Bernard S. Bachrach, "Charlemagne and the Carolingian General Staff," The Journal of Military History 66 (April 2002): 313-358.
This essay examines the institutional structures of the Carolingian central government fundamental to military planning during the reign of Charlemagne (768-814) in light of modern discussions of general or capital staffs as these evolved in early modern Europe. The Carolingian deployment of armies operating in separate columns and aggregated in the forty to fifty thousand range for military conquest required extensive planning and logistic preparation which included pre-positioned magazines for providing supplies. The use of specialists, who had available expensive intelligence and excellent geographical information based upon verbal maps and itineraries, made detailed planning possible and permitted as many as four lengthy troops columns, often starting five hundred kilometers apart, to meet at a precise location within hours of each other.
Michael Greenhalgh, "French Military Reconnaissance in the Ottoman Empire During the Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries as a Source for Our Knowledge of Ancient Monuments," The Journal of Military History 66 (April 2002): 359-388.
The paper draws attention to the rich materials available in the French military archives for the study of Roman antiquities, and illustrates the variety by examining first the reports which French military advisors sent home from Turkey (Dardanelles, Bosphorus, Constantinople), from the Greek Islands, and then from Algeria. Such antiquities are shown to be of interest not just because things classical were the temper of the age, but also because of the Turkish practice of refurbishing antique structures for military purposes--and the French need to do exactly the same in order to maintain and then extend their precarious foothold in Algeria.
Tim Travers and Birten Celik, "'Not one of them ever came back': What Happened to the 1/5 Norfolk Battalion on 12 August 1915 at Gallipoli?" The Journal of Military History 66 (April 2002): 389-406.
Recently, considerable attention has been paid to the "disappearance" of the 1/5 Norfolk Battalion on 12 August 1915 at Suvla, during the Gallipoli campaign, including a BBC TV film entitled All the King's Men (1999). Because one company of the battalion was recruited from the Royal estate at Sandringham, King George V became involved in finding out exactly what happened to this battalion and "his" Sandringham company. Two explanations were offered at the time: first, that the battalion disappeared mysteriously, even supernaturally; and second, that the battalion was destroyed by the Turks, including all prisoners. This article offers a third explanation, based on British sources and hitherto unused Turkish sources, which emphasize British military errors.
Robert B. Bruce, "America Embraces France: Marshal Joseph Joffre and the French Mission to the United States, April-May 1917," The Journal of Military History 66 (April 2002): 407-442.
Shortly after the United States entered the First World War, the French government dispatched a joint military-political mission to America to help coordinate American participation in the conflict. Marshal Joseph Joffre headed the military portion of the mission, and he quickly emerged as the dominant French representative. During the course of his visit to Washington, and his subsequent tour of the United States, Joffre attempted to convince the Wilson administration, the senior leadership of the U.S. Army, and the American people themselves of the necessity to raise a large army and send it to fight on the Western Front. Moreover, he endeavored to insure that the nascent American Expeditionary Forces would serve alongside, and be more closely associated with, the French Army rather than the British, thus enabling his nation to obtain the lion's share of U.S. military support. Through his personal charm, intellect, and fame as the "hero of the Marne," Joffre not only swayed U.S. military and political leaders to his agenda, but also evoked a great outpouring of American public support for France and enthusiasm for the war. His efforts laid the foundation of Franco-American military cooperation in the Great War and ensured that America's primary military relationship during the First World War would be with France.
William H. Bartsch, "Operation Dovetail: Bungled Guadalcanal Rehearsal, July 1942," The Journal of Military History 66 (April 2002): 443-476.
To ensure the success of the first American amphibious offensive of World War II, at Guadalcanal, Solomon Islands, a full-scale rehearsal of the landing scheduled for 7 August 1942 was considered essential by Navy planners, given the inadequate amphibious warfare training of the Navy and Marine Corps personnel assigned to the operation. During the last four days of July 1942, this rehearsal was mounted off the remote island of Koro in the Fijis with near-disastrous results. Despite its significance, no account has heretofore been given of what transpired during the implementation of the exercise or of lessons learned for the Guadalcanal and subsequent amphibious campaigns of the Navy and Marine Corps during the Pacific War.
David R. Snyder, "Arming the Bundesmarine: The United States and the Build-up of the German Federal Navy, 1950-1960," The Journal of Military History 66 (April 2002): 477-500.
Eager for an effective naval presence in the Baltic Sea, the United States in the early 1950s quietly assembled men and ships that it eventually placed at the disposal of the Federal Republic of Germany. A variety of mine warfare vessels and auxiliary ships earmarked for the Federal Republic before 1956 allowed the Bundesmarine to begin operations at the earliest possible date, but six U.S. Fletcher-class destroyers, on loan under the Mutual Security Act's reimbursable aid provision, formed the backbone of the young Bundesmarine. Although the literature regarding German remilitarization often takes the Bundesmarine's existence for granted, American political, financial, and material support proved crucial to its establishment.
Brian M. Linn, "The American Way of War Revisited," with a response by Russell F. Weigley, The Journal of Military History 66 (April 2002): 501-533.
No abstract available.