Ernest R. May, "1947-48: When Marshall Kept the U.S. Out of War in China" (The 2002 George C. Marshall Lecture in Military History), The Journal of Military History 66 (October 2002): 1001-1010.
The course of the Cold War was channeled by a small number of close decisions. One was the U.S. decision not to become actively involved in the Chinese Civil War, which was largely a decision by Secretary of State George C. Marshall.
Richard L. Di Nardo, "Southern by the Grace of God but Prussian by Common Sense: James Longstreet and the Exercise of Command in the U.S. Civil War," The Journal of Military History 66 (October 2002): 1011-1032.
During the mid-nineteenth century, commanders on both sides of the Atlantic had to contend with the difficulty of maintaining command over their larger units under conditions of greater tactical dispersion. Under these circumstances, perhaps the most important instrument a commander had at his disposal was his staff. In the U.S. Civil War, no commander on either side had as good a staff as James Longstreet. This article compares how Longstreet organized and employed his staff with the staff practices developed by the Prussian Army under Moltke. While there are some obvious differences, one can also note a surprising number of similarities.
Patrick J. Kelly, "Strategy, Tactics, and Turf Wars: Tirpitz and the Oberkommando der Marine, 1892-1895," The Journal of Military History 66 (October 2002): 1033-1060.
Admiral Alfred von Tirpitz, State Secretary of the German Imperial Navy Office from 1897 to 1916, was the principal creator of the German High Seas Fleet, second largest in the world in 1914. This article uses some new and some previously ignored archival material to reexamine the development of Tirpitz's strategic and tactical thought in the 1890s, and to discuss the genesis of some old contradictions, which were to have fateful consequences later. The paper also demonstrates how bruising bureaucratic conflict, often linked with strategic and tactical questions, radically altered Tirpitz's understanding of how to achieve power and influence within the navy.
Timothy Wilson, "Broken Wings: The Curtiss Aeroplane Company, K-Boats, and the Russian Navy, 1914-1916," The Journal of Military History 66 (October 2002): 1061-1084.
TIn the autumn of 1914, the Imperial Russian government placed an order for fifty-six flying boats totaling over one million dollars with the United States's Curtiss Aeroplane Company. The flying boats, called K-Boats, were a brand new design and featured an experimental engine. The new aircraft immediately displayed numerous structural and engine problems that could not be rectified. The Russians voided the contract in 1916 and demanded a refund. The Curtiss Aeroplane Company refused on the grounds that alleged poor Russian maintenance and corruption was at fault for the problems. However, evidence clearly shows that the blame lay in faulty airframe and engine design, combined with poor quality control on the part of Curtiss Aero. The consequences were serious, impeding Russian aerial operations in the Black Sea for the first eighteen months of the Great War.
Alexander Statiev, "Antonesco's Eagles Against Stalin's Falcons: The Romanian Air Force, 1920-1941," The Journal of Military History 66 (October 2002): 1085-1114.
This essay traces the evolution of the Romanian Air Force from its inception through the interwar period and illuminates some specific problems that faced a minor military power striving to maintain a modern aviation industry. Subsequently, the essay analyzes the operations of the Romanian Air Command in the first year of war against the U.S.S.R. The air force was a national favorite in Romania. Not surprisingly, it was far more efficient than either the army or the navy. However, in 1941 it was repeatedly assigned missions that exceeded its capacity and was thus brought to the brink of extinction.
Stephen I. Schwab, "The Role of the Mexican Expeditionary Air Force in World War II: Late, Limited, but Symbolically Significant," The Journal of Military History 66 (October 2002): 1115-1140.
While the two world wars forced the United States to pay attention to Mexico for reasons of national security, little has been written about U.S.-Mexico security relations in the 1940s. These bilateral relations became closer between 1940 and 1945 as U.S. leaders sought to counter the possibility that Axis powers would exploit anti-U.S. sentiments in order to forge alliances with Mexico and other Latin American nations. President Roosevelt eventually invited a small Mexican air unit, the 201st Squadron, to engage in offensive action under U.S. command. This unit arrived in the Philippines in May 1945 and participated in close air support and ferrying operations for approximately three months. Because of its active participation in the Allied effort, Mexico acquired new fighter aircraft and a better trained, combat experienced air corps. It was also invited to join the United Nations and acquired an initial nonpermanent seat on the Security Council.
Xiaoming Zhang, "China's Involvement in Laos During the Vietnam War, 1963-1975," The Journal of Military History 66 (October 2002): 1141-1166.
This article depicts China's involvement in Laos during the Vietnam War, paying particular attention to an analysis of the Beijing-Hanoi rivalry over control of the Lao communists. It seems inconceivable that the Chinese knew so little about the conditions in Laos that rendered unsuccessful an attempt by them to export their model of revolution to Laos. The distrust and suspicion between the Chinese and the Vietnamese over Laos may have been a reflection of an undercurrent of tension between Beijing and Hanoi during the war. After many years of committing China's resources to Hanoi's war effort, the Chinese had created for themselves a new enemy, as the two countries later engaged in a decade-long conflict.
Notes:
Clifford J. Rogers, "Clausewitz, Genius, and the Rules," The Journal of Military History 66 (October 2002): 1167-1176.
It is commonly believed that the great military theorist Carl von Clausewitz maintained that "genius rises above the rules." This note demonstrates to the contrary that, in his view, a good theory of war could and should describe rules of universal explanatory (though not prescriptive) value, while the statement "genius rises above the rules" actually denied the utility of military theory. Geniuses violate only the incorrect or oversimplified rules of bad theory; they succeed because they understand the true rules better than "blinkered" theorists who try to explain the phenomena of war without taking account of moral forces.
Peter Karsten, "The 'Naval Aristocracy' and the 'Young Turks' of the Fin de Siècle: A Dotting of the 'I's and Crossing of the 'T's," The Journal of Military History 66 (October 2002): 1177-1180.
The author utilizes data gathered in the late 1960s for The Naval Aristocracy (1972), but now analyzed more thoroughly in "time-series" fashion, to answer the question of whether the social background (in particular, the father's occupation) of the "Young Turk" generation of officers of the "New Navy" days of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries appears to have mattered. The results confirm his previously published findings regarding the graduates of the Annapolis class of 1920 and West Point class of 1946 who, like their post-Civil War "Young Turk" predecessors, also faced "doldrum years" with regard to promotion rates after World Wars I and II--that is, the sons of "public-service-oriented" fathers disproportionately "stuck to their lasts" and rose to flag rank.