Brian Bertosa, "The Supply of Hoplite Equipment by the Athenian State Down to the Lamian War," The Journal of Military History 67 (April 2003): 361-380.
Prior to the ephebic reform (reform in recruitment) at Athens in 335 BCE, Athenian infantrymen or hoplites were generally expected to provide their own arms and armour. While their defeat at Macedonian hands at Khaironeia in 338 caused the Athenians to rethink how to assure their military preparedness, little was done until Alexander the Great departed for the Near East in the spring of 335. The resulting ephebic reform involved a massive increase in the city's hoplite forces, with the thetes, the poor of Athens, admitted to the hoplite ranks for the first time. The need to equip all the thetes as hoplites resulted in the likely adoption of a system of issue-and-return, which was the most economical one available. Nevertheless, each of the ephebes, the new recruits to the system, was given a shield and spear at state expense, an uneconomical and militarily questionable practice that was nevertheless continued, probably for reasons of tradition.
Ben Cassidy, "Machiavelli and the Ideology of the Offensive: Gunpowder Weapons in The Art of War," The Journal of Military History 67 (April 2003): 381-404.
Historians have often claimed that Niccolo Machiavelli shunned the use of gunpowder weapons, both field artillery and hand-held weapons, because of their absence in the ancient world which the Italian loved so dearly. Machiavelli, however, did not reject the use of gunpowder weapons, but gave them a secondary role in his military scheme. The reason for this was that, in Machiavelli's time, reliance on gunpowder weapons necessitated defensive tactics in battle, while Machiavelli believed that an army should take the offensive in war, and he prescribed the role of guns in his army accordingly.
Albert Castel, "Liddell Hart's Sherman: Propaganda as History," The Journal of Military History 67 (April 2003): 405-426.
Although first published more than seven decades ago, Basil H. Liddell Hart's Sherman: Soldier, Realist, American remains highly regarded and influential among historians, in particular those specializing in the U.S. Civil War. This essay endeavors to demonstrate that while his status is understandable, it also is undeserved and unfortunate, because the book is seriously flawed, both factually and analytically, the consequence of Liddell Hart having written it to promote his thesis that the "indirect approach" is the secret of success in war.
Robert A. Doughty, "French Strategy in 1914: Joffre's Own," The Journal of Military History 67 (April 2003): 427-454.
In August 1914, General Joseph Joffre controlled the design and execution of French strategy. After concentrating the French army on the northeast frontier in the opening days of the war, he waited until after the Germans began their advance to complete the design of his strategy and did not fully inform his political superiors or his military subordinates until he published General Instructions No. 1 on 8 August. As Joffre implemented his strategy, he complied with the provisions of the Franco-Russian alliance by attacking into Alsace and Lorraine, but he sent his main thrust through central Belgium toward Neufchateau and Arlon where he hoped to avoid the powerful enemy force driving toward his left and strike the enemy's less dense, more vulnerable center. French strategy in 1914 was Joffre's own.
Mark Karau, "Twisting the Dragon's Tail: The Zeebrugge and Ostend Raids of 1918," The Journal of Military History 67 (April 2003): 455-482.
This essay is a reassessment of the famous raids of April 1918 in which the British attempted to block the two Belgian harbors of Ostend and Zeebrugge. Those harbors were the exits for the German inland naval base at Bruges, from which German submarines, destroyers, and torpedo-boats had accounted for roughly one-third of all British merchant shipping losses during the unrestricted submarine campaign. Finally in 1918 the Royal Navy decided to deal with them by blocking the canals connecting Bruges with Zeebrugge and Ostend. The British have generally considered the raid a limited success, but little effort previously has been made to examine the impact of the raids from the German perspective.
Richard Lock-Pullan, "'An Inward Looking Time': The United States Army, 1973-1976," The Journal of Military History 67 (April 2003): 483-512.
This article examines the initial stages of the rebuilding undertaken by the U.S. Army after the Vietnam War. It emphasizes how the ending of the draft, rather than the lessons of the Vietnam War, shaped and drove the key changes during this period. It stresses the central role of General William E. DePuy in developing a trained, value-based, and doctrinal Army focused on the European Central Front, influenced by the lessons drawn from the 1973 Arab-Israeli War. It highlights how important the initial period of reform was to the later developments that aided the prosecution of the Gulf War.
Note:
Terence M. Holmes, "'One Throw of the Gambler's Dice': A Comment on Holger Herwig's View of the Schlieffen Plan," The Journal of Military History 67 (April 2003): 513-516.
This comment challenges the view that the Schlieffen plan was flawed by its subjection to an unrealistic timetable. Schlieffen's great memorandum of 1905 does not in fact stipulate any deadline for completing the projected war against France. The six-week limit invoked by Herwig and others relates to plans that were made for the conduct of a two-front war. It has been falsely superimposed on the Schlieffen plan, which was actually devised for the event of a one-front war. The Schlieffen plan has come to be seen as a reckless gamble largely on the basis of this inveterate misunderstanding as to its proper context.
Document of Note:
Jonathan North, "General Hoche and Counterinsurgency," The Journal of Military History 67 (April 2003): 529-540.
General Louis Lazare Hoche was one of the outstanding generals of Revolutionary France. His instructions on how to fight and defeat enemies of that revolution are crisp and precise, and of significant relevance to any exponent of counter-insurgency. As a practical guide to fighting and winning in enemy territory the instructions of General Hoche are of considerable merit and eminently worthy of study. Incredibly they have not been available to English-speaking students of military art until now. In this clear and readable translation General Hoche's advice to officers combating guerrillas and partisans rings out as fresh as the day it was written.