

Presidential Valedictory Address

**“A Creative and Responsible Art”:
Some Thoughts on the State of Military History**

By

Gregory J. W. Urwin

Professor of History, Temple University

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On May 30, 1945 – less than a month after the surrender of Germany’s once-invincible *Wehrmacht* – Lieutenant General Lucian K. Truscott, Jr., the commander of the U.S. Fifth Army, returned to Anzio to deliver a Memorial Day address at the temporary cemetery containing nearly 20,000 Americans killed in the fighting that had raged in Sicily and on the Italian peninsula south of Rome in 1943-44.

The organizers of the day’s commemorative activities could not have found a more distinguished or appropriate speaker. Many of the men lying under the rows of whitewashed crosses and Stars of David overlooking the Italian seaside had fought and died under Truscott’s command. The gravel-voiced former cavalryman had led the U.S. 3rd Infantry Division throughout the Sicilian Campaign and then into Italy, performing with such steadiness and élan that many came to regard him as the best division commander in the U.S. Army. After the timidity and indecisiveness of another American general got the U.S. VI Corps trapped in a cramped beachhead at Anzio, Truscott received the unenviable task of replacing his former superior and breaking through the encircling Germans. A general who loved his troops and made a point of visiting the front, Truscott soon whipped VI Corps back into fighting shape, shattered the German lines, and drove to Rome. He and VI Corps left Italy shortly thereafter to participate in the invasion of southern France. Truscott performed so well in that operation that General George C. Marshall, the U.S. Army’s chief of staff, asked him to go back to Italy to take charge of the Fifth Army. Truscott spent the rest of the European war hammering German forces northward toward the shadows of the Alps.

When Truscott and his staff reached Anzio for the 1945 Memorial Day observances, they briefly toured the beachhead, reliving the battles that had occurred

there like proper military professionals. Then they drove over to the cemetery at the little coastal town of Nettuno, which they reached by 11:30 A.M. A speaker's platform covered with red, white, and blue bunting stood in front of the ranked graves that extended for many acres behind it.

After the opening ceremonies, General Truscott got to his feet. The assemblage seated before him included a number of VIPs – among them members of the U.S. Senate Armed Force Committee eager to hear what a proven American hero would have to say in this hour of victory. When General Truscott reached the podium, he executed a sharp about face, turning his back on the living, and addressed his remarks to the dead. Instead of a stream of congratulatory platitudes, Truscott began by apologizing to all the fallen soldiers for their presence in that place. According to an impressed Bill Mauldin, who witnessed this incredible scene, the general said that “everybody tells leaders it is not their fault that men get killed in war, but that every leader knows in his heart that is not altogether true.” He then appealed for forgiveness from any man who had been interred at Nettuno due to his mistakes. Truscott added that he would not speak about the “glorious dead” because he saw no glory in getting killed in your late teens or early twenties. He also promised that if he encountered anyone who saw something glorious about death in battle – especially men too old to fight – he would set them straight.¹

I had long known that World War 2 historians rated Truscott as a great soldier, but his 1945 Memorial Day address will cause me to forever regard him as a great man. Despite his capacity for decisive action, this was a commander who never forgot what war cost. He excelled at a devilish business, but still managed to retain his humanity – and also an admirable streak of humility.

When one has to read lots of scholarly military history as part of his daily business, little time remains for wallowing in sentiment. We military historians take it as a given that war, as Major General William Tecumseh Sherman observed, “is simply power unrestrained by constitution or compact.”² Every so often, however, something cuts through our academic detachment and drives home the reality of the catalogue of horrors on which we focus our professional attention. Few things have moved me more than this story about Truscott, which I came across in Wilson A. Heefner’s excellent 2010 biography, *Dogface Soldier*. Although five years have passed since I reviewed Heefner’s book, I find it hard to share this anecdote with others without getting emotional.³

I opened my remarks this evening with Truscott’s unconventional Memorial Day address not merely for its dramatic effect, but because I think it speaks directly to the sort of work we do as military historians. Just as the general must have visualized the faces of thousands of young GIs that he sent into battle among the grave memorials at Nettuno, this story conjures up memories of the eager, fresh-faced Army ROTC cadets that I have helped educate over the past thirty-three years – some of whom have gone to war and returned in flag-draped caskets or missing one or more limbs. Like Truscott, I accept that the cause for which these young men and women fell – national security – was worthy of their sacrifice. At the same time, I hope that nothing I have ever said in the classroom or on the printed page indicts me for teaching – as the British World War I poet, Wilfred Owen – put it:

. . . with such high zest

To children ardent for some desperate glory,

The old Lie: Dulce et decorum est

Pro patria mori.⁴

Last summer while on a research trip to England, I received an invitation from Major General E. A. Smyth-Osbourne, CBE, the General Officer Commanding London District and Major General Commanding the Household Division, to attend a special service commemorating the seventieth anniversary of the destruction of the Guards' Chapel at London's Wellington Barracks. There I heard something that bears directly on what I am trying to say tonight.⁵

The event in question happened on a Sunday – June 18, 1944 – nearly two weeks after the most famous of World War 2's numerous D-Days. The Guards' Chapel held about 250 worshippers in attendance for the weekly Anglican service. Most of the congregation consisted of Britons – soldiers and civilians who had survived five years of war, including the shock of early defeat, the perils of the Blitz, and the mounting tide of dearly purchased victories in the Mediterranean – all doubtlessly grateful that they had lived to see Operation OVERLORD, the beginning of the end. Then at 11:01 A.M., a German V1 flying bomb struck the chapel roof right after the choir had sung this part of the *Te Deum*:

When thou hadst overcome the sharpness of death:

Thou didst open the kingdom of heaven to all believers.

Thou sittest at the right hand of God; in the glory of the Father.

We believe that thou shalt come, to be our Judge.

At that moment, judgment struck. The resulting explosion simultaneously silenced and fulfilled the next four lines of that venerable prayer:

We therefore pray thee, help thy servants;
Whom thou hast redeemed with thy precious blood.
Make them to be numbered with thy Saints;
In glory everlasting.

The chapel roof collapsed, killing 119 people and seriously injuring 102 more.⁶

I found the seventieth anniversary commemoration of this catastrophe, which was held last June 22 in the reconstructed Guards' Chapel, tremendously solemn and moving. It featured all the pomp and ceremony at which the British Army excels, with exquisite musical accompaniment from the Chapel Choir and the regimental band of the Coldstream Guards. Following a series of hymns, prayers, and readings, the Right Reverend and Right Honorable Richard Chartres, the Lord Bishop of London, delivered a sermon that offered some thoughts I shall never forget.

“We cannot change the past,” the bishop declared, “but we are responsible for how we remember it. Memory is more than lifting down a file from a shelf to recall a past event. Memory is a creative and responsible art which involves highlighting certain aspects of the past and identifying significant resonances. Memory informs our attitudes in the present and opens up or closes down possibilities for the future.”⁷

Bishop Chartres' words should resonate within all branches of the historical profession, but I think they apply especially to military historians. Although we are schooled in the same academic standards as social, cultural, gender, political, diplomatic, and institutional historians, we must never fall into the trap of thinking that our work is purely academic. It has a practical application by figuring prominently in the education of military officers – men and women who are trained to make life-and-death decisions. And because our teaching and research can impact on such a deadly trade – one that can decide the fate of countless individuals and entire nations – it must be as good as we can make it. Hence, any society dedicated to advancing the study of military history must make its first priority the maintenance of scholarly rigor. Too much rides on the output of our members to risk lowering our guard and degenerating into a mutual admiration society.

Some of you may think that my remarks pertain only to the considerable number of people in this room who teach at professional military education (or PME) institutions – military academies, staff colleges, war colleges, and the like – but I ask you to think again. I daresay there are few if any historians present who do not belong to the military educational establishment. It makes no difference if you teach in a small liberal arts college run by a peace-loving religious community, or if you work at a state-sponsored or independent research university, or if you are an independent scholar operating in the solitude of your study. If ROTC cadets attend any of your military history classes, if you lead staff rides for future or serving officers, if you have ever delivered a guest lecture at a PME institution, or if anything you have ever published has assisted in the creation and development of military professionals – then you are a member of the military

educational establishment. This is a bond that joins us all regardless of where we may each earn our bread. It makes us colleagues in more ways than many of us may have suspected.⁸

Because of the utility of military history in training those we send to make war, there are some in academe who still insist on equating military historians with warmongers. They exhibit the same attitude toward those who serve in uniform. To such narrow minds, I respond with the words of Bishop Chartres. “We are alive to the horrors of war,” he declared, “and indeed in my experience of those who have seen action on the battle field, they are often much less belligerent than armchair warriors because they know the cost and the chaos of war at first hand.”⁹ I believe the same is true of military historians. Indeed, among the world of cranky intellectuals, this is a remarkably non-belligerent bunch. A major reason why the Society for Military History has thrived over the last few decades is because this is such a welcoming and friendly organization. I cannot tell you the number of colleagues who have confided to me how much they prefer our company to the decidedly hostile or uncaring atmosphere that prevails at some other professional meetings.

As for our being warmongers, I have yet to hear a military historian state, “Boy, I sure wish I had a new war to study.” We focus on war because it has always been a prominent human activity, and that, unfortunately, shows no sign of abating. Those academics who think that we can understand humanity or make the world a safer place by banning military history from the curriculum are as realistic as those well-intentioned folks who think you can safeguard public morality by ignoring the existence of sex. (As the product of a Catholic education in the 1960s and 1970s, I can testify to the futility of

the latter experiment.) War remains a common means by which our flawed species continues to transact business, and we ignore that and its consequences at our peril.

If I may reveal a personal prejudice, I enjoy spending time in the company of military historians because they tend to be realists. They know that the study of war and military institutions contributes to our understanding of human nature. And I would argue that we should not hang our heads because armies, navies, and air forces take so much of their guidance from military history. As long as we live in a world where nations and non-state actors resort to violence to advance their goals, then responsible governments must maintain militaries that are capable of either deterring aggression or winning wars as quickly and economically as possible. Once again, I quote Bishop Chartres: “Civilizations die in the night when no one can be found to give their lives for them.”¹⁰

At the same time, we bear a responsibility to testify to the fact that war is an evil, no matter how necessary it may be at certain points in time. Our analyses of strategy, tactics, technology, and human motivation must also acknowledge the imperfection of war as a tool for settling human differences by not forgetting the price it exacts in lives lost and economic resources squandered – along with the enduring sense of loss and the interlocking circles of grief that attend a single wartime death. Every act of combat leaves an enduring wound among those who fight our wars and those who love the fighters.¹¹

Even those participants who emerge from war physically unscathed and mentally sound often feel like they have wasted the best years of their lives. This became apparent to me as I researched the U.S. Marines, sailors, soldiers, and civilians captured by the

Imperial Japanese Navy at Wake Island on December 23, 1941. Marine Corporal Henry L. Durrwachter of the Wake Island Detachment, 1st Defense Battalion, spent only sixteen days of World War 2 in combat, but on November 11, 1944, he penned these lines in his diary while languishing in a prison camp in Japan: “As long as there is a man left in this world to disagree with his neighbor there will be war. War may be romantic to read about but this phase of it is not and no matter how you look at it it will never change its appearance to me. When you are in a country where you are not understood and can’t understand the people it makes it twice as hard to bear.”¹²

Candor about the cost of war is the best way I know to help our fellow citizens decide when a resort to arms is wise or foolhardy. At the very least, some familiarity with military history should teach them to be leery of those politicians who glibly promise to lead them into a conflict that will be quick and relatively inexpensive. In other words, an appreciation for military history not only instructs those who fight wars, but it can also help teach citizens to recognize when war should be avoided. An awareness of the limitations of armed force is a form of enlightenment that continues to elude too many states and ethnic or religious groups. That is especially vital to this nation, whose status as a leading military power has too often tempted its people to view war as a panacea. Few professionals are better qualified to explain the dangers of war than military historians.¹³

If I may be permitted to deviate briefly from pronouncing somber injunctions, I would like to say that we are fortunate to be living in the golden age of military history. No academic discipline can ever stand still or exist in isolation, but it is nothing less than awe-inspiring to see how far our sub-field has come over the past forty years. Is there

any other branch of our profession that has exhibited greater creativity, a keener desire to engage with other sub-fields, or more success at adapting their methodologies? Look at the first four winners of our Coffman Prize, and you see young scholars who have made major contributions to environmental history, transnational history, gender studies, and diplomatic history.¹⁴ The same cutting-edge sensitivity characterizes so many of the articles from the *Journal of Military History* that are singled out for the Moncado Prize and also the picks for our Distinguished Book Awards. The Society for Military History continues to reach out to other corners of our discipline with the presidential panels that augment the already impressive diversity offered routinely by the conference schedule at our annual meetings. At the same time, non-military historians have discovered that our research and much of the documentation that we utilize enrich their own work. Records kept by military organizations and their members have made ideal fodder for students of environmental change, social development, and gender norms – to name just a few categories. The SMH's admission to the American Council of Learned Societies and our newly forged alliance with the National Endowment for the Humanities are but two landmarks along the winding road military history has followed on its return to the academic mainstream.¹⁵

The academy could not have chosen a more opportune time to bring military history in from the cold. These are perilous days for the liberal arts. Government support for higher education continues to shrink and contemplated budget cuts may endanger the jobs of those historians who toil for various military establishments. America's recent recession stunted the growth of civilian history departments, many of which have lost ground when denied authorization to replace retirees and colleagues claimed by other

forms of attrition. Persisting economic uncertainty and the escalating cost of higher education disposes more and more students to choose majors they think will lead to lucrative careers. That leaves liberal arts departments competing for a shrinking pool of students – each department all too aware that a precipitate decline in the number of its majors could lead administrators to let it wither rather than help it grow.

Under the circumstances, it would well behoove history department chairs, deans, and other administrators who recognize the value of our discipline to remember the popularity of military history. From the days of Herodotus and Thucydides, military history has attracted a wide and enthusiastic audience. That interest persists to this day and can be readily observed in colleges and universities. Courses about wars and military affairs regularly draw large enrollments, including a substantial walk-on traffic composed of non-history majors and minors. This popularity has long baffled non-military historians and attracted the scorn of those who view military history as simply a vulgar form of entertainment. They need to grasp, however, that our sub-field – as practiced today – constitutes an ideal gateway to the historical discipline. While military courses boost enrollments, they also introduce students to the wide array of methodologies practiced by the rest of the historical profession. If the liberal arts are to survive in today's academic climate, its leaders must – dare I say it? – think strategically, make a shrewd use of military history, and hire more military historians. Unlike some of the other plans being proposed to preserve the liberal arts in higher education, this one would not result in an erosion of academic standards. It would merely remind receptive students of all they have to gain from studying history.

As we all know, even when a professional historian turns celebratory, there is no disengaging one's critical acuity. In February 1933, British Major General Archibald P. Wavell, who would become the scourge of the Italian Army in North and East Africa in the early part of World War 2, delivered a memorable lecture on "Training the Army for War" at the Royal United Services Institute. "The ideal officer," Wavell told a rapt audience, "must be afraid of nothing – not even of a new idea."¹⁶ The same is equally true for the conscientious historian. One of the most exciting things about our trade is that there is always something new to learn, and there is always room for new ways to look at what we study.

In that spirit I venture to share this thought. As much as I revel in all the wonderful work that members of this society produce, I fear that military history as a whole remains too officer-centric. Although officers compose a distinct minority among military forces, their thoughts and actions attract a disproportionate amount of attention from those of our ilk.

This is understandable. The hierarchical nature of military institutions means that officers tend to dominate how they train and operate. I cannot quarrel with Napoleon's dictum: "An army is nothing without a head."¹⁷ Officers also exert a greater influence over how military history is written than the other ranks. They are the ones who generate the official reports, after all, that often form the first draft of what we write. In earlier times, when the majority of the rank and file was illiterate, the command echelons produced most of the testimony that tells us what we know about war and military life during those eras. Today, with so many of us employed by institutions dedicated to educating the officer corps, it is only natural that our work should emphasize leadership.

This tendency is reinforced by the fact that so many military historians are serving or retired officers. Even those of us who are lifelong civilians may tend to identify more with the educated elites who lead armies as opposed to the common sort who serve under them.

While I have no intention of advocating a casteless or classless school of military history, I cannot go along with Napoleon's self-serving affirmation: "In war men are nothing; one man is everything. The presence of the general is indispensable. He is the head, the whole of an army. It was not the Roman army that subdued Gaul, but Caesar; not the Carthaginian army that caused the republic to tremble at the gates of Rome, but Hannibal; not the Macedonian army that reached the Indus, but Alexander; not the French army that carried the war to the Weser and the Inn, but Turenne; and not the Prussian army that defended Prussia for seven years against the three greatest powers of Europe, but Frederick the Great."¹⁸

That kind of thinking – and the sort of military history it inspires – reminds me of official institutional histories commissioned by colleges and universities. I am sure that most of you are familiar with the genre – upbeat accounts of the inspired leadership and wise decisions made by presidents, provosts, other administrators, and boards of trustees. Such chronicles have their place. There is no doubt they tell us important things about their respective institutions and how they evolved. Nevertheless, they hardly present the full picture. What of the daily interaction in the classroom between faculty and students where arguably the most vital work of higher education occurs? What of relationships forged in dormitories or off-campus bars where students often learn more about themselves and others than they ever absorbed in a lecture hall or while writing a

research paper? How about the ways faculty and other entrenched interests find to retard a new administration's initiatives, either causing modifications through friction or waiting out presidents, provosts, and deans until those leaders are relieved or retire? This kind of bottom-up history – messier, less coherent, and requiring much more extensive research – is just as valid as the traditional model. It does not produce narratives that flatter administrators' vanity or induce wealthy donors to make generous contributions, but it does provide a more balanced and accurate picture.

Now, I would not have devoted the last two years of my life to serving as your president if I thought leadership was unimportant, but my time in office has reinforced a conviction that stemmed originally from my own research – which asserts that officers can lead only as far as their troops are willing to follow.

There are many present who have written eloquently and persuasively on the history of the common soldier. They have revealed what motivates men and women to enlist, how well they adapt to military life, what keeps them on the firing line in battle, and how they are marked psychologically by the cauldron of combat. The testimony of the lower ranks and junior officers can also inform us considerably regarding the nature of leadership.¹⁹

That is the chief thing I learned from my first and admittedly flawed book, *Custer Victorious: The Civil War Battles of General George Armstrong Custer*. While few people today credit Custer with much military ability, the Northern troopers placed under his command between 1863 and 1865 idolized him. On July 9, 1863, just ten days after the twenty-three-year-old “Boy General” took command of the Michigan Cavalry Brigade and six days after he led it to victory at Gettysburg, a sergeant in the 7th

Michigan Cavalry penned this tribute: “He is a glorious fellow, full of energy, quick to plan and bold to execute, and with us has never failed in any attempt he has yet made.”²⁰ One week later, a French-Canadian private from the 5th Michigan Cavalry described his brigadier’s performance in action against a Confederate rear guard on July 14: “General Koster . . . commanded in person and I saw him plunge his saber into the belly of a rebel who was trying to kill him. You can guess how bravely soldiers fight for such a general.”²¹ Nearly a year later and well into Lieutenant General Ulysses S. Grant’s bloody Overland Campaign, Custer continued to elicit the same degree of confidence from his subordinates. As the twenty-four-year-old major of the 6th Michigan Cavalry assured his parents: “For all that this Brigade has accomplished all praise is due to Gen Custer[.] So brave a man I never saw and as Competent as brave. Under him a man is ashamed to be Cowardly. Under him our men can achieve wonders.”²²

It is easy to admire officers who are dashing, charismatic, and popular. One of the Marines I interviewed for my books on Wake Island spoke fondly nearly forty years later of his universally beloved battery commander, Captain Wesley McCoy Platt: “Hell, we would have died for him – still feel that way about him.”²³ Another old Leatherneck explained how he and his comrades would have reacted had Platt ordered them to charge hell with buckets of water: “If he was going to charge hell, we would argue about who was going to carry his bucket.”²⁴

At the same time, my Wake Island research has taught me that effective leadership does not necessarily hinge on popularity. It can also be exerted by detested martinets – if those they lead believe that such superiors know their business. And as much as we may admire those who lead from the front – the first person to stand up under

fire to shout “Follow me!” – it often takes a shove from behind to make troops face the jaws of death. This is the kind of insight you glean from sources other than officers – who are often protective of their units’ reputations or unaware of everything that happens within their commands.²⁵

Early on December 11, 1941, a Japanese flotilla spearheaded by three light cruisers and six destroyers attempted to effect an amphibious landing along Wake’s southern shore. With two of the garrison’s coastal batteries having lost their range finders to enemy air raids, Major James P. S. Devereux ordered his six 5-inch guns to hold their fire, waiting until the enemy closed to 4,500 yards, or pointblank range for that type of ordnance. This imposed a terrific strain on the Marine gunners. “Just standing there,” recalled one corporal, “waiting, waiting, and waiting, was nerve-racking.” At the first salvo from the enemy ships, one Leatherneck manning a 5-incher exclaimed, “We can’t fight that!” Platoon Sergeant William D. Beck promptly squelched the onset of panic by drawing his .45 automatic and vowing: “First man that leaves this gun I’ll shoot.”²⁶

When the Japanese finally landed on Wake twelve days later, an outnumbered group of Marine artillerymen, machine gunners, and searchlight operators fighting as infantry, assisted by some unarmed civilian Contractors, launched a counterattack that wiped out half of a Special Naval Landing Force company. A major part of the motivation for that successful offensive came from a burly Marine warrant officer who followed slightly behind a skirmish line with drawn .45 shouting in a bull voice, “Come on, move forward. Move forward or I’ll shoot you in the ass.”²⁷

There has been some illuminating work done on this strange alchemy of military leadership and followership, but I think that this topic that can still yield rich insights – and those who still cling to the embattled concept of the “strategic corporal” may find such research increasingly fruitful.²⁸

Judging from the sermon-like nature of this address, it will probably surprise few of you to learn that I spent seven years of my youth studying for the Roman Catholic priesthood. Fortunately for a Church that has experienced tremendous troubles during my lifetime, I ended up pursuing a different vocation. I still feel, however, that there is something holy in the work we do, especially when we do it well. We are the gatekeepers, the mentors, and the prophets who strive to save a heedless world bent on marching to folly. We may not agree on what constitutes objective truth, but our efforts to come as close to it as we can generate inner rewards – and sometimes they succeed in serving the common good. That is not a bad cause to make the purpose of your life.

Before I relinquish this podium, I wish to thank you for the privilege of serving as your president. In keeping with my previously stated views on the nature of leadership, I gladly acknowledge all the support I have received – sometimes in the form of friction – from the SMH Council, our paid employees, the many volunteers who chair and staff our long list of committees, and all other Society members who have taken the time to send me their suggestions and complaints. The Society for Military History owes much to those who have come before us and those who invest themselves in its current success. Through my dealings with our newest members, I have seen enough of them exhibit sufficient intelligence and commitment to ensure this precious organization will continue to grow and prosper. With my return to the ranks, I will watch these developments with

great interest, and I also hope to be of some little assistance to those who shoulder the burden of leading us in the coming years.

Notes

¹ Wilson A. Heefner, *Dogface Soldier: The Life of Lucian K. Truscott, Jr.* (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 2010), 97-241, 246; Bill Mauldin, *The Brass Ring: A Sort of Memoir* (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, Inc., 1971), 272.

² Quoted in John F. Marszalek, *Sherman: A Soldier's Passion for Order* (New York: Vintage Books, 1994), 251.

³ I am pleased that the Campaigns and Commanders Series that I edit has just released another Truscott biography – Harvey Ferguson, *The Last Cavalryman: The Life of General Lucian K. Truscott, Jr.* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2015).

⁴ Wilfred Owen, “Dulce Et Decorum Est,” in *The Collected Poems of Wilfred Owen*, ed. C. Day Lewis (New York: New Directions, 1963), 55. A major academic who composed eloquent warnings against the sanctification of war was Paul Fussell, a World War II veteran. See Fussell’s classic books, *The Great War and Modern Memory* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1975), *Wartime: Understanding and Behavior in the Second World War* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989), and *The Boys’ Crusade: The American Infantry in Northwestern Europe, 1944-1945* (New York: Modern Library, 2003), and also “Obituary: Paul Fussell,” *The Economist*, June 9, 2012, p. 86.

⁵ I am grateful to Colonel Hugh Boscawen, Coldstream Guards (ret.), for asking General Smyth-Osbourne to invite me to this awe-inspiring commemoration.

⁶ *A Commemoration upon the Seventieth Anniversary of the Destruction of the Royal Military Chapel (The Guards’ Chapel), Wellington Barracks, London, Sunday, 22 June 2014* (London: Friends of the Guards’ Chapel, 2014): 2-3, 11, 16-20.

⁷ Right Reverend and Right Honorable Richard Chartres, Lord Bishop of London, “Guards Chapel. 22-vi-2014,” 1-2 (copy in author’s possession). The author is grateful to Bishop Chartres and the latter’s personal secretary and assistant, Janet Laws, for sending him a copy of this sermon.

⁸ Convenient evidence of the common values and standards that bind both government historians and those employed in civilian institutions can be found in *Military History Operations, ATP 1-20* (Washington, D.C.: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 2014).

⁹ Chartres, “Guards Chapel,” 2-3.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, 2.

¹¹ Two books that illustrate how wartime deaths set off ripples of grief that can wash over the relatives of fallen soldiers and descendants who never knew the fallen are Bob Korkuc, *Finding a Fallen Hero: The Death of a Ball Turret Gunner* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2008) and Kathleen Broome Williams, *The Measure of a Man: My Father, the Marine Corps, and Saipan* (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2013).

¹² Henry L. Durrwachter, “Diary,” November 11, 1944, General Libraries, University of Texas at Austin, Austin, Texas.

¹³ The classic expression of this theme remains Andrew J. Bacevich, *The New American Militarism: How Americans Are Seduced by War* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005). Colonel Clark H. Summers, U.S. Army Reserve (ret.), expressed these ideas more succinctly in a fairly recent letter to the editor: “Addressing the growing civil-military divide in our country is better addressed by ensuring that

America's academic institutions are teaching and preparing the broadest possible range of students to understand and appreciate the strengths, limits and weaknesses of military service as an expression of civic virtue." *Wall Street Journal*, September 8, 2014.

¹⁴ The winners of the Edward M. Coffman Prize for First Manuscript prior to the Society for Military History's 82nd Annual Meeting include Kathryn S. Meier, University of Scranton, "The Seasoned Soldier: Coping with the Environment in Civil War Virginia" (2011); Lien-Hang T. Nguyen, University of Kentucky, "Hanoi's War: An International History of the War for Peace in Vietnam" (2012); Brian K. Feltman, Georgia Southern University, "Confronting the Stigma of Surrender: German Prisoners, British Captors, and Manhood in the Great War & Beyond" (2013); Ellen Tillman, Texas State University, San Marcos "Dollar Diplomacy by Force: U.S. Military Experimentation and Occupation in the Dominican Republic, 1900-1924" (2014), "The Society for Military History First Manuscript Prize," The Society for Military History: The Intellectual Home for Military Historians Worldwide, <http://www.smh-hq.org/awards/coffman.html> (accessed August 4, 2014).

¹⁵ This argument is presented with even greater eloquence and authority by Tami Davis Biddle and Robert M. Citino, *The Role of Military History in the Contemporary Academy*. A Society for Military History White Paper (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Advantage Printing, 2015).

¹⁶ Quoted in Harold E. Raugh, Jr., *Wavell in the Middle East, 1939-1941: A Study in Generalship* (1993; reprint ed., Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2012), 29.

¹⁷ Quoted in J. F. C. Fuller, *The Foundations of the Science of War* (London: Hutchinson, 1926), 125.

¹⁸ Jay Luvaas, ed., *Napoleon on the Art of War* (New York: Free Press, 1999), 61-62.

¹⁹ One pioneering work that reveals military leadership can often be a two-way street is Joseph T. Glatthaar, *Forged in Battle: The Civil War Alliance of Black Soldiers and White Officers* (New York: Free Press, 1990). Edward J. Coss, *All for the King's Shilling: The British Soldier under Wellington, 1808-1814* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2010) argues persuasively that the British Redcoats who bested Napoleon's finest in the Iberian Peninsula owed much of their success to their small group cohesion.

²⁰ Edwin R. Havens to "Dear Father, Mother, & Nell," July 9, 1863, Edwin R. Havens Papers, Historical Collections, University Archives, Michigan State University, East Lansing, Michigan.

²¹ Victor E. Comte to Elsie Comte, July 16, 1863, Victor E. Comte Papers, Michigan Historical Collections, Bentley Historical Library, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, Michigan.

²² James Harvey Kidd to "Dear Father & Mother," June 3, 1864, James Harvey Kidd Papers, Michigan Historical Collections, Bentley Historical Library.

²³ Erwin D. Pistole, interview by author, June 21, 1980.

²⁴ Henry H. W. Chapman, interview by author, February 20, 1982.

²⁵ A prime example of the successful martinet is Major James P. S. Devereux, the commander of the Wake Island Detachment, 1st Defense Battalion, U.S. Marine Corps, who distinguished himself in the atoll's defense in December 1941 and whose actions over the next three-and-a-half years contributed substantially to the survival of a high percentage of his Leathernecks in Japanese prison camps. The American press celebrated him as the hero of Wake, but his men remembered him as "Just Plain Shit" Devereux. For full accounts of Devereux's leadership style see Gregory J. W. Urwin, *Facing Fearful Odds: The Siege of Wake Island* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1997) and Gregory J. W. Urwin, *Victory in Defeat: The Wake Island Defenders in Captivity, 1941-1945* (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2010).

²⁶ Bernard E. Richardson, taped reply to author's questionnaire, October 31, 1986; Chapman Interview. See also Urwin, *Facing Fearful Odds*, 316-31.

²⁷ John Toland, *But Not in Shame: The Six Months after Pearl Harbor* (New York: Random House, 1961), 112-13; Wiley W. Sloman, taped reply to author's questionnaire, June 24, 1986; James D. Darden III, *Guests of the Emperor: The Story of Dick Darden* (Clinton, NC: Greenhouse Press, 1990), 140; Urwin, *Facing Fearful Odds*, 455-71.

²⁸ For more on the strategic corporal concept, see Charles Krulak, "The Strategic Corporal: Leadership in the Three Block War," in *Marine Corps Gazette*, 83 (January 1999), 18-23; Vincent J Curtis, "The Three Block War: Its Causes and the Shape of the Peace," *Canadian Army Journal*, 10 2 (Summer 2007): 49-65; A. Walter Dorn and Michael Varey, "The Rise and Demise of the 'Three Block War,'" *Canadian Military Journal*, 10 (2009): 38-45.