Journal of Military History
Article Abstracts
Vol. 72, No. 1
January 2008

Articles:

Peter H. Wilson, "Defining Military Culture," The Journal of Military History 72 #1 (January 2008): 11-41.

This article outlines a conceptual framework to analyse the norms and values influencing the behaviour of soldiers in the past. It will argue that military culture is a specific form of institutional culture and that viewing armies from this perspective offers new insight into how they functioned and the nature of their interaction with state and society. It also addresses definitions of militarism, arguing that these generally blur distinctions between cultural and material factors. By disassociating military culture from particular forms of rule or modes of production, it can be studied in societies where it has been forgotten or hidden in the historical memory.

Ronald F. Kingsley and Harvey J. Alexander, "The Failure of Abercromby's Attack on Fort Carillon, July 1758, and the Scapegoating of Matthew Clerk," The Journal of Military History 72 #1 (January 2008): 43-70.

The unsuccessful attack by a massive British army against the French position at Fort Carillon (Fort Ticonderoga) on July 8, 1758 came as a shock to the British Empire. The failure of the attack has been attributed to a range of causes. The most prominent among them has been the accusation that an over-optimistic report on the French defenses made by a young engineer, Matthew Clerk, was the reason for an unsuccessful frontal attack. While many historians place the blame for the defeat on general mismanagement of the British army by the expedition's commander, General James Abercromby, few have disputed the general's claim that Clerk deserves a large share of the blame. Evidence from letters and other documents associated with the engineer serves to clarify a complex and confusing episode in the history of the French and Indian War.

Mark van de Logt, "'The Powers of the Heavens Shall Eat of My Smoke:' The Significance of Scalping in Pawnee Warfare," The Journal of Military History 72 #1 (January 2008): 71-104.

This study examines the cultural significance of scalping among the Pawnee Indians. Pawnee warriors took scalps to obtain spiritual power. When sacrificed in a special ceremony, scalps ensured the vitality and well-being of the Pawnee people. Sacrificing scalps also raised the status of men in Pawnee society and improved their prospects for marriage. Scalps were also taken to avenge the killing of tribal members by enemies, to strengthen diplomatic ties, or to end the mourning period of people who had lost a friend or relative. The quest for scalps could be a reason to launch military expeditions.

Xu Guoqi, "The Great War and China's Military Expedition Plan," The Journal of Military History 72 #1 (January 2008): 105-140.

This article examines the long-ignored issue of China's plan to send military expeditionary forces to Europe during the First World War. Based on sources from Germany, France, the United Kingdom, the United States, and China, the article uses an international history approach to address the following questions: why China was interested in the war, why China tried so hard to join the war, why its military expedition plan did not materialize, and what kind of role China played in the so-called Great War. The article argues that the First World War is an important chapter in history of Modern China and China's internationalization.

Mary Glantz, "An Officer and a Diplomat? The Ambiguous Position of Philip R. Faymonville and United States-Soviet Relations, 1941-1943," The Journal of Military History 72 #1 (January 2008): 141-177.

Colonel Philip Faymonville (U.S. Army) played a significant and controversial role in United States-Soviet relations in the 1930s and 1940s. The first U.S. military attaché to the Soviet Union, Faymonville provided dispassionate, accurate assessments of the Red Army=s military worth. Yet he earned the enduring hostility of his military and diplomatic colleagues. During World War II, Faymonville returned to Moscow as lend-lease expediter. He reported directly to the White House, and worked independently from the military attaché and the Embassy, solidifying his position as outsider and raising questions about the role of military officers in the conduct of diplomacy.

Bradley Lynn Coleman, "Recovering the Korean War Dead, 1950-1958: Graves Registration, Forensic Anthropology, and Wartime Memorialization," The Journal of Military History 72 #1 (January 2008): 179-222.

During the Korean War, the American Graves Registration Service, U.S. Army Quartermaster Corps, developed an innovative system to recover, identify, and repatriate deceased U.S. Servicemen. In doing so, the U.S. armed forces returned their dead to the United States during major combat operations for the first time in military history. This article describes and analyzes the handling of the Korean War dead. It concludes that the wartime program exemplified the country's adaptation to limited war during a time of prosperous insecurity.