Journal of Military History
Article Abstracts
Vol. 68, No. 1
January 2004

Articles:

Michael C. Paul, "The Military Revolution in Russia, 1550-1682," The Journal of Military History 68 (January 2004): 9-46.

Much has been written about the Military Revolution, a series of changes in tactics and strategy, the scale of warfare, and the impact of warfare on society in the late sixteenth century and the first third of the seventeenth century. However, most of the discussion of the Military Revolution has centered on Western Europe. The Military Revolution in Eastern Europe and Russia is often poorly understood. From the mid-sixteenth to the late seventeenth century, the Russian armed forces underwent changes in tactics and organization that were truly revolutionary in their impact on Russian society and helped make Russia a significant power in Northern and Eastern Europe, laying the groundwork for the changes that Peter the Great was to bring about.

 

Joseph C. Fitzharris, "Field Officer Courts and U.S. Civil War Military Justice," The Journal of Military History 68 (January 2004): 47-72.

Generalizations about Civil War soldiers extend to the military justice system: army discipline was very poor, and military justice, implemented by regimental and general courts-martial, was arbitrary, capricious, and disproportionate. In contrast, the 3rd Minnesota Volunteer Infantry Regiment had good discipline, and in its field officer courts, justice was deliberate, consistent, and compassionate. This article examines the nature and function of field officer courts, which the 3rd used, although many units ignored the Congressional Act of July 1862 that replaced regimental courts-martial with field officer courts. More work is needed on these largely unknown field officer courts and on army justice and discipline in the Civil War era.

 

Steven D. Jackman, "Shoulder to Shoulder: Close Control and 'Old Prussian Drill' in German Offensive Infantry Tactics, 1871-1914," The Journal of Military History 68 (January 2004): 73-104.

This article argues that a conservative ideology held by German officers, both aristocratic and middle class, led the army to retain costly tactical and training methods. Officers' close control of men massed them in formations vulnerable to modern firepower, and repetitive "old Prussian drill" to force discipline led to rigid tactical execution. These methods survived both the Prussian reform of 1806-15 and the reasoned and needed tactical reforms undertaken in the 1860s and persisted into World War I. Only post-World War I reform of the Reichswehr by the renamed General Staff created tactical independence for the individual soldier.

 

Daniel R. Beaver, "The U.S. War Department in the Gaslight Era: Stephen Vincent Benét at the Ordnance Department, 1870-91," The Journal of Military History 68 (January 2004): 105-132.

Examination of the career of Chief of Ordnance Stephen Vincent Benét suggests that the War Department was a more active place during the last two decades of the nineteenth century than has been conventionally asserted. Benét played a significant role in the American Army's organizational/technological modernization, which had its modest beginnings before the Spanish-American War and continued, incrementally, through the Progressive Era.

 

Anna Kasten Nelson, "Anna M. Rosenberg, an 'Honorary Man,'" The Journal of Military History 68 (January 2004): 133-162.

In November 1950, Defense Secretary George C. Marshall announced the appointment of Anna M. Rosenberg as Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower. Apart from the startling fact that he had chosen a woman, Mrs. Rosenberg was also an immigrant, Jewish, and an ardent supporter of the New Deal. This article is about Rosenberg's career, her uncanny ability to solve problems, and the events that propelled her into the Pentagon. It is also about a woman who eschewed the feminine networks to hang her hat with men of power. Looking beyond her politics and gender, Marshall's choice was a brilliant one.

 

George J. Veith and Merle L. Pribbenow, II, "'Fighting is an Art': The Army of the Republic of Vietnam's Defense of Xuan Loc, 9-21 April 1975," The Journal of Military History 68 (January 2004): 163-214.

From early to mid-April 1975, the South Vietnamese 18th Division, defending the strategic road junction of Xuan Loc northeast of Saigon, held off massive attacks by an entire North Vietnamese Army corps engaged in a surprise assault to overrun Saigon and quickly end the war. Enduring extremely heavy fighting, they stopped the communist offensive before being ordered to retreat and help defend Saigon. While communist forces were guilty of over-confidence, the 18th Division's superb performance was largely the result of the combat skills, prior planning, and inspirational leadership of their commander, Brigadier General Le Minh Dao, who demonstrated that even in South Vietnam's darkest hour, the much-maligned soldiers of the Army of the Republic of Vietnam would fight when led by able officers.

 

Document of Note:

Dirk Steffen, "The Holtzendorff Memorandum of 22 December 1916 and Germany's Declaration of Unrestricted U-boat Warfare," The Journal of Military History 68 (January 2004): 215-224.

As Chief of the Admiralty Staff of the Imperial German Navy, Admiral Henning von Holtzendorff was the driving force behind the German declaration of unrestricted U-boat warfare in 1917. In his memorandum of 22 December 1916, Holtzendorff condensed the key arguments of his fifteen-month struggle for unrestricted U-boat warfare. He focused on two issues: the unique opportunity to starve Great Britain into submission due to the crop failure of 1916 and the declining prospects for German submarine warfare under cruiser rules in the face of the progressive arming of allied merchantmen. He also believed that Germany could afford to risk a confrontation with the United States over the issue.