Journal of Military History
Article Abstracts
Vol. 68, No. 4
October 2004

Articles:

David S. Bachrach, "The Military Administration of England: The Royal Artillery (1216-1272)," The Journal of Military History 68 (October 2004): 1083-1104.

It is commonly believed that King Edward I of England (1272-1307) revolutionized the military organization of England and began a new era in military affairs. This article argues that Edward's reputation as a "revolutionary" is exaggerated, because by the time he became king, a large and complex military bureaucracy already existed in England. This study examines one element of the sophisticated military administration that operated during the reign of Edward's predecessor, Henry III (1216-72): the construction, storage, and transportation of the artillery that was so important for the conduct of siege operations.

 

Niccoló Capponi, "Le Palle di Marte: Military Strategy and Diplomacy in the Grand Duchy of Tuscany under Ferdinand II de' Medici (1621-1670)," The Journal of Military History 68 (October 2004): 1105-1143.

Tuscany's geopolitical situation in the seventeenth century was unique and unenviable. The historiography of the Medici Grand Duchy, in particular of the reign of Ferdinand II, has ignored the difficult position that the ruling family faced and has overlooked its diplomatic and military successes. This article addresses three primary challenges facing the Medici: the difficulty of maintaining neutrality between Habsburg Spain and Bourbon France; the need to transform the state's costly defence organization; and the practicalities of defending Tuscany's borders from incursions by neighbouring states. Ferdinand II ably confronted these challenges with skilful diplomacy and an innovative defence policy.

 

Robert S. Burrell, "Breaking the Cycle of Iwo Jima Mythology: A Strategic Study of Operation Detachment," The Journal of Military History 68 (October 2004): 1143-1186.

The American struggle to capture the Pacific Island of Iwo Jima from the Japanese in 1945 proved to be the bloodiest fight in Marine Corps history. Yet, ironically, the justifications for seizing the island have undergone little critical analysis. A detailed look into the planning for Iwo Jima demonstrates that the service rivalry resulting from the competing agendas of the Navy, Army and Army Air Forces in the Pacific negatively influenced the decision to initiate Operation Detachment. The Marine Corps, which paid the heaviest price, remained completely excluded from the decision making process. When fighter escort operations from Iwo Jima, the original reason given for seizing the island, failed to produce the anticipated results, the military sought additional reasons to justify the costly battle. Historians, unfortunately, have perpetuated these illusions.

 

Moshe Gat, "On the Use of Air Power and Its Effect on the Outbreak of the Six Day War," The Journal of Military History 68 (October 2004): 1187-1216.

Following the end of the Suez Campaign of 1956, Israel devoted itself to the enhancement of its air power. As the Israeli air force's power and fighting capabilities grew, the national army chiefs pressed the government to utilize Israel's superior air power to put an end to the Syrian-instigated border incidents--incidents which had been taking place with increasing and worrying frequency. On 13 November 1964, Israel launched an air strike against Syria, raising the Arab-Israeli conflict onto a new and far more dangerous plane. Air power was soon established as a key element of Israel's security policy. The air strike of 7 April 1967, when 130 Israeli aircraft attacked targets deep inside Syria's air space, and in the course of which Israeli jets shot down six Syrian MIGs, marked the onset of a period of rapid deterioration in Arab-Israeli affairs and served as a prelude to the Six Day War.

 

Notes:

Jeremy Black, "Determinisms and Other Issues," The Journal of Military History 68 (October 2004): 1217-1232.

A think piece that addresses how to consider military history for the twenty-first century.

Review Essay:

Clifford J. Rogers, "The Field & the Forge," The Journal of Military History 68 (October 2004): 1233-1239.

Review of The Field and the Forge: Population, Production, and Power in the Pre-Industrial West. By John Landers. New York: Oxford University Press, 2003.