Journal of Military History
Article Abstracts
Vol. 70, No. 2
April 2006

Articles:

Kimberly Kagan, "Redefining Roman Grand Strategy," The Journal of Military History 70 (April 2006): 333-362.

Ancient historians have demonstrated that Edward Luttwak's The Grand Strategy of the Roman Empire does not accurately describe Roman grand strategy, and many conclude that there was no Roman imperial grand strategy. But the grand strategy of the Roman Empire can be studied as long as scholars ask questions that the available sources support. The field of strategic studies defines "grand strategy" as the allocation of a state's resources to meet its major objectives. Surviving sources regarding the patterns of troop movements in the Roman Empire show that emperors decided how to allocate resources empire-wide to meet objectives, and thus thought about grand-strategic issues even if they did not recognize the concept or engage in long-term planning.

 

Andrew N. Liaropoulos, "Revolutions in Warfare: Theoretical Paradigms and Historical Evidence--The Napoleonic and First World War Revolutions in Military Affairs," The Journal of Military History 70 (April 2006): 363-384.

This article provides an alternative view for examining Revolutions in Military Affairs (RMAs), perceiving them both as sociopolitical institutions and as war-fighting models. The weaknesses in the ways in which the RMA theory has been approached are analyzed, resulting in the formation of three different, but parallel, paradigms of the RMA phenomenon (the Social Wave, the Radical Transformation, and the Continuity and Evolution). Two historical case studies, the Napoleonic RMA and the First World War RMA, are used in order to draw out the lessons learned regarding past revolutions and to examine the validity of the paradigms.

 

Brian Holden Reid, "'A Signpost That Was Missed'? Reconsidering British Lessons from the American Civil War," The Journal of Military History 70 (April 2006): 385-414.

This article reviews the influences that have shaped our views of the "lessons" of the American Civil War as interpreted by British writers. It attempts to evaluate the enduring impact of Major General J. F. C. Fuller and Captain Sir Basil Liddell Hart, particularly the latter, on the interpretation of the lessons, especially through the medium of Jay Luvaas's seminal book, The Military Legacy of the Civil War (1959). It does not suggest any wholesale revision of Luvaas's work, but alters his relative emphasis. Both Fuller and Liddell Hart argued that the significance of the Civil War had either been ignored or misinterpreted before 1914, but they seem unduly preoccupied by operational considerations and judge the "lessons" by the standards of the First World War.

 

Stephen R. Ortiz, "The 'New Deal' for Veterans: The Economy Act, the Veterans of Foreign Wars, and the Origins of New Deal Dissent," The Journal of Military History 70 (April 2006): 415-438.

This article examines the impact of military veterans on the New Deal era. In 1934 the passage of the Economy Act, which severely cut veteran benefits, triggered a wave of political mobilization that laid the foundations for organized New Deal dissent. The response of the Veterans of Foreign Wars (VFW) to the Economy Act situated the organization in the vanguard of "New Deal Dissidents," including Huey P. Long, Father Charles E. Coughlin, and their supporters. In this coalition, military veterans expressed early and crucial "voices of protest." And the politics of veterans' pensions and benefits, in turn, profoundly shaped the New Deal era.

Edgar Jones, "'LMF': The Use of Psychiatric Stigma in the Royal Air Force during the Second World War," The Journal of Military History 70 (April 2006): 439-458.

"Lack of moral fibre" (LMF), a term introduced by the Royal Air Force in April 1940, was designed to stigmatize aircrew who refused to fly without a medical reason. This article explores the justification for this uncompromising policy, research by neuropsychiatrists into the psychological effects of aerial combat, and their attempts to modify LMF procedures. The reasons why the British Army and Royal Navy did not formally adopt the policy are analyzed in relation to the military context. What happened to airmen subjected to LMF assessment and treatment programs is also discussed in relation to recent British initiatives.

Merle L. Pribbenow, II, "A Tale of Five Generals: Vietnam's Invasion of Cambodia," The Journal of Military History 70 (April 2006): 459-486.

The December 1978 to January 1979 Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia was a meticulously planned, modern combined arms operation led by some of Vietnam's most talented and experienced generals. In spite of a preemptive attack by Cambodia, Vietnamese forces, using six coordinated corps-sized combined arms mechanized columns, along with a division-sized amphibious assault along the coast and air strikes conducted by captured American-made attack aircraft, quickly crushed the fanatical Cambodian resistance in a swift, blitzkrieg-like campaign. Within three weeks the Vietnamese controlled all major roads, harbors, airfields, and population centers in Cambodia, forcing the remainder of Pol Pot's Cambodian armed forces to flee to the Thai border for sanctuary.