Journal of Military History
Article Abstracts
Vol. 68, No. 2
April 2004

Articles:

John Stone, "Technology, Society, and the Infantry Revolution of the Fourteenth Century," The Journal of Military History 67 (October 2003): 361-380.

Major developments in the technology and technique of warfare are commonly understood to be an important source of historical change. Not only do they alter the character of warfare, but they also prompt broader social developments. This position has been notably adopted by Clifford J. Rogers, who claims that the emergence of newly effective infantry forces was responsible for the rise of the commons during the fourteenth century. This article argues that developments in the technique of infantry warfare during the period were largely a consequence, rather than a cause, of social change. In doing so it calls for a new approach to understanding late-medieval military developments, one which is informed by the view that war is powerfully shaped by the societies which wage it.

 

Ann M. Becker, "Smallpox in Washington's Army: Strategic Implications of the Disease During the American Revolutionary War," The Journal of Military History 67 (October 2003): 381-430.

The prevalence of smallpox during the early years of the American War for Independence posed a very real danger to the success of the Revolution. This essay documents the impact of the deadly disease on the course of military activities during the war and analyzes smallpox as a critical factor in the military decision-making process. Historians have rarely delved into the significant implications smallpox held for eighteenth-century military strategy and battlefield effectiveness, yet the disease nearly crippled American efforts in the campaigns of 1775 and 1776. Smallpox was a major factor during the American invasion of Canada and the siege of Boston. Rumors over the British use of biological warfare, controversy over inoculation, and attempts to control the spread of smallpox all impeded the progress of the war. Recruitment was adversely affected, desertions increased, and commanding officers were forced to proceed with inadequate forces because of smallpox. This frightening disease affected the actions of the Revolutionary army and its generals, reduced the American ability to attract and hold recruits, and influenced the controversial development of preventive medical policies.

 

G. J. Bryant, "Asymmetric Warfare: The British Experience in Eighteenth-Century India," The Journal of Military History 67 (October 2003): 431-470.

This is a case study of how confrontations between asymmetric military systems are resolved. It concentrates on the military aspects, though a full understanding of the outcome is possible only through a consideration of political, social, and cultural factors as well. In such a struggle the "weaker" side (in this case the Indian) will try to acquire the superior methodology and weapons of the "stronger." But the latter will also have to adapt its military system to suit the new context in which it is fighting. The British won eventually because they retained their military superiority while the Indian princes were heavily disabled by political problems.

 

Kevin J. Weddle, " 'The Magic Touch of Reform': Samuel Francis Du Pont and the Efficiency Board of 1855," The Journal of Military History 67 (October 2003): 471-504.

By the mid-nineteenth century the United States Navy's personnel system based entirely on seniority had created an officer corps filled with many old, infirm, and incompetent men, while blocking the promotion of many deserving officers. Commander Samuel Francis Du Pont, along with several other political and military leaders, was instrumental in achieving significant personnel reform that temporarily broke the promotion logjam by removing much of the deadwood from the naval officer corps. This article draws upon previously neglected material to provide a fresh look at Du Pont's role in the work of the United States Navy's Efficiency Board of 1855.

 

Russel H. S. Stolfi, "A Critique of Pure Success: Inchon Revisited, Revised, and Contrasted," The Journal of Military History 67 (October 2003): 505-526.

The Inchon landing was a strategical masterpiece followed by a ground advance to Seoul so tentative that it largely negated the successful landing. The Inchon-Seoul episode typifies the U.S. style of war fighting in the twentieth centuryæsuccessful maritime force projection followed by less effective ground campaigning. To illustrate the greater possibilities in the ground advance, the author contrasts the opening days of the Inchon-Seoul operations with those of an analogous German surprise offensive in the Baltic in 1941. The author concludes that the German battle fighting style in mobile war was superior, containing elements of boldness that could be applied to improve U.S. ground warfare today.

Feature:

Rick Atkinson, "Speech to the U.S. Commission on Military HistoryæWashington, 1 November 2003," The Journal of Military History 67 (October 2003): 527-534.

In a speech to the U.S. Commission on Military History, the author ruminates on the distinctions between journalism and history, and the extent to which the genres can inform and complement one another. (With Rick Atkinson's permission, the text of his speech has been lightly edited to make it more accessible to readers. Ed.)

 

Notes:

James R. Arnold, "A Reappraisal of Column Versus Line in the Peninsular War," The Journal of Military History 67 (October 2003): 535-552.

The writings of Sir Charles Oman provide the foundation for English-language readers' understanding of the tactical details of Napoleonic warfare. Oman explained British success against the French as the inevitable consequence of French tactical orthodoxy. Oman reduced tactics to a mathematical relationship between the number of effective marksmen in the French column versus the British line. This article demonstrates that Oman's understanding of French tactics was deeply flawed. Most importantly, it shows that Oman's "musket counting" analysis derived from a complete misapprehension about the 1806 Battle of Maida.

Documents of Note:

John M. Carland, "Winning the Vietnam War: Westmoreland's Approach in Two Documents," The Journal of Military History 67 (October 2003): 553-574.

Together these late 1965 documents detail Westmoreland's theory of victory in Vietnam. The first one provides guidance to senior commanders about how he wanted them to fight the war and the second presents his evaluation of the troops' performance and recommendations for improvement. They show that he fully understood the need to provide security for the South Vietnamese so pacification and nation-building programs might succeed. Hence, they send an obvious but sometimes neglected message to policy makers and commanders today: in a counterinsurgency environment, the successful approach will contain an aggressive warfighting plan and a well thought-out nation-building/pacification program.