Bruce McConachy, "The Roots of Artillery Doctrine: Napoleonic Artillery Tactics Reconsidered," The Journal of Military History 65 (July 2001): 617-640.
Historians claim that the changes evident in Napoleonic artillery practices from 1807 were the result of declining standards throughout the Grande Armée brought on by years of constant warfare. This essay argues that this perspective is incorrect. Examination of the long-term development of the French artillery arm, the growth in artillery numbers, and improvements in artillery practices reveals the increasing importance of artillery tactics within Napoleon's overall battle plan. This should be seen as a culmination of years of experimentation and innovation, rather than compensation for a decline in other arms.
Edward B. Westermann, "Fighting for the Heavens from the Ground: German Ground-based Air Defenses in the Great War, 19141918," The Journal of Military History 65 (July 2001): 641-670.
The Great War witnessed a dramatic, if overly romanticized, battle between the forces of the Allied and Central Powers for control of the "third dimension," the heavens above the battlefields. In their accounts of the air war, most historians have focused on the role and performance of the flying crews and their aircraft. The battle for the skies over Europe was not waged, however, in the air alone. During the conflict, German ground-based air defense systems began a slow but steady evolution in an effort to control the heavens from the earth below. At the outbreak of the war, German air defenses consisted of only six motorized guns and 12 horse-drawn 77-mm guns. By the end of the war, the antiaircraft force had expanded to 2,770 guns and 718 searchlights manned by 2,800 officers and 55,000 enlisted personnel. During the four years of the war, German antiaircraft crews shot down a total of 1,588 aircraft. In comparison, German aircraft accounted for 6,811 Allied aircraft destroyed. In the final analysis, the fact that German flak destroyed 19 percent of the Allied aircraft shot down despite its technological limitations offered strong evidence that ground-based air defenses could not be ignored. Therein development tells a story that highlights the interrelationship between technology, resources, and doctrine in warfare. It is also a story that enriches and expands the contemporary understanding of "the first air war."
Priscilla Roberts, "Tasker H. Bliss and the Evolution of Allied Unified Command, 1918: A Note on Old Battles Revisited," The Journal of Military History 65 (July 2001): 671-696.
The copy of British Captain Peter E. Wright's book, At the Supreme War Council (1921), which once belonged to General Tasker H. Bliss, the United States military representative on the Supreme War Council, illuminates old disputes over First World War strategy. Bliss's distaste for Wright's account of the spring 1918 decision to establish a united Allied command on the Western front, especially Wright's suggestion that during the March 1918 German offensive the British and French generals Sir Douglas Haig and Philippe Pétain helped to precipitate military disaster by deliberately withholding their designated General Reserve troops from General Ferdinand Foch's control, led Bliss to publish an article in Foreign Affairs giving his own, far less conspiratorial, version of this episode. Bliss's action demonstrated the fundamental moderation and balance which won him the respect of all his often violently opposed colleagues on the Supreme War Council. His account nonetheless exaggerated his own country's contribution to the eventual decision to establish a united Allied military command, an illustration of the manner in which, even at this time, leading Americans were seeking to assert the central position they believed the United States should assume internationally.
Thomas Wildenberg, "In Support of the Battle Line: Gunnery's Influence on the Development of Carrier Aviation," The Journal of Military History 65 (July 2001): 697-712.
This essay shows how gunnery influenced the development of carrier aviation in the U.S. Navy in the years immediately following World War I. Beginning with a description of the controversy over the Department of the Navy's decision to acquire its first aircraft carrier (Langley) and the critical role played by the experimental aircraft spotting practice of February 1919, known as the "Texas shoot," the author then describes the early development of aerial doctrine at the Naval War College and its effect on the tactical thanking of Joseph Mason Reeves, who was then a student at the college. Reeves's study comparing the fighting strengths and gun elevations of the British and U.S. navies convinced him that the U.S. Navy needed to gain air superiority in order to overcome its deficiency in big guns. His experience as a gunnery officer early in his career influenced his handling of the Aircraft Squadrons of the Battle Fleet after taking command of that unit in October 1925. Reeves's work led to the basic tenets of U.S. Navy carrier doctrine. He and other progressive Navy officers correctly viewed the airplane "as just another implement of war that would add its destructive power to those weapons already in existence."
Kenneth O. McCreedy, "Planning the Peace: Operation Eclipse and the Occupation of Germany," The Journal of Military History 65 (July 2001): 713-740.
While simultaneously planning the cross-channel attack on Europe, the Americans and British demonstrated the foresight to devote staff resources to planning postconflict operations in 1942. "Planning the Peace: Operation Eclipse and the Occupation of Germany" tells this story. Despite unclear political guidance, competing requirements, and a reluctance to involve the army in such a long-term commitment, General Dwight D. Eisenhower's headquarters created organizations to plan and conduct the occupation. In its anticipation of the requirements that would follow military victory, Eclipse was critical in averting a humanitarian disaster in Germany that could have fostered political unrest and turmoil sufficient to block conception and implementation of the Marshall Plan, perhaps changing the calculus of the Cold War.
Don Hickey, "The War of 1812: Still a Forgotten Conflict?" The Journal of Military History 65 (July 2001): 741-769.
Since the late 1980s, there has been a huge outpouring of scholarship on the War of 1812. In the 1990s alone, more than seventy-five books bearing on the conflict were published, making this the most prolific decade ever for 1812 studies. Although this literature has enhanced our understanding of the war, it is probably premature to drop the label "forgotten conflict." The scholarship has been narrowly focused on the war's military history and is unlikely to affect the standard treatment in textbooks. Moreover, despite a number of encouraging signs, it is not yet certain that the public will embrace the war as enthusiastically as scholars have. Finally, considerable work remains to be done, not only on the military history of the war but also on its domestic and diplomatic history.