Russell F. Weigley, "The Soldier, the Statesman, and the Military Historian" (The George C. Marshall Lecture in Military History), The Journal of Military History 63/4: 807-22
Civil-military relations in the United States have usually been characterized by exemplary acceptance by the soldier of civilian control exercised by the statesman, notably in the career of General of the Army George C. Marshall. This harmony has declined since the Vietnam War and the end of the Cold War, with the emergence of a growing military restiveness under civilian control and sometimes soldiers' challenges to the statesmen's authority. Seeking to explain the deterioration, the military historian must conclude that despite the apparent harmony of the past, an underlying distrust between the civilian and the military has almost always simmered beneath the surface of U.S. civil-military relations. The soldiers have obeyed, but often they have not felt enough confidence in civilians' judgments to permit genuinely candid discussions of strategy. This essay explores the history of such distrust and suggests desirable changes of attitude for both sides.
William H. Roberts, "'The Name of Ericsson': Political Engineering in the Union Ironclad Program, 1861-1863," The Journal of Military History 63/4: 823-44
The monitor is one of the preeminent symbols of the U.S. Civil War and the monitor myth is one of that war's most dramatic stories. The myth, which stresses John Ericsson's technical brilliance, has a "happy ending": forsaking its earlier skepticism, the Navy built a fleet of monitors and won the war with them. The Monitor's real story is more prosaic, but the U.S. Navy did order an entire fleet of monitors--over fifty coastal and seagoing ironclads based on Ericsson's design. The keys to the Union's decision to build its ironclad fleet to a single revolutionary pattern - to place the country's naval eggs in one Ericsson-designed basket - are found in the nontechnical aspects of the shipbuilding processes rather than in more purely technical realms. Commercial interest collided head-on with consuming national urgency, and the "monitor ring" of Ericsson's colleagues and supporters delayed the Navy's ironclad program by at least two vital months in 1862.
John Ferris, "Fighter Defence Before Fighter Command: The Rise of Strategic Air Defence in Great Britain, 1917-1934," The Journal of Military History 63/4: 845-84
This article traces the development of strategic air defence in Great Britain between 1917 and 1934. It refutes the conventional view that nothing of the sort existed during this period. The article examines the role of strategic air defence within Royal Air Force (RAF) doctrine and policy during the period. It analyses the structure of the British strategic air defence system of the time, and considers the quality of such things as command, control and intelligence, early warning systems, aircraft, and training. It demonstrates that by 1934, the RAF had already developed the world's best strategic air defence system, and that this served as the fundamental basis for the rise of Fighter Command in the later 1930s.
Conrad C. Crane, "Raiding the Beggar's Pantry: The Search for Airpower Strategy in the Korean War," The Journal of Military History 63/4: 885-920
In 1950, U.S. military leaders found themselves engaged in an unexpected drawn-out war of attrition with limited resources and restrictions on bombing the most important targets. The Korean War was the first combat test for the new independent U.S. Air Force and its Strategic Air Command, and the first chance for them to prove that independent airpower could achieve national policy goals. These new organizations would contribute to a series of inter and intraservice disputes over command and control arrangements as well as roles and missions, exacerbated by the frustrations of limited war and limited assets. U.S. leaders feared widening the war to include enemies with atomic weapons, but at the same time the presence of their own nuclear arsenal tempted U.S. decision makers and frightened allies. Airmen struggled with how best to apply their significant firepower not just to contribute on the battlefield with tactical missions that comprised the bulk of their effort, but also to influence difficult negotiations off it with strategic attacks that could directly influence enemy decision makers. This essay focuses on that latter search for a way to end the conflict with airpower.
Edwin L. Dooley, Jr., "Wartime San Juan, Puerto Rico: The Forgotten American Home Front, 1941-1945," The Journal of Military History 63/4: 921-38
As citizens of a Commonwealth of the United States, Puerto Rican citizens served in the land, sea, and air forces of the United States during World War II. Although far from the active front lines of Europe and the Pacific, the island was an important station during the height of German submarine warfare in the Western Atlantic in 1942, and it provided an important base for aircraft flying from the Continental U.S. to Brazil and on to North Africa. The service of Puerto Rican troops, and the sacrifices of its civilians, is little remembered now, however, relegating the island to the position of the forgotten American home front.
Jürgen Rohwer, "Signal Intelligence and World War II: The Unfolding Story," The Journal of Military History 63/4: 939-52
The article covers the development of historical research into the problems of signal intelligence during the Second World War, starting with the revelation of "Magic" during the U.S. congressional investigation of the Pearl Harbor attack, and concentrating on international cooperation in the research on signal intelligence after the opening of the Allied archives concerning the "Enigma/Ultra" decryptions.