Robert S. Davis, "Escape from Andersonville: A Study in Isolation and Imprisonment," The Journal of Military History 67 (October 2003): 1065-1082.
Civil War Camp Sumter, the notorious Confederate prison popularly
known as Andersonville, became the world's first great concentration
camp. Almost one third of the some 40,000 federal prisoners who
entered its gates remain there today in its cemetery. The National
POW Museum, representing all of America's wars, is part of the
modern national park and cemetery on the site. The volumes of
material in print about this prison do not, until now, include
an in depth discussion of the subject of escape. Contrary to
popular myth only some two dozen men broke out of Andersonville
and successfully reached Federal lines. And despite legends to
the contrary, almost none of them escaped by tunnel. This article
uses statistics and personal narratives to explore how isolation
thwarted efforts to flee the high mortality rate of this prison.
Although the article covers many factors unique to Andersonville,
such as POWs helped by slaves, it also compares fleeing this
prison to generalities about escapes from confinement in later
wars.
Daniel Todman, "'Sans peur et sans reproche': The Retirement, Death, and Mourning of Sir Douglas Haig, 1918-1928," The Journal of Military History 67 (October 2003): 1083-1106.
The death of Field Marshal Sir Douglas Haig in January 1928 was the occasion of great public and private mourning throughout the United Kingdom, marking it out from the passing of other Great War generals. This article examines the scale and character of that mourning and suggests that they were the result not only of his wartime victory, but also of Haig's postwar activities and the chronological location of his death in the context of postwar bereavement and remembrance.
Trent Hone, "The Evolution of Fleet Tactical Doctrine in the U.S. Navy, 1922-1941," The Journal of Military History 67 (October 2003): 1107-1148.
In the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941, the U.S. Navy battle line was destroyed. Although a great deal has been published concerning the construction and operational histories of these battleships, relatively little is known about how these ships would have been employed in battle. This article seeks to rectify this shortcoming by examining the Navy's tactical doctrine with specific focus on the employment of the battle line and illustrating the salient principles of the Navy's battle doctrine in the interwar period, as well as Admiral Husband E. Kimmel's plan for a fleet battle in the Central Pacific in the fall of 1941.
B. David Mann, "Japanese Defense of Bataan, Luzon, Philippine Islands, 16 December 1944-4 September 1945, The Journal of Military History 67 (October 2003): 1149-1176.
The Filipino-American defense of the Bataan peninsula in 1942 finally collapsed under Japanese might as the United States suffered the most devastating defeat in its history. This article describes the Japanese defenses, weapons, and tactics used when the Americans liberated Bataan in February 1945. Utilizing the key terrain feature of the peninsula, ZigZag Pass, through which wound the only road connecting Subic Bay with Manila and Clark Field, the undermanned Japanese fought with aggressiveness, tenacity, determination, and bravery for eighteen days before withdrawing to central Bataan to engage in guerrilla warfare until the war's end.
Harold M. Tanner, "Guerrilla, Mobile, and Base Warfare in Communist Military Operations in Manchuria, 1945-1947," The Journal of Military History 67 (October 2003): 1177-1222.
Historians have explained the Communist victory in the Chinese civil war (1945-49) in terms of either "standard" or "guerrilla" warfare. Analysis of the Communist experience in Manchuria, 1945_47, demonstrates that the Communists initially adopted a conventional war strategy and doctrine. As the situation developed, the Party faced a contradiction between economic and political necessity on the one hand and strategic reality on the other that sometimes put Communist forces into indefensible positions. After setbacks, the Communists recovered and developed a decisive hybrid strategy and doctrine that enabled them to turn the tide of the civil war and to make a second, more successful transition from guerrilla to mobile and base warfare.
Jean-Marc Regnault, "France's Search for Nuclear Test Sites, 1957-1963," The Journal of Military History 67 (October 2003): 1223-1248.
In 1957 the French government was searching for a nuclear testing site. It chose a site in the Sahara desert in Algeria in order to begin testing as soon as possible, but technical and political considerations rendered this solution only temporary. Recently declassified archival sources reveal that France subsequently considered using a South Pacific site, which helps to explain why France sought such tight control over its overseas territories of New Caledonia and French Polynesia. Finally, at the end of 1961, the Moruroa atoll was chosen, but New Caledonia remained an alternate site. The removal by the French government of nationalistic leaders in New Caledonia and French Polynesia between 1958 and 1963 appears to have been motivated by nuclear testing considerations.
Notes:
Andrew J. Birtle, "The Origins of the Legion of the United States," The Journal of Military History 67 (October 2003): 1249-1262.
The 1792 reorganization of the United States Army into the Legion of the United States marked a significant transformation in the structure of American military forces. Designed for the exigencies of American conditions, the Legion represented an innovative experiment in combined arms warfare. This article examines the roots of the legionary concept, from the ancient Romans to eighteenth-century European military theorists, and suggests that the structure of the Legion of the United States may have been based on the writings of Colonel Henry Bouquet, a noted veteran of the Indian frontier.
Review Essay:
Gordon W. Rudd, "The Israeli Revisionist Historians and the Arab-Israeli Conflict--Part One: From the Founding of Zionism to the 1967 War," The Journal of Military History 67 (October 2003): 1263-1270.
The Iron Wall: Israel and the Arab World. By Avi Shlaim. New York: W. W. Norton, 2001. ISBN 0-3933-2112-6. Maps. Illustrations. Notes. Bibliography. Index. Pp. 670. $32.50.
Righteous Victims: A History of the Zionist-Arab Conflict,
1881-2001. By Benny Morris. New York: Vintage, 2001.
ISBN 0-6797-4475-4. Maps. Notes. Selected bibliography. Index.
Pp. 784. $18.00.