Frederick C. Schneid, ``The Dynamics of Defeat: French Army Leadership, December 1812-March 1813,'' Journal of Military History 63/1: 7-28.
On 5 December 1812, Napoleon left the remnants of his army in Rrussia. His absence led to squabbling and rivalry among his lieutenants. The stress of the Rrussian campaign and the realization of its catastrophic consequences exacerbated tensions. While feelings of jealousy and anger surfaced, the leaders also turned to each other for support and comfort in this most dessperate of times. Once the army's leaders had accepted the reality of defeat, a certain level of stoicism could be found in the way the marshals and generals subsequently conducted themselves.
Nikolas Gardner, ``Command and Control in the `Great Retreat' of 1914: The Disintegration of the British Cavalry Division,'' Journal of Military History 63/1: 29-54.
This article examines the operations of the British Cavalry Division during the ``Great Retreat'' of August 1914. It begins with an explanation of the professional ethos, tactical doctrine, and force structure with which the division entered the First World War. The article then assesses the role of the cavalry in the retreat itself. It acknowledges the difficulties inherent in maintaining communications between highly mobile formations, especially in the midst of an unplanned withdrawal. Ultimately, however, it argues that on two occasions, first, on the evening of 25 August, before the battle of Le Cateau, and, second, during the retreat from Le Cateau on 26-27 August, the independent mindset of the cavalry came to the fore among its brigadiers, resulting in the disintegration of the division. Despite the tactical proficiency of the British cavalry, its overall effectiveness was undermined by a profound lack of cohesion at a critical stage of the 1914 campaign.
Albert P. Palazzo, ``The British Army's Counter-Battery Staff Office and Control of the Enemy in World War I,'' Journal of Military History 63/1: 55-74.
On the Western Front the weapon which dominated the operational environment was the artillery. Of the many tasks that this arm undertook, its most important was the control of the enemy's guns, whose firepower could destroy even the most resolute assault. The turning point in the artillery war occurred during the winter of 1916-1917 when the British Army created the Counter-Battery Staff Office. This corps-level agency was responsible for the integration of artillery intelligence with operational planning. The skill of this agency in accomplishing their task led to Britain's attainment of fire superiority and the restoration of infantry mobility. The achievement of the Counter-Battery Staff Office was fundamental to the evolving nature of the British method of waging war and to the understanding of the Allied victory in 1918.
José E. Alvarez, ``Between Gallipoli and D-Day: Alhucemas, 1925,'' Journal of Military History 63/1: 75-98.
The 1912 Treaty of Fez divided Morocco between France in the south and Spain in the north. In 1913 Spanish forces began to occupy and pacify the interior. In the eastern zone of the protectorate, Spanish troops set out from Melilla to occupy the area of the Rif. The ultimate goal was to reach Alhucemas Bay from the land side. Riffian tribesmen attacked the Spanish forces and beseiged them at Annual. With no hope of rescue, the Spanish fled back toward Melilla, but most were easily slaughtered by the Riffians in the worst colonial military defeat for a European power in the twentieth century. The disaster led to the fall of the Spanish government and to General Miguel Primo de Rivera's coup in 1923.
Spanish efforts to avenge this defeat and to suppress the Rif Rebellion (1921-27) began with a new strategy of falling back to defensive positions in the west and carrying out an amphibious landing at Alhucemas Bay, which would strike at the heart of Abd-el-Krim's tribal homeland. Spanish planners sought to avoid the pitfalls that had doomed the Allies at Gallipoli during World War I. The September 1925 landings were not made within Alhucemas Bay, as the Riffians expected, but at nearby beaches. Using British-built landing craft, the invasion force was able to land, establish beachheads, and break out, defeating the Riffians within a few weeks of bloody, hand-to-hand fighting. It was the beginning of the end for the ``Rif Republic.'' The successful operation proved that with proper preparation (planning and reconnaissance) and overwhelming firepowe/bombardment, an invading force could successfully disembark on a hostile shore. Alhucemas bridged the gap between the disaster of Gallipoli and the success at Normandy.
Jay Howard Geller, ``The Role of Military Administration in German-occupied Belgium, 1940-1944,'' Journal of Military History 63/1: 99-125.
After conquering the Low Countries in May 1940, the Wehrmacht assumed new, non-martial duties in Belgium. An occupation government under General Alexander von Falkenhausen and Eggert Reeder was charged with the administration of this conquered land. They tried to foment collaboration among the ethnically divided Belgians in an attempt to alleviate the burden of administration and to win additional allies for the war effort. At the same time, the Military Administration of Belgium struggled to ensure its own survival. SS leader Heinrich Himmler considered Belgium a viable testing ground for Nazi racial ideology and agitated for SS control of the country, achieving this goal in mid-1944.
Paul Wanke, ``American Military Psychiatry and Its Role among Ground Forces in World War II,'' Journal of Military History 63/1: 127-146.
This essay examines the historical development of American military psychiatry from World War I to the aftermath of World War II. The primary sources for the information are military and civilian psychiatric and medical journals, memoirs, and bulletins. The essay states that American military psychiatry was largely ignored during the interwar years despite excellent work during World War I. In fact many of the lessons learned in World War I had to be relearned during World War II, especially regarding the treatment of neuropsychiatric casualties. But through hard work, American military psychiatry established itself as a worthwhile member of the conventional medical establishment through its successes with psychological screening and treatment. Some of the treatments pioneered during World War II, such as drug and group therapy, are still used extensively today. Despite these achievements, American military psychiatry was still unable to answer basic questions such as the etiology of mental illness during wartime and whether any soldier will be able to withstand the psychological pressure of modern combat.
David Syrett, "The British Armed Forces in the American Revolutionary War: Publications, 1875-1998," Journal of Military History, 63/1: 147-164.
This essay is on the historiography of the British armed forces during the American Revolutionary War. This essay surveys every historical work concerning the British armed forces, in all major theaters of the war-America, Europe, the West Indies, and India-published between 1875 and the present. The works covered in this essay include not only operational histories, but also biographies of leading British admirals and generals, administrative histories as well as works of reference and all major collections of printed documents concerning the British military effort during the years 1775 and 1783. In short, every major work published in the last 120 years concerning the British military forces during the American Revolutionary War is cited and evaluated in this essay.
Joseph G. Dawson, III, ``Civil War Soldiers and Leaders: A Glatthaar Trio,'' Journal of Military History 63/1: 165-168.