Yuval Noah Harari, "Strategy and Supply in Fourteenth-Century Western European Invasion Campaigns," The Journal of Military History 64/2 (April 2000): 297-334.
The essay analyses the interplay between strategy and supply methods in fourteenth-century western Europe invasion campaigns. It argues that this interplay goes a long way towards explaining the two-fold nature of large-scale fourteenth-century offensive warfare, which consisted on the one hand of very rigid and slow campaigns revolving around the holding and taking of fortified places; and on the other hand of fast-moving and almost capricious raids, which often lacked any spatial coherence. It also demonstrates that invading armies frequently did not live off the land, and that supply lines and supply trains played a much more important part in fourteenth-century offensive warfare than is commonly thought.
Michael Epkenhans, "Krupp and the Imperial German navy, 1898-1914: A Reassessment," The Journal of Military History 64/2 (April 2000): 335-370.
The most notorious case of military-industrial relations remains the relationship between the military and the Essen firm of Krupp. A thorough investigation shows that Krupp only provided the weaponry, while politicians and military officials still defined the scope of armament programs. Friedrich Albert Krupp believed that his firm's relations with the German navy had political as well as commercial implications. He was deeply convinced that it was his patriotic duty to help build up the navy. Further, in order to "tame" greedy suppliers like Krupp, the Imperial Navy Office used every possible means to lower prices of warships as well as armour plate and naval artillery. Thus, neither Krupp's profits nor its military sales should be exaggerated.
Tan Tai-Yong, "An Imperial Home-Front: Punjab and the First World War," The Journal of Military History 64/2 (April 2000): 371-410.
During the First World War, the Indian Army was substantially expanded to meet the demands of operations in Europe and elsewhere. As most of the recruiting for the Indian Army had, by the turn of the century, come to concentrate mainly in the Punjab, the province would be called upon to bear the brunt of raising the necessary manpower to meet this expansion. Consequently, during the war, the entire bureaucratic structure in the province was militarised, as nearly all aspects of its activities were geared towards the provision of men and material for the war effort. The civil and military structures in the province coalesced into a formidable recruiting machinery, laying the foundations of a militarised bureaucracy in the Punjab, whose administrative-military tentacles were able to reach into every level of society and the economy in the province.
Alvin D. Coox, "Needless Fear: The Compromise of U.S. Plans to Invade Japan in 1945," The Journal of Military History 64/2 (April 2000): 411-438.
Evidence uncovered by the author reveals that U.S. plans to invade the Japanese homeland in 1945 were not as inviolate as long believed. According to a long-silent U.S. Signal Corps whistle-blower, the highly sensitive Operation Olympic reading file disappeared briefly from U.S. General Headquarters in Manila in July 1945. Still another breach attributed to administrative error caused the Joint Chiefs of Staff to retitle Olympic quickly as codename Majestic. Research in Japanese sources, however, including interviews with senior Imperial Japanese Army planning officers, indicates the substance of U.S. invasion plans did not fall into Japanese hands. The huge IJA buildup on Kyushu to precise designation of landing sites proceeded independently of security glitches at GHQ/Manila.
Nicholas Evan Sarantakes, "The Quiet War: Combat Operations Along the Korean Demilitarized Zone, 1966-1969," The Journal of Military History 64/2 (April 2000): 439-458.
In 1966, North Korea began a series of raids across the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) dividing the peninsula. These attacks continued for over three years and the U.S. Army treated the area south of the DMZ as a combat zone, awarding combat pay and decorations. At the time, soldiers from the south were fighting in Vietnam and were the second largest contingent of foreigners, behind those of the United States, engaged in combat operations in Southeast Asia. In 1967, despite the North Korean commando raids, South Korean President Park Cung-hee agreed to send a third division to Vietnam. An attack on Park's official residence in February 1968 quickly scuttled that agreement. The attacks continued, however, and in 1969 briefly threatened to become a crisis of the first magnitude, before the North Koreans brought their operations to an end.
George G. Eddy, "The Birth of the Concrete-Piercing Fuze: How the Siegfried Line and Other Formidable Targets Were Breached," The Journal of Military History 64/2 (April 2000): 459-466.
At U.S. Army Chief of Staff George C. Marshall's urging, then Colonel George G. Eddy, Director of the Ordnance Research Center at Aberdeen Proving Ground, Paryland, set to work in the early 1940s to develop a fuze capable of enabling artillery projectiles to penetrate enemy fortifications in depth. As there was no such suitable fuze in inventory and no time to start from scratch with a brand new design, the decision was made to fabricate and test this fuze from existing fuze mechanisms. The objective was to attack successfully with minimum casualties and time, strongly fortified enemy bunkers and facilities, such as the famous Siegfried Line and formidable Japanese emplacements. Under Colonel Eddy's direction and guidance, the powerful concrete-piercing fuze was devised, tested, and demonstrated with such a dramatic effect that Supreme Allied Commander Dwight Eisenhower took a personal interest in its employment in the European Theater of Operations.
Phillip S. Meilinger, "The Historiography of Airpower: Theory and Doctrine," The Journal of Military History 64/2 (April 2000): 467-502.
Airpower theory is a subset of airpower history. Over the past century, there have been hundreds of books and articles written regarding the employment of the new air weapon. The golden age of airpower theory occurred in the decades prior to World War II. Capitalizing on what they saw as the unique characteristics of the airplane, most airmen focused on strategic bombardment. Ironically, this mission achieved its greatest success at the same the atomic bomb seemed to make it irrelevant. In the aftermath of World War II, conventional air operations were largely forgotten. It has only been in the past decade that a combination of factors, such as reduced threat and a desire to reduce casualties, has generated serious literature regarding the use of airpower to achieve national objectives. This essay reviews the most important works dealing with airpower theory that have been written during this first century of flight.