Jamel Ostwald, "The 'Decisive' Battle of Ramilles, 1706: Prerequisites for Decisiveness in Early Modern Warfare," The Journal of Military History 64 (July 2000): 649-678.
The literature on the Duke of Marlborough's campaigns in the War of the Spanish Succession (170114) draws a strict battle-siege dichotomy, attributing all successes to Marlborough's quest for battle and all failures to his allies' avoidance of battle. The Low Countries campaign of 1706 and the battle of Ramillies are held up as proof of battle's potential for offensive strategic decision in even the most heavily fortified of theaters, despite recent early modern historiography which downplays military mobility and instead emphasizes logistical limitations. The paradox of post-Ramillies pursuit in the Flanders theater is resolved by illuminating the prerequisites of decisive battle: consensual combat, indefensible fortifications, and disloyal subjects. A reinterpretation of Marlborough's campaigns highlights the limitations under which even the greatest early modern commanders were forced to operate.
Dennis Showalter, "From Deterrence to Doomsday Machine: The German Way of War, 18901914," The Journal of Military History 64 (July 2000): 679-710.
The essay describes the German army's development between 1890 and 1914 in terms of a narrowly focused Prussian concept of military effectiveness responding to an Imperial system whose domestic tensions and international ambitions made it a comprehensively unpredictable "restless Reich." As a consequence the army developed perceptions of being boxed into a network of double binds whose only solution seemed refinement of operational capacities at the expense of wider issues of strategy and policy. From Frederick II to Bismarck, the army had been a deterrent. In the reign of William II it became a doomsday machine, able only to unleash apocalypse.
Hubert P. van Tuyll, "The Dutch Mobilization of 1914: Reading the Enemy's Intentions," The Journal of Military History 64 (July 2000): 711-38.
Between 1871 and 1914, the Netherlands' strategic position grew steadily more perilous. Geography made Holland an object of both German and Entente interest. To survive, the Netherlands had to convince other powers of its determination to protect its neutrality. This required accurate information. Lacking a formal intelligence apparatus, the Dutch relied on personal contacts and observation/espionage. This essay examines some of this informal intelligence network's successes, and how they assisted in the Netherlands' avoidance of World War I.
Timothy K. Nenninger, "'Unsystematic as a Mode of Command': Commanders and the Process of Command in the American Expeditionary Forces, 19171918," The Journal of Military History 64 (July 2000): 739-768.
During World War I, the U.S. Army fought a modern, twentieth-century, industrial war, as part of a coalition, at the end of a three-thousand-mile supply line. It was an unprecedented experience for U.S. soldiers. How the Army controlled forces in the field, at the tactical and operational level, also was unprecedented in its experience. This essay addresses the interaction of organization, doctrine, and personality in the process of command in the American Expeditionary Forces in France during 1917 and 1918. It also analyzes the role of Commander in Chief John J. Pershing in creating a command climate somewhat different from that of other belligerents in the war.
Joel Hayward, "Too Little, Too Late: An Analysis of Hitler's Failure in August 1942 to Damage Soviet Oil Production," The Journal of Military History 64 (July 2000): 769-794.
This essay argues that Adolf Hitler could have dealt the Soviet economy a major and timely blow, from which it would have taken at least several months to recover, if he had not been so obsessed with Stalingrad and wasted his Luftwaffe assets on that city's destruction. During August and early September 1942, he possessed the means to inflict heavy damage on the Caucasus oilfields that produced almost all Soviet oil. The Luftwaffe still had a strong bomber force and airfields within striking range and the Soviet Air Force's presence was weak. By October, however, when Hitler finally ordered attacks on oilfields, the Luftwaffe's eastern bomber fleet was much reduced and most forward airfields had been badly damaged by Soviet air forces which were then far stronger. The conclusion is unmistakable: Hitler had missed a golden opportunity to hurt the Soviet economy and war effort.
Anne C. Loveland, "Character Education in the U.S. Army, 19471977," The Journal of Military History 64 (July 2000): 795-818.
The U.S. Army's experiment in character education, begun in 1947, comprised three successive programs: Character Guidance, Our Moral Heritage, and Human Self-Development. Although character education was designated a command responsibility, chaplains provided the instruction. Initially it had a pronounced religious orientation-a response to problems confronting the Army after World War II and a reflection of the preoccupation with "national preparedness," the religious revival, and the Cold War of the late 1940s and 1950s. In the early 1960s, the Army began to deemphasize character education, and the religious orientation gave way to a secular, social-scientific approach. Planning for an all-volunteer force hastened the demise of character education; it was formally terminated in 1977.