Journal of Military History
Article Abstracts
Vol. 69, No. 4
October 2005

Articles:

Peter Worthing, "The Road Through Whampoa: The Early Career of He Yingqin," The Journal of Military History 69 (October 2005): 953-986.

This article explores the early career of Chinese Nationalist General He Yingqin, examining his origins and military training in order to understand how he came to the attention of prominent men such as Sun Yat-sen and Jiang Jieshi (Chiang Kai-shek) and subsequently was able to gain a position of prominence in the government of Nationalist China. It argues that He Yingqin and Jiang Jieshi developed a working relationship based on common training and military experience, a shared set of personal values, and a bonding experience in combat in the Eastern Expedition of 1925. This relationship paved the way for He Yingqin's rapid rise in the Nationalist military and government.

 

Mark C. Jones, "Give Credit Where Credit Is Due: The Dutch Role in the Development and Deployment of the Submarine Schnorkel," The Journal of Military History 69 (October 2005):·987-1012.

The Germans' attempt during World War II to use an air mast (schnorkel) on submerged submarines to reduce their heavy losses is reasonably well known to naval historians. What is not well known, especially to those historians using English-language sources, is how the Germans came to deploy such a novel approach to operating diesel-powered submarines. This article explains the Dutch contribution to the development of the schnorkel. The article discusses the Italian version of the schnorkel, the Dutch invention and use of the schnorkel, the German adaptation of the Dutch technology, and the British experimentation with a schnorkel.

 

Timothy P. Mulligan, "Ship-of-the-Line or Atlantic Raider? Battleship Bismarck Between Design Limitations and Naval Strategy," The Journal of Military History 69 (October 2005):·1013-1044.

The recent surge of writings on battleship Bismarck largely ignores the ship's early history, from its initial designs through its planned use in prewar tactical exercises. Focusing on the period between 1932 and 1939, this article examines the genesis of the German battleship in the context of the internal debates and uncertainty within the German Navy High Command as to the desired characteristics and functions of future capital ships. Before war's outbreak, Grand Admiral Erich Raeder determined that battleships dependent on a limited-range propulsion system should be employed on long-range commerce raiding.

 

Mame Warren, "Focal Point of the Fleet: U.S. Navy Photographic Activities in World War II," The Journal of Military History 69 (October 2005):·1045-1080.

Washington, D.C., was the headquarters of most U.S. Navy photographic activities during World War II. Continuing a distinguished history of naval photography, hundreds of cameramen, including Edward Steichen and his team of professional photographers, fanned out from Washington to document both the European and Pacific theaters. They shot millions of still and motion pictures, and sent them back to various facilities, especially the Naval Photographic Science Laboratory at Anacostia. There, hundreds of men and women worked around the clock to generate images that would inspire both their military commanders and the American people with the prowess of the U.S. Navy in warfare.

 

Gerhard Krebs, "Operation Super Sunrise? Japanese-United States Peace Feelers in Switzerland, 1945," The Journal of Military History 69 (October 2005):·1081-1120.

In early 1945 Japanese navy circles in Berlin tried to begin peace negotiations with the United States. Using their contacts with the arms trader Friedrich Wilhelm Hack, they sent Commander Fujimura Yoshikazu to Switzerland, where he opened talks with Allen W. Dulles of the U.S. Office of Strategic Services. Though the Japanese navy and Foreign Ministry showed some interest, the peace attempts finally failed since neither side took the initiative to an official level. Fujimura confused his government by claiming that the Americans had made the first step, while the U.S. side waited for proof that the administration in Tokyo was backing the navy officer's initiative.

 

Ronald H. Spector, "After Hiroshima: Allied Military Occupations and·the Fate of Japan's Empire, 1945-1947," The Journal of Military History 69 (October 2005):·1121-1136.

The United States and its allies were almost completely unprepared for the enormous occupation responsibilities they faced in the Far East beginning in 1945. The author reviews Chinese, American, and British occupation decisions in immediate postwar China, Korea, and Southeast Asia and the role of the forces of recently defeated Japan. Allied occupiers came into the area for the nonpolitical task of disarming and removing the Japanese, but they quickly found themselves in the middle of insurgencies or civil wars, because the basic political future of these countries remained undecided. By 1948 all the states of the former Japanese empire were involved in conflicts. The ultimate fate of the occupied nations seemed to depend more on internal forces than on the techniques or plans of the occupiers. Consequently, the lessons of this period for the recent Iraq occupation are ambiguous at best, and they suggest that nation-building with guns will have no more certain outcome.

 

Bradley Lynn Coleman, "The Colombian Army in Korea, 1950-1954," The Journal of Military History 69 (October 2005):·1137-1178.

A diverse multinational coalition fought to defend South Korea between 1950 and 1953. The United Nations (UN) army featured combat divisions from industrialized countries, but also included units from small UN member states such as Colombia. This article examines the multinational campaign in Korea through coverage of the Colombian Army experience. It finds that the successful integration of the Colombia Battalion into the U.S.-led UN Command grew from the republic's larger relationship with the United States.

Review Essay:

Jon Tetsuro Sumida, "Gunnery, Procurement, and Strategy in the Dreadnought Era," The Journal of Military History 69 (October 2005):·1179-1187.

The author of the book being reviewed challenges what he incorrectly believes is the existing consensus on the character of British capital ship fire control and attempts to reinterpret aspects of the Battle of Jutland. This essay seeks to provide a guide to the book's most important analytical shortcomings for those either unfamiliar with the large body of relevant sources or who lack the technical knowledge to evaluate the engineering aspects of long-range gunnery.