R. A. Johnson, "'Russians at the Gates of India'? Planning the Defence of India, 1885-1900," The Journal of Military History 67 (July 2003): 697-744.
The annexation of Central Asia by Russia in the second half of the nineteenth century, which brought the Tsar's armies to the borders of Afghanistan, compelled the British to consider how to defend their prize imperial possession, India. In the absence of a General Staff, senior officers and the Intelligence Division in London drew up a series of plans over a twenty year period. A variety of solutions were proposed, including amphibious operations in the Black Sea, a thrust through Persia and guerrilla attacks against Russian railroads. However, the most prominent idea, known as the "Scientific Frontier," was to defend India by holding a line along the Hindu Kush mountains deep inside Afghanistan. The chief difficulty was Afghanistan itself. The British were unable to resolve its status: was it an ally, or an enemy? This article seeks to highlight the development of the British plans, and the problems they presented.
Terence M. Holmes, "Classical Blitzkrieg: The Untimely Modernity of Schlieffen's Cannae Programme," The Journal of Military History 67 (July 2003): 745-772.
This article reconsiders Schlieffen's Cannae ideal and offers an historical perspective on the question of its applicability. Concurring with Hans Delbrück's interpretation, Schlieffen understood that the battle of Cannae was decided by a cavalry attack on the rear of the Roman phalanx. This model had no influence on the Schlieffen plan of 1905, which reflects a quite different method of envelopment taught by Schlieffen before he adopted the Cannae paradigm in 1909. Cannae was in any case a problematic exemplar, given that modern firepower severely limited the scope of cavalry operations. But if the Cannae programme was untimely in Schlieffen's own time, it also prefigured a rebirth of the cavalry idea in the age of mechanized warfare.
William Alexander Percy, "Jim Crow and Uncle Sam: The Tuskegee Flying Units and the U.S. Army Air Forces in Europe During World War II, The Journal of Military History 67 (July 2003): 773-810.
This article discusses the nature of race relations in the U.S. Army Air Forces during the Second World War. America's first all-black flying units, the 99th Fighter Squadron and the 332nd Fighter Group, trained at segregated Tuskegee Army Air Field in Tuskegee, Alabama, carried out tactical and strategic missions over North Africa and southern Europe in the last two years of the war. While overseas, the black airmen experienced both positive and negative racial relationships with other fighter and bomber units of the Army Air Forces, relationships which often affected the morale and combat effectiveness of the 99th and 332nd. The wartime success of the "Tuskegee Experiment" gave impetus to President Harry S. Truman's integration of the U.S. armed forces in 1948.
Christopher P. Loss, "Reading Between Enemy Lines: Armed Services Editions and World War II," The Journal of Military History 67 (July 2003): 811-834.
This article examines the real and symbolic importance of reading books--especially Armed Services Edition paperback books--during World War II. Lingering memories of World War I propagandizing at home, coupled with knowledge of Nazism's hostility to books abroad, compelled the American publishing community to fight for the free production and dissemination of all reading matter during World War II. In addition to exploring what books soldiers read and why, this article shows how the emergence of the Armed Services Edition paperback became a critical source of liberal democratic rejuvenation during the war as well as a harbinger of the pluralist conception of liberalism after it.
Philippe Lasterle, "Could Admiral Gensoul Have Averted the Tragedy of Mers el-Kébir?" The Journal of Military History 67 (July 2003): 835-844.
The career of French Admiral Marcel Gensoul collapsed in the virtual destruction by the Royal Navy of the fleet under his command at Mers el-Kébir, near Oran, Algeria, on 3 July 1940. Until that tragic day, Gensoul had been considered one of France's most promising naval officers. Since then, however, the French have known him only as "the man of Mers el-Kébir." Gensoul did nothing to shake off this unfortunate reputation. He never wrote his memoirs and never offered a public defense of his actions. He left his defense to others, preferring not to reopen the old Franco-British wound resulting from the events of 3 July 1940. On the other side of the Channel, actors in the drama and historians have expressed regret at the horrific consequences of the circumstances that led to the tragedy and shown sympathy for the difficult predicament in which the French admiral found himself. Meanwhile, in France very few people have seriously examined the role Gensoul played in the affair. For this reason it seems important, in order to understand the chain of events that took place on that tragic day, to reconsider the personality of the French admiral and to scrupulously analyze the part he played as one of the two main protagonists in the events. It will be particularly interesting in this regard to focus attention on Gensoul's proposal that the French squadron be disarmed in the port of Oran and British Prime Minister Winston Churchill's refusal of that option, which the Admiralty and many members of the British Cabinet found acceptable.
Fred L. Borch, "Comparing Pearl Harbor and '9/11': Intelligence Failure? American Unpreparedness? Military Responsibility?" The Journal of Military History 67 (July 2003): 845-860.
Claims by some commentators that "9/11" was an intelligence failure like Pearl Harbor, that the United States was unprepared for "9/11" like she was for the Japanese attack on Hawaii, and that, like Pearl Harbor, the military was not ready to defend against al Qaeda's terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and Pentagon are incorrect. On the contrary, an analysis of the two events reveals that they are more dissimilar than alike.
Frank J. Wetta and Martin A. Novelli, "'Now a Major Motion Picture': War Films and Hollywood's New Patriotism," The Journal of Military History 67 (July 2003): 861-882.
The "New Patriotism" that has appeared in recent Americans films is not a revival of older, reassuring versions of patriotic fervor and ideological conviction. In actuality, the "New Patriotism" can be seen as a repudiation of sentimental and ideological concepts that put nation and cause ahead of individual survival. The "New Patriotism" celebrates, in essence, loyalty to one's comrades in battle, the ability to survive the horrific face of modern hyper-lethal weaponry and warfare, and the shared experience of battle. Films such as The Patriot, Saving Private Ryan, We Were Soldiers, and Black Hawk Down do not revive patriotism so much as turn it inside out so that the private motivations and goals of the individual soldier supersede any stated or understood national or public rationales for whatever war is being fought.