Experience: George W. Goethals and the U.S. Army, 1867-**

1907.” Vol.81, No.2 (April, 2017), pp.395-424. Observes George W. Goethals (1858-1928) pre-Panama Canal / World War I career as an example of the career path of officers within the Gilded Age Army.

Cyr, Arthur I. **“Review Essay: Custer before the Little Bighorn: A Boy General Heads West.”** Vol.82, No.2 (April, 2018), pp.547-550.

Shellum, Brian G. **“African American Officers in Liberia, 1910-1942.”** Vol.82, No.3 (July, 2018), pp.739-757. Seventeen African American officers from the U.S. Army reorganized, trained, and commanded the Liberian Frontier Force that enabled it to defend the nation’s borders and defeat a number of indigenous uprisings.

Jamison, Thomas M. **“The War of the Pacific, Technology and U.S. Naval Development: An International History of a Regional War.”** Vol.82, No.4 (October, 2018), pp.1093-1122. The observations by foreign nations of the war between Chile and a coalition of Bolivia and Peru, 1879-1884, influenced naval developments around the globe, including contributing to the U.S. building of the ‘New Navy’ in the 1890s.

Crawford, Michael J. **“Avast Swabbing! The Medical Campaign to reform Swabbing the Decks in the U.S. Navy.”** Vol.83, No.1 (January, 2019), pp.127-156. Delves into the conflict between Navy officers, who prioritized the clean appearance of their ships, and Navy doctors, who believed that the humid air produced by swabbing the decks facilitated the spread of diseases that afflicted sailors.

Brands, Benjamin D. **“ ‘Unsatisfactory and Futile’: The Officers’ Lyceum Program and U.S. Army Reform.”** Vol.83, No.4 (October, 2019), pp.1067-1094. Inquires into the impact of the Officers’ Lyceum Program on the late-19th century Army’s effort to provide its officer corps with professional education.

Mears, Dwight S. **“ ‘Neither an Officer nor an Enlisted Man;: Contract Surgeons’ Eligibility for the Medal of Honor.”** Vol.85, No.1 (January, 2021), pp.51-75. Presents four instances in the Nineteenth century U.S. Army of contract surgeons who claimed entitlement to the Medal of Honor.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR (1898)

Brereton, T.R. **“First Lessons in Modern War: Arthur Wagner, the 1898 Santiago Campaign, and the U.S. Army Lesson-Learning.”** Vol.64, No.1 (January, 2000), pp.79-96. Relates how Lieutenant Colonel Arthur Wagner (1853-1905) pioneered the U.S. Army’s practice of producing ‘lessons-learned’ studies of the Army’s recent military operations.

Hooper, Candice Shy, **“The War that Made Hollywood: How the Spanish-American War**

Saved the U.S. Film Industry.” Vol.76, No.1 (January, 2012), pp.69-97. By 1897 the embryonic film industry was in decline, but the industry’s exploitation of the public’s interest in the explosion of the U.S.S. *Maine* and the subsequent war made the business of movies lucrative once more.

Smith, Jason W. **“Twixt the Devil and the Deep Blue Sea: Hydrography, Sea Power, and the Marine Environment, 1898-1901.”** Vol.78, No.2 (April, 2014), pp.575-604. Endeavors to understand the role played by knowledge of the marine environment in the Spanish-American War, 1898.

Krueger, David, **“The Red Cross, the Daughters of the American Revolution, and the Origins of the Army Nurse Corps in the Spanish-American War.”** Vol.83, No.2 (April, 2019), pp.409-434. Determines that the work of contract nurses, promoted by the Daughters of the American Revolution Hospital Corps and the Red Cross, demonstrated the capability and necessity of female nurses in the military, the Army chose to establish a professional nurse corps rather than rely on volunteers.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: PHILIPPINE-U.S. WAR (1899-1902)

Birtle, Andrew J. **“The U.S. Army’s Pacification of Marinduque, Philippine Islands, April 1900 – April 1901.”** Vol.61, No.2 (April, 1997), pp.255-282. Observes that the common image of the U.S. counterinsurgency campaign in the Philippines that emphasizes the political ‘Nation Building’ approach obscures the equally if not more important harsh military measures indispensable for pacification.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: MEXICAN PUNATIVE EXPEDITION (1916-17)

Beckstrand, Alex, **“Woodrow Wilson and the Struggle of Civil-Military Relations during the Punitive Expedition of 1916-1917.”** Vol.86, No.2 (April, 2022), pp.372-398. Argues that President Woodrow Wilson’s (1913-1921) decision to defer to his military commanders, Major General Frederick Funston (1865-1917) and Brigadier General John J. Pershing (1860-1948), was the cause of the failure to achieve the goals of the Punitive Expedition.

UNITED STATES: WORLD WAR I (1914-18): HOME FRONT

Bruce, Robert B. **“America Embraces France: Marshal Joseph Joffre and the French Mission to the United States, April-May 1917.”** Vol.66, No.2 (April, 2002), pp.407-441. Proposes that Marshal Joffre (1852-1931), more than any other individual, established strong-Franco-American military, political, and social ties, contributing mightily to U.S. public support for a commitment of a large expeditionary force to the Western Front.

Wilson, Timothy, **“Broken Wings: The Curtis Aeroplane Company, K-Boats, and the Russian**

Navy, 1914-1916.” Vol.66, No.4 (October, 2002), pp.1061-1083. Indicates that the contention between Curtiss and the Imperial Russian Government over the purchase of fifty-six flying boats impeded Russia’s operations in the Black Sea for the first eighteen months of World War I.

Budreau, Lisa M. **“The Politics of Remembrance: The Gold Star Mothers’ Pilgrimage and America’s Fading Memory of the Great War.”** Vol.72, No.2 (April, 2008), pp.371-411. Collectively, the Gold Star Mothers offer a multidimensional model of the ethnic, cultural, economic, and religious diversity prevalent in the United States during the interwar years.

Lukasik, Sebastian H. **“Doughboys, the Y.M.C.A., and the Moral Economy of Sacrifice in the First World War.”** Vol.84, No.3 (July, 2020), pp.774-797. Contends that U.S. soldiers’ complaints about the Y.M.C.A. in France reflected larger concerns about the Home Front, perceptions of which shaped soldiers’ notions about the value of their sacrifices.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: WORLD WAR I (1914-18)

Laurie, Clayton D. **“ ‘The Chanting of Crusaders’: Captain Heber Blankenhorn and A.E.F. Combat Propaganda in World War I.”** Vol.59, No.3 (July, 1995), pp.457-481.

Nenninger, Timothy K. **“ ‘Unsystematic as a Mode of Command’: Commanders and the Process of Command in the American Expeditionary Forces, 1917-1918.”** Vol.64, No.3 (July, 2000), pp.739-768. Inquires into how the knowledge, skills, and preparations of A.E.F. commanders and staff officers and their interactions with one another produced a distinctly American process of command.

Nelson, David T. and Cole, Richard G. **“Memoirs: Behind German Lines in 1915: The Letters Home of David T. Nelson.”** Vol.65, No.4 (October, 2001), pp.1053-1060. Nelson, who was from Decorah, Iowa, was a Rhodes Scholar at Oxford when the war broke out. He worked for the Commission for Relief in German occupied Belgium and, later in 1916, as a driver for the American Field Ambulance Corps.

Steffen, Dirk, **“The Holtzendorff Memorandum of 22 December, 1916, and Germany’s Declaration of Unrestricted U-Boat Warfare.”** Vol.68, No.1 (January, 2004), pp.215-224. Examines how the Chief of the Imperial German Navy’s Admiralty Staff, Henning von Holtzendorff (1853-1919), successfully argued that Germany could risk provoking the United States entering the war in return for starving Great Britain into submission.

Neumann, Brian, **“ ‘A Question of Authority’: Reassessing the March-Pershing ‘Feud’ in the First World War.”** Vol.73, No.4 (October, 2009), pp.1117-1142. Ascertains that the conflict between John J. Pershing (1860-1940) and Peyton C. March (1864-1955) was the result of a lack of a clearly defined command structure within the U.S. Army rather than a matter of opposing personalities.

Little, Branden, **“Evacuating Wartime Europe: U.S. Policy, Strategy, and Relief Operations for Overseas American Travelers, 1914-15.”** Vol.79, No.4 (October, 2015), pp.929-958. The evacuation by the U.S. Relief Commission of 125,000 U.S. citizens stranded in Europe and its far-ranging impact on war preparedness and subsequent humanitarian operations.

Goldman, David I. **“‘Charlie’ Chaplains in the Great War: Chaplains’ Experiences in the U.S. Army, 1917-1919.”** Vol.84, No.2 (April, 2020), pp.395-426. Due to budget cuts, the section of the U.S. Army’s official history of participation in world War I concerning the service of Chaplains was never completed. Nevertheless, the material for such a section in the form of letters, photos, and documents has survived and provides a largely overlooked source for the United States involvement in the Great War.

Spears, Timothy B. **“Stone Truths: American Memorial Landscapes of World War I.”** Vol.85, No.2 (April, 2021), pp.342-368. Assesses the accuracy of summaries and maps displaying the operations of the American Expeditionary Force etched in stone by the American Battle Monuments Commission.

Blazich, Frank A. **“Notre Cher Ami: The Enduring Myth and Memory of a Humble Pigeon.”** Vol.85, No.3 (July, 2021), pp.646-677. The homing pigeon Cher Ami survived severe wounds transporting messages, but the question of whether or not it was the pigeon that helped save the ‘Lost Battalion’ of the American Expeditionary Force is explored in this article.

Hauser, Mark T. **“‘A Violent Desire for Amusements’: Boxing, Libraries, and the Distribution and Management of Welfare During the First World War.”** Vol.86, No.4 (October, 2022), pp.883-913. Illustrates the impact of U.S. wartime recreation programs during World War I on the development of mass culture.

UNITED STATES: INTERWAR PERIOD (1919-39)

Meixsel, Richard B. **“Major General George Grunert, WPO-3, and the Philippine Army, 1940-1941.”** Vol.59, No.2 (April, 1995), pp.303-324. Challenges the conventional account of the initial abandonment of War Plan Orange – 3 by the Commanding General of the Philippine Department, General Grunert (1881-1971), and Philippine Army Field Marshal, Douglas MacArthur (1880-1964).

Ferrell, Henry C., Jr. **“Guns for Vermont: Military Land Acquisition in the 1920s.”** Vol.61, No.1 (January, 1997), pp.31-47. Presents the remarkable achievement of Vermont Senator, Frank Lester Greene (1870-1930), of arranging for the purchase of additional land for Fort Ethan Allen at a time of severely constrained defense budgets.

Hofmann, George F. **“The Tactical and Strategic Use of Attaché Intelligence: The Spanish Civil**

War and the U.S. Army's Misguided Quest for a Modern Tank Doctrine." Vol.62, No.1 (January, 1998), pp.101-134. Asserts that the analysis of the employment of tanks in the war was distorted by the cultural bias of the infantry, cavalry, and artillery branch chiefs, leaving the U.S. Army without an armored doctrine on the eve of World War II.

Corum, James S. **"The Spanish Civil War: Lessons Learned and not Learned by the Great Powers."** Vol.62, No.2 (April, 1998), pp.313-334. Considers what the British, French, German, Italian, Soviet, and United States armed forces learned or failed to learn from the study of the air war in Spain within the context of how armed forces undergo reform.

Wildenberg, Thomas, **"In Support of the Battle Line: Gunnery's Influence on the Development of Carrier Aviation in the U.S. Navy."** Vol.65, No.3 (July, 2001), pp.697-711. Debunks the presumed anti-aviation attitude of 'battleship admirals' and describes how carrier aviation was a mission driven, rather than a technological driven, affair that proceeded incrementally over the course of several years.

Irish, Kerry E. **"Apt Pupil: Dwight Eisenhower and the 1930 Industrial Mobilization Plan."** Vol.70, No.1 (January, 2006), pp.31-61. While the detailed plan for industrial mobilization drawn up by Eisenhower (1890-1969) as a staff officer was not formally implemented, it nevertheless provided the basis for a more efficient transition to war production than had taken place in World War I.

Sacca, John Wanda, **"Like Strangers in a Foreign Land: Chinese Officers Prepared at American Military Colleges, 1904-37."** Vol.70, No.3 (July, 2006), pp.703-742. Relates how those Chinese officers who received military education in the United States during the turbulent period marked by the end of the Qing Dynasty and the establishment of the Republic were tainted by their foreign education and hampered by their lack of membership in any alumni associations.

Bielakowski, Alexander M. **"General Hawkins' War: The Future of the Horse in the U.S. Cavalry."** Vol.71, No.1 (January, 2007), pp.127-138. Provides an account of the career of Brigadier General Hamilton S. Hawkins III (1872-1950), who, despite the increasing significance of mechanized forces, steadfastly advocated for horse cavalry throughout the interwar period and into the Second World War.

Ulbrich, David J. **"The Long Lost 'Tentative Manual for Defense of Advance Bases' (1936)."** Vol.71, No.3 (July, 2007), pp.889-901. In 1998 a copy of the Marine Corps' previously lost 1936 Tentative Manual for Defense of Advance Bases was uncovered, a manual that displays the culmination of decades of doctrinal thinking about the defense of island bases against enemy amphibious, naval, and aerial assaults.

Kuhlman, Erika, **"American Doughboys and German Fräuleins: Sexuality, Patriarchy, and**

the Privilege in the American-Occupied Rhineland, 1918-23.” Vol.71, No.4 (October, 2007), pp.1077-1106.

Budreau, Lisa M. **“The Politics of Remembrance: The Gold Star Mothers’ Pilgrimage and America’s Fading Memory of the Great War.”** Vol.72, No.2 (April, 2008), pp.371-411. Collectively, the Gold Star Mothers offer a multidimensional model of the ethnic, cultural, economic, and religious diversity prevalent in the United States during the interwar years.

Stentiford, Barry M. **“The Meaning of a Name: The Rise of the National Guard and the End of a Town Militia.”** Vol.72, No.3 (July, 2008), pp.727-754. Recounts the changing relationship between the community of Wakefield, Massachusetts, and its town militia, the Richardson Light Guard, when the unit became part of the National Guard in 1916.

Kellner, Katrina E. and Perras, Galen Roger, **“ ‘A Perfectly Logical and Sensible Thing’: Billy Mitchell Advocates a Canadian-American Aerial Alliance Against Japan.”** Vol.72, No.3 (July, 2008), pp.785-823. As a result of his overlooked trip to Canada in 1923, Brigadier General Billy Mitchell (1879-1936) formulated a plan for employing an allied U.S.-Canadian strategic bombing force based in Alaska to wage war on Japan.

Irish, Kerry, **“Dwight Eisenhower and Douglas MacArthur in the Philippines: There Must Be a Day of Reckoning [1935-39].”** Vol.74, No.2 (April, 2010), pp.439-473. Demonstrates that Eisenhower’s (1890-1969) dislike of MacArthur (1880-1964) was less about personalities and more about disagreements over the building of an army in an impoverished country and the proper qualities that a U.S. Army officer should exhibit and develop in his subordinates.

Kennedy, Greg, **“Anglo-American Strategic Relations and Intelligence Assessments of Japanese Air Power 1934-1941.”** Vol.74, No.3 (July, 2010), pp.737-773. Reassesses the influence of racism on Anglo-American views of Japanese air power, and how this influence evolved in the seven years leading up to Pearl Harbor.

Kuehn, John T. **“The U.S. Navy General Board and Naval Arms Limitations: 1922-1937.”** Vol.74, No.4 (October, 2010), pp.1129-1160. Highlights the critical link played by the Navy General Board between the U.S. Navy and 1922 Washington Naval Limitations Treaty.

Holwitt, Joel I. **“Review Essay: Reappraising the Interwar U.S. Navy.”** Vol.76, No.1 (January, 2012), pp.193-210. New studies demonstrate that the interwar U.S. was frequently led by innovative leaders, willing to experiment with new technologies and able to use fleet exercises and an internal review process to creatively, but realistically, generate a strategy that worked within the geographical and treaty constraints of an expected war in the Pacific.

Hughes, Thomas, **“Learning to Fight: Bill Halsey and the Early American Destroyer Force.”** Vol.77, No.1 (January, 2013), pp.71-90. The outcome of Admiral Halsey’s (1882-1959) service

under Admiral William Sims (1858-1936) as a destroyer Captain, 1914-1922.

Bruscino, Thomas, “**Naturally Clausewitzian: U.S. Army Theory and Education from Reconstruction to the Inter-War Years.**” Vol.77, No.4 (October, 2013), pp.1251-1275. Though familiar with Carl von Clausewitz (1780-1831), U.S. Army officers independently embraced concepts that Clausewitz advocated.

Peifer, Douglas, “**The Sinking of the *Lusitania*, Wilson’s Response, and Paths Not Taken: Historical Revisionism, the Nye Committee, and the Ghost of William Jennings Bryan.**” Vol.79, No.4 (October, 2015), pp.1025-1045. Assesses the way that the impact of the revisionist literature of the interwar period on the Neutrality Acts of the mid-1930s demonstrates how ‘history’s lessons’ without context can mislead rather than inform.

Shellum, Brian G. “**African American Officers in Liberia, 1910-1942.**” Vol.82, No.3 (July, 2018), pp.739-757. Seventeen African American officers from the U.S. Army reorganized, trained, and commanded the Liberian Frontier Force that enabled it to defend the nation’s borders and defeat a number of indigenous uprisings.

Wadle, Ryan, “**Failing to Speak the same Language: The Roots of ‘Jointness’ in the United States, 1919-1941.**” Vol.84, No.4 (October, 2020), pp.1097-1126. Sizes up the problems that interfered with attempts to create an interservice culture, promoted in efforts to integrate strategic planning, in professional military education, and large-scale joint exercises.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: WORLD WAR II (1939-45)

Williams, William J. “**Josephus Daniels and the U.S. Navy’s Shipbuilding Program During World War I.**” Vol.60, No.1 (January, 1996), pp.7-38. Observes how Daniels (1862-1948), with no naval or maritime background, applied himself conscientiously to shifting the Navy’s building program from capitol ships to destroyers designed to address the U-Boat threat.

Kimball, Warren F. “**Stalingrad: A Chance for Choices.**” Vol.60, No.1 (January, 1996), pp.89-114. Delves into the significance of the Battle of Stalingrad for United States foreign policy.

Van Courtland Moon, John Ellis, “**United States Chemical Warfare Policy in World War II: A Captive of Coalition Policy?**” Vol.60, No.3 (July, 1996), pp.495-511.

Sorley, Lewis and Pernel, Ralph McT. “**Too Good for the Infantry?**” Vol.63, No.3 (July, 1999), pp.704-705. This is a 1942 letter from New Mexico Congressman Clinton P. Anderson in response to a request for an individual to be reassigned out of a rifle squad.

Dooley, Edwin L. “**Memoirs: Wartime San Juan, Puerto Rico: The Forgotten American Home**

Front, 1941-1945.” Vol.63, No.4 (October, 1999), pp.921-938. The author provides an account of his father’s experiences as a young U.S. Army Private from Astoria, New York, who was deployed to Puerto Rico in 1939.

Eddy, George G. **“Memoirs: The Birth of the Concrete-Piercing Fuze: How the Siegfried Line and Other Formidable Targets were Breached.”** Vol.64, No.2 (April, 2000), pp.459-465. Brigadier General George G. Eddy (1895-1969) relates the development of the concrete piercing fuze when he served as Director of the Ordnance Research Center at Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland, during World War II.

Nenninger, Timothy K. **“United States Prisoners of War and the Red Army, 1944-45: Myths and Realities.”** Vol.66, No.3 (July, 2002), pp.761-781. When the Soviets overran German P.O.W. camps, they came into the possession of some 28,000 U.S. soldiers, the repatriation of which proved complicated.

Loss, Christopher P. **“Reading between Enemy Lines: Armed Services Editions and World War II.”** Vol.67, No.3 (July, 2003), pp.811-834.

Reiss, Matthias, **“Bronzed Bodies behind Barbed Wire: Masculinity and the Treatment of German Prisoners of War in the United States in World War II.”** Vol.69, No.2 (April, 2005), pp.475-504. In contrast to other Allied nations, the War Department chose not to parole German P.O.W.s being held in the United States into the custody of employers because of concerns over the potential for women being attracted to these prisoners.

Warren, Mame, **“Focal Point of the Fleet: U.S. Navy Photographic Activities in World War II.”** Vol.69, No.4 (October, 2005), pp.1045-1079. Concerned with the work of Edward Streichen (1879-1973) and his team of professional photographers.

Krebs, Gerhard, **“Operation Super Sunrise? Japanese-United States Peace Feelers in Switzerland, 1945.”** Vol.69, No.4 (October, 2005), pp.1081-1120. Explains why informal discussions between the Japanese Naval Commander from the embassy in Berlin, Fujimura Yoshikazu, and Allen W. Dulles (1893-1969) of the U.S. Office of Strategic Services failed to develop into formal communications.

Bielakowski, Alexander M. **“General Hawkins’ War: The Future of the Horse in the U.S. Cavalry.”** Vol.71, No.1 (January, 2007), pp.127-138. Provides an account of the career of Brigadier General Hamilton S. Hawkins III (1872-1950), who, despite the increasing significance of mechanized forces, steadfastly advocated for horse cavalry throughout the interwar period and into the Second World War.

Jeans, Roger B., Jr. **“Alarm in Washington: A Wartime ‘Expose’ of Japan’s Biological Warfare Program.”** Vol.71, No.2 (April, 2007), pp.411-439. Discusses a book published in

the summer of 1944 describing both Japan's biological warfare program and the failure of the U.S. government to meet this threat, and the government and the media's response to this publication, considering parallels with the 2001 anthrax 'scares.'

Glantz, Mary, **"An Officer and a Diplomat? The Ambiguous Position of Philip R. Faymonville and United States-Soviet Relations, 1941-1943."** Vol.72, No.1 (January, 2008), pp.141-177.

Appraises the role played by Colonel Philip Faymonville (1888-1962) in U.S.-Soviet relations, an officer who served as the United States' first military attaché and as expediter of Lend-Lease Aid during the war, but who had a contentious relationship with U.S. diplomatic personnel.

Flint, Fr. James, O.S.B. **"A Chaplain's Diary: Reverend Victor Laketek, O.S.B., 1942-1946."**

Vol.72, No.3 (July, 2008), pp.853-867. The account of a World War II Army Air Force Chaplain stationed in Maine, Florida, California, and Canton Island in the Pacific.

Sturma, Michael, **"U.S. Submarine Patrol Reports during World War II: Historical Evidence and Literary Flair."** Vol.74, No.2 (April, 2010), pp.475-490.

Insists that the patrol reports of U.S. submariners should be approached with caution due, among other things, to the 'fog of war', intentional fabrication, and deliberate omissions for security reasons or to avoid censure.

Lacey, James, **"World War II's Real Victory Program."** Vol.75, No.3 (July, 2011), pp.811-834.

Challenges Maj. Albert C. Wedemeyer's assertion that he was the author of the United States' Victory Program.

Lacey, James, **"Historical Truth and Tilting at Windmills."** Vol.77, No.1 (January, 2013),

pp.267-272. Addresses the controversy surrounding U.S. Army General Albert C. Wedemeyer (1896-1989).

McLaughlin, John J. and Lomazow, Steven, **"Counterpoint: Albert Coady Wedemeyer."** Vol.77,

No.1 (January, 2013), pp.255-272.

Catagnus, Earl J. **"Infantry Field Manual 7-5 *Organization and Tactics of Infantry: The Rifle Battalion* (October 1940)."** Vol.77, No.2 (April, 2013), pp.657-666.

Gioia, Philip, **"When 'The Institution was Heard from' in World War II: V.M.I. Alumni on**

the War Department General Staff, 1939-1945." Vol.78, No.4 (October, 2014), pp.1385-1394.

Stoler, Mark A. **"The 2015 George C. Marshall Lecture in Military History: George C.**

Marshall and the 'Europe-First Strategy, 1939-1951: A Study in Diplomatic as well as Military History.' Vol.79, No.2 (April, 2015), pp.293-316. Examines the relationship between diplomatic and military history regarding Marshall's (1880-1959) support for the strategy of 'Germany First' during World War II, for the postwar European Recovery Program, and the relief of Gen. Douglas MacArthur (1880-1964) during the Korean War.

Atkinson, Rick, **“The 2016 George C. Marshall Lecture in Military History: Projecting American Power in the Second World War.”** Vol.80, No.2 (April, 2016), pp.345-354. In spite of devoting a smaller proportion of the country’s gross domestic product to the war than any other major belligerent, the United States demonstrated logistical brilliance, firepower, mobility, mechanical aptitude, and an economic preponderance that outproduced the Axis powers.

Sturma, Michael, **“Coco Solo Submarines: Protecting the Panama Canal, 1941-1942.”** Vol.81, No.4 (October, 2017), pp.1039-1057. While these submarine patrols may have contributed little to repelling any threat to the Canal Zone, they did provide useful training and experience for a significant number of U.S. submariners.

Symonds, Craig, **“The 2017 George C. Marshall Lecture in Military History: For Want of a Nail: The Impact of Shipping on Grand Strategy in World War II.”** Vol.81, No.3 (July, 2017), pp.657-666. The remarkable success of U.S. ship building and its impact on Allied strategy.

Lawlor, Ruth, **“Bibliographic Essay: Contested Crimes: Race, Gender, and Nation in Histories of GI Sexual Violence, World War II.”** Vol.84, No.2 (April, 2020), pp.541-569.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: WORLD WAR II (1939-45) -

ALLIED STRATEGIC BOMBING OFFENSIVE, EUROPE

Gentile, Gian P.; Becker, Carl; Commager, Henry S.; Gottschalk; Schmitt, Bernadotte and Malone, Dumas, **“Document of Note: General Arnold and the Historians.”** Vol.64, No.1 (January, 2000), pp.179-180. Concerning U.S. Army Air Force General ‘Hap’ Arnold’s (1886-1950) commissioning of a group of leading historians to determine whether strategic bombing could force Germany to capitulate by the spring of 1944.

Gentile, Gian P. **“Shaping the Past Battlefield, ‘For the Future’: The United States Strategic Bombing Survey’s Evaluation of the American Air War against Japan.”** Vol.64, No.4 (October, 2000), pp.1085-1112. Contests the image of the Bombing Survey as an impartial primary source, demonstrating that it was shaped by particular circumstances, bias, and political factors, most notably the effort to justify an independent Air Force.

Mears, Dwight S. **“The Catch-22 Effect: The lasting Stigma of Wartime Cowardice in the U.S. Army Air Forces.”** Vol.77, No.3 (July, 2013), pp.1025-1054. Accusations of cowardice by the air crews that landed in Switzerland and their consequences.

Werrell, Kenneth P. **“Friction in Action: Revisiting the U.S. Army Air Forces’ August 1943 Raid on Ploesti.”** Vol.83, No.2 (April, 2019), pp.509-540. Looks at the Ploesti Raid from the perspective of planning and outcomes, pointing to failure of flexible leadership in the face of

minor unforeseen factors that had a major impact on the effectiveness of the mission.

Venable, Heather, **“Rescuing a General: General Haywood ‘Possum’ Hansell and the Burden of Command.”** Vol.84, No.2 (April, 2020), pp.487-509. Reappraises the negative assessment of General Haywood Hansell’s (1903-1988) command of the U.S. 8th Air Force.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: WORLD WAR II (1939-45) -
NORTH AFRICAN AND ITALIAN CAMPAIGNS

Percy, William Alexander, **“Jim Crow and Uncle Sam: The Tuskegee Flying Units and the U.S. Army Air Forces in Europe during World War II.”** Vol.67, No.3 (July, 2003), pp.773-810. Links the success of the African American 99th Fighter Squadron and the 332nd Fighter Group with President Harry S. Truman’s decision to end segregation in the Armed Forces.

Bechthold, B. Michael, **“A Question of Success: Tactical Air Doctrine and Practice in North Africa, 1942-43.”** Vol.68, No.3 (July, 2004), 821-851. Reveals that the tactical doctrine of the U.S. Army Air Force was found wanting in North Africa in 1942, leading to the adoption of the proven British Eighth Army Western Desert Air Force model of ground-air cooperation.

Anselmo, Frank A. **“The Battle for Hill K-9 and the Fall of Rome, 2 June 1944.”** Vol.76, No.1 (January, 2012), pp.99-126. The author seeks to ascertain which version of the capture of Hill K-9 by the U.S. 179th Infantry Regiment is the most accurate.

Marble, Sanders, **“Medical Problems in the Sicilian Campaign.”** Vol.84, No.2 (April, 2020), pp.537-540. Excerpt from the Monthly Progress Report, U.S. Army Service Forces, 31 October 1943.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: WORLD WAR II (1939-45) –
NORTHWESTERN EUROPE THEATER (1944-45)

Ganz, A. Harding, **“Questionable Objective: The Brittany Ports, 1944.”** Vol.59, No.1 (January, 1995), pp.77-96.

Rossi, Mario, **“United States Military Authorities and Free France, 1942-1944.”** Vol.61, No.1 (January, 1997), pp.49-64. Probes the political and military consequences of the clash between U.S. policy towards liberated French territory and Charles De Gaulle’s (1890-1970) claim to be the legitimate representative of the French people.

Shepardson, Donald E. **“The Fall of Berlin and the Rise of a Myth.”** Vol.62, No.1 (January, 1998), pp.135-154. Refutes the notions of United States naiveté and British realism in dealing with both their German enemy and their Soviet ally in the spring of 1945.

Jacobs, Harry A. **“Operation Strakonice: In Pursuit of the Soviet Order of Battle.”** Vol.65, No.2 (April, 2001), pp.391-400. Chronicles the successful mission of the U.S. military intelligence unit, Order of Battle Team 24, to seize German documents detailing Soviet forces, documents that were located beyond the Line of Demarcation in Czechoslovakia.

McCreedy, Kenneth O. **“Planning the Peace: Operation Eclipse and the Occupation of Germany.”** Vol.65, No.3 (July, 2001), pp.713-739. Indicates that Operation Eclipse, which was planned simultaneously with Overlord, had the dual goals of thoroughly eliminating Nazism in Germany

Salaita, George D. **“Embellishing Omaha Beach.”** Vol.72, No.2 (April, 2008), pp.531-534. Clarifies the misconceptions surrounding Company ‘A’, 116th Infantry Regiment, 29th Infantry Division, a lead unit in the landing on Omaha Beach.

Seipp, Adam R. **“Buchenwald Stories: Testimony, Military History, and the American Encounter with the Holocaust.”** Vol.79, No.3 (July, 2015), pp.721-744. Demonstrates how the testimonies of American servicemen have evolved in tandem with changes in public perceptions of the war and the Holocaust.

Zaloga, Steven J. **“Debunking an Omaha Beach Legend: The Use of the ‘Armored Funnies’ on D-Day.”** Vol.85, No.1 (January, 2021), pp.134-162. Confronts the notion that one of the reasons the landing force on Omaha Beach suffered heavy casualties was the U.S. Army’s resistance to the use of specialized tanks developed by the British for the D-Day invasion.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: WORLD WAR II (1939-45) - PACIFIC THEATER

Meixsel, Richard B. **“Major General George Grunert, WPO-3, and the Philippine Army, 1940-1941.”** Vol.59, No.2 (April, 1995), pp.303-324. Challenges the conventional account of the initial abandonment of War Plan Orange – 3 by the Commanding General of the Philippine Department, General Grunert (1881-1971), and Philippine Army Field Marshal, Douglas MacArthur (1880-1964).

Perras, Galen Roger, **“We have Opened the Door to Tokyo: United States Plans to Seize the Kurile Islands, 1943-1945.”** Vol.61, No.1 (January, 1997), pp.65-91. Proposals to defeat Imperial Japan by attacking the Home Islands through a campaign in the Northern Pacific, including the potential complications for U.S.-Soviet relations.

Fuquea, David C. **“Task Force One: The Wasted Assets of the United States Pacific Battleship Fleet, 1942.”** Vol.61, No.4 (October, 1997), pp.707-734. Explores the reasons behind Task Force One’s battleships languishing as a last line of defense during the first year of the war following Pearl Harbor.

Coox, Alvin D. **“Needless Fear: The Compromise of U.S. Plans to Invade Japan in 1945.”**

Vol.64, No.2 (April, 2000), pp.411-437. The disappearance of top-secret material from Manila caused a great deal of concern, but post-war access to Japanese documents demonstrates that these stolen papers had no impact on defensive plans for Kyushu.

Coles, Michael, **“Ernest King and the British Pacific Fleet: The Conference at Quebec, 1944 (‘Octagon’).”** Vol.65, No.1 (January, 2001), pp.105-129. While not excluding complications

from Fleet Admiral King’s (1878-1956) personality, the author insists that there were valid political, economic, and operational factors against the deployment of the British Fleet alongside the U.S. Navy in the Pacific Theater.

Bartsch, William H. **“Operation Dovetail: Bungled Guadalcanal Rehearsal, July 1942.”** Vol.66,

No.2 (April, 2002), pp.443-476. Reports on the all-but-forgotten rehearsal conducted at Koro Island in the Fijis, held ten days before the landing on Guadalcanal.

Stevenson, Matthew, **“Memoirs: War’s End on Okinawa: In Search of Captain Robert Fowler.”**

Vol.67, No.2 (April, 2003), pp.517-528. U.S.M.C. Captain Fowler, who was killed on Okinawa on 12 June, 1945, was a close friend of the author’s father.

Borch, Fred L. **“Comparing Pearl Harbor and ‘9/11’: Intelligence Failure? American Unpreparedness? Military Responsibility?”** Vol.67, No.3 (July, 2003), pp.845-860.

Dingman, Roger V. **“Language at War: U.S. Marine Corps Japanese Language Officers in the Pacific.”** Vol.68, No.3 (July, 2004), pp.853-883. Analyzes the origins, training, experiences,

and recollections of Caucasian Japanese language officers, including the shift from translating to facilitate life-taking to lifesaving.

Burrell, Robert S. **“Breaking the Cycle of Iwo Jima Mythology: A Strategic Study of Operation Detachment.”** Vol.68, No.4 (October, 2004), pp.1143-1186. Questions the justification for the

invasion of Iwo Jima, 19 February, 1945, explaining that the decision to invade was a matter of the competing agendas of the Navy, Army, and Army Air Force.

Hanley, Brian and Burrell, Robert S. **“The Myth of Iwo Jima: A Rebuttal [And Response].”**

Vol.69, No.3 (July, 2005), pp.801-809.

Terrar, Toby, **“First Landing on Guam: The Difficulties of a Naval Aviator during the Invasion.”**

Vol.72, No.4 (October, 2008), pp.1265-1270. Gives an account of the rivalry between the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps for landing the first plane on the newly liberated island of Guam, in which the Navy pilot, Ed Terrar, won the honor on 30 July, 1944.

Hughes, Matthew, **“War without Mercy? American Armed Forces and the Deaths of**

Civilians during the Battle for Saipan, 1944.” Vol.75, No.1 (January, 2011), pp.93-123. Despite this being the first Central Pacific Island on which U.S. forces encountered large numbers of civilians, including Japanese and Korean migrants, and native Chamorro and Carolinian peoples, the military histories of the battle for Saipan generally neglect how noncombatants were treated.

Reardon, Jeff, **“Breaking the U.S. Navy’s ‘Gun Club’ Mentality in the South Pacific.”** Vol.75, No.2 (April, 2011), pp.533-564. Analyzing the adjustment of pre-war doctrine in the face of defeat in nighttime naval engagements with the Imperial Japanese Navy.

McEvoy, William P. **“ ‘Experiences at Sea’: A Navy Doctor of War.”** Vol.75, No.4 (October, 2011), pp.1159-1182. U.S. Navy doctor serving in the Pacific from September 1944 to December 1945.

Dudley, William S. **“A Soldier, His Family, and the Impact of the Pacific War, 1942-1945.”** Vol.80, No.1 (January, 2016), pp.187-192. A three-volume biography of Wilber Bradt of Washington State who served as a Field Artillery officer in the 43rd Infantry Division as it fought its way through the Solomons, New Guinea, and the Philippines. Based on a trove of preserved correspondence and interviews, this account is as much about his family on the home front as it is about Bradt on the frontlines.

Hone, Trent, **“Learning to Win: The Evolution of U.S. Navy Tactical Doctrine During the Guadalcanal Campaign.”** Vol.82, No.3 (July, 2018), pp.817-841. Challenges the notion that the U.S. Navy suffered complete failure in surface night combat, contending, instead, that it was particularly skilled in integrating combat lessons and, accordingly, modifying its tactical doctrine.

Reardon, Jeff T. **“Reevaluating Ghormley and Halsey at Guadalcanal.”** Vol.86, No.4 (October, 2022), pp.915-948. Presents a reassessment of Vice Admiral Robert L. Ghormley (1883-1958) service as commander in chief of the South Pacific Area during 1942.

Bankoff, Greg, **“From the Art of Practical Sailing to the Electronic Science of Navigation: Typhoons, Seamanship, and U.S. Naval Operations in the Northwest Pacific, 1944-1945.”** Vol.86, No.4 (October, 2022), pp.949-972. Concerned with the challenges faced by ship’s commanders of choosing between entrusting the safety of his vessel to his own judgement based on years of practical experience at sea or relying on the new technology at a time when some of the largest armadas of warships were ever assembled in wartime conditions.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA:

WORLD WAR II (1939-45) - CHINA-BURMA-INDIA THEATER

Charles, Patrick J. **“Dissecting the Origins of Air-Centric Special Operations Theory.”** Vol.81, No.3 (July, 2017), pp.803-828. Seeks to find the answers to the controversy surrounding whether British or U.S. officers deserve the most credit for developing the concepts that led to Operation THURSDAY, the airlanding of a specialized force behind Japanese lines in Burma in March, 1944, to disrupt enemy infrastructure and communications.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: WORLD WAR II (1939-45) –
U.S. STRATEGIC BOMBING CAMPAIGN, ASIA

Bernstein, Barton J. **“Truman and the A-Bomb: Targeting Noncombatants, Using the Bomb, and His Defending the ‘Decision’.”** Vol.62, No.3 (July, 1998), pp.547-570. Focuses on the 1996 publication *Harry S. Truman and the Bomb: A Documentary History*. Edited and with commentary by Robert Ferrell.

Bernstein, Barton J. **“Review Essay: The Making of the Atomic Admiral: ‘Deak’ Parsons and Modernizing the U.S. Navy.”** Vol.63, No.2 (April, 1999), pp.415-426. William Sterling Parsons (1901-1953) was an ordnance expert who participated in the Manhattan project and was involved in post-war nuclear tests.

Searle, Thomas R. **“‘It made a Lot of Sense to Kill Skilled Workers’: The Firebombing of Tokyo in March 1945.”** Vol.66, No.1 (January, 2002), pp.103-133. Demonstrates that the firebombing of Japanese cities was not a radical departure from U.S.A.A.F. tactics used against Germany, that it was not an abandonment of concentrating on targeting industry, and that it was based on long-term planning.

Bernstein, Barton J. **“Reconsidering the ‘Atomic General’: Leslie R. Groves.”** Vol.67, No.3 (July, 2003), pp.883-920. A critical review of the influential published works, the substantial archival sources, and an attempt to separate fact from fiction regarding specific controversial issues.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: COLD WAR (1945-91)

Fautua, David T. **“The ‘Long Pull’ Army: NSC 68, the Korean War, and the Creation of the Cold War Army.”** Vol.61, No.1 (January, 1997), pp.93-120. Endeavors to distinguish the changes to the U.S. Army in the early 1950s resulting from National Security Council paper 68 from those prompted by the Korean War (1950-1953).

Bacevich, A.J. **“The Paradox of Professionalism: Eisenhower, Ridgway, and the Challenge to Civilian Control, 1953-1955.”** Vol.61, No.2 (April, 1997), pp.303-333. By focusing on the U.S. Army’s efforts to undermine President Eisenhower’s (1953-1961) policy of massive nuclear retaliation, this article attempts to depict the actual terms of the civil-military relationship within

the innermost circles of the U.S. government to determine the realities and limits of civilian control of the armed forces.

Coffman, Edward M. **“The Course of Military History in the United States since World War II.”** Vol.61, No.4 (October, 1997), pp.761-775.

Drew, Dennis M. **“U.S. Airpower Theory and the Insurgent Challenge: A Short Journey to Confusion.”** Vol.62, No.4 (October, 1998), pp.809-832. Covering the period from 1945 to 1992, the article contends that the U.S. Air Force has failed to account for the realities of guerrilla warfare in its theory of airpower.

Sarantakes, Nicholas Evan, **“The Quiet War: Combat Operations along the Korean Demilitarized Zone, 1966-1969.”** Vol.64, No.2 (April, 2000), pp.439-457. Describes how South Korea and the United States responded differently to the provocations of North Korea and how this impacted the war in Vietnam.

Loveland, Anne C. **“Character Education in the U.S. Army, 1947-1977.”** Vol.64, No.3 (July, 2000), pp.795-818. Scrutinizes the promotion of the Christian Faith in the Army Character Guidance program in the context of Cold War paranoia.

Snyder, David R. **“Arming the *Bundesmarine*: The United States and the Build-Up of the German Federal Navy, 1950-1960.”** Vol.66, No.2 (April, 2002), pp.477-500.

Marchio, James D. **“Risking General War in Pursuit of Limited Objectives: U.S. Military Contingency Planning for Poland in the Wake of the 1956 Hungarian Uprising.”** Vol.66, No.3 (July, 2002), pp.783-812. Reveals that the various problems in exploring options for coming to the defense of Poland in the wake of the suppression of the Hungarian uprising led the Eisenhower administration to develop more response options to compliment the doctrine of massive nuclear retaliation.

Bland, Larry I. **“Document of Note: Marlene Dietrich’s Firepower.”** Vol.66, No.3 (July, 2002), pp.829-831. Chief-of-Staff George C. Marshall (1880-1959) sought a means to stop the flow of firearms being brought back to the U.S. as war trophies.

May, Ernest R. **“The George C. Marshall Lecture in Military History: 1947-48: When Marshall kept the U.S. Out of War in China.”** Vol.66, No.4 (October, 2002), pp.1001-1010.

Lock-Pullan, Richard, **“ ‘An Inward Looking Time’: The United States Army, 1973-1976.”** Vol.67, No.2 (April, 2003), pp.483-511. Rejects the explanation that the immediate post-Vietnam War reforms were primarily shaped by the recent conflict in Southeast Asia, insisting, instead, that of greater importance was the end of the draft and the lessons drawn from the 1973 Arab-Israeli War by General William E. DePuy (1919-1992).

Neufeld, Michael J. **“The End of the Army Space Program: Interservice Rivalry and the Transfer of the von Braun Group to N.A.S.A., 1958-1959.”** Vol.69, No.3 (July, 2005), pp.737-757.

Priest, Andrew, **“ ‘In Common Cause’: The N.A.T.O. Multilateral Force and the Mixed-Manning Demonstration on the U.S.S. *Claude V. Ricketts*, 1964-1965.”** Vol.69, No.3 (July, 2005), pp.759-789. The crew of the destroyer (DDG-5) U.S.S. *Claude V. Ricketts* included U.S., British, Dutch, Greek, Italian, Turkish, and West German officers and men.

Spector, Ronald H. **“After Hiroshima: Allied Military Occupations and the Fate of Japan’s Empire, 1945-1947.”** Vol.69, No.4 (October, 2005), pp.1121-1136. The Allies confronted problems far beyond the disarming of Japanese troops in occupied China, Korea, and Southeast Asia, where internal conflicts rendered the plans of the Allied powers irrelevant.

Bronfeld, Saul, **“Fighting Outnumbered: The Impact of the Yom Kippur War on the U.S. Army.”** Vol.71, No.2 (April, 2007), pp.465-498. Illustrates the different ways in which the Yom Kippur War impacted the work of Generals William E. DePuy (1919-1992) and Donn A. Starry (1925-2011) in reforming the U.S. Army.

Young, Ken, **“No Blank Cheque: Anglo-American (Mis)Understandings and the Use of the English Airbases.”** Vol.71, No.4 (October, 2007), pp.1133-1167. Deals with the diplomatic, political, and military issues surrounding the deployment of U.S. nuclear-capable strategic bombers to bases in Great Britain following the Berlin crisis of 1948.

Carter, Donald Alan, **“Eisenhower versus the Generals.”** Vol.71, No.4 (October, 2007), pp.1169-1199. Traces the rancor that evolved between President Dwight D. Eisenhower (1953-1961), who pursued the ‘New Look’ national security policy that relied on nuclear weapons, the Strategic Air Command, and a robust economy, versus Army officers who believed the drastic reductions in conventional ground forces challenged the very existence of their service.

Trauschweizer, Ingo Wolfgang, **“Learning with an Ally: The U.S. Army and the Bundeswehr in the Cold War.”** Vol.72, No.2 (April, 2008), pp.477-508. Discusses four areas of German-U.S. defense cooperation, including aid for West German rearmament, the reorganization of German and U.S. combat formations in the post-Korean War period, the failure of a shared attempt at tank design, and the impact of German tactical and operational concepts on post-Vietnam U.S. Army doctrine.

Carland, John M. **“War, Politics, Diplomacy, and the Presidency: Off the Record Comments by Lyndon B. Johnson in Retirement.”** Vol.72, No.4 (October, 2008), pp.1257-1263.

Goldman, David I. **“The Generals and the Germs: The Army Leadership’s Response to Nixon’s Review of Chemical and Biological Warfare Policies in 1969.”** Vol.73, No.2 (April, 2009), pp.531-569. The response of U.S. Army leadership to President Richard Nixon (1969-1974) unilateral elimination of biological warfare agents, retaining only a defensive research program, as well as placing limitations on the chemical weapons.

Clymer, Kenton, **“U.S. Homeland Defense in the 1950s: The Origin of the Ground Observer Corps.”** Vol.75, No.3 (July, 2011), pp.835-859. Quasi-auxiliary of the U.S. Air Force from 1950 to 1959.

Donnelly, William M. **“Bilko’s Army: A Crisis in Command?”** Vol.75, No.4 (October, 2011), pp.1183-1215. Focusing on U.S. Army officers above company grade level, 1953 to 1965, the author considers whether service schools, the headquarters of the Continental Army Command, and Headquarters, Department of the Army identified a crisis in command.

Dujmović, Nicholas, **“Drastic Actions Short of War: The Origins and Application of C.I.A.’s Covert Paramilitary Function in the Early Cold War.”** Vol.76, No.3 (July, 2012), pp.775-808. In mid-1948, the Central Intelligence Agency was assigned a covert paramilitary function, which may explain why the C.I.A.’s paramilitary activities were never as effective as policy makers and Agency operations officers expected.

Martini, Edwin A. **“Incinerating Agent Orange: Operations Pacer HO, Pacer IVY, and the Rise of Environmentalist Thinking.”** Vol.76, No.3 (July, 2012), pp.809-836.

Young, Ken, **“Special Weapon, Special Relationship: The Atomic Bomb Comes to Britain.”** Vol.77, No.2 (April, 2013), pp.569-598. Beginning in 1950, the United States Air Force based strategic bombers with atomic bombs in East Anglia, England.

Reist, Katherine K. **“The American Military Advisory Missions to China, 1945-1949.”** Vol.77, No.4 (October, 2013), pp.1379-1398. Provides an account of the difficulties between the Joint U.S. Military Advisory Group and *Guomindang* leaders.

Friedman, Hal M. **“Blue versus Orange: The United States Naval War College, Japan, and the Old Enemy in the Pacific, 1945-1946.”** Vol.78, No.1 (January, 2014), pp.211-231. Reports on the delay in adjusting to post-war circumstances that meant that the War College curriculum remained a mixture of interwar and wartime doctrine during the early Cold War.

Dingman, Roger, **“Review Essay: American Bases in Japan.”** Vol.78, No.2 (April, 2014), pp.753-755. A collection of essays by Japanese academics and public historians providing a balanced study of the impact of U.S. bases Kanagawa Prefecture, just southwest of Tokyo.

Rislakki, Jukka, **“‘Without Mercy’ – U.S. Strategic Intelligence and Finland in the Cold War.”**

Vol.79, No.1 (January, 2015), pp.127-149. Unbeknownst to Finland's political leaders, a secret channel for the exchange of information regarding the U.S.S.R. existed between Finnish military intelligence and the United States.

Boghardt, Thomas, "**Dirty Work? The Use of Nazi Informants by U.S. Army Intelligence in Postwar Europe.**" Vol.79, No.2 (April, 2015), pp.387-422. Probes ethical issues and utility of the Allied enlistment of war criminals and suspected war criminals for collecting information on Soviet and Communist Party activities in Europe.

Goldstein, Cora Sol, "**A Comparative Analysis of Cultural Control: The German Military Occupation of France (1940-1942) and the American Military Occupation of Germany (1945-1949).**" Vol.80, No.4 (October, 2016), pp.1083-1116. Although their respective agendas were inspired by opposite ideologies, the author proposes that the mechanisms of control over information by both occupiers shared significant similarities.

Eames, Anthony, "**The Trident Sales Agreement and Cold War Diplomacy.**" Vol.81, No.1 (January, 2017), pp.163-186. The 'Special Relationship' was bolstered by the sale of U.S. Trident submarine-launched ballistic missile technology to Great Britain in 1982.

Holwitt, Joel I. "**The Loss of U.S.S. *Thresher*: Technological and Cultural Change and the Cold War U.S. Navy.**" Vol.82, No.3 (July, 2018), pp.843-872. Advances the proposition that the response to the 10 April, 1963, loss of the U.S.S. *Thresher* with all hands led to a cultural shift within the U.S. naval officer development from a 'generalist' to a 'technical specialist' model.

Walsh, Brian, "**Sexual Violence during the Occupation of Japan.**" Vol.82, No.4 (October, 2018), pp.1199-1230. Insists that the accusations of recent publications of the widespread rape of Japanese women by Allied troops during the occupation (1945-1952) are grossly exaggerated.

Petrina, Stephen, "**Scientific Ammunition to Fire at Congress: Intelligence, Reparations, and the U.S. Army Air Forces, 1944-1947.**" Vol.83, No.3 (July, 2019), pp.795-829. Appraises the place of intelligence and reparations in U.S. Army Air Force and U.S. Air Force postwar research and development.

Seipp, Adam R. "**'Visionary Battle Scenes': Reading Sir John Hackett's *The Third World War*, 1977-85.**" Vol.83, No.4 (October, 2019), pp.1235-1257. Suggests that the success of Sir John Hackett's (1910-1997) 1978 best-selling novel reflected rising Cold War tensions, as well as inspiring the modern literary genre of the techno-thriller.

Williamson, Corbin, "**Mediterranean Marines: The Challenges of Forward Deployment, 1948-1958.**" Vol.85, No.2 (April, 2021), pp.426-452. Considers the challenges to U.S. Marine Corps units deployed in the Mediterranean as part of President Truman's commitment to containment of the Soviet Union.

Walsh, Brian, “**‘This Degrading Slavery’: MacArthur’s General Headquarters and Prostitution Policy during the Occupation of Japan.**” Vol.85, No.3 (July, 2021), pp.678-712.

The Allied occupation government (1945-1952) outlawed the old Imperial system of licensed prostitution because it relied on human trafficking, but did not outlaw prostitution in general based on respect for individual autonomy and an appreciation for the situation in Japan.

Campbell, Isabel, “**A Tale of Submarine Sightings and a Golden Goose: American-British-Canadian Intelligence Sharing in the Early Cold War.**” Vol.85, No.4 (October, 2021), pp.980-1003. The consequences of efforts to establish trilateral intelligence of the sighting of Soviet submarines in the Davis Strait in 1946.

Kürkçü, Burak, “**The Question of U.S. Involvement in Turkish Military Coups during the Cold War: An Analysis via available C.I.A. Archives.**” Vol.86, No.1 (January, 2022), pp.110-131. Recently de-classified C.I.A. documents reveal no evidence for direct U.S. involvement in Turkish military coups during the Cold War.

Donnelly, William M. “**From Sergeant Snorkels to Drill Sergeants: Basic Training of Male Soldiers in the U.S. Army, 1953-1964.**” Vol.86, No.2 (April, 2022), pp.399-426. Assesses the much-criticized quality of officers and non-commissioned officers assigned to shepherd recruits through basic training, an issue that wasn’t addressed until the Secretaries of the Army Cyrus R. Vance Sr. (1917-2002) and Stephen Ailes (1912-2001).

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: KOREAN WAR (1950-53)

Fautua, David T. “**The ‘Long Pull’ Army: NSC 68, the Korean War, and the Creation of the Cold War Army.**” Vol.61, No.1 (January, 1997), pp.93-120. Endeavors to distinguish the changes to the U.S. Army in the early 1950s resulting from National Security Council paper 68 from those prompted by the Korean War (1950-1953).

Crane, Conrad C. “**Raiding the Beggar’s Pantry: The Search for Airpower Strategy in the Korean War.**” Vol.63, No.4 (October, 1999), pp.885-920. Contrasts the need to fight a limited war with the newly independent U.S. Air Force’s focus on nuclear warfare.

Donnelly, William M. “**Thunderbirds in Korea: The U.S. 45th Infantry Division, 1950-1952.**” Vol.64, No.4 (October, 2000), pp.1113-1139. Investigates the performance of one of two National Guard divisions deployed to Korea, concentrating on the division’s officers.

Jordan, Kelly C. “**Right for the Wrong Reasons: S.L.A. Marshall and the Ratio of Fire in Korea.**” Vol.66, No.1 (January, 2002), pp.135-162.

Donnelly, William M. “**‘The Best Army that can be put in the Field in the Circumstances’:**

The U.S. Army, July 1951 – July 1953.” Vol.71, No.3 (July, 2007), pp.809-847. Reckons with the difficulties faced by career soldiers during the Korean War due to limited national mobilization and the cuts to the Army’s budget by President Harry S. Truman (1945-1953).

Coleman, Bradley Lynn, **“Recovering the Korean War Dead, 1950-1958: Graves Registration, Forensic Anthropology, and Wartime Memorialization.”** Vol.72, No.1 (January, 2008), pp.179-222. The Graves Registration Service, U.S. Quartermaster Corps, developed an innovative system during the Korean War in which the dead were recovered and repatriated to the United States during major combat operations.

Casey, Steven, **“Wilfred Burchett and the United Nations Command’s Media Relations during the Korean War, 1951-1952.”** Vol.74, No.3 (July, 2010), pp.821-845. Assesses the Australian journalist, Wilfred Burchett’s (1911-1983), observations concerning the U.S. Army’s relations with the media during the Korean armistice negotiations.

Gibby, Bryan, **“The Best Little Army.”** Vol.77, No.1 (January, 2013), pp.173-201. Surveys the results of the work of the U.S. Korean Military Advisory Group (K.M.A.G.) prior to the outbreak of the Korean War.

Stoler, Mark A. **“The 2015 George C. Marshall Lecture in Military History: George C. Marshall and the ‘Europe-First Strategy, 1939-1951: A Study in Diplomatic as well as Military History.”** Vol.79, No.2 (April, 2015), pp.293-316. Examines the relationship between diplomatic and military history regarding Marshall’s (1880-1959) support for the strategy of ‘Germany First’ during World War II, for the postwar European Recovery Program, and the relief of Gen. Douglas MacArthur (1880-1964) during the Korean War.

Uyar, Mesut and Güvenç, Serhat, **“One Battle and Two Accounts: The Turkish Brigade at Kunu-ri in November 1950.”** Vol.80, No.4 (October, 2016), pp.1117-1147. Assesses the impact of U.S. military assistance provided to the Turkish Army and why the official U.S. and Turkish accounts of the Battle of Kunu-ri / Chongchon differ significantly.

Donnelly, William M. **“A Damn Hard Job: James A. Van Fleet and the Combat Effectiveness of U.S. Army Infantry, July 1951 – February 1953.”** Vol.82, No.1 (January, 2018), pp.147-179. The difficulties faced by the Eighth Army commander, Gen. Van Fleet (1892-1992), to maintain ‘the will to win’ during the Korean War.

Lerner, Mitchell, **“ ‘Is It for This We Fought and Bled?’: The Korean War and the Struggle for Civil Rights.”** Vol.82, No.2 (April, 2018), pp.515-545. Explains the role of the Korean War in the African American struggle for Civil Rights.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: VIETNAM WAR (2nd Indochina War) (1955-1975)

Leary, William M. **“The C.I.A. and the ‘Secret War’ in Laos: The Battle for Skyline Ridge, 1971-1971.”** Vol.59, No.3 (July, 1995), pp.505-517. Narrates an all-but-forgotten victory of a force of Hmong, Lao, and Thai defenders against the North Vietnamese Army.

Van De Mark, Brian, **“Review Essay: Thinking about the Vietnam War.”** Vol.60, No.2 (April, 1996), pp.339-357. Although the majority of the seven books reviewed are from the perspective of the involvement of the United States, including one on the anti-war movement and two on the Johnson administration, 1963-1969, there is a memoir from a rural woman living in South Vietnam and a comparative work about the reaction of academics to the wars in Algeria and Vietnam.

Jablon, Howard, **“General David M. Shoup, U.S.M.C.: Warrior and War Protester.”** Vol.60, No.3 (July, 1996), pp.513-538. Claims that the same hard-headed pragmatism that made General Shoup (1904-83) a reliable Marine Corps officer led him to conclude that U.S. involvement in Vietnam was ultimately a pointless waste of American lives.

Kirkland, Faris R. **“The Attack on Cap Mui Lay, Vietnam, July 1968.”** Vol.61, No.4 (October, 1997), pp.735-760. Shines light on Operation Thor, a neglected example of joint operation in Vietnam and one that significantly disrupted North Vietnam’s strategic plans.

Cole, Bernard D. **“Memoirs: A Noglow in Vietnam, 1968: Air Power at the Battle of Khe Sanh.”** Vol.64, No.1 (January, 2000), pp.141-158. Both a memoir and an analysis by a U.S. Marine who experienced first-hand the fighting at Khe Sanh.

Smith, Ralph B. **“Review Essay: Choosing War in Vietnam.”** Vol.64, No.2 (April, 2000), pp.503-513. Critiques Fredrik Logevall’s 1999 book of the same name.

Carland, John M. **“Winning the Vietnam War: Westmoreland’s Approach in Two Documents.”** Vol.68, No.2 (April, 2004), pp.553-574.

Carland, John M. **“Review Essay: Abandoning Vietnam.”** Vol.70, No.1 (January, 2006), pp.183-186. Examines James H. Willbanks 2004 book about the withdrawal of direct U.S. involvement in the war, beginning in 1968, to the victorious conclusion of the North Vietnamese invasion in 1975.

Milne, David, **“‘Our Equivalent of Guerrilla Warfare’: Walt Rostow and the Bombing of North Vietnam, 1961-1968.”** Vol.71, No.1 (January, 2007), pp.169-203. Claims that Walt Rostow’s (1916-2003) background as an economic historian led him to become one of the strongest advocates for the strategic bombing of North Vietnam.

Deitchman, Seymour J. **“The ‘Electronic Battlefield’ in the Vietnam War.”** Vol.72, No.3 (July, 2008), pp.869-887. Concludes that the proposal of the Jason Group of scientists for a network of sensors and aircraft to detect activity on the Ho Chi-Minh Trail in Laos, though not totally

successful, impacted the course of the war and foreshadowed key aspects of the equipment and operation of the U.S. Armed Forces today.

- Birtle, Andrew J. **“PROVN, Westmoreland, and the Historians: A Reappraisal.”** Vol.72, No.4 (October, 2008), pp.1213-1247. A reassessment of the U.S. Army report, nicknamed PROVN, that, in the past, had been mined for information with which to criticize General William C. Westmoreland (1914-2004) and praise his successor as commander of U.S. forces in South Vietnam, General Creighton Abrams (1914-1974).
- Boylan, Kevin M. **“The Red Queen’s Race: Operation Washington Green and Pacification in Binh Dinh Province, 1969-70.”** Vol.73, No.4 (October, 2009), pp.1195-1230. Examines the operations conducted by the 173rd Airborne Brigade in Binh Dinh Province closely, which matched recommendations made by many of the critics of the way U.S. military forces was conducted the war and, therefore, offers insight into the likely effectiveness of an alternate strategy focused on population control.
- Birtle, Andrew James, **“Advisory Service in Vietnam: Detrimental to an Officer’s Career?”** Vol.74, No.3 (July, 2010), pp.871-877. By examining the extent to which former Vietnam advisers achieved general officer rank in the U.S. Army, the article seeks to test the common belief among officers that the Army did not assign its best men for service as advisors and that promotion boards discriminated against these advisors.
- Carland, John M. **“Review Essay: Scorecard on CIA C.O.I.N. in Vietnam.”** Vol.75, No.3 (July, 2011), pp.887-891.
- Daddis, Gregory A. **“Eating Soup with a Spoon: The U.S. Army as a ‘Learning Organization’ in the Vietnam War.”** Vol.77, No.1 (January, 2013), pp.229-254. The U.S. Army’s strategic approach, operational experience, and organizational changes.
- Fino, Steven A. **“Breaking the Trance: The Perils of Technological Exuberance in the U.S. Air Force Entering Vietnam.”** Vol.77, No.2 (April, 2013), pp.625-655. The response of individual units to the need for guns, in addition to missiles, for air-to-air combat.
- Boylan, Kevin M. **“Goodnight Saigon: American Provincial Advisors’ Final Impressions of the Vietnam War.”** Vol.78, No.1 (January, 2014), pp.233-270. Scrutinizes the revisionist proposition that the United States had won the war in the wake of the Tet Offensive, 1968, by examining the assessments of U.S. Province Senior Advisors.
- Lipman, Jana K. **“‘A Precedent Worth Setting...’ Military Humanitarianism: The U.S. Military and the 1975 Vietnamese Evacuation.”** Vol.79, No.1 (January, 2015), pp.151-179. Proposes that the U.S. Armed Forces’ involvement in the evacuation of over 100,000 Vietnamese to the United States represented a turning point in how these institutions

viewed humanitarian operations.

Donnelly, William M. **“This ‘Horrible Example’: An Extraordinary Case of Absent Without Leave during the Vietnam War.”** Vol.79, No.2 (April, 2015), pp.457-466. Thomas J. Cuchal of Cleveland, Ohio.

Marolda, Edward J. **“Orphan of the Mekong Delta: The Army-Navy Mobile Riverine Force.”** Vol.80, No.4 (October, 2016), pp.1149-1181. Despite its success during the Tet Offensive of 1968, the failure of Army and Navy leaders to fully embrace the creation of the Army-Navy Mobile Riverine Force resulting in its disbanding by Gen. Creighton Abrams (1914-1974).

Daddis, Gregory A. **“Historiographical Essay: Mansplaining Vietnam: Male Veterans and America’s Popular Image of the Vietnam War.”** Vol.82, No.1 (January, 2018), pp.181-207. Explores how various media, such as memoirs, have excluded the story of the roughly 7,500 U.S. women who served in the Vietnam War.

Borch, Fred L. **“Review Essay: My Lai at Fifty: A History of Literature on the ‘My Lai Incident’ Fifty Years Later.”** Vol.82, No.2 (April, 2018), pp.551-564. Concerning the killing of unarmed civilians by U.S. Army troops during the Vietnam War at the village of My Lai in the Son Tinh district on 16 March, 1968.

Carland, John M. **“Daniel Ellsberg and the Tet Offensive.”** Vol.83, No.2 (April, 2019), pp.541-552. An analyst for the RAND Corporation and employee of both the Defense and State Departments, Daniel Ellsberg’s (1931-2023) critical assessment of the impact of the Tet Offensive, January, 1968, reflected a stage in his growing disillusionment with the war in Vietnam.

Harris, J.P. **“The Early Military History of the Second Indochina War and the Mayor Thesis.”** Vol.85, No.3 (July, 2021), pp.734-763. Contests the interpretation of Mark Moyar that by mid-1962 the South Vietnamese government was conducting a successful counter-insurgency campaign that was cut short by the overthrow of Ngo Dinh Diem (1901-1963).

Ruth, Richard A. **“Ham and Mothers: C-Ration Revelry and Revulsion in the Vietnam War.”** Vol.85, No.4 (October, 2021), pp.1004-1028. observes that the comradery of troops was facilitated by the love-hate relations with their rations.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: IRAN HOSTAGE CRISIS (1979-81)

Cogan, Charles G. **“Desert One and Its Disorders.”** Vol.67, No.1 (January, 2003), pp.201-216. Argues that the failure of the attempt to rescue the hostages in Iran, 1980, provoked the principle of joint operations in the U.S. Armed Forces and the consolidation of Special Forces under a Special Operations Command.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: POST COLD WAR PERIOD

Wetta, Frank J. and Novelli, Martin A. **“Review Essay: ‘Now a Major Motion Picture’: War Films and Hollywood’s New Patriotism.”** Vol.67, No.3 (July, 2003), pp.861-882. Suggests that the ‘New Patriotism’ displayed in films (1998-2002) celebrates loyalty to one’s comrades in battle and the ability to survive the horrific experience of modern combat rather than any stated or understood national or public rationales for whatever a war is being fought.

Borch, Fred L. **“Comparing Pearl Harbor and ‘9/11’: Intelligence Failure? American Unpreparedness? Military Responsibility?”** Vol.67, No.3 (July, 2003), pp.845-860.

Porch, Douglas, **“Historiographical Essay: Writing History in the ‘End of History’ Era: Reflections on Historians and the GWOT.”** Vol.70, No.4 (October, 2006), pp.1065-1079. Addresses the danger of history being twisted by partisans, polemicists, and ideologues into an apologia for contemporary U.S. policy, and ultimately as a weapon of intimidation to silence doubt, dissent, disagreement, and even debate, which serves neither the cause of history, nor of policy and strategy formulation, nor even of democracy in a moment of national peril.

Kohn, Richard H. **“The Danger of Militarization in an Endless ‘War’ on Terrorism.”** Vol.73, No.1 (January, 2009), pp.177-208. The identification of Americans with and use of war images and thinking, and a belief in the primacy of standing military forces for the safety of the country, have become normalized, so that the pursuit of an endless ‘war’ on terrorism only further threatens to militarize the nation.

Esdaile, Charles, **“Spain 1808 – Iraq 2003: Some Thoughts on the Use and Abuse of History.”** Vol.74, No.1 (January, 2010), pp.173-188. Disputes comparisons of Napoleon’s intervention in Spain, George Bush’s (r.2001-2009) intervention in Iraq, and the subsequent counterinsurgency campaigns, arguing that they are based on false notions about the war in Spain.

Lenaburg, Jerry, **“Review Essay: Four Slices of the Iraq War Apple.”** Vol.77, No.1 (January, 2013), pp.299-303. Includes an assessment of four recent titles about the United States war in Iraq, 2003-2011, in one case comparing counterinsurgency efforts in Iraq with those conducted by the U.S. forces in Vietnam.

Lenaburg, Jerry, **“Review Essay: Iraq & Afghanistan.”** Vol.77, No.3 (July, 2013), pp.1079-1084. Exploration of three recent studies of the wars in both Afghanistan, 2001-2021, and Iraq, 2003-2011.

Yarborough, William Michael, **“Undocumented Triumph: Gulf War Operational Records Management.”** Vol.77, No.4 (October, 2013), pp.1427-1438.

Dingman, Roger, **“Review Essay: American Bases in Japan.”** Vol.78, No.2 (April, 2014), pp.753-755. A collection of essays by Japanese academics and public historians providing

a balanced study of the impact of U.S. bases Kanagawa Prefecture, just southwest of Tokyo.

Fitzgerald, David, **“Warriors Who don’t Fight: The Post-Cold War United States Army and debates over Peacekeeping Operations.”** Vol.85, No.1 (January, 2021), pp.163-190.

Coleman, Bradley Lynn and Schultz, Timothy A. **“The Cornerstone of Joint Force Transformation: The Standing Joint Force Headquarters at U.S. Southern Command, 2001-2011.”** Vol.85, No.4 (October, 2021), pp.1029-1060. The difficulties of Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld (1932-2021) to establish Standing Joint Force Headquarters for each of the geographic combatant commands is examined by using the U.S. Southern Command as an example.

UPTON, EMORY (1839-81)

Fitzpatrick, David J. **“Emory Upton and the Citizen Soldier.”** Vol.65, No.2 (April, 2001), pp.355-389. Refutes the accepted notion of Upton’s opposition to citizen-soldiers and democracy. The article includes a review of Upton’s (1839-1881) reflections on the military systems in India and Serbia.

Fitzpatrick, David J. **“Emory Upton and the Army of Democracy.”** Vol.77, No.2 (April, 2013), pp.463-490. Challenges the depiction of Emory Upton (1839-1881) as an anti-democracy militarist.

Johnson, Mark W. **“Emory Upton’s Twenty-Six: Desertion and Divided Loyalty of the U.S. Army Soldiers, 1860-1861.”** Vol.81, No.3 (July, 2017), pp.747-774. Contrary to common assumptions, the enlisted men of the regular peace-time Army were as conflicted in their loyalties as their officers, resulting in over 500 deserting during the secession crisis to serve in what became the Army of the Confederate States of America.

URBAN WARFARE

Henriot, Christian, **“The Battle of Shanghai (January-March 1932): A Study in the Space-Time of War.”** Vol.85, No.1 (January, 2021), pp.76-94. Focuses on the impact of urban and rural environments on the manner in which the Imperial Japanese and Nationalist Chinese forces fought one another.

V

VAN FLEET, JAMES A. (1892-1992)

Donnelly, William M. **“A Damn Hard Job: James A. Van Fleet and the Combat Effectiveness of U.S. Army Infantry, July 1951 – February 1953.”** Vol.82, No.1 (January, 2018), pp.147-179. The difficulties faced by the Eighth Army commander, Gen. Van Fleet (1892-1992), to maintain ‘the will to win’ during the Korean War.

VANCE, CYRUS R., Sr. (1917-2002)

Donnelly, William M. **“From Sergeant Snorkels to Drill Sergeants: Basic Training of Male Soldiers in the U.S. Army, 1953-1964.”** Vol.86, No.2 (April, 2022), pp.399-426. Assesses the much-criticized quality of officers and non-commissioned officers assigned to shepherd recruits through basic training, an issue that wasn’t addressed until the Secretaries of the Army Cyrus R. Vance Sr. (1917-2002) and Stephen Ailes (1912-2001).

VANDENBERG, HOYT S. (1899-1954)

Meilinger, Phillip S. **“Historiographical Essay: U.S. Air Force Leaders: A Biographical Tour.”** Vol.62, No.4 (October, 1998), pp.833-870.

VERMONT, U.S.A.

Ferrell, Henry C., Jr. **“Guns for Vermont: Military Land Acquisition in the 1920s.”** Vol.61, No.1 (January, 1997), pp.31-47. Presents the remarkable achievement of Vermont Senator, Frank Lester Greene (1870-1930), of arranging for the purchase of additional land for Fort Ethan Allen at a time of severely constrained defense budgets.

VETERANS: LATE 17TH TO LATE 19TH CENTURIES – RUSSIA / SOVIET UNION

Wirtschafter, Elise Kimerling, **“Social Misfits: Veterans and Soldier’s Families in Servile Russia [1682-1874].”** Vol.59, No.2 (April, 1995), pp.215-235. Endeavors to understand the relationship between military service and social categories in Imperial Russia, beginning with the reign of Peter the Great in 1682 up to the introduction of universal conscription in 1874.

VETERANS: FRENCH REVOLUTIONARY AND NAPOLEONIC WARS (1792-1815)

Dodman, Thomas, **“1814 and the Melancholy of War.”** Vol.80, No.1 (January, 2016), pp.31-55. Through contemporary accounts, this article explores the emotional reaction of state officials, soldiers, military doctors, etc. to the collapse of Napoleon’s Empire.

Calvet, Stéphane, **“The Painful Demobilization of the Napoleonic Grande Armée’s Officers.”** Vol.80, No.1 (January, 2016), pp.77-92. By examining the Western French Department of Charente, the author illustrates the diverse loyalties, motivations, and subsequent careers of the officers of Napoleon’s Grande Armée.

Tozzi, Christopher, **“Soldiers without a Country: Foreign Veterans in the Transition from Empire to Restoration.”** Vol.80, No.1 (January, 2016), pp.93-120. The article identifies and explores three trends: the exclusion of foreign veterans from the program of social healing that the Restoration Bourbons undertook, the limits of the modern French state’s care for veterans, and the ambiguity of national identity after the revolutionary era.

Heuer, Jennifer, **“Soldiers as Victims or Villains? Demobilization, Masculinity, and Family in French Royalist Pamphlets, 1814-1815.”** Vol.80, No.1 (January, 2016), pp.121-144.

Ottosen, Morten Nordhagen, **“Ending War and Making Peace in Scandinavia, 1814-1848: ‘Peace Crisis’, Demobilization, and Reconciliation.”** Vol.80, No.1 (January, 2016), pp.145-172.

VETERANS: U.S. CIVIL WAR (1861-65)

Dunn, John P. **“Americans in the Nineteenth Century Egyptian Army: A Selected Bibliography.”** Vol.70, No.1 (January, 2006), pp.123-136. Ismail (r.1863-1879), grandson of Muhammad Ali Pasha, employed officers from the United States, including both veterans from both sides in the Civil War and serving officers in the postwar United States Army.

Newell, Clayton R. and Shrader, Charles R. **“The U.S. Army’s Transition to Peace, 1865-66.”** Vol.77, No.3 (July, 2013), pp.867-894.

Hackemer, Kurt, **“Wartime Trauma and the Lure of the Frontier: Civil War Veterans in Dakota Territory.”** Vol.81, No.1 (January, 2017), pp.75-103. Surveys a sample of 6,000 veterans based on the 1885 Dakota Territory census.

VETERANS: WORLD WAR I (1914-18)

Hancock, Eleanor, **“Ernst Rohm and the Experience of World War I.”** Vol.60, No.1 (January, 1996), pp.39-60. Inspects the role of the Great War service in the political rhetoric of the Chief of Staff of the National Socialist Sturmabteilung, including Rohm’s version of his war experiences as recounted in his 1928 autobiography.

Todman, Daniel, **“*Sans peur et sans reproche*: The Retirement, Death, and Mourning of Sir Douglas Haig, 1918-1928.”** Vol.67, No.4 (October, 2003), pp.1083-1106.

Ortiz, Stephen R. **“The ‘New Deal’ for Veterans: The Economy Act [1934], the Veterans of Foreign Wars, and the Origins of New Deal Dissent.”** Vol.70, No.2 (April, 2006), pp.415-438.

Nordlund, Alexander, **“ ‘Done My Bit’: British Soldiers, the 1918 Armistice, and Understanding the First World War.”** Vol.81, No.2 (April, 2017), pp.425-446. Contrasts British soldiers’ reactions to the Armistice and their war experience with their later reflections.

VETERANS: WORLD WAR II (1939-45)

Bland, Larry I. **“Document of Note: Marlene Dietrich’s Firepower.”** Vol.66, No.3 (July, 2002), pp.829-831. Chief-of-Staff George C. Marshall (1880-1959) sought a means to stop the flow of firearms being brought back to the U.S. as war trophies.

Wood, James A. **“Captive Historians, Captivated Audience: The German Military History Program, 1945-1961.”** Vol.69, No.1 (January, 2005), pp.123-147. Delves into the work and motivations of Wehrmacht officers who were employed the United States Government to describe their wartime experiences concerning Germany’s war effort.

Schmider, Klaus, **“Review Essay: The Last of the First: Veterans of the *Jagdwaaffe* Tell Their Story.”** Vol.73, No.1 (January, 2009), pp.231-249. Covers five memoirs of *Luftwaffe* fighter pilots.

Hutchinson, Robert W. **“The Weight of History: *Wehrmacht* Officers, the U.S. Army Historical Division, and U.S. Military Doctrine, 1945-1956.”** Vol.78, No.4 (October, 2014), pp.1321-1348. Suggests that, even within the ‘purely operational’ lessons provided by veteran German officers to the U.S. Army, a considerable element of Nazi racist ideology was transmitted.

VETERANS: VIETNAM WAR (2nd Indochina War) (1955-75)

Daddis, Gregory A. **“Historiographical Essay: Mansplaining Vietnam: Male Veterans and America’s Popular Image of the Vietnam War.”** Vol.82, No.1 (January, 2018), pp.181-207. Explores how various media, such as memoirs, have excluded the story of the roughly 7,500 U.S. women who served in the Vietnam War.

VETERANS: EL SALVADORAN CIVIL WAR (1980-92)

Courtney, Jocelyn, **“The Civil War that was fought by Children: Understanding the Role of Child Combatants in El Salvador’s Civil War, 1980-1992.”** Vol.74, No.2 (April, 2010), pp.523-556. Explores the legacy of the extensive reliance on child soldiers by both the Salvadoran government and the Farabundo Martí Front for National Liberation in terms of demobilization issues and postwar societal problems.

VIETNAM: 1st INDOCHINA WAR (1946-54)

Boylan, Kevin M. **“No ‘Technical Knockout’: Giap’s Artillery at Dien Bien Phu.”** Vol.78, No.4 (October, 2014), pp.1349-1383. Contests the common explanation for the victory of the Vietnamese People’s Army based on a flood of Vietnamese publications around the 2004 fiftieth anniversary of the siege, 13 March – 7 May, 1954.

VIETNAM WAR (2nd Indochina War) (1955-1975): U.S.A.

Leary, William M. **“The C.I.A. and the ‘Secret War’ in Laos: The Battle for Skyline Ridge, 1971-1971.”** Vol.59, No.3 (July, 1995), pp.505-517. Narrates an all-but-forgotten victory of a force of Hmong, Lao, and Thai defenders against the North Vietnamese Army.

Van De Mark, Brian, **“Review Essay: Thinking about the Vietnam War.”** Vol.60, No.2 (April, 1996), pp.339-357. Although the majority of the seven books reviewed are from the perspective of the involvement of the United States, including one on the anti-war movement and two on the Johnson administration, 1963-1969, there is a memoir from a rural woman living in South Vietnam and a comparative work about the reaction of academics to the wars in Algeria and Vietnam.

Jablon, Howard, **“General David M. Shoup, U.S.M.C.: Warrior and War Protester.”** Vol.60, No.3 (July, 1996), pp.513-538. Claims that the same hard-headed pragmatism that made General Shoup (1904-83) a reliable Marine Corps officer led him to conclude that U.S. involvement in Vietnam was ultimately a pointless waste of American lives.

Xiaoming Zhang, **“The Vietnam War, 1964-1969: A Chinese Perspective.”** Vol.60, No.4 (October, 1996), pp.731-762. Recounts how the People’s Republic of China supported Hanoi’s drive to unify Vietnam, assessing the extent to which there was a potential for direct Chinese military intervention.

Kirkland, Faris R. **“The Attack on Cap Mui Lay, Vietnam, July 1968.”** Vol.61, No.4 (October, 1997), pp.735-760. Shines light on Operation Thor, a neglected example of joint operation in Vietnam and one that significantly disrupted North Vietnam’s strategic plans.

Cole, Bernard D. **“Memoirs: A Noglow in Vietnam, 1968: Air Power at the Battle of Khe Sanh.”** Vol.64, No.1 (January, 2000), pp.141-158. Both a memoir and an analysis by a U.S. Marine who experienced first-hand the fighting at Khe Sanh.

Sarantakes, Nicholas Evan, **“The Quiet War: Combat Operations along the Korean Demilitarized Zone, 1966-1969.”** Vol.64, No.2 (April, 2000), pp.439-457. Describes how South Korea and the United States responded differently to the provocations of North Korea and how this impacted the war in Vietnam.

Smith, Ralph B. **“Review Essay: Choosing War in Vietnam.”** Vol.64, No.2 (April, 2000), pp.503-513. Critiques Fredrik Logevall’s 1999 book of the same name.

Xiaoming Zhang, **“China’s Involvement in Laos during the Vietnam War, 1963-1975.”** Vol.66, No.4 (October, 2002), pp.1141-1166. Shows that the competition between Hanoi and Beijing for control over the Laotian Communists reflected an underlying mistrust between the two governments.

Pribbenow II, Merle L. **“The -Ology War: Technology and Ideology in the Vietnamese Defense of Hanoi, 1967.”** Vol.67, No.1 (January, 2003), pp.175-200. Considers the multiple factors in the recovery of the air defenses of Hanoi following near disaster in 1967.

Veith, George J. and Pribbenow, Merle L., II, **“ ‘Fighting is an Art’: The Army of the Republic of Vietnam’s Defense of Xuan Loc, 9 – 21 April, 1975.”** Vol.68, No.1 (January, 2004), pp.163-213. Provides an account of the successful defensive operation of Brigadier General Lê Minh Đảo’s (1933-2020) 18th Division, demonstrating what A.R.V.N. units were capable of accomplishing when commanded by inspiring leaders.

Carland, John M. **“Winning the Vietnam War: Westmoreland’s Approach in Two Documents.”** Vol.68, No.2 (April, 2004), pp.553-574.

Malkasian, Carter, **“Toward a Better Understanding of Attrition: The Korean and Vietnam Wars.”** Vol.68, No.3 (July, 2004), pp.911-942.

Spector, Ronald H. **“After Hiroshima: Allied Military Occupations and the Fate of Japan’s Empire, 1945-1947.”** Vol.69, No.4 (October, 2005), pp.1121-1136. The Allies confronted problems far beyond the disarming of Japanese troops in occupied China, Korea, and Southeast Asia, where internal conflicts rendered the plans of the Allied powers irrelevant.

Hawkins, John M. **“The Costs of Artillery: Eliminating Harassment and Interdiction Fire During the Vietnam War.”** Vol.70, No.1 (January, 2006), pp.91-122. Determines that the reason that the use of U.S. artillery for harassment and interdiction had been all but eliminated by June, 1970, was due to budgetary pressures and not from concerns over collateral damage.

Carland, John M. **“Review Essay: Abandoning Vietnam.”** Vol.70, No.1 (January, 2006), pp.183-186. Examines James H. Willbanks 2004 book about the withdrawal of direct U.S. involvement in the war, beginning in 1968, to the victorious conclusion of the North Vietnamese invasion in 1975.

Milne, David, **“ ‘Our Equivalent of Guerrilla Warfare’: Walt Rostow and the Bombing of North Vietnam, 1961-1968.”** Vol.71, No.1 (January, 2007), pp.169-203. Claims that Walt

Rostow's (1916-2003) background as an economic historian led him to become one of the strongest advocates for the strategic bombing of North Vietnam.

Birtle, Andrew J. **"PROVN, Westmoreland, and the Historians: A Reappraisal."** Vol.72, No.4 (October, 2008), pp.1213-1247. A reassessment of the U.S. Army report, nicknamed PROVN, that, in the past, had been mined for information with which to criticize General William C. Westmoreland (1914-2004) and praise his successor as commander of U.S. forces in South Vietnam, General Creighton Abrams (1914-1974).

Boylan, Kevin M. **"The Red Queen's Race: Operation Washington Green and Pacification in Binh Dinh Province, 1969-70."** Vol.73, No.4 (October, 2009), pp.1195-1230. Examines the operations conducted by the 173rd Airborne Brigade in Binh Dinh Province closely, which matched recommendations made by many of the critics of the way U.S. military forces was conducted the war and, therefore, offers insight into the likely effectiveness of an alternate strategy focused on population control.

Birtle, Andrew James, **"Advisory Service in Vietnam: Detrimental to an Officer's Career?"** Vol.74, No.3 (July, 2010), pp.871-877. By examining the extent to which former Vietnam advisers achieved general officer rank in the U.S. Army, the article seeks to test the common belief among officers that the Army did not assign its best men for service as advisors and that promotion boards discriminated against these advisors.

Carland, John M. **"Review Essay: Scorecard on CIA C.O.I.N. in Vietnam."** Vol.75, No.3 (July, 2011), pp.887-891.

Daddis, Gregory A. **"Eating Soup with a Spoon: The U.S. Army as a 'Learning Organization' in the Vietnam War."** Vol.77, No.1 (January, 2013), pp.229-254. The U.S. Army's strategic approach, operational experience, and organizational changes.

Lenaburg, Jerry, **"Review Essay: Four Slices of the Iraq War Apple."** Vol.77, No.1 (January, 2013), pp.299-303. Includes an assessment of four recent titles about the United States war in Iraq, 2003-2011, in one case comparing counterinsurgency efforts in Iraq with those conducted by the U.S. forces in Vietnam.

Fino, Steven A. **"Breaking the Trance: The Perils of Technological Exuberance in the U.S. Air Force Entering Vietnam."** Vol.77, No.2 (April, 2013), pp.625-655. The response of individual units to the need for guns, in addition to missiles, for air-to-air combat.

Boylan, Kevin M. **"Goodnight Saigon: American Provincial Advisors' Final Impressions of the Vietnam War."** Vol.78, No.1 (January, 2014), pp.233-270. Scrutinizes the revisionist proposition that the United States had won the war in the wake of the Tet Offensive, 1968, by examining the assessments of U.S. Province Senior Advisors.

- Lipman, Jana K. “**‘A Precedent Worth Setting...’ Military Humanitarianism: The U.S. Military and the 1975 Vietnamese Evacuation.**” Vol.79, No.1 (January, 2015), pp.151-179. Proposes that the U.S. Armed Forces’ involvement in the evacuation of over 100,000 Vietnamese to the United States represented a turning point in how these institutions viewed humanitarian operations.
- Donnelly, William M. “**This ‘Horrible Example’: An Extraordinary Case of Absent Without Leave during the Vietnam War.**” Vol.79, No.2 (April, 2015), pp.457-466. Thomas J. Cuchal of Cleveland, Ohio.
- Marolda, Edward J. “**Orphan of the Mekong Delta: The Army-Navy Mobile Riverine Force.**” Vol.80, No.4 (October, 2016), pp.1149-1181. Despite its success during the Tet Offensive of 1968, the failure of Army and Navy leaders to fully embrace the creation of the Army-Navy Mobile Riverine Force resulting in its disbanding by Gen. Creighton Abrams (1914-1974).
- McGibbon, Ian, “**Australian-New Zealand Relations and Commitments to Asian Conflicts 1950-1972.**” Vol.81, No.4 (October, 2017), pp.1059-1074. Despite the replacement of the British security framework by alliance with the United States, New Zealand resisted pressure to commit troops to the Vietnam War in direct contrast to its larger neighbor.
- Daddis, Gregory A. “**Historiographical Essay: Mansplaining Vietnam: Male Veterans and America’s Popular Image of the Vietnam War.**” Vol.82, No.1 (January, 2018), pp.181-207. Explores how various media, such as memoirs, have excluded the story of the roughly 7,500 U.S. women who served in the Vietnam War.
- Borch, Fred L. “**Review Essay: My Lai at Fifty: A History of Literature on the ‘My Lai Incident’ Fifty Years Later.**” Vol.82, No.2 (April, 2018), pp.551-564. Concerning the killing of unarmed civilians by U.S. Army troops during the Vietnam War at the village of My Lai in the Son Tinh district on 16 March, 1968.
- Carland, John M. “**Daniel Ellsberg and the Tet Offensive.**” Vol.83, No.2 (April, 2019), pp.541-552. An analyst for the RAND Corporation and employee of both the Defense and State Departments, Daniel Ellsberg’s (1931-2023) critical assessment of the impact of the Tet Offensive, January, 1968, reflected a stage in his growing disillusionment with the war in Vietnam.
- Trauschweizer, Ingo, “**Cautious Hawk: Maxwell Taylor and the Path to War in Vietnam.**” Vol.83, No.3 (July, 2019), pp.831-859. Relates the U.S. ambassador to Saigon’s, 1964-1965, opinions regarding the efficacy of bombing Hanoi and deploying ground forces to South Vietnam and their possible influence on the decisions of President Lyndon Johnson (1963-69).
- Haun, Phil, “**Foundation Bias: The Impact of the Air Corps Tactical School on United States**

Air Force Doctrine.” Vol.85, No.2 (April, 2021), pp.453-474. Contrasts the steadfast belief in the role of strategic bombing at the Air Corps Tactical School with the effectiveness of joint operations demonstrated in the Korean, Vietnam, Iraq, and Afghanistan wars.

Harris, J.P. **“The Early Military History of the Second Indochina War and the Mayor Thesis.”** Vol.85, No.3 (July, 2021), pp.734-763. Contests the interpretation of Mark Moyar that by mid-1962 the South Vietnamese government was conducting a successful counter-insurgency campaign that was cut short by the overthrow of Ngo Dinh Diem (1901-1963).

Ruth, Richard A. **“Ham and Mothers: C-Ration Revelry and Revulsion in the Vietnam War.”** Vol.85, No.4 (October, 2021), pp.1004-1028. observes that the comradery of troops was facilitated by the love-hate relations with their rations.

Prentice, David L. **“ ‘Waltzing Matilda’ Out of Vietnam: Grand Strategy, Politics, and the Decision to Remove Australian Military Forces from Vietnam.”** Vol.86, No.3 (July, 2022), pp.642-669. When the United States chose to pursue the policy of ‘Vietnamization’, withdrawing increasing numbers of U.S. troops, Australian Prime Minister John Gorton (r.1968-1971) sought to encourage U.S. resolve by retaining Australian troops in South Vietnam until 1970, when Gorton’s government collapsed.

VIETNAM: CAMBODIA-VIETNAMESE WAR (1978-89)

Pribbenow, Merle L., II, **“A Tale of Five Generals: Vietnam’s Invasion of Cambodia.”** Vol.70, No.2 (April, 2006), pp.459-486. Concerned the meticulously planned and well executed 1978-79 invasion of neighboring Cambodia by the Communist forces of the newly united Vietnam, which included both an amphibious assault and combined arms mechanized columns.

VIRGINIA MILITARY INSTITUTE

Gioia, Philip, **“When ‘The Institution was Heard from’ in World War II: V.M.I. Alumni on the War Department General Staff, 1939-1945.”** Vol.78, No.4 (October, 2014), pp.1385-1394.

VÕ NGUYỄN GIÁP (1911-2013)

Boylan, Kevin M. **“No ‘Technical Knockout’: Giap’s Artillery at Dien Bien Phu.”** Vol.78, No.4 (October, 2014), pp.1349-1383. Contests the common explanation for the victory of the Vietnamese People’s Army based on a flood of Vietnamese publications around the 2004 fiftieth anniversary of the siege, 13 March – 7 May, 1954.

VON CLAUSEWITZ, CARL (1780-1831)

Sumida, Jon Tetsuro, **“The Relationship of History and Theory in *On War*: The Clausewitzian Ideal and Its Implications.”** Vol.65, No.2 (April, 2001), pp.333-354.

Rogers, Clifford J. **“Clausewitz, Genius, and the Rules.”** Vol.66, No.4 (October, 2002), pp.1167-1176. Contends that ‘genius rises above the rules’, attributed to Carl von Clausewitz (1780-1831), has been misunderstood, that what Clausewitz meant was that geniuses violate only the incorrect or oversimplified rules of bad theory.

Strachan, Hew, **“The 2010 George C. Marshall Lecture in Military History: Clausewitz and the First World War.”** Vol.75, No.2 (April, 2011), pp.367-391. How the belligerents interpreted the writings of Carl von Clausewitz (1780-1831) during and in the immediate aftermath of World War I.

Paret, Peter, **“Clausewitz: ‘Half against my will, I have become a Professor.’** Vol.75, No.2 (April, 2011), pp.591-601. Carl von Clausewitz’ (1780-1831) lectures on ‘Little War’ during the Prussian reform era.

Paret, Peter, **“Clausewitz and Schlieffen as Interpreters of Frederick the Great: Three Phases in the History of Grand Strategy.”** Vol.76, No.3 (July, 2012), pp.837-845. Compares how Carl von Clausewitz (1780-1831) and Count Alfred von Schlieffen (1833-1913) interpreted Frederick the Great’s generalship, illustrating the function of historical study in the development of Clausewitz’s theories.

Bruscino, Thomas, **“Naturally Clausewitzian: U.S. Army Theory and Education from Reconstruction to the Inter-War Years.”** Vol.77, No.4 (October, 2013), pp.1251-1275. Though familiar with Carl von Clausewitz (1780-1831), U.S. Army officers independently embraced concepts that Clausewitz advocated.

Sumida, Jon, **“A Concordance of Selected Subjects in Carl von Clausewitz’s *On War*.”** Vol.78, No.1 (January, 2014), pp.271-331.

Paret, Peter, **“Translation, Literal or Accurate.”** Vol.78, No.3 (July, 2014), pp.1077-1080. Disagreements over the proper translation of five words in Carl von Clausewitz’s *On War* as an example of the challenges of translating complex texts.

Bellinger, Vanya Eftimova, **“The Other Clausewitz: Findings from the Newly Discovered Correspondence between Marie and Carl von Clausewitz.”** Vol.79, No.2 (April, 2015), pp.345-367.

Paret, Peter, **“On War then and now.”** Vol.80, No.2 (April, 2016), pp.477-485. Analyzes the development of some of Clausewitz’ (1780-1831) concepts from the 1790s to the early 1830s and their relevance today.

Paret, Peter, **“Review Essay: Clausewitz’s Life and Work as a Subject of Historical Interpretation.”** Vol.81, No.3 (July, 2017), pp.829-837.

Paret, Peter, **“The Function of History in Clausewitz’s Understanding of War.”** Vol.82, No.4 (October, 2018), pp.1049-1066.

Paret, Peter, **“The Impact of Clausewitz’s Early Life on His Theories and Politics.”** Vol.84, No.1 (January, 2020), pp.35-50. Proposes that the angry quarrels with his father led Clausewitz (1780-1831) to develop a combative relationship with authority throughout his life that impacted the development of his theories.

Paret, Peter, **“From the Discovery of a Clausewitz Manuscript to Its Interpretation.”** Vol.84, No.3 (July, 2020), pp.867-871. A translation of an unpublished manuscript written by Carl von Clausewitz from the first years of his military career, specifically August, 1802.

VON FREYTAG-LORINGHOVEN (1855-1924)

Echevarria, Antulio, **“General Staff Historian Hugo Freiherr von Freytag-Loringhoven and the Dialectics of German Military Thought.”** Vol.60, No.3 (July, 1996), pp.471-494. Von Freytag-Loringhoven (1855-1924) was arguably the most prolific of Imperial Germany’s military authors and, notably, a historian of the Great General Staff, whose opposition to change served as an antithesis that forced his critics to justify and further develop their ideas.

VON HOLTZENDORFF, HENNING (1853-1919)

Steffen, Dirk, **“The Holtzendorff Memorandum of 22 December, 1916, and Germany’s Declaration of Unrestricted U-Boat Warfare.”** Vol.68, No.1 (January, 2004), pp.215-224. Examines how the Chief of the Imperial German Navy’s Admiralty Staff, Henning von Holtzendorff (1853-1919), successfully argued that Germany could risk provoking the United States entering the war in return for starving Great Britain into submission.

VON MOLTKE THE ELDER, HELMUTH (1800-1891)

DiNardo, Richard L. **“Southern by the Grace of God but Prussian by Common Sense: James**

Longstreet and the Exercise of Command in the U.S. Civil War.” Vol.66, No.4 (October, 2002), pp.1011-1032. Compares the manner in which General James Longstreet (1821-1904) organized and utilized his staff with the staff practices developed by the Prussian Army under Helmuth von Moltke the Elder (1800-1891).

VON SANDERS, OTTO LIMAN (1855-1929)

Travers, Tim, **“Liman von Sanders, the Capture of Lieutenant Palmer, and Ottoman Anticipation of the Allied Landings at Gallipoli on 25 April 1915.”** Vol.65, No.4 (October, 2001), pp.965-979. Shines a light on the expectations of the Turks for a possible landing on the Gallipoli Peninsula and, in particular, the neglected issue of the impact of information from a captured British intelligence officer shortly before the actual landing.

VON SCHLICHTING, SIGISMUND (1829-1909)

Hughes, Daniel J. **“Schlichting, Schlieffen, and the Prussian Theory of War in 1914.”** Vol.59, No.2 (April, 1995), pp.257-277. Reviews the work of the controversial and influential Prussian Army theorist and critic of Alfred von Schlieffen, General Sigismund von Schlichting (1829-1909).

VON SCHLIEFFEN, ALFRED (1833-1913)

Hughes, Daniel J. **“Schlichting, Schlieffen, and the Prussian Theory of War in 1914.”** Vol.59, No.2 (April, 1995), pp.257-277. Reviews the work of the controversial and influential Prussian Army theorist and critic of Alfred von Schlieffen, General Sigismund von Schlichting (1829-1909).

Holmes, Terence M. **“Classical Blitzkrieg: The Untimely Modernity of Schlieffen’s Cannae Programme.”** Vol.67, No.3 (July, 2003), pp.745-771. Reveals that the Chief of the Prussian General Staff, Count Alfred von Schlieffen (1891-1906), only adopted the Cannae paradigm in 1909, four years *after* he had formulated his plans for war with France, and that this paradigm inadvertently fit subsequent concepts for mechanized warfare.

Paret, Peter, **“Clausewitz and Schlieffen as Interpreters of Frederick the Great: Three Phases in the History of Grand Strategy.”** Vol.76, No.3 (July, 2012), pp.837-845. Compares how Carl von Clausewitz (1780-1831) and Count Alfred von Schlieffen (1833-1913) interpreted Frederick the Great’s generalship, illustrating the function of historical study in the development of Clausewitz’s theories.

VON SPEE, MAXIMILIAN REICHSGRAF (1861-1914)

Overlack, Peter, **“The Force of Circumstances: Graf Spee’s Options for the East Asian Cruiser Squadron in 1914.”** Vol.60, No.4 (October, 1996), pp.657-682. Investigates how the denial of coaling stations by both Japan’s decision to join the Entente Powers and the actions of Australia and New Zealand severely constricted the choices available to Vice-Admiral Maximilian Reichsgraf von Spee (1861-1914).

VON TIRPITZ, ALFRED (1849-1930)

Kelly, Patrick J. **“Strategy, Tactics, and Turf Wars: Tirpitz and the *Oberkommando der Marine*, 1892-1895.”** Vol.66, No.4 (October, 2002), pp.1033-1060. Relies on previously ignored archival material to reexamine the development of Grand Admiral Alfred von Tirpitz’s (1849-1930) strategic and tactical thought, including some significant contradictions.

W

WAGNER, ARTHUR (1853-1905)

Brereton, T.R. **“First Lessons in Modern War: Arthur Wagner, the 1898 Santiago Campaign, and the U.S. Army Lesson-Learning.”** Vol.64, No.1 (January, 2000), pp.79-96. Relates how Lieutenant Colonel Arthur Wagner (1853-1905) pioneered the U.S. Army’s practice of producing ‘lessons-learned’ studies of the Army’s recent military operations.

WALKER, KENNETH N. (1898-1943)

Meilinger, Phillip S. **“Historiographical Essay: U.S. Air Force Leaders: A Biographical Tour.”** Vol.62, No.4 (October, 1998), pp.833-870.

WAR OF 1812 (1812-15)

Skaggs, David Curtis, **“Aiming at the Truth: James Fenimore Cooper and the Battle of Lake Erie.”** Vol.59, No.2 (April, 1995), pp.237-255. Disentangles the disputed account of the Battle of Lake Erie, 10 September, 1813, written by Cooper (1789-1851) in his *History of the Navy of the United States* (1839).

Kastor, Peter J. **“Toward ‘The Maritime War Only’: The Question of Naval Mobilization, 1811-1812.”** Vol.61, No.3 (July, 1997), pp.455-480. Applies the broader context of the ‘New

Military History', particularly political circumstances, in an effort to better understand President James Madison's (1809-1817) naval policy and strategy leading up to the outbreak of the War of 1812.

Hickey, Donald R. "**Historiographical Essay: The War of 1812: Still a Forgotten Conflict?**" Vol.65, No.3 (July, 2001), pp.741-769.

Leiner, Frederick C. "**The Squadron Commander's Share: Decatur and the Prize Money for the *Chesapeake's* First War of 1812 Cruise.**" Vol.73, No.1 (January, 2009), pp.69-82. An examination of the prize case of Decatur vs. Chew that displays the tensions between ranking officers over their contrasting views of their appropriate shares.

Hickey, Donald R. "**1812: Remembering a Forgotten War.**" Vol.76, No.4 (October, 2012), pp.969-972.

Stagg, J.C.A. "**United States Army Officers in the War of 1812: A Statistical and Behavioral Portrait.**" Vol.76, No.4 (October, 2012), pp.1001-1034. An examination of 334 general court martials demonstrates that officers were judged more harshly for their moral and character defects than for their shortcomings in performing routine duties.

Crawford, Michael J. "**U.S. Navy Petty Officers in the Era of the War of 1812.**" Vol.76, No.4 (October, 2012), pp.1035-1051. Scrutinizes the Navy's process of recruiting and training petty officers between the years 1797 and 1812.

Black, Jeremy, "**The North American Theater of the Napoleonic Wars, or, as it is sometimes Called, the War of 1812.**" Vol.76, No.4 (October, 2012), pp.1053-1066. The challenge for Great Britain was to balance the demands of different naval commitments.

McCranie, Kevin D. "**The War of 1812 in the ongoing Napoleonic Wars: The Response of Britain's Royal Navy.**" Vol.76, No.4 (October, 2012), pp.1067-1094. The challenge for Great Britain to balance the demands of different naval commitments, particularly in 1812 and 1813.

Bowes, John P. "**Transformation and Transition: American Indians and the War of 1812 in the Lower Great Lakes.**" Vol.76, No.4 (October, 2012), pp.1129-1146. Focusing on the Wyandot communities in the Old Northwest within a broader temporal context beyond the beginning and end dates of the War of 1812.

Leiner, Frederick C. "**'The Sport of Arbitrary Men': The Privateer *Nonsuch* and a Search at Sea in the War of 1812.**" Vol.76, No.4 (October, 2012), pp.1147-1164. An incident involving the Baltimore Privateer *Nonsuch's* seizure of the schooner *Ann Maria*, which resulted in court cases that led all the way to the U.S. Supreme Court.

Jensen, Richard, **“Military History on the Electronic Frontier: Wikipedia Fights the War of 1812.”** Vol.76, No.4 (October, 2012), pp.1165-1182.

Arnold, James R. **“Winfield Scott Makes a Name for Himself.”** Vol.76, No.4 (October, 2012), pp.1183-1185. General Winfield Scott (1786-1866) first came to public notice during the War of 1812, during which he demonstrated a talent for training troops, but did the Duke of Wellington (1769-1852) ever actually say “Scott is lost” when commenting on Scott’s Mexico City Campaign (1847).

Grodzinski, John R. **“Review Essay: Opening Shots from the Bicentenary of the War of 1812: A Canadian Perspective on Recent Titles.”** Vol.76, No.4 (October, 2012), pp.1187-1201.

Trautsch, Jasper M. **“The Causes of the War of 1812: 200 Years of Debate.”** Vol.77, No.1 (January, 2013), pp.273-293.

Leiner, Frederick C. **“Privateers in the War of 1812.”** Vol.77, No.4 (October, 2013), Pp.1225-1250. Seeks to answer the question, ‘Was privateering profitable?’

Stagg, J.C.A. **“Freedom and Subordination: Disciplinary Problems in the U.S. Army of 1812.”** Vol.78, No.2 (April, 2014), pp.537-574. Based on general court martial case files and the question of proper forms of punishment.

Hickey, Donald R. **“‘War Hawks’: Using Newspapers to Trace a Phrase, 1792-1812.”** Vol.78, No.2 (April, 2014), pp.725-740.

Dudley, William S. **“Review Essay: War of 1812 Trilogy.”** Vol.78, No.2 (April, 2014), pp.747-751. Three works by the noted Canadian military historian, Donald E. Graves, on the Battles of the War of 1812 fought during the years 1813 to 1814.

Graves, Donald E. **“Review Essay: U.S. Army Campaigns of the War of 1812.”** Vol.79, No.1 (January, 2015), pp.181-185.

McCranie, Kevin D. **“Perception and Naval Dominance.: The British Experience during the War of 1812.”** Vol.82, No.4 (October, 2018), pp.1067-1091. The defeat of three British frigates by U.S. counterparts had no actual effect on British sea power, but provoked a disproportionate reaction within society and the Royal Navy, inadvertently leading to beneficial changes.

WAR OF THE AUSTRIAN SUCCESSION (1740-48)

Paoletti, Ciro, **“The Battle of Culloden: A Pivotal Moment in World History.”** Vol.81, No.1

(January, 2017), pp.187-198. Highlights the international context of the Battle of Culloden, 16 April, 1746, and speculates on the wider consequences of a Hanoverian defeat.

WAR OF THE PACIFIC (1879-84)

Jamison, Thomas M. **“The War of the Pacific, Technology and U.S. Naval Development: An International History of a Regional War.”** Vol.82, No.4 (October, 2018), pp.1093-1122.

The observations by foreign nations of the war between Chile and a coalition of Bolivia and Peru, 1879-1884, influenced naval developments around the globe, including contributing to the U.S. building of the ‘New Navy’ in the 1890s.

WAR OF THE SPANISH SUCCESSION (1701-15)

Ostwald, Jamel, **“The ‘Decisive’ Battle of Ramillies, 1706: Prerequisites for Decisiveness in Early Modern Warfare.”** Vol.64, No.3 (July, 2000), pp.649-677. Asks whether eighteenth century military strategy was indecisive by choice rather than by necessity by looking at the 1st Duke of Marlborough, John Churchill’s (1650-1722), Ramillies campaign.

Paoletti, Ciro, **“Prince Eugene of Savoy, the Toulon Expedition of 1707, and the English Historians: A Dissenting View.”** Vol.70, No.4 (October, 2006), pp.939-962. Using the siege of Toulon as an example, the author insists that most of the military histories of the period between 1688 and 1748 written by English speaking authors are flawed due to a failure to consult non-English contemporary sources.

WAR OF THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE / PARAGUAYAN WAR (1864-70)

Stamp, Jeffrey, **“Aero-Static Warfare: A Brief Survey of Ballooning in Mid-nineteenth-century Siege Warfare.”** Vol.79, No.3 (July, 2015), Pp.767-782. Includes usage in the U.S. Civil War, War of the Triple Alliance / Paraguayan War, and the Franco-Prussian War.

WASHINGTON, GEORGE (1732-99)

Hall, John W. **“An Irregular Reconsideration of George Washington and the American Military Tradition.”** Vol.78, No.3 (July, 2014), pp.961-993. Attempts to reconcile the contradictory interpretations of George Washington’s (1732-1799) approach to and performance in the conduct of war.

Boutin, Cameron, **“Adversary and Ally: The Role of Weather in the Life and Career of**

George Washington.” Vol.81, No.3 (July, 2017), pp.693-718.

WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION

See Also: COLD WAR

WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION: CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS

Van Courtland Moon, John Ellis, **“United States Chemical Warfare Policy in World War II: A Captive of Coalition Policy?”** Vol.60, No.3 (July, 1996), pp.495-511.

Cook, Tim, **“Creating the Faith: The Canadian Gas Services in the First World War.”** Vol.62, No.4 (October, 1998), pp.755-786. The Canadian forces developed a very efficient organization to instruct their troops in how to protect themselves from Chemical weapons.

Jeans, Roger B., Jr. **“Alarm in Washington: A Wartime ‘Expose’ of Japan’s Biological Warfare Program.”** Vol.71, No.2 (April, 2007), pp.411-439. Discusses a book published in the summer of 1944 describing both Japan’s biological warfare program and the failure of the U.S. government to meet this threat, and the government and the media’s response to this publication, considering parallels with the 2001 anthrax ‘scares.’

Goldman, David I. **“The Generals and the Germs: The Army Leadership’s Response to Nixon’s Review of Chemical and Biological Warfare Policies in 1969.”** Vol.73, No.2 (April, 2009), pp.531-569. The response of U.S. Army leadership to President Richard Nixon (1969-1974) unilateral elimination of biological warfare agents, retaining only a defensive research program, as well as placing limitations on the chemical weapons.

Sheffy, Yigal, **“Chemical Warfare and the Palestine Campaign, 1916-1918.”** Vol.73, No.3 (July, 2009), pp.803-844. Brings light to the British use of chemical warfare in the Second (April, 1917) and Third (October-November, 1917) Battles of Gaza, the Ottoman response, and the reasons why this aspect of the Palestine Campaign have been disregarded in the historiography.

WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION: GERMANY’S V-WEAPONS

Biddle, Tami Davis, **“On the Crest of Fear: V-Weapons, the Battle of the Bulge, and the Last Stages of World War II in Europe.”** Vol.83, No.1 (January, 2019), pp.157-194. Puts forward a causal relationship between Germany’s introduction of the use of the ‘V’ weapons, the impact of Germany’s Ardennes offensive on the Allied High Command, the Allied manpower crisis, and the acceleration of the Strategic Bombing Campaign during the last months of the war.

WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION: NUCLEAR WEAPONS

- Bacevich, A.J. **“The Paradox of Professionalism: Eisenhower, Ridgway, and the Challenge to Civilian Control, 1953-1955.”** Vol.61, No.2 (April, 1997), pp.303-333. By focusing on the U.S. Army’s efforts to undermine President Eisenhower’s (1953-1961) policy of massive nuclear retaliation, this article attempts to depict the actual terms of the civil-military relationship within the innermost circles of the U.S. government to determine the realities and limits of civilian control of the armed forces.
- Bernstein, Barton J. **“Truman and the A-Bomb: Targeting Noncombatants, Using the Bomb, and His Defending the ‘Decision’.”** Vol.62, No.3 (July, 1998), pp.547-570. Focuses on the 1996 publication *Harry S. Truman and the Bomb: A Documentary History*. Edited and with commentary by Robert Ferrell.
- Bernstein, Barton J. **“Review Essay: The Making of the Atomic Admiral: ‘Deak’ Parsons and Modernizing the U.S. Navy.”** Vol.63, No.2 (April, 1999), pp.415-426. William Sterling Parsons (1901-1953) was an ordnance expert who participated in the Manhattan project and was involved in post-war nuclear tests.
- Bernstein, Barton J. **“Reconsidering the ‘Atomic General’: Leslie R. Groves.”** Vol.67, No.3 (July, 2003), pp.883-920. A critical review of the influential published works, the substantial archival sources, and an attempt to separate fact from fiction regarding specific controversial issues.
- Settle, Frank; Whaley, Tom and Blackmer, Elizabeth, **“Alsos Digital Library for Nuclear Issues.”** Vol.67, No.3 (July, 2003), pp.921-923.
- Regnault, Jean-Marc, **“France’s Search for Nuclear Test Sites, 1957-1963.”** Vol.67, No.4 (October, 2003), pp.1223-1248. Reckons with the consequences for French Polynesia and New Caledonia of the mother country’s search for an alternative to the Sahara Desert in Algeria as a nuclear test site.
- Young, Ken, **“No Blank Cheque: Anglo-American (Mis)Understandings and the Use of the English Airbases.”** Vol.71, No.4 (October, 2007), pp.1133-1167. Deals with the diplomatic, political, and military issues surrounding the deployment of U.S. nuclear-capable strategic bombers to bases in Great Britain following the Berlin crisis of 1948.
- Young, Ken, **“Special Weapon, Special Relationship: The Atomic Bomb Comes to Britain.”** Vol.77, No.2 (April, 2013), pp.569-598. Beginning in 1950, the United States Air Force based strategic bombers with atomic bombs in East Anglia, England.
- Eames, Anthony, **“The Trident Sales Agreement and Cold War Diplomacy.”** Vol.81, No.1 (January, 2017), pp.163-186. The ‘Special Relationship’ was bolstered by the sale of U.S.

Trident submarine-launched ballistic missile technology to Great Britain in 1982.

Xiaoming Zhang, **“High-Altitude Duel: The C.I.A.’s U-2 Spy Plane Overflights and China’s Air Defense Force, 1961-1968.”** Vol.86, No.1 (January, 2022), pp.132-159. Charts the overflights of the People’s Republic of China during the 1960s by Chinese Nationalist pilots operating out of Taiwan with the goal of monitoring the P.R.C.’s nuclear weapons program.

WEIGLEY, RUSSELL F. (1930-2004)

Linn, Brian M. and Weigley, Russell F. **“*The American Way of War Revisited.*”** Vol.66, No.2 (April, 2002), pp.501-533. The author challenges some of the conclusions in Dr. Weigley’s (1930-2004) classic study of the manner in which the United States Army has conducted warfare through the length of its history.

WELLES, GIDEON (1802-78)

Weddle, Kevin J. **“The Fall of Satan’s Kingdom: Civil-Military Relations and the Union Navy’s Attack on Charleston, April 1863.”** Vol.75, No.2 (April, 2011), pp.411-439. Describes the conflict between Rear Admiral Samuel Francis Du Pont (1803-1865) and the members of Lincoln’s administration, Secretary of the Navy Gideon Welles (1802-1878) and his assistant, Gustavus Fox (1821-1883).

WELLESLEY, ARTHUR, 1ST DUKE OF WELLINGTON (1762-1852)

Bland, Larry I.; Marshall, George C. and the Duke of Wellington, **“Document of Note: Wellington Instructs the Yanks.”** Vol.63, No.2 (April, 1999), pp.427-428.

Davies, Huw J. **“Diplomats as Spymasters: A Case Study of the Peninsular War, 1809-1813.”** Vol.76, No.1 (January, 2012), pp.37-68. The work of the Duke of Wellington’s (1769-1852) intelligence network, particularly during 1812, compared with examples from the Crimean War, 1853-56, and World War I, 1914-18.

Arnold, James R. **“Winfield Scott Makes a Name for Himself.”** Vol.76, No.4 (October, 2012), pp.1183-1185. General Winfield Scott (1786-1866) first came to public notice during the War of 1812, during which he demonstrated a talent for training troops, but did the Duke of Wellington (1769-1852) ever actually say “Scott is lost” when commenting on Scott’s Mexico City Campaign (1847).

Rodriguez, Manuel Santirso, **“Under the Uniform: Tyrants and Praetorians in the Aftermath**

of the Revolution (1829-1854)." Vol.83, No.2 (April, 2019), pp.379-407. Weighs the parallels and differences in the lives and careers of Nicholas Jean-de-Dieu Soult of France (1769-1851), Arthur Wellesley, the Duke of Wellington of Great Britain (1769-1852), Baldomero Espartero of Spain (1793-1879), and Andrew Jackson of the United States (1767-1845).

WESTMORELAND, WILLIAM C. (1914-2004)

Carland, John M. **"Winning the Vietnam War: Westmoreland's Approach in Two Documents."** Vol.68, No.2 (April, 2004), pp.553-574.

Birtle, Andrew J. **"PROVN, Westmoreland, and the Historians: A Reappraisal."** Vol.72, No.4 (October, 2008), pp.1213-1247. A reassessment of the U.S. Army report, nicknamed PROVN, that, in the past, had been mined for information with which to criticize General William C. Westmoreland (1914-2004) and praise his successor as commander of U.S. forces in South Vietnam, General Creighton Abrams (1914-1974).

WHITEHEAD, ENNIS (1895-1964)

Meilinger, Phillip S. **"Historiographical Essay: U.S. Air Force Leaders: A Biographical Tour."** Vol.62, No.4 (October, 1998), pp.833-870.

WISCONSIN, U.S.A.

Frank, Joseph Allan and Duteau, Barbara, **"Measuring the Political Articulatness of United States Civil War Soldiers: The Wisconsin Militia."** Vol.64, No.1 (January, 2000), pp.53-77.

WILSON, WOODROW (1856-1924)

Peifer, Douglas, **"The Sinking of the *Lusitania*, Wilson's Response, and Paths Not Taken: Historical Revisionism, the Nye Committee, and the Ghost of William Jennings Bryan."** Vol.79, No.4 (October, 2015), pp.1025-1045. Assesses the way that the impact of the revisionist literature of the interwar period on the Neutrality Acts of the mid-1930s demonstrates how 'history's lessons' without context can mislead rather than inform.

Beckstrand, Alex, **"Woodrow Wilson and the Struggle of Civil-Military Relations during the Punitive Expedition of 1916-1917."** Vol.86, No.2 (April, 2022), pp.372-398. Argues that President Woodrow Wilson's (1913-1921) decision to defer to his military commanders, Major General Frederick Funston (1865-1917) and Brigadier General John J. Pershing (1860-1948),

was the cause of the failure to achieve the goals of the Punitive Expedition.

WORLD WAR I (1914-18)

Roberts, Priscilla, **“Tasker H. Bliss and the Evolution of Allied Unified Command, 1918: A Note on Old Battles Revisited.”** Vol.65, No.3 (July, 2001), pp.671-695.

Vandervort, Bruce, **“Review Essay: The Thin Black Line of Heroes.”** Vol.65, No.4 (October, 2001), pp.1067-1073. Recent work on European Colonial and, especially, African troops, 1700-1964.

Greenhalgh, Elizabeth, **“Myth and memory: Sir Douglas Haig and the Imposition of Allied Unified Command in March, 1918.”** Vol.68, No.3 (July, 2004), pp.771-820. Debunks Field Marshal Haig’s (1861-1928) claim that he deserves credit for Chief of the French General Staff, Ferdinand Foch’s (1851-1929), appointment as Allied Supreme Commander.

Black, Jeremy, **“Review Essay: War Stories.”** Vol.69, No.3 (July, 2005), pp.827-832. The author critiques a pair of books by John Mosier that purport to address myths about the World Wars.

Liaropoulos, Andrew N. **“Revolutions in Warfare: Theoretical Paradigms and Historical Evidence: The Napoleonic and First World War Revolutions in Military Affairs.”** Vol.70, No.2 (April, 2006), pp.363-384.

Strachan, Hew, **“The 2010 George C. Marshall Lecture in Military History: Clausewitz and the First World War.”** Vol.75, No.2 (April, 2011), pp.367-391. How the belligerents interpreted the writings of Carl von Clausewitz (1780-1831) during and in the immediate aftermath of World War I.

Davies, Huw J. **“Diplomats as Spymasters: A Case Study of the Peninsular War, 1809-1813.”** Vol.76, No.1 (January, 2012), pp.37-68. The work of the Duke of Wellington’s (1769-1852) intelligence network, particularly during 1812, compared with examples from the Crimean War, 1853-56, and World War I, 1914-18.

Bacevich, Andrew J. **“The Revisionist Imperative: Rethinking Twentieth Century Wars.”** Vol.76, No.2 (April, 2012), pp.333-342. Insists that historians need to replace the familiar and morally reassuring story of a Short Twentieth Century with a less familiar and morally ambiguous story of a still unfolding Long Twentieth Century.

Anon. **“Forward: In Commemoration of the First World War.”** Vol.79, No.4 (October, 2015), pp.925-928.

Greenhalgh, Elizabeth. **“General Ferdinand Foch and Unified Allied Command in 1918.”**

Vol.79, No.4 (October, 2015), pp.997-1023. Examines the actions and decisions of General Foch (1851-1929), including four during the German Spring Offensives, two during the Allied counteroffensive, and one during the armistice negotiations.

Vandervort, Bruce, **“Review Essay: African Military History Comes of Age.”** Vol.81, No.1 (January, 2017), pp.205-208. A look at two significant works on the military history of the continent, one an encyclopedia of colonial conflicts, the other a three-volume narrative account of conflict, edited and written by Timothy J. Stapleton, respectively.

Siotto, Andrea, **“Mapping the First World War: The Empowering Development of Mapmaking during the First World War in the British Army.”** Vol.82, No.1 (January, 2018), pp.45-66.

Phillips, Gervase, **“Technology, ‘Machine Age’ Warfare, and the Military Use of Dogs, 1880-1918.”** Vol.82, No.1 (January, 2018), pp.67-94. The establishment of permanent, regular military dog units in 1880 reflects the overlooked fact that, during modern ‘machine age’ warfare, there remained a widespread reliance on animals.

WORLD WAR I (1914-18) arranged by theater of operations - THE WAR AT SEA

Overlack, Peter, **“The Force of Circumstances: Graf Spee’s Options for the East Asian Cruiser Squadron in 1914.”** Vol.60, No.4 (October, 1996), pp.657-682. Investigates how the denial of coaling stations by both Japan’s decision to join the Entente Powers and the actions of Australia and New Zealand severely constricted the choices available to Vice-Admiral Maximilian Reichsgraf von Spee (1861-1914).

Lambert, Nicholas A. **“‘Our Bloody Ships’ or ‘Our Bloody System’? Jutland and the Loss of the Battle Cruisers, 1916.”** Vol.62, No.1 (January, 1998), pp.29-55. Speculates that an emphasis on rapid fire led gunnery personnel to stockpile far more shells in their turrets than the regulated maximum of eight projectiles, resulting in catastrophic explosions when German shells found their mark.

Kelly, Patrick J. **“Strategy, Tactics, and Turf Wars: Tirpitz and the *Oberkommando der Marine*, 1892-1895.”** Vol.66, No.4 (October, 2002), pp.1033-1060. Relies on previously ignored archival material to reexamine the development of Grand Admiral Alfred von Tirpitz’s (1849-1930) strategic and tactical thought, including some significant contradictions.

Sumida, Jon Tetsuro, **“A Matter of Timing: The Royal Navy and the Tactics of Decisive Battle, 1912-1916.”** Vol.67, No.1 (January, 2003), pp.85-136. Advances the explanation that the Admiralty’s adoption of a secret tactical system in 1912 interfered with the development of equipment and methods suitable for alternate forms of battle fleet action, with consequences for the Battle of Jutland.

Karau, Mark, **“Twisting the Dragon’s Tail: The Zeebrugge and Ostend Raids of 1918.”** Vol.67, No.2 (April, 2003), pp.455-481.

Steffen, Dirk, **“The Holtzendorff Memorandum of 22 December, 1916, and Germany’s Declaration of Unrestricted U-Boat Warfare.”** Vol.68, No.1 (January, 2004), pp.215-224. Examines how the Chief of the Imperial German Navy’s Admiralty Staff, Henning von Holtzendorff (1853-1919), successfully argued that Germany could risk provoking the United States entering the war in return for starving Great Britain into submission.

Lambert, Nicholas A. **“Strategic Command and Control for Maneuver Warfare: Creation of the Royal Navy’s ‘War Room’ System, 1905-1915.”** Vol.69, No.2 (April, 2005), pp.361-410.

Speelman, Patrick J. **“Review Essay: The Logistics of British Naval Supremacy in the Age of Sail.”** Vol.77, No.2 (April, 2013), pp.667-670. Consists of three recent books, two covering systems of supply during the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars, 1793-1815, and a third concerning medical care from 1805 to 1916.

Morgan-Owen, David, **“War as it Might Have Been: British Sea Power and the First World War.”** Vol.83, No.4 (October, 2019), pp.1095-1131. Argues that because of shortcomings in Britain’s strategic decision-making apparatus, the alternatives to the attrition on the Western Front offered by British Sea Power never received due consideration.

Dunley, Richard, **“Operation Q: Churchill and Fisher’s Invasion of Germany, 1915?”** Vol.86, No.3 (July, 2022), pp.612-641. Reveals the pursuit of a naval strategy by First Lord of the Admiralty, Winston Churchill (1874-1965), and Admiral of the Fleet, John Arbuthnot Fisher (1841-1920) that came withing hours of execution in May, 1915, but was never acted upon.

WORLD WAR I (1914-18) arranged by theater of operations - THE WESTERN FRONT

Cook, Tim, **“Creating the Faith: The Canadian Gas Services in the First World War.”** Vol.62, No.4 (October, 1998), pp.755-786. The Canadian forces developed a very efficient organization to instruct their troops in how to protect themselves from Chemical weapons.

Gardner, Nikolas, **“Command and Control in the ‘Great Retreat of 1914: The Disintegration of the British Cavalry Division.”** Vol.63, No.1 (January, 1999), pp.29-54. Suggests that the lack of experience in operating as a division, the division’s unwieldy size, the inefficiency of its commander and staff, and the independent mindset of its brigade commanders prevented it from operating effectively.

Palazzo, Albert P. **“The British Army’s Counter-Battery Staff Office and Control of the Enemy in World War I.”** Vol.63, No.1 (January, 1999), pp.55-74. Sets forth the argument

that the critical turning point for the artillery occurred during the winter of 1916-1917, when, drawing upon the lessons of the Battle of the Somme, a corps-level Counter-Battery Staff Office was created.

Greenhalgh, Elizabeth, “**‘Parade Ground Soldiers’: French Army Assessments of the British on the Somme in 1916.**” Vol.63, No.2 (April, 1999), pp.283-312. Assesses the attitudes among the *Poilus* towards their British counterparts in a battle in which roughly equal numbers of French and British troops fought alongside each other.

Nenninger, Timothy K. “**‘Unsystematic as a Mode of Command’: Commanders and the Process of Command in the American Expeditionary Forces, 1917-1918.**” Vol.64, No.3 (July, 2000), pp.739-768. Inquires into how the knowledge, skills, and preparations of A.E.F. commanders and staff officers and their interactions with one another produced a distinctly American process of command.

Nelson, David T. and Cole, Richard G. “**Memoirs: Behind German Lines in 1915: The Letters Home of David T. Nelson.**” Vol.65, No.4 (October, 2001), pp.1053-1060. Nelson, who was from Decorah, Iowa, was a Rhodes Scholar at Oxford when the war broke out. He worked for the Commission for Relief in German occupied Belgium and, later in 1916, as a driver for the American Field Ambulance Corps.

Marble, Sanders, “**Document of Note: General Haig Dismisses Attritional Warfare, January 1916.**” Vol.65, No.4 (October, 2001), pp.1061-1065.

Doughty, Robert A. “**French Strategy in 1914: Joffre’s Own.**” Vol.67, No.2 (April, 2003), pp.427-454.

Holmes, Terence M. “**‘One Throw of the Gambler’s Dice’: A Comment on Holger Herwig’s View of the Schlieffen Plan.**” Vol.67, No.2 (April, 2003), pp.513-516.

Cook, Tim, “**The Politics of Surrender: Canadian Soldiers and the Killing of Prisoners in the Great War.**” Vol.70, No.3 (July, 2006), pp.637-665.

Lloyd, Nick, “**‘With Faith and without Fear’: Sir Douglas Haig’s Command of First Army during 1915.**” Vol.71, No.4 (October, 2007), pp.1051-1076. Shines a light on the neglected performance of Sir Douglas Haig (1861-1928) as commander of the B.E.F.’s First Army during 1915.

Prete, Roy A. “**Joffre and the Origins of the Somme: A Study in Allied Military Planning.**” Vol.73, No.2 (April, 2009), pp.417-448.

Foley, Robert T. “**Learning War’s Lessons: The German Army and the Battle of the Somme**

1916.” Vol.75, No.2 (April, 2011), pp.471-504. Over the course of the Battle of the Somme, the Germans were forced by superior Anglo-French weaponry and tactics to improvise a new defensive tactical doctrine, the evolution of which is examined through the study of German ‘lessons-learned’ reports which display intellectual flexibility.

Krause, Jonathan, **“The French Battle for Vimy Ridge, Spring 1915.”** Vol.77, No.1 (January, 2013), pp.91-113. Analyzes the early French efforts to solve the challenge of the trench stalemate.

Doughty, Robert A. **“Papa’ Joffre and the Great War.”** Vol.79, No.4 (October, 2015), pp.959-979. Asks whether General Joseph Joffre’s (1852-1931) achievements are outweighed by his failures.

Moore, Andrew, **“Monuments Men and Martyred Towns: *The Arras Belfry* by Fernand Sabatté.”** Vol.79, No.4 (October, 2015), pp.1047-1057. Sabatté (1874-1940) served as a French officer in charge of evacuating artworks from Medieval churches and town halls that were under the threat of destruction as well as painting an example of the ‘martyred towns’ genre.

Westerman, William, **“The Real Controller of the Battle: The Importance of Studying Tactical Battalion Command – A Case Study.”** Vol.81, No.4 (October, 2017), pp.1007-1038. Offers the experience of the 22nd Australian Infantry Battalion during the 1918 Hundred Days Campaign as an example of decentralized command and control.

De Meneses, Filipe Rineiro, **“ ‘Not only Useless, but Dangerous?’ The Portuguese Expeditionary Corps in France in the Aftermath of the Battle of La Lys, 9 April 1918.”** Vol.82, No.4 (October, 2018), pp.1149-1174. Conflict between the wishes of the new President of Portugal, Sidónio Pais (1872-1918), the British High Command, and the soldiers and officers of the Portuguese Expeditionary Corps over the question of whether it should return to frontline duty.

Goldman, David I. **“ ‘Charlie’ Chaplains in the Great War: Chaplains’ Experiences in the U.S. Army, 1917-1919.”** Vol.84, No.2 (April, 2020), pp.395-426. Due to budget cuts, the section of the U.S. Army’s official history of participation in world War I concerning the service of Chaplains was never completed. Nevertheless, the material for such a section in the form of letters, photos, and documents has survived and provides a largely overlooked source for the United States involvement in the Great War.

Dykstra, Bodie D. **“ ‘To Dig and Burrow like Rabbits’: British Field Fortifications at the Battle of the Aisne, September and October 1914.”** Vol.84, No.3 (July, 2020), pp.747-773.

Blazich, Frank A. **“Notre Cher Ami: The Enduring Myth and Memory of a Humble Pigeon.”** Vol.85, No.3 (July, 2021), pp.646-677. The homing pigeon Cher Ami survived severe wounds transporting messages, but the question of whether or not it was the pigeon that helped save

the 'Lost Battalion' of the American Expeditionary Force is explored in this article.

WORLD WAR I (1914-18) arranged by theater of operations – THE EASTERN FRONT

Phillips, Gervase, **"Scapegoat Arm: Twentieth-Century Cavalry in Anglophone Historiography."** Vol.71, No.1 (January, 2007), pp.37-74. Too often used as a scapegoat for failures in war and an obstacle to modernization in peacetime, this article reassesses the capabilities of early twentieth-century soldiers, with a consideration of the military history of Eastern Europe, presenting a more positive interpretation of role of cavalry in modern warfare.

**WORLD WAR I (1914-18) arranged by theater of operations –
THE GALLIPOLI CAMPAIGN**

Travers, Tim, **"Liman von Sanders, the Capture of Lieutenant Palmer, and Ottoman Anticipation of the Allied Landings at Gallipoli on 25 April 1915."** Vol.65, No.4 (October, 2001), pp.965-979. Shines a light on the expectations of the Turks for a possible landing on the Gallipoli Peninsula and, in particular, the neglected issue of the impact of information from a captured British intelligence officer shortly before the actual landing.

Erickson, Edward J. **"Strength against Weakness: Ottoman Military Effectiveness at Gallipoli, 1915."** Vol.65, No.4 (October, 2001), pp.981-1011. In contrast to most studies, the author concentrates on Turkish preparations and performance, showing that the peninsula was heavily fortified and defended by the Empire's finest divisions.

Celik, Birten and Travers, Tim, **"'Not One of Them Ever came Back': What Happened to the 1/5 Norfolk Battalion on 12 August 1915 at Gallipoli?"** Vol.66, No.2 (April, 2002), pp.389-406.

WORLD WAR I (1914-18) arranged by theater of operations – THE BALKANS

DiNardo, Richard L. **"The Limits of Technology: The Invasion of Serbia, 1915."** Vol.79, No.4 (October, 2015), pp.981-995. By focusing on the different forms of technology employed by the invading forces of the Central Powers, the author explains how they benefitted the invaders, but also had their limitations.

**WORLD WAR I (1914-18) arranged by theater of operations –
THE AUSTRO-ITALIAN FRONT**

Ungari, Andrea, **"The Official Inquiry into the Italian Defeat at the Battle of Caporetto (October 1917)."** Vol.76, No.3 (July, 2012), pp.695-726. Addresses the question of why the general officer most responsible for the catastrophe not only managed to evade being

charged for his failures but instead ended up as the Chief of Staff of the Italian Army.

WORLD WAR I (1914-18) arranged by theater of operations – THE MIDDLE EAST

Bou, Jean, “**Cavalry, Firepower, and Swords: The Australian Light Horse and the Tactical Lessons of Cavalry Operations in Palestine, 1916-1918.**” Vol.71, No.1 (January, 2007), pp.99-125. Contrary to the traditions of the Australian mounted service, by the end of the Campaign in Palestine more than half of the Australian Light Horse were armed with both rifles and swords, relying on both fire and modern shock tactics.

Sheffy, Yigal, “**Chemical Warfare and the Palestine Campaign, 1916-1918.**” Vol.73, No.3 (July, 2009), pp.803-844. Brings light to the British use of chemical warfare in the Second (April, 1917) and Third (October-November, 1917) Battles of Gaza, the Ottoman response, and the reasons why this aspect of the Palestine Campaign have been disregarded in the historiography.

Hall, Brian N. “**Technological Adaptation in Global Conflict: The British Army and Communications beyond the Western Front, 1914-1918.**” Vol.78, No.1 (January, 2014), pp.37-71.

WORLD WAR I (1914-18) arranged alphabetically by country - AUSTRALIA

Bou, Jean, “**Cavalry, Firepower, and Swords: The Australian Light Horse and the Tactical Lessons of Cavalry Operations in Palestine, 1916-1918.**” Vol.71, No.1 (January, 2007), pp.99-125. Contrary to the traditions of the Australian mounted service, by the end of the Campaign in Palestine more than half of the Australian Light Horse were armed with both rifles and swords, relying on both fire and modern shock tactics.

Westerman, William, “**The Real Controller of the Battle: The Importance of Studying Tactical Battalion Command – A Case Study.**” Vol.81, No.4 (October, 2017), pp.1007-1038. Offers the experience of the 22nd Australian Infantry Battalion during the 1918 Hundred Days Campaign as an example of decentralized command and control.

WORLD WAR I (1914-18) arranged alphabetically by country - CANADA

Cook, Tim, “**Creating the Faith: The Canadian Gas Services in the First World War.**” Vol.62, No.4 (October, 1998), pp.755-786. The Canadian forces developed a very efficient organization to instruct their troops in how to protect themselves from Chemical weapons.

Cook, Tim, “**The Politics of Surrender: Canadian Soldiers and the Killing of Prisoners in the Great War.**” Vol.70, No.3 (July, 2006), pp.637-665.

Cook, Tim, “**Grave Beliefs: Stories of the Supernatural and the Uncanny among Canada’s**

Great War Trench Soldiers.” Vol.77, No.2 (April, 2013), pp.521-542.

Delaney, Douglas E. **“Mentoring the Canadian Corps: Imperial Officers and the Canadian Expeditionary Force, 1914-1918.”** Vol.77, No.3 (July, 2013), pp.931-953.

WORLD WAR I (1914-18) arranged alphabetically by country - CHINA

Xu Guoqi, **“The Great War and China’s Military Expedition Plan.”** Vol.72, No.1 (January, 2008), pp.105-140. The article seeks to understand why China tried so hard to participate in the war, why China’s plans to raise an expeditionary force went unfulfilled, and what role China played in the First World War.

WORLD WAR I (1914-18) arranged alphabetically by country –
ENGLAND / GREAT BRITAIN

Lambert, Nicholas A. **“ ‘Our Bloody Ships’ or ‘Our Bloody System’? Jutland and the Loss of the Battle Cruisers, 1916.”** Vol.62, No.1 (January, 1998), pp.29-55. Speculates that an emphasis on rapid fire led gunnery personnel to stockpile far more shells in their turrets than the regulated maximum of eight projectiles, resulting in catastrophic explosions when German shells found their mark.

Gardner, Nikolas, **“Command and Control in the ‘Great Retreat of 1914: The Disintegration of the British Cavalry Division.”** Vol.63, No.1 (January, 1999), pp.29-54. Suggests that the lack of experience in operating as a division, the division’s unwieldy size, the inefficiency of its commander and staff, and the independent mindset of its brigade commanders prevented it from operating effectively.

Palazzo, Albert P. **“The British Army’s Counter-Battery Staff Office and Control of the Enemy in World War I.”** Vol.63, No.1 (January, 1999), pp.55-74. Sets forth the argument that the critical turning point for the artillery occurred during the winter of 1916-1917, when, drawing upon the lessons of the Battle of the Somme, a corps-level Counter-Battery Staff Office was created.

Greenhalgh, Elizabeth, **“ ‘Parade Ground Soldiers’: French Army Assessments of the British on the Somme in 1916.”** Vol.63, No.2 (April, 1999), pp.283-312. Assesses the attitudes among the *Poilus* towards their British counterparts in a battle in which roughly equal numbers of French and British troops fought alongside each other.

Marble, Sanders, **“Document of Note: General Haig Dismisses Attritional Warfare, January 1916.”** Vol.65, No.4 (October, 2001), pp.1061-1065.

Celik, Birten and Travers, Tim, “**‘Not One of Them Ever came Back’: What Happened to the 1/5 Norfolk Battalion on 12 August 1915 at Gallipoli?**” Vol.66, No.2 (April, 2002), pp.389-406.

Karau, Mark, “**Twisting the Dragon’s Tail: The Zeebrugge and Ostend Raids of 1918.**” Vol.67, No.2 (April, 2003), pp.455-481.

Greenhalgh, Elizabeth, “**Myth and memory: Sir Douglas Haig and the Imposition of Allied Unified Command in March, 1918.**” Vol.68, No.3 (July, 2004), pp.771-820. Debunks Field Marshal Haig’s (1861-1928) claim that he deserves credit for Chief of the French General Staff, Ferdinand Foch’s (1851-1929), appointment as Allied Supreme Commander.

Lambert, Nicholas A. “**Strategic Command and Control for Maneuver Warfare: Creation of the Royal Navy’s ‘War Room’ System, 1905-1915.**” Vol.69, No.2 (April, 2005), pp.361-410.

Lunn, Joe, “**Male Identity and Martial Codes of Honor: A Comparison of the War Memoirs of Robert Graves, Ernst Jünger, and Kande Kamara.**” Vol.69, No.3 (July, 2005), pp.713-735. The memoirs of the British officer and author, Robert Graves (1895-1985), the German soldier and author, Ernst Jünger (1895-1998), and the French Colonial soldier from West Africa, Kande Kamara.

Lloyd, Nick, “**‘With Faith and without Fear’: Sir Douglas Haig’s Command of First Army during 1915.**” Vol.71, No.4 (October, 2007), pp.1051-1076. Shines a light on the neglected performance of Sir Douglas Haig (1861-1928) as commander of the B.E.F.’s First Army during 1915.

Sheffy, Yigal, “**Chemical Warfare and the Palestine Campaign, 1916-1918.**” Vol.73, No.3 (July, 2009), pp.803-844. Brings light to the British use of chemical warfare in the Second (April, 1917) and Third (October-November, 1917) Battles of Gaza, the Ottoman response, and the reasons why this aspect of the Palestine Campaign have been disregarded in the historiography.

Speelman, Patrick J. “**Review Essay: The Logistics of British Naval Supremacy in the Age of Sail.**” Vol.77, No.2 (April, 2013), pp.667-670. Consists of three recent books, two covering systems of supply during the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars, 1793-1815, and a third concerning medical care from 1805 to 1916.

Hall, Brian N. “**Technological Adaptation in Global Conflict: The British Army and Communications beyond the Western Front, 1914-1918.**” Vol.78, No.1 (January, 2014), pp.37-71.

Burns, Robert G.H. “**British Folk Songs of the Great War – Then and Now.**” Vol.79, No.4 (October, 2015), pp.1059-1071.

Nordlund, Alexander, “**‘Done My Bit’: British Soldiers, the 1918 Armistice, and Understanding the First World War.**” Vol.81, No.2 (April, 2017), pp.425-446. Contrasts British soldiers’ reactions to the Armistice and their war experience with their later reflections.

Siotto, Andrea, “**Mapping the First World War: The Empowering Development of Mapmaking during the First World War in the British Army.**” Vol.82, No.1 (January, 2018), pp.45-66.

Stice, Elizabeth, “**Men on the Margins: Representations of Colonial Troops in British and French Trench Newspapers of the Great War.**” Vol.83, No.2 (April, 2019), pp.435-454. Ascertains how, through the contents of trench newspapers, the war provided a new context for evaluating empires and their peoples and questioning existing imperial culture.

Morgan-Owen, David, “**War as it Might Have Been: British Sea Power and the First World War.**” Vol.83, No.4 (October, 2019), pp.1095-1131. Argues that because of shortcomings in Britain’s strategic decision-making apparatus, the alternatives to the attrition on the Western Front offered by British Sea Power never received due consideration.

Dykstra, Bodie D. “**‘To Dig and Burrow like Rabbits’: British Field Fortifications at the Battle of the Aisne, September and October 1914.**” Vol.84, No.3 (July, 2020), pp.747-773.

Bullock, Mike; Lyons, Laurence, and Judkins, Philip, “**A Resolution of the Debate about British Wireless in World War I.**” Vol.84, No.4 (October, 2020), pp.1079-1096. Visits the debate over whether, as Dr. Brian Hall contends, the British Army utilized continuous wave radio as best as this technology allowed with how it was used by their French and U.S. counterparts.

Dunley, Richard, “**Operation Q: Churchill and Fisher’s Invasion of Germany, 1915?**” Vol.86, No.3 (July, 2022), pp.612-641. Reveals the pursuit of a naval strategy by First Lord of the Admiralty, Winston Churchill (1874-1965), and Admiral of the Fleet, John Arbuthnot Fisher (1841-1920) that came withing hours of execution in May, 1915, but was never acted upon.

WORLD WAR I (1914-18) arranged alphabetically by country - FRANCE

Ripperger, Robert M. “**The Development of the French Artillery for the Offensive, 1890-1914.**” Vol.59, No.4 (October, 1995), pp.599-618. Advances the proposition that the French Army’s embrace of *offensive à l’outrance* produced strategies and tactics in which there was little room for heavy artillery.

Greenhalgh, Elizabeth, “**‘Parade Ground Soldiers’: French Army Assessments of the British on the Somme in 1916.**” Vol.63, No.2 (April, 1999), pp.283-312. Assesses the attitudes among the *Poilus* towards their British counterparts in a battle in which roughly equal numbers of French and British troops fought alongside each other.

Bruce, Robert B. **“America Embraces France: Marshal Joseph Joffre and the French Mission to the United States, April-May 1917.”** Vol.66, No.2 (April, 2002), pp.407-441. Proposes that Marshal Joffre (1852-1931), more than any other individual, established strong-Franco-American military, political, and social ties, contributing mightily to U.S. public support for a commitment of a large expeditionary force to the Western Front.

Doughty, Robert A. **“French Strategy in 1914: Joffre’s Own.”** Vol.67, No.2 (April, 2003), pp.427-454.

Lunn, Joe, **“Male Identity and Martial Codes of Honor: A Comparison of the War Memoirs of Robert Graves, Ernst Jünger, and Kande Kamara.”** Vol.69, No.3 (July, 2005), pp.713-735. The memoirs of the British officer and author, Robert Graves (1895-1985), the German soldier and author, Ernst Jünger (1895-1998), and the French Colonial soldier from West Africa, Kande Kamara.

Kiesling, Eugenia C. **“Historiographical Essays: Illuminating ‘Strange Defeat’ and ‘Pyrrhic Victory’: The Historian Robert A. Doughty.”** Vol.71, No.3 (July, 2007), pp.875-888. Reviews the English language publications on the performance of France in both World Wars and how Brigadier General (Rtd.) Robert A. Doughty (b.1943) has sought to teach the U.S. Army how to harness historical study in the interest of doctrinal development.

Prete, Roy A. **“Joffre and the Origins of the Somme: A Study in Allied Military Planning.”** Vol.73, No.2 (April, 2009), pp.417-448.

Krause, Jonathan, **“The French Battle for Vimy Ridge, Spring 1915.”** Vol.77, No.1 (January, 2013), pp.91-113. Analyzes the early French efforts to solve the challenge of the trench stalemate.

Doughty, Robert A. **“Papa’ Joffre and the Great War.”** Vol.79, No.4 (October, 2015), pp.959-979. Asks whether General Joseph Joffre’s (1852-1931) achievements are outweighed by his failures.

Greenhalgh, Elizabeth. **“General Ferdinand Foch and Unified Allied Command in 1918.”** Vol.79, No.4 (October, 2015), pp.997-1023. Examines the actions and decisions of General Foch (1851-1929), including four during the German Spring Offensives, two during the Allied counteroffensive, and one during the armistice negotiations.

Moore, Andrew, **“Monuments Men and Martyred Towns: *The Arras Belfry* by Fernand Sabatté.”** Vol.79, No.4 (October, 2015), pp.1047-1057. Sabatté (1874-1940) served as a French officer in charge of evacuating artworks from Medieval churches and town halls that were under the threat of destruction as well as painting an example of the ‘martyred towns’ genre.

Armes, Keith, **"French Intelligence on the Russian Army on the Eve of the First World War."** Vol.82, No.3 (July, 2018), pp.759-782.

Stice, Elizabeth, **"Men on the Margins: Representations of Colonial Troops in British and French Trench Newspapers of the Great War."** Vol.83, No.2 (April, 2019), pp.435-454. Ascertains how, through the contents of trench newspapers, the war provided a new context for evaluating empires and their peoples and questioning existing imperial culture.

WORLD WAR I (1914-18) arranged alphabetically by country - GERMANY

Hughes, Daniel J. **"Schlichting, Schlieffen, and the Prussian Theory of War in 1914."** Vol.59, No.2 (April, 1995), pp.257-277. Reviews the work of the controversial and influential Prussian Army theorist and critic of Alfred von Schlieffen, General Sigismund von Schlichting (1829-1909).

Hancock, Eleanor, **"Ernst Rohm and the Experience of World War I."** Vol.60, No.1 (January, 1996), pp.39-60. Inspects the role of the Great War service in the political rhetoric of the Chief of Staff of the National Socialist Sturmabteilung, including Rohm's version of his war experiences as recounted in his 1928 autobiography.

Overlack, Peter, **"The Force of Circumstances: Graf Spee's Options for the East Asian Cruiser Squadron in 1914."** Vol.60, No.4 (October, 1996), pp.657-682. Investigates how the denial of coaling stations by both Japan's decision to join the Entente Powers and the actions of Australia and New Zealand severely constricted the choices available to Vice-Admiral Maximilian Reichsgraf von Spee (1861-1914).

Showalter, Dennis, **"From Deterrence to Doomsday Machine: The German Way of War, 1890-1914."** Vol.64, No.3 (July, 2000), pp.679-710. Proposes that between 1890 and 1914 the German Army developed a siege mentality, the only solution for which was believed to be the refinement of operational capabilities, pursued at the expense of policy and strategy.

Westermann, Edward B. **"Fighting for the Heavens from the Ground: German Ground-Based Air Defenses in the Great War, 1914-1918."** Vol.65, No.3 (July, 2001), pp.641-669.

Travers, Tim, **"Liman von Sanders, the Capture of Lieutenant Palmer, and Ottoman Anticipation of the Allied Landings at Gallipoli on 25 April 1915."** Vol.65, No.4 (October, 2001), pp.965-979. Shines a light on the expectations of the Turks for a possible landing on the Gallipoli Peninsula and, in particular, the neglected issue of the impact of information from a captured British intelligence officer shortly before the actual landing.

Peifer, Douglas, **"Commemoration of Mutiny, Rebellion, and Resistance in Postwar Germany: Public memory, History, and the Formation of 'Memory Beacons'."** Vol.65, No.4 (October, 2001), pp.1013-1052. Analyzes three 'memory beacons' that have been cultivated in German

public and social memory: the naval mutinies of 1917-18, the 20th July, 1944, plot, and *Wehrmacht* deserters during World War II.

Herwig, Holger H. **“Germany and the ‘Short War’ Illusion: Toward a New Interpretation?”**

Vol.66, No.3 (July, 2002), pp.681-693. A reassessment based on newly accessed documents from the *Reichsarchiv* in the former East Germany suggest that Imperial Germany’s military leaders recognized that a conflict that they initiated might last up to two or more years.

Kelly, Patrick J. **“Strategy, Tactics, and Turf Wars: Tirpitz and the *Oberkommando der Marine*, 1892-1895.”**

Vol.66, No.4 (October, 2002), pp.1033-1060. Relies on previously ignored archival material to reexamine the development of Grand Admiral Alfred von Tirpitz’s (1849-1930) strategic and tactical thought, including some significant contradictions.

Holmes, Terence M. **“ ‘One Throw of the Gambler’s Dice’: A Comment on Holger Herwig’s View of the Schlieffen Plan.”**

Vol.67, No.2 (April, 2003), pp.513-516.

Jackman, Steven D. **“Shoulder to Shoulder: Close Control and ‘Old Prussian Drill’ in**

German Offensive Infantry Tactics, 1871-1914.” Vol.68, No.1 (January, 2004), pp.73-104.

Steffen, Dirk, **“The Holtzendorff Memorandum of 22 December, 1916, and Germany’s**

Declaration of Unrestricted U-Boat Warfare.” Vol.68, No.1 (January, 2004), pp.215-224.

Examines how the Chief of the Imperial German Navy’s Admiralty Staff, Henning von Holtzendorff (1853-1919), successfully argued that Germany could risk provoking the United States entering the war in return for starving Great Britain into submission.

Lunn, Joe, **“Male Identity and Martial Codes of Honor: A Comparison of the War Memoirs**

of Robert Graves, Ernst Jünger, and Kande Kamara.” Vol.69, No.3 (July, 2005), pp.713-735.

The memoirs of the British officer and author, Robert Graves (1895-1985), the German soldier and author, Ernst Jünger (1895-1998), and the French Colonial soldier from West Africa, Kande Kamara.

McRandle, James and Quirk, James, **“The Blood Test Revisited: A New Look at German Casualty**

Counts in World War I.” Vol.70, No.3 (July, 2006), pp.667-701. Tests Winston Churchill’s (1874-

1965) claim that the Allies generally suffered higher casualties in battle on the Western Front than their German opponents by examining the German Medical Corps’ official history.

Foley, Robert T. **“Learning War’s Lessons: The German Army and the Battle of the Somme**

1916.” Vol.75, No.2 (April, 2011), pp.471-504. Over the course of the Battle of the Somme,

the Germans were forced by superior Anglo-French weaponry and tactics to improvise a new defensive tactical doctrine, the evolution of which is examined through the study of German ‘lessons-learned’ reports which display intellectual flexibility.

Wiens, Gavin, **“Guardians and Go-betweens: Germany’s Military Plenipotentiaries during the First World War.”** Vol.86, No.2 (April, 2022), pp.344-371. Imperial German federalism was present in the German General Headquarters in the form of military plenipotentiaries from Bavaria, Saxony, and Württemberg who had some degree of responsibility over the units from these former kingdoms.

WORLD WAR I (1914-18) arranged alphabetically by country - INDIA

Tan Tai-Yong, **“An Imperial Home-Front: Punjab and the First World War.”** Vol.64, No.2 (April, 2000), pp.371-410. Looks at how, during the war, the civil administration of the State of Punjab ended up concentrating on recruiting men for the Indian Army.

WORLD WAR I (1914-18) arranged alphabetically by country – THE NETHERLANDS

Van Tuyll, Hubert, **“Memory, Myth and Forgetting: The Netherlands and the World Wars.”** Vol.80, No.4 (October, 2016), pp.1073-1081. Advances the explanation that the inaccurate myths that evolved around Netherlands neutrality during World War I had an unfortunate impact on the country’s defensive preparations leading up to World War II.

WORLD WAR I (1914-18) arranged alphabetically by country – PORTUGAL

De Meneses, Filipe Rineiro, **“ ‘Not only Useless, but Dangerous?’ The Portuguese Expeditionary Corps in France in the Aftermath of the Battle of La Lys, 9 April 1918.”** Vol.82, No.4 (October, 2018), pp.1149-1174. Conflict between the wishes of the new President of Portugal, Sidónio Pais (1872-1918), the British High Command, and the soldiers and officers of the Portuguese Expeditionary Corps over the question of whether it should return to frontline duty.

**WORLD WAR I (1914-18) arranged alphabetically by country –
RUSSIA / SOVIET UNION**

Armes, Keith, **“French Intelligence on the Russian Army on the Eve of the First World War.”** Vol.82, No.3 (July, 2018), pp.759-782.

Wright, Donald P. **“ ‘Clouds Gathering on the Horizon’: The Russian Army and the Preparation of the Imperial Population for War, 1906-1914.”** Vol.83, No.4 (October, 2019), pp.1133-1160.

WORLD WAR I (1914-18) arranged alphabetically by country - SERBIA

Lyon, James M.B. **“ ‘A Peasant Mob’: The Serbian Army on the Eve of the Great War.”** Vol.61, No.3 (July, 1997), pp.481-502. In contrast to previous studies, this article seeks to

assess the Army's preparedness on the eve of World War I based on Serbian archival sources, as opposed to Hapsburg sources.

WORLD WAR I (1914-18) arranged alphabetically by country - SPAIN

Matthews, James, **"Battling Bolshevik Bogeymen: Spain's Cordon Sanitaire against Revolution from a European Perspective, 1917-1923."** Vol.80, No.3 (July, 2016), pp.725-755. The violent social unrest experienced by Spain after 1917 represented the broader impact of the Russian Revolution that effected countries, whether they were belligerents in the Great War or neutrals like Spain.

**WORLD WAR I (1914-18) arranged alphabetically by country –
TURKEY / OTTOMAN EMPIRE**

Karpat, Kemal H. **"Review Essay: The Rise of Modern Turkey."** Vol.65, No.3 (July, 2001), pp.771-775. Covers two recent books that chronicle the transformation of the Turkish state from the late Ottoman Empire to a nation-state under Mustafa Kemal Atatürk (1881-1938).

Travers, Tim, **"Liman von Sanders, the Capture of Lieutenant Palmer, and Ottoman Anticipation of the Allied Landings at Gallipoli on 25 April 1915."** Vol.65, No.4 (October, 2001), pp.965-979. Shines a light on the expectations of the Turks for a possible landing on the Gallipoli Peninsula and, in particular, the neglected issue of the impact of information from a captured British intelligence officer shortly before the actual landing.

Erickson, Edward J. **"Strength against Weakness: Ottoman Military Effectiveness at Gallipoli, 1915."** Vol.65, No.4 (October, 2001), pp.981-1011. In contrast to most studies, the author concentrates on Turkish preparations and performance, showing that the peninsula was heavily fortified and defended by the Empire's finest divisions.

WORLD WAR I (1914-18) arranged alphabetically by country - U.S.A.

Laurie, Clayton D. **"'The Chanting of Crusaders': Captain Heber Blankenhorn and A.E.F. Combat Propaganda in World War I."** Vol.59, No.3 (July, 1995), pp.457-481.

Nenninger, Timothy K. **"'Unsystematic as a Mode of Command': Commanders and the Process of Command in the American Expeditionary Forces, 1917-1918."** Vol.64, No.3 (July, 2000), pp.739-768. Inquires into how the knowledge, skills, and preparations of A.E.F. commanders and staff officers and their interactions with one another produced a distinctly American process of command.

Roberts, Priscilla, **"Tasker H. Bliss and the Evolution of Allied Unified Command, 1918:**

A Note on Old Battles Revisited.” Vol.65, No.3 (July, 2001), pp.671-695.

Nelson, David T. and Cole, Richard G. **“Memoirs: Behind German Lines in 1915: The Letters Home of David T. Nelson.”** Vol.65, No.4 (October, 2001), pp.1053-1060. Nelson, who was from Decorah, Iowa, was a Rhodes Scholar at Oxford when the war broke out. He worked for the Commission for Relief in German occupied Belgium and, later in 1916, as a driver for the American Field Ambulance Corps.

Bruce, Robert B. **“America Embraces France: Marshal Joseph Joffre and the French Mission to the United States, April-May 1917.”** Vol.66, No.2 (April, 2002), pp.407-441. Proposes that Marshal Joffre (1852-1931), more than any other individual, established strong-Franco-American military, political, and social ties, contributing mightily to U.S. public support for a commitment of a large expeditionary force to the Western Front.

Budreau, Lisa M. **“The Politics of Remembrance: The Gold Star Mothers’ Pilgrimage and America’s Fading Memory of the Great War.”** Vol.72, No.2 (April, 2008), pp.371-411. Collectively, the Gold Star Mothers offer a multidimensional model of the ethnic, cultural, economic, and religious diversity prevalent in the United States during the interwar years.

McCall, Jack H., Jr. **“‘Amazingly Indiscreet’: The Plot to Capture Wilhelm II.”** Vol.73, No.2 (April, 2009), pp.449-469. Relates how former U.S. Senator, Col. Luke Lea (1879-1945), planned to kidnap the deposed Kaiser from his exile in the Netherlands and bring him to the Paris Peace Conference to be tried as a war criminal.

Neumann, Brian, **“‘A Question of Authority’: Reassessing the March-Pershing ‘Feud’ in the First World War.”** Vol.73, No.4 (October, 2009), pp.1117-1142. Ascertains that the conflict between John J. Pershing (1860-1940) and Peyton C. March (1864-1955) was the result of a lack of a clearly defined command structure within the U.S. Army rather than a matter of opposing personalities.

Little, Branden, **“Evacuating Wartime Europe: U.S. Policy, Strategy, and Relief Operations for Overseas American Travelers, 1914-15.”** Vol.79, No.4 (October, 2015), pp.929-958. The evacuation by the U.S. Relief Commission of 125,000 U.S. citizens stranded in Europe and its far-ranging impact on war preparedness and subsequent humanitarian operations.

Peifer, Douglas, **“The Sinking of the *Lusitania*, Wilson’s Response, and Paths Not Taken: Historical Revisionism, the Nye Committee, and the Ghost of William Jennings Bryan.”** Vol.79, No.4 (October, 2015), pp.1025-1045. Assesses the way that the impact of the revisionist literature of the interwar period on the Neutrality Acts of the mid-1930s demonstrates how ‘history’s lessons’ without context can mislead rather than inform.

Goldman, David I. **“‘Charlie’ Chaplains in the Great War: Chaplains’ Experiences in the**

U.S. Army, 1917-1919.” Vol.84, No.2 (April, 2020), pp.395-426. Due to budget cuts, the section of the U.S. Army’s official history of participation in world War I concerning the service of Chaplains was never completed. Nevertheless, the material for such a section in the form of letters, photos, and documents has survived and provides a largely overlooked source for the United States involvement in the Great War.

Lukasik, Sebastian H. **“Doughboys, the Y.M.C.A., and the Moral Economy of Sacrifice in the First World War.”** Vol.84, No.3 (July, 2020), pp.774-797. Contends that U.S. soldiers’ complaints about the Y.M.C.A. in France reflected larger concerns about the Home Front, perceptions of which shaped soldiers’ notions about the value of their sacrifices.

Spears, Timothy B. **“Stone Truths: American Memorial Landscapes of World War I.”** Vol.85, No.2 (April, 2021), pp.342-368. Assesses the accuracy of summaries and maps displaying the operations of the American Expeditionary Force etched in stone by the American Battle Monuments Commission.

Blazich, Frank A. **“Notre Cher Ami: The Enduring Myth and Memory of a Humble Pigeon.”** Vol.85, No.3 (July, 2021), pp.646-677. The homing pigeon Cher Ami survived severe wounds transporting messages, but the question of whether or not it was the pigeon that helped save the ‘Lost Battalion’ of the American Expeditionary Force is explored in this article.

Hauser, Mark T. **“‘A Violent Desire for Amusements’: Boxing, Libraries, and the Distribution and Management of Welfare During the First World War.”** Vol.86, No.4 (October, 2022), pp.883-913. Illustrates the impact of U.S. wartime recreation programs during World War I on the development of mass culture.

WORLD WAR II (1939-45)

Weinberg, Gerhard L. **“Historiographical Essay: World War II Scholarship, now and in the Future.”** Vol.61, No.2 (April, 1997), pp.335-345. Includes issues surrounding the use of the memoirs of German military leaders, the revelations of Field Marshal Lord Alanbrooke’s (1883-1963) unabridged diary, and the declassification of materials pertaining to Magic and Ultra.

Vandervort, Bruce, **“Review Essay: The Thin Black Line of Heroes.”** Vol.65, No.4 (October, 2001), pp.1067-1073. Recent work on European Colonial and, especially, African troops, 1700-1964.

Black, Jeremy, **“Review Essay: War Stories.”** Vol.69, No.3 (July, 2005), pp.827-832. The author critiques a pair of books by John Mosier that purport to address myths about the World Wars.

Weinberg, Gerhard L. **“The George C. Marshall Lecture in Military History: Some Myths of**

World War II.” Vol.75, No.3 (July, 2011), pp.701-718. Includes issues surrounding Winston Churchill, Adolf Hitler, Yamamoto Isoroku, Benito Mussolini, Franklin Roosevelt, and Josef Stalin, as well as the Yalta Conference, the Morgenthau Plan for Germany, and the ubiquity of horses in the Second World War.

Bacevich, Andrew J. **“The Revisionist Imperative: Rethinking Twentieth Century Wars.”** Vol.76, No.2 (April, 2012), pp.333-342. Insists that historians need to replace the familiar and morally reassuring story of a Short Twentieth Century with a less familiar and morally ambiguous story of a still unfolding Long Twentieth Century.

Kennedy, Paul, **“History from the Middle: The Case of the Second World War.”** Vol.74, No.1 (January, 2010), pp.35-51. Investigates the middle levels of war through examples from the middle of World War II when the chief operational objectives of the Allies were clearly established but had yet to be realized.

Vandervort, Bruce, **“Review Essay: African Military History Comes of Age.”** Vol.81, No.1 (January, 2017), pp.205-208. A look at two significant works on the military history of the continent, one an encyclopedia of colonial conflicts, the other a three-volume narrative account of conflict, edited and written by Timothy J. Stapleton, respectively.

Symonds, Craig, **“The 2017 George C. Marshall Lecture in Military History: For Want of a Nail: The Impact of Shipping on Grand Strategy in World War II.”** Vol.81, No.3 (July, 2017), pp.657-666. The remarkable success of U.S. ship building and its impact on Allied strategy.

WORLD WAR II (1939-45) arranged by campaign and / or theater of operations –
EUROPEAN CAMPAIGNS (1939-40)

Corum, James S. **“The *Luftwaffe*’s Army Support Doctrine, 1918-1941.”** Vol.59, No.1 (January, 1995), pp.53-76. Covers close air support doctrine and training, development and implementation, from the Spanish Civil War to Operation Barbarossa.

Fanning, William J., Jr. **“The Origin of the Term ‘Blitzkrieg’: Another View.”** Vol.61, No.2 (April, 1997), pp.283-302.

Thompson, David G. **“Norwegian Military Policy, 1905-1940: A Critical Appraisal and Review of the Literature.”** Vol.61, No.3 (July, 1997), pp.503-520. Questions the reliance exclusively on British and German sources for an understanding of the 1940 Norwegian campaign, insisting that without knowledge of the role of the Norwegian government and armed forces, the picture is incomplete.

Gunsburg, Jeffrey A. **“The Battle of Gembloux, 14-15 May 1940: The ‘Blitzkrieg’ Checked.”**

Vol.64, No.1 (January, 2000), pp.97-140. Uses an examination of the effectiveness of the French forces holding a defensive position at the Belgium town of Gembloux as a test case for French doctrine and performance.

Schwonek, Matthew R. **“Kazimierz Sosnkowski as Commander in Chief: The Government-in-Exile and Polish Strategy, 1932-1944.”** Vol.70, No.3 (July, 2006), pp.743-780.

Peszke, Michael Alfred, **“Historiographical Essay: An Introduction to English-Language Literature on the Polish Armed Forces in World War II.”** Vol.70, No.4 (October, 2006), pp.1029-1064.

Kiesling, Eugenia C. **“Historiographical Essays: Illuminating ‘Strange Defeat’ and ‘Pyrrhic Victory’: The Historian Robert A. Doughty.”** Vol.71, No.3 (July, 2007), pp.875-888.
Reviews the English language publications on the performance of France in both World Wars and how Brigadier General (Rtd.) Robert A. Doughty (b.1943) has sought to teach the U.S. Army how to harness historical study in the interest of doctrinal development.

Gunsburg, Jeffrey A. **“La Grand Illusion: Belgian and Dutch Strategy Facing Germany, 1919 – May, 1940.”** Vol.78, No.1 (January, 2014), pp.101-158; Vol.78, No.2 (April, 2014), pp.605-671.

WORLD WAR II (1939-45) arranged by campaign and / or theater of operations –
BATTLE OF THE ATLANTIC

Rawling, William, **“The Challenge of Modernization: The Royal Canadian Navy and Antisubmarine Weapons, 1944-1945.”** Vol.63, No.2 (April, 1999), pp.355-378.

Jones, Mark C. **“Give Credit where Credit is Due: The Dutch Role in the Development and Deployment of the Submarine Schnorkel.”** Vol.69, No.4 (October, 2005), pp.987-1012.

Bell, Christopher M. **“Air Power and the Battle of the Atlantic: Very Long Range Aircraft and the Delay in Closing the Atlantic ‘Air Gap’.”** Vol.79, No.3 (July, 2015), pp.691-719. Places the blame involving this failure to address this problem on the Royal Air Force’s Coastal Command rather than a prioritization of strategic bombing over the protection of maritime convoys.

Wilson, Evan and Schapira, Ruth, **“German Perspectives on the U-Boat War, 1939-1941.”** Vol.85, No.2 (April, 2021), pp.369-398. Probes the conflict between what the Germans’ needed to secure a quick, decisive result, and the fact that the U-Boat was designed for a war of attrition, resulting in a pessimistic outlook on the part of Germany’s Naval leaders.

WORLD WAR II (1939-45) arranged by campaign and / or theater of operations –

THE BATTLE OF BRITAIN

Fagan, Brennen; Horwood, Ian; MacKay, Niall; Price, Christopher; Richards, Ed, and Wood, A. Jamie, **“Bootstrapping the Battle of Britain.”** Vol.84, No.1 (January, 2020), pp.151-186. Using the statistical technique of weighted bootstrapping to provide a quantified assessment of the likelihood of German achievement of air superiority.

**WORLD WAR II (1939-45) arranged by campaign and / or theater of operations –
ALLIED STRATEGIC BOMBING OFFENSIVE, EUROPE**

Gentile, Gian P.; Becker, Carl; Commager, Henry S.; Gottschalk; Schmitt, Bernadotte and Malone, Dumas, **“Document of Note: General Arnold and the Historians.”** Vol.64, No.1 (January, 2000), pp.179-180. Concerning U.S. Army Air Force General ‘Hap’ Arnold’s (1886-1950) commissioning of a group of leading historians to determine whether strategic bombing could force Germany to capitulate by the spring of 1944.

Statiev, Alexander, **“Antonescu’s Eagles against Stalin’s Falcons: The Romanian Air Force, 1920-1941.”** Vol.66, No.4 (October, 2002), pp.1085-1113. Gives an account of how, though it was favored over the Army, the Air Force was assigned missions that exceeded its capacity so that it was brought to the brink of extinction.

Biddle, Tami Davis, **“Dresden 1945: Reality, History, and Memory.”** Vol.72, No.2 (April, 2008), pp.413-449. This essay is an effort to untangle a complicated and much misunderstood episode in the history of modern warfare and to make sense of it in the context in which it occurred.

Anon. **“The Air War Over Germany: Claims and Counter-claims.”** Vol.73, No.3 (July, 2009), pp.925-932.

Mears, Dwight S. **“The Catch-22 Effect: The lasting Stigma of Wartime Cowardice in the U.S. Army Air Forces.”** Vol.77, No.3 (July, 2013), pp.1025-1054. Accusations of cowardice by the air crews that landed in Switzerland and their consequences.

Gray, Peter, **“A Culture of Official Squeamishness? Britain’s Air Ministry and the Strategic Air Offensive against Germany?”** Vol.77, No.4 (October, 2013), pp.1349-1377. Endeavors to determine if the reluctance of the Air Ministry to issue a campaign medal for the R.A.F.s strategic bombing campaign was due to a discomfort with the tactics of area bombing, particularly in the wake of the attack on Dresden.

Stubbs, David, **“A Blind Spot? The Royal Air Force (R.A.F.) and Long-Range Fighters, 1936-1944.”** Vol.78, No.2 (April, 2014), pp.673-702. Explores why Bomber Command maintained its view that it would be neither appropriate nor prudent to protect its bombers with long-range

fighter escort.

Biddle, Tami Davis, **“On the Crest of Fear: V-Weapons, the Battle of the Bulge, and the Last Stages of World War II in Europe.”** Vol.83, No.1 (January, 2019), pp.157-194. Puts forward a causal relationship between Germany’s introduction of the use of the ‘V’ weapons, the impact of Germany’s Ardennes offensive on the Allied High Command, the Allied manpower crisis, and the acceleration of the Strategic Bombing Campaign during the last months of the war.

Werrell, Kenneth P. **“Friction in Action: Revisiting the U.S. Army Air Forces’ August 1943 Raid on Ploesti.”** Vol.83, No.2 (April, 2019), pp.509-540. Looks at the Ploesti Raid from the perspective of planning and outcomes, pointing to failure of flexible leadership in the face of minor unforeseen factors that had a major impact on the effectiveness of the mission.

Jacobs, W.A. **“Royal Air Force Bomber Command, the ‘Overlord Air Diversion’, and ‘Precision’ Bombing at Night.”** Vol.83, No.4 (October, 2019), pp.1161-1188. Takes account of the significant changes in procedure developed and adopted by Bomber Command and seeks to answer why further progress was limited through 1944 to 1945.

Venable, Heather, **“Rescuing a General: General Haywood ‘Possum’ Hansell and the Burden of Command.”** Vol.84, No.2 (April, 2020), pp.487-509. Reappraises the negative assessment of General Haywood Hansell’s (1903-1988) command of the U.S. 8th Air Force.

WORLD WAR II (1939-45) arranged by campaign and / or theater of operations –
THE BALKANS

Ewer, Peter, **“The British Campaign in Greece 1941: Assumptions about the Operational Art and Their Influence on Strategy.”** Vol.76, No.3 (July, 2012), pp.727-745. Inquires into the British decision to dispatch an expeditionary force to Greece and what it tells us about contemporary British Army doctrine.

Stockings, Craig and Hancock, Eleanor, **“Reconsidering the *Luftwaffe* in Greece, 1941.”** Vol.76, No.3 (July, 2012), pp.747-773. Despite its complete dominance of the Greek skies, the terror it inspired, and its almost continual operations against Allied positions, the author challenges the assumption that the *Luftwaffe* had a decisive impact on the campaign.

Kranjc, Gregor, **“Fight or Flight: Desertion, Defection, and Draft-Dodging in Occupied Slovenia, 1941-1945.”** Vol.81, No.1 (January, 2017), pp.133-162. Questions the motives for Slovenes to avoid or escape from military service for three occupying powers, Germany, Hungary, and Italy, and these powers efforts to combat draft-dodging, desertion, and defection.

Trifković, Gaj, **“The Yugoslav Partisans’ Lost Victories: Operations in Montenegro and Bosnia-**

Herzegovina, 1944-1945.” Vol.82, No.1 (January, 2018), pp.95-124. Seeks to understand why the Germans were able to extricate their XXI Mountain Corps from two consecutive attempts at encirclement during October 1944 through April 1945.

WORLD WAR II (1939-45) arranged by campaign and / or theater of operations –
THE EASTERN FRONT

Corum, James S. **“The *Luftwaffe*’s Army Support Doctrine, 1918-1941.”** Vol.59, No.1 (January, 1995), pp.53-76. Covers close air support doctrine and training, development and implementation, from the Spanish Civil War to Operation Barbarossa.

Kimball, Warren F. **“Stalingrad: A Chance for Choices.”** Vol.60, No.1 (January, 1996), pp.89-114. Delves into the significance of the Battle of Stalingrad for United States foreign policy.

Glantz, David M. **“Soviet Military Strategy during the Second Period of War (November 1942 – December 1943): A Reappraisal.”** Vol.60, No.1 (January, 1996), pp.115-150. Seeks to clarify the broader strategic context of the goals the Soviets sought, but failed, to achieve during the ‘Second Period of the Great Patriotic War.’

DiNardo, R.L. **“The Dysfunctional Coalition: The Axis Powers and the Eastern Front in World War II.”** Vol.60, No.4 (October, 1996), pp.711-730. Illustrates that German arrogance, compounded by muddled political and strategic thinking, inadequate resources, widely varying capabilities, and linguistic differences, rendered the Axis Coalition a costly failure.

Shepardson, Donald E. **“The Fall of Berlin and the Rise of a Myth.”** Vol.62, No.1 (January, 1998), pp.135-154. Refutes the notions of United States naiveté and British realism in dealing with both their German enemy and their Soviet ally in the spring of 1945.

Glantz, David M. **“Historiographical Essay: The Red Army at War, 1941-1945: Sources and Interpretations.”** Vol.62, No.3 (July, 1998), pp.595-617.

Hayward, Joel, **“Too Little, Too Late: An Analysis of Hitler’s Failure in August 1942 to Damage Soviet Oil Production.”** Vol.64, No.3 (July, 2000), pp.769-794. Claims that, had Adolf Hitler not been so fixated on Stalingrad, *Luftwaffe* assets could have been used to significantly disrupt the supply of oil to Soviet factories and forces.

Yelton, David K. **“*Ein Volk Steht Auf*: The German *Volkssturm* and Nazi Strategy, 1944-45.”** Vol.64, No.4 (October, 2000), pp.1061-1083. Explains that the *Volkssturm*, though based on flawed assumptions, was part of a coherent strategy that was intended to simultaneously fanaticize the civilian population and maximize Allied casualties beyond what their

governments were willing to bare.

Statiev, Alexander, **“Antonescu’s Eagles against Stalin’s Falcons: The Romanian Air Force, 1920-1941.”** Vol.66, No.4 (October, 2002), pp.1085-1113. Gives an account of how, though it was favored over the Army, the Air Force was assigned missions that exceeded its capacity so that it was brought to the brink of extinction.

Stolfi, Russell H.S. **“A Critique of Pure Success: Inchon Revisited, Revised, and Contrasted.”** Vol.68, No.2 (April, 2004), pp.505-525. Critiques the performance of the ground forces that were successfully landed at Inchon, proposing that a comparative example of German operations in the Baltic in 1941 suggests greater boldness would have rewarded U.S. forces.

Hill, Alexander, **“British Lend Lease Aid and the Soviet War Effort, June 1941 – June 1942.”** Vol.71, No.3 (July, 2007), pp.773-808. Measures the significance of the aid provided by Great Britain during the First Moscow Protocol to the end of June, 1942.

Glantz, Mary, **“An Officer and a Diplomat? The Ambiguous Position of Philip R. Faymonville and United States-Soviet Relations, 1941-1943.”** Vol.72, No.1 (January, 2008), pp.141-177. Appraises the role played by Colonel Philip Faymonville (1888-1962) in U.S.-Soviet relations, an officer who served as the United States’ first military attaché and as expediter of Lend-Lease Aid during the war, but who had a contentious relationship with U.S. diplomatic personnel.

Glantz, David M. **“Review Essay: Stalingrad Revisited.”** Vol.72, No.3 (July, 2008), pp.907-910.

Pennington, Reina, **“Offensive Women: Women in Combat in the Red Army in the Second World War.”** Vol.74, No.3 (July, 2010), pp.775-820. Reports on the nature and variety of women’s combat experiences.

Statiev, Alexander, **“Blocking Units in the Red Army.”** Vol.76, No.2 (April, 2012), pp.475-495. Concerning Joseph Stalin’s (1878-1953) ‘No Step Back!’ Order No.227.

Toprani, Anand, **“The First War for Oil: The Caucasus, German Strategy, and the Turning Point of the War on the Eastern Front, 1942.”** Vol.80, No.3 (July, 2016), pp.815-854.

Lak, Martijn, **“Review Essay: The Death Ride of the Panzers? Recent Historiography on the Battle of Kursk.”** Vol.82, No.3 (July, 2018), pp.909-919.

Harrison, Richard W. **“Soviet Planning for War, 1936-1941: The ‘Preventative Attack’ Thesis in Historical Context.”** Vol.83, No.3 (July, 2019), pp.769-794.

López, Miguel A. **“The Survival of *Auftragstaktik* during the Soviet Counterattack in the Battle for Moscow, December 1941 to January 1942.”** Vol.84, No.1 (January, 2020),

pp.187-212. Claims that Adolf Hitler's 16 December, 1941, *Haltbefehl* (Halt Order) did not mark the end of the Prussian-German principle of *Auftragstaktik*, that in the face of the Soviet counterattacks German field commanders did retain their command independence and conducted withdrawals regardless of the *Haltbefehl*.

Wagner, Erich, **"Ingenuity, Excess, Incompetence, and Luck: Air-Resupply Anecdotes in Military History."** Vol.84, No.2 (April, 2020), pp.427-457. Reviews six case studies from taken the Second Italo-Ethiopian War (1935-1936), the Spanish Civil War (1936-1939), the Battle of Stalingrad (1942), Operation Market Garden (1944), the Battle of the Chosin Reservoir (1950), and the Battle of Dien Bien Phu (1954).

Gilbin, Daniel F. **"Seeds of Victory: Satisfying the needs of the Red Army and the Soviet State during the Formation of the Kursk Salient, February – May 1943."** Vol.84, No.4 (October, 2020), pp.1157-1188. Reviews an example of the Soviet Army's practice of incorporating the civilian population in the rear areas near the frontlines in various forms of support, including the role of re-installed civilian government in recently liberated territory.

Rutherford, Jeff, **"Germany's Total War: Combat and Occupation around the Kursk Salient, 1943."** Vol.85, No.4 (October, 2021), pp.954-979. Examines the changing approach of three German divisions to extract resources from the population living near the frontlines.

WORLD WAR II (1939-45) arranged by campaign and / or theater of operations –
SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA

Benbow, Tim, **"'Menace' to 'Ironclad': The British Operations against Dakar (1940) and Madagascar (1942)."** Vol.75, No.3 (July, 2011), pp.769-809. Investigates why, regarding two separate British operations against Vichy French colonies in Africa, 'Menace' failed, while 'Ironclad' succeeded.

WORLD WAR II (1939-45) arranged by campaign and / or theater of operations –
MIDDLE EAST THEATER

Biddiscombe, Perry, **"The Mufti's Men: Haj Amin-al-Husayni and S.S. Parachute Expeditions to Palestine and Iraq, 1944-1945."** Vol.82, No.3 (July, 2018), pp.783-815.

WORLD WAR II (1939-45) arranged by campaign and / or theater of operations –
MEDITERRANEAN, NORTH AFRICAN, AND ITALIAN THEATERS

Jackson, Ashley, **"Supplying War: The High Commission Territories' Military-Logistical**

Contribution in the Second World War.” Vol.66, No.3 (July, 2002), pp.719-760. Assesses the mobilization of manpower from Basutoland, Bechuanaland, and Swaziland for use in logistics in the North African and Italian Campaigns.

Percy, William Alexander, **“Jim Crow and Uncle Sam: The Tuskegee Flying Units and the U.S. Army Air Forces in Europe during World War II.”** Vol.67, No.3 (July, 2003), pp.773-810. Links the success of the African American 99th Fighter Squadron and the 332nd Fighter Group with President Harry S. Truman’s decision to end segregation in the Armed Forces.

Lasterle, Philippe, **“Could Admiral Gensoul have Averted the Tragedy of Mers el-Kébir?”** Vol.67, No.3 (July, 2003), pp.835-844. Admiral Marcel-Bruno Gensoul (1880-1973) commanded the French fleet at Mers el-Kébir, Algeria, when it was bombarded by a British force commanded by Admiral James Somerville (1882-1949) on 3 July, 1940.

Bechthold, B. Michael, **“A Question of Success: Tactical Air Doctrine and Practice in North Africa, 1942-43.”** Vol.68, No.3 (July, 2004), 821-851. Reveals that the tactical doctrine of the U.S. Army Air Force was found wanting in North Africa in 1942, leading to the adoption of the proven British Eighth Army Western Desert Air Force model of ground-air cooperation.

Anselmo, Frank A. **“The Battle for Hill K-9 and the Fall of Rome, 2 June 1944.”** Vol.76, No.1 (January, 2012), pp.99-126. The author seeks to ascertain which version of the capture of Hill K-9 by the U.S. 179th Infantry Regiment is the most accurate.

Hein, David, **“Vulnerable: H.M.S. *Prince of Wales* in 1941.”** Vol.77, No.3 (July, 2013), pp.955-989. The storied career of the H.M.S. *Prince of Wales*, involving fighting the K.M.S. *Bismarck*, the first Churchill-F.D.R. summit, service in the Mediterranean, and its sinking off the coast of Malaya.

Muschamp, Amy, **“Living Under Allied Military Government in Southern Italy during the Second World War: A Case Study of the Region of Molise.”** Vol.79, No.2 (April, 2015), pp.369-386. Based on a combination of archival research at the regional capital of Campobasso and oral history.

Hammond, Richard, **“Fighting under a Different Flag: Multinational Naval Cooperation and Submarine Warfare in the Mediterranean, 1940-1944.”** Vol.80, No.2 (April, 2016), pp.447-476. In contrast to their experience in the British home theatre, the submarines in the Mediterranean operated by the exiled governments of the Free French, Greece, the Netherlands, Poland, and Yugoslavia, along with those of Italy beginning in 1943, found it difficult to cooperate with the Royal Navy, as well as each other.

Scianna, Bastian Matteo, **“Rommel Almighty? Italian Assessment of the ‘Desert Fox’ during and after the Second World War.”** Vol.82, No.1 (January, 2018), pp.125-145. The Italian view based on new primary material, including the eavesdropping by British intelligence on Italian

officers held as P.O.W.s in both Egypt and Britain.

Stubbs, David, **“Reappraising the Royal Air Force Contribution to the Defense of Crete, 1941.”** Vol.84, No.2 (April, 2020), pp.459-486. Points out that the failure of the British and Commonwealth ground troops to retain control over the airfields was not the primary reason for defeat, given that the fighter squadrons necessary for the defense of the island were not scheduled to arrive in the Mediterranean Sea in time to participate in the battle, a fact known to decision makers in London.

Marble, Sanders, **“Medical Problems in the Sicilian Campaign.”** Vol.84, No.2 (April, 2020), pp.537-540. Excerpt from the Monthly Progress Report, U.S. Army Service Forces, 31 October 1943.

WORLD WAR II (1939-45) arranged by campaign and / or theater of operations –
NORTHWESTERN EUROPE THEATER (1944-45)

Shepardson, Donald E. **“The Fall of Berlin and the Rise of a Myth.”** Vol.62, No.1 (January, 1998), pp.135-154. Refutes the notions of United States naiveté and British realism in dealing with both their German enemy and their Soviet ally in the spring of 1945.

Lewis, Adriabn R. **“The Failure of Allied Planning and Doctrine for Operation Overlord: The Case of Minefield and Obstacle Clearance.”** Vol.62, No.4 (October, 1998), pp.787-807.

Yelton, David K. **“*Ein Volk Steht Auf*: The German *Volkssturm* and Nazi Strategy, 1944-45.”** Vol.64, No.4 (October, 2000), pp.1061-1083. Explains that the *Volkssturm*, though based on flawed assumptions, was part of a coherent strategy that was intended to simultaneously fanaticize the civilian population and maximize Allied casualties beyond what their governments were willing to bare.

McCreedy, Kenneth O. **“Planning the Peace: Operation Eclipse and the Occupation of Germany.”** Vol.65, No.3 (July, 2001), pp.713-739. Indicates that Operation Eclipse, which was planned simultaneously with Overlord, had the dual goals of thoroughly eliminating Nazism in Germany

Perrun, Jody, **“Best-Laid Plans: Guy Simonds and Operation Totalize, 7-10 August 1944.”** Vol.67, No.1 (January, 2003), pp.137-173. Probes the role of airpower in Operation Totalize, which, the author claims, calls for a reassessment of Lieutenant General Simonds (1903-1974) leadership of the II Canadian Corps.

Salaita, George D. **“Embellishing Omaha Beach.”** Vol.72, No.2 (April, 2008), pp.531-534. Clarifies the misconceptions surrounding Company ‘A’, 116th Infantry Regiment, 29th

Infantry Division, a lead unit in the landing on Omaha Beach.

Milner, Marc, **“Stopping the Panzers: Reassessing the Role of 3rd Canadian Infantry Division in Normandy, 7-10 June, 1944.”** Vol.74, No.2 (April, 2010), pp.491-522. Reveals that the 3rd Canadian Infantry Division’s beachhead battles of 7-10 June against the 12th Hitler Youth Panzer Division are fundamentally misunderstood as failed breakout attempts when, in fact, they were successful defensive operations.

Buckley, John, **“Tackling the Tiger: The Development of British Armoured Doctrine for Normandy 1944.”** Vol.74, No.4 (October, 2010), pp.1161-1184. Asserts that the British Army’s loose approach to developing and imposing doctrine, despite inherent shortcomings, actually facilitated a flexibility that allowed the armoured forces to quickly and effectively modify their doctrines in the heat of battle.

Rives, Tim, **“Like Footprints in the Sand: Searching for Eisenhower’s Climactic D-Day Words.”** Vol.78, No.3 (July, 2014), pp.1057-1067.

Forrester, Charles, **“Field Marshal Montgomery’s Role in the Creation of the British 21st Army Group’s Combined Arms Doctrine for the Final Assault on Germany.”** Vol.78, No.4 (October, 2014), pp.1295-1320.

Wylie, Neville, **“Allied Special Forces and Prisoner of War Recovery Operations in Europe, 1944-1945.”** Vol.81, No.2 (April, 2017), pp.469-489. Contrary to contemporary and historical judgements, Allied plans to secure the safety of P.O.W.s in German hands were reasonable, realistic, and provided a template for similar operations in the Pacific Theater and beyond.

Biddle, Tami Davis, **“On the Crest of Fear: V-Weapons, the Battle of the Bulge, and the Last Stages of World War II in Europe.”** Vol.83, No.1 (January, 2019), pp.157-194. Puts forward a causal relationship between Germany’s introduction of the use of the ‘V’ weapons, the impact of Germany’s Ardennes offensive on the Allied High Command, the Allied manpower crisis, and the acceleration of the Strategic Bombing Campaign during the last months of the war.

Wagner, Erich, **“Ingenuity, Excess, Incompetence, and Luck: Air-Resupply Anecdotes in Military History.”** Vol.84, No.2 (April, 2020), pp.427-457. Reviews six case studies from taken the Second Italo-Ethiopian War (1935-1936), the Spanish Civil War (1936-1939), the Battle of Stalingrad (1942), Operation Market Garden (1944), the Battle of the Chosin Reservoir (1950), and the Battle of Dien Bien Phu (1954).

Lahey, R.J. **“Hitler’s ‘Intuition’, *Luftwaffe* Photoreconnaissance, and the Reinforcement of Normandy.”** Vol.86, No.1 (January, 2022), pp.77-109. Contends that it was *Luftwaffe* photoreconnaissance, rather than mere intuition, that led Hitler to significantly reinforce the forces tasked with defending the Normandy beaches.

WORLD WAR II (1939-45) arranged by campaign and / or theater of operations –
PACIFIC THEATER

Lofgren, Stephen J. (ed.) **“Diary of First Lieutenant Sugihara Kinrū: Iwo Jima, January-February 1945.”** Vol.59, No.1 (January, 1995), pp.97-134. Served in the 11th Antitank Battalion which was manned by reservists from Hiroshima and Shimane prefectures.

Meixsel, Richard B. **“Major General George Grunert, WPO-3, and the Philippine Army, 1940-1941.”** Vol.59, No.2 (April, 1995), pp.303-324. Challenges the conventional account of the initial abandonment of War Plan Orange – 3 by the Commanding General of the Philippine Department, General Grunert (1881-1971), and Philippine Army Field Marshal, Douglas MacArthur (1880-1964).

Holizimmer, Kevin C. **“Walter Krueger, Douglas MacArthur, and the Pacific War: The Wakde-Sarmi Campaign as a Case Study.”** Vol.59, No.4 (October, 1995), pp.661-685. Uses the Wakde-Sarmi operation in Northern New Guinea, 17-21 May, 1944, to demonstrate that General Krueger’s (1881-1967) performance as a commander has to be judged within the context of circumstances beyond anyone’s control.

Perras, Galen Roger, **“We have Opened the Door to Tokyo: United States Plans to Seize the Kurile Islands, 1943-1945.”** Vol.61, No.1 (January, 1997), pp.65-91. Proposals to defeat Imperial Japan by attacking the Home Islands through a campaign in the Northern Pacific, including the potential complications for U.S.-Soviet relations.

Fuquea, David C. **“Task Force One: The Wasted Assets of the United States Pacific Battleship Fleet, 1942.”** Vol.61, No.4 (October, 1997), pp.707-734. Explores the reasons behind Task Force One’s battleships languishing as a last line of defense during the first year of the war following Pearl Harbor.

Coox, Alvin D. **“Needless Fear: The Compromise of U.S. Plans to Invade Japan in 1945.”** Vol.64, No.2 (April, 2000), pp.411-437. The disappearance of top-secret material from Manila caused a great deal of concern, but post-war access to Japanese documents demonstrates that these stolen papers had no impact on defensive plans for Kyushu.

Coles, Michael, **“Ernest King and the British Pacific Fleet: The Conference at Quebec, 1944 (‘Octagon’).”** Vol.65, No.1 (January, 2001), pp.105-129. While not excluding complications from Fleet Admiral King’s (1878-1956) personality, the author insists that there were valid political, economic, and operational factors against the deployment of the British Fleet alongside the U.S. Navy in the Pacific Theater.

- Bartsch, William H. **“Operation Dovetail: Bungled Guadalcanal Rehearsal, July 1942.”** Vol.66, No.2 (April, 2002), pp.443-476. Reports on the all-but-forgotten rehearsal conducted at Koro Island in the Fijis, held ten days before the landing on Guadalcanal.
- Schwab, Stephen I. **“The Role of the Mexican Expeditionary Air Force in World War II: Late, Limited, but Symbolically Significant.”** Vol.66, No.4 (October, 2002), pp.1115-1140. Recounts the raising and service of the 201st Mexican P-47 Squadron in the Philippines beginning in May, 1945.
- Stevenson, Matthew, **“Memoirs: War’s End on Okinawa: In Search of Captain Robert Fowler.”** Vol.67, No.2 (April, 2003), pp.517-528. U.S.M.C. Captain Fowler, who was killed on Okinawa on 12 June, 1945, was a close friend of the author’s father.
- Borch, Fred L. **“Comparing Pearl Harbor and ‘9/11’: Intelligence Failure? American Unpreparedness? Military Responsibility?”** Vol.67, No.3 (July, 2003), pp.845-860.
- Hone, Trent, **“The Evolution of Fleet Tactical Doctrine in the U.S. Navy, 1922-1941.”** Vol.67, No.4 (October, 2003), pp.1107-1148. Establishes how the Navy intended to use the battleships stationed at Pearl Harbor in battle, including Admiral Husband E. Kimmel’s (1882-1968) plans for a decisive fleet engagement in the Central Pacific.
- Mann, B. David, **“Japanese Defense of Bataan, Luzon, Philippine Islands, 16 December 1944 – 4 September, 1945.”** Vol.67, No.4 (October, 2003), pp.1149-1176.
- Dingman, Roger V. **“Language at War: U.S. Marine Corps Japanese Language Officers in the Pacific.”** Vol.68, No.3 (July, 2004), pp.853-883. Analyzes the origins, training, experiences, and recollections of Caucasian Japanese language officers, including the shift from translating to facilitate life-taking to lifesaving.
- Burrell, Robert S. **“Breaking the Cycle of Iwo Jima Mythology: A Strategic Study of Operation Detachment.”** Vol.68, No.4 (October, 2004), pp.1143-1186. Questions the justification for the invasion of Iwo Jima, 19 February, 1945, explaining that the decision to invade was a matter of the competing agendas of the Navy, Army, and Army Air Force.
- Hanley, Brian and Burrell, Robert S. **“The Myth of Iwo Jima: A Rebuttal [And Response].”** Vol.69, No.3 (July, 2005), pp.801-809.
- Hadley, Gregory and Oglethorpe, James, **“Mackay’s ‘Betrayal’: Solving the Mystery of the ‘Sado Island Prisoner-of-War Massacre’.”** Vol.71, No.2 (April, 2007), pp.441-464. Conclusively demonstrates that the suppression of a supposed Japanese massacre of Allied prisoners working in a gold mine in Aikawa on Sado island in 1945 as presented in James MacKay’s 1996 book, *Betrayal in High Places*, is an intentional forgery.

Terrar, Toby, **“First Landing on Guam: The Difficulties of a Naval Aviator during the Invasion.”**

Vol.72, No.4 (October, 2008), pp.1265-1270. Gives an account of the rivalry between the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps for landing the first plane on the newly liberated island of Guam, in which the Navy pilot, Ed Terrar, won the honor on 30 July, 1944.

Hughes, Matthew, **“War without Mercy? American Armed Forces and the Deaths of Civilians during the Battle for Saipan, 1944.”** Vol.75, No.1 (January, 2011), pp.93-123.

Despite this being the first Central Pacific Island on which U.S. forces encountered large numbers of civilians, including Japanese and Korean migrants, and native Chamorro and Carolinian peoples, the military histories of the battle for Saipan generally neglect how noncombatants were treated.

McEvoy, William P. **“‘Experiences at Sea’: A Navy Doctor of War.”** Vol.75, No.4 (October, 2011), pp.1159-1182. U.S. Navy doctor serving in the Pacific from September 1944 to December 1945.

Dudley, William S. **“A Soldier, His Family, and the Impact of the Pacific War, 1942-1945.”**

Vol.80, No.1 (January, 2016), pp.187-192. A three-volume biography of Wilber Bradt of Washington State who served as a Field Artillery officer in the 43rd Infantry Division as it fought its way through the Solomons, New Guinea, and the Philippines. Based on a trove of preserved correspondence and interviews, this account is as much about his family on the home front as it is about Bradt on the frontlines.

Hone, Trent, **“Learning to Win: The Evolution of U.S. Navy Tactical Doctrine During the Guadalcanal Campaign.”** Vol.82, No.3 (July, 2018), pp.817-841.

Challenges the notion that the U.S. Navy suffered complete failure in surface night combat, contending, instead, that it was particularly skilled in integrating combat lessons and, accordingly, modifying its tactical doctrine.

Fuquea, David C. **“Advantage Japan: The Imperial Japanese Navy’s Superior High Seas Refueling Capability.”** Vol.84, No.1 (January, 2020), pp.213-235.

Addresses an understudied factor that made the Japanese victories at Pearl Harbor and beyond possible, one that at least initially, was not available to the U.S. Navy.

Reardon, Jeff T. **“Reevaluating Ghormley and Halsey at Guadalcanal.”** Vol.86, No.4 (October, 2022), pp.915-948.

Presents a reassessment of Vice Admiral Robert L. Ghormley (1883-1958) service as commander in chief of the South Pacific Area during 1942.

Bankoff, Greg, **“From the Art of Practical Sailing to the Electronic Science of Navigation: Typhoons, Seamanship, and U.S. Naval Operations in the Northwest Pacific, 1944-1945.”**

Vol.86, No.4 (October, 2022), pp.949-972. Concerned with the challenges faced by ship’s

commanders of choosing between entrusting the safety of his vessel to his own judgement based on years of practical experience at sea or relying on the new technology at a time when some of the largest armadas of warships were ever assembled in wartime conditions.

WORLD WAR II (1939-45) arranged by campaign and / or theater of operations –
AUSTRALASIA THEATER

Wilkins, Thomas S. **“Review Essay: Anatomy of a Military Disaster: The Fall of ‘Fortress Singapore’ 1942.”** Vol.73, No.1 (January, 2009), pp.221-230.

Borch, Fred L. **“ ‘In the Name of the Queen’: Military Trials of Japanese War Criminals in the Netherlands East Indies (1946-1949).”** Vol.79, No.1 (January, 2015), pp.93-125.

Jones, Mark C. **“In Need of a Home Away from Home: The Royal Netherlands Navy in Australia, 1942-1947.”** Vol.85, No.2 (April, 2021), pp.399-425. With the fall of the Netherlands’ East Indies, units of the Royal Netherlands Navy relocated to Australia, from where they continued their operations against the Japanese enemy.

WORLD WAR II (1939-45) arranged by campaign and / or theater of operations –
CHINA-BURMA-INDIA THEATER

Wilkins, Thomas S. **“Review Essay: Anatomy of a Military Disaster: The Fall of ‘Fortress Singapore’ 1942.”** Vol.73, No.1 (January, 2009), pp.221-230.

Roy, Kaushik, **“Military Loyalty in the Colonial Context: A Case Study of the Indian Army during World War II.”** Vol.73, No.2 (April, 2009), pp.497-529. Uncovers the motives for and extent of loyalty to the British colonial regime of the Indian Army troops fighting in Burma in the context of the British elite’s concerns about the loyalty of Indian soldiers.

Macri, Franco David, **“ ‘C’ Force to Hong Kong: The Price of Collective Security in China, 1941.”** Vol.77, No.1 (January, 2013), pp.141-171. Concerning the strategic and political influences on the deployment of two Canadian infantry battalions to Hong Kong in November, 1941.

Hein, David, **“Vulnerable: H.M.S. *Prince of Wales* in 1941.”** Vol.77, No.3 (July, 2013), pp.955-989. The storied career of the H.M.S. *Prince of Wales*, involving fighting the K.M.S. *Bismarck*, the first Churchill-F.D.R. summit, service in the Mediterranean, and its sinking off the coast of Malaya.

Chi Man Kwong, **“The Failure of Japanese Land-Sea Cooperation during the Second World War: Hong Kong and the South China Coast as an Example, 1942-1945.”** Vol.79, No.1 (January, 2015), pp.69-91.

Charles, Patrick J. **“Dissecting the Origins of Air-Centric Special Operations Theory.”** Vol.81, No.3 (July, 2017), pp.803-828. Seeks to find the answers to the controversy surrounding whether British or U.S. officers deserve the most credit for developing the concepts that led to Operation THURSDAY, the airlanding of a specialized force behind Japanese lines in Burma in March, 1944, to disrupt enemy infrastructure and communications.

Lim, Preston Jordan, **“Churchill’s Butchers: Mission 204’s Operations in China, 1942-1945.”** Vol.84, No.4 (October, 2020), pp.1127-1156. Whereas previous studies have focused on the mission’s record in 1942, the author examines the entire length of service of this combined British-Australian commando unit tasked with training Nationalist guerrillas, suggesting that it was more successful than previously thought.

WORLD WAR II (1939-45) arranged by campaign and / or theater of operations –
U.S. STRATEGIC BOMBING CAMPAIGN, ASIA

Bernstein, Barton J. **“Truman and the A-Bomb: Targeting Noncombatants, Using the Bomb, and His Defending the ‘Decision’.”** Vol.62, No.3 (July, 1998), pp.547-570. Focuses on the 1996 publication *Harry S. Truman and the Bomb: A Documentary History*. Edited and with commentary by Robert Ferrell.

Bernstein, Barton J. **“Review Essay: The Making of the Atomic Admiral: ‘Deak’ Parsons and Modernizing the U.S. Navy.”** Vol.63, No.2 (April, 1999), pp.415-426. William Sterling Parsons (1901-1953) was an ordnance expert who participated in the Manhattan project and was involved in post-war nuclear tests.

Gentile, Gian P. **“Shaping the Past Battlefield, ‘For the Future’: The United States Strategic Bombing Survey’s Evaluation of the American Air War against Japan.”** Vol.64, No.4 (October, 2000), pp.1085-1112. Contests the image of the Bombing Survey as an impartial primary source, demonstrating that it was shaped by particular circumstances, bias, and political factors, most notably the effort to justify an independent Air Force.

Bernstein, Barton J. **“Reconsidering the ‘Atomic General’: Leslie R. Groves.”** Vol.67, No.3 (July, 2003), pp.883-920. A critical review of the influential published works, the substantial archival sources, and an attempt to separate fact from fiction regarding specific controversial issues.

Kwan, Toh Boon, **“‘It was a thrill to see rows of B-29s going through the sky’: The Strategic Bombing of Singapore, 1944-45.”** Vol.73, No.3 (July, 2009), pp.905-924. Reports on an overlooked campaign in the U.S. strategic Air War in Asia from the perspective of U.S. bomber crews, Japanese occupation forces in Singapore, local civilians, and internees, noting that the

experiences of the latter have, in particular, been neglected.

WORLD WAR II (1939-45) arranged alphabetically by country – AUSTRALIA

Hobbins, Peter, **“Engineering the Fighter Pilot: Aviators, Anti-G suits, and Allied Air Power, 1940-53.”** Vol.84, No.1 (January, 2020), pp.115-149. Probes the failure of the Cotton Aerodynamic Anti-G suit championed by the Australian Air Force to be adopted by the British and United States Air Forces during the period marked by World War II and the Korean War.

Jones, Mark C. **“In Need of a Home Away from Home: The Royal Netherlands Navy in Australia, 1942-1947.”** Vol.85, No.2 (April, 2021), pp.399-425. With the fall of the Netherlands’ East Indies, units of the Royal Netherlands Navy relocated to Australia, from where they continued their operations against the Japanese enemy.

WORLD WAR II (1939-45) arranged alphabetically by country - BELGIUM

Gunsburg, Jeffrey A. **“La Grand Illusion: Belgian and Dutch Strategy Facing Germany, 1919 – May, 1940.”** Vol.78, No.1 (January, 2014), pp.101-158; Vol.78, No.2 (April, 2014), pp.605-671.

WORLD WAR II (1939-45) arranged alphabetically by country – CANADA

Dickson, Paul D. **“The Politics of Army Expansion: General H.D.G. Crerar and the Creation of the First Canadian Army, 1940-41.”** Vol.60, No.2 (April, 1996), pp.271-298. Explains that General Henry Duncan Graham Crerar’s (1888-1965) success in winning approval for raising and deploying a Field Army represented an aberration in the balance of Canadian civil-military relations and illustrates aspects of Canadian military and its impact on the war.

Rawling, William, **“The Challenge of Modernization: The Royal Canadian Navy and Antisubmarine Weapons, 1944-1945.”** Vol.63, No.2 (April, 1999), pp.355-378.

Souchen, Alex, **“The Culture of Morale: Battalion Newspapers in the 3rd Canadian Infantry Division, June-August 1944.”** Vol.77, No.2 (April, 2013), pp.543-567.

**WORLD WAR II (1939-45) arranged alphabetically by country –
ENGLAND / GREAT BRITAIN**

Coles, Michael, **“Ernest King and the British Pacific Fleet: The Conference at Quebec, 1944 (‘Octagon’).”** Vol.65, No.1 (January, 2001), pp.105-129. While not excluding complications from Fleet Admiral King’s (1878-1956) personality, the author insists that there were valid political, economic, and operational factors against the deployment of the British Fleet alongside

the U.S. Navy in the Pacific Theater.

Jones, Edgar, “**‘L.M.F.’: The Use of Psychiatric Stigma in the Royal Air Force during the Second World War.**” Vol.70, No.2 (April, 2006), pp.439-458. Explores the consequences of the introduction by the R.A.F. of the term ‘Lack of Moral Fibre’ in April, 1940, which was intended to stigmatize aircrew who, without a medical reason, refused to fly.

Hill, Alexander, “**British Lend Lease Aid and the Soviet War Effort, June 1941 – June 1942.**” Vol.71, No.3 (July, 2007), pp.773-808. Measures the significance of the aid provided by Great Britain during the First Moscow Protocol to the end of June, 1942.

Carland, John M. “**High Maintenance Generals.**” Vol.71, No.4 (October, 2007), pp.1201-1202. A passage from Anthony Dymoke Powell’s 1968 novel, *The Military Philosophers*, concerning dealing with demanding superiors.

Mann, Christopher, “**Combined Operations, the Commandos, and Norway, 1941-1944.**” Vol.73, No.2 (April, 2009), pp.471-495. Displays the broader strategic consequences of a series of British raids on the coast of Norway, including valuable experience in joint operations and the commitment of German forces for the defense of Norway.

Kennedy, Greg, “**Anglo-American Strategic Relations and Intelligence Assessments of Japanese Air Power 1934-1941.**” Vol.74, No.3 (July, 2010), pp.737-773. Reassesses the influence of racism on Anglo-American views of Japanese air power, and how this influence evolved in the seven years leading up to Pearl Harbor.

Jones, Mark C. “**Not Just along for the Ride: The Role of Royal Navy Liaison Personnel in Multinational Naval Operations during World War II.**” Vol.76, No.1 (January, 2012), pp.127-158. The liaison system as a means of cooperation with European navies in exile from France, Greece, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, and Yugoslavia.

Ewer, Peter, “**The British Campaign in Greece 1941: Assumptions about the Operational Art and Their Influence on Strategy.**” Vol.76, No.3 (July, 2012), pp.727-745. Inquires into the British decision to dispatch an expeditionary force to Greece and what it tells us about contemporary British Army doctrine.

Hein, David, “**Vulnerable: H.M.S. *Prince of Wales* in 1941.**” Vol.77, No.3 (July, 2013), pp.955-989. The storied career of the H.M.S. *Prince of Wales*, involving fighting the K.M.S. *Bismarck*, the first Churchill-F.D.R. summit, service in the Mediterranean, and its sinking off the coast of Malaya.

Jones, Mark C. “**Friend and Advisor to the Allied Navies: The Royal Navy’s Principal Liaison Officer and Multinational Naval Operations in World War II.**” Vol.77, No.3 (July, 2013), pp.991-1023. The work of Principal Liaison Officer, Allied Navies (P.N.L.O.) with the Belgian,

Dutch, French, Greek, Norwegian, Polish, and Yugoslav navies in exile.

Jones, Mark C. **“Experiment at Dundee: The Royal Navy’s 9th Submarine Flotilla and Multinational Naval Cooperation during World War II.”** Vol.72, No.4 (October, 2008), pp.1179-1212. The 9th Flotilla included British, Dutch, Free French, Norwegian, and Polish submariners.

WORLD WAR II (1939-45) arranged alphabetically by country - FRANCE

Gunsburg, Jeffrey A. **“The Battle of Gembloux, 14-15 May 1940: The ‘Blitzkrieg’ Checked.”** Vol.64, No.1 (January, 2000), pp.97-140. Uses an examination of the effectiveness of the French forces holding a defensive position at the Belgium town of Gembloux as a test case for French doctrine and performance.

WORLD WAR II (1939-45) arranged alphabetically by country - GERMANY

Corum, James S. **“The *Luftwaffe*’s Army Support Doctrine, 1918-1941.”** Vol.59, No.1 (January, 1995), pp.53-76. Covers close air support doctrine and training, development and implementation, from the Spanish Civil War to Operation Barbarossa.

Fritz, Stephen G. **“‘We are Trying...to Change the Face of the World’ – Ideology and Motivation in the Wehrmacht on the Eastern Front: The View from Below.”** Vol.60, No.4 (October, 1996), pp.683-710. Appraises the influence of ‘positive’ National Socialist ideological beliefs on the average *Landser*’s motives to engage in combat.

Fanning, William J., Jr. **“The Origin of the Term ‘Blitzkrieg’: Another View.”** Vol.61, No.2 (April, 1997), pp.283-302.

Weinberg, Gerhard L. **“Unexplored Questions about the German Military during World War II.”** Vol.62, No.2 (April, 1998), pp.371-380. Touches upon the 1934 oath to Hitler, reasons why high-ranking German commanders felt the need to justify to their troops their orders to slaughter Jewish civilians, the role of high-ranking German commanders in approving the execution of tens-of-thousands of their own troops, *Luftwaffe* field divisions, the creation of new airborne divisions after the use of paratroopers had been all but abandoned, and the organizing of *Kriegsmarine* and *Luftwaffe* suicide units.

Yelton, David K. **“*Ein Volk Steht Auf: The German Volkssturm and Nazi Strategy, 1944-45.*”** Vol.64, No.4 (October, 2000), pp.1061-1083. Explains that the *Volkssturm*, though based on flawed assumptions, was part of a coherent strategy that was intended to simultaneously fanaticize the civilian population and maximize Allied casualties beyond what their governments were willing to bare.

Peifer, Douglas, “**Commemoration of Mutiny, Rebellion, and Resistance in Postwar Germany: Public memory, History, and the Formation of ‘Memory Beacons’.**” Vol.65, No.4 (October, 2001), pp.1013-1052. Analyzes three ‘memory beacons’ that have been cultivated in German public and social memory: the naval mutinies of 1917-18, the 20th July, 1944, plot, and *Wehrmacht* deserters during World War II.

Hull, Mark M. “**The Irish Interlude: German Intelligence in Ireland, 1939-1943.**” Vol.66, No.3 (July, 2002), pp.695-717.

Schmider, Klaus, “**Review Essay: The Last of the First: Veterans of the *Jagdwaaffe* Tell Their Story.**” Vol.73, No.1 (January, 2009), pp.231-249. Covers five memoirs of *Luftwaaffe* fighter pilots.

Orbach, Danny, “**Criticism Reconsidered: The German Resistance to Hitler in Critical German Scholarship.**” Vol.75, No.2 (April, 2011), pp.565-590. Establishes that, beginning in the 1960s, some of the so-called ‘critical’ historiography of the 20 July, 1944, conspirators suffer from erroneous reading of the sources, one-sided evaluations, moral condescension, and rhetorical manipulation.

Douglas, Sarah K. “**The Search for Hitler: Hugh Trevor-Roper, Humphrey Searle, and the Last Days of Adolf Hitler.**” Vol.78, No.1 (January, 2014), pp.159-210. The means by which British intelligence officer Hugh Trevor-Roper (1914-2003) obtained his information for his book, *The Last Days of Hitler* (1947).

Yelton, David K. “**Older German Officers and National Socialist Activism: Evidence from the German *Volksturm*.**” Vol.83, No.2 (April, 2019), pp.455-485. Addresses the question of to what degree older, lower-level German officers serving in the *Volksturm* embraced National Socialist ideology.

Wilson, Evan and Schapira, Ruth, “**German Perspectives on the U-Boat War, 1939-1941.**” Vol.85, No.2 (April, 2021), pp.369-398. Probes the conflict between what the Germans’ needed to secure a quick, decisive result, and the fact that the U-Boat was designed for a war of attrition, resulting in a pessimistic outlook on the part of Germany’s Naval leaders.

WORLD WAR II (1939-45) arranged alphabetically by country – HUNGARY

Szabó, Miklós, “**The Development of the Hungarian Aircraft Industry, 1938-1944.**” Vol.65, No.1 (January, 2001), pp.53-76.

WORLD WAR II (1939-45) arranged alphabetically by country – INDIA

Roy, Kaushik, “**Military Loyalty in the Colonial Context: A Case Study of the Indian Army during World War II.**” Vol.73, No.2 (April, 2009), pp.497-529. Uncovers the motives for

and extent of loyalty to the British colonial regime of the Indian Army troops fighting in Burma in the context of the British elite's concerns about the loyalty of Indian soldiers.

WORLD WAR II (1939-45) arranged alphabetically by country – IRELAND

Hull, Mark M. **“The Irish Interlude: German Intelligence in Ireland, 1939-1943.”** Vol.66, No.3 (July, 2002), pp.695-717.

WORLD WAR II (1939-45) arranged alphabetically by country – ITALY

Scianna, Bastian Matteo, **“Rommel Almighty? Italian Assessment of the ‘Desert Fox’ during and after the Second World War.”** Vol.82, No.1 (January, 2018), pp.125-145. The Italian view based on new primary material, including the eavesdropping by British intelligence on Italian officers held as P.O.W.s in both Egypt and Britain.

WORLD WAR II (1939-45) arranged alphabetically by country - JAPAN

Lofgren, Stephen J. (ed.) **“Diary of First Lieutenant Sugihara Kinrū: Iwo Jima, January-February 1945.”** Vol.59, No.1 (January, 1995), pp.97-134. Served in the 11th Antitank Battalion which was manned by reservists from Hiroshima and Shimane prefectures.

Krebs, Gerhard, **“Operation Super Sunrise? Japanese-United States Peace Feelers in Switzerland, 1945.”** Vol.69, No.4 (October, 2005), pp.1081-1120. Explains why informal discussions between the Japanese Naval Commander from the embassy in Berlin, Fujimura Yoshikazu, and Allen W. Dulles (1893-1969) of the U.S. Office of Strategic Services failed to develop into formal communications.

Jeans, Roger B., Jr. **“Alarm in Washington: A Wartime ‘Expose’ of Japan’s Biological Warfare Program.”** Vol.71, No.2 (April, 2007), pp.411-439. Discusses a book published in the summer of 1944 describing both Japan’s biological warfare program and the failure of the U.S. government to meet this threat, and the government and the media’s response to this publication, considering parallels with the 2001 anthrax ‘scares.’

Chi Man Kwong, **“The Failure of Japanese Land-Sea Cooperation during the Second World War: Hong Kong and the South China Coast as an Example, 1942-1945.”** Vol.79, No.1 (January, 2015), pp.69-91.

Fuquea, David C. **“Advantage Japan: The Imperial Japanese Navy’s Superior High Seas Refueling Capability.”** Vol.84, No.1 (January, 2020), pp.213-235. Addresses an understudied factor that made the Japanese victories at Pearl Harbor and beyond possible, one that at least initially, was not available to the U.S. Navy.

WORLD WAR II (1939-45) arranged alphabetically by country - MEXICO

Schwab, Stephen I. **“The Role of the Mexican Expeditionary Air Force in World War II: Late, Limited, but Symbolically Significant.”** Vol.66, No.4 (October, 2002), pp.1115-1140. Recounts the raising and service of the 201st Mexican P-47 Squadron in the Philippines beginning in May, 1945.

**WORLD WAR II (1939-45) arranged alphabetically by country –
THE NETHERLANDS**

Gunsburg, Jeffrey A. **“La Grand Illusion: Belgian and Dutch Strategy Facing Germany, 1919 – May, 1940.”** Vol.78, No.1 (January, 2014), pp.101-158; Vol.78, No.2 (April, 2014), pp.605-671.

Jones, Mark C. **“In Need of a Home Away from Home: The Royal Netherlands Navy in Australia, 1942-1947.”** Vol.85, No.2 (April, 2021), pp.399-425. With the fall of the Netherlands’ East Indies, units of the Royal Netherlands Navy relocated to Australia, from where they continued their operations against the Japanese enemy.

WORLD WAR II (1939-45) arranged alphabetically by country - NORWAY

Thompson, David G. **“Norwegian Military Policy, 1905-1940: A Critical Appraisal and Review of the Literature.”** Vol.61, No.3 (July, 1997), pp.503-520. Questions the reliance exclusively on British and German sources for an understanding of the 1940 Norwegian campaign, insisting that without knowledge of the role of the Norwegian government and armed forces, the picture is incomplete.

Mann, Christopher, **“Combined Operations, the Commandos, and Norway, 1941-1944.”** Vol.73, No.2 (April, 2009), pp.471-495. Displays the broader strategic consequences of a series of British raids on the coast of Norway, including valuable experience in joint operations and the commitment of German forces for the defense of Norway.

WORLD WAR II (1939-45) arranged alphabetically by country - POLAND

Ponichtera, Robert M. **“The Military Thought of Wladyslaw Sikorski.”** Vol.59, No.2 (April, 1995), pp.279-301. Offers a description of Sikorski’ (1881-1943) pursuit of political goals through the promotion of Polish military strength throughout his career, from within the Austro-Hungarian Empire to the leadership of the Polish state in exile.

Schwonek, Matthew R. **“Kazimierz Sosnkowski as Commander in Chief: The Government-in-Exile and Polish Strategy, 1932-1944.”** Vol.70, No.3 (July, 2006), pp.743-780.

Peszke, Michael Alfred, **“Historiographical Essay: An Introduction to English-Language Literature on the Polish Armed Forces in World War II.”** Vol.70, No.4 (October, 2006), pp.1029-1064.

WORLD WAR II (1939-45) arranged alphabetically by country - ROMANIA

Statiev, Alexander, **“Antonescu’s Eagles against Stalin’s Falcons: The Romanian Air Force, 1920-1941.”** Vol.66, No.4 (October, 2002), pp.1085-1113. Gives an account of how, though it was favored over the Army, the Air Force was assigned missions that exceeded its capacity so that it was brought to the brink of extinction.

**WORLD WAR II (1939-45) arranged alphabetically by country –
RUSSIA / SOVIET UNION**

Nenninger, Timothy K. **“United States Prisoners of War and the Red Army, 1944-45: Myths and Realities.”** Vol.66, No.3 (July, 2002), pp.761-781. When the Soviets overran German P.O.W. camps, they came into the possession of some 28,000 U.S. soldiers, the repatriation of which proved complicated.

Pennington, Reina, **“Offensive Women: Women in Combat in the Red Army in the Second World War.”** Vol.74, No.3 (July, 2010), pp.775-820. Reports on the nature and variety of women’s combat experiences.

Harrison, Richard W. **“Soviet Planning for War, 1936-1941: The ‘Preventative Attack’ Thesis in Historical Context.”** Vol.83, No.3 (July, 2019), pp.769-794.

WORLD WAR II (1939-45) arranged alphabetically by country - U.S.A.

Kimball, Warren F. **“Stalingrad: A Chance for Choices.”** Vol.60, No.1 (January, 1996), pp.89-114. Delves into the significance of the Battle of Stalingrad for United States foreign policy.

Fuquea, David C. **“Task Force One: The Wasted Assets of the United States Pacific Battleship Fleet, 1942.”** Vol.61, No.4 (October, 1997), pp.707-734. Explores the reasons behind Task Force One’s battleships languishing as a last line of defense during the first year of the war following Pearl Harbor.

Boyd, Carl, **“U.S. Navy Radio Intelligence during the Second World War and the Sinking of the Japanese Submarine I-52.”** Vol.63, No.2 (April, 1999), pp.339-354. Determines the role of Ultra in the June, 1944, sinking of the blockade runner, I-52, in the Atlantic Ocean by aircraft from the escort carrier U.S.S. *Bogue*.

Sorley, Lewis and Pernell, Ralph McT. **“Too Good for the Infantry?”** Vol.63, No.3 (July, 1999), pp.704-705. This is a 1942 letter from New Mexico Congressman Clinton P. Anderson in response to a request for an individual to be reassigned out of a rifle squad.

Dooley, Edwin L. **“Memoirs: Wartime San Juan, Puerto Rico: The Forgotten American Home Front, 1941-1945.”** Vol.63, No.4 (October, 1999), pp.921-938. The author provides an account of his father’s experiences as a young U.S. Army Private from Astoria, New York, who was deployed to Puerto Rico in 1939.

Eddy, George G. **“Memoirs: The Birth of the Concrete-Piercing Fuze: How the Siegfried Line and Other Formidable Targets were Breached.”** Vol.64, No.2 (April, 2000), pp.459-465. Brigadier General George G. Eddy (1895-1969) relates the development of the concrete piercing fuze when he served as Director of the Ordnance Research Center at Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland, during World War II.

Coles, Michael, **“Ernest King and the British Pacific Fleet: The Conference at Quebec, 1944 (‘Octagon’).”** Vol.65, No.1 (January, 2001), pp.105-129. While not excluding complications from Fleet Admiral King’s (1878-1956) personality, the author insists that there were valid political, economic, and operational factors against the deployment of the British Fleet alongside the U.S. Navy in the Pacific Theater.

Jacobs, Harry A. **“Operation Strakonice: In Pursuit of the Soviet Order of Battle.”** Vol.65, No.2 (April, 2001), pp.391-400. Chronicles the successful mission of the U.S. military intelligence unit, Order of Battle Team 24, to seize German documents detailing Soviet forces, documents that were located beyond the Line of Demarcation in Czechoslovakia.

McCreedy, Kenneth O. **“Planning the Peace: Operation Eclipse and the Occupation of Germany.”** Vol.65, No.3 (July, 2001), pp.713-739. Indicates that Operation Eclipse, which was planned simultaneously with Overlord, had the dual goals of thoroughly eliminating Nazism in Germany

Nenninger, Timothy K. **“United States Prisoners of War and the Red Army, 1944-45: Myths and Realities.”** Vol.66, No.3 (July, 2002), pp.761-781. When the Soviets overran German P.O.W. camps, they came into the possession of some 28,000 U.S. soldiers, the repatriation of which proved complicated.

Loss, Christopher P. **“Reading between Enemy Lines: Armed Services Editions and World War II.”** Vol.67, No.3 (July, 2003), pp.811-834.

Hone, Trent, **“The Evolution of Fleet Tactical Doctrine in the U.S. Navy, 1922-1941.”** Vol.67, No.4 (October, 2003), pp.1107-1148. Establishes how the Navy intended to use the battleships

stationed at Pearl Harbor in battle, including Admiral Husband E. Kimmel's (1882-1968) plans for a decisive fleet engagement in the Central Pacific.

Dingman, Roger V. **"Language at War: U.S. Marine Corps Japanese Language Officers in the Pacific."** Vol.68, No.3 (July, 2004), pp.853-883. Analyzes the origins, training, experiences, and recollections of Caucasian Japanese language officers, including the shift from translating to facilitate life-taking to lifesaving.

Rodgers, Thomas E. **"Billy Yank and G.I. Joe: An Exploratory Essay on the Sociopolitical Dimensions of Soldier Motivation."** Vol.69, No.1 (January, 2005), pp.93-121. Presents the assertion that the pre-war socialization of Civil War Volunteers that enabled them to perform effectively in combat was missing among the citizen-soldiers of World War II.

Krebs, Gerhard, **"Operation Super Sunrise? Japanese-United States Peace Feelers in Switzerland, 1945."** Vol.69, No.4 (October, 2005), pp.1081-1120. Explains why informal discussions between the Japanese Naval Commander from the embassy in Berlin, Fujimura Yoshikazu, and Allen W. Dulles (1893-1969) of the U.S. Office of Strategic Services failed to develop into formal communications.

Bielakowski, Alexander M. **"General Hawkins' War: The Future of the Horse in the U.S. Cavalry."** Vol.71, No.1 (January, 2007), pp.127-138. Provides an account of the career of Brigadier General Hamilton S. Hawkins III (1872-1950), who, despite the increasing significance of mechanized forces, steadfastly advocated for horse cavalry throughout the interwar period and into the Second World War.

Jeans, Roger B., Jr. **"Alarm in Washington: A Wartime 'Expose' of Japan's Biological Warfare Program."** Vol.71, No.2 (April, 2007), pp.411-439. Discusses a book published in the summer of 1944 describing both Japan's biological warfare program and the failure of the U.S. government to meet this threat, and the government and the media's response to this publication, considering parallels with the 2001 anthrax 'scares.'

Glantz, Mary, **"An Officer and a Diplomat? The Ambiguous Position of Philip R. Faymonville and United States-Soviet Relations, 1941-1943."** Vol.72, No.1 (January, 2008), pp.141-177. Appraises the role played by Colonel Philip Faymonville (1888-1962) in U.S.-Soviet relations, an officer who served as the United States' first military attaché and as expediter of Lend-Lease Aid during the war, but who had a contentious relationship with U.S. diplomatic personnel.

Flint, Fr. James, O.S.B. **"A Chaplain's Diary: Reverend Victor Laketek, O.S.B., 1942-1946."** Vol.72, No.3 (July, 2008), pp.853-867. The account of a World War II Army Air Force Chaplain stationed in Maine, Florida, California, and Canton Island in the Pacific.

Kennedy, Greg, **"Anglo-American Strategic Relations and Intelligence Assessments of**

Japanese Air Power 1934-1941.” Vol.74, No.3 (July, 2010), pp.737-773. Reassesses the influence of racism on Anglo-American views of Japanese air power, and how this influence evolved in the seven years leading up to Pearl Harbor.

Lacey, James, **“World War II’s Real Victory Program.”** Vol.75, No.3 (July, 2011), pp.811-834. Challenges Maj. Albert C. Wedemeyer’s assertion that he was the author of the United States’ Victory Program.

Lacey, James, **“Historical Truth and Tilting at Windmills.”** Vol.77, No.1 (January, 2013), pp.267-272. Addresses the controversy surrounding U.S. Army General Albert C. Wedemeyer (1896-1989).

McLaughlin, John J. and Lomazow, Steven, **“Counterpoint: Albert Coady Wedemeyer.”** Vol.77, No.1 (January, 2013), pp.255-272.

Catagnus, Earl J. **“Infantry Field Manual 7-5 *Organization and Tactics of Infantry: The Rifle Battalion (October 1940).*”** Vol.77, No.2 (April, 2013), pp.657-666.

Gioia, Philip, **“When ‘The Institution was Heard from’ in World War II: V.M.I. Alumni on the War Department General Staff, 1939-1945.”** Vol.78, No.4 (October, 2014), pp.1385-1394.

Stoler, Mark A. **“The 2015 George C. Marshall Lecture in Military History: George C. Marshall and the ‘Europe-First Strategy, 1939-1951: A Study in Diplomatic as well as Military History.”** Vol.79, No.2 (April, 2015), pp.293-316. Examines the relationship between diplomatic and military history regarding Marshall’s (1880-1959) support for the strategy of ‘Germany First’ during World War II, for the postwar European Recovery Program, and the relief of Gen. Douglas MacArthur (1880-1964) during the Korean War.

Seipp, Adam R. **“Buchenwald Stories: Testimony, Military History, and the American Encounter with the Holocaust.”** Vol.79, No.3 (July, 2015), pp.721-744. Demonstrates how the testimonies of American servicemen have evolved in tandem with changes in public perceptions of the war and the Holocaust.

Dudley, William S. **“A Soldier, His Family, and the Impact of the Pacific War, 1942-1945.”** Vol.80, No.1 (January, 2016), pp.187-192. A three-volume biography of Wilber Bradt of Washington State who served as a Field Artillery officer in the 43rd Infantry Division as it fought its way through the Solomons, New Guinea, and the Philippines. Based on a trove of preserved correspondence and interviews, this account is as much about his family on the home front as it is about Bradt on the frontlines.

Atkinson, Rick, **“The 2016 George C. Marshall Lecture in Military History: Projecting American Power in the Second World War.”** Vol.80, No.2 (April, 2016), pp.345-354. In spite of devoting a

smaller proportion of the country's gross domestic product to the war than any other major belligerent, the United States demonstrated logistical brilliance, firepower, mobility, mechanical aptitude, and an economic preponderance that outproduced the Axis powers.

Symonds, Craig, **"The 2017 George C. Marshall Lecture in Military History: For Want of a Nail: The Impact of Shipping on Grand Strategy in World War II."** Vol.81, No.3 (July, 2017), pp.657-666. The remarkable success of U.S. ship building and its impact on Allied strategy.

Lawlor, Ruth, **"Bibliographic Essay: Contested Crimes: Race, Gender, and Nation in Histories of GI Sexual Violence, World War II."** Vol.84, No.2 (April, 2020), pp.541-569.

Bankoff, Greg, **"From the Art of Practical Sailing to the Electronic Science of Navigation: Typhoons, Seamanship, and U.S. Naval Operations in the Northwest Pacific, 1944-1945."** Vol.86, No.4 (October, 2022), pp.949-972. Concerned with the challenges faced by ship's commanders of choosing between entrusting the safety of his vessel to his own judgement based on years of practical experience at sea or relying on the new technology at a time when some of the largest armadas of warships were ever assembled in wartime conditions.

WÜRTTEMBERG – See: GERMANY

WYANDOT – See: NATIVE AMERICAN CONFLICTS

Y

YELLOW FEVER – See: BIOLOGICAL AND MEDICAL ISSUES

YEMEN

Witty, David M. **"A Regular Army in Counterinsurgency Operations: Egypt in North Yemen, 1962-1967."** Vol.65, No.2 (April, 2001), pp.401-439. The Egyptian campaign in Yemen may have contributed to a compromise peace settlement, but it adversely impacted the Egyptian Army's capacity to fight conventional wars.

YOM KIPPUR WAR – See: ARAB-ISRAELI WAR (1973)

Y.M.C.A.

Lukasik, Sebastian H. **“Doughboys, the Y.M.C.A., and the Moral Economy of Sacrifice in the First World War.”** Vol.84, No.3 (July, 2020), pp.774-797. Contends that U.S. soldiers’ complaints about the Y.M.C.A. in France reflected larger concerns about the Home Front, perceptions of which shaped soldiers’ notions about the value of their sacrifices.

YUGOSLAVIA

Sadkovich, James J. **“Review Essay: Balkan Battlefields.”** Vol.70, No.1 (January, 2006), pp.187-194. Concerns works on the violent breakup of Yugoslavia in the 1990s.

Jones, Mark C. **“Not Just along for the Ride: The Role of Royal Navy Liaison Personnel in Multinational Naval Operations during World War II.”** Vol.76, No.1 (January, 2012), pp.127-158. The liaison system as a means of cooperation with European navies in exile from France, Greece, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, and Yugoslavia.

Jones, Mark C. **“Friend and Advisor to the Allied Navies: The Royal Navy’s Principal Liaison Officer and Multinational Naval Operations in World War II.”** Vol.77, No.3 (July, 2013), pp.991-1023. The work of Principal Liaison Officer, Allied Navies (P.N.L.O.) with the Belgian, Dutch, French, Greek, Norwegian, Polish, and Yugoslav navies in exile.

Trifković, Gaj, **“The Yugoslav Partisans’ Lost Victories: Operations in Montenegro and Bosnia-Herzegovina, 1944-1945.”** Vol.82, No.1 (January, 2018), pp.95-124. Seeks to understand why the Germans were able to extricate their XXI Mountain Corps from two consecutive attempts at encirclement during October 1944 through April 1945.

Z

ZAMBIA

Stapleton, Tim, **“ ‘Bad Boys’: Infiltration and Sedition in the African Military Units of the Central African Federation (Malawi, Zambia and Zimbabwe) 1953-63.”** Vol.73, No.4 (October, 2009), pp.1167-1193. Illustrates that nationalists exploited the rising unpopularity of colonialism, discontent with participation in the war in Malaya, the Mau Mau uprising in Kenya, and the Congo Crisis, which led white officers doubt the dependability of their African troops.

ZIMBABWE / RHODESIA

Stapleton, Tim, “ **‘Bad Boys’: Infiltration and Sedition in the African Military Units of the Central African Federation (Malawi, Zambia and Zimbabwe) 1953-63.**” Vol.73, No.4 (October, 2009), pp.1167-1193. Illustrates that nationalists exploited the rising unpopularity of colonialism, discontent with participation in the war in Malaya, the Mau Mau uprising in Kenya, and the Congo Crisis, which led white officers doubt the dependability of their African troops.

PART III: ARTICLES LISTED BY AUTHOR

A

ADELBERG, MICHAEL S.

“The Scope and Severity of Civil Warfare in Revolutionary Monmouth County, New Jersey.” Vol.73, No.1 (January, 2009), pp.9-47. Examines both how many of the residents of Monmouth County chose to participate on the opposing sides and how many lives were adversely affected by the war.

ALEXANDER, HARVEY J.

With Kingsley, Ronald F. **“The Failure of Abercromby’s Attack on Fort Carillon, July 1758, and the Scapegoating of Matthew Clerk.”** Vol.72, No.1 (January, 2008), pp.43-70. A reassessment, based on letters and other documents, that calls into question the degree that the young engineer, Matthew Clerk, contributed to the defeat of the British attack on Fort Carillon (Fort Ticonderoga) during the French and Indian War. See also: McCulloch, Ian Macpherson, “ ‘A Blanket of Inconsistencies’: The Battle of Ticonderoga, 2008.” Vol.72, No.3 (July, 2008), Vol.72, No.1 (January, 2008), pp.889-900.

ALEXANDER, MARTIN S.

With Philpott, William, **“The French and the British Field Force: Moral Support or Material Contribution?”** Vol.71, No.3 (July, 2007), pp.743-772. Contends that, even though France viewed the military benefit of the British commitment of a field army if war broke out with Germany as unsubstantial, the moral value of such a promise meant that it played an important role in France’s preparations for war.

ALVAREZ, JOSE E.

“Between Gallipoli and D-Day: Alhucemas, 1925.” Vol.63, No.1 (January, 1999), pp.75-98. Recounts the Spanish amphibious landing at Alhucemas Bay on 8 September, 1925, during the Rif Rebellion in North Africa.

ANGEVINE, ROBERT G.

“The Rise and Fall of the Office of Naval Intelligence, 1882-1892: A Technological Perspective.” Vol.62, No.2 (April, 1998), pp.291-312. Advances the argument that the first peacetime military intelligence organization, by successfully gathering, overtly and covertly, information on foreign naval technology, enabled the United States to build a modern fleet as quickly and inexpensively as possible.

ANSANI, FABRIZIO

“ ‘This French Artillery is very good and very effective’: Hypotheses on the Diffusion of a New Military Technology in Renaissance Italy.” Vol.83, No.2 (April, 2019), pp.347-378. Scrutinizes the development of the production of heavy cannons in Italy before and after the French Neapolitan Campaign of 1494.

ANSELMO, FRANK A.

“The Battle for Hill K-9 and the Fall of Rome, 2 June 1944.” Vol.76, No.1 (January, 2012), pp.99-126. The author seeks to ascertain which version of the capture of Hill K-9 by the U.S. 179th Infantry Regiment is the most accurate.

ARFAIOLI, MAURIZIO

“Bastion of Empire: The Italian *terzo Vecchio* of the Army of Flanders (1597-1682).” Vol.85, No.1 (January, 2021), pp.27-50. An examination of the service of the longest-lived infantry unit, the *terzo Vecchio*, in an effort to better understand Italian involvement in the long conflict within the Spanish Low Countries.

ARIRLLI, NIR

“When are Foreign Volunteers Useful? Israel’s Transnational Soldiers in the War of 1948 Re-examined.” Vol.78, No.2 (April, 2014), pp.703-724. Assesses the military and political utility for Israel of *Machal* (overseas volunteers) by comparing them with alternate examples of this phenomenon in other twentieth century conflicts.

ARMES, KEITH

“French Intelligence on the Russian Army on the Eve of the First World War.” Vol.82, No.3 (July, 2018), pp.759-782.

ARNDT, JOCHEN S.

“Treacherous Savages & Merciless Barbarian: Knowledge, Discourse and Violence during the Cape Frontier Wars, 1834 and 1853.” Vol.74, No.3 (July, 2010), pp.709-735. Concludes that the British stereotypes of the Xhosa people of the eastern frontier of the Cape Colony, South Africa, that evolved during three wars fought between 1834 and 1853 were used to justify policies of dispossession and subjugation in the name of colonial security.

“The True Napoleon of the West: General Winfield Scott’s Mexico City Campaign [1847] and the Origins of the U.S. Army’s Combined-Arms Combat Division.” Vol.76, No.3 (July, 2012), pp.649-671. Ventures to prove that General Winfield Scott (1786-1866) organized the Army of the Invasion of Mexico according to the French system of combined arms divisions, enabling him to replicate the Napoleonic era’s aggressive operational tactics.

ARNOLD, JAMES R.

“A Reappraisal of Column Versus Line in the Peninsular War.” Vol.68, No.2 (April, 2004), pp.535-552. Disputes the influential English historian of the Napoleonic Wars, Sir Charles Oman’s (1860-1946), explanation for the superiority of the British line over the French column.

“Winfield Scott Makes a Name for Himself.” Vol.76, No.4 (October, 2012), pp.1183-1185.

ATKINSON, RICK

“Speech to the U.S. Commission on Military History: Washington, 1 November, 2003.” Vol.68, No.2 (April, 2004), pp.527-533.

“The 2016 George C. Marshall Lecture in Military History: Projecting American Power in the Second World War.” Vol.80, No.2 (April, 2016), pp.345-354. In spite of devoting a smaller proportion of the country’s gross domestic product to the war than any other major belligerent, the United States demonstrated logistical brilliance, firepower, mobility, mechanical aptitude, and an economic preponderance that outproduced the Axis powers.

B

BACEVICH, A.J.

“The Paradox of Professionalism: Eisenhower, Ridgway, and the Challenge to Civilian Control, 1953-1955.” Vol.61, No.2 (April, 1997), pp.303-333. By focusing on the U.S. Army’s efforts to undermine President Eisenhower’s (1953-1961) policy of massive nuclear retaliation, this article attempts to depict the actual terms of the civil-military relationship within the innermost circles of the U.S. government to determine the realities and limits of civilian control of the armed forces.

“The Revisionist Imperative: Rethinking Twentieth Century Wars.” Vol.76, No.2 (April, 2012), pp.333-342. Insists that historians need to replace the familiar and morally reassuring story of a Short Twentieth Century with a less familiar and morally ambiguous story of a still unfolding Long Twentieth Century.

BACHRACH, BERNARD S.

“Charlemagne and the Carolingian General Staff.” Vol.66, No.2 (April, 2002), pp.313-357. Contends that the personnel and procedures relied upon by Emperor Charlemagne (747-814) for intelligence and planning fulfill the qualifications for a modern general staff.

“Review Essay: The Barbarian Hordes that never were.” Vol.74, No.3 (July, 2010), pp.901-904. A critical assessment of Peter Heather’s 2009 book *Empires and Barbarians: Migration, Development and the Birth of Europe*, which covers the period from the decline of the Roman Empire to the age of the Viking.

With Bachrach, David S. **“Bruno of Mersburg Saxon War: A Study in Eleventh-Century German Military History.”** Vol.81, No.2 (April, 2017), pp.341-367. Bruno of Mersburg’s account of the civil

wars fought by King Henry IV (1056-1106) provides valuable information on the nature and conduct of warfare in north-central Europe during this period.

BACHRACH, DAVID S.

“The Military Organization of Ottonian Germany, c.900-1018: The Views of Bishop Thietmar of Merseburg.” Vol.72, No.4 (October, 2008), pp.1061-1088.

“The Military Administration of England: The Royal Artillery (1216-1272).” Vol.68, No.4 (October, 2004), pp.1083-1104. By describing an example of the sophisticated military administration during the reign of King Henry III, specifically involving siege engines, the author argues that much of the military innovations that have been attributed to Henry III’s successor, King Edward I, already existed before he ascended the throne.

“Early Ottonian Warfare: The Perspective from Corvey.” Vol.75, No.2 (April, 2011), pp.393-409.

A critical reassessment of the depiction of warfare in Widukind of Corvey’s *Res gestae Saxonicae*, which concludes that, rather than small bands of heavily armed, mounted warriors, King Henry I (r.919-936) and Emperor Otto (r.936-973) deployed large armies for placing fortresses under siege.

“Restructuring the Eastern Frontier: Henry I of Germany, 924-936.” Vol.78, No.1 (January, 2014), pp.9-35. Analyzes the establishment of a defense in depth against Magyar raiders, relying on garrisoned fortifications.

With Bachrach, Bernard S. **“Bruno of Mersburg Saxon War: A Study in Eleventh-Century German Military History.”** Vol.81, No.2 (April, 2017), pp.341-367. Bruno of Mersburg’s account of the civil wars fought by King Henry IV (1056-1106) provides valuable information on the nature and conduct of warfare in north-central Europe during this period.

BADSEY, STEPHEN

“The Boer War (1899-1902) and British Cavalry Doctrine: A Re-Evaluation.” Vol.71, No.1 (January, 2007), pp.75-97. Rejecting the traditional interpretation, the article proposes that a cavalry reform movement incorporating dismounted tactics pre-dated the Second Anglo-Boer War, a mixture of mounted and dismounted tactics were used by both sides in the conflict, and that the problems experienced by cavalry were largely not of their own making.

With Dawson, Joseph G., III and Stoker, Donald, **“Forum: Confederate Military Strategy in the U.S. Civil War – Revisited.”** Vol.73, No.4 (October, 2009), pp.1273-1287.

BAKER, ANNI

“The Abolition of the U.S. Army Canteen, 1898-1914.” Vol.80, No.3 (July, 2016), pp.697-724.

The impact of Progressive era activists on conditions in the Army and the debate over the role of the Army in U.S. society.

BANKOFF, GREG

“From the Art of Practical Sailing to the Electronic Science of Navigation: Typhoons, Seamanship, and U.S. Naval Operations in the Northwest Pacific, 1944-1945.” Vol.86, No.4 (October, 2022), pp.949-972. Concerned with the challenges faced by ship’s commanders of choosing between entrusting the safety of his vessel to his own judgement based on years of practical experience at sea or relying on the new technology at a time when some of the largest armadas of warships were ever assembled in wartime conditions.

BARKER, THOMAS M.

“A Debacle of the Peninsular War: The British-led Amphibious Assault against Fort Fuengirola 14-15 October 1810.” Vol.64, No.1 (January, 2000), pp.9-52. Reassesses the failed amphibious assault by a multi-national force under the command of the Eleventh Lord Blayney, General Andrews Thomas.

BARTLETT, MERRILL L.

“Ben Hebard Fuller and the Genesis of a Modern United States Marine Corps, 1891-1934.” Vol.69, No.1 (January, 2005), pp.73-91.

BARTSCH, WILLIAM H.

“Operation Dovetail: Bungled Guadalcanal Rehearsal, July 1942.” Vol.66, No.2 (April, 2002), pp.443-476. Reports on the all-but-forgotten rehearsal conducted at Koro Island in the Fijis, held ten days before the landing on Guadalcanal.

BEAVER, DANIEL R.

“The U.S. War Department in the Gaslight Era: Stephen Vincent Benét at the Ordnance Department, 1870-91.” Vol.68, No.1 (January, 2004), pp.105-132.

BECHTHOLD, B. MICHAEL

“A Question of Success: Tactical Air Doctrine and Practice in North Africa, 1942-43.” Vol.68, No.3 (July, 2004), 821-851. Reveals that the tactical doctrine of the U.S. Army Air Force was found wanting in North Africa in 1942, leading to the adoption of the proven British Eighth Army Western Desert Air Force model of ground-air cooperation.

BECKER, ANN M.

“Smallpox in Washington’s Army: Strategic Implications of the Disease during the American Revolutionary War.” Vol.68, No.2 (April, 2004), pp.381-430.

BECKETT, IAN F.W.

“The Road to Kandahar: The Politics of Retention and Withdrawal in Afghanistan, 1880-81.” Vol.78, No.4 (October, 2014), pp.1263-1294.

“How Wars End: Victorian Colonial Conflicts.” Vol.82, No.1 (January, 2018), pp.29-44. The author challenges the conclusions of Bruce Collins’ in his article “Defining Victory in Victorian Warfare, 1860-1882.” *The Journal of Military History*, Vol.77, No.3 (July, 2013), pp.895-929.

BECKSTRAND, ALEX

“Woodrow Wilson and the Struggle of Civil-Military Relations during the Punitive Expedition of 1916-1917.” Vol.86, No.2 (April, 2022), pp.372-398. Argues that President Woodrow Wilson’s (r.1913-1921) decision to defer to his military commanders, Major General Frederick Funston (1865-1917) and Brigadier General John J. Pershing (1860-1948), was the cause of the failure to achieve the goals of the Punitive Expedition.

BELL, ANDREW McILWAINE

“ ‘Gallinippers & Glory’: The Links between Mosquito-borne Diseases and U.S. Civil War Operations and Strategy, 1862.” Vol.74, No.2 (April, 2010), pp.379-405. Covers the physiological and psychological effects of malaria and yellow fever and their impact on military operations and strategy in 1862.

BELL, CHRISTOPHER M.

“ ‘Our Most Exposed Outpost’: Hong Kong and British Far Eastern Strategy, 1921-1941.” Vol.60, No.1 (January, 1996), pp.61-88. Brings to light the vital, if overlooked role of Hong Kong as a base for offensive operations in British interwar plans for a war with Japan has been.

“Winston Churchill and the Ten Year Rule.” Vol.74, No.4 (October, 2010), pp.1097-1128. Insists that criticisms of Churchill’s defense spending cutbacks during his tenure as Chancellor of the Exchequer (1924-29) exaggerate his authority and oversimplify his complex and shifting combination of political, financial, strategic, and bureaucratic goals.

“Air Power and the Battle of the Atlantic: Very Long Range Aircraft and the Delay in Closing the Atlantic ‘Air Gap’.” Vol.79, No.3 (July, 2015), pp.691-719. Places the blame involving this to failure address this problem on the Royal Air Force’s Coastal Command rather than a prioritization of strategic bombing over the protection of maritime convoys.

BELLINGER, VANYA EFTIMOVA

“The Other Clausewitz: Findings from the Newly Discovered Correspondence between Marie and Carl von Clausewitz.” Vol.79, No.2 (April, 2015), pp.345-367.

BENBOW, TIM

“ ‘Menace’ to ‘Ironclad’: The British Operations against Dakar (1940) and Madagascar (1942).” Vol.75, No.3 (July, 2011), pp.769-809. Investigates why, regarding two separate British operations against Vichy French colonies in Africa, ‘Menace’ failed, while ‘Ironclad’ succeeded.

BERKOVICH, ILYA

“The Battle of Forbie and the Second Frankish Kingdom of Jerusalem.” Vol.75, No.1 (January, 2011), pp.9-44. Inquires into the disastrous defeat of the Second Kingdom of Jerusalem’ coalition Franko-Syrian army at the Battle of Forbie, 1244, which reduced it to a pawn in the power politics of neighboring Muslim kingdoms.

BERNSTEIN, BARTON J.

“Truman and the A-Bomb: Targeting Noncombatants, Using the Bomb, and His Defending the ‘Decision’.” Vol.62, No.3 (July, 1998), pp.547-570. Focuses on the 1996 publication *Harry S. Truman and the Bomb: A Documentary History*. Edited and with commentary by Robert Ferrell.

“Review Essay: The Making of the Atomic Admiral: ‘Deak’ Parsons and Modernizing the U.S. Navy.” Vol.63, No.2 (April, 1999), pp.415-426. William Sterling Parsons (1901-1953) was an ordnance expert who participated in the Manhattan project and was involved in post-war nuclear tests.

“Reconsidering the ‘Atomic General’: Leslie R. Groves.” Vol.67, No.3 (July, 2003), pp.883-920. A critical review of the influential published works, the substantial archival sources, and an attempt to separate fact from fiction regarding specific controversial issues.

BERTOSA, BRIAN

“The Supply of Hoplite Equipment by the Athenian State down to the Lamian War [323-322 B.C.E.].” Vol.67, No.2 (April, 2003), pp.361-379. Covers the break with tradition in the *polis* of Athens in 335 B.C.E. when arms and armor were provided to citizens, including, for the first time, the *thetes* (poor), who had not previously been able to serve as hoplites.

BIDDLE, TAMI DAVIS

“Dresden 1945: Reality, History, and Memory.” Vol.72, No.2 (April, 2008), pp.413-449. This essay is an effort to untangle a complicated and much misunderstood episode in the history of modern warfare and to make sense of it in the context in which it occurred.

“On the Crest of Fear: V-Weapons, the Battle of the Bulge, and the Last Stages of World War II in Europe.” Vol.83, No.1 (January, 2019), pp.157-194. Puts forward a causal relationship between Germany’s introduction of the use of the ‘V’ weapons, the impact of Germany’s Ardennes offensive on the Allied High Command, the Allied manpower crisis, and the acceleration of the Strategic Bombing Campaign during the last months of the war.

BIDDISCOMBE, PERRY

“The Mufti’s Men: Haj Amin-al-Husayni and S.S. Parachute Expeditions to Palestine and Iraq, 1944-1945.” Vol.82, No.3 (July, 2018), pp.783-815.

BIELAKOWSKI, ALEXANDER M.

“General Hawkins’ War: The Future of the Horse in the U.S. Cavalry.” Vol.71, No.1 (January, 2007), pp.127-138. Provides an account of the career of Brigadier General Hamilton S. Hawkins III (1872-1950), who, despite the increasing significance of mechanized forces, steadfastly advocated for horse cavalry throughout the interwar period and into the Second World War.

BIGGART, JOHN

With Podsoblyayev, Evgenii and King, Francis, **“The Russian Naval General Staff and the Evolution of Naval Policy, 1905-1914.”** Vol.66, No.1 (January, 2002), pp.37-69. Addresses the neglected perspective of the connections between the formulation of naval strategy for the Baltic Sea, warship construction, and Imperial Russia’s aspirations to become a great naval power.

BIRD, KEITH

“Review Essay: The Tirpitz Legacy: The Political Ideology of German Sea Power.” Vol.69, No.3 (July, 2005), pp.821-825.

BIRTLE, ANDREW JAMES.

“The U.S. Army’s Pacification of Marinduque, Philippine Islands, April 1900 – April 1901.” Vol.61, No.2 (April, 1997), pp.255-282. Observes that the common image of the U.S. counter-insurgency campaign in the Philippines that emphasizes the political ‘nation building’ approach obscures the equally if not more important harsh military measures indispensable for pacification.

“The Origins of the Legion of the United States.” Vol.67, No.4 (October, 2003), pp.1249-1262. Offers the possibility that the reorganization of the U.S. Army in 1792 was based on the writings of Colonel Henry Bouquet (1719-1765), a noted veteran of the Indian Frontier.

“PROVN, Westmoreland, and the Historians: A Reappraisal.” Vol.72, No.4 (October, 2008), pp.1213-1247. A reassessment of the U.S. Army report, nicknamed PROVN, that, in the past, had been mined for information with which to criticize General William C. Westmoreland (1914-2004) and praise his successor as commander of U.S. forces in South Vietnam, General Creighton Abrams (1914-1974).

“Advisory Service in Vietnam: Detrimental to an Officer’s Career?” Vol.74, No.3 (July, 2010), pp.871-877. By examining the extent to which former Vietnam advisers achieved general officer rank in the U.S. Army, the article seeks to test the common belief among officers that the Army did not assign its best men for service as advisors and that promotion boards discriminated against these advisors.

BITTNER, DONALD F.

“Shattering Images: Officers of the Royal Marines, 1867-1913.” Vol.59, No.1 (January, 1995), pp.27-52. Demonstrates that Great Britain’s Royal Marines provided members of the middle class with the opportunity to earn a commission.

BLACK, JEREMY

“Historiographical Essay: Military Organisations and Military Change in Historical Perspective.” Vol.62, No.4 (October, 1998), pp.871-892. Presents an explanatory model of change based on military organization, including both unit and command structures, and intersection and interaction with wider social patterns and practices.

“War and the World, 1450-2000.” Vol.63, No.3 (July, 1999), pp.669-681. After a consideration of the circumstances of the study of military history in the academy, the author focuses primarily on European states’ military interaction with civilizations throughout the globe in the context of the ‘Military Revolution’ theory.

“Historiographical Essay: Britain as a Military Power, 1688-1815.” Vol.64, No.1 (January, 2000), pp.159-177.

“Determinisms and Other Issues.” Vol.68, No.4 (October, 2004), pp.1217-1232. Addresses the multiple problems surrounding the ways in which the role of technology in history has been interpreted.

“Review Essay: War Stories.” Vol.69, No.3 (July, 2005), pp.827-832. The author critiques a pair of books by John Mosier that purport to address myths about the World Wars.

“Frontiers and Military History.” Vol.72, No.4 (October, 2008), pp.1047-1059. As zones of interaction and contested sovereignty, it’s not surprising that frontiers, throughout history, have witnessed armed conflict, just as armed conflicts have both established and changed frontiers.

“A Revolution in Military Cartography?: Europe 1650-1815.” Vol.73, No.1 (January, 2009), pp.49-68. This article approaches the issue of cartography not only in tactical, operational and strategic terms, but also with reference to the mapping of war for public interest.

“The North American Theater of the Napoleonic Wars, or, as It is sometimes Called, the War of 1812.” Vol.76, No.4 (October, 2012), pp.1053-1066. The challenge for Great Britain was to balance the demands of different naval commitments.

BLACKMER, ELIZABETH

With Settle, Frank and Whaley, Tom, **“Alsos Digital Library for Nuclear Issues.”** Vol.67, No.3 (July, 2003), pp.921-923.

BLAND, LARRY I.

Marshall, George C. and the Duke of Wellington, **“Document of Note: Wellington Instructs the Yanks.”** Vol.63, No.2 (April, 1999), pp.427-428.

“Document of Note: Marlene Dietrich’s Firepower.” Vol.66, No.3 (July, 2002), pp.829-831. Chief-of-Staff George C. Marshall (1880-1959) sought a means to stop the flow of firearms being brought back to the U.S. as war trophies.

BLAZICH, FRANK A.

“Notre Cher Ami: The Enduring Myth and Memory of a Humble Pigeon.” Vol.85, No.3 (July, 2021), pp.646-677. The homing pigeon Cher Ami survived severe wounds transporting messages, but the question of whether or not it was the pigeon that helped save the ‘Lost Battalion’ of the American Expeditionary Force is explored in this article.

BOESCHE, ROGER

“Kautilya’s *Arthasāstra* on War and Diplomacy in Ancient India.” Vol.67, No.1 (January, 2003), pp.9-37. Kautilya is believed to have been an adviser to the founder of the Mauryan Empire, Chandragupta (c.317-293 B.C.E.).

BOGHARDT, THOMAS

“Dirty Work? The Use of Nazi Informants by U.S. Army Intelligence in Postwar Europe.” Vol.79, No.2 (April, 2015), pp.387-422. Probes ethical issues and utility of the Allied enlistment of war criminals and suspected war criminals for collecting information on Soviet and Communist Party activities in Europe.

BORCH, FRED L.

“Comparing Pearl Harbor and ‘9/11’: Intelligence Failure? American Unpreparedness? Military Responsibility?” Vol.67, No.3 (July, 2003), pp.845-860.

“Review Essay: Lieber’s Code: A Landmark in the Law of War but not Lincoln’s Code.” Vol.77, No.2 (April, 2013), pp.671-674. Critiques John Fabian Witt’s *Lincoln’s Code: The Laws of War in American History* (2012), which concludes with the Philippine Insurrection, 1898.

“ ‘In the Name of the Queen’: Military Trials of Japanese War Criminals in the Netherlands East Indies (1946-1949).” Vol.79, No.1 (January, 2015), pp.93-125.

“Review Essay: My Lai at Fifty: A History of Literature on the ‘My Lai Incident’ Fifty Years Later.” Vol.82, No.2 (April, 2018), pp.551-564. Concerning the killing of unarmed civilians by U.S. Army troops during the Vietnam War at the village of My Lai in the Son Tinh district on 16 March, 1968.

BORZECKI, JERZY

“Battle of Warsaw, 1920: Was Radio Intelligence the Key to Polish Victory over the Red Army?” Vol.81, No.2 (April, 2017), pp.447-468. A look at what recent Polish literature has to say about the role of radio-intelligence in the Russo-Polish War, 1919-1920.

BOU, JEAN

“Cavalry, Firepower, and Swords: The Australian Light Horse and the Tactical Lessons of Cavalry Operations in Palestine, 1916-1918.” Vol.71, No.1 (January, 2007), pp.99-125. Contrary to the traditions of the Australian mounted service, by the end of the Campaign in Palestine more than half of the Australian Light Horse were armed with both rifles and swords, relying on both fire and modern shock tactics.

BOUTIN, CAMERON

“Adversary and Ally: The Role of Weather in the Life and Career of George Washington.” Vol.81, No.3 (July, 2017), pp.693-718.

BOWES, JOHN P.

“Transformation and Transition: American Indians and the War of 1812 in the Lower Great Lakes.” Vol.76, No.4 (October, 2012), pp.1129-1146. Focusing on the Wyandot communities in the Old Northwest within a broader temporal context beyond the beginning and end dates of the War of 1812.

BOWER, STEPHEN E.

“The Theology of the Battlefield: William Tecumseh Sherman and the U.S. Civil War.” Vol.64, No.4 (October, 2000), pp.1005-1034. Focuses on the role of Sherman’s (1820-1891) nondenominational religious faith in his experiences in the Civil War.

BOYCE, D. GEORGE

“From Assaye to the *Assaye*: Reflections on British Government, Force, and Moral Authority in India.” Vol.63, No.3 (July, 1999), pp.643-668. Appraises the role of the threat and use of force in British rule, from the Battle of Assaye (1803) to the naval mutiny of 1946, including how the reliance on force shaped the moral and ethical justifications for the British governing India.

BOYD, CARL

“U.S. Navy Radio Intelligence during the Second World War and the Sinking of the Japanese Submarine I-52.” Vol.63, No.2 (April, 1999), pp.339-354. Determines the role of Ultra in the June, 1944, sinking of the blockade runner, I-52, in the Atlantic Ocean by aircraft from the escort carrier U.S.S. *Bogue*.

BOYLAN, KEVIN M.

“The Red Queen’s Race: Operation Washington Green and Pacification in Binh Dinh Province, 1969-70.” Vol.73, No.4 (October, 2009), pp.1195-1230. Examines the operations conducted by the 173rd Airborne Brigade in Binh Dinh Province closely, which matched recommendations made by many of the critics of the way U.S. military forces was conducted the war and, therefore. offers insight into the likely effectiveness of an alternate strategy focused on population control.

“Goodnight Saigon: American Provincial Advisors’ Final Impressions of the Vietnam War.”

Vol.78, No.1 (January, 2014), pp.233-270. Scrutinizes the revisionist proposition that the United States had won the war in the wake of the Tet Offensive, 1968, by examining the assessments of U.S. Province Senior Advisors.

“No ‘Technical Knockout’: Giap’s Artillery at Dien Bien Phu.” Vol.78, No.4 (October, 2014),

pp.1349-1383. Contests the common explanation for the victory of the Vietnamese People’s Army based on a flood of Vietnamese publications around the 2004 fiftieth anniversary of the siege.

BRADLEY, CARL MEREDITH

“The British War Chariot: A Case for Indirect Warfare.” Vol.73, No.4 (October, 2009),

pp.1073-1089. Weighs the capabilities of the Celtic tribes who fielded sturdy and fast two-horse chariots against Julius Caesar’s (100-44 B.C.E.) two landings in Britannia in 55-54 B.C.E. and the means used to sustain their resources and gauge their capabilities.

BRADY, ANDREA

“Dying with Honour: Literary Propaganda and the Second English Civil War.” Vol.70, No.1

(January, 2006), pp.9-30. Deals with the coverage in Parliamentary versus Royalist propaganda of the executions of Sir Charles Lucas and Sir George Lisle in 1648, following General Thomas Fairfax’s (1612-1671) siege of Colchester.

BRANDS, BENJAMIN D.

“ ‘Unsatisfactory and Futile’: The Officers’ Lyceum Program and U.S. Army Reform.” Vol.83,

No.4 (October, 2019), pp.1067-1094. Inquires into the impact of the Officers’ Lyceum Program on the late-nineteenth century Army’s effort to provide its officer corps with professional education.

BRANDS, HAL

“Why did Saddam Invade Iran [1980]? New Evidence on Motives, Complexity, and the Israel

Factor.” Vol.75, No.3 (July, 2011), pp.861-885.

BRERETON, T.R.

“First Lessons in Modern War: Arthur Wagner, the 1898 Santiago Campaign, and the U.S.

Army Lesson-Learning.” Vol.64, No.1 (January, 2000), pp.79-96. Relates how Lieutenant Colonel Arthur Wagner (1853-1905) pioneered the U.S. Army’s practice of producing ‘lessons-learned’ studies of the Army’s recent military operations.

BRONFELD, SAUL

“Fighting Outnumbered: The Impact of the Yom Kippur War on the U.S. Army.” Vol.71, No.2

(April, 2007), pp.465-498. Illustrates the different ways in which the Yom Kippur War impacted the

work of Generals William E. DePuy (1919-1992) and Donn A. Starry (1925-2011) in reforming the U.S. Army.

BROWNING, REED

“Review Essay: New Views on the Silesian Wars.” Vol.69, No.2 (April, 2005), pp.521-534. Concerning the series of conflicts, 1740-42, 1744-45, and 1756-63, fought between Austria and the Kingdom of Prussia, led by Frederick the Great (1712-1786).

BRUCE, ROBERT B.

“America Embraces France: Marshal Joseph Joffre and the French Mission to the United States, April-May 1917.” Vol.66, No.2 (April, 2002), pp.407-441. Proposes that marshal Joffre (1852-1931), more than any other individual, established strong-Franco-American military, political, and social ties, contributing mightily to U.S. public support for a commitment of a large expeditionary force to the Western Front.

BRUCE, SUSANNAH URAL

“ ‘Remember Your Country and Keep up Its Credit’: Irish Volunteers and the Union Army, 1861-1865.” Vol.69, No.2 (April, 2005), pp.331-359. Puts forward the explanation that a central theme in the support of Irish immigrants for the Union cause was their dual loyalties to both their new and original homelands, support that was tested by the rising casualties, Emancipation Proclamation, and the introduction of the draft.

BRUSCINO, THOMAS

“Naturally Clausewitzian: U.S. Army Theory and Education from Reconstruction to the Inter-War Years.” Vol.77, No.4 (October, 2013), pp.1251-1275. Though familiar with Carl von Clausewitz (1780-1831), U.S. Army officers independently embraced concepts that Clausewitz advocated.

BRYANT, G.J.

“Asymmetric Warfare: The British Experience in Eighteenth-Century India.” Vol.68, No.2 (April, 2004), pp.431-469. Juxtaposes the adaption to new circumstance of Indian versus British military forces, proposing that while the British were able to retain their military superiority, Indian rulers were unable to overcome political obstacles that interfered with the adoption of European methods.

BUCKLEY, JOHN

“Tackling the Tiger: The Development of British Armoured Doctrine for Normandy 1944.” Vol.74, No.4 (October, 2010), pp.1161-1184. Asserts that the British Army’s loose approach to developing and imposing doctrine, despite inherent shortcomings, actually facilitated a flexibility that allowed the armoured forces to quickly and effectively modify their doctrines in the heat of battle.

BUDREAU, LISA M.

“The Politics of Remembrance: The Gold Star Mothers’ Pilgrimage and America’s Fading Memory of the Great War.” Vol.72, No.2 (April, 2008), pp.371-411. Collectively, the Gold Star Mothers offer a multidimensional model of the ethnic, cultural, economic, and religious diversity prevalent in the United States during the interwar years.

BULLOCK, MIKE

With Lyons, Laurence, and Judkins, Philip, **“A Resolution of the Debate about British Wireless in World War I.”** Vol.84, No.4 (October, 2020), pp.1079-1096. Visits the debate over whether, as Dr. Brian Hall contends, the British Army utilized continuous wave radio as best as this technology allowed with how it was used by their French and U.S. counterparts.

BURNS, ROBERT G.H.

“British Folk Songs of the Great War – Then and Now.” Vol.79, No.4 (October, 2015), pp.1059-1071.

BURRELL, ROBERT S.

“Breaking the Cycle of Iwo Jima Mythology: A Strategic Study of Operation Detachment.” Vol.68, No.4 (October, 2004), pp.1143-1186. Questions the justification for the invasion of Iwo Jima, 19 February, 1945, explaining that the decision to invade was a matter of the competing agendas of the Navy, Army, and Army Air Force. See also: Burrell, Robert S. and Hanley, Brian, “The Myth of Iwo Jima: A Rebuttal [And Response].” Vol.69, No.3 (July, 2005), pp.801-809.

C

CALVET, STÉPHANE

“The Painful Demobilization of the Napoleonic Grande Armée’s Officers.” Vol.80, No.1 (January, 2016), pp.77-92. By examining the Western French Department of Charente, the author illustrates the diverse loyalties, motivations, and subsequent careers of the officers of Napoleon’s *Grande Armée*.

CAMPBELL, ISABEL

“A Tale of Submarine Sightings and a Golden Goose: American-British-Canadian Intelligence Sharing in the Early Cold War.” Vol.85, No.4 (October, 2021), pp.980-1003. The consequences of efforts to establish trilateral intelligence of the sighting of Soviet submarines in the Davis Strait in 1946.

CAMPOS, JORGE PLANAS

With De Blas, Antonio Grjal **“French and Allied Officer Casualties in the Peninsular War (1808-1814): A New Examination.”** Vol.85, No.4 (October, 2021), pp.889-905.

CANFIELD, DANIEL T.

“Opportunity Lost: Combined Operations and the Development of Union Military Strategy, April 1861 – April 1862.” Vol.79, No.3 (July, 2015), pp.657-690.

CAPPONI, NICCOLÒ

“Le Palle di Marte: Military Strategy and Diplomacy in the Grand Duchy of Tuscany under Ferdinand II de’Medici (1621-1670).” Vol.68, No.4 (October, 2004), pp.1105-1141.

“Clio, Mars, and Wine: Tracking Down Military Documents in Italy.” Vol.72, No.4 (October, 2008), pp.1249-1256.

CARLAND, JOHN M.

“Winning the Vietnam War: Westmoreland’s Approach in Two Documents.” Vol.68, No.2 (April, 2004), pp.553-574.

“Review Essay: Abandoning Vietnam.” Vol.70, No.1 (January, 2006), pp.183-186. Examines James H. Willbanks 2004 book about the withdrawal of direct U.S. involvement in the war, beginning in 1968, to the victorious conclusion of the North Vietnamese invasion in 1975.

“High Maintenance Generals.” Vol.71, No.4 (October, 2007), pp.1201-1202. A passage from Anthony Dymoke Powell’s 1968 novel, *The Military Philosophers*, concerning dealing with demanding superiors.

“War, Politics, Diplomacy, and the Presidency: Off the Record Comments by Lyndon B. Johnson in Retirement.” Vol.72, No.4 (October, 2008), pp.1257-1263.

“Review Essay: Scorecard on CIA C.O.I.N. in Vietnam.” Vol.75, No.3 (July, 2011), pp.887-891.

“Daniel Ellsberg and the Tet Offensive.” Vol.83, No.2 (April, 2019), pp.541-552. An analyst for the RAND Corporation and employee of both the Defense and State Departments, Daniel Ellsberg’s (1931-2023) critical assessment of the impact of the Tet Offensive, January, 1968, reflected a stage in his growing disillusionment with the war in Vietnam.

CARNEY, JAMES T.

“The Great Silence of Robert E. Lee.” Vol.83, No.1 (January, 2019), pp.97-126. Concludes that the primary reason Gen. Robert E. Lee (1807-1870) failed to advocate for an end to the war when, by November, 1864, it was clear that the Confederacy had lost, was his loyalty to his friend, President Jefferson Davis (1808-1889).

CARTER, DONAL ALAN

“Eisenhower versus the Generals.” Vol.71, No.4 (October, 2007), pp.1169-1199. Traces the rancor that evolved between President Dwight D. Eisenhower (1953-1961), who pursued the ‘New Look’ national security policy that relied on nuclear weapons, the Strategic Air Command, and a robust economy, versus Army officers who believed the drastic reductions in conventional ground forces challenged the very existence of their service.

CASEY, STEVEN

“Wilfred Burchett and the United Nations Command’s Media Relations during the Korean War, 1951-1952.” Vol.74, No.3 (July, 2010), pp.821-845. Assesses the Australian journalist, Wilfred Burchett’s (1911-1983), observations concerning the U.S. Army’s relations with the media during the Korean armistice negotiations.

CASHIN, JOAN

“Bibliographic Essay: American Women and the American Civil War.” Vol.81, No.1 (January, 2017), pp.199-204.

CASSIDY, BEN

“Machiavelli and the Ideology of the Offensive: Gunpowder Weapons in *The Art of War*.” Vol.67, No.2 (April, 2003), pp.381-404. Disputes the interpretation that, in his *Art of War*, Niccolò Machiavelli (1469-1527) completely rejects the use of both cannon and hand-held firearms, explaining that his downplaying of the use of gunpowder weapons was due to Machiavelli’s association of cannons and handguns with the defensive, while he endorsed the offensive.

CASTEL, ALBERT

“Liddell Hart’s *Sherman: Propaganda as History*.” Vol.67, No.2 (April, 2003), pp.405-426. Concludes that Liddell Hart’s 1929 biography of U.S. Civil War General William Tecumseh Sherman (1820-1891) is seriously flawed, both factually and analytically, because it was written to validate the author’s concept of the ‘indirect approach’ in warfare.

CATAGNUS, EARL J.

“Infantry Field Manual 7-5 *Organization and Tactics of Infantry: The Rifle Battalion* (October 1940).” Vol.77, No.2 (April, 2013), pp.657-666.

ÇEÇEN, ZEYNEP KOCABIYOİKOĞLU

“Two Different Views of Knighthood in the Early Fifteenth Century: *Le Livre de Bouciquaut* and the Works of Christine de Pizan.” Vol.76, No.1 (January, 2012), pp.9-35. Comparing the different contemporary views of knighthood, the author considers whether its depiction in the biography of Marshal of France, Jean le Meingre Bouciquaut (1366-1421), is consistent with its image in the works

of Christine de Pizan (1363-1430).

CELIK, BIRTEN

With Travers, Tim, “**‘Not One of Them Ever came Back’: What Happened to the 1/5 Norfolk Battalion on 12 August 1915 at Gallipoli?**” Vol.66, No.2 (April, 2002), pp.389-406.

CERDÁ, NÉSTOR

“**Political Ascent and Military Commander: General Franco in the Early Months of the Spanish Civil War, July-October 1936.**” Vol.75, No.4 (October, 2011), pp.1125-1157. Displays how General Francisco Franco (1892-1975) exploited the opportunities presented by the setbacks to the coup plotters in July through August, 1936, to rise from being merely another general supporting the uprising to the position of commander-in-chief of the Nationalist Army and head of the government.

CHARLES, PATRICK J.

“**Dissecting the Origins of Air-Centric Special Operations Theory.**” Vol.81, No.3 (July, 2017), pp.803-828. Seeks to find the answers to the controversy surrounding whether British or U.S. officers deserve the most credit for developing the concepts that led to Operation THURSDAY, the airlanding of a specialized force behind Japanese lines in Burma in March, 1944, to disrupt enemy infrastructure and communications.

CHET, GUY

“**Teaching in the Shadow of the Military Revolution.**” Vol.78, No.3 (July, 2014), pp.1069-1075.

CHI MAN KSWONG

“**The Failure of Japanese Land-Sea Cooperation during the Second World War: Hong Kong and the South China Coast as an Example, 1942-1945.**” Vol.79, No.1 (January, 2015), pp.69-91.

CLINE, ERIC H.

With Sutter, Anthony, “**Battlefield Archaeology at Armageddon: Cartridge Cases and the 1948 Battle for Megiddo, Israel.**” Vol.75, No.1 (January, 2011), pp.159-190. Israeli Archaeologists investigating the ancient history of Megiddo, came across 213 spent Czechoslovakian cartridge cases, with which they attempted to reconstruct the fighting that took place at that location during the 1948 war.

CLYMER, KENTON

“**U.S. Homeland Defense in the 1950s: The Origin of the Ground Observer Corps.**” Vol.75, No.3 (July, 2011), pp.835-859. Quasi-auxiliary of the U.S. Air Force from 1950 to 1959.

COLE, RICHARD G.

With Nelson, David T. **“Memoirs: Behind German Lines in 1915: The Letters Home of David T. Nelson.”** Vol.65, No.4 (October, 2001), pp.1053-1060. Nelson, who was from Decorah, Iowa, was a Rhodes Scholar at Oxford when the war broke out. He worked for the Commission for Relief in German occupied Belgium and, later in 1916, as a driver for the American Field Ambulance Corps.

COLEMAN, BRADLEY LYNN

With Schultz, Timothy A. **“The Cornerstone of Joint Force Transformation: The Standing Joint Force Headquarters at U.S. Southern Command, 2001-2011.”** Vol.85, No.4 (October, 2021), pp.1029-1060. The difficulties of Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld (1932-2021) to establish Standing Joint Force Headquarters for each of the geographic combatant commands is examined by using the U.S. Southern Command as an example.

COMPEAU, TIMOTHY

“The Royal Navy’s *Psyche* on Lake Ontario: A British Experiment with Prefabricated Warships in the War of 1812.” Vol.86, No.2 (April, 2022), pp.321-343. Narrates the British effort to transport four pre-fabricated vessels to Lake Ontario, of which only one, the 56-gun frigate H.M.S. *Psyche*, reached its destination.

CRAWFORD, MICHAEL J.

“The Abolition of Prize Money in the United States Navy Reconsidered.” Vol.81, No.1 (January, 2017), pp.105-132. Sizes up the efforts to eliminate prize money for the capture of enemy warships and merchant ships, which began shortly after the War of 1812, but only came about in 1899 due to a confluence of motives.

“Avast Swabbing! The Medical Campaign to reform Swabbing the Decks in the U.S. Navy.” Vol.83, No.1 (January, 2019), pp.127-156. Delves into the conflict between Navy officers, who prioritized the clean appearance of their ships, and Navy doctors, who believed that the humid air produced by swabbing the decks facilitated the spread of diseases that afflicted sailors.

COFFMAN, EDWARD M.

“The Course of Military History in the United States since World War II.” Vol.61, No.4 (October, 1997), pp.761-775.

“The George C. Marshall Lecture of Military History: The Duality of the American Military Tradition: A Commentary.” Vol.64, No.4 (October, 2000), pp.967-980. Discusses the duality of a standing, professional regular Armed Forces versus the citizen-soldier tradition.

COGAN, CHARLES G.

“Desert One and Its Disorders.” Vol.67, No.1 (January, 2003), pp.201-216. Argues that the failure of the attempt to rescue the hostages in Iran, 1980, provoked the principle of joint operations in the

U.S. Armed Forces and the consolidation of Special Forces under a Special Operations Command.

COLE, BERNARD D.

“Memoirs: A Noglow in Vietnam, 1968: Air Power at the Battle of Khe Sanh.” Vol.64, No.1 (January, 2000), pp.141-158. Both a memoir and an analysis by a U.S. Marine who experienced first-hand the fighting at Khe Sanh.

COLEMAN, BRADLEY LYNN

“The Colombian Army in Korea, 1950-1954.” Vol.69, No.4 (October, 2005), pp.1137-1177. Uses the service history of the Colombian Battalion as an example of the United Nations’ multi-national coalition force.

“Recovering the Korean War Dead, 1950-1958: Graves Registration, Forensic Anthropology, and Wartime Memorialization.” Vol.72, No.1 (January, 2008), pp.179-222. The Graves Registration Service, U.S. Quartermaster Corps, developed an innovative system during the Korean War in which the dead were recovered and repatriated to the United States during major combat operations.

COLES, MICHAEL

“Ernest King and the British Pacific Fleet: The Conference at Quebec, 1944 (‘Octagon’).” Vol.65, No.1 (January, 2001), pp.105-129. While not excluding complications from Fleet Admiral King’s (1878-1956) personality, the author insists that there were valid political, economic, and operational factors against the deployment of the British Fleet alongside the U.S. Navy in the Pacific Theater.

COLLINS, BRUCE

“Defining Victory in Victorian Warfare, 1860-1882.” Vol.77, No.3 (July, 2013), pp.895-929. Catalogues the range of pressures on the commanders of expeditions in Africa to declare victory.

CONNOR, JOHN

“Climate, Environment, and Australian Frontier Wars: New South Wales, 1788-1841.” Vol.81, No.4 (October, 2017), pp.985-1006. Attests that there was a strong correlation between the onset of drought in the inland region of south-eastern Australia and the eruption of armed conflict from 1824 to 1841, advocating a consideration of the impact of weather on the outbreak of war throughout history.

COOK, TIM

“Creating the Faith: The Canadian Gas Services in the First World War.” Vol.62, No.4 (October, 1998), pp.755-786. The Canadian forces developed a very efficient organization to instruct their troops in how to protect themselves from Chemical weapons.

“The Politics of Surrender: Canadian Soldiers and the Killing of Prisoners in the Great War.” Vol.70, No.3 (July, 2006), pp.637-665.

“Grave Beliefs: Stories of the Supernatural and the Uncanny among Canada’s Great War Trench Soldiers.” Vol.77, No.2 (April, 2013), pp.521-542.

COOX, ALVIN D.

“Needless Fear: The Compromise of U.S. Plans to Invade Japan in 1945.” Vol.64, No.2 (April, 2000), pp.411-437. The disappearance of top-secret material from Manila caused a great deal of concern, but post-war access to Japanese documents demonstrate that these stolen papers had no impact on defensive plans for Kyushu.

CORUM, JAMES S.

“The Luftwaffe’s Army Support Doctrine, 1918-1941.” Vol.59, No.1 (January, 1995), pp.53-76. Covers close air support doctrine and training, development and implementation, from the Spanish Civil War to Operation Barbarossa.

The Spanish Civil War: Lessons Learned and not Learned by the Great Powers.” Vol.62, No.2 (April, 1998), pp.313-334. Considers what the British, French, German, Italian, Soviet, and United States armed forces learned or failed to learn from the study of the air war in Spain within the context of how armed forces undergo reform.

COURTNEY, JOCELYN

“The Civil War that was fought by Children: Understanding the Role of Child Combatants in El Salvador’s Civil War, 1980-1992.” Vol.74, No.2 (April, 2010), pp.523-556. Explores the legacy of the extensive reliance on child soldiers by both the Salvadoran government and the Farabundo Martí Front for National Liberation in terms of demobilization issues and postwar societal problems.

CRANE, CONRAD C.

“Raiding the Beggar’s Pantry: The Search for Airpower Strategy in the Korean War.” Vol.63, No.4 (October, 1999), pp.885-920. Contrasts the need to fight a limited war with the newly independent U.S. Air Force’s focus on nuclear warfare.

CRAWFORD, MICHAEL J.

“U.S. Navy Petty Officers in the Era of the War of 1812.” Vol.76, No.4 (October, 2012), pp.1035-1051. Scrutinizes the Navy’s process of recruiting and training petty officers between the years 1797 and 1812.

CRONIN, STEPHANIE

“Building and Rebuilding Afghanistan’s Army: An Historical Perspective.” Vol.75, No.1 (January, 2011), pp.45-91. The repeated failure of the efforts of successive Afghan governments, from the nineteenth-century to the present, to create a modern regular army.

CROXTON, DEREK

“The Prosperity of Arms is Never Continual’: Military Intelligence, Surprise, and Diplomacy in 1640s Germany.” Vol.64, No.4 (October, 2000), pp.981-1003.

CYR, ARTHUR I.

“Review Essay: Custer before the Little Bighorn: A Boy General Heads West.” Vol.82, No.2 (April, 2018), pp.547-550.

CZARNECKI, JACEK

“The Rebirth and Progress of the Polish Military during the Interwar Years.” Vol.83, No.3 (July, 2019), pp.747-768. Challenges the notion that the Polish Army’s cavalry reflected a failure of modernization, enshrined in the myth of Polish lancers charging Panzers in 1939.

D

DADDIS, GREGORY A.

“Eating Soup with a Spoon: The U.S. Army as a ‘Learning Organization’ in the Vietnam War.” Vol.77, No.1 (January, 2013), pp.229-254. The U.S. Army’s strategic approach, operational experience, and organizational changes.

“Historiographical Essay: Mansplaining Vietnam: Male Veterans and America’s Popular Image of the Vietnam War.” Vol.82, No.1 (January, 2018), pp.181-207. Explores how various media, such as memoirs, have excluded the story of the roughly 7,500 U.S. women who served in the Vietnam War.

D’AMOURS, CAROLINE

“Canadian Military Culture and Tactical Training, 1940-1944: The Making of Infantry Junior N.C.O.s.” Vol.82, No.4 (October, 2018), pp.1175-1198.

DANCHEV, ALEX

“Liddell Hart and the Indirect Approach.” Vol.63, No.2 (April, 1999), pp.313-337.

“Review Essay: War Stories.” Vol.69, No.1 (January, 2005), pp.211-215. Covers works about the occupation of war photographers.

DAVEY, JAMES

“The Repatriation of Spanish Troops from Denmark, 1808: The British Government, Logistics, and Maritime Supremacy.” Vol.74, No.3 (July, 2010), pp.689-707. When Spain rebelled against French occupation, the British government responded by, among other things, preparing and executing

the repatriation of the Spanish regiments formerly fighting for Napoleon in northern Europe.

DAVIES, BRIAN

“The Russian Baltic Fleet in the Seven Years’ War.” Vol.86, No.3 (July, 2022), pp.557-572.

Charts the rise and fall and rise again of the Russian Baltic Fleet, from the reign of Peter ‘the Great’ (r.1682-1725) to that of Catherine ‘the Great’ (r.1762-1796).

DAVIES, HUW J.

“Diplomats as Spymasters: A Case Study of the Peninsular War, 1809-1813.” Vol.76, No.1

(January, 2012), pp.37-68. The work of the Duke of Wellington’s (1769-1852) intelligence network, particularly during 1812, compared with examples from the Crimean War, 1853-1856, and World War I, 1914-1918.

DAVIES, JAMES A.

“Musical Reconnaissance and Deception in the American Civil War.” Vol.74, No.1 (January,

2010), pp.79-105. Demonstrating both the intrinsic role of music in the lives of nineteenth century Americans and a growing understanding of battlefield psychology, the article looks at how music could provide scouts with clues about enemy locations and how this could be exploited to enhance tactical deception.

DAVIS, ROBERT S.

“Escape from Andersonville: A Study in Isolation and Imprisonment.” Vol.67, No.4 (October,

2003), pp.1065-1081. Seeks to understand why only some two dozen Union prisoners escaped from Andersonville within the larger context of the P.O.W. experience in later conflicts.

DAWSON, JOSEPH G., III

“With Fidelity and Effectiveness: Archibald Henderson’s Lasting Legacy to the U.S. Marine

Corps.” Vol.62, No.4 (October, 1998), pp.727-753. Affirms Henderson’s importance as Commandant of the Corps (1821-1859), during which he expanded the roles and capabilities of Marines, such as the deployment of a Marine battalion alongside Army units against the Creeks and Seminoles and the addition of an artillery component to strengthen landing forces.

“Review Essay: Civil War Soldiers and Leaders: A Glatthaar Trio.” Vol.63, No.1 (January, 1999),

pp.165-168. Contains a single study on the relationships between high-ranking commanders and two involving the enlisted men’s experience, included African American soldiers and their officers and the troops who participated in Sherman’s march.

With Badsey, Stephen, and Stoker, Donald, **“Forum: Confederate Military Strategy in the U.S.**

Civil War – Revisited.” Vol.73, No.4 (October, 2009), pp.1273-1287.

“Forum: Confederate Military Strategy in the U.S. Civil War: Jefferson Davis and the Confederacy’s ‘Offensive-Defensive’ Strategy in the U.S. Civil War.” Vol.73, No.2 (April, 2009), pp.591-613.

DE BLAS, ANTONIO GRJAL

With Campos, Jorge Planas, **“French and Allied Officer Casualties in the Peninsular War (1808-1814): A New Examination.”** Vol.85, No.4 (October, 2021), pp.889-905.

DE LA GARZA, ANDREW

“The Mughal Battlefield: Personnel, Technology, and Tactics in the Early Empire, 1500-1605.” Vol.78, No.3 (July, 2014), pp.927-960. Challenges the assumptions of inferiority in comparison with the ‘European Military Revolution.’

DE MENESES, FILIPE RINEIRO

“ ‘Not only Useless, but Dangerous?’ The Portuguese Expeditionary Corps in France in the Aftermath of the Battle of La Lys, 9 April 1918.” Vol.82, No.4 (October, 2018), pp.1149-1174. Conflict between the wishes of the new President of Portugal, Sidónio Pais (1872-1918), the British High Command, and the soldiers and officers of the Portuguese Expeditionary Corps over the question of whether it should return to frontline duty.

DE NINNO, FABIO

“A Technological Fiasco: Scientific Research, Institutional Culture, and Fascism in the Italian Navy (1919-1940).” Vol.84, No.3 (July, 2020), pp.798-824. Explains that the failure of the Italian Navy to develop and adopt new technologies, such as radar and sonar, was rooted in an opposition to technological change within the culture of the officer corps, compounded by inter-service rivalry and the chaos of the Fascist regime.

DEE, DARRYL

“The Survival of France: Logistics and Strategy in the 1709 Flanders Campaign.” Vol.84, No.4 (October, 2020), pp.1021-1050. Shines a light on the significant role of logistics in the debate concerning whether the French field army in Flanders should pursue an aggressive or cautious strategy during the first year of the War of the Spanish Succession, 1701-1715, arguing that this established a pattern for the remainder of the conflict.

DEITCHMAN, SEYMOUR J.

“The ‘Electronic Battlefield’ in the Vietnam War.” Vol.72, No.3 (July, 2008), pp.869-887. Concludes that the proposal of the Jason Group of scientists for a network of sensors and aircraft to detect activity on the Ho Chi-Minh Trail in Laos, though not totally successful, impacted the course of the war and foreshadowed key aspects of the equipment and operation of the U.S. Armed Forces today.

DELANEY, DOUGLAS E.

“Mentoring the Canadian Corps: Imperial Officers and the Canadian Expeditionary Force, 1914-1918.” Vol.77, No.3 (July, 2013), pp.931-953.

DELIS, PANAGIOTIS

“The Treatment of Prisoners of War Captured by the Greek Army during the Balkans Wars of 1912-13.” Vol.82, No.4 (October, 2018), pp.1123-1147. Due to a combination of the inability of the Greeks to pay for the care of Bulgarian and Ottoman P.O.W.s and negative stereotypes held about the same, the laws concerning the treatment of prisoners established by international conventions in 1899 and 1907 were not honored by the Greek Army.

DENNIS, PETER

“Historiographical Note: The Books that Influenced Jeff Grey.” Vol.81, No.4 (October, 2017), pp.1109-1112. Professor Jeffrey Grey (1959-2016), Australia’s most prominent military historian and the first President of the Society for Military History from outside of the United States.

DEUTSCH, HAROLD C.

“The Matter of Records.” Vol.59, No.1 (January, 1995), pp.135-142. Concerning the reliability of official documents, including both sins of commission and omission.

DeVRIES, KELLY

“The Lack of a Western European Military Response to the Ottoman Invasions of Eastern Europe from Nicopolis (1396) to Mohacs (1526).” Vol.63, No.3 (July, 1999), pp.539-559. Inquires into the reasons behind a failure to respond to the Turkish threat, proposing that it was a combination of the intimidating power of the Ottomans and changing attitudes towards the duties expected of a Christian soldier.

DHADA, MUSTAFAH

“The Liberation War in Guinea-Bissau Reconsidered.” Vol.62, No.3 (July, 1998), pp.571-593. Disputes the image of a straightforward march to victory for the *Partido Africano de Independência de Guiné e Cabo Verde* (P.A.I.G.C.), demonstrating that, instead, it was a struggle involving moves and countermoves by Portuguese forces and the P.A.I.G.C., each designed to maintain or regain specific initiatives, each designed to check or checkmate the opponent.

DICKSON, PAUL D.

“The Politics of Army Expansion: General H.D.G. Crerar and the Creation of the First Canadian Army, 1940-41.” Vol.60, No.2 (April, 1996), pp.271-298. Explains that General Henry Duncan Graham

Crerar's (1888-1965) success in winning approval for raising and deploying a Field Army represented an aberration in the balance of Canadian civil-military relations and illustrates aspects of Canadian military and its impact on the war.

DiNARDO, R.L.

“The Dysfunctional Coalition: The Axis Powers and the Eastern Front in World War II.”

Vol.60, No.4 (October, 1996), pp.711-730. Illustrates that German arrogance, compounded by muddled political and strategic thinking, inadequate resources, widely varying capabilities, and linguistic differences, rendered the Axis Coalition a costly failure.

“Southern by the Grace of God but Prussian by Common Sense: James Longstreet and the Exercise of Command in the U.S. Civil War.” Vol.66, No.4 (October, 2002), pp.1011-1032.

Compares the manner in which General James Longstreet (1821-1904) organized and utilized his staff with the staff practices developed by the Prussian Army under Helmuth von Moltke the Elder (1800-1891).

“The Limits of Technology: The Invasion of Serbia, 1915.” Vol.79, No.4 (October, 2015), pp.981-995. By focusing on the different forms of technology employed by the invading forces of the Central Powers, the author explains how they benefitted the invaders, but also had their limitations.

DINGMAN, ROGER V.

“Language at War: U.S. Marine Corps Japanese Language Officers in the Pacific.” Vol.68, No.3 (July, 2004), pp.853-883. Analyzes the origins, training, experiences, and recollections of Caucasian Japanese language officers, including the shift from translating to facilitate life-taking to lifesaving.

“Review Essay: American Bases in Japan.” Vol.78, No.2 (April, 2014), pp.753-755. A collection of essays by Japanese academics and public historians providing a balanced study of the impact of U.S. bases Kanagawa Prefecture, just southwest of Tokyo

DODMAN, THOMAS

“1814 and the Melancholy of War.” Vol.80, No.1 (January, 2016), pp.31-55. Through contemporary accounts, this article explores the emotional reaction of state officials, soldiers, military doctors, etc. to the collapse of Napoleon's Empire.

DONALDSON, PETER

“ ‘A New and Deadly Game’: British Sporting Culture in the First World War.” Vol.84, No.1 (January, 2020), pp.83-114. Popular journalism, memoirs, novels, and poetry provided the British public with a diet of war stories and reportage in which athletic endeavor and organized games featured prominently, demonstrating that the association between games and combat survived the horrors of industrial killing between 1914 and 1918.

DONNELLY, WILLIAM M.

“Thunderbirds in Korea: The U.S. 45th Infantry Division, 1950-1952.” Vol.64, No.4 (October, 2000), pp.1113-1139. Investigates the performance of one of two National Guard divisions deployed to Korea, concentrating on the division’s officers.

“ ‘The Best Army that can be put in the Field in the Circumstances’: The U.S. Army, July 1951 – July 1953.” Vol.71, No.3 (July, 2007), pp.809-847. Reckons with the difficulties faced by career soldiers during the Korean War due to limited national mobilization and the cuts to the Army’s budget by President Harry S. Truman (1945-1953).

“Bilko’s Army: A Crisis in Command?” Vol.75, No.4 (October, 2011), pp.1183-1215. Focusing on U.S. Army officers above company grade level, 1953 to 1965, the author considers whether service schools, the headquarters of the Continental Army Command, and Headquarters, Department of the Army identified a crisis in command.

“This ‘Horrible Example’: An Extraordinary Case of Absent Without Leave during the Vietnam War.” Vol.79, No.2 (April, 2015), pp.457-466. Thomas J. Cuchal of Cleveland, Ohio.

“A Damn Hard Job: James A. Van Fleet and the Combat Effectiveness of U.S. Army Infantry, July 1951 – February 1953.” Vol.82, No.1 (January, 2018), pp.147-179. The difficulties faced by the Eighth Army commander, Gen. Van Fleet (1892-1992), to maintain ‘the will to win’ during the Korean War.

“From Sergeant Snorkels to Drill Sergeants: Basic Training of Male Soldiers in the U.S. Army, 1953-1964.” Vol.86, No.2 (April, 2022), pp.399-426. Assesses the much-criticized quality of officers and non-commissioned officers assigned to shepherd recruits through basic training, an issue that wasn’t addressed until the Secretaries of the Army Cyrus R. Vance Sr. (1917-2002) and Stephen Ailes (1912-2001).

DOOLEY, EDWIN L.

“Memoirs: Wartime San Juan, Puerto Rico: The Forgotten American Home Front, 1941-1945.” Vol.63, No.4 (October, 1999), pp.921-938. The author provides an account of his father’s experiences as a young U.S. Army Private from Astoria, New York, who was deployed to Puerto Rico in 1939.

DORN, WALTER

“The U.N.’s First ‘Air Force’: Peacekeepers in Combat, Congo 1960-64.” Vol.77, No.4 (October, 2013), pp.1399-1425. Recounts O.N.U.C.’s Operation Grand Slam in December, 1962, during which Swedish jets neutralized Katanga’s air force.

DOUGHTY, ROBERT A.

“French Strategy in 1914: Joffre’s Own.” Vol.67, No.2 (April, 2003), pp.427-454.

“Papa’ Joffre and the Great War.” Vol.79, No.4 (October, 2015), pp.959-979. Asks whether General Joseph Joffre’s (1852-1931) achievements are outweighed by his failures.

DOUGLAS, SARAH K.

“The Search for Hitler: Hugh Trevor-Roper, Humphrey Searle, and the Last Days of Adolf Hitler.” Vol.78, No.1 (January, 2014), pp.159-210. The means by which British intelligence officer Hugh Trevor-Roper (1914-2003) obtained his information for his book, *The Last Days of Hitler* (1947).

DOWNING, ROGER

With Rommelse, Gijs, **“Victims of an Ideological Rift? Dutch Prisoners of War during the First Anglo-Dutch War (1652-1654).”** Vol.80, No.3 (July, 2016), pp.649-669. Rather than ideology, the author shows that it was a combination of logistical problems and a lack of funds that produced the dire conditions experienced by Dutch P.O.W.s.

DOWNS, TROY

“The Raj in Peril: The City of Benares [Varanasi] during the Indian Uprising of 1857.” Vol.81, No.1 (January, 2017), pp.39-73.

DREYER, EDWARD L.

“Zhao Chongguo: A Professional Soldier of the Former Han Dynasty.” Vol.72, No.3 (July, 2008), pp.665-725. Claims that the Former Han Dynasty general, Zhao Chongguo (137-52 B.C.E.) best known innovation, *tuntian* (military farms), was intended to deny the enemy land for grazing and growing crops, rather than as a means of providing food for troops involved in distant campaigns.

DREW, DENNIS M.

“U.S. Airpower Theory and the Insurgent Challenge: A Short Journey to Confusion.” Vol.62, No.4 (October, 1998), pp.809-832. Covering the period from 1945 to 1992, the article contends that the U.S. Air Force has failed to account for the realities of guerrilla warfare in its theory of airpower.

DROHAN, BRIAN

“Unintended Consequences: Baton Rounds, Riots, and Counterinsurgency in Northern Ireland, 1970-1981.” Vol.82, No.2 (April, 2018), pp.491-514. Designed to be a non-lethal means of employing force, the misuse of baton rounds by British soldiers resulting in serious injuries and even deaths, produced exactly the opposite public relations impact that was intended.

DUDLEY, WILLIAM S.

“Review Essay: War of 1812 Trilogy.” Vol.78, No.2 (April, 2014), pp.747-751. Three works by the noted Canadian military historian, Donald E. Graves, on the Battles of the War of 1812 fought during the years 1813 to 1814.

“A Soldier, His Family, and the Impact of the Pacific War, 1942-1945.” Vol.80, No.1 (January, 2016), pp.187-192. A three-volume biography of Wilber Bradt of Washington State who served as

a Field Artillery officer in the 43rd Infantry Division as it fought its way through the Solomons, New Guinea, and the Philippines. Based on a trove of preserved correspondence and interviews, this account is as much about his family on the home front as it is about Bradt on the frontlines.

DUJMOVIĆ, NICHOLAS

“Drastic Actions Short of War: The Origins and Application of C.I.A.’s Covert Paramilitary Function in the Early Cold War.” Vol.76, No.3 (July, 2012), pp.775-808. In mid-1948, the Central Intelligence Agency was assigned a covert paramilitary function, which may explain why the C.I.A.’s paramilitary activities were never as effective as policy makers and Agency operations officers expected.

DUNLEY, RICHARD

“Technology and Tradition: Mine Warfare and the Royal Navy’s Strategy of Coastal Assault, 1870-1890.” Vol.80, No.2 (April, 2016), pp.398-409.

“Operation Q: Churchill and Fisher’s Invasion of Germany, 1915?” Vol.86, No.3 (July, 2022), pp.612-641. Reveals the pursuit of a naval strategy by First Lord of the Admiralty, Winston Churchill (1874-1965), and Admiral of the Fleet, John Arbuthnot Fisher (1841-1920) that came withing hours of execution in May, 1915, but was never acted upon.

DUNN, JOHN P.

“Egypt’s Nineteenth-Century Armaments Industry.” Vol.61, No.2 (April, 1997), pp.231-254. Explains that the efforts of Muhammad Ali Pasha (1769-1849) and Khedive Ismail to establish a modern arms industry in Egypt was doomed in part due to haphazard implementation and inadequate funding, but, in a broader context, failure sprang from an unwillingness and / or inability to impose major political, cultural, and social changes.

“Americans in the Nineteenth Century Egyptian Army: A Selected Bibliography.” Vol.70, No.1 (January, 2006), pp.123-136. Ismail (r.1863-1879), grandson of Muhammad Ali Pasha, employed officers from the United States, including both veterans from both sides in the Civil War and serving officers in the postwar United States Army.

DUTEAU, BARBARA

With Frank, Joseph Allan, **“Measuring the Political Articulateness of United States Civil War Soldiers: The Wisconsin Militia.”** Vol.64, No.1 (January, 2000), pp.53-77.

DWYER, CHRISTOPHER S.

“Raiding Strategy: As Applied by the Western Confederate Cavalry in the American Civil War.” Vol.63, No.2 (April, 1999), pp.263-281. Offers the explanation that the failure of the Confederate Cavalry in the Western Theater was not due to any lack of success in the raids that were conducted, but to the misuse made of these raids in the overall strategy of Confederate theater commanders.

DYKSTRA, BODIE D.

“ ‘To Dig and Burrow like Rabbits’: British Field Fortifications at the Battle of the Aisne, September and October 1914.” Vol.84, No.3 (July, 2020), pp.747-773.

E

EAMES, ANTHONY

“The Trident Sales Agreement and Cold War Diplomacy.” Vol.81, No.1 (January, 2017), pp.163-186. The ‘Special Relationship’ was bolstered by the sale of U.S. Trident submarine-launched ballistic missile technology to Great Britain in 1982.

ECHEVARRIA, ANTULIO

“General Staff Historian Hugo Freiherr von Freytag-Loringhoven and the Dialectics of German Military Thought.” Vol.60, No.3 (July, 1996), pp.471-494. Von Freytag-Loringhoven (1855-1924) was arguably the most prolific of Imperial Germany’s military authors and, notably, a historian of the Great General Staff, whose opposition to change served as an antithesis that forced his critics to justify and further develop their ideas.

EDDY, GEORGE G.

“Memoirs: The Birth of the Concrete-Piercing Fuze: How the Siegfried Line and Other Formidable Targets were Breached.” Vol.64, No.2 (April, 2000), pp.459-465. Brigadier General George G. Eddy (1895-1969) relates the development of the concrete piercing fuze when he served as Director of the Ordnance Research Center at Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland, during World War II.

EHRlich, MICHAEL

“The Battle of Ain al-Mallāha, 19 June 1157.” Vol.83, No.1 (January, 2019), pp.31-42. An examination of the victory of Nūr al-Dīn’s (1146-1174) Syrian forces over a Frankish army led by the King of Jerusalem, Baldwin III (r.1143-1163), in the northern Jordan Valley that relates written sources to a careful examination of the terrain of the actual battlefield.

EICHHORN, NIELS

“A ‘Century of Peace’ that was not: War in the Nineteenth Century.” Vol.84, No.4 (October, 2020), pp.1051-1077. Challenges the notion of a century of peace between 1815 and 1914, pointing to a series of devastating wars that were fought, not only in Europe, but throughout the globe.

ELRON, ZEEV

With Gat, Moshe, **“Remarks on Air Power and the Six-Day War [And Response].”** Vol.69, No.3 (July, 2005), pp.811-820.

EPKENHANS, MICHAEL

“Krupp and the Imperial German Navy, 1898-1914: A Reassessment.” Vol.64, No.2 (April, 2000), pp.335-369.

EPSTEIN, KATHERINE C.

“ ‘No One can Afford to Say ‘Damn the Torpedoes’: Battle Tactics and the U.S. Naval History before World War I.” Vol.77, No.2 (April, 2013), pp.491-520.

ERICKSON, EDWARD J.

“Strength against Weakness: Ottoman Military Effectiveness at Gallipoli, 1915.” Vol.65, No.4 (October, 2001), pp.981-1011. In contrast to most studies, the author concentrates on Turkish preparations and performance, showing that the peninsula was heavily fortified and defended by the Empire’s finest divisions.

ESDAILE, CHARLES

“Review Essay: Recent Writing on Napoleon and His Wars.” Vol.73, No.1 (January, 2009), pp.209-220. Contains four works that cover the struggle specifically between Britain and France from 1792 to 1815, Napoleon’s (1769-1821) skill as a commander on all levels of warfare, and the guerrilla war in Spain.

“Spain 1808 – Iraq 2003: Some Thoughts on the Use and Abuse of History.” Vol.74, No.1 (January, 2010), pp.173-188. Disputes comparisons of Napoleon’s intervention in Spain, George Bush’s (r.2001-2009) intervention in Iraq, and the subsequent counterinsurgency campaigns, arguing that they are based on false notions about the war in Spain.

“Review Essay: Recent Works of Note on the Peninsular War (1808-1815).” Vol.74, No.4 (October, 2010), pp.1243-1252.

EWER, PETER

“The British Campaign in Greece 1941: Assumptions about the Operational Art and Their Influence on Strategy.” Vol.76, No.3 (July, 2012), pp.727-745. Inquires into the British decision to dispatch an expeditionary force to Greece and what it tells us about contemporary British Army doctrine.

EZOV, AMIRAM

“The Crossing Challenge: The Suez Canal Crossing by the Israeli Defense Forces during the

Yom Kippur War of 1973.” Vol.82, No.2 (April, 2018), pp.461-490. Compares the setting of objectives, planning, and execution of the Egyptian Army’s crossing with that of the Israeli Defense Forces.

E

FAGAN, BRENNEN

With Horwood, Ian; MacKay, Niall; Price, Christopher; Richards, Ed, and Wood, A. Jamie, **“Bootstrapping the Battle of Britain.”** Vol.84, No.1 (January, 2020), pp.151-186. Using the statistical technique of weighted bootstrapping to provide a quantified assessment of the likelihood of German achievement of air superiority.

FANNING, WILLIAM J., Jr.

“The Origin of the Term ‘Blitzkrieg’: Another View.” Vol.61, No.2 (April, 1997), pp.283-302.

FAUST, DREW GILPIN

“The 2006 George C. Marshall Lecture in Military History: ‘Numbers on Top of Numbers’: Counting the Civil War Dead.” Vol.70, No.4 (October, 2006), pp.995-1009. The scale and destructiveness of the United States Civil War generated the assumption that the government had an obligation to accurately name and count the military dead.

FAUTUA, DAVID T.

“The ‘Long Pull’ Army: NSC 68, the Korean War, and the Creation of the Cold War Army.” Vol.61, No.1 (January, 1997), pp.93-120. Endeavors to distinguish the changes to the U.S. Army in the early 1950s resulting from National Security Council paper 68 from those prompted by the Korean War.

FEDOROWICH, KENT

“ ‘Caught in the Crossfire’: Sir Gerald Campbell, Lord Beaverbrook and the Near Demise of the British Commonwealth Air Training Plan, May-October 1940.” Vol.79, No.1 (January, 2015), pp.37-68. The program was threatened by intemperate remarks by Lord Beaverbrook (1879-1964) which rattled Anglo-Canadian relations.

FERRARO, WILLIAM M.

“Old and New Views of Ulysses S. Grant: The Soldier and the Man.” Vol.83, No.1 (January, 2019), pp.195-212.

FERREIRO, LARRIE D.

“Mahan and the ‘English Club’ of Lima, Peru: The Genesis of *The Influence of Sea Power upon History*.” Vol.72, No.3 (July, 2008), pp.901-906.

“Horatio Nelson never Wrote ‘A Ship’s a Fool to Fight a Fort’: It was Jackie Fisher Who Invented the Attribution.” Vol.80, No.3 (July, 2016), pp.855-856.

FERRELL, HENRY C., Jr.

“Guns for Vermont: Military Land Acquisition in the 1920s.” Vol.61, No.1 (January, 1997), pp.31-47. Presents the remarkable achievement of Vermont Senator, Frank Lester Greene 1870-1930), of arranging for the purchase of additional land for Fort Ethan Allen at a time of severely constrained defense budgets.

FERRIS, JOHN

“Fighter Defence before Fighter Command: The Rise of Strategic Air Defence in Great Britain, 1917-1934.” Vol.63, No.4 (October, 1999), pp.845-884. Attests to the fact that the R.A.F. developed a sophisticated defense system against enemy bombers prior to the development of radar, laying the foundation for victory in the Battle of Britain.

FINCH, MICHAEL P.M.

“Edward Mead Earle and the Unfinished *Makers of Modern Strategy*.” Vol.80, No.3 (July, 2016), pp.781-814.

“Theodore Ropp’s *Makers of Modern Strategy* Revisited and the Course of Military History, 1945-1981.” Vol.82, No.4 (October, 2018), pp.1231-1257. Though it was never completed, Theodore Ropp’s (1911-2000) project to update his 1943 edition reflected some of the ways in which military history had developed since the conclusion of World War II.

FINO, STEVEN A.

“Breaking the Trance: The Perils of Technological Exuberance in the U.S. Air Force Entering Vietnam.” Vol.77, No.2 (April, 2013), pp.625-655. The response of individual units to the need for guns, in addition to missiles, for air-to-air combat.

FITZGERALD, DAVID

“Warriors Who don’t Fight: The Post-Cold War United States Army and debates over Peacekeeping Operations.” Vol.85, No.1 (January, 2021), pp.163-190.

FITZHARRIS, JOSEPH C.

“Field Officer Courts and the U.S. Civil War Military Justice.” Vol.68, No.1 (January, 2004), pp.47-72. Looks at the neglected topic of field officer courts which, by a Congressional Act of July, 1862, was supposed to replace the more arbitrary regimental courts-martial system.

FITZPATRICK, DAVID J.

“Emory Upton and the Citizen Soldier.” Vol.65, No.2 (April, 2001), pp.355-389. Refutes the accepted notion of Upton’s opposition to citizen-soldiers and democracy. The article includes a review of Upton’s (1839-1881) reflections on the military systems in India and Serbia.

“Emory Upton and the Army of Democracy.” Vol.77, No.2 (April, 2013), pp.463-490. Challenges the depiction of Emory Upton (1839-1881) as an anti-democracy militarist.

FITZSIMONDS, JAMES R.

“Aircraft Carrier versus Battleships in War and Myth: Demythologizing Carrier Air Dominance at Sea.” Vol.84, No.3 (July, 2020), pp.843-865. Claims that a closer examination of the evidence from World War II demonstrates that the battleship was far from powerless in the face of air strikes and that it was the battleship, and not the Aircraft Carrier, that determined control of the sea.

FLINT, Fr. JAMES, O.S.B.

“A Chaplain’s Diary: Reverend Victor Laketek, O.S.B., 1942-1946.” Vol.72, No.3 (July, 2008), pp.853-867. The account of a World War II Army Air Force Chaplain stationed in Maine, Florida, California, and Canton Island in the Pacific.

FOLEY, ROBERT T.

“Learning War’s Lessons: The German Army and the Battle of the Somme 1916.” Vol.75, No.2 (April, 2011), pp.471-504. Over the course of the Battle of the Somme, the Germans were forced by superior Anglo-French weaponry and tactics to improvise a new defensive tactical doctrine, the evolution of which is examined through the study of German ‘lessons-learned’ reports which display intellectual flexibility.

FORD, DOUGLAS

“British Intelligence on Japanese Army Moral during the Pacific War: Logical Analysis or Racial Stereotyping?” Vol.69, No.2 (April, 2005), pp.439-474.

FOREGGER, RICHARD

“Two Sketch Maps of the Auschwitz-Birkenau Extermination Camps.” Vol.59, No.4 (October, 1995), pp.687-696. Asks whether or not the sketch maps in question would have provided the Allies with adequate information for the bombing of gas chambers.

FORRESTER, CHARLES

“Field Marshal Montgomery’s Role in the Creation of the British 21st Army Group’s Combined Arms Doctrine for the Final Assault on Germany.” Vol.78, No.4 (October, 2014), pp.1295-1320.

FRANCE, JOHN

“Historiographical Essay: Recent Writing on Medieval Warfare: From the Fall of Rome to c.1300.” Vol.65, No.2 (April, 2001), pp.441-473. Primarily covering works that have been publishing in the last twenty-five years, the author reviews studies on the successor states to Rome, the Byzantine Empire, the thorny subject of feudalism, fortifications and siege operations, the naval dimension, the manner in which warfare was conducted in Europe during the High Middle Ages, 1000-1300, the employment of mercenaries, and the Crusades.

FRANK, JOSEPH ALLAN

With Duteau, Barbara, **“Measuring the Political Articulatness of United States Civil War Soldiers: The Wisconsin Militia.”** Vol.64, No.1 (January, 2000), pp.53-77.

FRIEDMAN, HAL M.

“Blue versus Orange: The United States Naval War College, Japan, and the Old Enemy in the Pacific, 1945-1946.” Vol.78, No.1 (January, 2014), pp.211-231. Reports on the delay in adjusting to post-war circumstances that meant that the War College curriculum remained a mixture of interwar and wartime doctrine during the early Cold War.

FRITZ, STEPHEN G.

“ ‘We are Trying...to Change the Face of the World’ – Ideology and Motivation in the Wehrmacht on the Eastern Front: The View from Below.” Vol.60, No.4 (October, 1996), pp.683-710. Appraises the influence of ‘positive’ National Socialist ideological beliefs on the average *Landser*’s motives to engage in combat.

FULLER, HOWARD J.

“Review Essay: Much in Little: John Ericsson and His Monitor Save the Republic.” Vol.83, No.3 (July, 2019), pp.861-864.

FULTON, MICHAEL S.

“The Siege of Montfort and Mamluk Artillery Technology in 1271: Integrating the Archaeology and Topography with the Narrative Sources.” Vol.83, No.3 (July, 2019), pp.689-717.
An investigation into the development of mechanical artillery, specifically the trebuchet, through the study of archaeologically unearthed projectiles and the suitability of the surrounding terrain for the deployment of trebuchets.

FUQUEA, DAVID C.

“Task Force One: The Wasted Assets of the United States Pacific Battleship Fleet, 1942.”

Vol.61, No.4 (October, 1997), pp.707-734. Explores the reasons behind Task Force One's battleships languishing as a last line of defense during the first year of the war following Pearl Harbor.

"Advantage Japan: The Imperial Japanese Navy's Superior High Seas Refueling Capability." Vol.84, No.1 (January, 2020), pp.213-235. Addresses an understudied factor that made the Japanese victories at Pearl Harbor and beyond possible, one that at least initially, was not available to the U.S. Navy.

G

GANZ, A. HARDING

"Questionable Objective: The Brittany Ports, 1944." Vol.59, No.1 (January, 1995), pp.77-96.

GARDNER, NIKOLAS

"Command and Control in the 'Great Retreat of 1914: The Disintegration of the British Cavalry Division.'" Vol.63, No.1 (January, 1999), pp.29-54. Suggests that the lack of experience in operating as a division, the division's unwieldy size, the inefficiency of its commander and staff, and the independent mindset of its brigade commanders prevented it from operating effectively.

GAT, MOSHE

"On the Use of Air Power and Its Effect on the Outbreak of the Six Day War." Vol.68, No.4 (October, 2004), pp.1187-1215. Insists that, whatever advantages Israel's increased reliance on air power following the Suez Campaign, 1956, it inadvertently led to a deterioration of Arab-Israeli relations. See also: Elron, Zeev and Gat, Moshe, "Remarks on Air Power and the Six-Day War [And Response]." Vol.69, No.3 (July, 2005), pp.811-820.

With Elron, Zeev, **"Remarks on Air Power and the Six-Day War [And Response]."** Vol.69, No.3 (July, 2005), pp.811-820.

GEISSLER, SUZANNE

"Professor Dennis Mahan Speaks out on West Point Chapel Issues, 1850." Vol.69, No.2 (April, 2005), pp.505-519. An 1850 letter from West Point professor to the Secretary of War in which Mahan (1802-1871) expressed his opposition to the academy's Chaplain always having to be Episcopalian and mandatory chapel attendance for staff.

GELLER, JAY HOWARD

"The Role of Military Administration in German-Occupied Belgium, 1940-1944." Vol.63, No.1 (January, 1999), pp.99-125. Attempts to determine how the German Military Administration viewed its role in occupying and governing the Kingdom of Belgium.

GENTILE, GIAN P.

“Document of Note: General Arnold and the Historians.” Vol.64, No.1 (January, 2000), pp.179-180. Concerning U.S. Army Air Force General ‘Hap’ Arnold’s (1886-1950) commissioning of a group of leading historians to determine whether strategic bombing could force Germany to capitulate by the spring of 1944.

“Shaping the Past Battlefield, ‘For the Future’: The United States Strategic Bombing Survey’s Evaluation of the American Air War against Japan.” Vol.64, No.4 (October, 2000), pp.1085-1112. Contests the image of the Bombing Survey as an impartial primary source, demonstrating that it was shaped by particular circumstances, bias, and political factors, most notably the effort to justify an independent Air Force.

GERMANI, IAN

“Terror in the Army: Representatives on Mission and Military Discipline.” Vol.75, No.3 (July, 2011), pp.733-768. The French National Convention’s Representatives on Mission and the exercise of military justice in the French Revolutionary armies.

GERSHOVICH, MOSHE

“The Ait Ya’qub Incident and the Crisis of French Military Policy in Morocco.” Vol.62, No.1 (January, 1998), pp.57-73. Though small in scale, the author suggests that defeat at Ait Ya’qub was the final straw that led the French government to call into question the twin concepts of *Maroc utile* and peaceful penetration.

GIANGRECO, D.M.

“Casualty Projections for the U.S. Invasion of Japan, 1945-1946: Planning and Policy Implications.” Vol.61, No.3 (July, 1997), pp.521-581. Demonstrates that those historians who have rejected President Harry Truman’s (1945-1953) claim that he expected huge losses from an invasion of the Japanese Home Islands have based their conclusions on a combination of superficial research in the mass of related documents and specifically misinterpreting planning documents.

GIBBY, BRYAN

“The Best Little Army.” Vol.77, No.1 (January, 2013), pp.173-201. Surveys the results of the work of the U.S. Korean Military Advisory Group (K.M.A.G.) prior to the outbreak of the Korean War.

GILBIN, DANIEL F.

“Seeds of Victory: Satisfying the needs of the Red Army and the Soviet State during the Formation of the Kursk Salient, February – May 1943.” Vol.84, No.4 (October, 2020), pp.1157-1188. Reviews an example of the Soviet Army’s practice of incorporating the civilian population in the rear areas near the frontlines in various forms of support, including the role of re-installed civilian government in recently

liberated territory.

GILL, JOHN H.

“Review Essay: Glimpses Inside Pakistan’s Elusive Army.” Vol.77, No.1 (January, 2013), pp.294-298. Covers five recent works on the Army of Pakistan, a very difficult subject to study due to a lack of access to archival sources.

GIOIA, PHILIP

“When ‘The Institution was Heard from’ in World War II: V.M.I. Alumni on the War Department General Staff, 1939-1945.” Vol.78, No.4 (October, 2014), pp.1385-1394.

GLANTZ, DAVID M.

“Soviet Military Strategy during the Second Period of War (November 1942 – December 1943): A Reappraisal.” Vol.60, No.1 (January, 1996), pp.115-150. Seeks to clarify the broader strategic context of the goals the Soviets sought, but failed, to achieve during the ‘Second Period of the Great Patriotic War.’

“Historiographical Essay: The Red Army at War, 1941-1945: Sources and Interpretations.” Vol.62, No.3 (July, 1998), pp.595-617.

“Review Essay: Stalingrad Revisited.” Vol.72, No.3 (July, 2008), pp.907-910.

GLANTZ, MARY

“An Officer and a Diplomat? The Ambiguous Position of Philip R. Faymonville and United States-Soviet Relations, 1941-1943.” Vol.72, No.1 (January, 2008), pp.141-177. Appraises the role played by Colonel Philip Faymonville (1888-1962) in U.S.-Soviet relations, an officer who served as the United States’ first military attaché and as expediter of Lend-Lease Aid during the war, but who had a contentious relationship with U.S. diplomatic personnel.

GOLDMAN, DAVID I.

“The Generals and the Germs: The Army Leadership’s Response to Nixon’s Review of Chemical and Biological Warfare Policies in 1969.” Vol.73, No.2 (April, 2009), pp.531-569. The response of U.S. Army leadership to President Richard Nixon (1969-1974) unilateral elimination of biological warfare agents, retaining only a defensive research program, as well as placing limitations on the chemical weapons.

“ ‘Charlie’ Chaplains in the Great War: Chaplains’ Experiences in the U.S. Army, 1917-1919.” Vol.84, No.2 (April, 2020), pp.395-426. Due to budget cuts, the section of the U.S. Army’s official history of participation in world War I concerning the service of Chaplains was never completed. Nevertheless, the material for such a section in the form of letters, photos, and documents has survived and provides a largely overlooked source for the United States involvement in the Great War.

GOLDSTEIN, CORA SOL

“A Comparative Analysis of Cultural Control: The German Military Occupation of France (1940-1942) and the American Military Occupation of Germany (1945-1949).” Vol.80, No.4 (October, 2016), pp.1083-1116. Although their respective agendas were inspired by opposite ideologies, the author proposes that the mechanisms of control over information by both occupiers shared significant similarities.

GORDON, ANDREW

“Time after Time in the Horn of Africa.” Vol.74, No.1 (January, 2010), pp.107-144. Provides an examination of the British joint, amphibious assault on the Dervish stronghold of Illig, Somaliland, in 1904.

GORDON, DAVID M.

“Historiographical Essay: The China-Japan War, 1931-1945.” Vol.70, No.1 (January, 2006), pp.137-182.

GOULTER, CHRISTINE J.M.

“The Greek Civil War: A National Army’s Counter-Insurgency Triumph.” Vol.78, No.3 (July, 2014), pp.1017-1055. Challenges the assumption that victory resulted from Anglo-American training and equipment, rather than the Greek National Army’s successful development of an effective counter-insurgency strategy.

GRANDSTAFF, MARK R.

“Making the Military American: Advertising, Reform, and the Demise of an Antistanding Military Tradition, 1945-1955.” Vol.60, No.2 (April, 1996), pp.299-323. Establishes that, while concerns over the spread of communism and nuclear war played a role, both reforms within the military and a national public relations campaign also helped citizens view the armed forces as an acceptable American institution.

GRANDSTAFF, MARK R.

“Preserving the ‘Habits and Usages of War’: William Tecumseh Sherman, Professional Reform and the U.S. Army Officer Corps, 1865-1881, Revisited.” Vol.62, No.3 (July, 1998), pp.521-545.

GRANT, JONATHAN

“The Sword of the Sultan: Ottoman Arms Imports, 1854-1914.” Vol.66, No.1 (January, 2002), pp.9-36. Attempts to ascertain why the Ottoman Empire changed from being self-sufficient in the production of armaments, including warships, to relying entirely on imports by 1914.

GRAVES, DONALD E.

“Why the White House was Burned: An Investigation into the British Destruction of Public Buildings at Washington in August 1814.” Vol.76, No.4 (October, 2012), pp.1095-1127.

Encrusted with mythology by nineteenth century historians motivated by national chauvinism, the article considers whether the actions of the British forces were justified by the contemporary laws of war and / or as retaliation for the U.S. destruction of Canadian towns.

“Review Essay: U.S. Army Campaigns of the War of 1812.” Vol.79, No.1 (January, 2015), pp.181-185.

GRAY, PETER

“A Culture of Official Squeamishness? Britain’s Air Ministry and the Strategic Air Offensive against Germany?” Vol.77, No.4 (October, 2013), pp.1349-1377. Endeavors to determine if the reluctance of the Air Ministry to issue a campaign medal for the R.A.F.s strategic bombing campaign was due to a discomfort with the tactics of area bombing, particularly in the wake of the attack on Dresden.

GREENHALGH, ELIZABETH

“ ‘Parade Ground Soldiers’: French Army Assessments of the British on the Somme in 1916.” Vol.63, No.2 (April, 1999), pp.283-312. Assesses the attitudes among the *Poilus* towards their British counterparts in a battle in which roughly equal numbers of French and British troops fought alongside each other.

“Myth and memory: Sir Douglas Haig and the Imposition of Allied Unified Command in March, 1918.” Vol.68, No.3 (July, 2004), pp.771-820. Debunks Field Marshal Haig’s (1861-1928) claim that he deserves credit for Chief of the French General Staff, Ferdinand Foch’s (1851-1929), appointment as Allied Supreme Commander.

“General Ferdinand Foch and Unified Allied Command in 1918.” Vol.79, No.4 (October, 2015), pp.997-1023. Examines the actions and decisions of General Foch (1851-1929), including four during the German Spring Offensives, two during the Allied counteroffensive, and one during the armistice negotiations.

GREENHALGH, MICHAEL

“French Military Reconnaissance in the Ottoman Empire during the Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries as a Source for Our Knowledge of Ancient Monuments.” Vol.66, No.2 (April, 2002), pp.359-388. Displays how a combination of the intellectual background of many French officers and the Ottoman reuse of Classical Greek and Roman ruins for military purposes resulted in valuable archaeological information in reports preserved in French military archives.

GREY, JEFFREY

“The Formation of the Commonwealth Division, 1950-1951.” Vol.81, No.4 (October, 2017), pp.1097-1107. The saga of the military and political challenges of forming a division composed of units from the Australian, British, Canadian, Indian, and New Zealand armies.

GRIMES, SHAWN

“The Baltic and Admiralty War Planning, 1906-1907.” Vol.74, No.2 (April, 2010), pp.407-437. Reassessment of the Great Britain’s Ballard Committee’s 1907 War Plans against Germany in the context of Norway’s gaining independence in 1905.

GRIMSLEY, MARK

“Review Essay: In Not so Dubious Battle: The Motivations of American Civil War Soldiers.” Vol.62, No.1 (January, 1998), pp.175-188.

“Review Essay: The American Military History Master Narrative: Three Textbooks on the American Military Experience.” Vol.79, No.3 (July, 2015), pp.783-802.

GRODZINSKI, JOHN R.

“Review Essay: Opening Shots from the Bicentenary of the War of 1812: A Canadian Perspective on Recent Titles.” Vol.76, No.4 (October, 2012), pp.1187-1201.

GRUMMITT, DAVID

“Flodden 1513: Re-Examining British Warfare at the End of the Middle Ages.” Vol.82, No.1 (January, 2018), pp.9-28. Asserts that the English Army that fought the forces lead by King James IV (1473-1513) on 9 September, 1513, was more modern than its Scottish counterpart, just as its commander, Thomas Howard, the Earl of Surrey (1443-1524), was more of a ‘Renaissance General’ than James IV.

GUILMARTIN, JOHN F., Jr.

“The Earliest Shipboard Gunpowder Ordnance: An Analysis of its Technical Parameters and Tactical Capabilities.” Vol.71, No.3 (July, 2007), pp.649-669. Various obstacles presented difficulties to the effective use of early cannons onboard ships, but shortly after 1400 these were swiftly overcome, so that ordnance became an increasingly important weapon on Mediterranean war galleys and Portuguese caravels.

GUNSBURG, JEFFREY A.

“The Battle of Gembloux, 14-15 May 1940: The ‘Blitzkrieg’ Checked.” Vol.64, No.1 (January, 2000), pp.97-140. Uses an examination of the effectiveness of the French forces holding a defensive position at the Belgium town of Gembloux as a test case for French doctrine and performance.

“La Grand Illusion: Belgian and Dutch Strategy Facing Germany, 1919 – May, 1940.” Vol.78,

No.1 (January, 2014), pp.101-158; Vol.78, No.2 (April, 2014), pp.605-671.

GÜVENÇ, SERHAT

With Uyar, Mesut, **“One Battle and Two Accounts: The Turkish Brigade at Kunu-ri in November 1950.”** Vol.80, No.4 (October, 2016), pp.1117-1147. Assesses the impact of U.S. military assistance provided to the Turkish Army and why the official U.S. and Turkish accounts of the Battle of Kunu-ri / Chongchon differ significantly.

GYUCHA, ATTILA

With Lee, Wayne E. and Rózsa, Zoltán, **“The Mongol Campaign in Hungary, 1241-1242: The Archaeology and History of Nomadic Conquest and Massacre.”** Vol.83, No.4 (October, 2019), pp.1021-1066. This article integrates conquest process theory, literary evidence, and data from substantial new archaeological work to explore the motivation and nature of Mongol invasions and the consequences for rural settlements on the Great Hungarian Plain.

H

HADLEY, GREGORY

With Oglethorpe, James, **“Mackay’s ‘Betrayal’: Solving the Mystery of the ‘Sado Island Prisoner-of-War Massacre’.”** Vol.71, No.2 (April, 2007), pp.441-464. Conclusively demonstrates that the suppression of a supposed Japanese massacre of Allied prisoners working in a gold mine in Aikawa on Sado island in 1945 as presented in James MacKay’s 1996 book, *Betrayal in High Places*, is an intentional forgery.

HACKEMER, KURT

“Wartime Trauma and the Lure of the Frontier: Civil War Veterans in Dakota Territory.” Vol.81, No.1 (January, 2017), pp.75-103. Surveys a sample of 6,000 veterans based on the 1885 Dakota Territory census.

HAGEMANN, KAREN

“Mobilizing Women for War: The History, Historiography, and Memory of German Women’s War Service in the Two World Wars.” Vol.75, No.4 (October, 2011), pp.1055-1093. An effort to understand why the large-scale mobilization of women in Germany during the course of both world wars is missing from the historiography.

HAGGARD, DIXIE RAY

“The First Invasion of Georgia and the myth of Westo Power, 1656-1684.” Vol.86, No.3 (July, 2022), pp.533-556. Narrates the two decades long assault on Native American towns of central Georgia

by a mysterious people known as the ‘Westos’, seeking to better understand the reasons for their success.

HAGSTROM, JACOB

“**‘My Soldiers Above All’: Justifying Violence against Noncombatants in French Algeria, 1830-1847.**” Vol.86, No.1 (January, 2022), pp.32-53. Shows that French officers participating in the conquest of Algeria defended the actions of their soldiers against civilians, which were motivated by fear, anger, and greed, on the basis of the necessity of preserving their lives and the lives of indigenous allies.

HALE, BRIAN J.

“**Review Essay: Recent Literature on the Crusades.**” Vol.75, No.4 (October, 2011), pp.1225-1272. Includes twenty-three recent titles that cover a wide variety of topics, such as the pre-Crusades struggles of Byzantium with the Turks, the Albigensian Crusade, fortifications in the Holy Land, logistics, and the role of women.

HALL, BRIAN N.

“**Technological Adaptation in Global Conflict: The British Army and Communications beyond the Western Front, 1914-1918.**” Vol.78, No.1 (January, 2014), pp.37-71.

HALL, JOHN W.

“**An Irregular Reconsideration of George Washington and the American Military Tradition.**” Vol.78, No.3 (July, 2014), pp.961-993. Attempts to reconcile the contradictory interpretations of George Washington’s (1732-1799) approach to and performance in the conduct of war.

HALPERIN, CHARLES J.

“**Ivan IV’s State Cossacks.**” Vol.82, No.2 (April, 2018), pp.357-371. During the reign of Ivan IV (1533-1584) Muscovite ‘State Cossacks’ lived in urban enclaves, fought under the command of a government-appointed colonels, most were infantry, and a large percentage were armed with firearms.

HAMMOND, RICHARD

“**Fighting under a Different Flag: Multinational Naval Cooperation and Submarine Warfare in the Mediterranean, 1940-1944.**” Vol.80, No.2 (April, 2016), pp.447-476. In contrast to their experience in the British home theatre, the submarines in the Mediterranean operated by the exiled governments of the Free French, Greece, the Netherlands, Poland, and Yugoslavia, along with those of Italy beginning in 1943, found it difficult to cooperate with the Royal Navy, as well as each other.

HANCOCK, ELEANOR

“**Ernst Rohm and the Experience of World War I.**” Vol.60, No.1 (January, 1996), pp.39-60.

Inspects the role of the Great War service in the political rhetoric of the Chief of Staff of the National Socialist Sturmabteilung, including Rohm's version of his war experiences as recounted in his 1928 autobiography.

With Stockings, Craig, **"Reconsidering the *Luftwaffe* in Greece, 1941."** Vol.76, No.3 (July, 2012), pp.747-773. Despite its complete dominance of the Greek skies, the terror it inspired, and its almost continual operations against Allied positions, the author challenges the assumption that the *Luftwaffe* had a decisive impact on the campaign.

HANLEY, BRIAN

With Burrell, Robert S. **"The Myth of Iwo Jima: A Rebuttal [And Response]."** Vol.69, No.3 (July, 2005), pp.801-809.

HANSON, VICTOR DAVIS

"Historiographical Essay: The Status of Ancient Military History: Traditional Work, Recent Research, and On-Going Controversies." Vol.63, No.2 (April, 1999), pp.379-413. A very thorough survey covering works on every conceivable topic concerning the armed forces and conduct of warfare in the age of ancient Greece and Rome.

HANTRAYE, JACQUES

"The Silence of the Woods: The 1815 Murder of a Prussian Soldier in Western France." Vol.80, No.1 (January, 2016), pp.57-76. Focuses on the murder of a Prussian soldier on 22 July, 1815, outside of the village of Unverre, located roughly ninety miles southwest of Paris, as a means of exploring the interactions between the forces of occupation and the civilian population of postwar France.

HARARI, YUVAL NOAH

"Strategy and Supply in Fourteenth-Century Western European Invasion Campaigns." Vol.64, No.2 (April, 2000), pp.297-333. Seeks to understand both how food for men and animals was ensured by logistical trains versus plunder, and to what extent the chosen or imposed form of supply placed restrictions on strategy.

"Martial Illusions: War and Disillusionment in Twentieth-Century and Renaissance Military memoirs." Vol.69, No.1 (January, 2005), pp.43-72. Sets forth the notion that the change in the image of war from one that was positive and romantic to disillusionment owed more to soldiers' self-perceptions and expectations than developments in technology produced.

"Armchairs, Coffee, and Authority: Eye-witnesses and Flesh-witnesses Speak about War, 1100-1200." Vol.74, No.1 (January, 2010), pp.53-78. The possibility and utility of understanding the experience of war from first-hand accounts.

HARRINGTON, HUGH T.

With Jordan, Jim, **“The Other Mystery Shot of the American Revolution: Did Timothy Murphy Kill British Brigadier General Simon Fraser at Saratoga?”** Vol.74, No.4 (October, 2010), pp.1037-1045. Attempts to disentangle the various accounts of the Battle of Saratoga, 1777, to determine the origins and validity of the Murphy legend, and its repetition by subsequent historians, along with the physics of musket fire.

HARRIS, J.P.

“The Early Military History of the Second Indochina War and the Mayor Thesis.” Vol.85, No.3 (July, 2021), pp.734-763. Contests the interpretation of Mark Moyar that by mid-1962 the South Vietnamese government was conducting a successful counter-insurgency campaign that was cut short by the overthrow of Ngo Dinh Diem (1901-1963).

HARRISON, RICHARD W.

“Soviet Planning for War, 1936-1941: The ‘Preventative Attack’ Thesis in Historical Context.” Vol.83, No.3 (July, 2019), pp.769-794.

HARRISON, STEOHAN

With Tunwell, David Passmore, **“An Evaluation of Allied Intelligence in the Tactical Bombing of German Supply Depots during the Normandy Campaign, 1944.”** Vol.84, No.3 (July, 2020), pp.825-842. Sets forth the proposition that had Allied intelligence regarding German supply activities been more accurate, a decisive crippling of German logistics could have enabled Allied troops to achieve victory sooner than was the case.

HATZIVASSILIOU, EVANTHIS

“Cold War Pressures, Regional Strategies, and Relative Decline: British Military and Strategic Planning for Cyprus, 1950-1960.” Vol.73, No.4 (October, 2009), pp.1143-1166. Highlights the significance of Cyprus as a secure base in the Middle East for Great Britain during the Cold War, particularly after the loss of the Suez Canal.

HAUN, PHIL

“Foundation Bias: The Impact of the Air Corps Tactical School on United States Air Force Doctrine.” Vol.85, No.2 (April, 2021), pp.453-474. Contrasts the steadfast belief in the role of strategic bombing at the Air Corps Tactical School with the effectiveness of joint operations demonstrated in the Korean, Vietnam, Iraq, and Afghanistan wars.

HAUSER, MARK T.

“ ‘A Violent Desire for Amusements’: Boxing, Libraries, and the Distribution and Management of Welfare During the First World War.” Vol.86, No.4 (October, 2022), pp.883-913. Illustrates the impact of U.S. wartime recreation programs during World War I on the development of mass culture.

HAWKINS, JOHN M.

“The Costs of Artillery: Eliminating Harassment and Interdiction Fire During the Vietnam War.” Vol.70, No.1 (January, 2006), pp.91-122. Determines that the reason that the use of U.S. artillery for harassment and interdiction had been all but eliminated by June, 1970, was due to budgetary pressures and not from concerns over collateral damage.

HAYWARD, JOEL

“Too Little, Too Late: An Analysis of Hitler’s Failure in August 1942 to Damage Soviet Oil Production.” Vol.64, No.3 (July, 2000), pp.769-794. Claims that, had Adolf Hitler not been so fixated on Stalingrad, *Luftwaffe* assets could have been used to significantly disrupt the supply of oil to Soviet factories and forces.

HEIKKINEN, JARMO K.

With Kuronen, Jarmo O. and Lewis, Aidan Mark, **“A Research Note on Military Medicine in Finland, 1555-1945.”** Vol.85, No.3 (July, 2021), pp.765-770.

HEIN, DAVID

“Vulnerable: H.M.S. *Prince of Wales* in 1941.” Vol.77, No.3 (July, 2013), pp.955-989. The storied career of the H.M.S. *Prince of Wales*, involving fighting the K.M.S. *Bismarck*, the first Churchill-F.D.R. summit, service in the Mediterranean, and its sinking off the coast of Malaya.

HENRIOT, CHRISTIAN

“The Battle of Shanghai (January-March 1932): A Study in the Space-Time of War.” Vol.85, No.1 (January, 2021), pp.76-94. Focuses on the impact of urban and rural environments on the manner in which the Imperial Japanese and Nationalist Chinese forces fought one another.

HERRERA, RICARDO A.

“Self-Governance and the American Citizen as Soldier, 1775-1861.” Vol.65, No.1 (January, 2001), pp.21-52. Attempts to understand the conception of the relationship between military service and the Republic held by enlisted men, including regulars, militiamen, and volunteers, from the Revolution to the first year of the Civil War.

“‘[T]he zealous activity of Capt. Lee’: Light-Horse Harry Lee and *Petite Guerre*.” Vol.79, No.1 (January, 2015), pp.9-36. Captain ‘Light Horse Harry’ Lee’s (1756-1818) foraging mission in Delaware and Maryland, during February and March, 1778, as an example of command at the company level.

HERWIG, HOLGER H.

“Germany and the ‘Short War’ Illusion: Toward a New Interpretation?” Vol.66, No.3 (July,

2002), pp.681-693. A reassessment based on newly accessed documents from the *Reichsarchiv* in the former East Germany suggest that Imperial Germany's military leaders recognized that a conflict that they initiated might last up to two or more years.

HEUER, JENNIFER

"Soldiers as Victims or Villains? Demobilization, Masculinity, and Family in French Royalist Pamphlets, 1814-1815." Vol.80, No.1 (January, 2016), pp.121-144.

HICKEY, DONALD R.

"Historiographical Essay: The War of 1812: Still a Forgotten Conflict?" Vol.65, No.3 (July, 2001), pp.741-769.

"1812: Remembering a Forgotten War." Vol.76, No.4 (October, 2012), pp.969-972.

" 'War Hawks': Using Newspapers to Trace a Phrase, 1792-1812." Vol.78, No.2 (April, 2014), pp.725-740.

"Research Note: The Quasi-War." Vol.85, No.2 (April, 2021), pp.475-484. Traces the origins and use of the term 'Quasi-War' to identify the naval conflict fought between the United States and Revolutionary France, 1798-1801.

HILL, ALEXANDER

"British Lend Lease Aid and the Soviet War Effort, June 1941 – June 1942." Vol.71, No.3 (July, 2007), pp.773-808. Measures the significance of the aid provided by Great Britain during the First Moscow Protocol to the end of June, 1942.

HINES, JASON

"Sins of Omission and Commission: A Reassessment of the Role of Intelligence in the Battle of Jutland." Vol.72, No.4 (October, 2008), pp.1117-1153. Sets forth the explanation that it was the higher priority that the Admiralty placed on security, at the expense of operational use, that interfered with British Admirals successfully exploiting the fruits of the Admiralty's cryptographic organization at the Battle of Jutland.

HITCHENS, RALPH M.

"Review Essay: Casting Light on a Dark Territory." Vol.80, No.3 (July, 2016), pp.857-862. Works concerning cyber warfare.

HOBBINS, PETER

"Engineering the Fighter Pilot: Aviators, Anti-G suits, and Allied Air Power, 1940-53." Vol.84, No.1 (January, 2020), pp.115-149. Probes the failure of the Cotton Aerodynamic Anti-G suit

championed by the Australian Air Force to be adopted by the British and United States Air Forces during the period marked by World War II and the Korean War.

HOFFENAAAR, JAN

“Hannibal ante portas: The Soviet Military Threat and the Build-up of the Dutch Armed Forces, 1948-1958.” Vol.66, No.1 (January, 2002), pp.163-191.

HOFFMAN, F.G.

“To Drone or not to Drone.” Vol.81, No.2 (April, 2017), pp.535-538.

HOFMANN, GEORGE F.

“The Tactical and Strategic Use of Attaché Intelligence: The Spanish Civil War and the U.S. Army’s Misguided Quest for a Modern Tank Doctrine.” Vol.62, No.1 (January, 1998), pp.101-134. Asserts that the analysis of the employment of tanks in the war was distorted by the cultural bias of the infantry, cavalry, and artillery branch chiefs, leaving the U.S. Army without an armored doctrine on the eve of World War II.

HOGAN, DAVID W.

“Head and Heart: The Dilemmas of American Attitudes towards War.” Vol.75, No.4 (October, 2011), pp.1021-1054. Modernist challenges to the old uniform attitudes towards war in a larger, more pluralistic society has made consensus difficult, if not impossible, to reach.

HOLIZIMMER, KEVIN C.

“Walter Krueger, Douglas MacArthur, and the Pacific War: The Wakde-Sarmi Campaign as a Case Study.” Vol.59, No.4 (October, 1995), pp.661-685. Uses the Wakde-Sarmi operation in Northern New Guinea, 17-21 May, 1944, to demonstrate that General Krueger’s (1881-1967) performance as a commander has to be judged within the context of circumstances beyond anyone’s control.

HOLMES, TERENCE M.

“‘One Throw of the Gambler’s Dice’: A Comment on Holger Herwig’s View of the Schlieffen Plan.” Vol.67, No.2 (April, 2003), pp.513-516.

“Classical Blitzkrieg: The Untimely Modernity of Schlieffen’s Cannae Programme.” Vol.67, No.3 (July, 2003), pp.745-771. Reveals that the Chief of the Prussian General Staff, Count Alfred von Schlieffen (1891-1906), only adopted the Cannae paradigm in 1909, four years *after* he had formulated his plans for war with France, and that this paradigm inadvertently fit subsequent concepts for mechanized warfare.

HOLWITT, JOEL I.

“Review Essay: Reappraising the Interwar U.S. Navy.” Vol.76, No.1 (January, 2012), pp.193-210. New studies demonstrate that the interwar U.S. was frequently led by innovative leaders, willing to experiment with new technologies and able to use fleet exercises and an internal review process to creatively, but realistically, generate a strategy that worked within the geographical and treaty constraints of an expected war in the Pacific.

“The Loss of U.S.S. *Thresher*: Technological and Cultural Change and the Cold War U.S. Navy.” Vol.82, No.3 (July, 2018), pp.843-872. Advances the proposition that the response to the 10 April, 1963, loss of the U.S.S. *Thresher* with all hands led to a cultural shift within the U.S. naval officer development from a ‘generalist’ to a ‘technical specialist’ model.

HONE, TRENT

“The Evolution of Fleet Tactical Doctrine in the U.S. Navy, 1922-1941.” Vol.67, No.4 (October, 2003), pp.1107-1148. Establishes how the Navy intended to use the battleships stationed at Pearl Harbor in battle, including Admiral Husband E. Kimmel’s (1882-1968) plans for a decisive fleet engagement in the Central Pacific.

“Learning to Win: The Evolution of U.S. Navy Tactical Doctrine During the Guadalcanal Campaign.” Vol.82, No.3 (July, 2018), pp.817-841. Challenges the notion that the U.S. Navy suffered complete failure in surface night combat, contending, instead, that it was particularly skilled in integrating combat lessons and, accordingly, modifying its tactical doctrine.

HOOPER, CANDICE SHY

“The War that Made Hollywood: How the Spanish-American War Saved the U.S. Film Industry.” Vol.76, No.1 (January, 2012), pp.69-97. By 1897 the embryonic film industry was in decline, but the industry’s exploitation of the public’s interest in the explosion of the U.S.S. *Maine* and the subsequent war made the business of movies lucrative once more.

HORWOOD, IAN

With Fagan, Brennen; MacKay, Niall; Price, Christopher; Richards, Ed, and Wood, A. Jamie, **“Bootstrapping the Battle of Britain.”** Vol.84, No.1 (January, 2020), pp.151-186. Using the statistical technique of weighted bootstrapping to provide a quantified assessment of the likelihood of German achievement of air superiority.

HOSLER, JOHN D.

“Status Report: Pre-Modern Military History in American Doctoral Programs: Figures and Implications.” Vol.82, No.2 (April, 2018), pp.565-582.

HUGHES, DANIEL J.

“Schlichting, Schlieffen, and the Prussian Theory of War in 1914.” Vol.59, No.2 (April, 1995), pp.257-277. Reviews the work of the controversial and influential Prussian Army theorist and critic of Alfred von Schlieffen, General Sigismund von Schlichting (1829-1909).

HUGHES, GERAINT

“Demythologising Dhofar: British Policy, Military Strategy, and Counter-Insurgency in Oman, 1963-1976.” Vol.79, No.2 (April, 2015), pp.423-456. Demonstrates that the UK backed C.O.I.N. operations of the Sultanate of Oman placed a heavier reliance on military force than civil engagement and that specific historical circumstances make the ‘lessons learned’ less applicable for other conflicts.

HUGHES, MATTHEW

“Logistics and the Chaco War: Bolivia versus Paraguay, 1932-1935.” Vol.69, No.2 (April, 2005), pp.411-437. Employs a broad definition of logistics that includes the acquisition of matériel before the outbreak of war, as well as the establishment of national and international supply lines during the war.

HUGHES, MATTHEW

“War without Mercy? American Armed Forces and the Deaths of Civilians during the Battle for Saipan, 1944.” Vol.75, No.1 (January, 2011), pp.93-123. Despite this being the first Central Pacific Island on which U.S. forces encountered large numbers of civilians, including Japanese and Korean migrants, and native Chamorro and Carolinian peoples, the military histories of the battle for Saipan generally neglect how noncombatants were treated.

“Women, Violence, and the Arab Revolt in Palestine, 1936-39.” Vol.83, No.2 (April, 2019), pp.487-507. Seeks to understand what part Palestinian women played in the Arab Revolt, how British colonial pacification affected the latter, and how British soldiers treated Palestinian women.

HUGHES, THOMAS

“Learning to Fight: Bill Halsey and the Early American Destroyer Force.” Vol.77, No.1 (January, 2013), pp.71-90. The outcome of Admiral Halsey’s (1882-1959) service under Admiral William Sims (1858-1936) as a destroyer Captain, 1914-1922.

HULL, MARK M.

“The Irish Interlude: German Intelligence in Ireland, 1939-1943.” Vol.66, No.3 (July, 2002), pp.695-717.

HUNTER, ANTWAIN K.

“ ‘Patriots, Cowards, and Men Disloyal at Heart’: Labor and Politics at the Springfield Armory, 1861-1865.” Vol.84, No.1 (January, 2020), pp.51-81. Demonstrates that while the Springfield Armory was vocal in its support for the cause of the Union during the Civil War, it nevertheless contained employees who expressed criticism of the Lincoln administration and support for the Confederacy.

HUNTER, MARK C.

“The U.S. Naval Academy and Its Summer Cruises: Professionalization in the Antebellum U.S. Navy, 1845-1861.” Vol.70, No.4 (October, 2006), pp.963-994.

HURL-EAMON, JENNINE

“Husbands, Sons, Brothers, and Neighbors: Eighteenth-Century Soldiers’ Efforts to Maintain Civilian Ties.” Vol.86, No.2 (April, 2022), pp.299-320. Endeavors to understand the conflict between army regulations restricting British servicemen’s ability to visit and provide for their kin with the efforts of soldiers to maintain the connections to the communities they left.

HUTCHINSON, ROBERT W.

“The Weight of History: *Wehrmacht* Officers, the U.S. Army Historical Division, and U.S. Military Doctrine, 1945-1956.” Vol.78, No.4 (October, 2014), pp.1321-1348. Suggests that, even within the ‘purely operational’ lessons provided by veteran German officers to the U.S. Army, a considerable element of Nazi racist ideology was transmitted.

I

IRISH, KERRY E.

“Apt Pupil: Dwight Eisenhower and the 1930 Industrial Mobilization Plan.” Vol.70, No.1 (January, 2006), pp.31-61. While the detailed plan for industrial mobilization drawn up by Eisenhower (1890-1969) as a staff officer was not formally implemented, it nevertheless provided the basis for a more efficient transition to war production than had taken place in World War I.

“Dwight Eisenhower and Douglas MacArthur in the Philippines: There Must Be a Day of Reckoning [1935-39].” Vol.74, No.2 (April, 2010), pp.439-473. Demonstrates that Eisenhower’s (1890-1969) dislike of MacArthur (1880-1964) was less about personalities and more about disagreements over the building of an army in an impoverished country and the proper qualities that a U.S. Army officer should exhibit and develop in his subordinates.

ISAAC, STEVEN

“The Role of Towns in the Battle of Bouvines (1214).” Vol.79, No.2 (April, 2015), pp.317-344. Uses the French King, Philip Augustus’ (1165-1223), victory at Bouvines as an example of the military contributions of urban centers in the form of non-noble troops, the production of arms and armor, financial resources, and contributors to policy.

J

JABLON, HOWARD

“General David M. Shoup, U.S.M.C.: Warrior and War Protester.” Vol.60, No.3 (July, 1996), pp.513-538. Claims that the same hard-headed pragmatism that made General Shoup (1904-1083) a reliable Marine Corps officer led him to conclude that U.S. involvement in Vietnam was ultimately a pointless waste of American lives.

JACKSON, AARON P.

“Review Essay: Expanding the Scope and Accessibility of Non-Western Military History.” Vol.75, No.2 (April, 2011), pp.603-613. Covering works on China, India, and Russia.

JACKSON, ASHLEY

“Supplying War: The High Commission Territories’ Military-Logistical Contribution in the Second World War.” Vol.66, No.3 (July, 2002), pp.719-760. Assesses the mobilization of manpower from Basutoland, Bechuanaland, and Swaziland for use in logistics in the North African and Italian Campaigns.

JACKMAN, STEVEN D.

“Shoulder to Shoulder: Close Control and ‘Old Prussian Drill’ in German Offensive Infantry Tactics, 1871-1914.” Vol.68, No.1 (January, 2004), pp.73-104.

JACOBS, HARRY A.

“Operation Strakonice: In Pursuit of the Soviet Order of Battle.” Vol.65, No.2 (April, 2001), pp.391-400. Chronicles the successful mission of the U.S. military intelligence unit, Order of Battle Team 24, to seize German documents detailing Soviet forces, documents that were located beyond the Line of Demarcation in Czechoslovakia.

JACOBS, W.A.

“Royal Air Force Bomber Command, the ‘Overlord Air Diversion’, and ‘Precision’ Bombing at Night.” Vol.83, No.4 (October, 2019), pp.1161-1188. Takes account of the significant changes in procedure developed and adopted by Bomber Command and seeks to answer why further progress was limited through 1944 to 1945.

JAMISON, THOMAS M.

“The War of the Pacific, Technology and U.S. Naval Development: An International History of a Regional War.” Vol.82, No.4 (October, 2018), pp.1093-1122. The observations by foreign nations of the war between Chile and a coalition of Bolivia and Peru, 1879-1884, influenced naval developments around the globe, including contributing to the U.S. building of the ‘New Navy’ in the 1890s.

JANDA, LANCE

“Shutting the Gates of Mercy: The American Origins of Total War, 1860-1880.” Vol.59, No.1 (January, 1995), pp.7-26. Links the evolution of ‘total war’ with the nature of armed conflict during the U.S. Civil War through to the late nineteenth century campaigns against the Native American tribes.

JEANS, ROGER B., Jr.

“Victims or Victimizers? Museums, Textbooks, and the War Debate in Contemporary Japan.” Vol.69, No.1 (January, 2005), pp.149-195. Shows that, rather than possessing a unified view of the war, the ‘correct history’ of the conflict is contested between conservatives, the right-wing, moderates, and the left-wing.

“Alarm in Washington: A Wartime ‘Expose’ of Japan’s Biological Warfare Program.” Vol.71, No.2 (April, 2007), pp.411-439. Discusses a book published in the summer of 1944 describing both Japan’s biological warfare program and the failure of the U.S. government to meet this threat, and the government and the media’s response to this publication, considering parallels with the 2001 anthrax ‘scares.’

“Ghost Guerrillas: The C.I.A. and ‘Tiger General’ Li Zongren’s Third Force during the Early Cold War.” Vol.81, No.2 (April, 2017), pp.491-512. The attempt by the C.I.A. to develop an anti-Communist faction as an alternative to Chiang Kai-Shek’s (1887-1975) Nationalists and the broader impact of this approach on the C.I.A.

JEFFREY, THOMAS E.

“Commodore’ Edison Joins the Navy: Thomas Alva Edison and the Naval Consulting Board.” Vol.80, No.2 (April, 2016), pp.411-445. Claims that the impetus for the formation of the Naval Consulting Board headed by Edison (1847-1931), which was intended to provide advice on naval warfare technology, was Edison’s chief engineer, who conceived it as the centerpiece of a marketing campaign to sell Edison designed batteries to the Navy for their submarines.

JENSEN, RICHARD

“Military History on the Electronic Frontier: Wikipedia Fights the War of 1812.” Vol.76, No.4 (October, 2012), pp.1165-1182.

JOHNSON, R.A.

“ ‘Russians at the Gates of India’?: Planning the Defence of India, 1885-1900.” Vol.67, No.3 (July, 2003), pp.697-743.

JOHNSON, MARK W.

“Emory Upton’s Twenty-Six: Desertion and Divided Loyalty of the U.S. Army Soldiers, 1860-1861.” Vol.81, No.3 (July, 2017), pp.747-774. Contrary to common assumptions, the enlisted men of the regular peace-time Army were as conflicted in their loyalties as their officers, resulting in over

500 deserting during the secession crisis to serve in what became the Army of the Confederate States of America.

JONES, EDGAR

“ ‘L.M.F.’: The Use of Psychiatric Stigma in the Royal Air Force during the Second World War.” Vol.70, No.2 (April, 2006), pp.439-458. Explores the consequences of the introduction by the R.A.F. of the term ‘Lack of Moral Fibre’ in April, 1940, which was intended to stigmatize aircrew who, without a medical reason, refused to fly.

JONES, MARK C.

“Give Credit where Credit is Due: The Dutch Role in the Development and Deployment of the Submarine Schnorkel.” Vol.69, No.4 (October, 2005), pp.987-1012.

“Experiment at Dundee: The Royal Navy’s 9th Submarine Flotilla and Multinational Naval Cooperation during World War II.” Vol.72, No.4 (October, 2008), pp.1179-1212. The 9th Flotilla included British, Dutch, Free French, Norwegian, and Polish submariners.

“Not Just along for the Ride: The Role of Royal Navy Liaison Personnel in Multinational Naval Operations during World War II.” Vol.76, No.1 (January, 2012), pp.127-158. The liaison system as a means of cooperation with European navies in exile from France, Greece, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, and Yugoslavia.

“Friend and Advisor to the Allied Navies: The Royal Navy’s Principal Liaison Officer and Multinational Naval Operations in World War II.” Vol.77, No.3 (July, 2013), pp.991-1023. The work of Principal Liaison Officer, Allied Navies (P.N.L.O.) with the Belgian, Dutch, French, Greek, Norwegian, Polish, and Yugoslav navies in exile.

“In Need of a Home Away from Home: The Royal Netherlands Navy in Australia, 1942-1947.” Vol.85, No.2 (April, 2021), pp.399-425. With the fall of the Netherlands’ East Indies, units of the Royal Netherlands Navy relocated to Australia, from where they continued their operations against the Japanese enemy.

JONES, SPENCER

“The Influence of Horse Supply Upon Field Artillery in American Civil War.” Vol.74, No.2 (April, 2010), pp.357-377. Proposes that the difficulties of both sides in finding and maintaining a sufficient supply of horses for artillery has implications for the wider debate on whether the U.S. Civil War marked the beginnings of ‘modern’ war.

JONES, T. COLE

“ ‘The Rage of Tory-Hunting’: Loyalist Prisoners, Civil War, and the Violence of American Independence.” Vol.81, No.3 (July, 2017), pp.719-746.

JORDAN, KELLY C.

“**Right for the Wrong Reasons: S.L.A. Marshall and the Ratio of Fire in Korea.**” Vol.66, No.1 (January, 2002), pp.135-162.

JORDAN, JIM

With Harrington, Hugh T “**The Other Mystery Shot of the American Revolution: Did Timothy Murphy Kill British Brigadier General Simon Fraser at Saratoga?**” Vol.74, No.4 (October, 2010), pp.1037-1045. Attempts to disentangle the various accounts of the Battle of Saratoga, 1777, to determine the origins and validity of the Murphy legend, and its repetition by subsequent historians, along with the physics of musket fire.

JOSEPH, URI BAR

“**Strategic Surprise or Fundamental Flaws? The Source of Israel’s Military Defeat at the Beginning of the 1973 War.**” Vol.72, No.2 (April, 2008), pp.509-530. Suggests that the deficient deployment of Israeli forces that met the Egyptian assault was due to a failure of intelligence to provide sufficient warning.

JUDKINS, PHILIP

With Bullock, Mike and Lyons, Laurence “**A Resolution of the Debate about British Wireless in World War I.**” Vol.84, No.4 (October, 2020), pp.1079-1096. Visits the debate over whether, as Dr. Brian Hall contends, the British Army utilized continuous wave radio as best as this technology allowed with how it was used by their French and U.S. counterparts.

K

KAGAN, KIMBERLY

“**Redefining Roman Grand Strategy.**” Vol.70, No.2 (April, 2006), pp.333-362. By scrutinizing the patterns of troop movements provided by surviving sources, the author proposes that Roman Emperors directed how to allocate resources empire-wide to meet objectives, which satisfies the definition of a grand strategy.

KAGAY, DONALD J.

“**The Defense of the Crown of Aragon during the War of the Two Pedros (1356-1366).**” Vol.71, No.1 (January, 2007), pp.11-33. Undertakes to show that the War of the Two Pedros established the administrative and military forces that would ultimately lead toward a unified Spanish kingdom in the fifteenth century.

KAHN, DAVID

“The Prehistory of the General Staff.” Vol.71, No.2 (April, 2007), pp.499-504. Sets forth the argument that the advent of the modern general staff system was the consequence of secularization, which provided control, bureaucracy, which rationalized endeavor, and management, which overcame specialization.

KAPLAN, MIKE

“Review Essay: Grant’s Drinking... The Beast that will not Die.” Vol.79, No.4 (October, 2015), pp.1109-1119.

KARAU, MARK

“Twisting the Dragon’s Tail: The Zeebrugge and Ostend Raids of 1918.” Vol.67, No.2 (April, 2003), pp.455-481.

KARPAT, KEMAL H.

“Review Essay: The Rise of Modern Turkey.” Vol.65, No.3 (July, 2001), pp.771-775. Covers two recent books that chronicle the transformation of the Turkish state from the late Ottoman Empire to a nation-state under Mustafa Kemal Atatürk (1881-1938).

KARSTEN, PETER

“The ‘Naval Aristocracy’ and the ‘Young Turks’ of the *Fin de Siècle*: A Dotting of the ‘I’s and Crossing of the ‘T’s.’ Vol.66, No.4 (October, 2002), pp.1177-1180. Undertakes to determine whether the social backgrounds of the ‘Young Turk’ generation of officers of the late-nineteenth century ‘New Navy’ played a role in their careers.

KASTOR, PETER J.

“Toward ‘The Maritime War Only’: The Question of Naval Mobilization, 1811-1812.” Vol.61, No.3 (July, 1997), pp.455-480. Applies the broader context of the ‘New Military History’, particularly political circumstances, in an effort to better understand President James Madison’s (1809-1817) naval policy and strategy leading up to the outbreak of the War of 1812.

KELLER, CHRISTIAN B.

“Flying Dutchmen and Drunken Irishmen: The Myths and Realities of Ethnic Civil War Soldiers.” Vol.73, No.1 (January, 2009), pp.117-145. Contrasts the myths, misconceptions, and stereotypes developed by Anglo-Americans regarding German- and Irish-American soldiers fighting in the United States Civil War with the historical truth about ethnic participation in the conflict.

KELLNER, KATRINA

With Perras, Galen Roger, **“ ‘A Perfectly Logical and Sensible Thing’: Billy Mitchell Advocates**

a Canadian-American Aerial Alliance Against Japan.” Vol.72, No.3 (July, 2008), pp.785-823. As a result of his overlooked trip to Canada in 1923, Brigadier General Billy Mitchell (1879-1936) formulated a plan for employing an allied U.S.-Canadian strategic bombing force based in Alaska to wage war on Japan.

KELLY, PATRICK J.

“Strategy, Tactics, and Turf Wars: Tirpitz and the *Oberkommando der Marine*, 1892-1895.” Vol.66, No.4 (October, 2002), pp.1033-1060. Relies on previously ignored archival material to reexamine the development of Grand Admiral Alfred von Tirpitz’s (1849-1930) strategic and tactical thought, including some significant contradictions.

KEMMERLY, PHILLIP R.

“Environment and the Course of Battle: Flooding at Shiloh (6-7 April, 1862).” Vol.79, No.4 (October, 2015), pp.1079-1108.

“Rivers, Rails, and Rebels: Logistics and Struggle to Supply U.S. Army Depot at Nashville, 1862-1865.” Vol.84, No.3 (July, 2020), pp.713-746. Highlights the indispensable support provided by the U.S. Army depot at Nashville, Tennessee, for Union operations in the Western Theater, which, in turn, depended upon the Louisville-Nashville railway line and the Cumberland River kept open by the U.S. Navy.

“Logistics of U.S. Grant’s 1863 Mississippi Campaign: From the Amphibious Landing at Bruinsburg to the Siege of Vicksburg.” Vol.86, No.3 (July, 2022), pp.573-611. Approaches the much-studied Vicksburg Campaign of General Ulysses S. Grant (r.1869-1877) from the neglected perspective of logistics, assessing how the interactions of the environment and logistical requirements impacted battle plans, command decisions, and tactics.

KENNEDY, GREG

“Anglo-American Strategic Relations and Intelligence Assessments of Japanese Air Power 1934-1941.” Vol.74, No.3 (July, 2010), pp.737-773. Reassesses the influence of racism on Anglo-American views of Japanese air power, and how this influence evolved in the seven years leading up to Pearl Harbor.

KENNEDY, PAUL

“History from the Middle: The Case of the Second World War.” Vol.74, No.1 (January, 2010), pp.35-51. Investigates the middle levels of war through examples from the middle of World War II when the chief operational objectives of the Allies were clearly established but had yet to be realized.

KERNER, ALEX

“Espionage and Field Intelligence in the Conquest of México, 1519-1521.” Vol.78, No.2 (April, 2014), pp.469-501. Identifies the types of intelligence sources and information-gathering systems

available to both sides during the fateful events of 1519-1521, and their role in the outcome of this milestone in the New World's history.

KHAN, DAVID

"How the Allies Suppressed the Second Greatest Secret of World War II." Vol.74, No.4 (October, 2010), pp.1229-1241. Concerning the post-war classification of information about the Allies' success in breaking German codes.

KIESLING, EUGENIA C.

"Historiographical Essays: Illuminating 'Strange Defeat' and 'Pyrrhic Victory': The Historian Robert A. Doughty." Vol.71, No.3 (July, 2007), pp.875-888. Reviews the English language publications on the performance of France in both World Wars and how Brigadier General (Rtd.) Robert A. Doughty (b.1943) has sought to teach the U.S. Army how to harness historical study in the interest of doctrinal development.

KIMBALL, WARREN F.

"Stalingrad: A Chance for Choices." Vol.60, No.1 (January, 1996), pp.89-114. Delves into the significance of the Battle of Stalingrad for United States foreign policy.

KING, FRANCIS

With Podsoblyayev, Evgenii and Biggart, John, **"The Russian Naval General Staff and the Evolution of Naval Policy, 1905-1914."** Vol.66, No.1 (January, 2002), pp.37-69. Addresses the neglected perspective of the connections between the formulation of naval strategy for the Baltic Sea, warship construction, and Imperial Russia's aspirations to become a great naval power.

KINGSLEY, RONALD F.

With Alexander, Harvey J. **"The Failure of Abercromby's Attack on Fort Carillon, July 1758, and the Scapegoating of Matthew Clerk."** Vol.72, No.1 (January, 2008), pp.43-70. A reassessment, based on letters and other documents, that calls into question the degree that the young engineer, Matthew Clerk, contributed to the defeat of the British attack on Fort Carillon (Fort Ticonderoga) during the French and Indian War. See also: McCulloch, Ian Macpherson, " 'A Blanket of Inconsistencies': The Battle of Ticonderoga, 2008." Vol.72, No.3 (July, 2008), Vol.72, No.1 (January, 2008), pp.889-900.

KIRKLAND, FARIS R.

"The Attack on Cap Mui Lay, Vietnam, July 1968." Vol.61, No.4 (October, 1997), pp.735-760. Shines light on Operation Thor, a neglected example of joint operation in Vietnam and one that significantly disrupted North Vietnam's strategic plans.

KLEINSCHMIDT, HARALD

“Using the Gun: Manual Drill and the Proliferation of Portable Firearms.” Vol.63, No.3 (July, 1999), pp.601-630. Delves into the military, political, and social factors that led to an increase in the use of hand-held firearms throughout Europe, from the fifteenth through the eighteenth century.

KOHN, RICHARD H. (ed.)

“The Practice of Military History in the U.S. Government: The Department of Defense.” Vol.61, No.1 (January, 1997), pp.121-147. Includes contributions from Alfred Goldberg, Elizabeth A. Muenger, and Harold W. Nelson.

“The Danger of Militarization in an Endless ‘War’ on Terrorism.” Vol.73, No.1 (January, 2009), pp.177-208. The identification of Americans with and use of war images and thinking, and a belief in the primacy of standing military forces for the safety of the country, have become normalized, so that the pursuit of an endless ‘war’ on terrorism only further threatens to militarize the nation.

KOLBERG, ARE SKARSTEIN

“Did Vikings Really go Berserk? An Interdisciplinary Critical Analysis of Berserks.” Vol.82, No.3 (July, 2018), pp.899-908.

“There is Power in a Cohort: Development of Warfare in Iron Age to Early Medieval Scandinavia.” Vol.83, No.1 (January, 2019), pp.9-30. Questions the degree to which Scandinavian society was organized for warfare and the extent to which tactics in Iron Age to Early Medieval Scandinavia were influenced by external examples.

KOPPERMAN, PAUL E.

“‘The Cheapest Pay’: Alcohol Abuse in the Eighteenth-Century British Army.” Vol.60, No.3 (July, 1996), pp.445-470. Analyzes the unwillingness of officers to confront what was generally agreed to be a significant problem due to conflicting medical opinion and the utility of control over government supplied alcohol.

KOSTICK, CONOR

“*Iuvenes* and the First Crusade (1096-99): Knights in Search of Glory?” Vol.73, No.2 (April, 2009), pp.369-392. *Iuvenes* was a term applied to a category of knights who were not necessarily young in age, but were ‘young’ in their careers, a category of knights who, despite a degree of recklessness and indiscipline, played an important role in the First Crusade.

KRANJC, GREGOR

“Fight or Flight: Desertion, Defection, and Draft-Dodging in Occupied Slovenia, 1941-1945.” Vol.81, No.1 (January, 2017), pp.133-162. Questions the motives for Slovenes to avoid or escape from military service for three occupying powers, Germany, Hungary, and Italy, and these powers

efforts to combat draft-dodging, desertion, and defection.

KRAUSE, JONATHAN

“The French Battle for Vimy Ridge, Spring 1915.” Vol.77, No.1 (January, 2013), pp.91-113. Analyzes the early French efforts to solve the challenge of the trench stalemate.

KREBS, DANIEL

“Useful Enemies: The Treatment of German Prisoners of War during the American War of Independence.” Vol.77, No.1 (January, 2013), pp.9-39. Narrates how, to boost morale, revolutionaries staged elaborate rituals with P.O.W.s, that local citizens hired captive soldiers as laborers, and that, after the victory at Yorktown, 1781, Congress and the Continental Army allowed P.O.W.s to go free after a cash payment and even sold some into indentured servitude.

KREBS, GERHARD

“Operation Super Sunrise? Japanese-United States Peace Feelers in Switzerland, 1945.” Vol.69, No.4 (October, 2005), pp.1081-1120. Explains why informal discussions between the Japanese Naval Commander from the embassy in Berlin, Fujimura Yoshikazu, and Allen W. Dulles (1893-1969) of the U.S. Office of Strategic Services failed to develop into formal communications.

KROME, FREDERIC

“ ‘Will the Germans Bombard New York?’: Hugo Gernsback and the Future War Tale.” Vol.86, No.1 (January, 2022), pp.54-76. Appraises the role of ‘Future War’ fiction, particularly works produced by Hugo Gernsback (1884-1967), in engaging the American public’s interest in military affairs in the early 20th century.

KRUEGER, DAVID

“The Red Cross, the Daughters of the American Revolution, and the Origins of the Army Nurse Corps in the Spanish-American War.” Vol.83, No.2 (April, 2019), pp.409-434. Determines that the work of contract nurses, promoted by the Daughters of the American Revolution Hospital Corps and the Red Cross, demonstrated the capability and necessity of female nurses in the military, the Army chose to establish a professional nurse corps rather than rely on volunteers.

KUBIK, TIMOTHY R.W.

“Is Machiavelli’s Canon Spiked? Practical Reading in Military History.” Vol.61, No.1 (January, 1997), pp.7-30. Argues that Niccolò Machiavelli’s (1469-1527) *The Art of War* functioned as a prompt for debate, an exercise of prudent judgement, rather than offering a stock of handy maxims for use in a crisis.

KUEHN, JOHN T.

“The U.S. Navy General Board and Naval Arms Limitations: 1922-1937.” Vol.74, No.4 (October, 2010), pp.1129-1160. Highlights the critical link played by the Navy General Board between the U.S. Navy and 1922 Washington Naval Limitations Treaty.

KUHLMAN, ERIKA

“American Doughboys and German Fräuleins: Sexuality, Patriarchy, and the Privilege in the American-Occupied Rhineland, 1918-23.” Vol.71, No.4 (October, 2007), pp.1077-1106.

KÜRKÇÜ, BURAK

“The Question of U.S. Involvement in Turkish Military Coups during the Cold War: An Analysis via available C.I.A. Archives.” Vol.86, No.1 (January, 2022), pp.110-131. Recently de-classified C.I.A. documents reveal no evidence for direct U.S. involvement in Turkish military coups during the Cold War.

KURONEN, JARMO O.

With Heikkinen, Jarmo K., and Lewis, Aidan Mark, **“A Research Note on Military Medicine in Finland, 1555-1945.”** Vol.85, No.3 (July, 2021), pp.765-770.

KWAN, TOH BOON

“ ‘It was a thrill to see rows of B-29s going through the sky’: The Strategic Bombing of Singapore, 1944-45.” Vol.73, No.3 (July, 2009), pp.905-924. Reports on an overlooked campaign in the U.S. strategic Air War in Asia from the perspective of U.S. bomber crews, Japanese occupation forces in Singapore, local civilians, and internees, noting that the experiences of the latter have, in particular, been neglected.

L

LABAND, JOHN

“The Slave Soldiers of Africa.” Vol.81, No.1 (January, 2017), pp.9-38. Presents a broad overview of the long history of African military slavery, which the author notes was not limited to Muslim states, was adapted by European colonial powers, and has re-emerged in the phenomenon of child soldiers.

LACEY, JAMES

“World War II’s Real Victory Program.” Vol.75, No.3 (July, 2011), pp.811-834. Challenges Maj. Albert C. Wedemeyer’s assertion that he was the author of the United States’ Victory Program.

“Historical Truth and Tilting at Windmills.” Vol.77, No.1 (January, 2013), pp.267-272. Addresses the controversy surrounding U.S. Army General Albert C. Wedemeyer (1896-1989).

LAHEY R.J.

“Hitler’s ‘Intuition’, *Luftwaffe* Photoreconnaissance, and the Reinforcement of Normandy.”
Vol.86, No.1 (January, 2022), pp.77-109. Contends that it was *Luftwaffe* photoreconnaissance, rather than mere intuition, that led Hitler to significantly reinforce the forces tasked with defending the Normandy beaches.

LAK, MARTIJN

“Review Essay: The Death Ride of the Panzers? Recent Historiography on the Battle of Kursk.”
Vol.82, No.3 (July, 2018), pp.909-919.

LOMAZOW, STEVEN

With McLaughlin, John J. and **“Counterpoint: Albert Coady Wedemeyer.”** Vol.77, No.1 (January, 2013), pp.255-272.

LAMBERT, NICHOLAS A.

“Admiral Sir John Fisher and the Concept of Flotilla Defence, 1904-1909.” Vol.59, No.4 (October, 1995), pp.639-660. Asks whether Admiral Fisher’s (1841-1920) embracing of a submarine and flotilla strategy represented an abandonment of the Mahanian approach to winning control of the seas through victory in a decisive clash between battle fleets.

“ ‘Our Bloody Ships’ or ‘Our Bloody System’? Jutland and the Loss of the Battle Cruisers, 1916.”
Vol.62, No.1 (January, 1998), pp.29-55. Speculates that an emphasis on rapid fire led gunnery personnel to stockpile far more shells in their turrets than the regulated maximum of eight projectiles, resulting in catastrophic explosions when German shells found their mark.

“Strategic Command and Control for Maneuver Warfare: Creation of the Royal Navy’s ‘War Room’ System, 1905-1915.” Vol.69, No.2 (April, 2005), pp.361-410.

“Review Essay: False Prophet?: The Maritime Theory of Julian Corbett and Professional Education.” Vol.77, No.3 (July, 2013), pp.1055-1078.

LAPP, DERRICK E.

“Did They Really ‘Take None but Gentlemen’? Henry Hardman, the Maryland Line, and a Reconsideration of the Socioeconomic Composition of the Continental Officer Corps.” Vol.78, No.4 (October, 2014), pp.1239-1261.

LARNACH, MATTHEW

“The Battle of the Gates of Trajan, 986: A Reassessment.” Vol.84, No.1 (January, 2020), pp.9-34.
An investigation of the destruction of Emperor Basil II’s (r.976-1025) Byzantine army by the

Bulgarians that incorporates the issue of logistics and an examination of terrain to ascertain the reasons for victory and defeat.

LARSON, ROBERT H.

“Max Jähns and the Writing of Military History in Imperial Germany.” Vol.72, No.2 (April, 2008), pp.345-370. A career Prussian officer who taught military history at the elite War Academy for fourteen years and was a prolific author, Max Jähns’ (1837-1900) studies focused on the place of military institutions and practices in the context of general history.

LASTERLE, PHILIPPE

“Could Admiral Gensoul have Averted the Tragedy of Mers el-Kébir?” Vol.67, No.3 (July, 2003), pp.835-844. Admiral Marcel-Bruno Gensoul (1880-1973) commanded the French fleet at Mers el-Kébir, Algeria, when it was bombarded by a British force commanded by Admiral James Somerville (1882-1949) on 3 July, 1940.

LAURIE, CLAYTON D.

“ ‘The Chanting of Crusaders’: Captain Heber Blankenhorn and A.E.F. Combat Propaganda in World War I.” Vol.59, No.3 (July, 1995), pp.457-481.

LAWLOR, RUTH

“Bibliographic Essay: Contested Crimes: Race, Gender, and Nation in Histories of GI Sexual Violence, World War II.” Vol.84, No.2 (April, 2020), pp.541-569.

LEARY, WILLIAM M.

“The C.I.A. and the ‘Secret War’ in Laos: The Battle for Skyline Ridge, 1971-1971.” Vol.59, No.3 (July, 1995), pp.505-517. Narrates an all-but-forgotten victory of a force of Hmong, Lao, and Thai defenders against the North Vietnamese Army.

LEE, WAYNE E.

“Fortify, Fight, or Flee: Tuscarora and Cherokee Defensive Warfare and Military Culture Adaptation.” Vol.68, No.3 (July, 2004), pp.713-770.

“Peace Chiefs and Blood Revenge: Patterns of Restraint in Native American Warfare, 1500-1800.” Vol.71, No.3 (July, 2007), pp.701-741. Although eastern Native American societies were willing to attempt to destroy an enemy, including indiscriminate killing, patterns of restraint inherent to their social authority, cultural values, and methods of warfare tended to limit escalation and the overall level of violence.

“Research Note: Military History in a Global Frame.” Vol.78, No.1 (January, 2014), pp.333-336. Three works by the prolific military historian, Jeremy Black that explore the conduct and consequences

of warfare throughout the globe from the mid-fifteenth century to the conclusion of the eighteenth century.

With Gyucha, Attila and Rózsa, Zoltán, **“The Mongol Campaign in Hungary, 1241-1242: The Archaeology and History of Nomadic Conquest and Massacre.”** Vol.83, No.4 (October, 2019), pp.1021-1066. This article integrates conquest process theory, literary evidence, and data from substantial new archaeological work to explore the motivation and nature of Mongol invasions and the consequences for rural settlements on the Great Hungarian Plain.

LEGGIERE, MICHAEL V.

“From Berlin to Leipzig: Napoleon’s Gamble in North Germany, 1813.” Vol.67, No.1 (January, 2003), pp.39-48. Claims that the Allies’ defense of Berlin defeated Napoleon’s strategy. Significantly contributing to his expulsion from Germany.

LEINER, FREDERICK C.

“The Squadron Commander’s Share: Decatur and the Prize Money for the *Chesapeake*’s First War of 1812 Cruise.” Vol.73, No.1 (January, 2009), pp.69-82. An examination of the prize case of Decatur vs. Chew that displays the tensions between ranking officers over their contrasting views of their appropriate shares.

“ ‘The Sport of Arbitrary Men’: The Privateer *Nonsuch* and a Search at Sea in the War of 1812.” Vol.76, No.4 (October, 2012), pp.1147-1164. An incident involving the Baltimore Privateer *Nonsuch*’s seizure of the schooner *Ann Maria*, which resulted in court cases that led all the way to the U.S. Supreme Court.

“Privateers in the War of 1812.” Vol.77, No.4 (October, 2013), Pp.1225-1250. Seeks to answer the question, ‘Was privateering profitable?’

LENABURG, JERRY

“Review Essay: Four Slices of the Iraq War Apple.” Vol.77, No.1 (January, 2013), pp.299-303. Includes an assessment of four recent titles about the United States war in Iraq, 2003-2011, in one case comparing counterinsurgency efforts in Iraq with those conducted by the U.S. forces in Vietnam.

“Review Essay: Iraq & Afghanistan.” Vol.77, No.3 (July, 2013), pp.1079-1084. Exploration of three recent studies of the wars in both Afghanistan, 2001-2021, and Iraq, 2003-2011.

LENDER, MARK EDWARD

“Review Essay: The Ever Controversial General Charles Lee.” Vol.78, No.4 (October, 2014), pp.1395-1405. Charles Lee (1732-1782), a veteran of service in the British, Portuguese, and Polish armies, served as a high-ranking commander in George Washington’s Continental Army until his court martial over behavior associated with the Battle of Monmouth, June 28, 1778.

With Martin, James Kirby, **“Target New London: Benedict Arnold’s Raid, Just War, and**

‘Homegrown Terror’ Reconsidered.” Vol.83, No.1 (January, 2019), pp.67-95. Challenges the traditional Patriot depiction of Benedict Arnold’s (1741-1801) attack on the privateer base of New London, Connecticut, 6 September, 1781, arguing that it was conducted according to the contemporary rules of ‘civilized warfare.’

LERNER, MITCHELL

“ ‘Is It for This We Fought and Bled?’: The Korean War and the Struggle for Civil Rights.” Vol.82, No.2 (April, 2018), pp.515-545. Explains the role of the Korean War in the African American struggle for Civil Rights.

LEVINSON, IRVING W.

“A New Paradigm for an Old Conflict: The Mexico-United States War.” Vol.73, No.2 (April, 2009), pp.393-416. The victorious U.S. Army that found itself in possession of Mexico City had to provide assistance to the dominant political and socio-economic groups in order to obtain a peace treaty that would conclude the war.

LEWIS, ADRIAN R.

“The Failure of Allied Planning and Doctrine for Operation Overlord: The Case of Minefield and Obstacle Clearance.” Vol.62, No.4 (October, 1998), pp.787-807.

LEWIS, AIDAN MARK

With Kuronen, Jarmo O. and Heikkinen, Jarmo K. **“A Research Note on Military Medicine in Finland, 1555-1945.”** Vol.85, No.3 (July, 2021), pp.765-770.

LIAROPOULOS, ANDREW N.

“Revolutions in Warfare: Theoretical Paradigms and Historical Evidence: The Napoleonic and First World War Revolutions in Military Affairs.” Vol.70, No.2 (April, 2006), pp.363-384.

LIM, PRESTON JORDAN

“Churchill’s Butchers: Mission 204’s Operations in China, 1942-1945.” Vol.84, No.4 (October, 2020), pp.1127-1156. Whereas previous studies have focused on the mission’s record in 1942, the author examines the entire length of service of this combined British-Australian commando unit tasked with training Nationalist guerrillas, suggesting that it was more successful than previously thought.

LINES, LISA

“Francisco Franco as Warrior: Is It Time for a Reassessment of His Military Leadership?” Vol.81, No.2 (April, 2017), pp.513-534. Critiques Franco’s (1892-1975) performance as a military commander within the context of his cultural and political environment.

LINN, BRIAN M.

With Weigley, Russell F. ***“The American Way of War Revisited.”*** Vol.66, No.2 (April, 2002), pp.501-533. The author challenges some of the conclusions in Dr. Weigley’s (1930-2004) classic study of the manner in which the United States Army has conducted warfare through the length of its history.

LINN, JASON

“Attila’s Appetite: The Logistics of Attila the Hun’s Invasion of Italy in 452.” Vol.83, No.2 (April, 2019), pp.325-246. Offers the explanation that Attila the Hun’s (406-453) decision to withdraw from Italy was not due to either Pope Leo the Great (400-461) or hunger and disease, but the approach of winter.

LIPMAN, JANA K.

“ ‘A Precedent Worth Setting...’ Military Humanitarianism: The U.S. Military and the 1975 Vietnamese Evacuation.” Vol.79, No.1 (January, 2015), pp.151-179. Proposes that the U.S. Armed Forces’ involvement in the evacuation of over 100,000 Vietnamese to the United States represented a turning point in how these institutions viewed humanitarian operations.

LITTLE, BRANDEN

“Evacuating Wartime Europe: U.S. Policy, Strategy, and Relief Operations for Overseas American Travelers, 1914-15.” Vol.79, No.4 (October, 2015), pp.929-958. The evacuation by the U.S. Relief Commission of 125,000 U.S. citizens stranded in Europe and its far-ranging impact on war preparedness and subsequent humanitarian operations.

LLOYD, NICK

“ ‘With Faith and without Fear’: Sir Douglas Haig’s Command of First Army during 1915.” Vol.71, No.4 (October, 2007), pp.1051-1076. Shines a light on the neglected performance of Sir Douglas Haig (1861-1928) as commander of the B.E.F.’s First Army during 1915.

LOCK-PULLAN, RICHARD

“ ‘An Inward Looking Time’: The United States Army, 1973-1976.” Vol.67, No.2 (April, 2003), pp.483-511. Rejects the explanation that the immediate post-Vietnam War reforms were primarily shaped by the recent conflict in Southeast Asia, insisting, instead, that of greater importance was the end of the draft and the lessons drawn from the 1973 Arab-Israeli War by General William E. DePuy (1919-1992).

LOCKENOUR, JAY

“Black and White Memories of War: Victimization and Violence in West German War Films of the 1950s.” Vol.76, No.1 (January, 2012), pp.159-191. Contends that war films helped to construct a specifically West German identity as helpless victims or heroic nonconformists rather than historical actors and compliant, or even eager, collaborators by creating myths and memories important to the legitimacy of the new Federal Republic.

LOFGREN, STEPHEN J. (ed.)

“Diary of First Lieutenant Sugihara Kinrū: Iwo Jima, January-February 1945.” Vol.59, No.1 (January, 1995), pp.97-134. Served in the 11th Antitank Battalion which was manned by reservists from Hiroshima and Shimane prefectures.

LONSDALE, DAVID J.

“Alexander the Great and the Art of adaptation.” Vol.77, No.3 (July, 2013), pp.817-835. Uses the examples of Alexander’s (356-323 B.C.E.) operations in the Balkans, against the Persian navy, counterinsurgency in Central Asia, and the Battle of Hydaspes (326 B.C.E.).

LÓPEZ, MIGUEL A.

“The Survival of *Auftragstaktik* during the Soviet Counterattack in the Battle for Moscow, December 1941 to January 1942.” Vol.84, No.1 (January, 2020), pp.187-212. Claims that Adolf Hitler’s 16 December, 1941, *Haltbefehl* (Halt Order) did not mark the end of the Prussian-German principle of *Auftragstaktik*, that in the face of the Soviet counterattacks German field commanders did retain their command independence and conducted withdrawals regardless of the *Haltbefehl*.

LOSS, CHRISTOPHER P.

“Reading between Enemy Lines: Armed Services Editions and World War II.” Vol.67, No.3 (July, 2003), pp.811-834.

LOVELACE, ALEXANDER G.

“Meade and the Media: Civil War Journalism and the New History of War Reporting.” Vol.85, No.4 (October, 2021), pp.907-929. Employs a new approach in which War Correspondents are seen as powerful actors who could influence the decision-making process of commanders.

LOVELAND, ANNE C.

“Character Education in the U.S. Army, 1947-1977.” Vol.64, No.3 (July, 2000), pp.795-818. Scrutinizes the promotion of the Christian Faith in the Army Character Guidance program in the context of Cold War paranoia.

LUKASIK, SEBASTIAN H.

“Doughboys, the Y.M.C.A., and the Moral Economy of Sacrifice in the First World War.”

Vol.84, No.3 (July, 2020), pp.774-797. Contends that U.S. soldiers' complaints about the Y.M.C.A. in France reflected larger concerns about the Home Front, perceptions of which shaped soldiers' notions about the value of their sacrifices.

LUND, ERIK

“The Industrial History of Strategy: Re-evaluating the Wartime Record of the British Aviation Industry in Comparative Perspective, 1919-1945.” Vol.62, No.1 (January, 1998), pp.75-99. Rejects the conventional notion that the Allies achieved victory by outproducing the Axis, insisting that, instead, more factors than mere volume played a role, as demonstrated by the British air sector that displayed greater flexibility, technological sophistication, and effectiveness than either its German or United States counterparts.

LUNN, JOE

“Male Identity and Martial Codes of Honor: A Comparison of the War Memoirs of Robert Graves, Ernst Jünger, and Kande Kamara.” Vol.69, No.3 (July, 2005), pp.713-735. The memoirs of the British officer and author, Robert Graves (1895-1985), the German soldier and author, Ernst Jünger (1895-1998), and the French Colonial soldier from West Africa, Kande Kamara.

LYNN, JOHN A.

“The Embattled Future of Academic Military History.” Vol.61, No.4 (October, 1997), pp.777-789.

“Historiographical Essay: The Treatment of Military Subjects in Diderot’s *Encyclopedie*.” Vol.65, No.1 (January, 2001), pp.131-165. Concludes that while Denis Diderot’s (1713-1784) coverage of military topics was not the basis for reforms, they provide an excellent picture of the European art of war in the mid-eighteenth century.

LYON, JAMES M.B.

“ ‘A Peasant Mob’: The Serbian Army on the Eve of the Great War.” Vol.61, No.3 (July, 1997), pp.481-502. In contrast to previous studies, this article seeks to assess the Army’s preparedness on the eve of World War I based on Serbian archival sources, as opposed to Hapsburg sources.

LYONS, LAURENCE

With Bullock, Mike and Judkins, Philip, **“A Resolution of the Debate about British Wireless in World War I.”** Vol.84, No.4 (October, 2020), pp.1079-1096. Visits the debate over whether, as Dr. Brian Hall contends, the British Army utilized continuous wave radio as best as this technology allowed with how it was used by their French and U.S. counterparts.

MAASS, JOHN R.

“‘Too Grievous for a People to Bear’: Impressment and Conscription in Revolutionary North Carolina.” Vol.73, No.4 (October, 2009), pp.1091-1115. The government of North Carolina, faced with the challenges of fighting a revolutionary war, chose to impose impressment and conscription, which produced antipathy and resistance to Patriot authorities, undermining support for the new state, and added to the disorders within the state during the war.

MacKAY, NIALL

With Fagan, Brennen; Horwood, Ian; Price, Christopher; Richards, Ed, and Wood, A. Jamie, **“Bootstrapping the Battle of Britain.”** Vol.84, No.1 (January, 2020), pp.151-186. Using the statistical technique of weighted bootstrapping to provide a quantified assessment of the likelihood of German achievement of air superiority.

MacKENZIE, S.P.

“Progressives and Reactionaries among British Prisoners of War at Pyoktong and Chongson, North Korea, 1951-1953.” Vol.77, No.1 (January, 2013), pp.203-228. From the Chinese perspective, why were the British P.O.W.s at Chongson (Camp 1) more troublesome than those at Pyoktong (Camp 5).

MACRI, FRANCO DAVID

“‘C’ Force to Hong Kong: The Price of Collective Security in China, 1941.” Vol.77, No.1 (January, 2013), pp.141-171. Concerning the strategic and political influences on the deployment of two Canadian infantry battalions to Hong Kong in November, 1941.

MALKASIAN, CARTER

“Toward a Better Understanding of Attrition: The Korean and Vietnam Wars.” Vol.68, No.3 (July, 2004), pp.911-942.

MANN, B. DAVID

“Japanese Defense of Bataan, Luzon, Philippine Islands, 16 December 1944 – 4 September, 1945.” Vol.67, No.4 (October, 2003), pp.1149-1176.

MANN, CHRISTOPHER

“Combined Operations, the Commandos, and Norway, 1941-1944.” Vol.73, No.2 (April, 2009), pp.471-495. Displays the broader strategic consequences of a series of British raids on the coast of Norway, including valuable experience in joint operations and the commitment of German forces for the defense of Norway.

MANNING, ROGER B.

“Styles of Command in Seventeenth Century English Armies.” Vol.71, No.3 (July, 2007), pp.671-699. Proposes that aristocratic officers were reluctant to accept the idea that military hierarchies had superseded social hierarchies or that in warfare they should pursue military objectives rather than personal honor, so that, excepting the New Model Army, English military leadership was backwards in comparison with its continental counterparts.

MARBLE, SANDERS

“Document of Note: General Haig Dismisses Attritional Warfare, January 1916.” Vol.65, No.4 (October, 2001), pp.1061-1065.

MARBLE, SANDERS

“Medical Problems in the Sicilian Campaign.” Vol.84, No.2 (April, 2020), pp.537-540. Excerpt from the Monthly Progress Report, U.S. Army Service Forces, 31 October 1943.

MARCHIO, JAMES D.

“Risking General War in Pursuit of Limited Objectives: U.S. Military Contingency Planning for Poland in the Wake of the 1956 Hungarian Uprising.” Vol.66, No.3 (July, 2002), pp.783-812. Reveals that the various problems in exploring options for coming to the defense of Poland in the wake of the suppression of the Hungarian uprising led the Eisenhower administration to develop more response options to compliment the doctrine of massive nuclear retaliation.

MAROLDA, EDWARD J.

“Orphan of the Mekong Delta: The Army-Navy Mobile Riverine Force.” Vol.80, No.4 (October, 2016), pp.1149-1181. Despite its success during the Tet Offensive of 1968, the failure of Army and Navy leaders to fully embrace the creation of the Army-Navy Mobile Riverine Force resulting in its disbanding by Gen. Creighton Abrams (1914-1974).

MARTIN, CHRISTOPHER

“The Complexity of Strategy: ‘Jackie’ Fischer and the Trouble with Submarines.” Vol.75, No.2 (April, 2011), pp.441-470. The problems of re-formulating strategy in the wake of the introduction of submarines for Admiral ‘Jackie’ Fischer (1841-1920), Prime Minister A.J. Balfour (r.1902-1905), and Julian Corbett (1854-1922).

MARTIN, JAMES KIRBY

With Lender, Mark Edward, **“Target New London: Benedict Arnold’s Raid, Just War, and ‘Homegrown Terror’ Reconsidered.”** Vol.83, No.1 (January, 2019), pp.67-95. Challenges the traditional Patriot depiction of Benedict Arnold’s (1741-1801) attack on the privateer base of New London, Connecticut, 6 September, 1781, arguing that it was conducted according to the contemporary rules of ‘civilized warfare.’

MARTINI, EDWIN A.

“Incinerating Agent Orange: Operations Pacer HO, Pacer IVY, and the Rise of Environmentalist Thinking.” Vol.76, No.3 (July, 2012), pp.809-836.

MARVIN, LAURENCE W.

“The Battle of Fariskur (29 August 1219) and the Fifth Crusade: Causes, Course, and Consequences.” Vol.85, No.3 (July, 2021), pp.597-618. Seeks to understand the neglected Battle of Fariskur, fought between a force of Crusaders and the army of the Sultan of Egypt, Al-Kamil (circa 1177-1238).

MATSUI, JOHN H.

“Historiographical Essay: Seven Score and Ten: American Civil War Historiography at the Close of the Sesquicentennial.” Vol.80, No.2 (April, 2016), pp.487-509.

MATTHEWS, JAMES

“Battling Bolshevik Bogeymen: Spain’s Cordon Sanitaire against Revolution from a European Perspective, 1917-1923.” Vol.80, No.3 (July, 2016), pp.725-755. The violent social unrest experienced by Spain after 1917 represented the broader impact of the Russian Revolution that effected countries, whether they were belligerents in the Great War or neutrals like Spain.

MAY, ERNEST R.

“The George C. Marshall Lecture in Military History: 1947-48: When Marshall kept the U.S. Out of War in China.” Vol.66, No.4 (October, 2002), pp.1001-1010.

MAY, TIMOTHY

“The Training of an Inner Asian Nomad Army in the Pre-Modern Period.” Vol.70, No.3 (July, 2006), pp.617-635. Confirms that nomadic ‘horse people’, such as the Mongols, employed more sophisticated training for war than had previously been imagined.

MAYER, HOLLY A.

“Canada, Congress, and the Continental Army: Strategic Accommodations, 1774-1776.” Vol.78, No.2 (April, 2014), pp.503-535. Discusses the challenge of reconciling the Continental Congress’ policy of encouraging the enlistment of French Catholics in Canada with anti-Catholic bigotry among the members of the Continental Army.

McARTHUR, TONY

“Should Roman Soldiers be Called ‘Professional’ Prior to Augustus?” Vol.85, No.1 (January,

2021), pp.9-26. Raises the question of to what extent, if any, could soldiers in Roman armies during the period between 200 B.C.E. and the Battle of Actium in 31 B.C.E. qualify as professionals.

McCALL, JACK H., Jr.

“**‘Amazingly Indiscreet’: The Plot to Capture Wilhelm II.**” Vol.73, No.2 (April, 2009), pp.449-469. Relates how former U.S. Senator, Col. Luke Lea (1879-1945), planned to kidnap the deposed Kaiser from his exile in the Netherlands and bring him to the Paris Peace Conference to be tried as a war criminal.

McCONACHY, BRUCE

“**The Roots of Artillery Doctrine: Napoleonic Artillery Tactics Reconsidered.**” Vol.65, No.3 (July, 2001), pp.617-640. Puts forward the explanation that the changes in Napoleonic artillery practices beginning in 1807 were the results of years of experimentation and innovation, rather than compensation for a general decline in standards throughout the *Grande Armée*.

McCRANIE, KEVIN D.

“**The War of 1812 in the ongoing Napoleonic Wars: The Response of Britain’s Royal Navy.**” Vol.76, No.4 (October, 2012), pp.1067-1094. The challenge for Great Britain to balance the demands of different naval commitments, particularly in 1812 and 1813.

McCULLOCH, IAN MacPHERSON

“**‘A Blanket of Inconsistencies’: The Battle of Ticonderoga, 2008.**” Vol.72, No.3 (July, 2008), pp.889-900. A response to Ronald F. Kingsley and Harvey J. Alexander article, “The Failure of Abercomby’s Attack on Fort Carillon, July 1758, and the Scapegoating of Matthew Clerk.” Vol.72, No.1 (January, 2008), pp.43-70.

McCRANIE, KEVIN D.

“**Perception and Naval Dominance.: The British Experience during the War of 1812.**” Vol.82, No.4 (October, 2018), pp.1067-1091. The defeat of three British frigates by U.S. counterparts had no actual effect on British sea power, but provoked a disproportionate reaction within society and the Royal Navy, inadvertently leading to beneficial changes.

McCREEDY, KENNETH O.

“**Planning the Peace: Operation Eclipse and the Occupation of Germany.**” Vol.65, No.3 (July, 2001), pp.713-739. Indicates that Operation Eclipse, which was planned simultaneously with Overlord, had the dual goals of thoroughly eliminating Nazism in Germany and establishing the conditions that would free up Allied forces for military operations against Japan.

McEVOY, WILLIAM P.

“‘Experiences at Sea’: A Navy Doctor of War.” Vol.75, No.4 (October, 2011), pp.1159-1182.
U.S. Navy doctor serving in the Pacific from September 1944 to December 1945.

McGIBBON, IAN

“Australian-New Zealand Relations and Commitments to Asian Conflicts 1950-1972.” Vol.81, No.4 (October, 2017), pp.1059-1074. Despite the replacement of the British security framework by alliance with the United States, New Zealand resisted pressure to commit troops to the Vietnam War in direct contrast to its larger neighbor.

McGINNIS, ANTHONY R.

“When Courage was not Enough: Plains Indians at War with the United States Army.” Vol.76, No.2 (April, 2012), pp.454-473. Considers why the Native American tribes of the Great Plains continued to rely on their own specific style of limited warfare in the face of the U.S. Army newcomers when this style of warfare was unable to achieve any permanent success against the ‘Blue Coats.’

McGOVERN, RORY M.

“The School of Experience: George W. Goethals and the U.S. Army, 1867-1907.” Vol.81, No.2 (April, 2017), pp.395-424. Observes George W. Goethals (1858-1928) pre-Panama Canal / World War I career as an example of the career path of officers within the Gilded Age Army.

McLAUGHLIN, JOHN J.

With Lomazow, Steven, **“Counterpoint: Albert Coady Wedemeyer.”** Vol.77, No.1 (January, 2013), pp.255-272.

McMAHON, DANIEL

“Geomancy and Walled Fortifications in Late Eighteenth Century China.” Vol.76, No.2 (April, 2012), pp.373-393. Takes account of the role of geomancy based on *fengshui* in military planning and activity during the Qing Dynasty, including intelligence gathering, sabotage, and fortifications.

McMASTER, H.R.

“The 2020 George C. Marshall Lecture in Military History: Developing Strategic Empathy: History as a Foundation of Foreign Policy and National Security Strategy.” Vol.84, No.3 (July, 2020), pp.689-697.

McPHERSON, ALAN

“Lid Sitters and Prestige Seekers: The U.S. Navy versus the State Department and the End of U.S. Occupations.” Vol.78, No.1 (January, 2014), pp.73-99. Conflicting outlooks between the State Department and the Marine Corps on the U.S. military occupation of the Dominican Republic, from

1912 to 1924, Haiti, from 1915 to 1934, and Nicaragua, from 1927 to 1932.

McPHERSON, JAMES M.

“The 2014 George C. Marshall Lecture in Military History: The Rewards of Risk-Taking: Two Civil War Admirals.” Vol.78, No.4 (October, 2014), pp.1225-1237. Comparison between Rear Admiral David Glasgow Farragut (1801-1870) and Rear Admiral Samuel Francis Du Pont (1803-1865).

McANDLE, JAMES

With Quirk, James, **“The Blood Test Revisited: A New Look at German Casualty Counts in World War I.”** Vol.70, No.3 (July, 2006), pp.667-701. Tests Winston Churchill’s (1874-1965) claim that the Allies generally suffered higher casualties in battle on the Western Front than their German opponents by examining the German Medical Corps’ official history.

MEARS, DWIGHT S.

“The Catch-22 Effect: The lasting Stigma of Wartime Cowardice in the U.S. Army Air Forces.” Vol.77, No.3 (July, 2013), pp.1025-1054. Accusations of cowardice by the air crews that landed in Switzerland and their consequences.

“ ‘Neither an Officer nor an Enlisted Man;: Contract Surgeons’ Eligibility for the Medal of Honor.” Vol.85, No.1 (January, 2021), pp.51-75. Presents four instances in the Nineteenth century U.S. Army of contract surgeons who claimed entitlement to the Medal of Honor.

MEILINGER, PHILLIP

“Trenchard and ‘Morale Bombing’: The Evolution of Royal Air Force Doctrine before World War II.” Vol.60, No.2 (April, 1996), pp.243-270. Deals with the inexact blend of the intended goals of the R.A.F.’s interwar strategic bombing doctrine: breaking the will of the enemy and / or breaking the enemy’s economy.

“Historiographical Essay: U.S. Air Force Leaders: A Biographical Tour.” Vol.62, No.4 (October, 1998), pp.833-870.

“Historiographical Essay: The Historiography of Airpower: Theory and Doctrine.” Vol.64, No.2 (April, 2000), pp.467-501.

“A History of Effects-Based Air Operations.” Vol.71, No.1 (January, 2007), pp.139-167. Surveys the problem of measuring the effectiveness of Air Operations due to the ready availability of metrics such as casualty numbers, bomb tonnage, and the number of sorties flown versus the lack of the intelligence apparatus with which to analyze the complex economic system of one’s opponents.

MEIXSEL, RICHARD B.

“Major General George Grunert, WPO-3, and the Philippine Army, 1940-1941.” Vol.59, No.2 (April, 1995), pp.303-324. Challenges the conventional account of the initial abandonment of War Plan Orange – 3 by the Commanding General of the Philippine Department, General Grunert (1881-1971), and Philippine Army Field Marshal, Douglas MacArthur (1880-1964).

“A Uniform Story.” Vol.69, No.3 (July, 2005), pp.791-799. Debunks the often-repeated story that Douglas MacArthur (1880-1964) designed a field marshal’s uniform for his role as Philippine military advisor in the 1930s.

MIKABERIDZE, ALEXANDER

“Historiographical Essay: Recent Trends in the Russian Historiography of the Napoleonic Wars.” Vol.74, No.1 (January, 2010), pp.189-194.

MILLER, STEPHEN M.

“In Support of the ‘Imperial Mission’? Volunteering for the South African War, 1899-1902.” Vol.69, No.3 (July, 2005), pp.691-711. Inquires into the motives of British civilians who responded to the call for recruits by enlisting in the Volunteers, the Militia, or the Imperial Yeomanry.

“The British Way of War: Cultural Assumption and Practices in the South African War, 1899-1902.” Vol.77, No.4 (October, 2013), pp.1329-1347. Cosmopolitanism, political egalitarianism, and attitudes towards race influenced the British conduct of the war.

MILLETT, ALLAN R.

“A Reader’s Guide to the Korean War.” Vol.61, No.3 (July, 1997), pp.583-597.

“The George C. Marshall Lecture in Military History: Introduction to the Korean War.” Vol.65, No.4 (October, 2001), pp.921-935.

MILNE, DAVID

“ ‘Our Equivalent of Guerrilla Warfare’: Walt Rostow and the Bombing of North Vietnam, 1961-1968.” Vol.71, No.1 (January, 2007), pp.169-203. Claims that Walt Rostow’s (1916-2003) background as an economic historian led him to become one of the strongest advocates for the strategic bombing of North Vietnam.

MILNER, MARC

“Stopping the Panzers: Reassessing the Role of 3rd Canadian Infantry Division in Normandy, 7-10 June, 1944.” Vol.74, No.2 (April, 2010), pp.491-522. Reveals that the 3rd Canadian Infantry Division’s beachhead battles of 7-10 June against the 12th Hitler Youth Panzer Division are fundamentally misunderstood as failed breakout attempts when, in fact, they were successful defensive operations.

MONTEIRO, ARMANDO DA SILVA SATURNINO

“The Decline and Fall of Portuguese Seapower, 1588-1663.” Vol.65, No.1 (January, 2001), pp.9-20.

MOORE, ANDREW

“Monuments Men and Martyred Towns: *The Arras Belfry* by Fernand Sabatté.” Vol.79, No.4 (October, 2015), pp.1047-1057. Sabatté (1874-1940) served as a French officer in charge of evacuating artworks from Medieval churches and town halls that were under the threat of destruction as well as painting an example of the ‘martyred towns’ genre.

MOORE, BOB

“Unwanted Guests in Troubled Times: German Prisoners of War in the Union of South Africa, 1942-1943.” Vol.70, No.1 (January, 2006), pp.63-90. Contrasts the potential threats to domestic security in South Africa during a time of internal dissension of holding German P.O.W.s with the less troublesome experience with Italian prisoners.

MORGAN, JOHN

“War Feeding War? The Impact of Logistics on the Napoleonic Occupation of Catalonia.” Vol.73, No.1 (January, 2009), pp.83-116. The inability of the French occupation forces to live off the land meant that alternate sources and modes of supply had to be relied upon in the midst of guerrilla resistance and the British blockade of Catalan ports, all of which negatively impacted French operations.

MORGAN-OWEN, DAVID

“War as it Might Have Been: British Sea Power and the First World War.” Vol.83, No.4 (October, 2019), pp.1095-1131. Argues that because of shortcomings in Britain’s strategic decision-making apparatus, the alternatives to the attrition on the Western Front offered by British Sea Power never received due consideration.

MOULTON, AARON COY

“The Dominican Dictator’s Funds and Guns in Costa Rica’s Wars of 1948.” Vol.85, No.3 (July, 2021), pp.713-733. Whereas past studies of the conflicts in Costa Rica have focused on the involvement of Anastasio Somoza García of Nicaragua (1896-1956) and Juan José Arévalo of Guatemala (1904-1990), the author demonstrates that Costa Ricans sought to obtain arms from the Dominican Dictator Rafael Trujillo (1891-1961).

MUEHLBAUER, MATTHEW S.

“Holy War and Just War in Early New England, 1630-1655.” Vol.81, No.3 (July, 2017), pp.667-692. Questions the uneven application of these concepts by the New England colonies in relation to both wars and efforts to avoid war with both Native American tribes and the neighboring colony of New Netherlands.

MULLIGAN, TIMOTHY P.

“Ship-of-the-Line or Atlantic Raider? Battleship *Bismarck* between Design Limitations and Naval Strategy.” Vol.69, No.4 (October, 2005), pp.1013-1044.

MURTEIRA, ANDRÉ

“Historiographical Essay: The Military Revolution and European Wars Outside of Europe: The Dutch-Portuguese War in Asia in the First Quarter of the Seventeenth Century.” Vol.84, No.2 (April, 2020), pp.511-535. Challenges the notion of Early Modern Western Military exceptionalism that, in Portuguese historiography, has blamed their defeat on Portuguese naval forces that were inferior to their Dutch opponents supposedly because of Asian military influence that was absent among the Dutch.

MUSCHAMP, AMY

“Living Under Allied Military Government in Southern Italy during the Second World War: A Case Study of the Region of Molise.” Vol.79, No.2 (April, 2015), pp.369-386. Based on a combination of archival research at the regional capital of Campobasso and oral history.

N

NAIDEN, F.S.

“Spartan Naval Performance in the Decelean War, 413-404 B.C.E.” Vol.73, No.3 (July, 2009), pp.729-744. Identifies improvements in Sparta’s cadre of naval officers as the reason for Spartan naval victories during the final phase of the Peloponnesian War.

NASSON, BILL

“Historiographical Essay: Waging Total War in South Africa: Some Centenary Writings on the Anglo-Boer War, 1899-1902.” Vol.66, No.3 (July, 2002), pp.813-828.

NATH, PRATYAY

“Looking beyond the Military Revolution: Variations in Early Modern Warfare and the Mughal Case.” Vol.86, No.1 (January, 2022), pp.9-31. Argues that the heterogeneous nature of Mughal strategy, tactics, and the deployment of technology over time and across space was due to a wide range of factors, including environmental conditions, military pragmatism, financial considerations, and distance from the imperial heartland, challenging the simplistic early modern ‘Military Revolution’ thesis.

NEILL, DONALD A.

“Ancestral Voices: The Influence of the Ancients on the Military Thought of the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries.” Vol.62, No.3 (July, 1998), pp.487-520. Insists that the military developments

of the Enlightenment were the result of the normal course of military innovation, simple evolutionary adaptation, as opposed to a sudden, revolutionary change stemming from the rediscovery of the military methods described by Classical authors.

NEILSON, KEITH

“The Royal Navy, Japan, and British Strategic Foreign Policy, 1932-1934.” Vol.75, No.2 (April, 2011), pp.505-531. Japan’s challenge to British interests affected British policy generally, and particularly Anglo-American relations, producing conflicting proposals from the Treasury, the Admiralty, and the Foreign Offices.

NEILSON, ANNA KASTEN

“Anna M. Rosenberg, an ‘Honorary Man’.” Vol.68, No.1 (January, 2004), pp.133-161. Considers how and why Defense Secretary George C. Marshall (1880-1959) bucked political and gender assumptions when he appointed a pro-New Deal, Jewish immigrant woman, Anna M. Rosenberg (1899-1983), as the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower.

NELSON, DAVID T.

With Cole, Richard G. **“Memoirs: Behind German Lines in 1915: The Letters Home of David T. Nelson.”** Vol.65, No.4 (October, 2001), pp.1053-1060. Nelson, who was from Decorah, Iowa, was a Rhodes Scholar at Oxford when the war broke out. He worked for the Commission for Relief in German occupied Belgium and, later in 1916, as a driver for the American Field Ambulance Corps.

NENNINGER, TIMOTHY K.

“ ‘Unsystematic as a Mode of Command’: Commanders and the Process of Command in the American Expeditionary Forces, 1917-1918.” Vol.64, No.3 (July, 2000), pp.739-768. Inquires into how the knowledge, skills, and preparations of A.E.F. commanders and staff officers and their interactions with one another produced a distinctly American process of command.

“United States Prisoners of War and the Red Army, 1944-45: Myths and Realities.” Vol.66, No.3 (July, 2002), pp.761-781. When the Soviets overran German P.O.W. camps, they came into the possession of some 28,000 U.S. soldiers, the repatriation of which proved complicated.

“ ‘Casualties’ at Leavenworth: A Research Problem.” Vol.76, No.2 (April, 2012), pp.497-506. A cautionary tale of doing research in terms of bias and the issue of the factual content of sources.

NEUFELD, MICHAEL J.

“The End of the Army Space Program: Interservice Rivalry and the Transfer of the von Braun Group to N.A.S.A., 1958-1959.” Vol.69, No.3 (July, 2005), pp.737-757.

NEUMANN, BRIAN

“ ‘A Question of Authority’: Reassessing the March-Pershing ‘Feud’ in the First World War.”

Vol.73, No.4 (October, 2009), pp.1117-1142. Ascertains that the conflict between John J. Pershing (1860-1940) and Peyton C. March (1864-1955) was the result of a lack of a clearly defined command structure within the U.S. Army rather than a matter of opposing personalities.

NEWELL, CLAYTON R.

With Shrader, Charles R. **“The U.S. Army’s Transition to Peace, 1865-66.”** Vol.77, No.3 (July, 2013), pp.867-894.

NICOLLE, DAVID

“Medieval Warfare: The Unfriendly Interface.” Vol.63, No.3 (July, 1999), pp.579-599. Probes the nature of and reasons for the adoption of military technology and techniques, focusing on the influence of the Islamic world on Christian Europe.

NOE, KENNETH W,

“ ‘Damned North Carolinians’ and ‘Brave Virginians’: The Lane-Mahone Controversy, Honor, and Civil War Memory.” Vol.72, No.4 (October, 2008), pp.1089-1115. Charts the feud between the North Carolina commander, James Henry, and William Mahone over the question of who deserved credit for capturing three enemy flags at the Battle of Spotsylvania, 1864, a feud that was influenced by a culture of honor and post-war politics.

NORDLUND, ALEXANDER

“ ‘Done My Bit’: British Soldiers, the 1918 Armistice, and Understanding the First World War.” Vol.81, No.2 (April, 2017), pp.425-446. Contrasts British soldiers’ reactions to the Armistice and their war experience with their later reflections.

NORTH, JOHNATHAN

“General Hoche and Counterinsurgency.” Vol.67, No.2 (April, 2003), pp.529-540. Louis Lazare Hoche (1768-1797) was a General of Revolutionary France whose service included the successful suppression of the Catholic Royalist Revolt in the Vendée.

NOVELLI, MARTIN A.

With Wetta, Frank J. **“Review Essay: ‘Now a Major Motion Picture’: War Films and Hollywood’s New Patriotism.”** Vol.67, No.3 (July, 2003), pp.861-882. Suggests that the ‘New Patriotism’ displayed in films (1998-2002) celebrates loyalty to one’s comrades in battle and the ability to survive the horrific experience of modern combat rather than any stated or understood national or public rationales for whatever a war is being fought.

O

OGLETHORPE, JAMES

With Hadley, Gregory and **“Mackay’s ‘Betrayal’: Solving the Mystery of the ‘Sado Island Prisoner-of-War Massacre’.”** Vol.71, No.2 (April, 2007), pp.441-464. Conclusively demonstrates that the suppression of a supposed Japanese massacre of Allied prisoners working in a gold mine in Aikawa on Sado island in 1945 as presented in James MacKay’s 1996 book, *Betrayal in High Places*, is an intentional forgery.

ORANGE, VINCENT

“The German Air Force is Already ‘The Most Powerful in Europe’: Two Royal Air Force Officers Report on a Visit to Germany, 6-15 October, 1936.” Vol.70, No.4 (October, 2006), pp.1011-1028. Presents the contents of an unpublished report by two R.A.F. officers who toured Germany to investigate the *Luftwaffe*, where they were well received and given access to both the latest aircraft and high-ranking air force personnel.

ORBACH, DANNY

“Criticism Reconsidered: The German Resistance to Hitler in Critical German Scholarship.” Vol.75, No.2 (April, 2011), pp.565-590. Establishes that, beginning in the 1960s, some of the so-called ‘critical’ historiography of the 20 July, 1944, conspirators suffer from erroneous reading of the sources, one-sided evaluations, moral condescension, and rhetorical manipulation.

With Serebriakova, Polina, **“Irregular Warfare in Late Medieval Japan: Towards a Historical Understanding of the Ninja.”** Vol.84, No.4 (October, 2020), pp.997-1020. Separating the contemporary myth from what we can actually determine based on surviving primary sources.

ORR, ANDREW

“ ‘We call you to holy war’: Mustafa Kemal, Communism, and Germany in French Intelligence Nightmare, 1919-1923.” Vol.75, No.4 (October, 2011), pp.1095-1123. Explains how French military intelligence analysts chose to identify Mustafa Kemal (1881-1938) as the central figure in a communist-inspired, German controlled, anti-colonial enterprise that was closely allied to Islamist political movements, rather than the nationalist, secular, westernizing leader that he was.

ORTIZ, STEPHEN R.

“The ‘New Deal’ for Veterans: The Economy Act [1934], the Veterans of Foreign Wars, and the Origins of New Deal Dissent.” Vol.70, No.2 (April, 2006), pp.415-438.

OSMAN, JULIA

“Guibert vs. Guibert: Competing Notions in the *Essai general de Tactique* and the *Défense du* [751]

système de guerre modern.” Vol.83, No.1 (January, 2019), pp.43-65. Examines the apparently contradictory ideas about the conduct of war in two books written by the Enlightenment-era author, Jacques Antoine Hippolyte, the Comte de Guibert (1743-1790), who has been credited as the prophet of French Revolutionary and Napoleonic warfare.

OSTWALD, JAMEL

“The ‘Decisive’ Battle of Ramillies, 1706: Prerequisites for Decisiveness in Early Modern Warfare.” Vol.64, No.3 (July, 2000), pp.649-677. Asks whether eighteenth century military strategy was indecisive by choice rather than by necessity by looking at the 1st Duke of Marlborough, John Churchill’s (1650-1722), Ramillies campaign.

OTTE, T.G.

“From *Can-Can Diabolique* to *Sitzkrieg*: The International China Expeditionary Force, 1900-1901.” Vol.77, No.4 (October, 2013), pp.1277-1302. Analyzes a neglected example of coalition warfare.

OTTOSEN, MORTEN NORDHAGEN

“Ending War and Making Peace in Scandinavia, 1814-1848: ‘Peace Crisis’, Demobilization, and Reconciliation.” Vol.80, No.1 (January, 2016), pp.145-172.

OVERLACK, PETER

“The Force of Circumstances: Graf Spee’s Options for the East Asian Cruiser Squadron in 1914.” Vol.60, No.4 (October, 1996), pp.657-682. Investigates how the denial of coaling stations by both Japan’s decision to join the Entente Powers and the actions of Australia and New Zealand severely constricted the choices available to Vice-Admiral Maximilian Reichsgraf von Spee (1861-1914).

OYOS, MATTHEW M.

“Theodore Roosevelt and the Implements of War.” Vol.60, No.4 (October, 1996), pp.631-655. Brings to light an overlooked aspect of Roosevelt’s presidency (1901-1909), his role in accelerating the pace of military technological modernization, including involvement with battleships, submarines, aircraft, and machine guns.

P

PAINE, SARAH C.M.

“The 2022 George C. Marshall Lecture in Military History: Centuries of Security: Chinese, Russian and U.S. Continental versus Maritime Approaches.” Vol.86, No.4 (October, 2022), pp.813-836.

PALAZZO, ALBERT P.

“The British Army’s Counter-Battery Staff Office and Control of the Enemy in World War I.” Vol.63, No.1 (January, 1999), pp.55-74. Sets forth the argument that the critical turning point for the artillery occurred during the winter of 1916-1917, when, drawing upon the lessons of the Battle of the Somme, a corps-level Counter-Battery Staff Office was created.

PALMER, MICHAEL A.

“ ‘The Soul’s Right Hand’: Command and Control in the Age of Fighting Sail, 1652-1827.” Vol.61, No.4 (October, 1997), pp.679-705. Suggests that the ‘rationalism’ of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries had a detrimental impact on methods of command and control, emphasizing centralization which, in turn, favored the single line ahead formation that has been blamed for the indecisiveness of naval battles in this period.

PAOLETTI, CIRO

“Prince Eugene of Savoy, the Toulon Expedition of 1707, and the English Historians: A Dissenting View.” Vol.70, No.4 (October, 2006), pp.939-962. Using the siege of Toulon as an example, the author insists that most of the military histories of the period between 1688 and 1748 written by English speaking authors are flawed due to a failure to consult non-English contemporary sources.

“The Battle of Culloden: A Pivotal Moment in World History.” Vol.81, No.1 (January, 2017), pp.187-198. Highlights the international context of the Battle of Culloden, 16 April, 1746, and speculates on the wider consequences of a Hanoverian defeat.

PARET, PETER

“Review Essay: The Annales School and the History of War.” Vol.73, No.4 (October, 2009), pp.1289-1295.

“Clausewitz: ‘Half against my will, I have become a Professor.’ Vol.75, No.2 (April, 2011), pp.591-601. Carl von Clausewitz’ (1780-1831) lectures on ‘Little War’ during the Prussian reform era.

“Clausewitz and Schlieffen as Interpreters of Frederick the Great: Three Phases in the History of Grand Strategy.” Vol.76, No.3 (July, 2012), pp.837-845. Compares how Carl von Clausewitz (1780-1831) and Count Alfred von Schlieffen (1833-1913) interpreted Frederick the Great’s generalship, illustrating the function of historical study in the development of Clausewitz’s theories.

“Translation, Literal or Accurate.” Vol.78, No.3 (July, 2014), pp.1077-1080. Disagreements over the proper translation of five words in Carl von Clausewitz’s *On War* as an example of the challenges of translating complex texts.

“On War then and now.” Vol.80, No.2 (April, 2016), pp.477-485. Analyzes the development of some of Clausewitz’ (1780-1831) concepts from the 1790s to the early 1830s and their relevance today.

“Review Essay: Clausewitz’s Life and Work as a Subject of Historical Interpretation.” Vol.81, No.3 (July, 2017), pp.829-837.

“The Function of History in Clausewitz’s Understanding of War.” Vol.82, No.4 (October, 2018), pp.1049-1066.

“The Impact of Clausewitz’s Early Life on His Theories and Politics.” Vol.84, No.1 (January, 2020), pp.35-50. Proposes that the angry quarrels with his father led Clausewitz (1780-1831) to develop a combative relationship with authority throughout his life that impacted the development of his theories.

“From the Discovery of a Clausewitz Manuscript to Its Interpretation.” Vol.84, No.3 (July, 2020), pp.867-871. A translation of an unpublished manuscript written by Carl von Clausewitz from the first years of his military career, specifically August, 1802.

PARKER, GEOFFREY

“Review Essay: The ‘Military Revolution’, 1555-2005: From Belfast to Barcelona and the Hague.” Vol.69, No.1 (January, 2005), pp.205-209.

“The Limits to Revolutions in Military Affairs: Maurice of Nassau, the Battle of Nieuwpoort (1600), and the Legacy.” Vol.71, No.2 (April, 2007), pp.331-372. Probes the evolution of the use of volley fire by matchlock armed infantry, beginning with its use in Japan in the 1560s and by the Dutch in the 1590s, with its first use in combat in Europe at the battle of Nieuwpoort, 2 July, 1600.

“States Make War but Wars also Break States.” Vol.74, No.1 (January, 2010), pp.11-34. The ‘chicken and egg’ debate at the heart of the mid-seventeenth century ‘General Crisis Debate’, arguing that only a synergy between natural and man-made disasters produced state-breakdown.

“Review Essay: A Soldier of Fortune in Seventeenth Century Eastern Europe.” Vol.76, No.2 (April, 2012), pp.545-548. Examines Diary of General Patrick Gordon of Auchleuchries 1635-1699, the account of a Scottish Catholic who, like many Early-Modern Scots, served in the armies of Sweden, Poland, and Russia.

“Review Essay: Patrick Gordon Rides Again.” Vol.79, No.4 (October, 2015), pp.1127-1129. Examines The remaining volumes of the diary of General Patrick Gordon of Auchleuchries 1635-1699, the account of a Scottish Catholic who, like many Early-Modern Scots, served in the armies of Sweden, Poland, and Russia.

PARKIN, RUSSELL

“Colonel E.G. Keogh and the Making of the *Australian Army Journal*.” Vol.81, No.4 (October, 2017), pp.1075-1096. Shines a light on the overlooked contribution to professional education and military history in Australia by Eustace Graham Keogh (1899-1981).

PARTON, NEVILLE

“The Development of Early R.A.F. Doctrine.” Vol.72, No.4 (October, 2008), pp.1155-1177. Rather than a monolithic focus on strategic bombing imposed by Hugh Trenchard (1873-1956), the article argues that R.A.F. doctrine between 1918 and 1923 was a more nuanced, balanced approach

to developing and applying air power.

PAUL, MICHAEL C.

“The Military Revolution in Russia, 1550-1682.” Vol.68, No.1 (January, 2004), pp.9-45.

Asserts that the Armed Forces of the tsars underwent truly revolutionary changes between the mid-sixteenth and late-seventeenth centuries that made Imperial Russia a significant power and laid the groundwork for the reforms of Peter the Great.

PEARSON, ELIZABETH

“Decimation and Unit Cohesion: Why were Roman Legionaries willing to Perform Decimation?”

Vol.83, No.3 (July, 2019), pp.665-688. Analyzes the practice in light of ‘primary group’ theory, arguing that it reintegrated offending units through collective acceptance of both guilt and the necessity for punishment.

PEIFER, DOUGLAS

“Commemoration of Mutiny, Rebellion, and Resistance in Postwar Germany: Public memory, History, and the Formation of ‘Memory Beacons’.” Vol.65, No.4 (October, 2001), pp.1013-1052.

Analyzes three ‘memory beacons’ that have been cultivated in German public and social memory: the naval mutinies of 1917-18, the 20th July, 1944, plot, and *Wehrmacht* deserters during World War II.

“The Past in the Present: Passion, Politics, and the Historical Profession in the German and British Pardon Campaigns.” Vol.71, No.4 (October, 2007), pp.1107-1132. Long a peripheral matter, by the 1990s military justice during the World Wars had vaulted from the field of grassroots activism to the legislative, executive, and judicial arenas of government in Germany and Great Britain, resulting in official pardons for soldiers who had been court martialed in these conflicts.

“The Sinking of the *Lusitania*, Wilson’s Response, and Paths Not Taken: Historical Revisionism, the Nye Committee, and the Ghost of William Jennings Bryan.” Vol.79, No.4 (October, 2015), pp.1025-1045. Assesses the way that the impact of the revisionist literature of the interwar period on the Neutrality Acts of the mid-1930s demonstrates how ‘history’s lessons’ without context can mislead rather than inform.

PENNINGTON, REINA

“Review Essay: Women, War, and the Military.” Vol.71, No.4 (October, 2007), pp.1203-1210.

Reference works covering antiquity to the present.

“Offensive Women: Women in Combat in the Red Army in the Second World War.” Vol.74, No.3 (July, 2010), pp.775-820. Reports on the nature and variety of women’s combat experiences.

PERCY, WILLIAM ALEXANDER

“Jim Crow and Uncle Sam: The Tuskegee Flying Units and the U.S. Army Air Forces in Europe

during World War II.” Vol.67, No.3 (July, 2003), pp.773-810. Links the success of the African American 99th Fighter Squadron and the 332nd Fighter Group with President Harry S. Truman’s decision to end segregation in the Armed Forces.

PERNELL, RALPH McT.

With Sorley, Lewis, **“Too Good for the Infantry?”** Vol.63, No.3 (July, 1999), pp.704-705. This is a 1942 letter from New Mexico Congressman Clinton P. Anderson in response to a request for an individual to be reassigned out of a rifle squad.

PERRAS, GALEN ROGER

“We have Opened the Door to Tokyo: United States Plans to Seize the Kurile Islands, 1943-1945.” Vol.61, No.1 (January, 1997), pp.65-91. Proposals to defeat Imperial Japan by attacking the Home Islands through a campaign in the Northern Pacific, including the potential complications for U.S.-Soviet relations.

With Kellner, Katrina E. **“ ‘A Perfectly Logical and Sensible Thing’: Billy Mitchell Advocates a Canadian-American Aerial Alliance Against Japan.”** Vol.72, No.3 (July, 2008), pp.785-823. As a result of his overlooked trip to Canada in 1923, Brigadier General Billy Mitchell (1879-1936) formulated a plan for employing an allied U.S.-Canadian strategic bombing force based in Alaska to wage war on Japan.

PERRUN, JODY

“Best-Laid Plans: Guy Simonds and Operation Totalize, 7-10 August 1944.” Vol.67, No.1 (January, 2003), pp.137-173. Probes the role of airpower in Operation Totalize, which, the author claims, calls for a reassessment of Lieutenant General Simonds (1903-1974) leadership of the II Canadian Corps.

PESZKE, MICHAEL ALFRED

“Historiographical Essay: An Introduction to English-Language Literature on the Polish Armed Forces in World War II.” Vol.70, No.4 (October, 2006), pp.1029-1064.

PETRINA, STEPHEN

“Scientific Ammunition to Fire at Congress: Intelligence, Reparations, and the U.S. Army Air Forces, 1944-1947.” Vol.83, No.3 (July, 2019), pp.795-829. Appraises the place of intelligence and reparations in U.S. Army Air Force and U.S. Air Force postwar research and development.

PETTY, ADAM H.

“Reconsidering the Wilderness’s Role in Battle, 4-6 May 1864.” Vol.82, No.2 (April, 2018), pp.413-438. Questions the existing consensus regarding the influence of the forest known as

the Wilderness on the battle of the same name.

PHILLIPS, GERVASE

“To Cry ‘Home! Home!’: Mutiny, Morale, and Indiscipline in Tudor Armies.” Vol.65, No.2 (April, 2001), pp.313-332. Points to the study of the unrest within Tudor armies as a means of better understanding common notions of equitable treatment, mutual obligations, and obedience within society as a whole.

“Scapegoat Arm: Twentieth-Century Cavalry in Anglophone Historiography.” Vol.71, No.1 (January, 2007), pp.37-74. Too often used as a scapegoat for failures in war and an obstacle to modernization in peacetime, this article reassesses the capabilities of early twentieth-century soldiers, with a consideration of the military history of Eastern Europe, presenting a more positive interpretation of role of cavalry in modern warfare.

“Technology, ‘Machine Age’ Warfare, and the Military Use of Dogs, 1880-1918.” Vol.82, No.1 (January, 2018), pp.67-94. The establishment of permanent, regular military dog units in 1880 reflects the overlooked fact that, during modern ‘machine age’ warfare, there remained a widespread reliance on animals.

PHILPOTT, WILLIAM

With Alexander, Martin S. **“The French and the British Field Force: Moral Support or Material Contribution?”** Vol.71, No.3 (July, 2007), pp.743-772. Contends that, even though France viewed the military benefit of the British commitment of a field army if war broke out with Germany as unsubstantial, the moral value of such a promise meant that it played an important role in France’s preparations for war.

PHIMISTER, IAN

“Developing and Defending Britain and Her Empire: Montgomery’s 1947 Tour of Africa.” Vol.79, No.3 (July, 2015), pp.745-766. An overlooked event of the immediate postwar era that provides a window into both Field Marshal Bernard Montgomery’s (1887-1976) post-1945 career and the attitudes of the new Labour government towards defense.

PLOTNIKOV, DMITRY

“Still Misreading Svechin: Annihilation, Attrition, and the Strategic and Operational Implications.” Vol.86, No.3 (July, 2022), pp.670-687. Addresses misunderstanding relating to the concepts of annihilation and attrition in the writings of the Imperial Russian and Soviet military theorist Aleksandr Svechin (1878-1938).

PODSOBYLAEV, EVGENII

With King, Francis and Biggart, John, **“The Russian Naval General Staff and the Evolution of**

Naval Policy, 1905-1914.” Vol.66, No.1 (January, 2002), pp.37-69. Addresses the neglected perspective of the connections between the formulation of naval strategy for the Baltic Sea, warship construction, and Imperial Russia’s aspirations to become a great naval power.

PONICHTERA, ROBERT M.

“The Military Thought of Wladyslaw Sikorski.” Vol.59, No.2 (April, 1995), pp.279-301. Offers a description of Sikorski’ (1881-1943) pursuit of political goals through the promotion of Polish military strength throughout his career, from within the Austro-Hungarian Empire to the leadership of the Polish state in exile.

PORCH, DOUGLAS

“Historiographical Essay: Writing History in the ‘End of History’ Era: Reflections on Historians and the GWOT.” Vol.70, No.4 (October, 2006), pp.1065-1079. Addresses the danger of history being twisted by partisans, polemicists, and ideologues into an apologia for contemporary U.S. policy, and ultimately as a weapon of intimidation to silence doubt, dissent, disagreement, and even debate, which serves neither the cause of history, nor of policy and strategy formulation, nor even of democracy in a moment of national peril.

POPE, STEVEN W.

“An Army of Athletes: Playing Fields, Battlefields, and the American Military Sporting Experience, 1890-1920.” Vol.59, No.3 (July, 1995), pp.435-456. Looks at the efforts of a reformist generation of officers, who were committed to their soldiers’ welfare, to utilize athletics and sports as a means of combatting desertion and vice, which contributed to a transformation in the public image of both sports and the Army.

POWERS, SANDRA L.

“Historiographical Essay: Studying the Art of War: Military Books known to American Officers and Their French Counterparts during the Second Half of the Eighteenth Century.” Vol.70, No.3 (July, 2006), pp.781-814.

PRENTICE, DAVID L.

“ ‘Waltzing Matilda’ Out of Vietnam: Grand Strategy, Politics, and the Decision to Remove Australian Military Forces from Vietnam.” Vol.86, No.3 (July, 2022), pp.642-669. When the United States chose to pursue the policy of ‘Vietnamization’, withdrawing increasing numbers of U.S. troops, Australian Prime Minister John Gorton (r.1968-1971) sought to encourage U.S. resolve by retaining Australian troops in South Vietnam until 1970, when Gorton’s government collapsed.

PRETE, ROY A.

“Joffre and the Origins of the Somme: A Study in Allied Military Planning.” Vol.73, No.2 (April,

2009), pp.417-448.

PRIBBENOW, MERLE L., II

“The -Ology War: Technology and Ideology in the Vietnamese Defense of Hanoi, 1967.” Vol.67, No.1 (January, 2003), pp.175-200. Considers the multiple factors in the recovery of the air defenses of Hanoi following near disaster in 1967.

With Veith, George J. **“ ‘Fighting is an Art’: The Army of the Republic of Vietnam’s Defense of Xuan Loc, 9 – 21 April, 1975.”** Vol.68, No.1 (January, 2004), pp.163-213. Provides an account of the successful defensive operation of Brigadier General Lê Minh Đảo’s (1933-2020) 18th Division, demonstrating what A.R.V.N. units were capable of accomplishing when led by commanded by inspiring leaders.

“A Tale of Five Generals: Vietnam’s Invasion of Cambodia.” Vol.70, No.2 (April, 2006), pp.459-486. Concerned the meticulously planned and well executed 1978-79 invasion of neighboring Cambodia by the Communist forces of the newly united Vietnam, which included both an amphibious assault and combined arms mechanized columns.

PRICE, CHRISTOPHER

With Fagan, Brennen; Horwood, Ian; MacKay, Niall; Richards, Ed, and Wood, A. Jamie, **“Bootstrapping the Battle of Britain.”** Vol.84, No.1 (January, 2020), pp.151-186. Using the statistical technique of weighted bootstrapping to provide a quantified assessment of the likelihood of German achievement of air superiority.

PRIEST, ANDREW

“ ‘In Common Cause’: The N.A.T.O. Multilateral Force and the Mixed-Manning Demonstration on the U.S.S. *Claude V. Ricketts*, 1964-1965.” Vol.69, No.3 (July, 2005), pp.759-789. The crew of the destroyer (DDG-5) U.S.S. *Claude V. Ricketts* included U.S., British, Dutch, Greek, Italian, Turkish, and West German officers and men.

PROBASCO, NATE

“The Role of Commoners and Print in Elizabethan England’s Acceptance of Firearms.” Vol.76, No.2 (April, 2012), pp.343-372. Looks at the debate in print between, on the one hand, common citizens and local officials, who were skeptical of firearms, the expense and safety of which they criticized, and those who promoted the replacement of longbows with firearms, who often employed dubious information.

Q

QUIRK, JAMES

With McAndle, James, **“The Blood Test Revisited: A New Look at German Casualty Counts in**
[759]

World War I.” Vol.70, No.3 (July, 2006), pp.667-701. Tests Winston Churchill’s (1874-1965) claim that the Allies generally suffered higher casualties in battle on the Western Front than their German opponents by examining the German Medical Corps’ official history.

R

RAFUSE, ETHAN S.

“Historiographical Essays: Still a Mystery? General Grant and the Histories, 1981-2006.”

Vol.71, No.3 (July, 2007), pp.849-874. Traces the evolution of the assessment of General Ulysses S. Grant (1822-1885), from William S. McFeely’s 1981 Pulitzer Prize-winning study to the present day.

RAFUSE, ETHAN S.

“ ‘Little Phil’, a ‘Bad Old Man’, and the ‘Gray Ghost’: Hybrid Warfare and the Fight for the Shenandoah Valley, August-November 1864.” Vol.81, No.3 (July, 2017), pp.775-801. Uses Major General Philip Sheridan’s (1831-1888) successful campaign against the combination of Confederate regular and irregular forces as a case study of addressing the challenges of hybrid warfare.

RAUDZENS, GEORGE

“Military Revolution or Maritime Evolution? Military Superiorities or Transportation Advantages as Main Causes of European Colonial Conquests to 1788.” Vol.63, No.3 (July, 1999), pp.631-641.

RAWLING, WILLIAM

“The Challenge of Modernization: The Royal Canadian Navy and Antisubmarine Weapons, 1944-1945.” Vol.63, No.2 (April, 1999), pp.355-378.

REARDON, JEFF T.

“Breaking the U.S. Navy’s ‘Gun Club’ Mentality in the South Pacific.” Vol.75, No.2 (April, 2011), pp.533-564. Analyzing the adjustment of pre-war doctrine in the face of defeat in nighttime naval engagements with the Imperial Japanese Navy.

“Reevaluating Ghormley and Halsey at Guadalcanal.” Vol.86, No.4 (October, 2022), pp.915-948. Presents a reassessment of Vice Admiral Robert L. Ghormley (1883-1958) service as commander in chief of the South Pacific Area during 1942.

REESE, ROGER R.

“Red Army Professionalism and the Communist Party, 1918-1941.” Vol.66, No.1 (January, 2002), pp.71-102. Explores the social and institutional dynamics that shaped the Red Army’s officer corps and determined the extent of its ability to face the Nazi invasion.

“Lessons of the Winter War: A Study in the Military Effectiveness of the Red Army, 1939-1940.”

Vol.72, No.3 (July, 2008), pp.825-852. Based on newly consulted primary sources, this article confronts the notion of a uniformly dismal performance of the Red Army during the Winter War.

REGNAULT, JEAN-MARC

“France’s Search for Nuclear Test Sites, 1957-1963.” Vol.67, No.4 (October, 2003), pp.1223-1248. Reckons with the consequences for French Polynesia and New Caledonia of the mother country’s search for an alternative to the Sahara Desert in Algeria as a nuclear test site.

REID, BRIAN HOLDEN

“ ‘A Signpost that was Missing?’ Reconsidering British Lessons from the American Civil War.” Vol.70, No.2 (April, 2006), pp.385-414. Focuses on the works of the military authors, notably General J.F.C. Fuller (1878-1966) and Captain Basil Liddell Hart (1895-1970), to consider the ‘lessons’ they perceived from their study of the U.S. Civil War.

“ ‘Young Turks, or Not So Young?’: The Frustrated Quest of Major General J.F.C. Fuller and Captain B.H. Liddell Hart.” Vol.73, No.1 (January, 2009), pp.147-175. A study of their motives and aspirations during the inter-war period.

“Michael Howard and the Evolution of Modern War Studies.” Vol.73, No.3 (July, 2009), pp.869-904. Chart the efforts of Sir Michael Howard (1922-2019), beginning in 1950, to impart a framework on the study of the relationship between war and society to the extent that it has been shaped by organizational and moral forces.

REISS, MATTHIAS

“Bronzed Bodies behind Barbed Wire: Masculinity and the Treatment of German Prisoners of War in the United States in World War II.” Vol.69, No.2 (April, 2005), pp.475-504. In contrast to other Allied nations, the War Department chose not to parole German P.O.W.s being held in the United States into the custody of employers because of concerns over the potential for women being attracted to these prisoners.

REIST, KATHERINE K.

“The American Military Advisory Missions to China, 1945-1949.” Vol.77, No.4 (October, 2013), pp.1379-1398. Provides an account of the difficulties between the Joint U.S. Military Advisory Group and *Guomindang* leaders.

RICHARDS, ED

With Fagan, Brennen; Horwood, Ian; MacKay, Niall; Price, Christopher; Richards, Ed, and Wood, A. Jamie, **“Bootstrapping the Battle of Britain.”** Vol.84, No.1 (January, 2020), pp.151-186. Using the statistical technique of weighted bootstrapping to provide a quantified assessment of the likelihood of German achievement of air superiority.

RICHENBACHER, WAYNE E.

“The Demise of Stonewall Jackson: A Civil War Medical Case Study.” Vol.79, No.3 (July, 2015), pp.635-655. Chronicles the eight days between General Stonewall Jackson’s (1824-1863) wounding at the Battle of Chancellorsville, 2 May, 1863, and his death, considering the care provided his surgeon,

RIPPERGER, ROBERT M.

“The Development of the French Artillery for the Offensive, 1890-1914.” Vol.59, No.4 (October, 1995), pp.599-618. Advances the proposition that the French Army’s embrace of *offensive à l’outrance* produced strategies and tactics in which there was little room for heavy artillery.

RISLAKKI, JUKKA

“ ‘Without Mercy’ – U.S. Strategic Intelligence and Finland in the Cold War.” Vol.79, No.1 (January, 2015), pp.127-149. Unbeknownst to Finland’s political leaders, a secret channel for the exchange of information regarding the U.S.S.R. existed between Finnish military intelligence and the United States.

RIVES, TIM

“Like Footprints in the Sand: Searching for Eisenhower’s Climactic D-Day Words.” Vol.78, No.3 (July, 2014), pp.1057-1067.

ROBERTS, PRISCILLA

“Tasker H. Bliss and the Evolution of Allied Unified Command, 1918: A Note on Old Battles Revisited.” Vol.65, No.3 (July, 2001), pp.671-695.

ROBERTS, WILLIAM H.

“ ‘The Name of Ericsson’: Political Engineering in the Union Ironclad Program, 1861-1863.” Vol.63, No.4 (October, 1999), pp.823-843.

ROBERTSON, CLAIRE

“Racism, the Military, and Abolitionism in the Late Eighteenth- and Early Nineteenth-Century Caribbean.” Vol.77, No.2 (April, 2013), pp.433-461. Examines Governor of Guadeloupe, Victor Hugues (1762-1826), General Sir John Moore (1761-1809), Captain Thomas Southey, and Sir John Jeremie (1795-1841) and the impact of racism on the differences between the British and French conduct of warfare in the Caribbean.

ROBINSON, GAVIN

“Equine Battering Rams? A Reassessment of Cavalry Charge in the English Civil War.”

Vol.75, No.3 (July, 2011), pp.719-731. Challenges the traditional notion that shock cavalry tactics imported from Sweden had replaced the caracole during the English Civil War and, in particular, contemplates the mechanics of cavalry shock tactics.

RODGER, N.A.M.

“Historiographical Essay: Recent Books on the Royal Navy of the Eighteenth Century.” Vol.63, No.3 (July, 1999), pp.683-703. A very thorough survey of the latest works.

RODGERS, THOMAS E.

“Billy Yank and G.I. Joe: An Exploratory Essay on the Sociopolitical Dimensions of Soldier Motivation.” Vol.69, No.1 (January, 2005), pp.93-121. Presents the assertion that the pre-war socialization of Civil War Volunteers that enabled them to perform effectively in combat was missing among the citizen-soldiers of World War II.

RODMAN, DAVID

“Review Essay: A Tale of Two Fronts: Israeli Military Performance during the Early Days of the 1973 Yom Kippur War.” Vol.82, No.1 (January, 2018), pp.208-218.

RODRIGUEZ, MANUEL SANTIRSO

“Under the Uniform: Tyrants and Praetorians in the Aftermath of the Revolution (1829-1854).” Vol.83, No.2 (April, 2019), pp.379-407. Weighs the parallels and differences in the lives and careers of Nicholas Jean-de-Dieu Soult of France (1769-1851), Arthur Wellesley, the Duke of Wellington of Great Britain (1769-1852), Baldomero Espartero of Spain (1793-1879), and Andrew Jackson of the United States (1767-1845).

ROGERS, CLIFFORD J.

“Clausewitz, Genius, and the Rules.” Vol.66, No.4 (October, 2002), pp.1167-1176. Contends that ‘genius rises above the rules’, attributed to Carl von Clausewitz (1780-1831), has been misunderstood, that what Clausewitz meant was that geniuses violate only the incorrect or oversimplified rules of bad theory.

“Review Essay: The Field & the Forge.” Vol.68, No.4 (October, 2004), pp.1233-1239. Population, production, and power in the pre-industrial West.

“Medieval Strategy and the Economics of Conquest.” Vol.82, No.3 (July, 2018), pp.709-738. Approaching the question in a quantitative fashion, the author seeks to show how Medieval kings could make war pay for war, especially in urbanized areas and in times and places where it was permitted to enslave enemy populations.

ROHWER, JURGEN

“Historiographical Essay: Signal Intelligence and World War II: The Unfolding Story,” Vol.63, No.4 (October, 1999), pp.939-951.

ROMMELSE, GIJS

With Downing, Roger, **“Victims of an Ideological Rift? Dutch Prisoners of War during the First Anglo-Dutch War (1652-1654).”** Vol.80, No.3 (July, 2016), pp.649-669. Rather than ideology, the author shows that it was a combination of logistical problems and a lack of funds that produced the dire conditions experienced by Dutch P.O.W.s.

ROSE, SUSAN

“Islam Versus Christendom: The Naval Dimension, 1000-1600.” Vol.63, No.3 (July, 1999), pp.561-578. Surveys developments from the Crusades to the dominance of the Ottoman Empire within the geographic framework of the Mediterranean Sea.

ROSSI, MARIO

“United States Military Authorities and Free France, 1942-1944.” Vol.61, No.1 (January, 1997), pp.49-64. Probes the political and military consequences of the clash between U.S. policy towards liberated French territory and Charles De Gaulle’s (1890-1970) claim to be the legitimate representative of the French people.

ROY, KAUSHIK

“Coercion through Leniency: British Manipulation of the Courts-Martial System in the Post-Mutiny Indian Army, 1859-1913.” Vol.65, No.4 (October, 2001), pp.937-964.

“Military Synthesis in South Asia: Armies, Warfare, and Indian Society, c.1740-1849.” Vol.69, No.3 (July, 2005), pp.651-690. Attempts to determine why, with both the British East India Company and the Mughal successor states developing hybrid military forces, it was the E.I.C.’s armies that, more often than not, achieved victory.

“Military Loyalty in the Colonial Context: A Case Study of the Indian Army during World War II.” Vol.73, No.2 (April, 2009), pp.497-529. Uncovers the motives for and extent of loyalty to the British colonial regime of the Indian Army troops fighting in Burma in the context of the British elite’s concerns about the loyalty of Indian soldiers.

RÓZSA, ZOLTÁN

With Gyucha, Attila and Lee, Wayne E. **“The Mongol Campaign in Hungary, 1241-1242: The Archaeology and History of Nomadic Conquest and Massacre.”** Vol.83, No.4 (October, 2019), pp.1021-1066. This article integrates conquest process theory, literary evidence, and data from substantial new archaeological work to explore the motivation and nature of Mongol invasions and

the consequences for rural settlements on the Great Hungarian Plain.

RUDD, GORDON W.

“Review Essay: The Israeli Revisionist Historians and the Arab-Israeli Conflict Part One: From the Founding of Zionism to the 1967 War.” Vol.67, No.4 (October, 2003), pp.1263-1270;
“Part Two: From the 1967 War to the Present.” Vol.68, No.1 (January, 2004), pp.225-231.

RUTH, RICHARD A.

“Ham and Mothers: C-Ration Revelry and Revulsion in the Vietnam War.” Vol.85, No.4 (October, 2021), pp.1004-1028. observes that the comradery of troops was facilitated by the love-hate relations with their rations.

RUTHERFORD, JEFF

“Germany’s Total War: Combat and Occupation around the Kursk Salient, 1943.” Vol.85, No.4 (October, 2021), pp.954-979. Examines the changing approach of three German divisions to extract resources from the population living near the frontlines.

S

SACCA, JOHN WANDA

“Like Strangers in a Foreign Land: Chinese Officers Prepared at American Military Colleges, 1904-37.” Vol.70, No.3 (July, 2006), pp.703-742. Relates how those Chinese officers who received military education in the United States during the turbulent period marked by the end of the Qing Dynasty and the establishment of the Republic were tainted by their foreign education and hampered by their lack of membership in any alumni associations.

SADKOVICH, JAMES J.

“Review Essay: Balkan Battlefields.” Vol.70, No.1 (January, 2006), pp.187-194. Concerns works on the violent breakup of Yugoslavia in the 1990s.

SALAITA, GEORGE D.

“Embellishing Omaha Beach.” Vol.72, No.2 (April, 2008), pp.531-534. Clarifies the misconceptions surrounding Company ‘A’, 116th Infantry Regiment, 29th Infantry Division, a lead unit in the landing on Omaha Beach.

SANTOSUOSSO, ANTONIO

“Kadesh Revisited: Reconstructing the Battle between the Egyptians and the Hittites [1274 B.C.E.]” Vol.60, No.3 (July, 1996), pp.423-444.

SARANTAKES, NICHOLAS EVAN

“The Quiet War: Combat Operations along the Korean Demilitarized Zone, 1966-1969.”

Vol.64, No.2 (April, 2000), pp.439-457. Describes how South Korea and the United States responded differently to the provocations of North Korea and how this impacted the war in Vietnam.

SARTY, ROGER

“The American Origins of Academic Military History in Canada: Princeton University, the Carnegie Endowment, and C.P. Stacey’s *Canada and the British Army*.” Vol.82, No.2 (April, 2018), pp.439-460.

SCHAPIRA, RUTH

With Wilson, Evan, **“German Perspectives on the U-Boat War, 1939-1941.”** Vol.85, No.2 (April, 2021), pp.369-398. Probes the conflict between what the Germans’ needed to secure a quick, decisive result, and the fact that the U-Boat was designed for a war of attrition, resulting in a pessimistic outlook on the part of Germany’s Naval leaders.

SCHMIDER, KLAUS

“Review Essay: The Last of the First: Veterans of the *Jagdwaaffe* Tell Their Story.” Vol.73, No.1 (January, 2009), pp.231-249. Covers five memoirs of *Luftwaaffe* fighter pilots.

SCHNEID, FREDERICK C.

“The Dynamics of Defeat: French Army Leadership, December 1812 – March 1813.” Vol.63, No.1 (January, 1999), pp.7-28. Examines how, in the wake of the catastrophe in Russia, the remnants of the *Grande Armée* were preserved despite the departure of Emperor Napoleon Bonaparte (1769-1821).

“A Well-Coordinated Affair: Franco-Piedmontese War Planning in 1859.” Vol.76, No.2 (April, 2012), pp.395-425. Demonstrates that the Franco-Piedmontese general staffs undertook extensive planning that incorporating the new technologies of railways and steam ships, so that the Second War of Italian Unification (1859-1861) qualifies, alongside the more familiar U.S. Civil War and German Wars of Unification, as one of the first ‘modern’ wars of the industrial age.

SCHUBERT, FRANK N.

“The 25th Infantry at Brownsville, Texas: Buffalo Soldiers, the ‘Brownsville Six’, and the Medal of Honor.” Vol.75, No.4 (October, 2011), pp.1217-1224. Addresses the myth that there were six holders of the Medal of Honor among the Buffalo Soldiers who were dismissed after the August, 1906, shooting in Brownsville, Texas.

“Commemorative Essay: Sesquicentennial Reflection on the Black Regulars.” Vol.80, No.4

(October, 2016), pp.1011-1016. To honor the sesquicentennial of the inclusion of African Americans in the regular U.S. Army, this brief essay considers how this precedent that came about in the wake of the service Black Volunteers in the Civil War pushed forward, albeit all too slowly, social change in American society.

SCHULTZ, TIMOTHY A.

With Coleman, Bradley Lynn, **“The Cornerstone of Joint Force Transformation: The Standing Joint Force Headquarters at U.S. Southern Command, 2001-2011.”** Vol.85, No.4 (October, 2021), pp.1029-1060. The difficulties of Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld (1932-2021) to establish Standing Joint Force Headquarters for each of the geographic combatant commands is examined by using the U.S. Southern Command as an example.

SCHWAB, STEPHEN I.

“The Role of the Mexican Expeditionary Air Force in World War II: Late, Limited, but Symbolically Significant.” Vol.66, No.4 (October, 2002), pp.1115-1140. Recounts the raising and service of the 201st Mexican P-47 Squadron in the Philippines beginning in May, 1945.

SCHWONEK, MATTHEW R.

“Kazimierz Sosnkowski as Commander in Chief: The Government-in-Exile and Polish Strategy, 1932-1944.” Vol.70, No.3 (July, 2006), pp.743-780.

SCIANNA, BASTIAN MATTEO

“Rommel Almighty? Italian Assessment of the ‘Desert Fox’ during and after the Second World War.” Vol.82, No.1 (January, 2018), pp.125-145. The Italian view based on new primary material, including the eavesdropping by British intelligence on Italian officers held as P.O.W.s in both Egypt and Britain.

SEARLE, THOMAS R.

“ ‘It made a Lot of Sense to Kill Skilled Workers’: The Firebombing of Tokyo in March 1945.” Vol.66, No.1 (January, 2002), pp.103-133. Demonstrates that the firebombing of Japanese cities was not a radical departure from U.S.A.A.F. tactics used against Germany, that it was not an abandonment of concentrating on targeting industry, and that it was based on long-term planning.

SEARS, MATTHEW A.

With Willekes, Carolyn, **“Alexander’s Cavalry Charge at Chaeronea, 338 B.C.E.”** Vol.80, No.4 (October, 2016), pp.1017-1035. Confronts the controversy surrounding whether or not the eighteen year old Alexander the Great (356-322 B.C.E.) actually led a cavalry charge that contributed to the defeat of the forces of the Greek coalition.

SEIDULE, JAMES TYRUS

“Treason is Treason: Civil War Memory at West Point, 1861-1902.” Vol.76, No.2 (April, 2012), pp.427-452. Asserts that West Point during the Gilded Age neither forgot nor forgave graduates who had chosen to fight against the U.S. Army as officers in the Confederate forces and that memorials were created during the 1890s to highlight the role of its graduates in preserving the Union.

SEIPP, ADAM R.

“Buchenwald Stories: Testimony, Military History, and the American Encounter with the Holocaust.” Vol.79, No.3 (July, 2015), pp.721-744. Demonstrates how the testimonies of American servicemen have evolved in tandem with changes in public perceptions of the war and the Holocaust.

“ ‘Visionary Battle Scenes’: Reading Sir John Hackett’s *The Third World War*, 1977-85.” Vol.83, No.4 (October, 2019), pp.1235-1257. Suggests that the success of Sir John Hackett’s (1910-1997) 1978 best-selling novel reflected rising Cold War tensions, as well as inspiring the modern literary genre of the techno-thriller.

SEREBRIAKOVA, POLINA

With Orbach, Danny, **“Irregular Warfare in Late Medieval Japan: Towards a Historical Understanding of the Ninja.”** Vol.84, No.4 (October, 2020), pp.997-1020. Separating the contemporary myth from what we can actually determine based on surviving primary sources.

SETTLE, FRANK

Settle, Frank; Whaley, Tom and Blackmer, Elizabeth, **“Alsos Digital Library for Nuclear Issues.”** Vol.67, No.3 (July, 2003), pp.921-923.

SHEFFY, YIGAL

“Chemical Warfare and the Palestine Campaign, 1916-1918.” Vol.73, No.3 (July, 2009), pp.803-844. Brings light to the British use of chemical warfare in the Second (April, 1917) and Third (October-November, 1917) Battles of Gaza, the Ottoman response, and the reasons why this aspect of the Palestine Campaign have been disregarded in the historiography.

SHELDON, ROSE MARY

“Review Essay: *The Military History of Ancient Israel* by Richard A. Gabriel.” Vol.69, No.1 (January, 2005), pp.197-204.

SHELLUM, BRIAN G.

“African American Officers in Liberia, 1910-1942.” Vol.82, No.3 (July, 2018), pp.739-757. Seventeen African American officers from the U.S. Army reorganized, trained, and commanded the Liberian Frontier Force that enabled it to defend the nation’s borders and defeat a number of

indigenous uprisings.

SHEPPARD, THOMAS

“There will still remain Heroes and Patriots: The Politics of Resignation in the Early American Navy, 1794-1815.” Vol.84, No.2 (April, 2020), pp.369-394. Establishes that early secretaries of the navy worked to end the practice of officers resigning their commissions, or using the threat to do so, as a bargaining tactic with the Navy Department, something that they had largely accomplished by the end of the War of 1812.

SHEPARDSON, DONALD E.

“The Fall of Berlin and the Rise of a Myth.” Vol.62, No.1 (January, 1998), pp.135-154. Refutes the notions of United States naiveté and British realism in dealing with both their German enemy and their Soviet ally in the spring of 1945.

SHERER, IDAN

“ ‘All of Us, in One Voice, Demand what’s Owed Us’: Mutiny in the Spanish Infantry during the Italian Wars, 1525-1538.” Vol.78, No.3 (July, 2014), pp.893-926. The author notes the similarities between these all too frequent mutinies and strikes initiated and resolved by modern employees.

SHOWALTER, DENNIS

“From Deterrence to Doomsday Machine: The German Way of War, 1890-1914.” Vol.64, No.3 (July, 2000), pp.679-710. Proposes that between 1890 and 1914 the German Army developed a siege mentality, the only solution for which was believed to be the refinement of operational capabilities, pursued at the expense of policy and strategy.

SHRADER, R.

With Newell, Clayton R. **“The U.S. Army’s Transition to Peace, 1865-66.”** Vol.77, No.3 (July, 2013), pp.867-894.

SHULIMSON, JACK

“Military Professionalism: The Case of the U.S. Marine Officer Corps, 1880-1898.” Vol.60, No.2 (April, 1996), pp.231-242. Views the transformation of the officer corps of the Marines into a professional body as part of the late nineteenth century, society wide ‘organizational revolution.’

SHY, JOHN

“The 2008 George C. Marshall Lecture in Military History: History and the History of War.” Vol.72, No.4 (October, 2008), pp.1033-1046. A consideration of the works of military history

written by distinguished non-military historians over the past twenty years.

SIOTTO, ANDREA

“Mapping the First World War: The Empowering Development of Mapmaking during the First World War in the British Army.” Vol.82, No.1 (January, 2018), pp.45-66.

SKAGGS, DAVID CURTIS

“Aiming at the Truth: James Fenimore Cooper and the Battle of Lake Erie.” Vol.59, No.2 (April, 1995), pp.237-255. Disentangles the disputed account of the Battle of Lake Erie, 10 September, 1813, written by Cooper (1789-1851) in his *History of the Navy of the United States* (1839).

SKELTON, WILLIAM B.

“Samuel P. Huntington and the Roots of the American Military Tradition.” Vol.60, No.2 (April, 1996), pp.325-338.

SMITH, DAVID G.

“ ‘Clear the Valley’: The Shenandoah Valley and the Genesis of the Gettysburg Campaign.” Vol.74, No.4 (October, 2010), pp.1069-1096. Brings to light an overlooked motivation for General Robert E. Lee’s (1807-1870) Gettysburg Campaign, the need to clear the Shenandoah Valley of occupying U.S. troops due to a combination of home front discontent and logistical issues.

SMITH, JASON W.

“Twixt the Devil and the Deep Blue Sea: Hydrography, Sea Power, and the Marine Environment, 1898-1901.” Vol.78, No.2 (April, 2014), pp.575-604. Endeavors to understand the role played by knowledge of the marine environment in the Spanish-American War, 1898.

SMITH, MARK A.

“The Politics of Military Professionalism: The Engineer Company and the Political Activities of the Antebellum U.S. Army Corps of Engineers.” Vol.80, No.2 (April, 2016), pp.355-387. Addresses the tensions presented by both internal politicking in the Corps and the lobbying of officers in promoting the nation’s defensive needs.

SMITH, RALPH B.

“Review Essay: Choosing War in Vietnam.” Vol.64, No.2 (April, 2000), pp.503-513. Critiques Fredrik Logevall’s 1999 book of the same name.

SNYDER, DAVID R.

“Arming the *Bundesmarine*: The United States and the Build-Up of the German Federal Navy,

1950-1960.” Vol.66, No.2 (April, 2002), pp.477-500.

SORLEY, LEWIS

With Pernell, Ralph McT. **“Too Good for the Infantry?”** Vol.63, No.3 (July, 1999), pp.704-705. This is a 1942 letter from New Mexico Congressman Clinton P. Anderson in response to a request for an individual to be reassigned out of a rifle squad.

SOUCHEN, ALEX

“The Culture of Morale: Battalion Newspapers in the 3rd Canadian Infantry Division, June-August 1944.” Vol.77, No.2 (April, 2013), pp.543-567.

SOUCIER, DANIEL S.

“ ‘Where there was no Signs of any Human Being’: Navigating the Eastern Country Wilderness on Arnold’s March to Quebec, 1775.” Vol.81, No.2 (April, 2017), pp.369-393. Looks at soldiers’ attitudes towards and interaction with the natural environment.

SPEARS, TIMOTHY B.

“Stone Truths: American Memorial Landscapes of World War I.” Vol.85, No.2 (April, 2021), pp.342-368. Assesses the accuracy of summaries and maps displaying the operations of the American Expeditionary Force etched in stone by the American Battle Monuments Commission.

SPECTOR, RONALD H.

“After Hiroshima: Allied Military Occupations and the Fate of Japan’s Empire, 1945-1947.” Vol.69, No.4 (October, 2005), pp.1121-1136. The Allies confronted problems far beyond the disarming of Japanese troops in occupied China, Korea, and Southeast Asia, where internal conflicts rendered the plans of the Allied powers irrelevant.

SPEELMAN, PATRICK J.

“Review Essay: The Logistics of British Naval Supremacy in the Age of Sail.” Vol.77, No.2 (April, 2013), pp.667-670. Consists of three recent books, two covering systems of supply during the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars, 1793-1815, and a third concerning medical care from 1805 to 1916.

SPILLER, ROGER

“Historiographical Essay: Military History and Its Fictions.” Vol.70, No.4 (October, 2006), pp.1081-1097. Observes that military history’s intellectual authority has declined as other disciplines have taken more adventurous approaches to the study of war and assumed a more prominent role in contemporary military criticism.

SPROULE, JOSEPH

“Raiding, Pillaging, and Violent Social Change in Late Sixteenth-Century Livonia.” Vol.85, No.2 (April, 2021), pp.317-341. Establishes how the pervasiveness of raiding dictated tactical and strategic considerations, influenced military policy, shaped civil-military relations, and played a role in breaking down longstanding social mores, transforming societies, normalizing violence.

STAGG, J.C.A.

“United States Army Officers in the War of 1812: A Statistical and Behavioral Portrait.” Vol.76, No.4 (October, 2012), pp.1001-1034. An examination of 334 general court martials demonstrates that officers were judged more harshly for their moral and character defects than for their shortcomings in performing routine duties.

“Freedom and Subordination: Disciplinary Problems in the U.S. Army of 1812.” Vol.78, No.2 (April, 2014), pp.537-574. Based on general court martial case files and the question of proper forms of punishment.

STAIANO-DANIELS, LUCIAN E.

“Determining Early Modern Army Strength: The Case of Electoral Saxony.” Vol.83, No.4 (October, 2019), pp.1001-1020. Questions the issues of the ‘Military Revolution’ thesis that larger armies both reflected a revolution in warfare and forced states to adopt more efficient means of raising revenue by examining the experience of Saxony during the Thirty Years War (1618-1648).

STAMP, JEFFREY

“Aero-Static Warfare: A Brief Survey of Ballooning in Mid-nineteenth-century Siege Warfare.” Vol.79, No.3 (July, 2015), Pp.767-782. Includes usage in the U.S. Civil War, War of the Triple Alliance / Paraguayan War, and the Franco-Prussian War.

STAPLETON, TIMOTHY J.

“ ‘Bad Boys’: Infiltration and Sedition in the African Military Units of the Central African Federation (Malawi, Zambia and Zimbabwe) 1953-63.” Vol.73, No.4 (October, 2009), pp.1167-1193. Illustrates that nationalists exploited the rising unpopularity of colonialism, discontent with participation in the war in Malaya, the Mau Mau uprising in Kenya, and the Congo Crisis, which led white officers doubt the dependability of their African troops.

“Sexual Health in Britain’s West African Colonial Army (1898-1960).” Vol.85, No.3 (July, 2021), pp.619-645. Following an initial neglect due to greater concern over tropical diseases, British officers became obsessed with the threat of venereal diseases, reflecting colonial stereotypes surrounding race and gender.

STATIEV, ALEXANDER

“**Antonescu’s Eagles against Stalin’s Falcons: The Romanian Air Force, 1920-1941.**” Vol.66, No.4 (October, 2002), pp.1085-1113. Gives an account of how, though it was favored over the Army, the Air Force was assigned missions that exceeded its capacity so that it was brought to the brink of extinction.

“**Blocking Units in the Red Army.**” Vol.76, No.2 (April, 2012), pp.475-495. Concerning Joseph Stalin’s (1878-1953) ‘No Step Back!’ Order No.227.

STEFFEN, DIRK

“**The Holtzendorff Memorandum of 22 December, 1916, and Germany’s Declaration of Unrestricted U-Boat Warfare.**” Vol.68, No.1 (January, 2004), pp.215-224. Examines how the Chief of the Imperial German Navy’s Admiralty Staff, Henning von Holtzendorff (1853-1919), successfully argued that Germany could risk provoking the United States entering the war in return for starving Great Britain into submission.

STENTIFORD, BARRY M.

“**The Meaning of a Name: The Rise of the National Guard and the End of a Town Militia.**” Vol.72, No.3 (July, 2008), pp.727-754. Recounts the changing relationship between the community of Wakefield, Massachusetts, and its town militia, the Richardson Light Guard, when the unit became part of the National Guard in 1916.

STEVENSON, MATTHEW

“**Memoirs: War’s End on Okinawa: In Search of Captain Robert Fowler.**” Vol.67, No.2 (April, 2003), pp.517-528. U.S.M.C. Captain Fowler, who was killed on Okinawa on 12 June, 1945, was a close friend of the author’s father.

STICE, ELIZABETH

“**Men on the Margins: Representations of Colonial Troops in British and French Trench Newspapers of the Great War.**” Vol.83, No.2 (April, 2019), pp.435-454. Ascertains how, through the contents of trench newspapers, the war provided a new context for evaluating empires and their peoples and questioning existing imperial culture.

STOCKINGS, CRAIG

With Hancock, Eleanor, “**Reconsidering the *Luftwaffe* in Greece, 1941.**” Vol.76, No.3 (July, 2012), pp.747-773. Despite its complete dominance of the Greek skies, the terror it inspired, and its almost continual operations against Allied positions, the author challenges the assumption that the *Luftwaffe* had a decisive impact on the campaign.

STOKER, DONALD

With Dawson, Joseph G., III and Badsey, Stephen, **“Forum: Confederate Military Strategy in the U.S. Civil War – Revisited.”** Vol.73, No.4 (October, 2009), pp.1273-1287.

“Forum: Confederate Military Strategy in the U.S. Civil War: There was no Offensive-Defensive Confederate Strategy.” Vol.73, No.2 (April, 2009), pp.571-590.

STOLER, MARK A.

“The 2015 George C. Marshall Lecture in Military History: George C. Marshall and the ‘Europe-First Strategy, 1939-1951: A Study in Diplomatic as well as Military History.’ Vol.79, No.2 (April, 2015), pp.293-316. Examines the relationship between diplomatic and military history regarding Marshall’s (1880-1959) support for the strategy of ‘Germany First’ during World War II, for the postwar European Recovery Program, and the relief of Gen. Douglas MacArthur (1880-1964) during the Korean War.

STOLFI, RUSSELL H.S.

“A Critique of Pure Success: Inchon Revisited, Revised, and Contrasted.” Vol.68, No.2 (April, 2004), pp.505-525. Critiques the performance of the ground forces that were successfully landed at Inchon, proposing that a comparative example of German operations in the Baltic in 1941 suggests greater boldness would have rewarded U.S. forces.

STONE, DAVID R.

“Misreading Svechin: Attrition, Annihilation, and Historicism.” Vol.76, No.3 (July, 2012), pp.673-693. Debunks the interpretation that the Soviet military theorist Aleksandr Svechin (1878-1938) favored attrition over annihilation, demonstrating, instead, that he was a historicist, who saw the precise balance between attrition and annihilation, or defense and offense, as constantly shifting as a result of changing material circumstances.

STONE, JOHN

“Technology, Society, and the Infantry Revolution of the Fourteenth Century.” Vol.68, No.2 (April, 2004), pp.361-380. Challenges the concept of changes in warfare provoking changes in society, insisting, instead, that the opposite was case, calling for a new approach to understanding late-Medieval military developments based on a greater appreciation of the societies from which armies were raised.

STOYANOV, ALEKSANDAR

“The Size of Bulgaria’s Medieval Field Armies: A Case Study of Military Mobilization Capacity in the Middle Ages.” Vol.83, No.3 (July, 2019), pp.719-746. Broadens the scope of time and sources to ascertain estimates of the actual size of Bulgarian field Armies from the First Bulgarian Empire (681-

1018) to the Second Bulgarian Empire (1185-1422).

STRACHAN, HEW

“The 2010 George C. Marshall Lecture in Military History: Clausewitz and the First World War.” Vol.75, No.2 (April, 2011), pp.367-391. How the belligerents interpreted the writings of Clausewitz during and in the immediate aftermath of World War I.

STUBBS, DAVID

“A Blind Spot? The Royal Air Force (R.A.F.) and Long-Range Fighters, 1936-1944.” Vol.78, No.2 (April, 2014), pp.673-702. Explores why Bomber Command maintained its view that it would be neither appropriate nor prudent to protect its bombers with long-range fighter escort.

“Reappraising the Royal Air Force Contribution to the Defense of Crete, 1941.” Vol.84, No.2 (April, 2020), pp.459-486. Points out that the failure of the British and Commonwealth ground troops to retain control over the airfields was not the primary reason for defeat, given that the fighter squadrons necessary for the defense of the island were not scheduled to arrive in the Mediterranean Sea in time to participate in the battle, a fact known to decision makers in London.

STURMA, MICHAEL

“U.S. Submarine Patrol Reports during World War II: Historical Evidence and Literary Flair.” Vol.74, No.2 (April, 2010), pp.475-490. Insists that the patrol reports of U.S. submariners should be approached with caution due, among other things, to the ‘fog of war’, intentional fabrication, and deliberate omissions for security reasons or to avoid censure.

“Coco Solo Submarines: Protecting the Panama Canal, 1941-1942.” Vol.81, No.4 (October, 2017), pp.1039-1057. While these submarine patrols may have contributed little to repelling any threat to the Canal Zone, they did provide useful training and experience for a significant number of U.S. submariners.

SULLIVAN, BRIAN R.

“Review Essay: Fascist Italy’s Military Involvement in the Spanish Civil War.” Vol.59, No.4 (October, 1995), pp.697-727. Surveys the existing literature concerning Benito Mussolini’s (1883-1945) commitment some 70,000 soldiers of the *Corpo Truppe Volontarie* and over 700 warplanes of the *Aviazione Legionaria* to the Nationalist cause, including the publications of official histories.

SUMIDA, JON TETSURO

“Sir John Fisher and the Dreadnought: The Sources of Naval Mythology.” Vol.59, No.4 (October, 1995), pp.619-637.

“The Relationship of History and Theory in *On War*: The Clausewitzian Ideal and Its Implications.” Vol.65, No.2 (April, 2001), pp.333-354.

“A Matter of Timing: The Royal Navy and the Tactics of Decisive Battle, 1912-1916.” Vol.67, No.1 (January, 2003), pp.85-136. Advances the explanation that the Admiralty’s adoption of a secret tactical system in 1912 interfered with the development of equipment and methods suitable for alternate forms of battle fleet action, with consequences for the Battle of Jutland.

“Review Essay: Gunnery, Procurement, and Strategy in the *Dreadnought* Era.” Vol.69, No.4 (October, 2005), pp.1179-1187.

“A Concordance of Selected Subjects in Carl von Clausewitz’s *On War*.” Vol.78, No.1 (January, 2014), pp.271-331.

SUNDARAM, CHANDAR S.

“ ‘Treated with Scant Attention’: The Imperial Cadet Corps, Indian Nobles, and Anglo-Indian Policy, 1897-1917.” Vol.77, No.1 (January, 2013), pp.41-70. Foreshadowing the Indianization of the Indian Army’s officer corps and the opening of the Indian Military Academy in 1932, the Imperial Cadet Corps offered officer training to Indian princes and gentlemen between 1901 and 1917.

SUTTER, ANTHONY

With Cline, Eric H. **“Battlefield Archaeology at Armageddon: Cartridge Cases and the 1948 Battle for Megiddo, Israel.”** Vol.75, No.1 (January, 2011), pp.159-190. Israeli Archaeologists investigating the ancient history of Megiddo, came across 213 spent Czechoslovakian cartridge cases, with which they attempted to reconstruct the fighting that took place at that location during the 1948 war.

SWENSON, BENJAMIN J.

“ ‘Measures of Conciliation’: Winfield Scott, Henry Halleck, and the Origins of U.S. Army Counterinsurgency Doctrine.” Vol.86, No.4 (October, 2022), pp.859-881. Explores the collaboration between Major General Winfield Scott (1786-1866), who implemented policies intended to forestall insurgency, and General Henry Halleck (1815-1872), who made a study of Napoleon’s failed occupation of Spain, in developing U.S. Army counterinsurgency doctrine, which impacted the formation of international laws of war.

SWOPE, KENNETH M.

“Crouching Tigers, Secret Weapons: Military Technology Employed during the Sino-Japanese War, 1592-1598.” Vol.69, No.1 (January, 2005), pp.11-41. Reviews the major military technology employed by the belligerents, showing, contesting the conventional explanation that superior numbers and the death of Toyotomi Hideyoshi’s (1537-1598) death were the deciding factors in Japan’s defeat.

“Manifesting Awe: Grand Strategy and Imperial Leadership in the Ming Dynasty.” Vol.79, No.3 (July, 2015), pp.597-634. Affirms the development and use of an overarching grand strategy by the Ming Dynasty (1368-1644) and considers its relationship with the actual policy decisions and military operations of the dynasty’s Emperors.

SYMONDS, CRAIG

“The 2017 George C. Marshall Lecture in Military History: For Want of a Nail: The Impact of Shipping on Grand Strategy in World War II.” Vol.81, No.3 (July, 2017), pp.657-666.

The remarkable success of U.S. ship building and its impact on Allied strategy.

SYRETT, DAVID

“Historiographical Essay: The British Armed Forces in the American Revolutionary War: Publications, 1875-1998.” Vol.63, No.1 (January, 1999), pp.147-164.

SZABÓ, MIKLÓS

“The Development of the Hungarian Aircraft Industry, 1938-1944.” Vol.65, No.1 (January, 2001), pp.53-76.

I

TAL, DAVID

“Between Intuition and Professionalism: Israeli Military Leadership during the 1948 Palestine War.” Vol.68, No.3 (July, 2004), pp.885-909.

TAN TAI-YONG

“An Imperial Home-Front: Punjab and the First World War.” Vol.64, No.2 (April, 2000), pp.371-410. Looks at how, during the war, the civil administration of the State of Punjab ended up concentrating on recruiting men for the Indian Army.

TANNER, HAROLD M.

“Guerrilla, Mobile, and Base Warfare in Communist Military Operations in Manchuria, 1945-1947.” Vol.67, No.4 (October, 2003), pp.1177-1222. Relates how, after initial setbacks while relying on a conventional war strategy, the Communists developed a hybrid strategy that turned the tide of the Civil War, enabling them to make a more successful transition from guerrilla to conventional warfare.

TERRAR, TOBY

“First Landing on Guam: The Difficulties of a Naval Aviator during the Invasion.” Vol.72, No.4 (October, 2008), pp.1265-1270. Gives an account of the rivalry between the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps for landing the first plane on the newly liberated island of Guam, in which the Navy pilot, Ed Terrar, won the honor on 30 July, 1944.

THOMAS, MARTIN

“Colonial Violence in Algeria and the Distorted Logic of State Retribution: The Sétif Uprising of 1945.” Vol.75, No.1 (January, 2011), pp.125-157. Charts the rapid escalation of French security and vigilante violence in response to the uprising that broke out on VE-Day, 8 May, 1945, arguing that in the long run this was counterproductive.

THOMPSON, DAVID G.

“Norwegian Military Policy, 1905-1940: A Critical Appraisal and Review of the Literature.” Vol.61, No.3 (July, 1997), pp.503-520. Questions the reliance exclusively on British and German sources for an understanding of the 1940 Norwegian campaign, insisting that without knowledge of the role of the Norwegian government and armed forces, the picture is incomplete.

TIAN SER SEAH, JOSHUA-JOHN

“Singapore, Hong Kong, and the Royal Navy’s War in Korea, c.1950-1953: Part 1.” Vol.83, No.4 (October, 2018), pp.1213-1234; **“Part 2.”** Vol.84, No.1 (January, 2020), pp.237-260.

TRAVERS, TIM

With Celik, Birten **“ ‘Not One of Them Ever came Back’: What Happened to the 1/5 Norfolk Battalion on 12 August 1915 at Gallipoli?”** Vol.66, No.2 (April, 2002), pp.389-406.

TODMAN, DANIEL

“*Sans peur et sans reproche*: The Retirement, Death, and Mourning of Sir Douglas Haig, 1918-1928.” Vol.67, No.4 (October, 2003), pp.1083-1106.

TONE, JOHN LAWRENCE

“The Machete and the Liberation of Cuba.” Vol.62, No.1 (January, 1998), pp.7-28. Disputes the importance attached to the machete, arguing that the significance of its symbolic value has overshadowed the fact that the Cuban Liberation Army relied, first and foremost, on the use of rifles, in which they surpassed their Spanish opponents.

TOPRANI, ANAND

“The First War for Oil: The Caucasus, German Strategy, and the Turning Point of the War on the Eastern Front, 1942.” Vol.80, No.3 (July, 2016), pp.815-854.

TOZZI, CHRISTOPHER

“Soldiers without a Country: Foreign Veterans in the Transition from Empire to Restoration.” Vol.80, No.1 (January, 2016), pp.93-120. The article identifies and explores three trends: the exclusion of foreign veterans from the program of social healing that the Restoration Bourbons undertook, the limits of the modern French state’s care for veterans, and the ambiguity of national

identity after the revolutionary era.

TRAUSCHWEIZER, INGO WOLFGANG

“Learning with an Ally: The U.S. Army and the Bundeswehr in the Cold War.” Vol.72, No.2 (April, 2008), pp.477-508. Discusses four areas of German-U.S. defense cooperation, including aid for West German rearmament, the reorganization of German and U.S. combat formations in the post-Korean War period, the failure of a shared attempt at tank design, and the impact of German tactical and operational concepts on post-Vietnam U.S. Army doctrine.

“Historiographical Essay: On Militarism.” Vol.76, No.2 (April, 2012), pp.507-543.
The definition(s) of European militarism, beginning in the late eighteenth century, and the question of U.S. militarism.

“Cautious Hawk: Maxwell Taylor and the Path to War in Vietnam.” Vol.83, No.3 (July, 2019), pp.831-859. Relates the U.S. ambassador to Saigon’s, 1964-1965, opinions regarding the efficacy of bombing Hanoi and deploying ground forces to South Vietnam and their possible influence on the decisions of President Lyndon Johnson.

TRAUTSCH, JASPER M.

“The Causes of the War of 1812: 200 Years of Debate.” Vol.77, No.1 (January, 2013), pp.273-293.

“Review Essay: The Causes of the War of 1812: 200 Years of Debate.” Vol.77, No.2 (April, 2013), pp.273-293.

TRAVERS, TIM

“Liman von Sanders, the Capture of Lieutenant Palmer, and Ottoman Anticipation of the Allied Landings at Gallipoli on 25 April 1915.” Vol.65, No.4 (October, 2001), pp.965-979. Shines a light on the expectations of the Turks for a possible landing on the Gallipoli Peninsula and, in particular, the neglected issue of the impact of information from a captured British intelligence officer shortly before the actual landing.

TRAVERS, TIM

With Celik, Birten, **“ ‘Not One of Them Ever came Back’: What Happened to the 1/5 Norfolk Battalion on 12 August 1915 at Gallipoli?”** Vol.66, No.2 (April, 2002), pp.389-406.

TRIFKOVIĆ, GAJ

“The Yugoslav Partisans’ Lost Victories: Operations in Montenegro and Bosnia-Herzegovina, 1944-1945.” Vol.82, No.1 (January, 2018), pp.95-124. Seeks to understand why the Germans were able to extricate their XXI Mountain Corps from two consecutive attempts at encirclement during October 1944 through April 1945.

TRIPODI, CHRISTIAN

“ ‘Good for one but not the other’: The ‘Sandeman System’ of Pacification as Applied to Baluchistan and the North-West Frontier, 1877-1947.” Vol.73, No.3 (July, 2009), pp.767-802.

Looks at why the Government of India declared Colonel Sir Robert Groves Sandeman’s (1835-1892) innovative doctrine of tribal administration inapplicable for the troubled North West Frontier, despite its having achieved success in Baluchistan.

TUCCI, JIM

“Historiographical Essay: Warfare in the Ancient World.” Vol.74, No.3 (July, 2010), pp.878-899.

TUCK, CHRISTOPHER

“ ‘Cut the bonds which bind our hands’: Deniable Operations during the Confrontation with Indonesia, 1963-1966.” Vol.77, No.2 (April, 2013), pp.599-623. Describes the British confrontation with Indonesia and the problems with cross-border operations.

“Measuring Victory: Assessing the outcomes of *Konfrontasi*, 1963-66.” Vol.82, No.3 (July, 2018), pp.873-898. Suggests that the outcome of the British low intensity conflict with Indonesia, known as the ‘Confrontation’, is far more complex than either the triumphal or revisionist interpretations suggest.

TUNWELL, DAVID PASSMORE

With Harrison, Stephan, “An Evaluation of Allied Intelligence in the Tactical Bombing of German Supply Depots during the Normandy Campaign, 1944.” Vol.84, No.3 (July, 2020), pp.825-842.

Sets forth the proposition that had Allied intelligence regarding German supply activities been more accurate, a decisive crippling of German logistics could have enabled Allied troops to achieve victory sooner than was the case.

TURNER, BLAIR P.

“Capturing the many Faces of War.” Vol.78, No.2 (April, 2014), pp.741-746. A look at a 2012 catalogue of the exposition of war photography by the Museum of Fine Arts at Houston, Texas.

“Celebrating ‘Bloodless Victories’ in the Roman World.” Vol.86, No.2 (April, 2022), pp.277-298. Critiques the references of ancient authors to Roman victories that were bloodless or were achieved without the loss of a single Roman soldier.

TZOREF-ASHKENAZI, CHEN

“German Military Participation in Early Modern European Colonialism.” Vol.80, No.3 (July, 2016), pp.671-695. Brings to light the employment of German mercenaries in the colonial ventures of different European kingdoms.

U

ULBRICH, DAVID J.

“The Long Lost ‘Tentative Manual for Defense of Advance Bases’ (1936).” Vol.71, No.3 (July, 2007), pp.889-901. In 1998 a copy of the Marine Corps’ previously lost 1936 Tentative Manual for Defense of Advance Bases was uncovered, a manual that displays the culmination of decades of doctrinal thinking about the defense of island bases against enemy amphibious, naval, and aerial assaults.

UNGARI, ANDRE

“The Official Inquiry into the Italian Defeat at the Battle of Caporetto (October 1917).” Vol.76, No.3 (July, 2012), pp.695-726. Addresses the question of why the general officer most responsible for the catastrophe not only managed to evade being charged for his failures but instead ended up as the Chief of Staff of the Italian Army.

UYAR, MESUT

With Güvenç, Serhat, **“One Battle and Two Accounts: The Turkish Brigade at Kunu-ri in November 1950.”** Vol.80, No.4 (October, 2016), pp.1117-1147. Assesses the impact of U.S. military assistance provided to the Turkish Army and why the official U.S. and Turkish accounts of the Battle of Kunu-ri / Chongchon differ significantly.

V

VAN COURTLAND MOON, JOHN ELLIS,

“United States Chemical Warfare Policy in World War II: A Captive of Coalition Policy?” Vol.60, No.3 (July, 1996), pp.495-511.

VAN DE LOGT, MARK

“ ‘The Powers of the Heavens Shall Eat of my Smoke’: The Significance of Scalping in Pawnee Warfare.” Vol.72, No.1 (January, 2008), pp.71-104. Explains that there were a range of motives for Pawnee warriors to seek scalps, including improved status and marriage prospects for the warrior, revenge for the killing of tribal members, to end the mourning period of those who had lost a relative or friend, and, when sacrificed in a special ceremony, to improve the spiritual well-being of the Pawnee people.

VAN DE MARK, BRIAN

“Review Essay: Thinking about the Vietnam War.” Vol.60, No.2 (April, 1996), pp.339-357. Although the majority of the seven books reviewed are from the perspective of the involvement of the United States, including one on the anti-war movement and two works on the Johnson administration, 1963-1969, there is a memoir from a rural woman living in South Vietnam and

a comparative work about the reaction of academics to the wars in Algeria and Vietnam.

VAN TUYLL, HUBERT P.

“The Dutch Mobilization of 1914: Reading the ‘Enemy’s’ Intentions.” Vol.64, No.3 (July, 2000), pp.711-737. Establishes that the Dutch Armed Forces were aware that Von Schlieffen intended to violate Dutch neutrality and their response resulted in a change in Germans plans for war with France.

“Memory, Myth and Forgetting: The Netherlands and the World Wars.” Vol.80, No.4 (October, 2016), pp.1073-1081. Advances the explanation that the inaccurate myths that evolved around Netherlands neutrality during World War I had an unfortunate impact on the country’s defensive preparations leading up to World War II.

VANCE, JONATHAN F.

“Men in Manacles: The Shackling of Prisoners of War, 1942-1943.” Vol.59, No.3 (July, 1995), pp.483-504. Appraises the wartime relationship of the Dominion nations with Great Britain as reflected in the success of Canadian Prime Minister Mackenzie King’s (1874-1950) government in convincing Churchill (1874-1965) to abandon the retaliatory shackling of German P.O.W.s.

VANDERVORT, BRUCE

“Review Essay: The Thin Black Line of Heroes.” Vol.65, No.4 (October, 2001), pp.1067-1073. Recent work on European Colonial and, especially, African troops, 1700-1964.

“Review Essay: Small Wars in North America.” Vol.68, No.1 (January, 2004), pp.233-238. Covers works on conflicts with Native American peoples, particularly in the Old West.

“Review Essay: From the Halls of Montezuma.” Vol.71, No.2 (April, 2007), pp.505-511. Native American resistance to European conquest to the 19th century.

“Review Essay: Remembering the Empire of France in America.” Vol.74, No.1 (January, 2010), pp.195-199.

“Review Essay: The Indian Wars of North America: From East to West.” Vol.74, No.2 (April, 2010), pp.557-560.

“When the French Colonial Mind Turns to Thoughts of War.” Vol.76, No.3 (July, 2012), pp.847-851. Looks at two recent works on French imperialism: one a two-volume collection of twenty-eight essays, the overwhelming majority of which are devoted to Africa, the other book is an attempt at a synthesis of French colonialism exclusively in Africa.

“Review Essay: Italian Imperialism and the Onset of the Great War.” Vol.79, No.4 (October, 2015), pp.1121-1126. Three books about the Italo-Turkish War, 1911-1912, and a third covering the wars that immediately preceding the outbreak of World War I which, of course, include both Italy’s war and the Balkan Wars.

“Review Essay: African Military History Comes of Age.” Vol.81, No.1 (January, 2017), pp.205-208. A look at two significant works on the military history of the continent, one an encyclopedia of colonial conflicts, the other a three-volume narrative account of conflict, edited and written by Timothy J. Stapleton, respectively.

VARNAVA, ANDREKOS

“ ‘Martial Races’ in the Isle of Aphrodite.” Vol.74, No.4 (October, 2010), pp.1047-1067. The British attempt in the 1890s to form an indigenous defense force on Cyprus based on the ‘Martial Races’ concept and its enduring consequences.

VEITH, GEORGE J.

With Pribbenow, Merle L., II, **“ ‘Fighting is an Art’: The Army of the Republic of Vietnam’s Defense of Xuan Loc, 9 – 21 April, 1975.”** Vol.68, No.1 (January, 2004), pp.163-213. Provides an account of the successful defensive operation of Brigadier General Lê Minh Đảo’s (1933-2020) 18th Division, demonstrating what A.R.V.N. units were capable of accomplishing when commanded by inspiring leaders.

VENABLE, HEATHER

“Rescuing a General: General Haywood ‘Possum’ Hansell and the Burden of Command.” Vol.84, No.2 (April, 2020), pp.487-509. Reappraises the negative assessment of General Haywood Hansell’s (1903-1988) command of the U.S. 8th Air Force.

VERGOLINA, JOSEPH R.

“ ‘Methods of Barbarism’ or Western Tradition? Britain, South Africa, and the Evolution of Escalatory Violence as Policy.” Vol.77, No.4 (October, 2013), pp.1303-1327. Investigates British counterinsurgency methods in the Second Anglo-Boer War (1899-1902).

VIGUS, ROBERT T.

“The Military Revolution and the Ancient Origins of the *Trace Italienne*.” Vol.84, No.3 (July, 2020), pp.698-712. Points out that the *trace italienne*, in the form of angled bastions, that have been identified as a key and novel feature of the Early-Modern ‘Military Revolution’, had its roots in Ancient Greek and Roman treatises and the actual works constructed by Roman and Byzantine engineers, surviving examples of which could be seen in important trading and pilgrimage routes.

W

WALKER, FRANCESCA

Wadle, Ryan, **“Failing to Speak the same Language: The Roots of ‘Jointness’ in the United States,**

1919-1941.” Vol.84, No.4 (October, 2020), pp.1097-1126. Sizes up the problems that interfered with attempts to create an interservice culture, promoted in efforts to integrate strategic planning, in professional military education, and large-scale joint exercises.

WAGNER, ERICH

“Ingenuity, Excess, Incompetence, and Luck: Air-Resupply Anecdotes in Military History.”

Vol.84, No.2 (April, 2020), pp.427-457. Reviews six case studies from taken the Second Italo-Ethiopian War (1935-1936), the Spanish Civil War (1936-1939), the Battle of Stalingrad (1942), Operation Market Garden (1944), the Battle of the Chosin Reservoir (1950), and the Battle of Dien Bien Phu (1954).

WHALEY, TOM

With Settle, Frank and Blackmer, Elizabeth, **“Alsos Digital Library for Nuclear Issues.”** Vol.67, No.3 (July, 2003), pp.921-923.

WALSH, BRIAN

“Sexual Violence during the Occupation of Japan.” Vol.82, No.4 (October, 2018), pp.1199-1230.

Insists that the accusations of recent publications of the widespread rape of Japanese women by Allied troops during the occupation (1945-1952) are grossly exaggerated.

“ ‘This Degrading Slavery’: MacArthur’s General Headquarters and Prostitution Policy during the Occupation of Japan.” Vol.85, No.3 (July, 2021), pp.678-712. The Allied occupation government (1945-1952) outlawed the old Imperial system of licensed prostitution because it relied on human trafficking, but did not outlaw prostitution in general based on respect for individual autonomy and an appreciation for the situation in Japan.

WANKE, PAUL

“American Military Psychiatry and its Role among Ground Forces in World War II.” Vol.63,

No.1 (January, 1999), pp.127-146. Explains how the role of U.S. military psychiatrists evolved from one of screening recruits as a preventative measure to one of responding to battlefield psychiatric casualties.

WARREN, MAME

“Focal Point of the Fleet: U.S. Navy Photographic Activities in World War II.” Vol.69, No.4

(October, 2005), pp.1045-1079. Concerned with the work of Edward Streichen (1879-1973) and his team of professional photographers.

WATSON, SAMUEL

“Historiographical Essay: Continuity in Civil-Military Relations and Expertise: The U.S. Army during the Decade before the Civil War.” Vol.75, No.1 (January, 2011), pp.221-250.

“Trusting to ‘the Chapter of Accidents’: Contingency, Necessity, and Self-Constraint in

Jeffersonian National Security Policy.” Vol.76, No.4 (October, 2012), pp.973-1000. Ascertains how the U.S. war effort was crippled by the antipathy of the Democratic-Republican Party of Thomas Jefferson (1743-1826) towards taxation, debt, a standing army, federal aid to infrastructure, and a national bank

“Military Learning and Adaptation Shaped by Social Context: The U.S. Army and its ‘Indian Wars’, 1790-1890.” Vol.82, No.2 (April, 2018), pp.373-412.

WATT, ROBERT N.

“ ‘An Exodus to Nowhere’?: Victorio’s Tres Castillos Campaign, September-October 1880.” Vol.80, No.4 (October, 2016), pp.1037-1072. Undertakes to show that, rather than being the conclusion to aimless wandering in the deserts of northern Mexico, the campaign was based on the traditional Apache conduct of guerrilla warfare.

WAWRO, GEOFFREY

“An ‘Army of Pigs’: The technical, Social, and Political Basis of Austrian Shock Tactics, 1859-1866.” Vol.59, No.3 (July, 1995), pp.407-433. Contends that, like the French after 1871, the Austrian Army responded to their defeat in the Second Italian War of Unification, 1859, by a commitment to aggressive shock tactics.

WEDDLE, KEVIN J.

“ ‘The Magic Touch of Reform’: Samuel Francis Du Pont and the Efficiency Board of 1855.” Vol.68, No.2 (April, 2004), pp.471-504. Using previously neglected sources, this article considers how political and military leaders, notably Commander Du Pont (1803-1865), broke the logjam produced by a system of promotion based exclusively on seniority.

“The Fall of Satan’s Kingdom: Civil-Military Relations and the Union Navy’s Attack on Charleston, April 1863.” Vol.75, No.2 (April, 2011), pp.411-439. Describes the conflict between Rear Admiral Samuel Francis Du Pont (1803-1865) and the members of Lincoln’s administration, Secretary of the Navy Gideon Welles (1802-1878) and his assistant, Gustavus Fox (1821-1883).

“ ‘A Change of both Men and Measures’: British Reassessment of Military Strategy after Saratoga, 1777-1778.” Vol.77, No.3 (July, 2013), pp.837-865.

WEIGLEY, RUSSELL F.

“The George C. Marshall Lecture in Military History: The Soldier, the Statesman, and the Military Historian.” Vol.63, No.4 (October, 1999), pp.807-822. Reviews the United States tradition of the subordination of the Armed Forces to civilian control at the highest level of civil-military relations, beginning with the Civil War.

With Linn, Brian M. ***“The American Way of War Revisited.”*** Vol.66, No.2 (April, 2002), pp.501-533. The author challenges some of the conclusions in Dr. Weigley’s (1930-2004) classic study of the

manner in which in which the United States Army has conducted warfare through the length of its history.

WEINBERG, GERHARD L.

“Historiographical Essay: World War II Scholarship, now and in the Future.” Vol.61, No.2 (April, 1997), pp.335-345. Includes issues surrounding the use of the memoirs of German military leaders, the revelations of Field Marshal Lord Alanbrooke’s (1883-1963) unabridged diary, and the declassification of materials pertaining to Magic and Ultra.

“Unexplored Questions about the German Military during World War II.” Vol.62, No.2 (April, 1998), pp.371-380. Touches upon the 1934 oath to Hitler, reasons why high-ranking German commanders felt the need to justify to their troops their orders to slaughter Jewish civilians, the role of high-ranking German commanders in approving the execution of tens-of-thousands of their own troops, *Luftwaffe* field divisions, the creation of new airborne divisions after the use of paratroopers had been all but abandoned, and the organizing of *Kriegsmarine* and *Luftwaffe* suicide units.

“The George C. Marshall Lecture in Military History: Some Myths of World War II.” Vol.75, No.3 (July, 2011), pp.701-718. Includes issues surrounding Winston Churchill, Adolf Hitler, Isoroku Yamamoto, Benito Mussolini, Franklin Roosevelt, and Josef Stalin, as well as the Yalta Conference, the Morgenthau Plan for Germany, and the ubiquity of horses in the Second World War.

WEINTRAUB, STANLEY

“Review Essay: The Conscript: George Catlett Marshall.” Vol.72, No.3 (July, 2008), pp.911-919. The fifth volume of The Papers of George Catlett Marshall, covering 1945 to 1947.

WEITZ, MARK A.

“Drill, Training, and the Combat Performance of the Civil War Soldier: Dispelling the Myth of the Poor Soldier, Great Fight.” Vol.62, No.2 (April, 1998), pp.263-289. Proposes that, contrary to conventional wisdom, the soldiers who fought in the war functioned effectively because of military skills that flowed directly from drill, training, and discipline rather than any innate fighting ability.

WELDEMICHAEL, AWET T.

“The Eritrean Long March: The Strategic Withdrawal of the Eritrean People’s Liberation

Front (E.P.L.F.), 1978-1979.” Vol.73, No.4 (October, 2009), pp.1231-1271. Despite the battlefield victories achieved by the Soviet backed Ethiopian offensives, as a guerrilla force, the Eritrean proved to be more adaptable to the changing circumstances, enabling them to go over to the tactical offensive by 1980.

WERRELL, KENNETH P.

“Across the Yalu: Rules of Engagement and the Communist Air Sanctuary during the Korean War.” Vol.72, No.2 (April, 2008), pp.451-475. U.S. warplanes violated Chinese air space during the Korean War more frequently than was generally acknowledged, often encouraged and sometimes led by field grade officers, with few pilots suffering punishment.

“Friction in Action: Revisiting the U.S. Army Air Forces’ August 1943 Raid on Ploesti.” Vol.83, No.2 (April, 2019), pp.509-540. Looks at the Ploesti Raid from the perspective of planning and outcomes, pointing to failure of flexible leadership in the face of minor unforeseen factors that had a major impact on the effectiveness of the mission.

WESTERMANN, EDWARD B.

“Fighting for the Heavens from the Ground: German Ground-Based Air Defenses in the Great War, 1914-1918.” Vol.65, No.3 (July, 2001), pp.641-669.

WESTERMAN, WILLIAM

“The Real Controller of the Battle: The Importance of Studying Tactical Battalion Command – A Case Study.” Vol.81, No.4 (October, 2017), pp.1007-1038. Offers the experience of the 22nd Australian Infantry Battalion during the 1918 Hundred Days Campaign as an example of decentralized command and control.

WESTPHAL, RAYMOND W., Jr.

“Postwar Planning: Parliamentary Politics and the Royal Navy, 1919-22.” Vol.74, No.1 (January, 2010), pp.145-171. Delves into the conflict between governments that viewed cuts in the military budget as a means of achieving economic recovery versus the Royal Navy’s goal of achieving parity with their U.S. counterpart while fulfilling its mission of two-ocean imperial defense.

WETTA, FRANK

With Novelli, Martin A. **“Review Essay: ‘Now a Major Motion Picture’: War Films and Hollywood’s New Patriotism.”** Vol.67, No.3 (July, 2003), pp.861-882. Suggests that the ‘New Patriotism’ displayed in films (1998-2002) celebrates loyalty to one’s comrades in battle and the ability to survive the horrific experience of modern combat rather than any stated or understood national or public rationales for whatever a war is being fought.

WHEELER, EVERETT L.

“Rome’s Dacian Wars: Domitian, Trajan, and Strategy on the Danube.” Vol.74, No.4 (October, 2010), pp.1185-1227; Vol.75, No.1 (January, 2011), pp.191-219. Seeks to clarify the narrative accounts of the three Dacian Wars of Emperors Domitian (r.81-96) and Trajan (r.98-117), fought between 84 and 106 C.E., within the context of the development of a Geto-Dacian State in Transylvania.

“The Archaeology of War in Late Antiquity.” Vol.78, No.3 (July, 2014), pp.1081-1093. A critical examination of a two-volume collection of papers originally presented at a 2007 Oxford conference.

WHITBY, MICHAEL J.

“Matelots, Martinets, and Mutineers: The Mutiny in H.M.C.S. *Iroquois*, 19 July 1943.” Vol.65, No.1 (January, 2001), pp.77-103. The author identifies the substantial expansion of the Royal Canadian Navy, bringing together inexperienced officers with inexperienced crews, as the cause of the Destroyer *Iroquois*.

WHITE, LORRAINE

“Strategic Geography and the Spanish Habsburg Monarchy’s Failure to Recover Portugal, 1640-1668.” Vol.71, No.2 (April, 2007), pp.373-409. Contrasting Alba’s (1507-1582) successful campaign in 1580 with the course of this mid-17th century conflict, the article considers the impact of geographic and climactic factors on the strategy, tactics, and logistics of the Spanish forces.

WIENS, GAVIN

“Guardians and Go-betweens: Germany’s Military Plenipotentiaries during the First World War.” Vol.86, No.2 (April, 2022), pp.344-371. Imperial German federalism was present in the German General Headquarters in the form of military plenipotentiaries from Bavaria, Saxony, and Württemberg who had some degree of responsibility over the units from these former kingdoms.

WILDENBERG, THOMAS

“In Support of the Battle Line: Gunnery’s Influence on the Development of Carrier Aviation in the U.S. Navy.” Vol.65, No.3 (July, 2001), pp.697-711. Debunks the presumed anti-aviation attitude of ‘battleship admirals’ and describes how carrier aviation was a mission driven, rather than a technological driven, affair that proceeded incrementally over the course of several years.

WILDERMUTH, DAVID W.

“ ‘I am fully aware of my guilt...’: Insights from a Soviet Military Tribunal’s Investigation of the German Army’s 35th Division, 1946-47.” Vol.83, No.4 (October, 2019), pp.1189-1212. Weighing the credibility of both perpetrator and eyewitness statements from Soviet tribunals for information on the actions of officers and soldiers of the German 35th Division during anti-partisan operations in April, 1944.

WILKINS, THOMAS S.

“Review Essay: Anatomy of a Military Disaster: The Fall of ‘Fortress Singapore’ 1942.” Vol.73, No.1 (January, 2009), pp.221-230.

WILLEKES, CAROLYN

With Sears, Matthew A. **“Alexander’s Cavalry Charge at Chaeronea, 338 B.C.E.”** Vol.80, No.4 (October, 2016), pp.1017-1035. Confronts the controversy surrounding whether or not the eighteen year old Alexander the Great (356-322 B.C.E.) actually led a cavalry charge that contributed to the defeat of the forces of the Greek coalition.

WILLIAMS, WILLIAM J.

“Josephus Daniels and the U.S. Navy’s Shipbuilding Program During World War I.” Vol.60, No.1 (January, 1996), pp.7-38. Observes how Daniels (1862-1948), with no naval or maritime background, applied himself conscientiously to shifting the Navy’s building program from capitol ships to destroyers designed to address the U-Boat threat.

WILLIAMSON, CORBIN

“Mediterranean Marines: The Challenges of Forward Deployment, 1948-1958.” Vol.85, No.2 (April, 2021), pp.426-452. Considers the challenges to U.S. Marine Corps units deployed in the Mediterranean as part of President Truman’s commitment to containment of the Soviet Union.

WILLIS, SAM

“The Battle of Lagos, 1759.” Vol.73, No.3 (July, 2009), pp.745-765. Though an indecisive engagement, Royal Navy Vice-Admiral Edward Boscawen’s (1711-1761) squadron weakened the French Mediterranean fleet that was sailing to join the French Atlantic fleet, thus serving as an important precursor to the Battle of Quiberon Bay, November, 1759.

WILLOUGHBY, JOHN

“The Sexual Behavior of American G.I.s during the Early Years of the Occupation of Germany.” Vol.62, No.1 (January, 1998), pp.155-174. Investigates the U.S. Army’s search for a form of sexual relations between G.I.’s and German girls that would be acceptable to young German men, young U.S. women, and the mothers and fathers of both lands, a topic that illuminates much about the social and political relations between the American and German people in the immediate aftermath of World War II.

WILSON, EVAN

With Schapira, Ruth, **“German Perspectives on the U-Boat War, 1939-1941.”** Vol.85, No.2 (April, 2021), pp.369-398. Probes the conflict between what the Germans’ needed to secure

a quick, decisive result, and the fact that the U-Boat was designed for a war of attrition, resulting in a pessimistic outlook on the part of Germany's Naval leaders.

WILSON, PETER H.

"Defining Military Culture." Vol.72, No.1 (January, 2008), pp.11-41. Puts forward the notion that military culture is a specific form of institutional culture and that viewing armies from this perspective offers new insight into both how they functioned and the nature of their interaction with state and society.

WILSON, TIMOTHY

"Broken Wings: The Curtis Aeroplane Company, K-Boats, and the Russian Navy, 1914-1916." Vol.66, No.4 (October, 2002), pp.1061-1083. Indicates that the contention between Curtiss and the Imperial Russian Government over the purchase of fifty-six flying boats impeded Russia's operations in the Black Sea for the first eighteen months of World War I.

WINKLER, JONATHAN REED

"Information Warfare in World War I." Vol.73, No.3 (July, 2009), pp.845-867. Presents both the British success in destroying the pre-war German system and the simultaneous German campaign against Allied communications, all within the broader economic, political, intelligence, and military context of modern conflict.

WINTON, HAROLD R.

"Toward an American Philosophy of Command." Vol.64, No.4 (October, 2000), pp.1035-1060. Considers the particular blend of intellectual and psychological qualities articulated within the practice of command in the U.S. Army during the interwar period.

WIRTSCHAFTER, ELISE KIMERLING

"Social Misfits: Veterans and Soldier's Families in Servile Russia [1682-1874]." Vol.59, No.2 (April, 1995), pp.215-235. Endeavors to understand the relationship between military service and social categories in Imperial Russia, beginning with the reign of Peter the Great in 1682 up to the introduction of universal conscription in 1874.

WITTY, DAVID M.

"A Regular Army in Counterinsurgency Operations: Egypt in North Yemen, 1962-1967." Vol.65, No.2 (April, 2001), pp.401-439. The Egyptian campaign in Yemen may have contributed to a compromise peace settlement, but it adversely impacted the Egyptian Army's capacity to fight conventional wars.

WOLTERS, TIMOTHY S.

“Electric Torpedoes in the Confederacy: Reconciling Conflicting Histories.” Vol.72, No.3 (July, 2008), pp.755-783. The article seeks to clarify the linkages between memory, history, and technology by examining the claims of Hunter Davidson, Beverley Kennon, Stephen Mallory, Matthew, and Gabriel Rains to contributing to the development of electric torpedoes for the Confederacy.

“Harvey A. De Weerd and the Dawn of Academic Military History in the United States.” Vol.85, No.1 (January, 2021), pp.95-133. Chronicles the career of Harvey A. De Weerd (1902-1979), a significant member of early academic military historians who was an editor of the *Infantry Journal* during World War II, early editor of the *Journal of Military History*, taught some of the first dedicated military history courses in the United States, and was the second military historian hired by the R.A.N.D. corporation.

WOOD, A. JAMIE

With Fagan, Brennen; Horwood, Ian; MacKay, Niall; Price, Christopher, and Richards, Ed, **“Bootstrapping the Battle of Britain.”** Vol.84, No.1 (January, 2020), pp.151-186. Using the statistical technique of weighted bootstrapping to provide a quantified assessment of the likelihood of German achievement of air superiority.

WOOD, JAMES A.

“Captive Historians, Captivated Audience: The German Military History Program, 1945-1961.” Vol.69, No.1 (January, 2005), pp.123-147. Delves into the work and motivations of Wehrmacht officers who were employed the United States Government to describe their wartime experiences concerning Germany’s war effort.

WOODFORK, JACQUELINE

“It is a Crime to be a *Tirailleur* in the Army.” Vol.77, No.1 (January, 2013), pp.115-139. Presents the contrast between the rights of indigenous civilians in the French colony of Senegal and those of the *Tirailleur sénégalais*.

WORTHING, PETER

“The Road through Whampoa: The Early Career of He Yingqin.” Vol.69, No.4 (October, 2005), pp.953-985. Determines that He Yingqin (1890-1987) owed his repeated promotions to his good working relationship with Jiang Jieshi (Chiang Kai-shek, 1887-1975), a relationship that was based on shared experiences and values.

“Continuity and Change: Chinese Nationalist Army Tactics, 1925-1938.” Vol.78, No.3 (July, 2014), pp.995-1016.

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Vol.80, No.1 (January, 2016), pp.173-185. Despite contrary requirements for polar opposite strategic circumstances, the cooperation of these two states produced path-breaking artillery technology.

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No.2 (April, 2017), pp.469-489. Contrary to contemporary and historical judgements, Allied plans to secure the safety of P.O.W.s in German hands were reasonable, realistic, and provided a template for similar operations in the Pacific Theater and beyond.

X

XIAOGANG LAI, SHERMAN

“ ‘The Devil is in the Details’: Mao Zedong before and after the Luochuan Conference, August 1937.” Vol.85, No.4 (October, 2021), pp.930-953. Relates how Mao Zedong (1893-1976) succeeded

in convincing both the Chinese Communist Party and Joseph Stalin (1878-1953) to adopt his strategy of guerrilla warfare.

XIAOMING ZHANG

“The Vietnam War, 1964-1969: A Chinese Perspective.” Vol.60, No.4 (October, 1996), pp.731-762.

Recounts how the People’s Republic of China supported Hanoi’s drive to unify Vietnam, assessing the extent to which there was a potential for direct Chinese military intervention.

“China and the Air War in Korea, 1950-1953.” Vol.62, No.2 (April, 1998), pp.335-370. Looks at the development of the People’s Republic of China’s Air Force during the war, the role played by the Soviet Union, and the emergence of an air warfare strategy.

“China’s Involvement in Laos during the Vietnam War, 1963-1975.” Vol.66, No.4 (October, 2002), pp.1141-1166. Shows that the competition between Hanoi and Beijing for control over the Laotian Communists reflected an underlying mistrust between the two governments.

“High-Altitude Duel: The C.I.A.’s U-2 Spy Plane Overflights and China’s Air Defense Force, 1961-1968.” Vol.86, No.1 (January, 2022), pp.132-159. Charts the overflights of the People’s Republic of China during the 1960s by Chinese Nationalist pilots operating out of Taiwan with the goal of monitoring the P.R.C.’s nuclear weapons program.

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The article seeks to understand why China tried so hard to participate in the war, why China's plans to raise an expeditionary force went unfulfilled, and what role China played in the First World War.

Y

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"Older German Officers and National Socialist Activism: Evidence from the German *Volkssturm*." Vol.83, No.2 (April, 2019), pp.455-485. Addresses the question of to what degree older, lower-level German officers serving in the *Volkssturm* embraced National Socialist ideology.

YOUNG, JAMES L., Jr.

"The Heights of Ineptitude: The Syrian Army's Assault on the Golan Heights." Vol.74, No.3 (July, 2010), pp.847-870. Argues that, during the 1973 Yom Kippur War, it was primarily the Syrian's tactical incompetence and failure to adhere to Soviet operational doctrine that ensured Israeli victory on the Golan Heights, notwithstanding the bravery of the Israeli troops.

YOUNG, KEN

"No Blank Cheque: Anglo-American (Mis)Understandings and the Use of the English Airbases." Vol.71, No.4 (October, 2007), pp.1133-1167. Deals with the diplomatic, political, and military issues surrounding the deployment of U.S. nuclear-capable strategic bombers to bases in Great Britain following the Berlin crisis of 1948.

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YUN, DUKHEE

"The 'Push of the Pike' in Seventeenth-Century English Infantry Combat." Vol.86, No.4 (October, 2022), pp.837-857. Relying on a close reading of contemporary sources, the author seeks to develop a better understanding of how opposing pike formations actually fought one another.

Z

ZALOGA, STEVEN J.

“Debunking an Omaha Beach Legend: The Use of the ‘Armored Funnies’ on D-Day.” Vol.85, No.1 (January, 2021), pp.134-162. Confronts the notion that one of the reasons the landing force on Omaha Beach suffered heavy casualties was the U.S. Army’s resistance to the use of specialized tanks developed by the British for the D-Day invasion.